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The Minorities and the Military in China

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*The unification of our country, the unity of our people and
the unity of our various nationalities—these are the basic
guarantees of the sure triumph of our cause.*

—Mao Tse-tung

A central theme of the Chinese Revolution has been the achievement of territorial integrity, national unity, and national power. These goals have guided the actions of the Chinese Communist leaders from the beginning. Furthermore, the success of these leaders in developing military power, particularly during the War of Resistance against Japan and the Chinese Civil War, came through their ability to foster public sentiment and to mobilize the masses in support of these goals. Military force and political organization were effectively integrated to achieve victory in 1949.

The force of both Chinese tradition and the new Chinese nationalism dictated the integration of China's border areas into the new political system. The border provinces constituted about 50% of China's total territory and contained much of China's natural wealth; yet, many of these areas were inhabited primarily by national minorities who composed only about 6% of China's total population. The border regions were "liberated" by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Since that time, the PLA has had a significant

role in the effort to integrate these areas, and the minority populations, into the national framework.

The major border areas include Inner Mongolia, Kansu, Ch'inghai, Sinkiang, Tibet, Yunnan, and Kwangsi. As noted above, much of the population is non-Han (the "Han" or Chinese nationality is dominant in culture, language, and political affairs). For example, in Sinkiang, of a total population of about 4.5 million in 1949, only about .3 million were Han. In Tibet there were only about 20,000 Han in a population of 1.3 million. In Inner Mongolia and Southwest China, the Han nationality predominated; nevertheless, there were large concentrations of minorities, particularly near the actual borders with other countries. Chinese outnumbered Mongols two to one in Inner Mongolia, and in Southwest China, of a total population of around 37 million, about 13 million were national minorities.¹

Over the years the border regions have become increasingly vital to China's national security, particularly as tension with the USSR and India has developed. For this reason, the historical issue of how to deal with the "barbarians," as the Chinese termed minority peoples, has taken on increased significance for the Chinese Communists. In political affairs, the Chinese Communists organized five "autonomous regions" (A.R.), including the Inner Mongolia A.R., Ninghasia-Hui A.R., Sinkiang-Uighur A.R., Tibet A.R., and Kwangsi-Chuang A.R.² The autonomous regions are governed much like any other provinces of China; however, minority nationalities are given special consideration in recruitment for political positions and in cultural and religious affairs. Below the autonomous regions there are other "autonomous" units organized where minorities constitute a significant element of the population. Since 1949, policy and organization in the autonomous units have been directed toward national integration by the center.

As noted, the PLA has been prominent in the effort to achieve the integration of the border regions. The entire relationship of the minorities and the military must be viewed in this context. This paper has been written to explain two facets of integration: (1) the function of the PLA in national minority areas, and (2) the role of national minority personnel in the PLA. The paper will discuss each and make some conclusions about the overall issue.

FUNCTIONS OF THE PLA IN MINORITY REGIONS

Public Security and Order

Historically, an important function of Chinese armies has been to maintain internal order, and the PLA has continued this legacy.³ The border regions were liberated by military force. After occupying the regions, 1949-50, the PLA led in the formation of military and political commissions which were responsible for governing these areas until around 1954, when the constitution was promulgated and civil administration formally inaugurated. The military assisted in the training of civilian cadres who were to take the reins of government as the military retired from actual administration. Nevertheless, even as the autonomous regions were formed, the PLA remained garrisoned in them. Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet were made military regions. Harold Hinton has observed that PLA units were stationed in these areas to ensure that they would remain securely in the Chinese fold.⁴ Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang had all experienced some moves for independence or greater autonomy by local national minorities; the presence of the PLA guaranteed that any strong political activity in this direction would not succeed.

After the promulgation of the Constitution and the development of party and government organs in the minority regions, the PLA generally retired from direct involvement. Rather, its influence in political decision-making was indirectly felt through other activities, some of which are discussed below. The major exception, of course, is the PLA's intervention to crush the Tibetan revolt in 1959. As border tension with India mounted after the revolt, the PLA played a more direct role in decision-making in Tibet.⁵

During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA once again became closely involved with civil administration throughout China. This was particularly true in the border regions, where many civilian leaders were replaced by military personnel (military leaders were also replaced). In Inner Mongolia, for example, PLA forces stationed outside the region were called upon to oust Ulanfu, Mongol leader of the Inner Mongolia A.R. (IMAR) party and government organs and commander of the military region, and to establish martial law. Inner Mongolia has had two leaders since 1967; both have been military officers.

Inner Mongolia was downgraded from a military region to a military district in 1969 and was placed under the Peking Military Region. Yu Tai-chung, chairman of the IMAR party committee and revolutionary committee and commander of the military district, has been associated with the 2d Field Army system. It is worthwhile to note that the escalation of PLA involvement in IMAR politics during the Cultural Revolution was accompanied by a decline in Mongol participation. Prior to the Cultural Revolution Mongols composed 60% of the IMAR CCP committee and 80% of the People's Council (government). Mongols now account for only 16.5% of high positions in various organs.⁶ Other evidence demonstrates that the PLA presence in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution was designed to ensure against Mongol separatism.⁷

During the Cultural Revolution, the role of the PLA also increased in Tibet and Sinkiang. Both areas experienced turmoil and the PLA had to be called in to establish order. Both areas have a PLA officer as party leader. Tibet, like Inner Mongolia, was downgraded from a military region to a military district. In both regions, national minority leaders were often replaced by PLA soldiers of Han nationality.

In more recent years, the PLA has again sought to retire from civil administration. Nevertheless, it continues to be vigilant for tendencies toward separatism. It remains associated with a second important function—that of training civilian leaders and cadres from among the national minorities.

Recruitment and Training of Cadres

A 1951 article in *People's China* indicated that the PLA was taking an active role in the training of national minority cadres for CCP and government positions.⁸ Under the policy of regional autonomy for national minority regions, it was a requirement that large numbers of national minority cadres be recruited and trained. Inasmuch as the PLA was closely connected to civil administration in these areas, it is not surprising that it assisted in training cadres. Many officers and cadres of the PLA from minority groups became civilian cadres after leaving the military.

The PLA was not so involved in cadre recruitment and training during the late 1950s and early 1960s; however, with its increased role in civil administration during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA again

became closely associated with such activity. Since large numbers of national minority cadres were purged and sent to Mao Tse-tung schools, the PLA had to be concerned with replacing them, at least temporarily. The usual approach was to use minority PLA cadres in civilian work or to encourage them to go into government positions after leaving the military.

In March 1973, *Jenmin Jih Pao* contained accounts of various units engaged in cadre training. A regimental party committee in the Chengtu Military Region was training Tibetans, Miao, Hui, Koreans, Mongols, Manchus, and other nationalities as regimental cadres. These cadres were to be responsible for "forging close ties between the army and the people and, in carrying out army-civilian joint defense."⁹ A similar program was being implemented in Inner Mongolia.

A report from Ch'inghai, in September 1973, stated that the PLA was recruiting and training cadres from the Tibetan, Hui, Tu, Mongol, Salar, Tunghsiang, and Kazakh nationalities. Many of these were being admitted to the Chinese Communist Party; they were being assigned to militia or production work in various parts of Ch'inghai.¹⁰ These reports, and others, illustrate the effort the PLA is making to recruit and train cadres—many of whom find their way into the civilian sector.

The accounts of cadres training demonstrate that the training programs have an integrative aspect. National minority cadres are expected to study the standard works of the CCP, to learn the Chinese language, and to master CCP policy. Much time is spent in studying the writings of Mao. For example, when La-mu-chu-hu, a Mongol PLA soldier, applied for admission to the party, the local party branch sent him to a cultural evening school to study. Assisted by his Han squad leader, he repeatedly studied Mao's teaching, "the party organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat; it should be a vigorous and vital organization of vanguards which can lead the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in struggle against class enemies." After several years of this kind of study, he was admitted to the party.¹¹ This and other accounts show that national minorities recruited and trained as cadres by the PLA undergo a long and thorough socialization experience designed to promote loyalty to the party and the political system.

Militia Work

The training of militia among the national minorities is another important integrative function of the PLA. Shortly after the organiza-

tion of the People's Communes during the Great Leap Forward, the PLA gave increased attention to militia work. As in other areas of China, the autonomous regions and other minority regions organized militia and the PLA was responsible for training. The PLA uses cadres from among the local minority nationalities for militia work. They are familiar with local dialects, customs, and other conditions—which greatly enhances their success in this work. An example comes from the Tunlung Valley of Yunnan. PLA troops first arrived in 1961 and began organizing and training a militia which assisted the PLA in border defense. During the Cultural Revolution, PLA units and the militia organized "Mao Tse-tung Thought" study sessions among the minorities and led the struggle against "the revisionist Liu Shao-ch'i line." The militia is said to have been strengthened and consolidated by these movements.¹²

The importance of PLA work in organizing and training the national minority militia units was emphasized in an article in *Hung Ch'i* in August 1970. Yen Shuai, the author, is a member of the Red Flag Militia Platoon, Hsiaoshin Stockade, Wa Nationality Autonomous Hsien, Western League, Yunnan. Yen described the relationship between the militia and the PLA and gave the PLA credit for teaching the Chinese language to national minorities, transforming the minorities' social organization to create a "new socialist border area," and achieving the economic development of the region. According to Yen, everyone in the stockade said: "Under the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, the great leader of the people of all nationalities, we Aha liberated serfs are enjoying a happy life today, and epoch-making changes have taken place in Hsiaohsin Stockade."¹³

While there are no actual figures on the numbers of minority nationalities involved in the militia, they are probably substantial. The organization and training of the militia by the PLA establish one more link between the minorities and the central authorities. Furthermore, the assignment of minority cadres and officers to militia work (all the while seeking to ensure that these individuals are loyal to central authority) helps to facilitate this program. As more minority people are regularly involved in the militia, their susceptibility to one more form of state-oriented and -managed socialization will be increasingly enhanced.

Production and Construction

One of the most important functions of the PLA in the sparsely populated national minority regions is the provision of personnel and resources for economic development. There are two major programs. One is the effort the PLA makes itself to promote production; the other is through the organization of the Production and Construction Corps, a civilian program managed by the military.

In the late 1950s PLA forces were sent into many areas to assist the national minorities in production. A 1961 report from Yunnan stated that the PLA sent 100 work teams into minority regions to teach the minorities how to plow, fertilize, and harvest. The minorities had been "slash-and-burn" agriculturalists until the PLA assisted them in establishing permanent dwellings, schools, and other facilities and in organizing cooperatives.¹⁴

PLA work in production has been continued in various regions since that time. During the tenth anniversary celebrations of the establishment of the Tibet A.R. in mid-September 1975, it was reported that PLA units had engaged in land reclamation, construction of water conservation projects, and the growing of grain and vegetables. In one year's time, various PLA units contributed more than 239,400 work-days in support of farmland capital construction. They helped the local Tibetans reclaim farmland totaling more than 25,000 *mou*, built irrigation ditches of more than 96,000 meters, accumulated over 3,644 million catties of manure, and repaired and donated 1,823 items of agricultural machinery. They also assisted the Tibetans in livestock production and fruit tree planting, and trained more than 260 bare-foot doctors.¹⁵

In the Lanchou Military Region, PLA soldiers have contributed more than 20,000 man-days annually in assisting national minority herdsmen in such things as irrigating, digging wells, transporting fodder, and wiping out pests and rats. The PLA has also organized veterinary teams to assist in the care of livestock.¹⁶ A report from Sinkiang stated that regular PLA units during the past year had spent 700,000 workdays building more than 210,000 meters of irrigation canals, removing more than 100,000 cubic meters of earth and stone, repairing over 4,700 pieces of agricultural machinery and implements, and planting more than 200,000 trees. PLA soldiers assisted the masses in the cultivation of 130,000 *mou* of farmland and contributed numerous projects for economic development.¹⁷

Besides contributing manpower to construction projects in national minority areas, the PLA is responsible for the Production and Construction Corps (PCC), which has made many contributions to economic development. The PCC was originally established in Sinkiang but was expanded to other border areas during the Cultural Revolution. It has facilitated Han colonization as well as economic development.

During the liberation campaigns in Sinkiang from 1949 to 1950, the PLA captured nearly 100,000 KMT troops. These were combined with a similar number of demobilized PLA veterans to form the first PCC unit. The original 200,000 personnel were subsequently augmented by other veterans, colonizers, and even individuals sent to Sinkiang for "reform through labor." The PCC was subdivided into units specializing in agriculture, mining and industry, communications, repair, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. The original program came under the auspices of the Sinkiang Military Region. The agricultural branch established Sinkiang's state farms and raised wheat, cotton, livestock, and other crops. The industrial branch established factories, and the mining section was responsible for the extraction of uranium, petroleum, and other minerals. Other specialized units handled surveying, planning, architecture, construction, material procurement, equipment installation, research, and so on.

The Sinkiang PCC was extremely successful. A 1966 *China Reconstructs* article observed that the PCC had opened over 600,000 hectares of farmland on former deserts and alkaline wastes, constructed and operated 100 mechanized state farms, built dams, canals, cities, and towns, and had trained thousands of technical workers among the national minorities.¹⁸ Another report indicated that by this time the PCC had constructed more than 112 water conservation projects.¹⁹

The Sinkiang PCC had social and political implications as well. The Han population of Sinkiang increased from about 300,000 to more than 3,700,000 by 1968 (from less than 10% of Sinkiang's total in 1950 to about 50% in 1968), as Han colonists flowed into the PCC projects. The PCC itself had grown to around 500,000 personnel. While many local national minorities were trained and given jobs, the vast majority of those involved in the projects were Han colonists. The great migrations of Han people to Sinkiang lessened the likelihood that national minorities could effectively seek full autonomy from the center.

During the Cultural Revolution, it was decided to expand the PCC to other areas. Between 1965 and 1966 the Lanchou Military Region

(M.R.) established PCC units in areas of Shensi, Kansu, and Ch'inghai. By the early 1970s the total number of PCC personnel in the Lanchow M.R. was over 100,000. In 1966, some Sinkiang PCC personnel were transferred to Tibet; the PCC subsequently has been expanded there. In 1969 the Inner Mongolia A.R. Corps was established and subsequently grew to more than 250,000 personnel. Additional units numbering over 200,000 were established in the border regions of the Shenyang M.R.

In addition to Sinkiang, the PCC has facilitated Han colonization in other national minority regions. Since the establishment of the PCC in Inner Mongolia, the number of Chinese has increased by perhaps as many as 2 million. Many of the Han colonists are middle-school graduates from China's urban areas who are expected to go to frontier regions to engage in "struggle and revolution." Several thousand young people will embark en masse from large cities such as Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Canton for work in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and other border regions. In Inner Mongolia alone in the past few years, more than 200,000 youths have been resettled. The PCC is the only organization with sufficient resources to cope with such large numbers of young colonists.

When young people arrive at the PCC camps, they are expected to work hard and spend time in political study. They are encouraged to become self-reliant as quickly as possible by building shelters, planting gardens, raising animals, and doing related work. The camps are in areas with harsh climate and topography, yet units are expected to become self-sufficient through auxiliary production as well as work on the specific project for which the unit was formed. Corps personnel receive some military training and sometimes participate in border patrols. The rewards for sacrifice and diligent service include the possibility of selection for higher education, designation as a "five-good" fighter, and even membership in the Communist Party or Youth League.²⁰

The Production and Construction Corps has done much in achieving the social, political, and economic integration of the border regions into China, particularly Sinkiang. The economic projects have not only helped the respective regions to advance but have also more closely linked their economies with that of the center. The training of national minority personnel and the promotion of Han colonization have also contributed to this process. Likewise, the contributions of regular PLA units in economic work have had an effect. The economic

work has lessened the possibility of minority separatism; it has had the secondary effect of securing the dominance of Han culture and language in the national minority areas.

Summary

The integration of national minority regions into the Chinese framework has been facilitated by PLA activities. By establishing order, and even stepping into civil administration at crucial points, it has prevented secessionist movements among the minorities from gaining power and has secured China's territorial integrity. It has trained cadres, both Han and minority, to take responsible positions at various levels in CCP and government organs. It has been responsible for the training of the militia. Moreover, it has greatly contributed to economic development, which, in turn, has hastened political integration. The record shows that the national minority regions have become more closely correlated with affairs in the rest of China since 1949; much of the credit for this achievement must go to the PLA.

It must be observed that the PLA, in performing the above functions, has had an important educational role. The PLA has constantly organized study groups among the minorities, sent out propaganda teams, set up cultural programs, and engaged in many other programs designed to acculturate the masses and promote unity. Hence, the PLA serves as an agent for political socialization of the masses. While there is no thorough method for analyzing just how effective the socialization has been in creating national unity, it may not be presumptuous to suggest that it has been at least partly successful. If so, it constitutes one more reason why the PLA must be seen as a vital force for national integration. The paper now turns to a discussion of the role of national minorities in the PLA.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE PLA

In developing countries, the military is an agent for political socialization of its members, an instrument for creating a common sense of identity. This has been recognized from the beginning by the Chinese Communists, who have used the military in an effort to create common bonds of solidarity among various nationalities. During the Long

March, the Red Army actively recruited minority groups, although it experienced some difficulties.²¹ During the War of Resistance against Japan some *hui* (Chinese Moslem) units were established,²² and during the Chinese Civil War Mongol cavalry units were formed.²³ During the Korean War as many as 50,000 Koreans in China volunteered for the PLA.²⁴ Recognizing the importance of minority participation, Article 52 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference guaranteed the right of minority nationalities to join the PLA.

Minority participation in the PLA is considered under three categories: (1) the recruitment of national minority soldiers; (2) the development of minority officers and cadres; and (3) the glorification of selected national minorities as exemplary soldiers. These will be considered separately, and some general conclusions will be drawn.

Recruitment of National Minority Soldiers

Unfortunately, information about recruitment and assignment of national minorities for the PLA is scant. Official reports are self-serving and rarely give information on numbers recruited, where minorities are assigned, and so on. There does seem to be an interesting correlation between recruitment and general nationalities policy. In the early years, the CCP adopted what was termed a "no struggle" policy toward minorities that gave special attention to developing minority customs and culture and to the recruitment and training of national minorities cadres. During that period, minorities were encouraged to join the PLA. In Inner Mongolia, for example, several thousand Mongols joined the PLA and formed separate units. The PLA also had Mongol officers; Mongols accounted for 52% of all officers in the Inner Mongolia M.R.²⁵ Minorities were encouraged to join the PLA in other areas also.

Beginning during the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and through the Great Leap Forward, the regime followed a more assimilationist policy toward minorities. Minorities were encouraged to learn Chinese and to accept the values and precepts of "socialist culture" along with the more advanced Han nationality. During this period there was little mention of minority recruitment for the PLA. It will be recalled that this was the period of revolt in Tibet and unrest in Sinkiang; it is not unlikely that there was some concern over the recruitment of minorities in the armed forces.

In the early 1960s there was a thaw toward the minorities, and once again the press carried accounts of national minority recruitment for the PLA. For example, a report from Yunnan in January 1963 stated that soldiers were being recruited from among the Yi, Tai, Pai, Lahu, Chingpo, Lisu, Kawa, and Penglung nationalities. The soldiers were learning the Chinese language and forming close bonds of solidarity with the Han soldiers. They were also developing correct working styles. In one regiment a total of 210 out of 229 minority soldiers were designated as "five-good" soldiers.²⁶ Another 1963 report stated that various national minorities were being promoted as PLA officers.²⁷

During the Cultural Revolution, policy toward minority nationalities was characterized by a renewal of the assimilationist tactics used during the Great Leap. Mao's statement that the national question was essentially a class question which must be resolved through class struggle was the basis for policy. Once again, very little was said about the recruitment of minorities for military service. Since the Cultural Revolution, there has been another thaw and more information has been forthcoming.

A report from the Liangshan Yi Autonomous *chou* in 1973 stated that persons from the Yi nationality were being recruited for military service.²⁸ There were similar reports from Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Besides recruitment for service in the PLA, a great deal of emphasis has been given to the formation of militia. As noted above, minority cadres in the PLA are frequently assigned to militia work.

Despite the lack of evidence, some educated assumptions can be made about minority recruitment into the PLA. It can be assumed that volunteers are selected in the same manner that Han volunteers are. Prospective recruits are nominated from among the masses and then go through physical tests. Most recruits leave the military after performing the required term of service, but some remain as cadres and officers. Minorities usually remain in the original area of recruitment, and many are assigned to work with their own nationality in production and construction work. It would not be surprising if the number of minority PLA soldiers roughly approximates the ratio of minorities to Chinese in the particular area of assignment.

By virtue of being in the PLA, minorities undergo programs of training and political study which, in Chinese Communist terminology, help to raise their collective consciousness. Involvement in a truly national institution helps to build a sense of national identity and presumably could bring about a transformation of local or regional

loyalties into loyalties to the nation. Clearly, official reports give this impression. Without fully accepting these accounts at face value, we may still safely assume that some transformation has occurred.

The Development of Minority Cadres and Officers

The development of minority cadres and officers has also followed the line of overall nationalities policy. For periods when a "soft" approach was being taken, much more information was available. Especially since the Cultural Revolution, there have been a number of reports concerning the recruitment of cadres and officers among the minorities. In the Liangshan Yi Autonomous *chou*, for example, it was reported that 23.6% of leading battalion and regimental cadres and 63% of company cadres were of Yi nationality. Yi cadres accounted for over one-third of the battalion and regimental cadres in the local militia.²⁹ A report from Tibet stated that all militia cadres in certain communes were Tibetan. At the *hsien* level (the *hsien* or county being discussed contained 10 communes), about 45% of the militia cadres were Tibetan.³⁰

Among very high-ranking minority cadres in the PLA, Wei Kuo-ch'ing stands out. Wei is a Chuang—the largest minority group in China—and has been involved in the Chinese Communist military since the early 1930s. He subsequently became a political commissar in the Canton Military Region and party and government leader of the Kwangsi-Chuang A.R. He managed to hold his positions during the Cultural Revolution and is currently a member of the CCP Politburo.³¹

Other minority leaders have been brought into the PLA indirectly through the political commissar system. Ulanfu, a Mongol, was political commissar of the Inner Mongolia M.R. (he was also commander) until he was purged in the Cultural Revolution. Wu Tao, also a Mongol, currently holds the position of political commissar in the Inner Mongolia M.D. Saifudin, a leader in Sinkiang and now an alternate member of the Politburo, served as a political commissar in Sinkiang. Other minority leaders have also used this avenue. While the number of minorities who achieve high rank within the military, either through regular channels or through the political commissar system, is relatively small, the figure appears good when the population ratio of minorities to Chinese for the nation is considered.

The Glorification of Exemplary Minority Soldiers

The glorification of exemplary minority soldiers is significant. These individuals are held as models to be emulated by all nationalities and symbolize the unity of the political system. In 1975, for example, two minority PLA soldiers were honored for their service.

The most prominent was Lozang Tanzin, a Tibetan officer who died trying to rescue a Tibetan youth from an icebound river in late 1974. The military committee of the CCP Central Committee awarded the title "Model in Cherishing the People" posthumously to him, and he was made an object for emulation throughout the PLA. Several military regions in China held special rites to pay homage to him.³² In praising this officer, the *Tibet Daily* stated:

Launching activities to emulate Comrade Lozang Tanzin should give an impetus to the people of all nationalities in our region who are enthusiastically deepening the study of Chairman Mao's important instruction on the question of theory and the Marxist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat. It will play an active role in spurring them to go a step further to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat well and to criticize revisionism, capitalist tendencies and the ideology of bourgeois rights.³³

In Inner Mongolia, Comrade Meng-ko-ta-lai was honored posthumously for 28 years of valiant and revolutionary service. He was cited for his efforts to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, and particularly for his efforts in defending the motherland from the Soviet revisionists. The report said:

Comrade Meng-ko-ta-lai's fighting life was filled with the proletarian spirit of continuing the revolution, which is a good example for us to emulate. Comrade Meng-ko-ta-lai was a fine member of our party and a good PLA fighter. In the war of liberation he fought valiantly, fearless of hardship or sacrifices. He made contributions to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people.³⁴

Minority exemplary heroes are praised in much the same manner as Han heroes. They are always identified with the same values and show the same determination and valor. They are held up to their nationality as standards of correct political attitudes and efforts. Clearly, the overall message is integration and unity. While it is difficult to say precisely what effect these symbols have on the national minorities, the use of these symbols by the PLA does demonstrate the effort toward integration and unity that the PLA is making in behalf of the political system.

Summary

Three areas have been examined in this portion of the paper: the recruitment of minorities into the PLA, the training of officers and cadres, and the use of minorities as exemplary PLA soldiers. All these further demonstrate the integrative function of the PLA. Recruiting minority soldiers not only helps to provide for national defense but also serves to involve the national minorities in a centralized institution. Training has a socializing function. This is particularly true in the training of cadres and officers who must identify with the ideological precepts of the system in order to advance. Finally, minority exemplary soldiers are used as symbols. National minorities are put on notice that they, too, can be part of the system if they are willing to show identity with the same values, make the same sacrifices, and do the same hard work as the models which they are called upon to emulate.

CONCLUSIONS

At the outset it was observed that national integration is a basic goal of the Chinese Communists. This goal, of necessity, involves the national minorities of China. The PLA, along with party and governmental structures, is seen by the leaders of China as an important instrument for achieving integration. The entire issue of the minorities and the military in China must be viewed in this context.

Students of integration have observed at least two fundamental variables which affect the rate of integration. The first involves technological change. As transportation and communications facilities are developed, the economic integration of an area is promoted. This has certainly been so in the national minority regions of China. The border regions are increasingly interconnected with China's heartland by a variety of roads, railroads, airways, telephone, telegraph, and other communications and transport facilities. Furthermore, their economies have been increasingly linked with that of the national economy. A second variable has to do with the transformation of loyalties from locality and region toward the central system. Certainly, this variable is much more difficult to measure than the influence of technological change (especially in China, where attitude surveys are not easy to come by). It does appear that the use of the Chinese language is becoming increasingly common in national minority areas, even though

much attention is still given to the use of local dialects. More and more minority children are going through an education system which emphasizes nontraditional values. While the final outcome is uncertain, it is clear that minority attitudes and loyalties are undergoing substantial change.

What role has the PLA had in all this? From the evidence cited above, it can be seen that the PLA has an effect on both variables. Through the maintenance of public order, the training of cadres, and production and construction, the PLA has facilitated the material transformation of national minority regions. The PLA has sent out barefoot doctors, built roads, constructed communications facilities, and engaged in countless other projects for this purpose. Moreover, it has created the basis for Han colonization in the national minority regions. The PLA has also recruited minorities, promoted political education, and engaged in similar activities in an effort to transform political consciousness—that is, to transform loyalties.

A review of changes in the national minority regions since 1949 suggests that integration has been occurring. Of course, there are still possibilities for minority separatism, but they are less likely now than in the past. A good share of the credit must go to the PLA, a most important agent for the construction of the new China.

NOTES

1. For population figures on Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, see Armit Lal, "Significations of Ethnic Minorities in China." *Current Scene* 7, 4 (February 15, 1970): 1-25. For additional information on Southwest China, see George Moseley, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 17-26. Moseley also contains a discussion of the distinction between Han and non-Han peoples of China (pp. 2-5). For further discussion of this question, also see G. F. Hudson, "The National Minorities of China." *St. Antony's Papers* 7 (1960): 51-61.

2. A discussion of the Policy of regional autonomy for national minorities is to be found in *Min-tsu ch'u-yu tzu-chih shih-shih kuang-yao* [Program for Implementing Autonomy in Nationality Regions] (Peking: People's Publishing, 1952).

3. Edward L. Dreyer, "Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China," in William W. Whitson, ed., *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 3-24.

4. Harold C. Hinton, "The National Minorities in China." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 19, 11 (September 15, 1955): 321-25, and 29, 12 (September 22, 1955): 367-72.

5. *New China News Agency (NCNA)*, September 8, 1975; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (EBIS) Daily Report* (People's Republic of China: September 11, 1975).

6. William Heaton, "Local Nationalism and the Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia," *Mongolia Society Bulletin* 10, 1 (Spring 1961): 11-47. Also see Ross H. Munro, "China's Mongols Have Special Status in Their Region," *New York Times* (September 1, 1975).
7. William Heaton, "Inner Mongolia: The Political of National Integration in a Key Border Region," in Edwin Winkler, ed., *A Provincial Handbook of China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
8. Teng Chen-tung, "First Fruits of New China's Policy on Nationalities," *People's China* 4, 7 (October 1, 1951): 28-30.
9. "Train a Number of Young Cadres from Minority Nationality Fighters," *Jen-min Jih Pao* (JMJP; March 14, 1973); *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press* (SCMP; No. 5340): 163-65.
10. "PLA Party Organizations under the Ch'inghai Military Area Command Actively Train and Develop Minority Nationality Cadres and Fighters for Admission into the Party," JMJP (August 29, 1973); SCMP (No. 5456): 16-18.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
12. SCMP (No. 4176): 24; SCMP (No. 4753): 82.
13. Yen Shuai, "Build Up the Border Region, Defend the Mother Country," *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag) 9 (August 8, 1970); *Survey of China Mainland Magazines* (SCMM; No. 689): 6-12.
14. "PLA Men Help Minority Nationalities in Construction Work," NCNA (July 28, 1961); SCMP (No. 2551): 27-28.
15. NCNA (September 8, 1975); FBIS (September 11, 1975). One *mou* equals 1.6 acres. One *catty* equals 1.3 pounds. A "barefoot" doctor is a Chinese paramedic having some medical training and being assigned to rural health work.
16. "PLA Men Help Develop Animal Husbandry in Northwest China Minority Area," NCNA (August 4, 1975); SCMP (No. 5915): 160-61.
17. "Sinkiang PLA Units Aid Socialist Construction," NCNA (September 28, 1975); FBIS (September 30, 1975).
18. For the history of the PCC, see Wu Chao, "A Study of the Chinese Communist Buildup of 'Production and Construction Corps' Along the Sino-Soviet Frontiers," *Issues and Studies* 6, 2 (November 1969): 56-62. Also see Husayin Abaydulla, "The New Sinkiang," *China Reconstructs* 1 (January 1966): 26-28.
19. Chang Yun-t'ien, "Communist China's Production and Construction Corps," *Chungkung Yenchiu* (Chinese Communist Affairs; March 1970); translated by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service No. 50719 (June 11, 1970): 27.
20. "How We Help Educated Youth Reform Their World Outlook," JMJP (February 22, 1970); SCMP (No. 4608): 91-96. In the early 1960s the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP Central Committee launched a movement to develop "five-good" soldiers. A "five-good" soldier should be "good" (1) in political thought. He should study politics hard, study Chairman Mao's writings, obey Chairman Mao's words, carry out Chairman's directives and thereby become a good soldier; (2) in military training; (3) in the PLA "three-right" work style (referring to Mao's three rules and eight points of discipline for the PLA); (4) in accomplishing tasks; and (5) in physical training. Soldiers who achieve these in a satisfactory manner are designated "five-good" soldiers.
21. Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1944), pp. 213-15.
22. Snow, *Red Star*, pp. 339-55.

23. Ting Mou, "Nei-meng-ku jen-min tzu-ti ping ti ch'ang-chang." (The Development of the Inner Mongolian People's Brother Soldiers), *Nei-meng-ku tzu-chih-ch'u ch'ang-li shih-chou-nien chi-nien wen-chi* [Selections Commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region] (Huhehot: Inner Mongolia People's Publishing, 1957): 174-179.
24. Ling Fang, "The Koreans of China," *People's China* 3, 5 (March 1, 1951): 23-24.
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26. "Soldiers of Minority Nationalities of Frontier Guard Unit in Yunnan Grow Rapidly," *JMJP* (January 21, 1963); *SCMP* (No. 2917): 5-6.
27. *SCMP* (No. 3130): 12-13.
28. "Southwest China Minority People Become Army Cadres," *NCNA* (April 12, 1973); *SCMP* (No. 5360): 88.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *SCMP* (No. 5361): 135-37.
31. "Wei Kuo-ch'ing: Kwangsi Party Secretary," *Current Scene* 9, 7 (July 7, 1971): 18-19. For backgrounds on other minority military figures, see W. W. Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971* (Rand Report R-1091-DOS ARPA, June 1973).
32. *Radio Lhasa* (June 27, 1975); *FBIS* (June 30, 1975).
33. *Tibet Daily* (June 27, 1975); *FBIS* (June 30, 1975).
34. *Radio Huhehot* (May 19, 1975); *FBIS* (May 22, 1975).

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