

Anti-Communist Struggles of the Chinese Minority Peoples

By Li Chiu-yi

In their so-called "nationality policy" toward the minority peoples of frontier areas, the Chinese Communists proclaim that "all the nationalities of China are equal. They live in unity, help each other, oppose imperialism and the people's common enemies." They say the country have been made into "a big family in which all the nationalities love and cooperate with each other, while opposing ultra-nationalism and provincial nationalism, and forbidding discrimination, oppression and division among the various nationalities." In actuality, they have tried to make use of nationalism to destroy it. They have also used socialist and internationalist ideology in their attempts to destroy nationalistic feeling. In their work among the minority peoples of frontier areas, the Chinese Communists have used the "minority peoples autonomy" as a basic method for solving problems concerning the minority peoples and carried out "social reform" in the "autonomous regions of the minority peoples" in an attempt to destroy the social organization and leadership of the frontier areas completely, and establish Peiping's rule and tighten its control over these areas.

The "minority peoples autonomous regions" can be divided into three categories: The first one has a minority group that does not constitute an

area majority; the second one has a minority group who constitute a majority; and the third one has several minority groups. The Chinese Communists have set up administrative units of various levels in the "autonomous regions" and cultivated "cadres among the minority peoples" to carry out their policy of "using the minority peoples to govern the minority peoples."

Social reform is one of the Chinese Communist methods of changing the habits of life, social relationships and religious faiths of the minority peoples and thus destroying their national consciousness. It is divided into "democratic reform" and "socialist reform". The "democratic reform" was designed to confiscate the land of landlords (or masters, of slaves) and liberate the slaves to revoke the political privileges of the exploiting class and to abolish high interest rates. The "socialist reform" was directed at the various lines of business such as agriculture, animal husbandry, industry and commerce.

The Chinese Communists have pretended to use "peaceful consultation" and they have ingratiated themselves with the upper class of the minority peoples so as to obtain their support. In spite of the Communist use of these subtle methods to carry out their

“democratic reform” and “socialist reform”, the minority peoples of frontier areas have remained staunchly anti-Communist. In fact, this anti-Communism has spread to the point that it seriously affects the stability of the frontier areas.

I. The Minority Strength Against Communism

The anti-Communist activities of the frontier area minority peoples began when the Communists sent troops to oppress them.

This situation can be attributed to Peiping's tyrannical rule in border areas as well as these three basic factors:

(1) Contradictions among the different nationalities—To tighten their control over the border areas, the Chinese Communists carried out the principle of “divide and rule.” They divided the minority peoples into more than 900 ethnic groups at first but later combined them into more than 40 groups. In 1958, they proclaimed that there were altogether 50 ethnic groups in the border areas of China. After dividing these minority peoples, the Chinese Reds sent large groups of cadres to the border areas, thus creating dissension among the different nationalities. This dissension was characterized by the opposition between the Hans and the “provincial nationalists” and between the big and small ethnic groups. For instance, in dealing with the Hans, the Tung people take the stance of “provincial nationalism” to exclude the Chinese Communists. But in dealing with other small ethnic groups, they regard themselves as a big people. Such contradictions are prevalent among the minority peoples of frontier areas and have constituted a broad anti-Communist basis.

(2) Religious dissension—The Chinese Communists began their religious oppression in 1950. In that year they

launched the “three-self movement” against the Christians. Subsequently, tens of thousands of Christians were persecuted and butchered. Most of the minority peoples of the frontier areas embrace Buddhism, Lamaism and Islam. Ten ethnic groups, including the Uighurs, Kazakhs and Turkis, embrace Islam. These groups include more than 10 million people and constitute a majority among the minority peoples. In July, 1952, the Chinese Communists established the “Chinese Islamic Association” as a means of persecuting the Moslems. They killed Moslem leaders and expelled many Moslem people. Therefore, since 1952, the Turkis people's resistance to Communism has steadily increased. To resist the Communist “divide and rule” policy by asserting that the Turkis people and Islam are two different things”, the Turkis advocated that “Turkic and Islam are identical.” At the same time, to obstruct the Communist leadership, the Turkic people declared that they cared only for religious affairs, not national matters, and that religious interests were their national interests. Moslem leaders Ma Sung-ting, Ma Po-an (both in Yunnan), Ma Tse-wen, Ma Wen-ting (both in Tsinghai), Ma Kai-shan (in Kansu) and Hsueh Hsi-shan (in Honan) began carrying out anti-Communist activities in their areas. On April 4, 1958, Ma Cheng-wu, a Moslem leader in Kansu, personally directed armed anti-Communist activities in Hsichi area to protect Kungpei, the base of the Pope of Islam in China. All this shows that the Communist “nationality policy” was in conflict with the religions of the frontier area minority peoples and has created much religious dissension.

(3) Opposition to the Communist leadership and the “nationality policy”—To break away from Communist control, the frontier minority peoples demanded self-government and the right to man all the autonomous organizations with their own people. They opposed

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Communist leadership and excluded Han cadres. Thinking that the Chinese Communists wanted to destroy all the minority peoples and religions of China, the ethnic groups especially emphasized that "all nationalities and religions are incompatible with Communism."

The Chinese Reds categorized the difficulties as follows: (1) separatist activities; (2) the demand for the right of autonomy and the desire to man all the autonomous organizations with people of the ethnic groups; (3) the opposition to any large-scale emigration of Hans to the frontier areas; (4) the opposition to "socialist reform"; and (5) the resentment of and opposition to the Chinese Communist Party. (These five kinds of specific activities were disclosed by Liu Ke-ping, chairman of the nationality committee of the "National People's Congress", on January 11, 1958 when he reaffirmed the decisions made by the CCP Central Committee in its third plenary session.)

II. The Situation of Anti-Communist Minorities

The anti-Communist feeling among the minority peoples of the frontier areas is so extensive that the factors which can inspire anti-Communist actions always exist. Sometimes the anti-Communist feeling reached the boiling point and sometimes it was comparatively quiet, depending on the intensity of the Communist oppressive programs. The anti-Communist struggle of the minority peoples of the frontier areas can be divided into two stages:

In the first stage from 1950 to 1955, the Chinese Communists divided the minority peoples into many ethnic groups and established many "autonomous regions" in an attempt to create friction among the minority peoples. This led to the minority peoples' resentment of the Chinese Communists.

At first, the "Common Programme

of the People's Political Consultative Conference" stipulated that regional autonomy should be practiced in those areas populated by the minority peoples. In August, 1952, they promulgated the "General Rules on the Implementation of Regional Autonomy of the Minority Peoples" and the "Decision on the Methods of Implementation for the Establishment of Democratic Coalition Governments Among the Minority Peoples." Because these rules and regulations were opposed by the minority peoples and had caused anti-Communist incidents, the Chinese Reds often had to revise the laws and decrees governing the minority peoples in accordance with the anti-Communist situation. Sometimes they had to yield to the minority peoples and sometimes they intensified their suppression of these peoples. But the ethnic groups have never stopped their struggle against the "autonomy of the regions of minority peoples." They charged that in the "regional autonomy of the minority peoples", the Chinese Communists not only did not give any right of autonomy to them but instead to tighten their control over them by dividing the "autonomous regions." Therefore, they strongly demanded "national self-determination" to establish independent countries of "federations." Such anti-Communist activities in the areas of the Uighurs, Mongols and Tibetans, especially in Sinkiang, often reached the boiling point. The minority peoples of Sinkiang once contemplated establishing a "Uighurstan" (Uighur Republic) and thus stirred up a very violent anti-Communist movement there.

The second stage was from 1956 (in that year the Chinese Reds began carrying out their "democratic reform" and "socialist reform" forcibly) to 1959 (in that year a large-scale anti-Communist uprising broke out in Tibet). During this period, the Chinese Communist objective was to destroy the original social organization and leadership of the minority peoples and establish Peiping's rule. Because their "democratic reform"

and "socialist reform" aroused the strong opposition of the minority peoples, the Chinese Reds had to adopt the policies of "redemption" and "peaceful consultation" and use indirect methods to conceal their ulterior motives. They also applied the tactics of ingratiating, alienation and pacification in an attempt to mitigate the resistance of the minority peoples. Nevertheless, the resistance in Szechuan, Tsinghai and Sinkiang was still as strong as ever. This compelled the Chinese Communists to slow down their reform campaigns. It was not until 1958 that they had completed their "socialist reform" in the frontier areas with a 30,000,000 minority population. There were still many areas which had not undergone the "democratic reform." As for Tibet, the Communist attempt to tighten their control and carry out their "democratic reform" and "socialist reform" touched off a large-scale revolt in March, 1959.

The anti-Communist activities of the minority peoples are extensive. The following are some specific incidents:

(1) In Inner Mongolia: At first, all the resistance activities in Inner Mongolia were against the "cooperative movement" for agriculture and animal husbandry. When the Chinese Communists carried out the program of "compulsory participation in cooperatives" in 1956, most of the peasants in Inner Mongolia were dissatisfied and demanded their withdrawal from these cooperatives. As for herdsmen, they fled to other places in groups. For instance, all the herdsmen of 15 villages near the Tahsinganling Mountain migrated. This compelled the Chinese Reds to change their "socialist reform" of animal husbandry in Inner Mongolia in October, 1956 and to adopt the method of "consultation." Nevertheless, the tension in Inner Mongolia still continued to develop. In a report to the second session of the First Congress of Inner Mongolia in 1958, Ulanfu, a Chinese Communist leader in charge of Mongolian affairs, admitted that "the Mongolians and other minority groups

who believed in provincial nationalism had violently assailed the Party on the question of nationalities, and had opposed party leadership and socialism. In fact, they had even attempted to make the Mongolian people and other minority peoples break away from the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist road." From this confession we can see that all the "provincial nationalists" oppose Communist Party leadership and Communist brutalities.

(2) In Northwest China: In addition to actively opposing the Communist "socialist reform" of agriculture and animal husbandry in 1955 and 1956, the minority peoples of the frontier areas in northwestern China had engineered a "separatist movement." The scope of this movement was very wide. The minority groups in Sinkiang once plotted to establish an "Uighurstan Republic" and an "East Turkestan Republic" and the minority groups in Ninghsia wanted to set up a "Turkic Republic." Some ethnic groups organized the "Islamic Party" and "Nationalist Party" to oppose the Chinese Communist Party. Such anti-Communist activities were encouraged and joined by many high-ranking Communist officials, including party commissars, a chief procurator, chief of the Administrative Office for South Sinkiang mayor of Ulumuchi, secretary general of the Commissioner's Office in Ili, and chief of the "Kazakhs' Autonomous Chou" in Ili.

The anti-Communist activities in Sinkiang have developed continuously in recent years and destructive activities and armed revolts have taken place one after another. The following are some major incidents:

a) In the summer of 1962, more than a thousand people in Tehcheng and Ili fled to Russia. In April of the same year, a battalion of Uighur cavalry staged an armed revolt.

b) On December 17, 1962, eighteen

workers of the "4382 Repair Shop" in Tihua together resisted the leadership of Communist cadres.

c) To oppose the Communist emigration of Han people to the frontier areas, the minority groups in the Kula area staged a large-scale anti-Communist riot in April, 1965. During the riot, many Communist cadres were buried alive.

d) In the first half of 1965, the minority groups of Sinkiang, including the Uighurs and Kazakhs, carried out anti-Communist and anti-Maoist activities continuously in more than 20 cities and counties in the area of Ili, Tah-cheng and Alatai as well as South Sinkiang. Some low-level Communist cadres even covered up for these activities.

e) In October, 1965, several thousand people of the minority groups in Tah-cheng and Ili launched an anti-Communist uprising to oppose the Communist stipulation that the livestock produced in these two places be sent to Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Hupeh, and Szechuan to support these provinces on a long-term basis.

The Turkic people in Kansu and Ninghsia provinces also have resisted the Communists. The earliest armed struggle against the Communists in this region took place in May, 1950 when Ma Cheng-wu, an Islamic leader, led a group of fighters attacking Pingliang county in Kansu province. The second armed uprising against the Chinese Communists was carried out in April, 1952 to oppose the Communist "land reform." The third armed clash took place in April, 1958, when Ma Cheng-wu, the same Islamic leader, ordered several hundred guerrillas to attack Communist cadres and rob Communist cooperatives and trade companies. The fourth armed struggle was launched in June, 1958 in Tunghsin county, Ninghsia province.

(3) In Sikang and Tibet: Among the minority peoples anti-Communist

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resistance movements, the most violent are in Sikang and Tibet. When the Communist troops began to march into Tibet in the early 1950s, they met with large-scale armed resistance from the Tibetans. Later, the Reds adopted their "united front" policy and proclaimed that they would "liberate Tibet through peaceful means." They lured the Dalai Lama, the supreme religious and political leader of the Tibetans, into signing the "Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" and began to ingratiate the Tibetan leaders in an attempt to pacify them. At the same time, they brought forward the slogan of "no change in the status quo of Tibet within six years" to cover their actions. But in 1953 when the Chinese Communists acted to confiscate the private guns of the Tibetans, they met with a strong resistance in eastern Tibet. The war soon spread all over Tibet and Sikang. The most violent fighting between the Tibetans and Communist troops took place in Litang county and Changtu city, both in Sikang. The Reds had sent airplanes to bomb the Tibetan-held areas, resulting in more than 4,000 Tibetan casualties. With the Tibetan tribes in northwestern Sikang as its center, this armed revolt spread to the border areas between Kansu and Szechuan and the border areas between Tibet and Sinkiang and was not ended until the winter of 1956.

Although the Dalai Lama fled to India after the Communist troops moved into Tibet to suppress the anti-Communist revolt in Lhasa in March, 1959, the Tibetans still carried on their anti-Communist revolt in Shigatse, Shannan and other places. In more recent years, the brutalities committed by the Communists in carrying out their "democratic reform" and "socialist reform" in Tibet have compelled the Tibetans to launch armed revolts one after another. The following are some of the cases:

a) On January 5, 1962, the Tibetan anti-Communist guerrillas in the Kamba area ambushed Communist troops pass-

ing there and killed more than 90 of them. About 150 guerrilla fighters were killed or wounded.

b) In mid-May, 1962, the war between the Communist troops and Tibetans in Tungpa area resumed. As a result, the social order there was disturbed and many important highways were damaged.

c) On June 11, 1962, when a Communist military truck was passing the vicinity of Chartsechung, it was intercepted by the anti-Communist guerrillas. The truck was burned, four Communist cadres were killed and three others got away.

d) In mid-June, 1962, the Tibetans in Tingri county carried out various obstructive activities to prevent the Communist Tibetan Highway Bureau from repairing the highways in that county.

e) More than 2,000 anti-Communist guerrilla fighters in the prairie areas of northern Tibet launched repeated surprise attacks on Communist transport wagons. In July, 1962, these guerrilla fighters ambushed 12 Communist trucks carrying food from Tsinghai to northern Tibet, destroyed eight of them, killed all the Communist soldiers aboard and took the food.

f) In July, 1962, anti-Communist guerrillas often appeared in a place near the Tangla Range. These guerrillas destroyed three Communist military trucks.

g) In August, 1962, more than 50 armed cavalymen of the guerrillas in Liho attacked Communist highway repair personnel; killed 12 persons and took their weapons and food.

h) In mid-August, 1962, the guerrillas cut off the communications between the Tungpa area and the outside world and captured some Communist transport trucks.

i) During the war between Chinese

Reds and Indians, which broke out in October, 1962, sporadic anti-Communist guerrilla activities continued to take place.

j) In July, 1963, a Tibetan leader who had taken refuge in Nepal led 15 guerrillas to northern Tibet. They demolished a Communist cattle ranch, seized 300 head of cattle and fought with 30 Communist soldiers for two hours.

k) In July, 1964, more than 1,000 teachers and students of the Lupu School in Lhasa staged an anti-Communist uprising and set fire to the Communist Lupu Trading Company and scores of other Communist-operated firms. Communist troops rushed to the scene to suppress the uprising, killed four students and arrested 15.

l) In March, 1965, the guerrillas of the Kamba tribe launched a surprise attack on a Communist engineering bureau in charge of the repair of the Mochang Highway, annihilated a whole company of Communist troops and killed an important Communist cadre.

m) In May, 1965, the former chief of the Pachen Lama's bodyguards led several officers to destroy a bridge near Shekar. After the incident, Communist troops searched the area but found nothing.

n) On June 25, 1965, some 300 guerrillas in Changtu joined with 200 Chinese and Tibetans who were undergoing "reform by labor" in fighting against more than 200 Communist security troops. Most of these people used knives and axes as their weapons. The battle lasted a whole day and all the Communist troops were annihilated.

o) Communist tyrannical rule often brought about popular riots. In 1965 alone, there were several such riots in Tibet. For instance, to oppose the compulsory purchase of Communist-printed almanacs, the citizens of Lhasa staged a large-scale riot in February.

The Lhasa people staged a riot again on a Buddhist festival in March in retaliation of the Communist destruction of their Buddhist scriptures, temples, images and statues. In July, the hungry Tibetans of the Amlinchung area staged a riot and robbed a Communist trading company of its food. In early August, because they opposed the compulsory participation of Tibetan youths in military training, more than 40 Tibetans of Nedong beat up the Communist cadres and demolished the Communist cooperatives there. Similar anti-Communist incidents in other frontier areas also have been reported.

p) In February, 1962, a Tibetan leader Aligid (phonetic) led more than 200 Tibetans in an armed revolt in the Kweinan area of Tsinghai province. Most of these Tibetans used clubs as their weapons. They cut off the electric power and encircled a Communist "state-operated farm" to steal its food. After fighting for three nights, these Tibetans withdrew into the mountainous areas. In June, 1964, a weather observation station in Golmo, Tsinghai, was destroyed by the anti-Communists.

(4) In Southwest China: Anti-Communist activities have been repeated in the border areas of Southwest China. In Lushui, Pikiang, Kungshan, Fukung, Pengshan, Lungchuan, Juili, Tengchung Paoshan, Yingkiang, and the areas south and west of Tali, the guerrilla fighters often launched surprise attacks on the Communist local government, farms, warehouses and troops. To destroy the anti-Communist forces in the border areas between Yunnan and Burma, the Chinese Communists signed an agreement with the Burmese government to permit their troops to cross the Burmese border to chase the anti-Communist guerrillas. This shows the seriousness of the anti-Communist situation in the border areas of Southwest China. The following are some anti-Communist incidents in the border areas of Southwest China in recent years:

a) In February, 1961, an anti-Communist leader, Chen Yun-hai, organized the people of three communes in the Yiwei county, Yunnan province, 40 officers and men of the 8501st Contingent of the Communist Railway Corps, and more than 400 railway workers into an "Anti-Communist Self-Salvation Army." This army fought with the Communist troops violently.

b) In July, 1962, an armed revolt took place in a labor camp in Changning county. The chief of the camp, his wife and five Communist cadres were killed and three guns taken by the anti-Communists.

c) In September, 1962, the chief of the Wacha district in Hungho county led several hundred militiamen in an armed revolt and proclaimed independence.

d) On October 1, 1962, when the Communist troops in Yingkiang staged a drama performance in celebration of Peiping's national day, a grenade was thrown killing more than 10 persons and wounding more than 20.

e) In December, 1963, when a "cultural work troupe" from Kunming staged a performance in Chinghung county to cheer up local troops, the anti-Communists threw grenades and distributed anti-Communist leaflets.

f) In September, 1964, taking advantage of marksmanship training and tactical maneuvers, a platoon of Communist troops in Chingku county broke away and fled into the mountains. Under the leadership of its chief surnamed Wang, this platoon began to launch surprise attacks on Communist troops.

g) In January, 1965, 17 anti-Communist guerrillas carried out actions in the Kuyung district of Tengchung county and fought with local Communist troops for six days.

h) The anti-Communist guerrillas

in Tengchung, Liangshan and Yingkiang were very active. They often launched surprise attacks on Communist troops and stole their equipment and food.

i) There were several groups of anti-Communist guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Hsiangyun and Menghua counties. Each group had more than 1,000 persons. One group, called "the 16th Column of the Free People's Anti-Communist Army", was headed by Wan Tien-hung. Another group, the "9th Column", was directed by Li Tse-sheng. These guerrillas often made surprise raids on Communist troops.

j) Taking advantage of the opportunity of a military maneuver, more than 100 militiamen among the minority peoples in Paoshan county fled into mountainous areas with their weapons. These militiamen often staged surprise attacks on Communist troops.

k) In 1965, the anti-Communist guerrillas headed by Ma Kuo-chuan repeatedly entered Yunnan province from the mountainous areas of Hsiminshan, 170 kilometers northwest of the joint border of Burma, Thailand and Laos, to attack Chinese Communist troops.

l) In May, 1965, more than 400 guerrilla fighters launched a surprise attack on a regiment of the Communist "14th Army" in Chinghung county, killing and wounding more than 300 Communist soldiers and destroying two ammunition depots and the Cheli bridge. A Communist political commissar, Lin Hung, also was killed.

III. A New Upsurge of Anti-Communism

In the light of the anti-Communist situation among the minority peoples of the frontier areas, their opposition to Communism was based on their nationality and religious faith. After more than 10 years of development, a new development has appeared in the current stage of the minority peoples'

opposition to Communism. It has two characteristics:

a) Many high-ranking Communist cadres in party, political and educational organizations have turned against Communism or even directed anti-Communist activities.

b) Communism and Mao Tse-tung are opposed at the same time.

This new development appeared after the failure of the Communist policy of "three red flags" and is exposed in the current "great cultural revolution" and purge campaign. The following are specific instances of anti-Communist and anti-Maoist activities in frontier areas:

(1) In Inner Mongolia: On May 17, 1966, the *Inner Mongolian Daily* of the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region" published an editorial entitled "All the National Minorities in This Region Must Participate in the Socialist Cultural Revolution Actively." After that a series of campaigns against the anti-Communist and anti-Maoist elements were launched. These struggles show the intensity of the anti-Communist and anti-Maoist activities in Inner Mongolia in recent years. Here are some of the accounts:

a) Since 1965, Li Chih, member of the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Commission", first secretary of the Huhohout Municipal Party Committee and vice chairman of the "People's Council" in Inner Mongolia, was engaged in activities to restore "capitalism and feudalism." He spread the idea of separatism and used his own political, economic and cultural theories to oppose and replace Mao's thought. At the same time organized his own faction and carried out various anti-Mao and anti-socialist activities within the Party. As a result, he was dismissed from his post as first secretary of the Huhohout Municipal Party Committee.

b) Some high-ranking Communist cadres opposed the "socialist education" campaign and the "four clean-ups" campaign and tried to overthrow the Communist local government. These cadres included Chang Ju-kang, chief procurator of the procuratorate in the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region"; Ho Yao, an investigator and researcher of the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Commission"; Tien Shu-pao, acting chief of the Agricultural Commission in Inner Mongolia; Yang Yi-kao, chief of the team in charge of the "four clean-ups" campaign in Inner Mongolia; Lin Yung-yuan, acting chief of political department for industry and communications in Inner Mongolia, and Che Shan, former secretary of the "Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Commission".

c) Several Communist educational leaders, including Yu Pei-sheng, deputy secretary of the party committee in the Inner Mongolian University and vice president of that university; Tien Hsin, also deputy secretary of the same party committee; and Tu Yang, chief of the propaganda department in the committee and concurrently chief of the departments of political science and history in the university, actively directed the resistance to the Communist "great proletarian cultural revolution."

d) Ya Han-chang, former acting vice president of the Inner Mongolian University, was engaged in anti-Communist and anti-Maoist activities.

e) Since 1959, Chen Ping-yu, acting mayor of Huhohout city, has criticized Mao's ideology and the Communist policy of "three red flags." After 1963, he opposed the "socialist education campaign" and "socialist revolution" and tried to undermine the "four clean-ups" movement. He promoted the teaching of Mongolian language in the university and carried out activities for the independence of Inner Mongolia. In February, 1966, he committed an

anti-party crime against the team in charge of the "four clean-ups" movement in Paishihpu district and instigated the minority peoples to carry out an independence movement and stage a *coup d'etat* to overthrow the local government.

(2) In Sinkiang: The vice chairman of the Union of Literary and Art Circles in the "Sinkiang Autonomous Region", Wang Lin-pu, criticized Mao's writings as too "vulgarized, simplified and conceptionized" and corrected Mao's poems with contempt. With the Union as a base, he carried out various anti-Communist, anti-Maoist and anti-socialist activities.

Another anti-Communist, Liu Sheng-hu, was engaged in "provincial nationalist" activities against Communism, socialism and Mao's thought.

(3) In Tsinghai and Tibet:

a) After he became editor-in-chief of the *Tibet Daily News* in 1960, Ching Sha, who was concurrently deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the "Tibetan Autonomous Region Commission, used the supplement of the paper to publish anti-Communist and anti-Mao articles. Following are some specific cases:

A) He criticized the Chinese Communist Party as "having contracted an incurable disease".

B) He expressed sympathy for the "right opportunists" who were dismissed from their government posts and further demanded that they should be reinstated.

C) He struck out the sentences "love Mao Tse-tung, love the party leadership" from two articles published on February 4, 1962.

D) He criticized Mao's writings as too vulgar.

E) In 1960, he had organized a

Tibetan language team" to carry out anti-Communist and anti-Mao activities.

F) In a seminar sponsored by the Communists to study Mao's writings in the autumn of 1964, he openly spread anti-Communist ideas. He organized a small group secretly to write articles against the Party and socialism. At the same time, in his anti-Communist and anti-socialist plays, he ridiculed the emancipated serfs and beautified the landlords. He also rewrote all those "revolutionary modern plays" praising Mao and the Communist Party.

b) An anti-Communist, Shih Nanchai, used the slogans of "liberty, equality and fraternity" to instigate anti-Communist, anti-socialist and anti-Maoist activities.

c) The editor-in-chief of the *Tsinghai Daily News*, Chen Kuang-yuan, published an editorial entitled "Great Attack, Great Counterattack, Great Revolution" on June 3, 1966, to oppose Communism, socialism and Mao's thought.

(4) In Southwest China:

a) The following are the anti-Communist and anti-Mao activities of Mung-shao, editor-in-chief of the *Sunnan Daily*:

A) The book *Random Talk About Misty Rain* written by Li was a replica of the *Night Chat at Yenshan* written by Teng To.

B) He criticized the "people's communes" as "bad enough."

C) Another book by Li, *Random Talk in Kunming*, was similar to the *Night Chat at Yenshan* both in form and content. This book assailed the Communist Party and Mao's ideology.

D) He denounced Mao's writings as "very childish."

E) He refuted Mao's claim that his

thought could produce quick effect when applied and could be useful anywhere.

F) In the spring of 1965, he went to Fuming county as a member of a working team of the provincial Party committee to dissolve the "people's communes" there.

b) Wang Po-pan, an anti-Communist in Kweichow, accused the Communist "big leap forward" of being a boast jeopardizing the national economy. He criticized Mao's thought as an "empty ideal."

c) Lu Ti, an anti-Communist in Kwangsi, launched a violent attack on the Communist Party and socialism in coordination with the situation at home and abroad. He was accused of "insisting on his bourgeois stand" and "raising red flags to oppose the red flag".

IV. Conclusion

The Communist brutalities against the minority peoples of the frontier areas have touched off many armed revolts and brought about numerous incidents in the frontier areas. As a result of the development of activities in the last 10 years or so, anti-Communist influence has spread in Northwest China, Southwest China, Sikang, Tibet and other border areas populated by the minority peoples. These areas account for 50-60 per cent of the total land area of China. Moreover, the anti-Communist activities have expanded from the people to the leading cadres in Communist Party, political, military and cultural organizations in frontier areas. The further growth of this anti-Communist influence in frontier areas, if coordinated with the anti-Communist and anti-Maoist activities elsewhere, may quicken the downfall of the Peiping regime.

2) After World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson advocated "national self-determination." After World

War II, the call for national independence was louder than ever before and many countries obtained their independence one after another. As for the minority peoples of China, because their strength is divided, they can hardly attain their goal in resisting the Communist tyrannical rule and seeking independence. Therefore, the best thing for them to do now is to direct all their efforts at the overthrow of the Peiping regime under the guidance of free

China's policy of counterattack and national recovery. Only after the Peiping regime is overthrown can they have the right of self-determination. As President Chiang Kai-shek declared after the outbreak of the anti-Communist revolt in Tibet in 1959: "After the Chinese mainland is recovered, the political status of Tibet will be determined in accordance with the principle of national self-determination so as to suit the aspirations of the Tibetan people."

Chinese Communist Terminology

人民公社 (*Jen-min-kung-she*) "People's Commune."

The people's commune is a mass organization of peasants, consisting of 5,000 households on an average, which carried out farm work as well as rural government work when it started in 1958. Each commune was formed by combining many agricultural producers' cooperatives. There were 26,000 communes formed from 740,000 such cooperatives in December, 1958. Failing in its objectives, the commune gradually lost its governmental functions and diminished in size. Each commune was later split into production brigades and again into production teams under production brigades.

There were 74,000 communes in 1963, according to an article written by Liao Lu-yen, Minister of Agriculture for *Cuba Socialista* of Cuba and reproduced in English in *Peking Review*, No. 44, November 1, 1963.

The communes were said to have shown the Chinese people "the way to the gradual industrialization of the rural areas, the way to gradual transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people (state ownership) in agriculture, the way to the gradual transition from the Socialist principle of 'to each according to his work' to the Communist principle of 'to each according to his needs'..." (Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes", December 10, 1958).

An Analysis of the Situation in Sinkiang

By Tsao Ching

I. Introduction

Located on the northwest frontier of continental China and connecting Europe and Asia, Sinkiang occupies an important strategic position in the military sense. It is a vast area with small population but rich resources and therefore has long been a target of Russian aggression. In the latter days of the Ching Dynasty, the Russians annexed part of the land by diplomatic and military means. After the Communists came to power in Russia, they successively launched movements for the establishment of the republics of "East Turkestan," "Uighur," and "Ili" in an attempt to seize Sinkiang. Following the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland and the deterioration of Peiping-Moscow relations, the Soviets withdrew their forces from the area but have never abandoned their plot against it. To strengthen frontier defenses, the Chinese Reds have moved in large numbers of troops and civilians and have organized semi-armed production and construction units for tapping the region's natural resources. Following is an analysis of the situation in Sinkiang in these aspects: topography and communications, distribution of nationalities, military deployment, nuclear facilities, armed struggle and Soviet infiltration.

II. Topography and Communications

1. Topography

Sinkiang is situated between the Mongolian Plateau and Central Asia. It is bounded by Outer Mongolia on the northeast, by the Soviet Union on the northwest, by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir on the southwest, by Tibet on the south and by Kansu and Tsinghai on the east. Sinkiang has an area of 1,650,000 square kilometers. It is China's largest province, occupying one-sixth of the country. Called *Hsi Yueh* (meaning "countries bordering on western China") in ancient times, the area formally became a province of China in the late Ching Dynasty and hence was given the name Sinkiang, meaning "new territory." It was renamed the "Uighur Autonomous Region" after the Communists seized the Chinese mainland.

The land form of the area is quite complicated. In the northeast is the Altai Mountain Range, in the west, the "Onion Range" (the Belaturgh Mountains in Turkestan), in the south, the Kunlun Mountains and in the east, the Chilien Rangs. Lying in the middle is the Tien Shan Range, which divides the province into north and south. Most of the south-

ern part is desert, where the main land feature is the Tarim Basin. Except those areas from 5 to 100 kilometers of the fringe of the basin where communications are comparatively convenient and water supply comparatively abundant and which are thus suitable for troop movement, other parts of the basin are dry, trackless and subjected to changeable weather. In the northern part of Sinkiang lies the Dzungaria Basin, which is smaller than the Tarim Basin and is better in terms of geographic and communication conditions. The rest of the province is mountainous, the average height being 3,000 kilometers above sea level. Snow-clad mountain tops and icy rivers make communications difficult, thus forming an area that is easier for defense than attack.

2. Communications

(1) Railways: Those which have been constructed are the Lanchow-Tihwa line, totaling 1,889 kilometers; the Tihwa-Tsingho line, totaling 400 kilometers; and the Tushantze-Karamei line, totaling 160 kilometers. There are two lines under construction, one from Turfan to Kashgar and the other from Karamei to Altai. Seven proposed lines run from Tsingho to Ining, from Kucha to Ining, from Kurle to Chochiang, from Chochiang to Kashgar, from Chochiang to Chinhungshan, from Chinhungshan to Anhsi and from Chinhungshan to the Tsaidam Basin.

(2) Highways: Tihwa is the center of the highway system in this area, which extends to Lanchow, Kansu, and Golmo, Tsinghai, in the east; to Uliassutai, Outer Mongolia, in the northeast; to Russia's Turkestan-Siberia railroad, in the northwest; and to Gartok, Tibet, in the south. There are seven major highways and eight secondary ones as well as forest roads leading to the Tien Shan Range. The Reds have claimed that all roads at the county and municipal levels and over 80 per cent of the roads in the

communes are open to traffic by automobiles, totaling 100,000 kilometers in good weather and 22,000 kilometers in rainy weather.

Most of the railroads and highways mentioned above pass through mountains, hills, deserts or ice belts on the plateaus. For example, the railroad from Lanchow to Tihwa passes through a group of tunnels totaling 8,000 kilometers in the Wubsiaolin and Tien Shan Range and crosses a total of 1,100 bridges in the section between Hami and Tihwa; the line from Tihwa to Tsingho passes through the marsh area of Ebi Nor; the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway passes through the 5,000-kilometer-high Kunlun Shan Range and the Kailas Range. Hence such a communications system is exposed to air attack in time of war.

III. Distribution of Nationalities

Before 1949 the population in Sinkiang was 4,010,000. As a result of Peiping's sending large numbers of intellectual youths and retired and demobilized military personnel to the area, population has increased sharply over the past 10 years. A Communist report in June 1960 put the population at 6,000,000. The figure given by the *Daily Telegraph & Morning Post* in London in June 1968 was 12,000,000-15,000,000. Major nationalities are the Hans, Uighurs and Kazaks. Others include the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Mongols, Huis (Moslems), Manchus, Tatars, Sibos and Russians. These people have different languages, religious beliefs and customs and habits and each form a tribe of its own. Nevertheless, they have common features, namely, the traits of nomads—simplicity, lack of inhibitions and bravery. Excluding the Hans, the Uighurs have the largest population, with 3,660,000, followed by 510,000 Kazaks and 70,000 Kirghiz. Each of the remaining nationalities numbers from 1,000 to 60,000. The Uighurs live in southern Sinkiang and in areas east of

Turfan, and the Huis and Mongols are scattered around Tihwa and Yenki respectively. Other peoples are distributed along the Sino-Soviet border and tend to identify themselves with the Russians against the Chinese Reds.

IV. Military Deployment

(1) Command organizations: The highest military command is the Sinkiang Military Region Command in Tihwa, under which there are 12 military sub-regions: Tihwa, Hami, Hotien, Kashgar, Aksu, Changki, Paying Kuo-lo (Autonomous District), Kotzulesu Kirghiz (Autonomous District), Po-erh-ta-la, Ili, Tahcheng and Altai. There are also two military districts, one each in northern and southern Sinkiang, which are empowered by the regional military command to take military charge of military activities in their respective areas. The present Sinkiang Military Region Command is capable of directing joint air-ground operations. It can directly command the ground and air forces in the area to maintain the defense of frontier garrisons in peace-time and their military activities in time of war.

(2) Deployment of military forces: Red military units in this area include regular PLA troops, frontier garrison troops, cavalry, combat-support troops and production and construction units, which are semi-armed forces. Except for frontier garrison troops, which are stationed in border areas, the regular units and cavalry are concentrated in Ining and Tahcheng in the northern part and in Kashgar in the southern region along the railroads between Lanchow and Tihwa and between Tihwa and Tsingho, ready to move whenever ordered.

(3) The production and construction corps:

A. History: To tap frontier resources and reduce the number of servicemen on active duty, the Reds organized a produc-

tion unit in Sinkiang in 1950 on the basis of their experience in northern Shensi. The group, consisting of the troops of Tao Chih-yu who defected to Communism and those of Wang Chen (including the 359th Brigade, originally working in northern Shensi) as well as local units and retired officers in Sinkiang, has embarked on water conservancy projects, reclaiming waste land and doing agricultural and pastoral work in the Dzungarian and Tarim basins. In 1952 the Red "Ministry of Agriculture" and the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee implemented Mao Tse-tung's instructions concerning military participation in production and construction by rehabilitating some of the troops formerly under Wang Chen, Saifudin and Lo Yuan, and reorganized them into agricultural construction divisions and civil construction division. In 1954 all military units in Sinkiang engaged in reclamation and construction were merged into the semi-armed Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps, with Tao Chih-yu as commander and Wang En-mou, commander of the military region, as first political commissar. Under it were agricultural reclamation divisions and civil construction divisions. From 1963 to 1966, the corps was enlarged several times. Presently there are units stationed in Altai, Tiwha, Malas, Tushantze, Polo, Shih-ho-tzu and Ining in northern Sinkiang and in Yenki, Koerhle, Aksu, Kashgar, and Yehcheng in southern Sinkiang.

B. Organization and equipment: The corps is semi-armed. In time of peace it assumes the task of production and construction and maintaining local order, while in war it can be quickly mobilized after further training and receiving more equipment. It is for its possible mission during wartime that the corps still preserves the organization of a military unit. Since it plays a two-fold role of a combat and production corps, it is commanded by the Sinkiang Military Region in military affairs and

at the same time directed by the "Ministry of Agriculture" and the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Committee in production activities. The headquarters is composed of military staff units as well as agricultural and pastoral, water conservancy, industrial and commerce, finance and trade, supply and sale, and transportation control departments. There are also research institutes on agriculture, forest and pastoral industries, and courts, hospitals, schools and factories. On a lower level are agricultural reclamation divisions and civil construction divisions. Altogether there are 120-odd ministries, departments, sections and sub-sections. Each reclamation division has a different reclamation area and hence the number of workers and units differs in each. But the basic organization of these divisions is the same, that is, each division is divided into regiments, battalions and companies and the triangular system is generally adopted at and below the company level. The staff units of a division are also composed of ministries, departments, sections and sub-sections and those of a regiment are divided into departments, sections and sub-sections. Normally, one division is stationed in a reclamation area and, as the situation of each area requires, a number of administrative offices are established to take charge of farms, factories and pastoral districts. The production responsibility is assumed by regiments, battalions, companies, platoons and squads or by production brigades, teams, groups and sub-groups. The production brigade is equal to a battalion, team to company, group to platoon and sub-group to squad. Civil construction divisions are primarily engaged in repairing and constructing water works, railroads and highways. They also have farms for their own supply and their organization is the same as that of agricultural reclamation divisions. Units are stationed in construction areas, factories and farms. The demarcation of construction areas varies in accordance with different situations

and a division may have under it one or several construction areas with the regiment as the primary unit in carrying out construction work. In the above-mentioned production and construction units, the military staff departments have been reduced to a minimum while those for political work remain at normal size. This indicates that the Reds intend to exercise ideological control of the labor force of the units.

C. Production and construction activities: The Reds have established eight reclamation areas in Altai, Shih-ho-tzu, Wusu, Polo, Tihwa, Ili, Aksu and Yenki; these areas lie along the Manass, Tala, and Ili rivers in northern Sinkiang and along the Tarim and Kashgar rivers in southern Sinkiang. The total reclamation area increased from 600,000 *mou* in 1950 to 11,000,000 *mou* in 1966. (The Reds claim that arable land in Sinkiang totals 110 million *mou*.) About 7,400,000 *mou* have already been tilled. There are 149 mechanized farms and over 20 pastoral areas. In 1959, 38,000,000 cattles of cotton were produced. In 1961 the breakdown of production was 700 million cattles of food crops and 1,410,000 head of hogs, sheep, horses and cattle. As of 1961, a total of 112 water conservancy projects had been repaired or constructed. Thirty-eight water-ways could irrigate 9,700,000 *mou* of farmland. In addition there were 26 large, medium and small reservoirs. In the field of industrial construction, there are clothing, electricity, machine tool, steel, cement, textile, paper and coal factories as well as establishments for processing agricultural products and food. In 1958 the Reds claimed the total production value had reached 240 million *JMP*. In 1964 the profits, aside from meeting the needs for further development of the undertakings, were sufficient to develop 3,000,000 *mou* of high-yield land. In 1951 the Reds began to build cities at Shih-ho-tzu in the Dzungarian Basin and at Alaerh on the bank of the Tarim River. Presently Shih-ho-tzu has a population of 80,000

and textile, paper, steel, chemical and food processing plants. The new city of Alaerh has been expanded to 210,000 square meters with factories, schools, hospitals, post and telegraph offices, banks and department stores.

V. Nuclear Facilities

Sinkiang has abundant deposits of uranium, concentrated in the mountain areas on the northern and southern borders. According to a French report, continental China has one-fourth of the world's supply of radioactive elements. The most important is the discovery of uranium in Sinkiang. In 1950 Peiping and Moscow cooperated in establishing a uranium mine at Pishan. The uranium ore was sent to Russia for refinement. Following the deterioration of Peiping-Moscow relations and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960, the Chinese Reds managed to set up an integrated uranium refinery between Tihwa and Hami, a mineral ore refinery at Tihwa, a plutonium separation plant near the Tarim River and 15 mines at Chitai, Wei-wu-ehr-tai, Fuyun, Chinaimu, Tah-cheng, Wusu, Polo, Ining, Mo-erh-te River, Shih-tung-po, Kashgar, Maikaiti and Puli.

As head of the Institute of Atomic Energy, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chien San-chiang supervises and coordinates research work in Harbin, Sian, Paotow, Lanchow, Tihwa, Chungking, Wuhan and Shanghai. Missile, fuel and electronics systems plants have been established in Peiping, Taiyuan, Sian, Kansu, Mukden, Harbin, Chengtu, Liaoyang, Hsianghsiang, Port Arthur and Dairen. Since 1964 seven nuclear tests have been conducted in Lop Nor, Sinkiang, with bombs ranging in yield from 20,000 tons to 3,000,000 tons of TNT. Some were fixed detonations and some were bombs delivered by aircraft or missiles. In the field of intercontinental missiles, it is generally estimated that Peiping will make its first intercontinental missile in

1970 and will acquire a sufficient offensive capability by 1973. This time lag may be further shortened in view of the speedy development of Peiping's nuclear capacity. In recent years, the Chinese Reds have manufactured and test-fired missiles in the medium range of about 1,000 nautical miles. Evidently they must already have had considerable knowledge about the components and boosters used in intercontinental missiles. Since the Chinese Communist could use a medium-range missile with booster as the first stage of an intercontinental missile, they may be able to make the necessary modifications to produce a second stage. It is reported that the launching bases of Peiping's missiles will be in the desert in Sinkiang, from which the rockets will fly over Pakistan or Afghanistan to a possible target area in the Indian Ocean near the East African coast. We make this judgement because Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania have diplomatic ties with Peiping and therefore it would be convenient for the Reds to establish observation stations in the territories of these countries.

VI. Armed Struggle during the Cultural Revolution

1. Armed struggle

Armed struggle in Sinkiang is primarily between revolutionary mass organizations led by Wu Kuang and Lu Chien-jen, both Party committee secretaries, and Tso Chi, first deputy political commissar of the Sinkiang Military Region, and conservative mass organizations led by Wang En-mou, commander of the Sinkiang Military Region, and Chang Hsi-ching, deputy commander, and by the CCP committee in Sinkiang. On the surface, it is a struggle between mass organizations; but actually it is between "revolutionary rebels" supported by the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCP Central Committee on the one hand and the CCP committee and the mili-

tary region of Sinkiang on the other. Hence every conflict involves PLA elements, which is a unique feature of power-struggle in the Sinkiang area. Incomplete statistics show that since 1967, 700 armed incidents have been reported in the area that includes Tihwa, Hami, Ining, Tahcheng, Kashgar, Hotien, Chitai, Toksun, Yenki, Shih-ho-tzu, Tushantze, Aksu, Karamei and Mosowan. Major incidents are as follows:

(1) Shih-ho-tzu incident: The whole thing originated in the Cultural Revolution Group's suspicion that Liu Shao-chi and his wife Wang Kuang-mei had secret discussions with Wang En-mou during their stay in Sinkiang after visiting Pakistan on their way to Afghanistan, and Burma. Enraged by the Maoist accusation that he is a "revisionist," Wang En-mou set out to organize various anti-Mao organizations. On January 26, 1967, Sinkiang Military Region personnel attacked the Maoists and occupied Shih-ho-tzu. At the same time, anti-Mao organizations in Tihwa were also prompted into pitched battles with "revolutionary rebels" and thus gained control of the city. Although the incident was later suppressed by Wang, armed conflicts erupted from time to time, including one in which an airplane was shot down. Sinkiang has thus been in a state of chronic chaos.

(2) Anti-Mao incidents on the Sino-Soviet border:

A. In January, 1967, youths sent to "support the frontier," Communist Youth League members and militiamen organized an anti-Communist force in Ili, Tahcheng and Aksu, engaging in guerrilla-style sabotage activities and even subverting the Karamei oilfield.

B. In January, 1967, the anti-Mao "Eighth Field" more than once attacked Red posts on the frontier in an attempt to flee to Soviet territory. After being beaten back by Red troops at the

Ili Bridge, they began to hold up cars and seized munitions and food for long-term resistance in the Nan Shan Range.

C. In September, 1967, the anti-Mao "Fourth Field" transported 238 truck loads of material to the mountains and encircled and attacked the "Ili Leather Manufacturing Factory" and "Ili Restaurant" with armed units. It also employed "labor reform prisoners" as a suicide corps to attack the Mao-Lin followers, causing heavy casualties. In October, about 10,000 Maoists were driven out of the city to the Tien Shan Range, and nearly 3,000 of them froze to death in temperatures of minus 40° C. Another group totaling 2,100 escaped from Ining through the Tarim Basin and the Chilien Mountains to Hsining, Tsinghai, but only nine survived the trip.

D. In May 1967, production units in Aksu and Ining united to attack "revolutionary rebels," with heavy casualties reported.

2. Wang En-mou's Stay in Peiping

Wang En-mou was first secretary of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Party Committee and concurrently first political commissar and commander of the military region and political commissar of the Production Corps. The deputy commanders of the military region were Ting Sheng, Chang Hsi-ching, Ko Peng, Tao Chih-yu (concurrently commander of the Production Corps), Hsu Kuo-hsien and Hsing Yuan-lin. (Both Hsu and Hsing were concurrently deputy commanders of the Production Corps.) Deputy political commissars were Tso Chi and Pei Chou-yu. The above people have complicated backgrounds, but generally speaking they are followers of Peng Teh-huai and Ho Lung. In 1938 Wang was political commissar of the 359th Brigade, 120th Division, 8th Route Army. Later he was appointed successively deputy political commissar of the 1st Army Corps, of the First Field Army, political

commissar of the 2nd Army, deputy political commissar and political commissar of the Sinkiang Military Region. In 1953 he took over as commander of the Sinkiang Military Region. After the purge of Peng Teh-huai, Wang became the leader of the Peng clique in northwest China. During the "cultural revolution," both regular PLA units and local and production corps elements have been involved in anti-Mao incidents. Big-character wall posters in Peiping disclosed in January 1968 that "seven of the eight army divisions in Sinkiang turned against Mao Tse-tung in a counter-revolutionary rebellion." However, Wang's performance was different from that of Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia. Ulanfu projected himself as a radical nationalist, while Wang was a faithful cadre of a military clique. After Chou En-lai's intervention, Wang accepted a three-point agreement in February: (1) disband the "Eighth Field" and punish responsible persons, (2) put the Production and Construction Corps under military control, and (3) exempt industrial, communications and finance and trade departments from military control and power-seizure struggle. Wang was in a dilemma and failed to implement the whole of the agreement. Incidents of armed struggle flared up again in Karamei, Mosowan, Tushantze, Yenki and Kashgar. In view of the pressure from the Cultural Revolution Group and defiance of orders by his troops, Wang had to leave Sinkiang for Peiping to request his resignation. Anti-Mao organizations such as the "Fourth Field" and "Eighth Field" have transported large quantities of materials into mountainous areas in preparation for resistance if Wang is maltreated in Peiping. As a matter of fact, when Wang went to Peiping the Maoists sent troops into the Sinkiang area, forcing military leaders there to leave. For instance, Ting Sheng, a deputy commander, was transferred to the Canton Military Region as its deputy commander, while Kung Jui-yun, original deputy commander of the 67th Army, assumed duties

as deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military Region. Tseng Ju-ching, originally second political commissar of Kiangsu Provincial Military District, and Wang Cheng-tung, deputy chief of staff of the 54th Army, were reassigned respectively as deputy political commissar and chief of staff of the Production and Construction Corps. As to Wang himself, he has been replaced as commander of the Sinkiang Military Region by Lung Shu-ching, commander of the Hunan Provincial Military District. Thus large-scale anti-Mao incidents will become more difficult in this area. It is expected that a revolutionary committee will be established soon. (Editor's note: The present article was written in August and the Sinkiang Revolutionary Committee was established in September of this year.)

VII. Soviet Infiltration

The strategic importance and rich mineral resources of Sinkiang have been the two major factors for Moscow's plot against the area. Control of the area will not only facilitate Soviet expansion southward into the Near East, but also means possession of the third largest uranium deposits in the world. Russian designs on Sinkiang are historical. During the Czarist period, the Russians seized 1.8 million square kilometers in the area and established the present five states outside Ili. Moscow's subversive activities in recent decades include promotion of the movement for an "East Turkestan Republic" in 1940-44 and the movement to establish "East Turkestan," "Uighur" and "Ili Kazak" republics in 1954-1958. With the deterioration of their relations with the Chinese Reds in 1960, the Russians retreated for a while but have never abandoned their plans for the area. In 1962 they again engineered a movement for an "East Turkestan Republic" in Ili and Tahcheng. Although the incident was quelled by the Chinese Reds, the main force of the insurgents fled to the Soviet Union, who together with other

refugees fleeing to Kazakhstan totaled over 100,000. During their hunt for escapees, the Chinese Reds constantly clashed with Soviet troops on the border. Official reports from Moscow revealed that incidents on the Sinkiang border averaged 5,000 a year. According to refugee sources in East Turkestan, there were also 5,000 border incidents in 1966. In May 1968, Lt. General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the Soviet frontier units, disclosed on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the units that skirmishes had taken place constantly on the Sino-Soviet borders in Sinkiang and Manchuria. To increase the tempo of infiltration, the Soviets have established in Alma Ata the "Headquarters for Supporting the Independent Movements of the Nationalities in Sinkiang" and organized and trained 40,000 refugees now in their territory. They have also set up broadcasting stations to carry out psychological warfare against the Chinese Reds, reinforced their military strength in the Far East and trained youths to cope with Chinese Communist provocations during the "cultural revolution." On the other hand, Peiping has recently evacuated residents living within 12 to 18 miles of the border and laid mines and increased border patrols. They have also set up radio stations beaming messages to the Central Asia area, inciting the Russians to rise up against their government.

VIII. Conclusion

1. Chinese Communist army units in Sinkiang consist of frontier garrison troops and regular units. Regular troops are concentrated in Ining and Tahcheng in northern Sinkiang and Kashgar in southern Sinkiang, along the railroads from Lanchow to Tihwa and from Tihwa to Tsingho. On the surface their strength is similar to that of Soviet troops in Turkestan (four infantry divisions, one airborne division and one armored division, totaling 80,000 men). But actually Peiping also has semi-armed production and construction units in the area, which can

be mobilized in time of emergency. Therefore, the Chinese Communist units are numerically stronger. However, their Russian counterparts enjoy superiority in equipment. As to the air force, the Russians' superiority is absolute, with more than 230 aircraft. Presently, the Chinese Reds have neither formal defense installations nor heavy troop concentrations on their border with Outer Mongolia. However, the Soviets have already stationed several infantry and artillery units in Outer Mongolia, posing a flank and rear threat to Sinkiang. If and when war breaks out, the Russians are bound to avoid a frontal attack. Instead they will take advantage of the mobility provided by the Trans-Siberia railway and apply pressure on Kansu and Sinkiang from Outer Mongolia by cutting off their communications with the interior of the Chinese mainland.

2. The main anti-Mao clique at this moment is the Production and Construction Corps. The first group of people in this unit consists of 100,000 former troops of Tao Chih-yu, most of whom have become weary of frontier life and want to return to their native places. The second group includes former troops of Wang Cheng, who fought for the Reds before but later were sent to Sinkiang for reclamation work. The third group is made up of former nationalist troops in Ili, Tahcheng and Ashan, who want to establish an "East Turkestan Republic" and therefore are subject to Soviet instigation. The fourth group comprises youths who have been sent from the interior of the Chinese mainland to "support the frontier," most of whom cannot endure the bad weather and hard work and have turned from disappointment to active resistance. It is these discontented masses that have formed a huge anti-Mao force which obstructs the progress of the Maoist "cultural revolution" in the Sinkiang area.

3. Recent transfers of Communist leaders ordered by Peiping, including the