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## ARTICLES

## At the Meeting-Point Between Two Communist Empires

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In a previous article, the present writer pointed out that there is a certain tendency in the West to regard the present Sino-Soviet conflict as a continuation of the ancient struggle between a vast but ramshackle China and an aggressive and imperialistic Russia, who has gradually extended her Asiatic territories at the expense of China's northern and northwesterly possessions.<sup>1</sup> It was also commented that the adherents of this view either completely ignore the ideological aspect of the conflict and the rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and their leaders Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev, or else regard these factors as a mask used by both countries to conceal a steadily worsening clash of national interests. They argue that (a) starting from the seventeenth century, Russia, taking advantage of China's weakness, took from her huge areas in Siberia, the Far East and what is now Soviet Central Asia; (b) China, having become powerful under Mao Tse-tung's centralized authority, is now prepared to fight for the return of all land lost by her in past centuries, including land now belonging to the Soviet Union; (c) the Chinese government is forced to pursue such a policy by the country's serious overpopulation; (d) to the north and northwest of China lie the half-deserted Asiatic regions of the USSR, to much of which China has legitimate claims; (e) the huge numbers of Chinese massed along the Soviet frontiers will eventually pour into the Soviet Union itself in an irresistible wave. Thus, the American journal *Newsweek* wrote:

The eastern half of the Soviet Union is a vast empty land, teeming with untapped resources; China's population, which will pass the 1 billion mark by 1980, is bursting out of its own frontiers.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> K. Pavlov, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: Origins and Present Prospects," *Bulletin*, Munich, 1963, No. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Newsweek*, New York, March 26, 1962.



A year later, in March 1963, the British *Economist* remarked that "Russia has been disturbed by the large number of Chinese colonising northern Manchuria and Sinkiang, which are just south of Russia's border."<sup>3</sup> In September 1963, Chinese government statements and an editorial in the newspaper *Jen Min Jih Pao* of September 5, 1963, revealed that the USSR had hospitably accepted some tens of thousands of refugees from the Sinkiang-Uighur autonomous region of the Chinese People's Republic who had crossed the Soviet frontier in the spring and summer of 1962, to escape from hunger and religious and political persecution according to the Soviet press.<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times* made the following comment:

The Chinese-Soviet conflict appears to be heading toward revival of traditional greatpower Russian and Chinese territorial rivalries in the Asian heartland. This was the interpretation advanced by the diplomatic specialists upon the sharpening quarrel between Peking and Moscow over events along their remote Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border. Chinese allegations of Soviet intrigue in this border area are seen as a new step in a long-range Chinese drive to regain the vast territories lost by the Chinese Empire in the nineteenth century to Russia and other nations.<sup>5</sup>

Let us now examine the truth of these assertions.

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Until 1963, neither government nor press of either the Soviet Union or China had given any serious grounds for supposing that there were any unresolved territorial disputes between the two countries. Not even Chiang Kai-shek's government had ever made such a suggestion, at least not officially. Nevertheless, in about 1959, in connection with China's ever more aggressive policy, which manifested itself in the frontier conflict with India, the territorial dispute with Burma and the deterioration of relations with Djakarta, reports began to appear in the Western press to the effect that Mao Tse-tung's government was bent on recovering several regions which China had lost to Russia in past centuries. Probably the most important piece of evidence used to support this theory was a map entitled "The Seizure of Chinese Territory by the Imperialists in 1840-1919," showing the Chinese frontiers in 1840 and in 1919, which appeared in 1954 in Liu Pei-hua's book *A Brief History of Modern China*, reissued in 1960.<sup>6</sup> Among the regions lost by China during this period the map includes most of the area now occupied by the Soviet Central Asian republics, a large part of Kazakhstan, the Amur and Primorie regions, the island of Sakhalin, certain regions bordering on India and Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, the Andaman Islands, Malaya, Thailand, Indochina, Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, the Sulu Archipelago and Korea. However, it is questionable whether the appearance in 1954 of such a map as an illustration to a historical work and the reissue of this work in 1960 should be

<sup>3</sup> *The Economist*, London, March 16, 1963.

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, September 7, 1963.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, September 11, 1963.

<sup>6</sup> Liu Pei-hua, *Hsientai chingkuo chianshib* (*A Brief History of Modern China*), Peking, 1954 (2nd ed., 1960). See *The Economist*, March 16, 1963, and *The New York Times*, September 11, 1963.



taken as anything more than an attempt by Mao Tse-tung's government to increase its popularity among the people by playing on their nationalistic feelings. In any case, there is little reason to consider the publication of the map as showing anti-Soviet tendencies. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the close attention paid in the West to the cartographic exercises of the Chinese Communists is not without justification. Thus, during the frontier disputes with India and Burma in 1959 maps showing the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese frontiers as envisaged by the Chinese Communists were displayed in all large Chinese towns. It is also perhaps not universally known that at that time the frontiers not only with India and Burma but also with the USSR, especially those in the Far East, were the subject of discussion at meetings in governmental and educational institutions all over China. An interesting point about these discussions is the frequent reference to a small piece of Chinese territory in the region of Poset which the USSR allegedly occupied after 1945 in order to have a common frontier with Korea, although there has been no confirmation of this from either the Soviet or the Korean side. Again, in 1960, during his visit to India and Burma with Chen Yi, Chou En-lai merely told foreign correspondents "to mind their own business" when they asked him directly whether there was any territorial dispute between the USSR and China.

However, on March 8, 1963, *Jen Min Jih Pao* hinted vaguely at unresolved territorial problems between the two countries in an editorial headed "On the Declaration of the Communist Party of the USA." This gave rise to more talk in the West about Communist China's might and increasing aggressiveness, the hypnotic effect of her teeming and fast expanding population, and the threat which it posed not only to India and the small countries of Southeast Asia but even to the Soviet Union itself. The press interprets the *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial rather freely, often drawing arbitrary conclusions from it, and it is for this reason that we are giving the relevant excerpts in the present article. Before doing so, however, it is well to point out that the newspaper's polemics regarding the territories lost by China are not really intended for the American Communists but for Khrushchev—the references to him are unmistakable—for it was he who first remarked, not without a touch of malice, that "India, for example, has succeeded in liberating Goa, Diu and Daman" whereas "the government of the Chinese People's Republic is tolerating Macao and Hongkong," in a speech delivered at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 12, 1962.<sup>7</sup> Khrushchev's motives for making such a comparison were well understood in Peking, despite various flattering references to China. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung refrained from attacking Khrushchev directly until Khrushchev's argument was taken up by the American Communists in their declaration on the Cuban crisis and the fight for a stable world peace, which was published in the *Worker* of January 13, 1963.

Here are the relevant passages from the *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial on the territorial disputes between the Soviet and Chinese Communists:

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, December 13, 1962.



In the declaration of the Communist Party of the USA it is remarked, not without ulterior motives, that the Chinese comrades are acting "correctly" in not pursuing an adventurist policy toward Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao, but that they are inciting others to pursue such a policy. Why [ask the American Communists] are they [the Chinese Communists] observing such a dual standard?

We know from whom these strange arguments are borrowed. We also know the ulterior motives of their author. We should like to reply to all those who are raising the given question.

We have never had a problem with any "dual standard." In solving the Taiwan question, the Hongkong and Macao question, just as all international questions, we have only one standard, and that is Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, the interests of the Chinese people and the peoples of the whole world, the interests of world peace and the revolution of the peoples of the whole world. In the international struggle we oppose both adventurism and capitulationism. Neither of these labels can in any way be attached to us.

As soon as anyone refers to Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao we cannot avoid touching on the history of imperialist aggression in China. During the hundred odd years prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution, imperialist and colonialist countries—the USA, Great Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Portugal—were engaged in unbridled aggression against China. They forced the government of old China to sign many unequal treaties with them, such as the Nanking Treaty of 1842, the Aigun Treaty of 1858, the Tientsin Treaty of 1858, the Peking Treaty of 1860, the Saint Petersburg Treaty of 1881, the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 1887, the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, the Anglo-Chinese agreement on Hongkong in 1898 and the Peking Final Protocol of 1901. On the basis of these unequal treaties they seized territory in the east, west, north and south of China, and leased lands in her coastal and interior regions. . .

Upon proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, the government of our country declared that those treaties left to us by history and concluded by former Chinese governments with the governments of foreign states will be accepted or revoked, reviewed or renewed according to their content. In this respect, our policy toward the socialist countries is basically different from our policy toward the imperialist states. But even our policy toward the imperialist countries varies according to circumstances. In fact, some of the numerous old treaties have become invalid, others have been revoked or replaced by new treaties. We are of the unshakeable opinion that all unresolved problems left over from the past must be solved in a peaceful manner when the conditions are ripe for their solution; until then the *status quo* must be preserved. Such is the case with Hongkong, Kowloon and Macao and all frontiers which were not fixed on a bilateral basis.<sup>8</sup>

It will be seen that the above quotation contains no indication that Communist China is making any direct territorial claims on the USSR, let alone threatening her with the use of military force. Under present circumstances the Mao Tse-tung government has no interest in making threats. On the contrary, *Jen Min Jih Pao* is merely repeating previous statements by the Chinese Communists to the effect

<sup>8</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, March 8, 1963, as quoted in Chinese-language weekly *Sinwen Tienti*, No. 788, Hong Kong, March 23, 1963.



that they have a different approach to socialist and capitalist countries in regard to territorial questions, and stressing that China will try to arrive at a peaceful solution of such problems even with capitalist countries. Although the Sino-Indian border conflict greatly detracts from the value of such statements, it must not be forgotten that Communist China has concluded frontier agreements with such countries as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and Burma. Although *Jen Min Jih Pao* gives no precise definition of China's policy on territorial questions toward the socialist countries, it is only logical to assume that it must be of a peaceful nature. The facts appear to confirm this assumption. About a year ago, on December 26, 1962, Peking signed a frontier agreement with Outer Mongolia, which until comparatively recently was an integral part of China, at least formally. The fact that Mao Tse-tung still regards the USSR as a socialist country emerges from the letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of June 14, 1963, in which the USSR is listed among thirteen socialist countries.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the conflict between the USSR and China has led to an increase in tension in the Chinese-Soviet frontier regions. The flight of some tens of thousands of refugees from China to the Soviet Union, which we have already mentioned, would have been impossible a few years ago for the simple reason that the Soviet border guards would have either arrested them at the frontier or else sent them back immediately. Even now there are cases of individual persons' crossing the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border. Not only are such border violators not sent to a concentration camp for 10-15 years, as was the case under Stalin, but receptions, interviews with journalists, etc., are arranged for them. The border crossers have given Khrushchev another trump card in his fight with Mao. Moreover, the propaganda from both the USSR and China is continuing to build up hatred between the two peoples. For example, on August 5, 1963, Moscow Radio broadcast from Blagoveshchensk-on-Amur a conversation with river port traffic controller F. G. Tarasov purporting to show that "the once deep and brotherly friendship between Soviet and Chinese rivermen" was no more. Tarasov said that the situation had reached a point where "Chinese ships on the Amur do not even reply when greeted by Soviet ships." In the Soviet Union, antagonism toward the Chinese is now so great that Soviet citizens no longer bother to conceal it from them. According to a report from London, members of other Asiatic nations have had to suffer from this antagonism because they were mistaken for Chinese by Soviet citizens.<sup>10</sup> Soviet-Chinese hostility was also manifested by the Naushka frontier station incident, when Chinese railroad officials and passengers held up the Peking-Moscow express for two days at the beginning of September 1963, and by the arrest of five Chinese officers at Zabaikalsk railroad station and their subsequent return to China by the Soviets.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao*, June 17, 1963.

<sup>10</sup> *Russkaya zhizn*, San Francisco, September 3, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> *The New York Times*, September 14, 1963.



After ignoring the insinuations of *Jen Min Jih Pao* for over six months, the Soviet government in September 1963 unexpectedly made public a number of new facts concerning the situation on the Soviet-Chinese frontier,<sup>12</sup> including the fact that in 1962 alone five thousand cases of violating the Soviet frontier by the Chinese had been recorded. The Soviets presumably selected this piece of information for its propaganda value. It is no secret that prior to the Sino-Soviet quarrel the frontier between the two countries was not guarded very seriously by either side. The Soviet border guards—wherever there were any—turned a blind eye to violations of the border by the “Chinese brothers,” who were often plain fishermen or peasants. At the present time, however, all such violations are being carefully recorded in order to have further grounds for recrimination against the Chinese. Moreover, by taking these border violations in conjunction with the Chinese refusal of repeated Soviet suggestions to arrange meetings for demarcating certain disputed sections of the frontier the Soviet government has expressed its concern over the frontier situation, even accusing China of embarking on a dangerous course by demanding the revision of historic frontiers and “artificially creating territorial problems, particularly between socialist countries, at the present time.” This is much more of a serious warning than the *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial. It is also significant that immediately after the Soviet government’s statement the newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* began to publish letters in which Soviet soldiers and officers expressed their readiness to defend their country “against any attack.”<sup>13</sup> Despite China’s power, it is the threats of the USSR which have the more impressive ring.

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For lack of space, it is not possible to make more than a few brief remarks on the nature of the relations between Russia and China in past centuries. One thing is certain, i.e., that the steady advance of the Russians through Siberia to the shores of the Pacific, a process which lasted many centuries, was not marked by any serious clashes, let alone bloody wars, between the Russians and the Chinese. As they moved eastwards through the “Siberian vacuum” the Russian Cossacks, few in number, came across only a sparse and half-wild population which had nothing in common with the Chinese. The desolate regions acquired by Russia under the treaties of Nerchinsk (1689), Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) had never belonged to China’s primordial lands and were populated not by Chinese but by various Mongolian, Tungusic and Turkic tribes. The boundaries between the Russian and Chinese territorial possessions in these regions were established not by force of arms but peacefully—“by common agreement, for the sake of the deep, eternal and mutual friendship between the two states [and] for the benefit of their subjects,” as the preamble to the Aigun treaty of 1858 put it.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> TASS, September 20, 1963; *Izvestia*, September 21 and 22, 1963.

<sup>13</sup> *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 24, 1963.

<sup>14</sup> Yakov Brandt, *Sbornik traktatov Rossii s Kitajem* (A Collection of Treaties Between Russia and China), Peking, 1915, p. 9.



Moreover, from the purely formal point of view, China herself was not an independent national state between 1644 and 1911. At the end of the sixteenth century there was a new uprising of the Manchus (Jurchens), who inhabited what is now northwest China and had the status of vassals under the Chinese. In 1644, at which time Russian outpost settlements were firmly established along the rivers Argun and Amur, the Manchus overthrew the Chinese dynasty, installed their own emperor on the throne, and gave the country the new official name of Tai-tsing, or the Great Tsing State, which endured until 1911. It was the Manchus, not the Russians, who waged numerous wars of aggression during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Central Asia, thereby conquering Mongolia, the Oirots of the Altai region, East Turkistan, Kokand, several Kirghiz hordes, Tibet and other regions.<sup>15</sup> Thus if modern China, in her capacity as successor to the Manchurian Empire, lays claim to various regions lost during the last century of its existence, she must reckon with possible counterclaims. The Mongols, who once had the whole of China in their possession from 1280 to 1367, could make considerable territorial claims on both China and Russia if they were powerful enough.

Thus, the borders between China and Russia in eastern Siberia and the Far East were more or less finally established by the middle of the nineteenth century. It was at this time that the Western powers began to pursue their "gun-boat" policy in China. On the other hand, it was not until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century that the Russians, who had taken part in the policy of dividing China up into spheres of influence, appeared in Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea, regions on which China has far sounder claims than on the Amur and Primorie regions. The fact is that in the end Russian expansion in Manchuria benefited only China herself, for as a result of Russo-Japanese competition Manchuria became rapidly populated by the Chinese and was developed economically by the capital, skill and energy of first the Russians and then the Japanese. According to incomplete data, by the end of 1945 Japanese investments in Manchuria had reached a total of about 9,300,000,000 American dollars, whereas the total of all foreign investments in China up to the end of 1937 was only 4,500,000,000 dollars.<sup>16</sup> Although the Chinese are still reaping the benefits of this expansion, in their eyes it puts Russia on a level with all the other countries who used armed force in their policy toward China.

After the Revolution in Russia, the Soviets tried to follow the policy of the previous Russian government in northeastern China, but were forced to leave Manchuria completely in the nineteen thirties. Although in 1945 they reappeared in Manchuria on the basis of the same rights granted to Russia under the 1896 and 1898 Conventions with China, they stayed only for a very short time. The Soviet government was, however, very successful in Outer Mongolia, whose autonomy under the nominal suzerainty of China was established in 1915 under the Tripartite Agreement between China, Russia and Outer Mongolia.<sup>17</sup> Since

<sup>15</sup> A. V. Tuzhilin, *Sovremenny Kitai* (Modern China), Saint Petersburg, 1910, Vol. II.

<sup>16</sup> Chen Chen, "Some Peculiarities of Industry in Old China," *Hsinhua yuepao*, Vol. I, No. 1, Peking, October 1949.

<sup>17</sup> Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 95.



1921, the USSR has been the real master of Outer Mongolia. Under the treaty of friendship and alliance concluded between the USSR and Nationalist China in August 1945, Outer Mongolia was recognized as a separate country independent of China; China officially recognized Outer Mongolia's independence on January 5, 1946. Although the 1945 treaty was annulled as a result of the signing of a friendship, alliance and mutual aid treaty between China and the USSR in February 1950, Outer Mongolia's independence was confirmed in this treaty also.

On the other hand, in the nineteenth century Russia pursued a policy of open conquest in Central Asia, where her main rival was Britain and where China herself had been a ruthless conqueror as long ago as the second century B.C. Nevertheless there were no direct military clashes between the Russians and the Chinese in this area, as the Russians, in an attempt to forestall Britain, conquered regions in which the Chinese had lost power. The St. Petersburg Treaty (known in Chinese literature as the Ili or Kuldja Treaty), which *Jen Min Jih Pao* refers to as being unequal, was in reality concluded under special circumstances. East Turkistan and Dzungaria, later united under the name of Sinkiang, were inhabited in the nineteenth century, as now, by Moslem peoples. Both regions, particularly East Turkistan, which was finally conquered by the Manchus in only the eighteenth century, were the scene of continuous uprisings, culminating in the 1862-74 Dungan uprising against the Manchus and the Chinese, which affected all China's western possessions and caused tremendous devastation. In Dzungaria alone, up to half-a-million Chinese lost their lives. Many populous cities, particularly numerous in the valley of the Upper Ili, lay in ruins, irrigation canals were abandoned and pastureland became desert. On their way back, punitive expeditions of Manchu and Chinese troops slaughtered all the inhabitants. Strange as it may seem, China was aided in finally suppressing the Dungan uprising and reestablishing her power in the rebellious western provinces by the Russian government, with whose assistance the Manchu and Chinese forces succeeded in advancing from the Great Wall to Dzungaria.<sup>18</sup> In addition to this, Russia, concerned that the uprising might spread to her own territory, took advantage of the favorable situation and occupied the Ili (Kuldja) region in 1871 as a temporary measure. Russia later agreed to return the region to China, with the exception of a narrow strip of land in the west, inhabited by Kirghiz and Kazakhs, which she kept "in order to settle there all inhabitants of this [the Ili] region who will adopt Russian citizenship and who, as a result, will be forced to leave the lands which they possessed there."<sup>19</sup> It is thus not true that Russia received vast territories in Sinkiang as a result of the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881, as is considered for some reason or other in the West, or that this treaty was not recognized by the Chinese Empire,<sup>20</sup> for the Chinese Emperor ratified it on May 15, 1881.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, Russia did push forward to the borders of Sinkiang until the

<sup>18</sup> A. Stolpovskaya, *Očerok istorii kultury kitaiskogo naroda* (An Outline History of the Culture of the Chinese People), Moscow, 1891, p. 408.

<sup>19</sup> Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>20</sup> *The New York Times*, September 11, 1963.

<sup>21</sup> Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 81.



end of the nineteenth century. The situation on this section of the Russian-Chinese frontier remained stable right up to the nineteen thirties, when the Soviet Union, forced to leave Manchuria, transferred its activities to western China, in particular Sinkiang. But we shall discuss this later.

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The frontier between China on the one hand and the USSR and her loyal vassal the Mongolian People's Republic on the other stretches for almost ten thousand kilometers. It is commonly thought in the West that to the north of this frontier lie the vast but deserted territories of the Soviet Union, and to the south the overpopulated regions of China. But is this really so?

Let us first consider the size of China's population, whose rapid growth has long been a cause of serious concern to other nations. Even at the turn of the century many responsible persons in Russia (e.g., V. S. Solovev), Germany (Kaiser Wilhelm the Second) and France were talking loudly of the "yellow peril." In the nineteenth century, the Russian sinologue V. P. Vasilev wrote, on much the same lines as the Western press today:

It is sufficient [for China] to first populate all the lands under her control, and a vast empire with a highly-developed and industrious population of one thousand million will arise. After having seized the islands of the Eastern [Pacific] Ocean, richest in the world, China can at the same time threaten Russia and India, America and Western Europe. Given the power, she has the ruthlessness to slaughter all recalcitrants, even the entire world if need be!<sup>22</sup>

Similar warnings of a colossal growth in China's population, the imminent threat which she poses to her neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union, and the ruthlessness of the Chinese Communist leaders, who are prepared to sacrifice hundreds of millions of their own and other peoples on behalf of Mao Tse-tung's ideas, are being voiced at the present time. We have only to remember the "Starlinger theory" on the tremendous "biological pressure" exerted by China on Soviet Russia, Adenauer's repeated assertions that an armed conflict between overpopulated China and the Soviet Union is inevitable, and finally the words spoken by President De Gaulle at his second press conference in Paris on November 10, 1959:

No doubt Soviet Russia, in spite of having aided Communism to take root in China, recognizes that nothing can change the fact that she is Russia, a white nation of Europe which has conquered part of Asia and is, in sum, richly endowed with land, mines, factories and wealth, face to face with the yellow masses of China, numberless and impoverished . . .<sup>23</sup>

But is the population of China really increasing so rapidly, and is China really so overpopulated that her inhabitants are now living under intolerable conditions, or at least will be in the near future? The figures on China's population during the past hundred years are so contradictory that it is inadvisable to rely on them too heavily. They show, however, that at the beginning of the twentieth

<sup>22</sup> As quoted in Stolpovskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

<sup>23</sup> *The New York Times*, November 12, 1959.



century the population of China was about 400 million.<sup>24</sup> According to the statistical authorities of Nationalist China, the population of China in 1931, her last year of peace, was 475 million.<sup>25</sup> In 1953 the Chinese Communist government carried out a nation-wide census, whose thoroughness and accuracy it particularly stressed. This census, the only one of its kind which has ever been made in China, showed that in June 1953 the population of China was 582 million, excluding Formosa and Chinese living abroad,<sup>26</sup> which gives an average annual increase of about 4,860,000, or one percent, for the period 1931-53. As these years were particularly hard ones for China, owing to the war with Japan, the interminable civil wars, natural catastrophes, etc., "during the last ten to fifteen years prior to the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, the population not only failed to increase, but even decreased."<sup>27</sup> For the years following the 1953 census the Chinese Communists give very high figures for the natural population increase, having been obliged to do so by their own declarations on the unprecedented rise in the people's well-being and the radical improvement in sanitary and living conditions and also in medical services. Thus, for the years 1953-56 the mean annual increase is given as 13,300,000, or about 2.2 percent,<sup>28</sup> the figure for 1956 being as high as 15 million, or 2.5 percent.<sup>29</sup> In 1959-60, the time of the "Great Leap Forward," the Chinese leaders, evidently using this rate of increase as a basis, talked repeatedly of the "700-million-strong Chinese people," although about the middle of 1960 they reduced this figure to 650 million, which figure they are using today in their propaganda.<sup>30</sup> The reasons for these fluctuations can only be surmised. Perhaps the Chinese leaders came to realize, during the numerous campaigns which they carried out to mobilize the population on a large scale for work in industry, agriculture, on construction projects, etc., during the "Great Leap Forward," that there were in fact fewer people in the country than the statisticians maintained. This would mean that either the figures given by the "accurate" 1953 census were too high or that the mean annual population increase was overestimated as a result of failing to take into account the effect of the considerable deterioration in the food situation, particularly after the organization of the collective farms (agricultural production cooperatives) and then of the people's communes. In any case, it would seem that during the period 1953-63 the population of China increased by 68 million, or by an average of slightly over one percent per year, i.e., at much the same rate as during the difficult years of 1931-53. It is interesting to note that in 1957 Soviet economists P. I. Glushakov and G. A. Ganshin, in their introductory article to the Russian translation of a book on the economic geography of China, noted that "the

<sup>24</sup> On the basis of Chinese and foreign sources, Tuzhilin gives China's population at the beginning of the twentieth century as 434 million (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 106).

<sup>25</sup> Cheng Chu-yuan, *Income and Standard of Living in Mainland China*, Vol. I, Hong Kong, 1958, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> *Jen Min Jih Pao*, November 1, 1954.

<sup>27</sup> *Bolsbaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. XXI, Moscow, 1953, p. 180.

<sup>28</sup> *Tungchi Kungtso*, Peking, 1957, No. 11.

<sup>29</sup> I. Kh. Ovdienko, *Kitai: Ekonomiko-geografichesky obzor* (China: An Economic-Geographical Survey), Moscow, 1959, p. 49.

<sup>30</sup> See the editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, August 30, 1963.



population of China is now increasing by four to five million persons annually" and considered that this figure represented a great achievement for Communist China when compared with previous ten-year periods.<sup>31</sup> It may thus be seen that the predictions made in the West that the Chinese population will reach the thousand million mark by 1980 are based on the exaggerated figures on the natural population increase published by the Chinese themselves up to 1961. It can confidently be said that the Chinese population will not have reached such a level even by the year 2000.

The mere fact that China's population is almost three times as large as that of the USSR does not mean that China will inevitably invade her Communist neighbor one day. Moreover, the Soviet Union now has a much higher rate of population increase—an average of 1.7 percent per year (in 1960 it was 3,800,000, or 1.8 percent)<sup>32</sup>—than China. And finally, we must not forget the words of the American Homer Lea, who wrote in 1912 that "inferior numbers *plus* military capacity results in a sum of actual power; superior numbers *minus* military capacity results only in potential power."<sup>33</sup>

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If the Soviet-Chinese border regions be examined objectively from the point of view of population density and degree of economic development, it becomes apparent that the Asiatic territories of the USSR are not one vast semidesert, a kind of "vacuum" waiting passively to be swamped by some tens of millions of Chinese, nor is there any unusual concentration of Chinese in the regions bordering on the USSR. Let us compare all the Asiatic regions of the USSR excluding the Urals—i.e., Western and Eastern Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics—with Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the Ningsia-Hui autonomous region, Kansu, Sinkiang and Tibet. (Although Tibet has no common frontier with the USSR, it is being included to provide a counterbalance to the huge deserted areas in the far north of Siberia, which likewise have no common frontier with China.)

The area and population of the regions concerned in the USSR may be seen from the following table:

	Area (Thousand Square Kilometers)	Population (Millions)	Population Density (Per Square Kilometer)
Total USSR.....	22,402.0	219.7	9.9
Western Siberia .....	991.9	12.6	12.7
Eastern Siberia .....	7,226.0	7.3	1.0
Soviet Far East .....	3,112.7	4.4	1.3
Kazakh SSR .....	2,756.0	10.9	3.9
Kirghiz SSR .....	198.5	2.3	11.7
Tadzhik SSR .....	143.0	2.2	15.3
Uzbek SSR .....	408.9	9.0	22.0
Turkmen SSR .....	488.0	1.7	3.4
All Regions .....	15,325.0	50.4	3.3

SOURCES: P. G. Podyachikh, *Naselenie SSSR* (The Population of the USSR), Moscow, 1961, p. 67; *Estadistik Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii 1962* (Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia for 1962), Moscow, 1962, *passim*.

<sup>31</sup> *Ekonomicheskaya geografia Kitaya* (The Economic Geography of China), translated from the Chinese, Moscow, 1957, p. 11.

<sup>32</sup> P. G. Podyachikh, *Naselenie SSSR* (The Population of the USSR), Moscow, 1961, p. 24.

<sup>33</sup> Homer Lea, *The Day of the Saxon*, s.l., 1912, pp. 41-42.



Although these regions, which occupy two-thirds of the entire area of the USSR and contain slightly less than a quarter of the population, thus have a mean population density of only 3.3 inhabitants per square kilometer, a very different picture is obtained if the regions of permafrost and bitter cold in northern Siberia and the Soviet Far East, as well as the deserts of Kazakhstan, are excluded. Thus, taken as a whole, the Krasnoyarsk Krai, with its area of 2,402,000 square kilometers and a population of 2,615,000 (according to the 1959 census), has a mean population density of only 1.1; the vast majority of its inhabitants (2,271,000) lives in an area of 472,000 square kilometers in the south of the krai, giving a mean population density of 4.5 for this area.<sup>34</sup> This is typical of the tendency of the population of the Asiatic regions of the USSR to settle mainly in the territory bordering on China and Outer Mongolia. In fact, most of the inhabitants of the USSR in Asia now live in this area, mainly in the immediate vicinity of railroads and rivers. The settlement of the eastern regions of the USSR began long before the October Revolution, and obviously had no connection with the "yellow peril." Migration to the Asiatic territories of Russia began centuries ago, becoming particularly marked at the beginning of the twentieth century. The settlement of Siberia, Soviet Central Asia and the Soviet Far East has been proceeding steadily under the Soviet regime. From 1926 to 1959, the population of the USSR (within the boundaries prior to September 17, 1939) increased by 28 percent, that of the Soviet Far East by 340 percent, that of Eastern Siberia by 190 percent and that of Western Siberia by 160 percent. From 1939 to 1959, these figures were only 9.5 percent for the USSR as a whole, but 70 percent for the Soviet Far East, 34 percent for Eastern Siberia, 28 percent for Western Siberia, 53 percent for Kazakhstan and 30 percent for the Soviet Central Asian republics.<sup>35</sup> The growing importance of the Asian regions of the USSR is reflected in the appearance of hundreds of new industrial enterprises such as factories, mines, electric power stations, etc., and in the great increase in the area under grain crops. In the eastern regions of the USSR, the demand for manpower will probably result in an even greater influx of population than in the past.

The area and population of the Chinese border regions are as follows:

	Area (Thousand Square Kilometers)	Population (Millions)	Population Density (Per Square Kilometer)
Total China .....	9,600	650.0	67.7
Manchuria .....	800	45.6	57.0
Inner Mongolia .....	1,200	8.8	7.3
Ningsia-Hui Autonomous Region ...	80	2.0	25.0
Kansu .....	360	13.0	36.1
Sinkiang .....	1,650	6.0	3.9
Tibet .....	1,200	1.2	1.0
All Regions .....	5,290	76.6	14.4

SOURCES: *Nash drug Kitai: Slovar-spravochnik* (Our Friend China: An Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1959, and I. Kh. Ovdienko, *Kitai: Ekonomiko-geografichesky ohzor* (China: An Economic Geographical Survey), Moscow, 1959, *passim*.

<sup>34</sup> Podyachikh, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.



Thus the Chinese border regions and Tibet, occupying an area of 5,300,000 square kilometers, or 55.2 percent of the total area of China, contain 76,600,000 inhabitants, a mere 11.8 percent of the total population, giving them a population density of 14.4 inhabitants per square kilometer, i.e., little more than one-fifth of the average for China as a whole. It is therefore clear that there can be no talk of an unusual concentration of the Chinese population near the borders of the USSR. Only in Manchuria does the population density approach that of China as a whole, and even here most of the inhabitants live in the southern provinces of Liaoning and Kirin. The northern Manchurian province of Heilungkiang, which, with an area of 460,000 square kilometers, occupies over half of Manchuria, has only 12 million inhabitants,<sup>36</sup> and therefore a population density of only 25.9.

The bulk of China's population is concentrated in the eastern part of the country, where the mean population density is comparatively high, 130–150 inhabitants per square kilometer. Even so, it must be remembered that in Japan the corresponding figure is 250 and in Belgium 300. On the other hand, there are parts of China whose population density is far above the average, e.g., in the south of the province of Kiangsu it is 600.<sup>37</sup>

The general picture, therefore, is that the population of the USSR's Asian regions is concentrated in the south, near the borders of China and Mongolia, the north being very sparsely populated; the population of China, on the other hand, is concentrated largely in the interior regions, in an area less than half the size of China as a whole, whereas the vast frontier regions are sparsely populated, with the possible exception of Manchuria, although even here the population is concentrated in the south, far from the Soviet frontier.

Incidentally, it is untrue that China is so poor in agricultural land that she is faced with the necessity of taking such land from other countries, by force of arms if necessary. According to incomplete information, Communist China has about 100 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land suitable for cultivation, almost as much as is now being cultivated. Most of the virgin land is located in the frontier regions themselves, in Inner Mongolia, Manchuria (where only about half the land suitable for agriculture has been reclaimed), the Sinkiang-Uighur autonomous region, and the province of Chinghai. There are also large areas of virgin and long-fallow land in the provinces of Szechwan, Kwangtung, Fukien and Kiangsi and in the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous region. By the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958), 53,300,000 hectares of the aforementioned 100 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land had been inspected, whereby it was found that 33,300,000 hectares could be reclaimed fairly easily, without great capital expenditure. During the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57), 5,100,000 hectares of virgin land were reclaimed; during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62), it was intended to reclaim 10 to 13 million hectares, although

<sup>36</sup> *Nash drug Kitai: Slovar-spravocbnik* (Our Friend China: An Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1959, p. 102.

<sup>37</sup> Ovdienko, *op. cit.*, p. 50; *Ezbeodnik Bolsnoi Sovetskoj Entsiklopedii 1962* (Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia for 1962), Moscow, 1962, *passim*.



there is as yet no information on the extent to which this plan was fulfilled besides the fact that 1,300,000 hectares were reclaimed in 1958.<sup>38</sup>

There were many factors preventing China's border regions from being settled prior to the establishment of the Communist regime: unfavorable natural conditions; hostility toward the Chinese on the part of the local inhabitants, mostly herdsmen; ancestor worship and other religious views preventing the Chinese from leaving the graves of his ancestors; the combination of a poverty-stricken population and a lack of government resources, etc. In modern China only the last of these factors is valid, as resettlement is no longer a voluntary process, being carried out entirely with government means. The Chinese Communist authorities embarked on large-scale resettlement in 1956. As a first step, it was planned to transfer 20–25 million persons to the virgin land regions.<sup>39</sup> By the end of 1958, 1,380,000 persons had been transferred from the provinces of Kiangsu, Hopei, Shantung, Honan and Hupai to Sinkiang, Chinghai, Kansu, Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia.<sup>40</sup> Resettlement is thus proceeding slowly but steadily. The virgin lands are being reclaimed mainly by mechanized state farms; for example, 100 recently created state grain and animal farms with over 10,000 tractors and a large number of combines and other machines have reclaimed 1,260,000 hectares of virgin land in the Tarim Basin in Sinkiang.<sup>41</sup>

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The border regions of both the USSR and China have a fairly high proportion of national minorities, consisting largely of peoples who were already occupying these areas upon their annexation by either of the two countries. The presence of such minorities can, of course, be exploited for political ends if necessary, in which respect the USSR has the advantage that at the present time the population of such huge territories as Siberia and the Soviet Far East is virtually homogeneous as regards national and racial composition. According to the 1959 census, the indigenous inhabitants of these two regions account for about 3.5 percent of the total population, the bulk of which is Russian, although the Ukrainian element is also large. In the nineteen thirties the Soviet government, preparing for the war against Japan, transferred all the Koreans living in the Soviet Far East to Central Asia. From 1939 to 1959 the number of Chinese living in the USSR also dropped considerably, from 92,000 to 26,000, many returning to China before 1941. Most of the Chinese permanently resident in the USSR have lost their national habits and customs to a considerable degree; some have even forgotten their native language. From 1956 to 1958, hundreds of "Soviet Chinese" left the USSR for Peking and other large Chinese cities, evidently in the hope of a better life. A small number were specialists such as engineers, teachers, doctors, etc. However, having come into contact with the realities of life in their old homeland, which had become particularly unattractive during the years of the "Great Leap

<sup>38</sup> *Nash drug Kitai*, p. 360.

<sup>39</sup> *Ovdienko, op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>40</sup> *Nash drug Kitai*, p. 55.

<sup>41</sup> *Pravda*, March 28, 1962.



Forward," nearly all the "Soviet Chinese" hastened to return to the USSR. The Chinese authorities did not stop them; the "Soviet Chinese," especially the young people, had been affected by the post-Stalin thaw and brought "a spirit of mutiny" into China at a time when the Chinese Communist Party had just introduced a rigid policy which demanded an unquestioning subordination of personal interest to the interests of the state and unbounded sacrifices for the Party cause. Under these circumstances the "Soviet Chinese," who openly expressed dissatisfaction with conditions in China, were merely a source of irritation to the Chinese Communists, who now regard them as enemies rather than allies.

The proportion of indigenous inhabitants in Kazakhstan and the Soviet Central Asian republics is greater, although even here the Slavic element is increasing extremely rapidly. The 1959 census showed that the indigenous population accounts for 30 percent of the total in the Kazakh SSR, 62.2 percent in the Uzbek SSR, 40.5 percent in the Kirghiz SSR, 53.1 percent in the Tadzhik SSR and 60.9 percent in the Turkmen SSR.<sup>42</sup> The continuing influx of population from the European USSR into Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, connected with the rapid economic development of these areas, will doubtless further reduce the proportion of indigenous population, despite the latter's fairly considerable natural increase. This population trend is part of a more general process in which the political, economic and cultural center of Russia is moving eastward. At the present time, there are no forces in sight in Asia which appear capable of stopping this process or even of slowing it down.

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Lack of space does not permit us to discuss the economic development of the Soviet border regions in the present article. We shall therefore proceed to examine the situation in the Chinese border regions. Although a military conflict on the Chinese-Soviet border is highly improbable, it is always possible that a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations will focus the USSR's particular attention on these regions: in pre-Communist China, the USSR tried to spread its political influence, mainly in Manchuria, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, and it is quite possible that in his quarrel with Mao Tse-tung Khrushchev will once again start probing in these areas, albeit with the limited aim of encouraging hostility toward the central authorities and thereby spreading unrest and dissatisfaction throughout the country.

However, the situation which Khrushchev would now face in these areas is essentially different from the one obtaining even immediately after 1949. This is particularly true of Manchuria. From the beginning of the present century, Manchuria (known in Chinese as Tung-pei) was for a long period practically outside the immediate control of the Chinese central authorities. The first half of the century saw numerous changes of regime in Manchuria, although this did not prevent either a rapid increase in her population or her economic development. The population grew from about 3 million in 1894-95 to 15 million in

<sup>42</sup> *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu: Statistichesky ezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1960: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1961, pp. 21-22.



1910, 22 million in 1923 and 40 million in 1945.<sup>43</sup> Even when the Communist regime became established in Peking in 1949, Manchuria, with the status of a large administrative region, continued in many ways to be semi-autonomous and was under the control of a single man, Kao Kang. However, the years 1953 and 1954 saw the liquidation of both Kao Kang and the system of large administrative regions, and the heavy hand of Peking descended upon Manchuria. It was at about this time that the Soviet government was compelled to cede to China its rights to the Chinese Changchun railroad and its share in joint Sino-Soviet industrial and commercial enterprises. Soviet trade and transport organizations in Manchuria also had to close down. In 1954, the naval base of Port Arthur was handed over to the Chinese. Joint Soviet-Chinese research begun in 1956 to reveal the natural resources of the basin of the Argun and Upper Amur rivers for future joint exploitation was broken off in 1962, having achieved virtually nothing, it may be added.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the Soviet government relinquished its positions in Manchuria one by one. Moreover, the Russian inhabitants of Manchuria, numbering over 100,000 at the beginning of the nineteen thirties, have now nearly all left, most of them for countries in the free world but some for the USSR. According to the most recent information, Harbin, once the most important center of Russian influence in Manchuria, now has only a few hundred Russian inhabitants. The Soviet authorities themselves are chiefly to blame for the exodus of Russians from China in general and Manchuria in particular. In 1945-46, the USSR granted Soviet citizenship to all former subjects of the Russian Empire who happened to be in Soviet-occupied territory at that time, with a view to exploiting these "human spoils of war" in the political maneuvering with the Nationalist government of China which it was intending to start in Manchuria. When the Communists came to power in China, the Soviet authorities encouraged the Chinese government to apply political and economic pressure to the local Russian inhabitants in an attempt to discredit the former "White" Russians in the eyes of the ordinary Chinese and drag their standard of living down to the Chinese level—in other words, to make them "white Chinese" in both word and deed.

This does not mean, however, that the way back into Manchuria is closed for the USSR. It must be borne in mind that in Manchuria, whose historic name was once used for a state quite independent of China, there still live about two million Manchurians, over 500,000 Koreans and about 450,000 Mongolians,<sup>45</sup> who might provide a basis for the organization of national movements hostile to the Chinese. Moreover, it is conceivable that there might arise in the Far East a situation—possibly even engineered by the Soviets themselves—which would require the presence of Soviet troops in Manchuria under the provisions of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of alliance concluded in 1950. Manchuria is not only of considerable strategic importance, but also plays a huge role in China's economy. It is the chief industrial region of China, producing about half her steel, cast iron

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<sup>43</sup> Ovdienko, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, April 6, 1962.

<sup>45</sup> Ovdienko, *op. cit.*, p. 149.



and coal and about 40 percent of her iron ore, as well as being China's top gold-producing area. The machine-building industry is also highly developed in Manchuria, where hundreds of large plants turn out all kinds of machine tools, locomotives and rolling stock, automobiles, mining equipment, boiler installations, hydraulic turbines, etc. Neither should Manchuria's agriculture be ignored, as it produces about 40 percent of China's soya beans, about 10 percent of her grain, 10 percent of her tobacco, 6-9 percent of her cotton and 55 percent of her ambary.<sup>46</sup> Manchuria's importance to China's economy means that whoever controls her economy to a large extent controls the entire national economy of China. And yet, however much the Chinese Communists may boast of their economic autarky and however high they may rate their potentialities, a further, more rapid and stable, development of the national economy of China in general and Manchuria in particular is possible only with foreign financial, technical and scientific assistance. With the present alignment of world forces it is hardly likely that China could obtain such assistance outside the Soviet bloc, and it is also questionable whether the Soviet Union would tolerate the presence of specialists from the free world in the immediate vicinity of her frontiers even if China had agreed to accept them as one of the conditions for financing her industrialization. On the other hand, agreement by Peking to accept once again extensive economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union would mean capitulation of the Mao Tse-tung regime and the establishment of rigid Soviet control over China; as Soviet specialists said openly upon their departure from China in 1960, "Now we are leaving, but if we ever return there will be ten times as many of us."

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Another region where there is a fairly serious, although perhaps inconspicuous, clash of Soviet and Chinese interests is Outer Mongolia, with which the problem of Inner Mongolia is also connected. As previously remarked, this clash of interests originated quite a long time ago. It is common knowledge that at the beginning of the nineteen twenties Outer Mongolia lay unmistakably within the Soviet sphere of influence, a fact of which Mao Tse-tung was naturally not unaware. Nevertheless, in an interview with the American writer and publicist Edgar Snow in 1936 Mao Tse-tung found it possible to say:

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolians will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will.<sup>47</sup>

Despite this, on January 5, 1946, Chiang Kai-shek's government accepted Outer Mongolia's independence in accordance with the provisions of the 1945 Yalta conference, and Mao Tse-tung was compelled to do the same under the 1950 treaty with the USSR. Although it would thus appear that formally the Chinese Communists have reconciled themselves to the loss of a country with an

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 153-54.

<sup>47</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1944, p. 96 (footnote).



area of 1,600,000 square kilometers and a population of about one million,<sup>48</sup> there are numerous indications that during all these years Peking has never ceased to hold the view that it still has the right at least to establish relations with the Mongolian People's Republic guaranteeing it a special position in that country. China made attempts to penetrate into Outer Mongolia *via* the channels of economic and technical assistance and the promotion of cultural relations. The Soviet Union, for its part, in rendering assistance to Outer Mongolia, did not press the Mongolian Communists to carry out "socialist transformations" in the country. For example, collectivization of agriculture was really begun in Outer Mongolia only in 1958 and completed in 1959.<sup>49</sup> Industrialization also proceeded at a slow pace. All this was the result firstly of the USSR's reluctance to rush collectivization in a country with a predominance of nomadic herdsmen, notoriously hostile to collectivization, and secondly—this applied particularly to the years immediately after World War II—of her own lack of the means to render the required economic and technical aid to all countries in the Soviet bloc. Peking was thus able to make considerable progress in expanding and consolidating her positions in Outer Mongolia during the period 1958–60. In 1959, Outer Mongolia's trade turnover with China was 15.5 percent of her total foreign trade turnover, and continued to rise in 1960. In May 1960, State Council Premier Chou En-lai paid a visit to Ulan Bator, as a result of which a treaty of friendship and mutual aid was signed by the two countries. At the same time, agreements on scientific and technical cooperation and on the rendering of economic and technical assistance to Outer Mongolia were signed. China actively participated in the construction of a number of industrial enterprises in Outer Mongolia, despatching for this purpose the required materials as well as hundreds of specialists and skilled workers.<sup>50</sup> Cultural exchange between the two countries was also intensified. However, the recent fierce and open battle between the Soviet and Chinese leaders has also left its mark on Chinese-Mongolian relations, as the Mongolian Communists unhesitatingly aligned themselves with their Soviet colleagues. The openly anti-Chinese statements of the Mongolian leaders gradually began to affect the two countries' diplomatic relations, and September 1963 saw the departure of all the Chinese specialists and skilled workers in Outer Mongolia, numbering over 700.<sup>51</sup> The official explanation that they had left because "their turn of duty had expired" was the same as that given for the sudden departure of all Soviet specialists from China in the summer of 1960. Nevertheless, there are grounds for supposing that the Chinese specialists and skilled workers left Outer Mongolia at the request of that country's government, which would be a further proof of the strong Soviet influence there.

The position of the Outer Mongolian Communists is not unconnected with the situation in Chinese, or Inner, Mongolia. It should first be remembered

<sup>48</sup> *Razvitie ekonomiki stran narodnoi demokratii Evropy i Azii: Statistichesky sbornik* (The Development of the Economies of the People's Democracies in Europe and Asia: A Statistical Handbook), Moscow, 1961, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup> *40 let narodnoi Mongolii* (40 Years of People's Mongolia), Moscow, 1961, p. 17.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 122 and 135.

<sup>51</sup> See English-language broadcasts of Hsinhua on September 21 and October 10, 1963.



that the Chinese Communists proclaimed the autonomy of Inner Mongolia on May 1, 1947, i.e., two-and-a-half years prior to the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, after having created the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia from the various territories with a large Mongolian population which they had occupied. This haste was doubtless dictated by hidden political motives, and was possibly a concession to Outer Mongolia, behind which stood the USSR herself. Just as the Chinese have evidently not yet entirely reconciled themselves to the loss of Outer Mongolia, neither have the Mongolians been able to renounce entirely the hope of reuniting the two Mongolias, a hope which is nourished by the strong traditional antagonism between the nomad and the tiller of the soil and by the historic past of the Chinese and Mongolian peoples. To be sure, many observers are inclined to think that the Mongolian desire for reunification would hardly be received favorably by the Soviet Union because a strong Mongolia could lay claim to Buryat Mongolia and Tuva, whose peoples are akin to the Mongolians, but this is mere theory. However, practical considerations, especially the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations, make it quite possible that the Mongolian People's Republic would advance a claim, be it a purely formal one, to Inner Mongolia. Of course, such a claim would have to be made with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet government, who would use it as a counter threat in the case of more insistent Chinese reminders of the Russian-Chinese treaties of the last century.

At the present time, Outer Mongolia is exerting a magnetic attraction on the Mongols in Inner Mongolia by virtue of its indisputably higher economic and cultural level. The Chinese authorities realize this, and have therefore been attempting to dilute the Mongol population of Inner Mongolia by the gradual incorporation into the latter of numerous regions with a predominantly Chinese population. As a result, out of the 8,800,000 inhabitants of Inner Mongolia only 1,100,000, or 13 percent, are Mongols. The recent increase in the rate of industrialization of this primarily agricultural territory will accelerate the influx of Chinese and thus further reduce the proportion of Mongols, the more as the natural increase of the Mongol population here is virtually zero.<sup>52</sup>

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Whereas the possibility of renewed Soviet activity in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is a mere assumption, in Sinkiang, which is the third—and from the Soviet point of view the most promising—area of conflicting Soviet and Chinese interests which we shall examine, there are quite clear traces of new Soviet political intrigues. Sinkiang, or the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Regions as it is now officially known, is one of the vast peripheral regions of China which the Chinese themselves have developed least of all. Of its six million inhabitants, no more than 5 percent are Chinese, the bulk of the population being made up of Uighurs (75 percent), Kazakhs (10 percent) and other Moslem peoples.<sup>53</sup> In the nineteen

<sup>52</sup> Ovdienko, *op. cit.*, pp. 284—89.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 295—96.



thirties, when the Soviet Union began to extend its influence to the eastern part of the area, it was in a state of constant ferment. This is not surprising if it is remembered that, besides the clash of Soviet and Chinese interests in eastern Sinkiang, the British had a powerful influence in western Sinkiang and were trying to extend it. It was an easy matter to instigate revolts among the local population, which was largely hostile to the Chinese people and the Chinese authorities. Thus, when unrest among the Moslems in the Hami region broke out in 1930, Soviet and Mongol agents infiltrated into the area and did everything possible to fan the flames of revolt. In 1933, General Sheng Shih-tsai executed a *coup* in eastern Sinkiang and, supported by Moscow, proclaimed himself governor-general of Sinkiang. The Soviet Union gave him all he needed, including weapons, ammunition, money and advisers, receiving in exchange key political and economic positions in the territory. One of the six political principles proclaimed by General Sheng Shih-tsai was friendship with the Soviet Union. Moscow was also given complete liberty to carry out extensive pro-Soviet and Communist propaganda among the local population, as well as the army, in Sinkiang. Schools, cinemas, theaters, the press—all were used by official and unofficial Soviet representatives for their own purposes. Thousands of young people in Sinkiang were sent to schools and places of higher education in the Soviet Union.<sup>54</sup> Although in 1942 General Sheng Shih-tsai, evidently assuming that the Soviet Union had lost the war against Germany beyond all hope, turned against Moscow, liquidating thousands of Communists and Soviet agents, in 1944 the Soviet republic of East Turkistan, with its own army, made up largely of Uighurs and Kazakhs, was set up in the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai regions, which were the richest in eastern Sinkiang in terms of natural resources and bordered directly on the Soviet Union. In 1949, Chinese Communist forces arrived in Sinkiang and the East Turkistan republic was dissolved, many of its leading personalities being subsequently liquidated by the Mao Tse-tung regime.<sup>55</sup> The dissolution of East Turkistan did not, however, mean the end of all Soviet influence in Sinkiang. In 1950 Communist China, under pressure from Stalin, concluded a special agreement with Moscow which provided for the organization of two joint Sino-Soviet companies in Sinkiang, one for mining non-ferrous and rare metals, including uranium ore, and the other for extracting and refining oil.<sup>56</sup> In 1954 Khrushchev ceded to China the Soviet share in these enterprises, but according to unofficial reports received in exchange from Peking an assurance that colonization of the territory by the Chinese would be restricted. After its departure from Sinkiang, the Soviet Union left behind considerable traces of its influence among the local inhabitants, an influence deepened by the close ties of kinship between the peoples of Sinkiang and the Soviet Central Asian republics.

Local hostility toward the Chinese continued after Sinkiang came under Chinese Communist rule, unrest and uprisings occurring almost every year. The

<sup>54</sup> *Sinwen Tienti*, No. 801, June 22, 1963.

<sup>55</sup> Urael Gluckstein, *Mao's China*, London, 1957, pp. 409–10.

<sup>56</sup> *Nash drug Kitai*, p. 238.



situation was worsened by the social changes in local agriculture, industry and trade, particularly those which took place during the period of the "Great Leap Forward" and the establishment of the people's communes. In 1956, for example, there was a large uprising in the region of Ining (Kuldja) and Tacheng (Chuguchak), both former centers of Soviet influence in Sinkiang not far from the Soviet frontier. In 1957, there were large-scale disturbances in the border region between Sinkiang and the province of Tsinghai.<sup>57</sup> In 1958-59, there were again serious disturbances throughout the whole of Sinkiang.<sup>58</sup> In 1962 there was another large uprising, which resulted in the departure of some tens of thousands (according to Western press reports, 50,000) of Kazakhs, Uighurs, Dungans and Chinese to the Soviet Union. This uprising had also started in the Ining-Tacheng region, in the spring, and had spread to the whole of Sinkiang by the summer. It was put down by additional Chinese Communist troops rushed to the area.<sup>59</sup> Despite the exacerbated relations between the Soviet Union and China, there was no reaction to the uprising in the press of either country during the remainder of 1962. Only in the autumn of 1963, at the height of the dispute between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties, did the Chinese government officially accuse the Soviet consulate in Kuldja of having incited the people of Sinkiang to rebel against the local Chinese authorities and of having enticed them over onto Soviet territory. There is doubtless a certain amount of truth in the Chinese accusations. The Soviet government, for its part, used the flight to underline the inviability of Mao Tse-tung's economic and national policies. However, when the inhabitants of Sinkiang fled to the USSR in 1962 they were probably not showing any particular liking for the USSR but merely choosing the lesser of two evils. During recent years, thousands of people have fled from Sinkiang to other countries besides the USSR, such as India, Pakistan and Turkey.<sup>60</sup>

The situation in Sinkiang now appears to have become stabilized. At any rate, at the beginning of October Chou En-lai said in an interview with Gerald Long, general manager of Reuters, that in Sinkiang "the situation has recently improved."<sup>61</sup> How genuine and lasting this period of calm will prove to be depends largely on the future course of the conflict between the leaders of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties.

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Two general conclusions may be drawn from this brief review of the geopolitical situation on the boundary separating the two Communist empires. Firstly, national and racial problems are at present playing a minor role in the present Sino-Soviet conflict. Secondly, the balance of power along the Soviet-Chinese border will continue to be in favor of the USSR at least until the end of the present century.

<sup>57</sup> *Sinwen Tienti*, No. 801, June 22, 1963.

<sup>58</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Mass., September 7, 1963.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, October 2, 1963.

<sup>60</sup> *Sinwen Tienti*, No. 801, June 22, 1963.

<sup>61</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, October 15, 1963.