CHINA VERSUS RUSSIA IN SINKIANG

(A Problem in Sino-Soviet Border Area "Attachment")

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CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 12, 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in an address on China policy before the National Press Club in Washington, charged that the Soviet Union was in the process of "detaching" the Sino-Soviet border areas of Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang from China. He declared that this was the "single most significant, most important fact in the relation of any foreign power with Asia."

The crux of Mr. Acheson's statement was contained in the following remarks[1]:

> The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas [Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang] as well, long antedates Communism. This is not something that has come out of Communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang, there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas-- populated by Chinese--, the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union.

The use of the word "attachment" tended to blink the fact that the United States, as a signatory of the three-power Yalta agreement of February 11, 1945, had underwritten the basic conditions whereby the "status quo" was "preserved" in Outer Mongolia and a predominant Russian economic interest was restored in Manchuria[2]. The China provisions of this agreement were later incorporated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance,

signed in Moscow on August 14, 1945 by the Soviet and Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) representatives.

An Outer Mongolia plebiscite provided for in the 1945 Wang-Molotov treaty led to the legal independence of that area[3]. Under the Manchurian terms of the 30-year treaty, the Soviet Union obtained a partnership with China in the reorganized Chinese Changchun Railway (the old Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways), preeminent economic interests in the internationalized free port of Dairen and joint use with China of the naval base at Port Arthur. By recognizing the "status quo" in Outer Mongolia, the United States acceded to a situation in which the Mongolian People's Republic was under the complete military and political domination of the Soviet Union. By agreeing to restore "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904," the United States helped reestablish the primacy of the Soviet Union in Manchuria.

Under the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement, the Soviet Union was supposed to recognize the "sovereignty" of China in Manchuria. But the treaty itself was an impairment of Chinese sovereignty, both in the manner in which it was foisted on China under the Yalta decisions and in its concrete provisions giving the Soviet Union territorial and economic rights in the northeast provinces. Moreover, V-J Day left the Soviet Union in occupation of Manchuria— a practical fact that made Russia not China the real ruler there.

Russia did not consult China when its occupation forces began stripping former Japanese factories and sending the dismantled machines to the U.S.S.R. as "war booty." Moreover, the prolonged Red Army occupation, the new railway partnership and the new status of Dairen as a Soviet-dominated

"free port" made the Chinese Nationalist advance into Manchuria subject to the Soviet will.

While the Chinese Communists infiltrated into Manchuria from North China by way of Jehol, the Hopei Corridor and Dairen (in junks from the Shantung Peninsula), the delayed Russian evacuation from Mukden stalled the advance of Nationalist General Tu Yu-ming at Hsinmin, about 35 miles west of Mukden. Tu Yu-ming lingered at Hsinmin for months. Meanwhile, Soviet Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky prescribed that only a few thousand Chinese Nationalist police troops-- not regulars-- could be flown in from Peiping to establish Chinese "sovereignty" in Russian-occupied Changchun. Malinovsky refused to let the Nationalists use the jointly-controlled Chinese Changchun Railway for military purposes. He also refused to permit naval vessels to land Nationalist troops at Dairen for an advance into Manchuria from that port.

This is not the place to argue the merits of the Yalta agreement, which may well have been justified from President Roosevelt's viewpoint in terms of the strategic and political factors obtaining in February, 1945. The agreement must not be overlooked, however, in assaying Mr. Acheson's statement of January 12, 1950. It should also be pointed out that notwithstanding the Secretary's assertion that the border areas are "populated by Chinese," the Chinese constitute the primary population only in Manchuria. Outer Mongolia is inhabited almost entirely by Mongols. The Chinese constitute only a small minority of the population in Sinkiang.

Nevertheless, these two qualifications of Mr. Acheson's statement do not invalidate his fundamental thesis that the Soviet Union has made deep

inroads into present-day Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. He is equally correct in his assertion that the interest of the Russians in the border areas of China "long antedates Communism." The entire history of Russian activities in these three areas supports his statement. For those seeking to probe the relationship between Tsarist and Soviet attitudes towards the Sino-Russian borderlands, the report of General Kuropatkin[4] to Tsar Nicholas II in 1916 is worthy of note:

> ... As for China, the danger menacing Russia in the future from that Empire of 400,000,000 people is not to be doubted. The most vulnerable point on the Russian border, as 800 years ago, will be the Great Gateway of the Nations, through which the hordes of Ghengiz Khan invaded Europe. So long as Kulja will remain in Chinese hands, the protection of Turkestan against China will be a matter of great difficulty and will require considerable military force. It is impossible to leave this gateway in the hands of the Chinese. The alteration of our frontier with China is absolutely imperative. By drawing the border line from the Khan Tengri range (27,000 feet high and the highest in the Tian Shan Mountains) in a direct line to Vladivostok, our frontier will be shortened by 4,000 versts and Kulja, Northern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria will be included in the Russian Empire[5].

In the post-1945 period, it was quite clear that the Soviet Union did not fear the intrinsic power of Nationalist China in the Sino-Soviet border areas. It was also clear, however, that the Soviet Union <u>was</u> concerned about the American military and economic support to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Central Government in China. While Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky's Third Ukrainian Army was occupying Manchuria, the United States Third Amphibious Corps was also stationed in North China along the railway leading from Tientsin to Ch'inwangtao.

The United States, and with good reason, was just as much concerned about the presence and activities of the Soviet Union in North Asia in the

first five years after the Japanese surrender. There were the Chinese Communist infiltration and absorption of Japanese arms in Manchuria, the stripping of Manchurian factories by the Soviet Red Army, the Soviet obstacles placed in the path of the Chinese Nationalist advance into the northeast provinces, the continuing presence of Red Army troops in Dairen, the establishment of the pro-Soviet "North Korean Republic," the close relations between the Soviet Union and the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" in Sinkiang and the failure of "independent" Outer Mongolia to open its borders to any non-Russian outsider or to exchange diplomatic representatives with any other country except the Soviet Union.

When the war against Japan ended, the United States and the Soviet Union-- as former allies and as the world's two leading powers-- faced each other as prime antagonists in the Far East as well as in Europe. In Europe they rushed into the vacuum created by the defeat of Germany; in Asia, they rushed into the vacuum created by the defeat of Japan. From that time on, their mutual strategic thrusts and counter-thrusts in both areas started producing an inter-acting and ever-worsening set of conflicts leading up to the present world crisis.

Stalinist Communism, based on a doctrine of world revolution, guided by the policy of the center in Moscow and linked to the national interests of the Soviet Union, confronts the world today as a new kind of imperialist aggression. Its dynamic process of expansion also has a defensive concomitant, however, in what amounts to a Soviet psychosis about protecting the USSR's eastern and western frontiers not only against trespass, but also against approach. This fear may be understood to a large extent in terms

of the Bolshevik suspicion of the "Western capitalists."

But it can only be appreciated theoretically until one runs up against it directly. Explaining why the Red Army had removed key industrial machinery from Manchuria after V-J Day, a Russian major I met on a trip from Mukden to Changchun in 1946 summed up what seemed to be a general feeling among his brother officers: "We can never again permit an industrialized Manchuria to be used by a hostile power as a dagger pointed at our back."

Just as the western frontier of the Soviet Union is now cushioned by the "iron-curtain" states of Eastern Europe, so the eastern frontier is now cushioned by the "iron curtain" of Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. There are still British and French consulates at Mukden, a British consulate at Tihwa, and Indian and Pakistani consulates at Kashgar. On the whole, however, the entry of Western foreigners into the Sino-Soviet border belt is now even more difficult than entry into the Eastern European border belt.

Soviet interests in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang are similar, and certain broad conclusions may be drawn from post-war Soviet policy in all three areas. Nevertheless, each remains a distinct area, with its special history, its special characteristics and its special problems.

Of the three areas, Sinkiang and Manchuria are still parts of China, while Outer Mongolia was literally detached from China under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945[6]. But even in Sinkiang and Manchuria, the specific contexts differ. Manchuria is populated primarily by Chinese, while Sinkiang is populated primarily by Uighurs and Kazakhs who are related linguistically and ethnically to the peoples living on the Soviet side of the border. The

cultural traditions of the present Chinese population in Manchuria are rooted in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Most of the inhabitants of Sinkiang are Moslems. While there is regional feeling in Manchuria, it compares hardly at all with the pressures for autonomy in Sinkiang and the bitter hatred among the Moslem "Turkis" there for the "infidel" Chinese. Moreover, while there is still the shell of a modern industrial system in Manchuria, Sinkiang has a primitive and undeveloped economy.

As part of a general interest in all three Sino-Soviet border areas, the writer has singled out Sinkiang for special study in an attempt to narrow down to one area the problem of what Mr. Acheson has called "attachment" and to probe within this particular context for the answers to such questions as the following:

What is the background of Chinese and Russian penetration into Sinkiang? What are the Chinese and Russian interests in Sinkiang? What are the attitudes of the peoples of Sinkiang towards China and Russia? What are the forces pulling Sinkiang in the direction of Russia and in the direction of China? What do these countries, respectively, have to offer Sinkiang? And finally, how is the problem of Sinkiang likely to condition the broader alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist-dominated China?

The writer visited Sinkiang in the summer of 1948 along with Ian Morrison of the London Times and A. Doak Barnett of the Chicago Daily News and Institute of Current World Affairs. We were not able to get permission, however, to enter the territory of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" in the three northwest zones of Sinkiang. The best we could do was get to Suilai on the Manas River, the boundary line between rebel and Chinese

territory, about 100 miles northwest of Tihwa. At that time Chinese and "Turki" sentries faced each other across the narrow, slate-gray river, which bisects the road from Tihwa to Ining, then the capital of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic."

Two-and-a-half years before I was able to travel through Sinkiang and Northwest China, a six-month tour of duty as a correspondent in post-war Manchuria impressed upon me the importance of the Sino-Soviet border areas as a territorial belt containing China's political center of gravity. It was certainly not an original discovery. But as a "personal" discovery, it stimulated a special interest on my part in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia as well as in Manchuria.

This year, thanks to a fellowship provided by the Council on Foreign Relations, I have had an opportunity to examine Sino-Soviet border relations as a university student rather than as a correspondent. This, then, is an attempt to blend both experiences and focus them on one segment of the entire border area problem.

Although there is considerable published material available in Western languages on Sinkiang's past, there are wide gaps in the material available on its recent past. While I was in Sinkiang in 1948, I tried to fill in those historical gaps for myself through interviews with Chinese, Uighur and Kazakh leaders and with British and American residents in the area. They were kind enough to recount as much of Sinkiang's history as they could remember and I could assimilate in the time available.

Much of the information included herein about post-war developments in

Sinkiang already had appeared in the New York Times under the writer's signature. Chapter II of this study was originally presented to the History-Government 392 seminar at Columbia University's East Asian Institute on March 27, 1950. This seminar paper has been incorporated herein with only minor revisions as a summary of the "Sinkiang Problem."

Wherever possible, I have documented the material contained in this thesis. Where I have not been able to do so for one reason or another, the responsibility for its accuracy is-- of course-- mine.

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NOTES

1. Department of State press release No. 34, January 12, 1950. The brackets around "Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang" in the first part of the quoted statement are the writer's. The brackets enclosing the word "areas" later in the quoted statement are from the State Department release.

2. United States Relations with China (State Department "White Paper"), United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949, pp. 113-114.

3. Text, 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, White Paper, pp. 585-596.

4. General Kuropatkin, then Governor-General of Turkestan, was the first commander of Russian forces in the Russo-Japanese war. He was replaced during the course of that war.

5. Quoted in Russia and Asia, A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, The Macmillan Company, 1933, p. 256.

6. The new Communist-dominated Chinese People's Republic recognized Outer Mongolia's independence in the Vyshinsky-Chou En-lai agreements of February 14, 1950. The published agreements included a communique, text of a new 30-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, and several annexes dealing with a US $300,000,000 Soviet credit to the Chinese People's Republic and modification of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty terms on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Dairen and Port Arthur. (New York Times, February 15, 1950.) On March 28, 1940 the Soviet Telegraph Agency (Tass) announced that a 30-year Sino-Soviet agreement also had been signed for joint exploitation of Sinkiang's oil and nonferrous mineral resources. (New York Times, March 29, 1950.)

II. THE SINKIANG PROBLEM

Sinkiang (the "New Dominion")[1], China's largest and westernmost province, is a geographical enclave that lies in the heart of Asia flanked by China, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan, India and Tibet. Throughout its long and turbulent history, it has been a crossroads for shifting and mingling peoples, a meeting ground for expanding cultures, empires and philosophies, and a witch's brew of incessant conflict.

The phenomenon of Sinkiang is shot through with anomaly and paradox.

With an area of 650,000 square miles, it is three times the size of France and almost two-and-a-half times the size of Texas. With a population of 4,000,000[2], it has fewer inhabitants than tiny Switzerland and just a little more than the single city of Chicago. It has been conquered and reconquered by the Chinese over a period of 2,000 years, but the Chinese today constitute not more than 6 percent of the total number of people. Virtually all of the non-Chinese population is Moslem, but that has not kept Moslem from slaughtering fellow Moslem with the same fervor that Moslems and Chinese have slaughtered each other. Furthermore, although Sinkiang has served as a territorial link connecting the various worlds that surround it, it also has been an historic "no-man's land" in which no modern power has yet completely filled the vacuum.

A new era began in Sinkiang on September 25, 1949, when the commander of the Sinkiang garrison and top-ranking provincial officials severed their connections with the Kuomintang regime[3] and accepted the authority of the Chinese Communists[4]. It is difficult to predict the future of this new relationship. Up to the Communist takeover, however, China had been able to

fill the vacuum in Sinkiang only partially. It has ruled Sinkiang for substantial periods of time since the Han Dynasty, but it has never succeeded in absorbing the area into the national organism as an integral part of the provincial system. Under Chinese rule, Sinkiang thus far has been more like a special military area or a colonial territory than a province.

Historically, Chinese rule in Sinkiang has been intermittent, fluctuating and strife-ridden[5]. On his inauguration as military governor in 1912, Yang Tseng-hsin reflected on the ups-and-downs of Chinese fortunes in Sinkiang as follows: "From the Han and T'ang Dynasties on, whenever China was at peace and powerful, the frontier people became obedient; but whenever China was weak and in confusion, they revolted."[6]

In the latter half of the 19th Century, Russia and Britain came into conflict over Sinkiang just as Yakub Beg and his followers were carrying out a temporarily successful revolution from the inside. In this century, Russia and Japan and later Russia and the United States watched each other carefully both in Sinkiang and Manchuria. These rivalries, combined with domestic eruptions that produced first a short-lived anti-Soviet "East Turkestan Republic" in the south and then a pro-Soviet and more important "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" in the northwest, shook China's hold on Sinkiang. But China managed to hang on to Sinkiang after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution where it failed to hang on in Outer Mongolia--despite weakness, dissension and war, despite international conflict, despite the rise of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" and despite the general hatred of the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang for their Chinese rulers.

After the Chinese Republican Revolution of 1911, the Uighurs, Kazakhs

and Tungans of Sinkiang failed to unite against China like the Outer Mongols, who declared themselves independent and established their own government with the Living Buddha of Urga ruling in the secular sphere as the Bogdo Khan. More to the point, perhaps, the Soviet Union found it expedient to choose different instruments of policy in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang to ward off the threat of Japan and secure Soviet Asia against non-controllable internal movements on the Chinese side of the border.

By the early 1920's, the Soviet Union-- notwithstanding its own internal difficulties-- had filled the shoes of Tsarist Russia as the dominant outside force in both Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. Under the Bolsheviks as well as the Tsars, Russia's chief rival in the entire border area belt of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang up to 1945 was Japan. In the 1920's Japan was already so deeply entrenched in Manchuria that only a new international war, victoriously fought, could dislodge it. As between Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, the former demanded first-priority consideration by Russia in terms of its readier accessibility to Japan and in terms of internal developments immediately threatening Soviet territory.

The Chinese General Hsü Shu-tseng (Little Hsü), who led an expedition into Urga in October, 1919, was a member of the pro-Japanese "Anfu Clique" at Peking. His successor, the "Mad Baron" Von Ungern-Sternberg, whose mixed "White Russian" and Mongol troops seized Urga in February, 1921, had Japanese arms[7] and had adopted from the pro-Japanese Ataman Semenov the doctrine of Pan-Mongolism. He pushed his plan to overrun all of Trans-Baikalia until he was captured by the Bolsheviks on June 22, 1921 and later executed.

It was in March, 1921, that Soviet-supported Mongol partisan troops operating on the Russo-Mongolian border formed a provisional government of their own. They eliminated the Chinese frontier guards, occupied Urga in July, 1921, and signed an agreement of friendship with the Soviet Union the following November. After the death of the Living Buddha in 1924, the provisional government became the Mongolian People's Republic. While dealing directly with the new government, the Soviet Union maintained the fiction of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia in its relations with China. The fiction continued until October 20, 1945, when Outer Mongolia's legal independence was established in a plebiscite provided for in the August, 1945, Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

This catalogue of events in Outer Mongolia bears a striking similarity to subsequent events in Sinkiang, but the sequence in Sinkiang unfolded two decades later and produced a different denouement insofar as Sinkiang remained part of China. Between 1924 and 1943 the Soviet Union found it more expedient to work through the Chinese warlord rulers of Sinkiang rather than through the Moslem nationalist movement that had come into being. The Chinese warlords lacked any connection with Japan and up until 1943 were disposed to cooperate more closely with the Soviet Union than with China. On the other hand, such non-Chinese nationalism as existed in Sinkiang manifested itself in an anti-Soviet Pan-Turkestan movement that had the moral support of Japan and constituted a threat to the Moslem areas of Soviet Central Asia. In 1934, when the Chinese Moslem General Ma Chung-ying invaded Sinkiang with dreams of his own Moslem empire and with what the Russians construed as Japanese support, the Soviet Union intervened directly

in Sinkiang and brought about his defeat by military aid to warlord General Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

The conditions that prevailed in Outer Mongolia in March, 1921 were not duplicated in Sinkiang until November, 1944, about a year after the Soviet Union broke with Sheng Shih-ts'ai and pulled out of that border province. On November 7, 1944, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet-supported Kazakhs and Uighurs revolted in Northwest Sinkiang and overwhelmed the Chinese garrison in the Ili Zone. On November 23 the leaders of this so-called "Ining Incident" established an "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" at Ining (Kuldja), capital of Ili[8]. By 1945 the rebel army had overrun the three northwest zones of Sinkiang-- Ili, T'ach'eng and Ashan. As in Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Union maintained direct relations with the rebels while preserving the fiction of Kuomintang sovereignty in its relations with the Nationalist Government.

The Chinese warlords in Sinkiang from 1912 to 1944 did not establish enviable records as administrators, but they performed-- indirectly and unconsciously-- a high service for China insofar as their usefulness to Russia enabled them to hold Sinkiang in escrow under the Chinese flag. At the time of the establishment of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" in 1944 the world political context was such that it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to sponsor the full "detachment" of Sinkiang from China. Subsequent gains by the Chinese Communists in China made such a policy less necessary.

Thus far, with the future of Sinkiang under the new "Turki"-Communist

alliance still uncertain, the inability of the Chinese to absorb the area into the Chinese system has been matched by the inability of the "14 peoples" of Sinkiang to attain a unity of their own.

In the absence of sufficiently developed internal communications and the lack of a modern industrial system, the terrain of Sinkiang-- a combination of mountains, deserts and oases-- has left the area with a diverse, decentralized and cellular economic structure. There is only a loose relationship between the two main branches of the economy: oasis farming and the breeding of livestock by tribal nomads on the mountain pasturelands. Nor are the two main branches closely integrated in themselves. Each tribe has marked out for itself a special pastureland area that must be protected against other nomadic tribes. Each oasis has tended to be a self-contained and self-sufficient unit in which local village handicrafts have been more important than the few provincial factories that exist.

The ebb and flow of peoples, accompanied as it has been by competition for land and ceaseless strife, has produced a history of dissension and suspicion that has lived over unto the present day. Equally important perhaps is the fact that the Chinese have followed a traditional policy of "divide-and-rule," playing off one group against another and resettling non-Chinese peoples from one area to another to dilute anti-Chinese movements and make the task of government easier.

Islam, which displaced Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism and Manichaeism in Sinkiang, has provided a large measure of cultural unity in the form of a common religion and a common law even though tribal law and custom is stronger among the Kazakh nomads. The Moslem code of the Sheriyat (written

law) and the mores of the Adat (law of custom) have continued to govern the Uighurs at the grass roots of their society.

Mohammedan religion and law have not resulted in unity for Sinkiang. Nevertheless, Islam has produced considerable trouble for China.

The first considerable group of Moslems is said to have entered China in 755 A.D., when about 4,000 soldiers were sent to China by the Caliph of Baghdad on the request of the Chinese emperor to help put down a rebellion[9]. Islam also entered Southeast China by means of Arab traders in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries[10].

Four years before the first Moslems appeared in China, China's western periphery was opened to Islamic influence by the Arab defeat of Chinese General Kao Hsien-chih near the Talas River in July, 751. Both Barthold and Goodrich[11] comment on the significance of this battle, which established the predominance of Islamic civilization in Central Asia.

Mohammedanism does not appear to have become especially important in Sinkiang, however, until the 10th Century, when the Turks of the Samarkand-Khokand-Ferghana area entered Kashgaria and the Kashgarian Khan, Satuk Bughra, became a convert[12]. The Mongol rulers and the descendants of the Jagatai line in Sinkiang, who hung on after the Mongol Dynasty collapsed in China, were converted to Islam in the 13th and 14th Centuries.

Since the establishment of Islam in Sinkiang and on the western fringes of China Proper, China has been confronted with a number of Moslem revolts, especially during the latter part of the Manchu Dynasty. There were revolts in Yunnan in 1818, 1826, 1834 and from 1855 to 1873; revolts in Kansu, Shensi and Sinkiang from 1862 to 1878; and another Kansu revolt in 1895.

Still, the lack of Moslem unity is indicated by the fact that after the Chinese Moslems in Sinkiang turned against the Manchus in 1862, the Turki Moslems under Yakub Beg turned on both the Chinese Moslems and the non-Moslem Chinese. The Moslem splits have not always followed the lines of ethnic divisions. In 1781 in Kansu, for example, the Chinese Moslem revolt was based largely on a feud among the Chinese Moslems themselves. It started with a fight between the "Old Sect" and the "New Sect" on ritual. Similarly in Sinkiang, after the arrival from Bokhara in the 15th Century of Khoja Makhtum Azyum (founder of the Khoja line in Sinkiang), his two sons founded rival and feuding sects in Kashgaria: the Aktaghlyk ("White Mountain") Sect, which became dominant in Kashgar, and the Karatghlyk ("Black Mountain") Sect, which became dominant in Yarkand.

Islam is a strong enough force in Sinkiang so that the pro-Soviet rebel leaders in the northwest zones found it both necessary to take cognizance of it and feasible to exploit it. In their leaflets addressed to the peoples of Sinkiang, the Ili propagandists usually began with the salutation: "To All the Brethren."[13] In the past, however, movements based primarily on the foundation of Islam have failed, especially under circumstances where the leaders of the movements have been prone to compromise their holy causes to make the best possible deals for themselves.

After the collapse of Yakub Beg, who turned out to be an opportunistic adventurer notwithstanding his exalted title of "Ruler of the Faithful," Sinkiang nationalism manifested itself most concretely in the Pan-Turanian movement[14] that lasted from the time of the first World War until 1934. First the Germans and the Constantinople Turks tried to exploit the movement,

and then the Japanese. It was furthered in Sinkiang as a useful device by entrenched Moslem leaders and promoted more selflessly and zealously by returned Uighur students who had gone to Turki to study when they were unable to get an education at home during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin.

The Pan-Turanian Movement in Sinkiang was crystallized briefly in 1933. In the Autumn of 1933 a group of non-Chinese Moslem leaders proclaimed a pro-Kemal and anti-Bolshevik "East Turkestan Republic" following convocation of a Kurultai (Congress) at Kashgar[15]. Hodja Nyas Hadji, former adviser to the Prince of Hami, was elected president in absentia and Sabut Mullah, Moslem leader of Khotan, vice-president. There was a constitution with 30 articles, and five advisers were said to have arrived from Turkey. But the republic lasted less than six months. The twists and turns of Hodja Nyas Hadji offer one clue to why it has been difficult thus far to establish internal unity in Sinkiang. First he supported the Chinese Moslem General Ma Chung-ying against General Sheng Shih-ts'ai; then he broke with Ma Chung-ying and contested the authority of both Sheng and Ma in the "East Turkestan Republic"; and finally he joined Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

During the past 2,000 years Sinkiang has been dominated either in whole or in part by a succession of peoples. The confused, complicated and over-lapping line of descent encompasses the Indo-Scythians (Sakae, Yüeh-chih and Hythalites), the Hsiung-nu (Huns) and their Uighur allies, the Chinese Hans, the Jeujani (Jwen-Jwen), the Tukiu (T'u-chüeh), the T'ang Chinese, the Tibetans and Arabs, the Uighurs again, the Karluk and Seljuk Turks, the Kara-Kidani, the Mongols of Jenghiz Khan and Jagatai, the Moghuls of Timur (Tamerlane), the Khojas, the Öirat Mongols, the Manchus, Yakub Beg, the

Manchus again, the post-1911 Chinese warlords, the Kuomintang and now the Chinese Communists.

Out of the various forces that have been brought to bear on the area in the past, four basic influences make themselves felt in present-day Sinkiang.

The Chinese influence is reflected at the top layers of government and in formal administrative units, in a minority people of functionaries, shopkeepers, traders and farmers, and in the Chinese characters that stand above the Uighur script and the Russian letters on the street signs as a symbol of rule. Much stronger is the Uighur and Khoja Turk influence, which manifests itself in the language, religion and habits of the majority people, in oasis farming, in the alternately teeming and lethargic life of the bazaars, in mosques and mullahs, and in the omnipresent Moslem skullcaps whose color and pattern reveal the home district of the wearer.

Thirdly, there is the influence of the Kazakh nomads, which survives in the life of the mountain pasturelands, in proud, suspicious and insular groups who shift their flocks and their yurts with the season, and in a system of tribal organization and customs that continues to defy the sedentary institutions of both the Chinese and Uighur farmers. And lastly, there is the comparatively new and increasingly important influence of the Soviet Union, which has developed in terms of ideology, economic association, power politics and the links between the U.S.S.R. and both the old Ili movement in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists.

Of these four influences, the Chinese influence was the weakest in 1948. To a large extent, the history of Chinese rule in Sinkiang bears out

Yang Tseng-hsin's observation that the "barbarians" were quiescent when China was powerful and obstreperous when China was weak and divided. Even in times of relative strength and unity, however, the Chinese have been unable to fix an imprint on Sinkiang that survived with much force after they left.

According to Chinese legends, Chinese under Emperor Mu Wang (r. 1001 B.C. to 946 B.C.) in the Chou Dynasty entered the territory of what is now Sinkiang and proceeded to the regions of Yarkand and Kashgar. This, however, is doubted as an historical fact[16]. It was not until the Han Dynasty (208 B.C.-220 A.D.)[17] that the Chinese established anything resembling a firm foothold in the "Western Regions."

The history of Chinese penetration into Sinkiang on a major scale really goes back to the sixth Han emperor, Wu Ti (r. 140 B.C.-86 B.C.), under whom the Han arms were carried northward into Mongolia, westward deep into the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia, northeastward into Korea and southeastward to what is now Canton. Early in his reign Wu Ti sent an envoy into the "Western Regions" to seek an alliance with the Yüeh-chih against the Hsiung-nu, but the latter already had displaced the Yüeh-chih in Central Asia[18]. However, the envoy's report on trade opportunities and political divisions among the "barbarians" encouraged Wu Ti to launch a campaign against the Hsiung-nu.

In campaigns directed to the north and northwest, three Chinese generals-- Wei Ch'ing, Ho Ch'u-ping and Li Kuang-li-- weakened Hsiung-nu domination and paved the way for subjugation of the 50-odd principalities of the Tarim Basin. In 101 B.C. Li Kuang-li occupied Ferghana. The rule

of the early Hans, who extended the Great Wall as far as Tunhuang and their watch-towers up to Lop Nor, flourished for almost a century in the "Western Regions." By 36 B.C. it started to weaken, by 9 A.D. it was confronted with revolt, and by 25 A.D. it was eliminated.

During the first part of the later Han Period (25 A.D. to 220 A.D.), Chinese rule in Sinkiang was reestablished by General Pan Ch'ao, who entered the area in 73 A.D. Although Pan Ch'ao succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the Hsiung-nu in 93 A.D. with the help of the southern principalities, the second phase of Han control was not as illustrious as the first. After Pan Ch'ao's retirement in 102 A.D., such Chinese control as existed disintegrated.

Under Emperor Wen Ti in the Sui Dynasty (581-618), Chinese interests in Sinkiang were defended by diplomacy instead of arms, with Wen Ti using a skillful agent, P'ei Chu, to play off the "Western Turks" against the "Eastern Turks." It remained for the first emperors of the T'ang Dynasty (618-907) to reconquer Sinkiang and hold it again for more than a century.

Between 630 and 648 one of the founders of the T'ang Dynasty, Li Shih-min or Tai Tsung (r. 627-650) invaded Mongolia and then subdued both the "Eastern" and "Western Turks" by force of arms. After establishing the center of its control in Sinkiang at Turfan, the T'ang subjugated Kashgaria (South Sinkiang) as well as Jungaria (North Sinkiang) and stationed garrisons at Khotan, Kashgar, Kucha and Tokmak. Later, however, the Chinese experienced considerable difficulty in Sinkiang as a result of the invasion of the Tibetans in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries, the establishment of Arab influence in Southwest Sinkiang and the rise of a Uighur Empire that ruled

from Karakorum (Outer Mongolia) from 744 to 847.

The Tibetans, who were blocking trade between China and Iran in the Pamirs, were defeated in 745 by General Kao Hsien-chih, a Korean officer and administrator in the service of the T'ang. But when Kao Hsien-chih proceeded to launch an expedition against the Prince of Tashkent, the Arabs went to the aid of the prince and Kao Hsien-chih himself went down to defeat in a battle fought near the Talas River in July, 751. It was a thousand years before the Manchus reestablished "Chinese" authority in Sinkiang.

By the beginning of the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1912), Kashgaria had come under the reign of the Moslem Khojas and Jungaria under the control of the Oirat Mongols. The latter were a confederation of four tribes-- the Choros, Khoit, Koshut and Torgut. With the rise to power of Galdan Boshoktu as leader of the Öirat Mongols in 1671, the early Manchus were confronted with a power that soon overran Sinkiang, conquered Tibet and threatened the north and northwest frontiers of China Proper with its attacks on the Khalka Mongols. The new Oirat-Manchu conflict was not long in developing.

Galdan's reign deserves special attention not alone because of his conquests, but also because he appears to have been the first non-Chinese ruler of Sinkiang (and Mongolia) to seek aid from Russia in his conflict with China.

After establishing a protectorate in Kashgaria, making inroads into Kazakh territory northwest of the present Russo-Sinkiang frontier and subjugating the Kara-Kirghis in the Ferghana Valley, Galdan is said to have dispatched an emissary to Irkutsk in 1688 in an effort to obtain an alliance with the Russians against the Manchus. But the Russians, who were then

negotiating with the Manchus over the Amur River question in talks that produced the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, are further said to have told Galdan's emissary that they would give him military aid only if Sinkiang were invaded and not to help him expand his holdings[19].

The Russian reply to Galdan's emissary in 1688 is noteworthy. It established a classic precedent for future Russian policy in Sinkiang.

In 1690 Galdan joined battle with the Manchu troops of Emperor K'ang Hsi in Outer Mongolia, but suffered a reverse. He was defeated again in 1695 and died two years later just as the Manchus were preparing to send an expedition against him. His successors carried on, however, and the job of reconquering Sinkiang was delayed until the Manchu reign of Ch'ien Lung (r. 1736-1796).

When Ch'ien Lung ascended the throne, the Mongols in Sinkiang were already divided into "Western" and "Eastern" groups. Ch'ien Lung welcomed to his court the Ili chief, Amursana, who was given titles and estates and then sent back to Sinkiang as the supposedly loyal servant of Peking. But Amursana had ideas of his own and proclaimed himself an independent khan in 1755. The first Manchu general to take the field against him, Pan Ti, was defeated. But another Manchu general, Chao Hui, was successful in overthrowing Amursana, who fled into Russian territory and died there <u>circa</u> 1758.

Chao Hui and his deputy commander, Fu Teh, put into practice a policy of massacre that virtually rid Jungaria of Öirat Mongols. By 1765, the Manchus had all of Sinkiang. There was a revolt in Kashgaria in 1758, and Chao Hui-- who contined his advance into Kashgaria-- was trapped and besieged before Yarkand. But A-kuei[20] and Fu Teh were successful in

relieving him and breaking the siege. The lifting of the siege was followed by the same kind of massacres in the south that already had taken place in the north.

The Manchus then reopened Sinkiang to Chinese colonization, repopulated the Ili Valley by giving land to Manchu soldiers and transplanting 12,000 Uighur farmers into the area as T'aranch'is ("cultivators"), and replaced the Öirats in Northeast Sinkiang by bringing in friendlier Mongols from what is now Ch'inghai, Kansu and Ningheia. Manchu policy undoubtedly had much to do with creating the present hodge-podge of peoples in Jungaria.

In the slaughter of the Khojas, one of the few to escape was Sarimsak, son of Barkanuddin, who had been advanced by Amursana as his candidate for rule over Kashgaria[21]. After crushing the Kashgarian rebellion in 1758, the Manchus eased up in their policy and permitted their tributary, the Khan of Khokand, to collect imposts in Kashgaria on all goods imported from Khokand.

Sarimsak had three sons-- Jehangir, Yusuf and Barkanuddin, who based themselves in Khokand and were able to win the support of the Khokand rulers. Following 60 years of relative peace in Kashgaria from 1760 to 1822, the aksykals ("white beards") who had been collecting imposts for the Khan of Khokand gave the signal for revolt. Jehangir entered Kashgaria from Khokand on the first of a series of expeditions that became known as the "Revolt of the Seven Khojas." This series of expeditions paved the way for the eventual rule of Yakub Beg.

Jehangir captured Kashgar in 1826 and ruled there for less than a year. He was captured by Manchu reinforcements, sent to Peking and executed[22]. But Khojas Yusuf, Katti Ture and Wali Khan Ture kept coming, and in 1864

Busurgh Khan, the son of Jehangir, entered Kashgaria with Yakub Beg as his baturbashi (commander)[25]. Turning on Busurgh Khan, Yakub established his own authority and governed as Atalyk Ghazi ("Tutor of the Champions") until he was defeated by the Manchu expedition under Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1877. Liu Ching-t'ang, Tso's chief deputy, became the first governor of Sinkiang when it became a province.

Since the Han Dynasty Chinese rulers in Sinkiang have maintained control by combining military force whenever necessary and possible with various techniques by which one people or group has been played off against another. In applying the tactic of "divide-and-rule," the Chinese have been assisted by the eternal splits that heretofore have kept the peoples of Sinkiang from coalescing as a unitary force. Although the Chinese have let "barbarians rule barbarians" under top-level Chinese administrators, they have insisted traditionally that it be their "barbarians." These ancient techniques have persisted down to modern times. Thus, during the post-war period of Kuomintang rule, the Chinese installed Kuomintang Uighur officials in the top posts of the provincial government and tried to play off the Kirei Kazakhs against the Naiman Kazakhs living under the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic."

Under the Hans Sinkiang was ruled as a protectorate, with a Chinese governor-general (Tu-tu) stationed in Kansu and military functionaries placed at the heads of "groups of 1,000 men" in various strategic centers. Special sub-prefectures were designated for Chinese colonization, and in case of trouble the local peoples were shifted from one place to another.

During the period of T'ang rule over the "Western Regions," the

institution of the Tu-tu was preserved, but the administrative apparatus was strengthened by the introduction of the Chinese chou (department) and hsien (county) into the system of "states," departments, counties and military districts. The local governments were divided into three categories: those headed by Chinese, those headed by local rulers with hereditary titles who had autonomy but were subject to military inspection, and those headed by autonomous rulers of "states" who had merely to report on their activities[24].

Where the T'ang had ruled from Anhsi and Turfan, the early Manchus shifted the center of their rule in Sinkiang to the Ili area under a military regime headed by the Commander of the Fortress of Ili. The military commander operated through a staff of divisional chiefs, a secretariat and a system of bureaus dealing with such problems as Petitions, Sanctions and Merits, Food, Animals, Gendarmerie and Justice. Urumchi (Tihwa after Sinkiang became a province) had a Chinese administration, and the rest of Sinkiang was governed through local begs and wangs (princes).

In the latter part of the Manchu Dynasty, after troops under Tso Tsung-t'ang defeated Yakub Beg in 1877, the administrative system of Sinkiang was changed. When Tso's deputy, Liu Ching-t'ang, became governor of Sinkiang, the Commander of the Ili Fortress (established in 1763) lost some of his power. The governor obtained jurisdiction over the districts of Tihwa, Aksu and Kashgar, but the Ili Commander maintained his jurisdiction elsewhere and was also designated as the agent to handle diplomatic relations with Russia along the Russo-Sinkiang frontier.

After the victory of Tso Tsung-t'ang and the reorganisation of Sinkiang on a provincial basis, the new province was also divided into tao (circuits,

headed by officials known as tao-tai), hsien (counties), chu (districts) and hsiang (parishes).

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 brought few administrative changes. The old taos became "administrative districts" and the hsien were made responsible directly to the provincial government instead of to the taos. A board of commissioners (finance, reconstruction, interior, trade, etc.) eventually emerged during the regimes of Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen, with the provinces taking the leadership in the establishment of provincial and joint provincial-private monopolies to develop trade and exploit resources.

During the reign of Sheng Shih-ts'ai from 1934 to 1944, non-military administration was corrdinated under three departments: Diplomatic, Financial and Reconstruction. A Provisional Committee in which the various peoples of Sinkiang were represented also was established, but the real rulers up to 1943 were Sheng and his Russian advisers. Economic planning was instituted under two three-year plans and trade monopoly reached a new level of development, with a Sinkiang Trading Company being organized as a counterpart to the Soviet trade agency, Sovsintorg.

Sheng's Sinkiang Trading Company was reorganized as the Northwest Development Company during the post-war viceroyship of General Chang Chih-chung, who became Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest when the war against Japan ended. The successor organization, however, was a puny enterprise. Chang Chih-chung's main contribution to administration in Sinkiang was the formation of a "Turki-Chinese coalition government in which the leaders of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic"

participated from July 1, 1946, to August 27, 1947. This coalition, which provided more autonomy for Sinkiang's Uighurs and Kazakhs than they ever had enjoyed before under Chinese rule, was the result of a peace agreement negotiated between the Kuomintang and the Ili rebels through the good offices of the Soviet Consul-General in Tihwa, Alexandre Saveliev.

The Chinese made what seemed to them a sincere effort to introduce a larger measure of self-rule by means of the provincial government coalition, district elections and a provincial assembly. But they were hampered by the precautions they felt it necessary to take to protect their own sovereignty, by the refusal of the Ili participants to cooperate completely in terms of these precautions, by the lack of sufficient trained "Turki" personnel to take over administrative jobs, and by the dead weight of an outmoded and corrupt politico-economic system that existed at the broad base of government in Sinkiang.

The Chinese had cooperated with the system in the past and had tried to make it work in their own behalf. When they tried to cope with popular discontent in the post-1945 period by introducing popular elections, the system defeated the new attempt both by making its execution impossible and by weakening the structure that already existed. Popular elections thus failed in Sinkiang just as they failed in China Proper, and for the same reasons. Recalling the 1946 Sinkiang elections in an interview with three correspondents[25] who interviewed him at Tihwa in August, 1948, Masud Sabri, then the provincial governor, noted:

"Perhaps the biggest problem confronting the provincial government is the fact that the elections held after the government reorganization

resulted in the election of numerous men, particularly in the position of district officer, who are incompetent and undesirable. These men, who include religious leaders, men of wealth and others, were elected just because of their long-standing hold over the people. The government can't just step in and replace them, for it would then be accused of being undemocratic."

By and large Chinese administration in Sinkiang in the past was artificially imposed. Although Uighur begs and Kazakh bators (folk heroes) bore such Chinese titles as hsiang-yeh (elder) and hsien-chang (county headman), the Uighur farmers and the Kazakh nomads continued under the Kuomintang to live primarily by social systems that had developed out of their own respective heritages.

The present Uighur social structure in the oases is the offshoot of a land system that developed under the joint influences of the Khojas as temporal rulers and of Islam in both its religious and legal aspects. Inasmuch as the Khojas were Moslem rulers, the two influences were inextricably interwoven in the Khoja rule that took root in Kashgaria following the arrival of Makhtum Azyum from Bokhara in the 15th Century.

Under the system that obtained in Russian Turkestan as well as Kashgaria, land fell into three classifications: 1.) amlak, or land owned by the state; 2.) mulk, land owned by individuals; and 3.) wakf, land owned by the mosques[26]. Theoretically all land belonged to the state. But this concept was modified in practice by the developing traditions of the Adat (law of custom), which provided under the principle of Mavat that land belonged to the man who had first applied water to it.

The importance of irrigation in the oasis country of Kashgaria appears to have played a vital role in the development of feudal institutions in Sinkiang, for building irrigation works involved a fairly large expenditure of capital[27] and the financial ability to recruit labor. Thus, there sprang up the twin institutions of the mulkdar, a landholder who supplied the capital and was exempted from paying taxes to the theocratic state, and the chakar, a serf who came to owe service and/or rent to the mulkdar in return for either water or land, or both.

Water was supposed to be distributed equitably under the customary law of the Adat, but this did not prevent the emergence of a system of sales and bribes dominated by the begs and the aksykals who supervised the irrigation projects.

The term beg is an administrative and political title originally held by hereditary feudal aristocrats who served the Khoja khans. During the rule of the Manchus, the hierarchy of begs included the Akim Beg-- local chief, Shang Beg-- chief teacher, Katzo Beg-- judge, and Mirabu Beg-- agricultural official[28]. In time the strict hereditary nature of beg-ship was watered down, and the title came to be applied more loosely to any "Turki" who reached the status of a local leader. But the hereditary feature did not disappear altogether. Once a man achieved the title of beg, it was usually affixed to his family name and the concept of the well-born lingered on in the names of his children. The symbol was reinforced by the fact that the Turki officials usually were men of property, which passed on to their children.

After Sinkiang became a province and especially after 1911, the specific gradation of begs was obscured by the growing official use of formal Chinese titles. The Kuomintang, which sought to strengthen the Chinese hsien and pao-chia system[29] in Sinkiang, bestowed upon both the begs and the Kazakh leaders such titles as hsien-chang, pao-chang and chia-chang. But the term beg continued to be used by the Uighurs to characterize both the religious dignitaries and squires who held local office. In many places in Sinkiang the title continued to pass from father to son as late as 1949[30].

The old institutions of the mulkdar and chakar, probably already in the process of being weakened internally, started to break down in the middle of the 19th Century with the development of a foreign trade system linked to Russia's new demand for Sinkiang's cotton and livestock. The development of foreign trade saw the rise of credit, a stronger banking system and an emergent commercial system that altered traditional relationships. After Sinkiang became a province, the mulkdars were required to pay taxes to the government. They were replaced by a combined landowner-money-lender type known as the bai ("wealthy"). But the connection between political rule and economic power did not change substantially, and the governing relationship in the villages of Sinkiang was similar to that which continued to exist in the Chinese countryside under the Kuomintang.

The kind of organization now existing among the Kazakh nomads, who are also Moslems but less fanatical than the Uighur Moslems, is reflected in the structure of the Kirei Kazakhs as it was explained to the writer by the Kireis themselves in 1948. The Kireis have an hereditary prince and a

tribal system based upon a hierarchy of leaders governing through a pyramid of yurt household groupings. The Taiji is the leader of 1,000 to 3,000 yurt families. Under him are the Okurday, leader of 500 to 600 yurts; the Zangen, 50 to 100 yurts; and the Kunde, 10 to 30 yurts. The positions of Taiji and Okurday are usually inherited, while the Zangen and Kunde may be elected. Occasionally, a successful warrior fights his way to the top under the title of Bator (folk hero), notwithstanding the rules on hereditary descent.

Legal decisions are rendered in each sub-tribe by an elder known as the Bi, who consults with the Taiji in administering law based both on tribal customs and the tenets of Islam. All the leaders-- Taiji, Okurday, Zangen and Kunde-- meet at least once a year (Moslem New Year) in a council known as the Majlis. Meetings are also held on those occasions when important decisions have to be taken. When the sub-tribes are at peace, their leaders occasionally meet in the larger congress of the Kurultai.

The present Mongol structure is similar to that of the Kazakhs, except that there is a greater prevalence of Chinese titles as the result of the Mongol administrative reorganization carried out by the Manchus. The 13 Mongol concentrations in Sinkiang are composed of Leagues, Banners and Sub-Banners (Sumu). There is a hierarchy of princes, including the Han Wang, Chin Wang and Chün Wang, a quasi-noble administrative officer known as the Jassak and another type of administrative officer appointed by the Manchus under the title of Tsung Kuan. Unlike the Mohammedan Kazakhs, the Sinkiang Mongols adhere to the Lamaist Buddhist faith.

Although the Chinese manipulated control of Sinkiang in the past by playing off one group against another and winning over key figures by means

of subsidies, arms and offices, it would be a mistake to assume that there has been complete unity or abiding love between the Chinese and their chosen instruments of control. The relationship has been characterized by rivalry and friction. Yang Tseng-hsin found it necessary to issue a decree to break the power of the begs insofar as their power interfered with the supremacy of Chinese rule[31]. Chin Shen-ju, who followed him, tried (disastrously enough) to abolish the princedom of Hami. On the other hand, Osman Bator, dominant warrior leader of the Kirei Kazakhs, resisted Chinese efforts to control him completely even when they provided him with arms and money to keep up the fight against the Ili regime. Similarly, Kuomintang Uighurs like Masud Sabri and Mohammed Eimin pressed their own brand of Turki nationalism against the "one-family" racial theory of the Kuomintang, criticized Chinese corruption and the depredations of Chinese troops, and fought for more autonomy in the province.

The alliance between such Uighurs and the Chinese was a matter of convenience. The Chinese couldn't rule without them, and they couldn't rule without the Chinese. But neither side was happy, particularly the Uighurs, who became suspect in the eyes of their own people because of their association with the Chinese.

This kind of association was duplicated at the lower levels, where Chinese corruption based itself largely on the corruption of Uighur officials, who squeezed the people under them. Traditionally, corruption in Sinkiang has operated through graft exacted in the allocation of water, in the extension of food loans from public granaries, in the pyramiding of interest rates on money loans channeled to Uighur farmers via Uighur

officials, in the misappropriation of government subsidies and holding back of taxes and, later, through graft in the operations of the provincial trading companies and monopolies.

The literature[32] on Sinkiang written by Western travelers is studded with references to corruption; there were numerous complaints of corruption by Kazakhs and Uighurs with whom this writer talked in 1948; and up to July 8, 1949-- two months before the Communist takeover-- the Tihwa press still contained articles and editorials on the need to combat corruption. Thus, the New Sinkiang News, a Chinese Moslem organ, reported on July 8, 1949 that Wang Cheng, an official in charge of military clothing supply, had been accused of misappropriating enough money to supply the Nationalist Army units in Sinkiang "for one year."

"Wang must be tried and punished," the newspaper added.

On the question of Chinese administration in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin, who was governor from 1912 to 1928, once observed:

> It is a pity that what is called five races in one family [Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans] has been only nominal and has not become a reality. Chinese officials, without a sense of moral obligation but full of ideas for selfish gain, are rarely talented in administration. There are too many bad officials and too few good one. This is why there have been more days of trouble and fewer of tranquility. This is true of all provinces, but it is worst on the frontier. It will be impossible for the Chinese officials to control the Moslems permanently unless administration is greatly improved.[33]

Much later, in 1948, a similar observation was made by Liu Tse-yung, representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tihwa:

> The crucial question in Sinkiang is a Chinese one, and the solution depends upon our performance during the next two or three years. If we have a good administration, the people of Sinkiang will support us. If we do not, the people will oppose us.

A one-time British consul in Kashgar, George Macartney[34], observed that Chinese administration in Kashgaria was based on an approach of administering little, exercising control through the local gentry, holding Chinese administrators responsible for developments in their respective areas, and maintaining Chinese "dignity." This "dignity" has been severely resented by the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang as a manifestation of cultural arrogance.

In the early Manchu period a Moslem was required to dismount from his horse whenever a Manchu official appeared, and if it was a high official, he had to get down on his knees. When the high official visited the mosque, even the begs were required to kneel with their hands behind them[35]. Later less stringent means were used to maintain Chinese "dignity," but up to the collapse of the Kuomintang the Uighurs continued to bridle at a manifest feeling on the part of the Chinese that they were the products of a higher and more advanced civilization. For example, in an article written in February, 1949, Achmad Djan Kasimov, former leader of the Ili regime, stated:

"The Chinese reactionaries who believe in imperialism consider that we are an ignorant, stubborn and savage race, that self-government is beyond our capacity and that, even under an organized government, we are unable to perform the duties that are passed down to us. They consider themselves the most civilized race among the eastern peoples and oppress us with contempt.[36]

Under Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen, the provincial authorities pursued a policy of "intellectual suffocation."[37] Schools were closed, books purged and the press censored. Those Uighurs who wanted an education went abroad to study, either in Turkey or India. More schools were opened

under Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but censorship was strengthened and an oppressive police state developed. Chang Chih-chung encouraged free speech and a free press and he also made some attempt to improve educational and hospital facilities, but funds were lacking and, besides, the Central Government was more preoccupied with the civil war in China.

The present hatred for the Chinese in Sinkiang involves not merely a legacy of misrule and corruption, but a long history of massacres, arrests and imprisonments. No man in the entire modern era of Sinkiang is hated with a more burning hatred than Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whose rule from 1934 to 1944 will be more closely examined in Chapter VI. An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people were thrown into jail under Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whose prisons were literally hell-holes[38]. During his pro-Russian period, he arrested the "anti-Russians"; during his anti-Russian period, he arrested the "pro-Russians." In 1948, the then Vice-Governor, Borhan, observed that there were few families in Tihwa that hadn't had at least one of their members imprisoned during the reign of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

The height of economic development in Sinkiang came, nevertheless, under Sheng Shih-ts'ai during his period of collaboration with the Russians from 1934 to 1943.

Coal, oil and wolfram resources were exploited, new roads and factories were built, the provincial bank was reorganised, and scores if not hundreds of Russian technicians entered Sinkiang to help develop the province. Once the Russians left and the Kuomintang took over, however, Sinkiang lapsed back into its pre-1934 state. By 1948 there were only a few factories operating under conditions where each was strapped for funds.

Sun Yat-sen had envisaged great plans for Sinkiang in terms of colonization and trade based on a northwestern railway system[39]. The backbone of the system was to be a line extending northwestward from a "great northern port" scheduled for development between T'ak'u and Ch'inwangtao on Pohai Gulf to Dolon Nor in Northern Chahar. With Dolon Nor as a prairie hub, trunk lines were to extend northeastward into Manchuria up to the Amur River, northwestward through Outer Mongolia to the Siberian border, and westward for 1,600 miles to Tihwa. From Tihwa, there were to be two separate branches-- one running westward from Tihwa to Ining (Kuldja) and the other moving southeastward to Turfan and then southwestward to Kashgar. Ten million people were to be transported to the northwest area as colonists within 10 years.

In 1933 the Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, was commissioned by the Ministry of Railways to survey road and railway possibilities in Sinkiang. It was on this expedition that Hedin later ran into the exploits of Ma Chung-ying ("Big Horse") in Sinkiang.

To this day, however, there is no railway connecting Sinkiang with China and not a single mile of railway inside Sinkiang.

Although the famous Silk Road running through Sinkiang constituted an important avenue of trade and tribute for China up to the emergence of sea power in the 15th and 16th Centuries, it is doubtful that Sinkiang has been an economic asset to China since it was recovered by the Manchus under Ch'ien Lung in the latter half of the 18th Century. By 1905 the Manchus were subsidizing Sinkiang to the extent of 2,980,000 taels a year[40]. After the revolution of 1911, subsidies from the central government fell off, and

contributed to the rise of warlord regimes in the area. The Kuomintang, which established itself in Sinkiang in 1943, found it necessary to continue the policy of subsidy.

The Kuomintang began by earmarking CNC $10,000,000 a year for reconstruction in Sinkiang, which was not an impressive figure even for the comparatively low exchange rate prevailing at that time. Later subsidies, although larger in terms of monetary figures, were negated by the accelerated process of inflation that gripped both China Proper and Sinkiang, whose Sinkiang dollar exchanged at the rate of SD $1 for CNC (Chinese National Currency) $5 [41]. According to Sinkiang's Finance Commissioner, Jarimhan, the province's budgetary deficit of SD $31,000,000,000 in 1947 was covered partly by government subsidies and partly by local printing of paper money. By the summer of 1948 the hard-pressed Central Government was no longer subsidizing the provincial budget.

Beginning in 1943 the Sinkiang currency, which had previously been tied to the rouble system, was brought into the mainstream of Chinese inflation by its new relationship with the CNC. Between then and August, 1948, the price of wheat flour in Tihwa had been multiplied by 5,000 times. Inflation became progressively worse after 1948 until by the spring of the following year Sinkiang's paper currency was unacceptable for trade in Tihwa. In March, 1949, with notes of multi-billion denomination already in circulation, the Provincial Government called on the people to stop using brick tea for money and promulgated a decree permitting the free circulation of silver [42].

Notwithstanding the colonization policies of the Han, T'ang, Manchus and the Kuomintang, Sinkiang also has failed to attract anything like the

number of Shantung Chinese who migrated to Manchuria. The failure of these colonisation efforts is demonstrated by the present small minority position of the Han Chinese.[43]

Chinese colonists have preferred to settle in North Sinkiang (Jungaria), especially along the Hami-Tihwa-Ining road. Undoubtedly this has been because Jungaria has contained the most effective centers of Chinese administrative and military control in the past, and also because it has been easier for Chinese farmers to press upon the Kazakh nomads in the north than upon rooted Uighur farmers in the south.

A number of uprisings in which Chinese have been massacred has taught them the wisdom of living as close as possible to Tihwa, the capital. As the result of a concentration of administrators, shopkeepers, traders and colonists, the Chinese constitute the largest group in the Tihwa zone. It is the only one of Sinkiang's ten zones in which they have a plurality. According to figures made available by the Commission of Civil Affairs at Tihwa in 1948, the Chinese number 145,100 in this zone compared with 119,800 Uighurs and 64,800 Tungans.

As an "imperialist" in Sinkiang, China appears to have been motivated first by considerations of security and trade and, more recently, by these factors plus the added factor of prospective mineral wealth. Although the province has not been adequately surveyed, Chinese geologists in 1948 held that it contained substantial deposits of coal, iron, oil, gold, zinc, wolfram and gypsum. They speculated on the possibility of uranium, but said none had been found there so far. Interested as it was in the potentialities of Sinkiang, the Kuomintang was never in a position to exploit these

potentialities because of its multiple difficulties at home, because of its own deficiencies and because the rich northwest areas of Sinkiang were occupied by Ili troops. Thus, in a province rich in oil, the Kuomintang had to import oil from the Yumen fields of Kansu to supply the Chinese garrison in Sinkiang.

Nevertheless, quite apart from the reluctance of any nation to yield territory it controls, Kuomintang leaders felt it necessary to hold on to Sinkiang both because of the province's untapped resources and its security value.

From the time of the Hans up to the collapse of the Kuomintang, Chinese states and governments have been concerned about the threat to China Proper from hostile peoples and movements in the borderland areas to the north and northwest. Although the "barbarian" incursions ended with the reign of Ch'ien Lung in the 18th Century, the later Manchus--(themselves the offshoot of a "barbarian" invasion)-- and the Kuomintang continued to fear the historic menace from the border areas.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, who reconquered Sinkiang for China in 1877 after winning a court battle on the priority of his campaign in the northwest, observed:

> Great weight should be given to Sinkiang as a protection for Mongolia. For it protects Mongolia, it ensures that the power of the capital and the forearm of the northwest work in unison. It also ensures that there is no break in the country's topographical defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be at peace. Moreover, then bandits might outflank the whole Kansu, Shensi and Shansi frontier. In such an emergency those places might be defended, but not victoriously. In such a case, Sinkiang would be a direct north gate to the mountains, and there would not be a day of rest or sleep.[24]

Under the Kuomintang, Chinese border area fears were augmented by the Ili rebellion in Sinkiang, by the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, by the loss of Outer Mongolia through the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty, by the post-war border clashes with Outer Mongol patrols in the Peitashan area of Northeast Sinkiang, and by the development of Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria. Many Kuomintang members viewed General Lin Piao's Manchurian Communist troops as a new kind of "barbarian" invader from "the north."

This psychology about "the north" was brought home forcefully to the writer on his plane trip out of Sinkiang in 1948 when he tried to take a photograph from the air of Bogdo Ula, the majestic mountain peak just southeast of Tihwa. A Chinese civilian passenger seized the camera gesticulating wildly and yelling that Bogdo Ula was an important strategic feature of the Sinkiang terrain.

The fact that the Kuomintang was nervous about Sinkiang and Manchuria, however, does not mean that it was in a position to defend its frontiers. With the appearance of Russian power on Sinkiang's western border, China's security in the northwest became more contingent on Soviet policies and attitudes than on Chinese might.

Since the extension of the Russian state to the border of Sinkiang in the middle of the 19th Century, no government has been able to rule in Sinkiang without Russian support-- or at least assent. From 1912 to 1943, Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai found it more expedient to cooperate with the Soviet Union than with the Chinese Central Government. Within a year after he broke with the Russians and turned to the Kuomintang in Chungking, Sheng Shih-ts'ai was out as governor and the Kuomintang was

confronted with the Ili revolt.

In late 1948 and early 1949, with the Nationalist Government already in the last stage of collapse, General Chang Chih-chung sponsored a new plan to reestablish the closest possible ties with the Soviet Union in Sinkiang as a means of achieving a negotiated Kuomintang-Communist peace throughout all of China. But before anything could come of the negotiations that actually got under way in Tihwa, the Nationalist Government was driven out of Nanking, and Chang Chih-chung himself later joined the Communist coalition in Peiping.

The advent of Russia in Central Asia, which was part of the unification process and the extension of the national frontier in Russia itself, was stimulated at the beginning by those complicated psychological-economic-and political impulses that have spurred the growth of allbig powers in the world today. As in the case of the Chinese emperors, the Russian tsars were also confronted by "barbarian incursions" and also looked upon Central Asia as a prospective source of trade and wealth[45]. And the Russians conquered the Khanates of Khiva, Khokand and Bokhara just as the Chinese conquered the principalities of Sinkiang.

By 1851, when the Treaty of Kuldja (Ili) was signed with China[46], Tsarist Russia had an economic stake in Sinkiang. More important, it had developed a strong interest in Sinkiang from the standpoint of national security-- for Russian expansion into Central Asia from the east was accompanied by British penetration into Kashmir and Afghanistan through India from the south. Sinkiang lay between the two expanding empires.

The basic interests of security and trade in Sinkiang, with the first probably being more dominant insofar as one can separate international trade

from international politics, remained the same after the Bolsheviks took over in Russia. Notwithstanding a fundamental change in regime, with a new ideology, a new vocabulary and avowedly purer motives, the Bolsheviks-- whenever they felt it necessary-- have not hesitated to implement these interests with the same boldness and bluntness that characterized the actions of their Tsarist predecessors.

In 1871 Imperial Russian troops occupied Kuldja (Ining)[47] to head off a northward thrust by Yakub Beg. In 1912, when disturbances broke out at Kuldja and Kashgar, Russian Cossack troops again invaded Sinkiang to protect Russian lives and property in both cities[48].

In 1934 Bolshevik troops moved into Sinkiang and Bolshevik planes and weapons were placed at the disposal of Sheng Shih-ts'ai to liquidate the Chinese Moslem General Ma Chung-ying[49]. Soviet troops went to the aid of Sheng Shih-ts'ai again in 1936 to help crush another attempted revolt at Hami[50].

Strategically and economically, Northwest Sinkiang-- Ili, T'ach'eng and Ashan, the very districts in which the pro-Soviet "East Turkestan Republic" took root-- is the most important part of the province from the Soviet Union's standpoint. Quite aside from the rich resources of Northwest Sinkiang, three rivers flow from this area into Soviet territory.

Beginning in the Altai Mountains, the Black Irtysh runs northwestward below Ch'enghwa (capital of Ashan) into Lake Zaisan and the Irtysh River Valley leading up to Semipalatinsk. Beginning in the T'ienshan range southwest of Tihwa, the Ili River descends into the rich Ili Valley, passes Ining (capital of Ili) and then makes its way northwestward into Lake Balkash.

Between the two, the Emil River— also originating in the mountains of Jungaria— flows westward below Chuguchak (capital of T'acheng) and empties into Lake Ala on the Soviet side of the border.

If these river courses provide problems of defense, they also provide avenues of commerce that lead in the direction of Russia rather than in the direction of China. Moreover, both in Jungaria and in Kashgaria, the distance from the major centers of Sinkiang to the cities of Soviet Asia is much closer than it is from these centers to the remote and non-industrialized cities of China. The completion of the Turk-Sib Railway in 1930, together with the industrial development of such cities as Tashkent, Alma Ata and Semipalatinsk and a policy of subsidizing trade with Sinkiang[51], have added to Russian advantages in making it impossible for other powers to compete there on any major scale.

An extra advantage for the Soviet Union in Sinkiang lies in the ethnic and linguistic ties between the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang and the peoples of Soviet Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tadjikstan. Although one can take serious exception to the political pattern of Soviet rule in the latter areas, there is little doubt that the Soviet republics have made far more progress economically and educationally than Sinkiang has under Chinese rule.

While the vast majority of the Sinkiang population has remained illiterate and while there are still not more than a handful of qualified doctors[52] in the entire province, the literacy rate in Soviet Central Asia increased from 10 percent to nearly 70 percent in 1939 and the number of doctors jumped from about 200 in Tsarist days to 3,536 in 1937[53]. Two current writers on Soviet Central Asia, Paul B. Henze and Warren Wilbelm,

differ on a comparison between living standards in the Asiatic and European areas of the U.S.S.R., with Henze[54] maintaining that the European standards are much higher and Wilhelm[55] holding that the Soviet Asiatic is faring "approximately as well" if not better than the Soviet European. Still, the production figures cited for Soviet Central Asia makes this area seem like an industrial colossus by comparison with Sinkiang.

Under circumstances where the peoples on both sides of the border are drawn to each other by ties of race and language, this differential has helped establish the magnetic center of attraction in Soviet Asia rather than in Sinkiang.

The logic of the situation impressed itself strongly on Sir Eric Teichman, one-time British Consul-General in Peiping, on a trip through Sinkiang in 1935. He wrote later: "... For geographical and racial reasons, the connection between Chinese Turkistan and the neighboring territories of Siberia and Russian Central Asia must always, unless artifically suspended for political reasons, be especially close and intimate."[56]

In brief, the Soviet pull on Sinkiang is based on a combination of proximity, physiography, racial border ties, ideological attraction, and an industrial and commercial development that has brought Sinkiang's economy into closer association with the economy of Soviet Asia than with the economy of China. It is important to stress the point, however, that many non-Chinese leaders and their followers in Sinkiang have feared the Russians and come to dislike them more than they dislike the Chinese. The Kazakh leader, Osman, told us in 1948 that he had "declared war" on the Soviet

Union, claiming that during his period of cooperation with the rebel Ili regime he had become convinced that the Russians were more predatory than the Chinese. The so-called "Autonomous Group" in Sinkiang, headed by Aisabek Aleptekin and Mohammed Eimin, preferred the Chinese to the Russians because they claimed that chances for "real autonomy" were better under the Chinese than under the Russians. On September 20, 1949, five days before the Sinkiang Garrison surrendered to the Communists, 400 members of this group left Tihwa and finally reached New Delhi[57].

When Chang Chih-chung's representatives undertook to negotiate a new agreement with Russian delegates to grant the Soviet Union special trade and mineral exploitation rights in Sinkiang in 1949, the Tihwa newspaper, Freedom, organ of the "Autonomist Group," commented editorially:

"Opinions differ, but none deny its importance. Some expect it to benefit the area, others not. Economic control entails political control, and we trust the Soviet government-- protector of oppressed races-- will work unselfishly for the welfare of the provincial people. Some fear, however, that certain sycophants may wish to barter our wealth to the USSR. We do not oppose the pact, but suggest that the Soviet Government seek aid to Sinkiang and not enrichment of the already wealthy USSR, removal of only such minerals as are not needed here and trade on the basis of local need, and not on the basis of dumping unneeded products while taking away our necessities."[58]

Distrust of the Soviet Union ranges from concern over safeguarding the Uighur script, as opposed to the Roman alphabet introduced on the Soviet side of the border, to worries about keeping Islam intact and preserving

the old habits of life. The Kirei Kazakhs in 1948 spoke resentfully about the "collectivization" that had taken place in Kazakhstan. Moreover, many Kazakhs and Uighurs recall the police state of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, which blossomed during his period of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Although the Kuomintang Central Government did not actually establish its own effective control in Sinkiang until 1943, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the Russians fell out, it reaped in the following year the whirlwind generated by centuries of hatred and discontent. The Ining rebellion broke out, symbolically enough, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

The foundations for the Ili rebellion and the subsequent establishment of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" may well have been laid during the period from 1934 to 1943, when Soviet advisers and technicians entered Sinkiang in force and when the Soviet Eighth Regiment (wearing Chinese insignia) was stationed at Hami. From 1937 to about 1942 the Soviet Union coupled its fulsome support of Sheng Shih-ts'ai with military aid to China channeled through Sinkiang along the rebuilt road from Ili to Hami and then down through the Kansu corridor to Lanchow. Although the Russians withdrew their troops, technicians and equipment from Sinkiang in 1943, the Soviet Union continued to remain the paramount factor in Sinkiang politics-- and still is to this day.

When the war against Japan ended, the Soviet Union took the initiative in bringing the Kuomintang and Ili leaders together in Sinkiang just as the United States later took the initiative in bringing the Kuomintang and Communists together in the broader China context. Talks were started

between General Chang Chih-chung and the Ili representatives at Tihwa in October, 1945 and finally produced a coalition government by July 1, 1946. During and after the collapse of the coalition in August, 1947, the Soviet Union maintained a policy of ostensible "neutrality." The three top Chinese political leaders in Sinkiang-- Chang Chih-chung, Foreign Affairs Commissioner Liu Tze-yung and Liu Meng-ch'un, Secretary-General of the Northwest Headquarters-- expressed the conviction, however, that the new Ili-Tihwa break was related more basically to a shift in Soviet policy than to domestic developments in Sinkiang.

Except for the Sino-Soviet airline route, which connected Hami and Tihwa with Ining and Alma Ata, all economic ties between the Ili areas and the rest of Sinkiang were broken. So matters stood until September 25, 1949, when the Sinkiang officials accepted the Communist authority.

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NOTES

1. Sinkiang is also sometimes called Chinese Turkestan (Turkistan) as opposed to Russian Turkestan. "Turkestan" is a Persian term meaning "Land of the Turks," but is applied only to the areas inhabited by the Turanian or Central Asian Turks. The early Chinese knew what is now Sinkiang as the largest part of the Hsi Yu ("Western Regions"). Sinkiang or Hsin Chiang, variously translated as the "New Territory," "New Dominion" and "New Borderland," became the official name when the area became a province. It started functioning as a province in 1882, but the formal decree giving it provincial status was issued on November 18, 1884. (Cf. Lattimore, Owen and Others, Pivot of Asia, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1950, p. 50.)

2. Area and population figures are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

3. The headquarters of the Kuomintang Central Government, which is now in Formosa, was then in Canton. Founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and taken over later by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang ("National Party") operated legally as a one-party government in China until March 1, 1947. At that time some members of the Young China Party and Democratic Socialist Party and a number of "non-partisans" were brought into the government under the new constitution adopted by the National Assembly on December 25, 1946. Neither the Chinese Communists nor the Democratic League participated in the Assembly. (Sinkiang delegates were present along with Tibetan and Inner Mongolian delegates.) Taking effect one year after its adoption, the new constitution officially pronounced the end of the Kuomintang's one-party "political tutelage" and theoretically completed the divorce of the Kuomintang from the Central Government. In practice, however, the association continued. After March 1, 1947, the Kuomintang continued to be the only important party in Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek continued to be the dominant leader both in the party and in the government. Chiang "retired" as president of China on January 21, 1949, with Vice President General Li Tsung-jen assuming the acting presidency. But Chiang retained his post as leader of the Kuomintang and maintained his control over the most vital surviving units of the entire Central Government complex. On April 24, 1949, Li Tsung-jen and his shadow government at Nanking abandoned the old Kuomintang capital to the Communists. The capital was shifted to Canton, then to Chungking, then to Chengtu and finally to Taipei in Formosa. Chiang reassumed the title of president in Formosa on March 1, 1950. Hereafter, the term "Kuomintang" will be used interchangeably with the "National Government" or "Central Government" of Chiang Kai-shek unless more precise terms are necessary to make the situation in Sinkiang clear at any given time.

4. The Sinkiang officials accepted the authority of the Chinese Communists before the formal establishment of the Communist-dominated Chinese People's Republic at Peiping on October 1, 1949. It represented a military surrender based on acceptance of terms drafted earlier by the Communists and held out to all regional officials or commanders who were

willing to surrender to the Communist "People's Liberation Army."

5. Writing in 1926, Skrine estimated that the Chinese had ruled in Kashgaria for about 425 out of the last 2,000 years. (Skrine, C. P., Chinese Central Asia, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1926, p. 58.)

6. Quoted in A Survey of Sinkiang, published by the Sinkiang Provincial Government, Tihwa, 1938.

7. Friters, Gerard M., Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1949, p. 230. Cf. Beloff, Max, Appendix E on "Russia and Mongolia" in The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, Oxford University Press, London, 1949 (Second Printing)-- Vol. I, pp. 239-248.

8. Yi Shih Pao, "The Ili Movement," Peiping, February 23, 1946.

9. China Handbook, 1937-1945, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, p. 27.

10. Goodrich, L. Carrington, A Short History of the Chinese People, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948, p. 130. General Pai Chung-hsi, who with General Li Tsung-jen headed the "Kwangsi Clique" in Chinese Nationalist politics, is a Kwangsi Moslem. The Moslems of Southeast China are a much less important force than they are in Northwest China.

11. Cf. Goodrich, op. cit., p. 120; Barthold, W., Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (Second Edition), Luzac and Co., London, 1928, pp. 195-196.

12. Lattimore, Owen, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, American Geographical Society, New York, 1940, p. 124.

13. These propaganda handbills were seen by the writer at Tihwa in August, 1948 and later at Nanking.

14. The ethnic and linguistic myths that underlay the Pan-Turkestan and Pan-Turanian movements were exploded by M. A. (Mary Antoinette) Czaplicka in her book, The Turks of Central Asia in History and at Present Day, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1918.

15. Clubb, O. Edmund, Sinkiang: The New Borderland (unpublished), p. 258 of manuscript.

16. In his doctoral thesis on Chinese colonization in Sinkiang, Ho speculates that Mu Wang reached the borders of Sinkiang and then sent emissaries deeper into the territory. (Ho, David, La Colonisatrice de la Chine dans le Turkestan Chinois, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1941, pp. 8-9.) This speculation is also open to serious doubt.

17. The dates on Chinese dynasties and rulers, as used herein, are taken from the table of dynasties in the China Handbook, 1937-1945, pp.20-24.

18. Goodrich, op. cit., p. 37.

19. Galdan's relations with the Russians are discussed in O. Edmund Clubb's unpublished, Sinkiang: The New Borderland.

20. Vide, Knight Biggerstaff's article on A-kuei (pp.6-8) in Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912, U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Edited by Arthur W. Hummel.

21. Lattimore, Owen, High Tartary, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1930, p. 320.

22. A graphic account of the execution of Jehangir is contained in E. (Regis-Evarist) Huc's Souvenirs of a Journey through Tartary, Tibet and China, Lazarist Press, Peking, 1931, Vol. I., pp. 346-348. According to Huc, Jehangir was first exhibited to the public in an iron cage and then condemned to be "cut into pieces" and "served up as food for the dogs." This, however, is not a first-hand account. The Abbé Huc, a Lazarist priest who wrote of his travels in 1844, 1845 and 1846, does not seem to have been in Peking when the incident took place.

23. Cf. Shaw, Robert, Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand and Kashgar, John Murray, London, 1871 and Boulger, Demetrius C., Central Asian Questions: Essays on Afghanistan, China and Central Asia, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1885.

24. Ho, op. cit.,pp. 27-23. Cf., Norins, Martin R., Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, The John Day Company, New York, 1944, pp. 94-95, et seq.

25. The correspondents were Ian Morrison of the London Times, A. Doak Barnett of the Chicago Daily News, and this writer, representing the New York Times.

26. Lyashchenko, Peter I., History of the National Economy of Russia, (translated by L. M. Herman under the Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies), The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949, pp. 606-609. In the translation of Lyashchenko's text, the terms are listed as amlyak, myulk and vakuf.

27. In addition to building the canals and ditches, land had to be leveled to absorb the water evenly. (Lyashchenko, op.cit., p.608) In the oasis of Turfan, where irrigation called for the building of a series of wells known as karez, construction costs were especially high.

28. Ho, op. cit., p. 35.

29. According to the "Organizational Outline of Various Graded Units in the Hsien," promulgated by the Central Government on September 19, 1939,

a chia was to consist in principle of ten households and in practice of not less than six nor more than 15. The pao was to consist in principle of 10 chia and in practice of not less than six nor more than 15. China Handbook, 1937-1945, pp. 125-126.

30. On February 23, 1949 the Sinkiang Gazette, published at Tihwa, observed: "Improved management of public affairs would result from a change in the pao-chia system and the abolition of hereditary begships, with the public sharing in the selections."

31. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 54.

32. Cf. Shaw, Boulger and Skrine, op. cit., also Hedin, Sven, The Flight of Big Horse, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936. Writing in 1929, Bosshard observed: "In Chinese Turkestan, where corruptness permeated all classes, advancement, like other marketable commodities, was bought and sold." (Bosshard, W., Politics and Trade in Central Asia, Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. XVI, p. 437, London, 1929.)

33. Tseng Wen-yu, Chung Kuo Chin Ying Hsi Yü Shih, Shanghai, 1936, p. 592. (Quoted in Pivot of Asia, op. cit., p. 56.)

34. Macartney, G., Eastern Turkestan: The Chinese as Rulers Over an Alien Race, (Paper read to the Central Asian Society, March 10, 1909), Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, London, 1909.

35. Clubb, op. cit., p. 126.

36. Alga (Forward), Ining, February 17, 1949.

37. Ho, op. cit., p. 56.

38. Cf. Vasel, Georg, My Russian Jailers in China, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., London, 1937. Also, Kamal, Ahmad, Land Without Laughter, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940.

39. Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China, reprinted by the Calcutta office of the Chinese Ministry of Information, 1942, pp. 13-19.

40. Norins, op. cit., p.105.

41. The ratio was maintained after the CNC was replaced by the gold yuan in September, 1948, the new rate being SD $1 for GY $5.

42. Sinkiang Jih Pao, Tihwa, March 26, 1949.

43. The term "Han Chinese" is a cultural designation that has special political significance in Sinkiang inasmuch as it distinguishes the Chinese ruling group from other groups. These so-called "Men of Han," a name

associated with an illustrious "Chinese" dynasty, constitute almost the complete bulk of the people of China Proper. Kuomintang writers divided the peoples or "family" of China into five major classifications: Han, Manchu, Mongol, Moslem and Tibetan. These divisions confuse religious and ethnic groups, ignore various groups under the Moslem category, and completely exclude such tribes as the Miaos, Yis and Lolos, and also the Taiwanese (Formosans). The Han Chinese look upon the Taiwanese-- many of whom are a mixture of Fukienese, Malay and Japanese-- as "Chinese," but the Taiwanese look upon themselves as a group apart. In Sinkiang, the Han Chinese and Chinese Moslems (Tungans) are distinct and separate groups. The Tungans, who are a mixture of Han Chinese and "Turki", nominally fall into the Kuomintang category of Moslem. The Moslem Uighurs, however, look upon them as a breed of Chinese. Herein, the writer refers to the "Han Chinese" as Chinese and to the Chinese Moslems in Sinkiang as Tungans.

44. Quoted by Norins, op. cit., p. 145.

45. Peter the Great, who was interested in the wealth of India as well as in the wealth of Central Asia, stressed the economic motive in his instructions to the leaders of a military expedition to the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara in 1714. The instructions included this passage: "To set out for Khiva with salutations for the khan, and to Bukhara (Bokhara), finding some commercial objective, a real objective..." Quoted by Lyashchenko, op. cit., p. 353.

46. The Kuldja treaty, signed in 1851, was first made public in 1861. (Cf. Norins, op. cit., p. 51.)

47. See sketch of territory occupied by Russia during the "Kuldja incident" in Bales, W. L., Tso Tsungt'ang, Soldier and Statesman of Old China, Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai, 1937, p. 378.

48. Reed, Barrett M., Sinkiang: Crossroads of Empire, Russian Institute dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1947, pp. 107 and 110.

49. Clubb, op. cit., p. 252.

50. Ibid., p. 275.

51. Conolly, Violet, Soviet Economic Policy in the East, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, pp. 115-125.

52. In 1948 there were three small hospitals (one military) in Tihwa, the best of which was the Russian hospital. When United States Consul-General Robert Ward required surgical medical attention in 1946, it was necessary to fly him from Tihwa to Alma Ata.

53. Wilhelm, Warren, Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area, Foreign Policy Reports February 1, 1950, Foreign Policy Association, New York, p. 224.

54. Henze, Paul B., The Economic Development of Soviet Central Asia (two parts), Part II, Royal Central Asian Journal, London, January, 1950, pp. 39-40.

55. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 223.

56. Teichman, Sir Eric, Journey to Turkistan, Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London, 1937, p. 25.

57. This information is based on a letter from Aisabek to a friend in this country. The writer has seen the letter. It was dated January 31, 1950 and mailed from New Delhi.

58. Freedom, Tihwa, March 6, 1949.

III. THE FACE OF SINKIANG

According to figures made available at Tihwa in 1948 by the Office of Geological Survey and the Commission of Civil Affairs, the territory of Sinkiang covers 1,734,750 square kilometers (669,700 square miles) and includes a population totalling 4,055,900 persons[1] divided into 14 "racial groups." The province was then broken down into ten zones[2], as shown in the map below, consisting of 74 hsien (counties) and six special administrative areas. Tihwa, the capital, was listed as a special municipality.



Although the hsien were theoretically responsible directly to the provincial government in 1948, a system of administrative district officers still intervened between the hsien-chang (county headmen) and the provincial regime at that time. The Tihwa Zone, for example, had the following administrative hierarchy at that time: Administrative Commissioner for the Tihwa Zone, Tihwa District Commissioner, Mayor of Tihwa, various Municipal Bureaus and a military chief of police responsible to the Sinkiang Garrison Headquarters instead of to the municipal government.

Notwithstanding the emergence in July, 1946 of a provincial government coalition with a greater degree of autonomy than had formerly been enjoyed in Sinkiang, actual control over the province was exercised in 1948 by agencies and officials of the Central Government. The supreme authority in Sinkiang at that time was vested in General Chang Chih-chung as Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest, a joint military-political-and-economic authority which had its central base in Lanchow (Kansu Province) and which theoretically exercised jurisdiction over the provinces of Kansu, Ch'inghai, Ninghsia and Shensi as well as Sinkiang. The provincial government of Sinkiang fitted into the governmental framework as shown in the chart on the following page.

The task of classifying the present-day peoples of Sinkiang with any degree of precision is made difficult by the lack of sufficient anthropological data on their exact origins, by centuries of inter-mingling among the peoples themselves, and by the conflicting terms that already have been applied to them. Politics has played an important role in adding to the confusion in terms.

Structure of Sinkiang Provincial Government, 1946#

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NANKING

GENERALISSIMO'S HEADQUARTERS FOR THE NORTHWEST
Director, General Chang Chih-chung (C)
Vice-Dr., Lieut. Gen. T'ao Chih-yueh (C)
Secretary-General, Liu Meng-ch'un (C)
Chief-of-Staff, Lieut. Gen. Liu Jen (C)

TIHWA OFFICE OF NORTHWEST HEADQUARTERS
Chief, Liu Meng-ch'un

NATIONAL AGENCIES

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER
Liu Tze-yung (C)

SINKIANG COMMITTEE OF KUOMINTANG
Chmn, Ch'en Hsi-hao (C)
Soc., Yang Wei (C)

OFFICE OF CONTROL YUAN
Rep., Ma Liang-chun (Tungan)
Deputy, Chao Wen-ping (C)

JUDICIAL YUAN REPRESENTATIVES
Supreme Court--Chia Huang-chen (C)
Local Court-- Wang Wen-ch'o (C)

CUSTOMS OFFICE
Commissioner, Haiung Ta-lun (C)

TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE ADMIN.
Chief, Wang Chang-ch'uan

POSTAL ADMINISTRATION
Chief, Ch'en Hsu-chou (C)

HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION
Chief, Liu Liang-chang (C)

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
Chief, Wang Heng-sheng (C)

IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
Chief, Wang Ho-t'ing (C)

CENTRAL BANK, TIHWA BRANCH
Mgr., Li Wen-fu (C)

SINKIANG PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

CHAIRMAN, Masud Sabri (U)
VICE-CHMN., Aolmad Djan (U)*
VICE-CHMN., Borhan (T)
SEC. GEN., Aisabek (U)
DPTY.SEC.GEN., Abasov (U)*
DPTY.SEC.GEN., Salis (K)

BUREAUS

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Chief, Wang Tsung-shan (C)
Deputy, Rahim Djan (U)*

FINANCE
Chief, Jarimhan (K)
Deputy, Pai Wen-yu (C)

RECONSTRUCTION
Chief, Mohammed Emin (U)
Deputy, Liu Teh-en (C)

EDUCATION
Chief, Seyfuddin (U)*
Deputy, Chen Fang-pai (C)

SOCIAL WELFARE
Chief, Liu Hsiao-li (C)
Deputy, Erdeni (M)

BOARD OF SANITATION
Chief, Ma Shu-chi (Tungan)

SINKIANG PROVINCIAL BANK
Mgr., Pai Wen-yu

SINKIANG GARRISON HEADQUARTERS

CINC., Lieut. Gen. T'ao Chih-yueh
DPTY., Lieut.Gen. Chao Hsi-kuang (C)
C.-of-S., Maj.Gen. T'ao Ch'in-chu (C)

TIHWA COMMAND FOR JUNGARIA
(Lieut.Gen. T'ao Chih-yueh)
KASHGAR COMMAND FOR KASHGARIA
(Lieut.Gen. Chao Hsi-kuang)

16th AIRFORCE DISTRICT
Cdr., Lieut. Col Yu P'ing-hsiang (C)

BUREAU OF MILITARY SUPPLY
Chief, Maj.Gen. Hsia Jih-ch'ang (C)

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH CAVALRY ARMY
Cdr., Maj.Gen. Ma Cheng-hsiang (Tungan)

SINKIANG PEACE PRESERVATION CORPS
Cdr., Chairman Masud Sabri
Dpty., Maj. Gen. Tang Pi-kang (C)

CH'INGHAI PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
(General Ma Pu-fang)

The "racial" grouping of members of the government is denoted as follows: C for Chinese, U for Uighur, K for Kazakh, M for Mongol, and T for Tatar. Chinese Moslems are denoted as Tungans (spelled out). An asterisk denotes members of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" who joined the provincial government in July, 1946 and returned to Ili in August, 1947.

In attacking the racial validity of the Pan-Islamic movement promoted by the German and nationalist elements in Turkey during the first World War, Czaplicka notes how the word "Osmanly" was changed to "Turk" and the word "Turk" to "Turanian" as the sponsors of the movement adjusted anthropology to political considerations in Central Asia[3]. On the other hand, because of their distaste for the Pan-Islamic movement insofar as it challenged their own control in Sinkiang, the Chinese came to frown severely on such terms as "Turkestan" and "Turki." As minority rulers, they have preferred Sinkiang (Hsin Chiang) as the name for Chinese Turkestan and "Uighur" (Wei-wu-erh) as a "racial" label for its largest non-Chinese grouping.

Up to 1948, at least, differences between Chinese officials and non-Chinese leaders in Sinkiang over ethnical terminology was not merely a quibble, for the argument was related to Sinkiang's basic political status. Chang Chih-chung devoted considerable time as a post-war negotiator in Sinkiang trying to get the Ili leaders to drop the word "Turkestan" from their propaganda insofar as it raised the question of Chinese sovereignty. At the same time even the relatively pro-Chinese "Turki" members of the Kuomintang in Sinkiang quarreled with the parent Kuomintang organisation about "racial" terminology as it applied to the peoples of the province.

Kuomintang "racial theorists" in Chungking and later in Nanking argued that the peoples of Sinkiang belonged to 14 different "stocks," but that like other "stocks" in China, they were part of "one Chinese family." Sinkiang leaders like Masud Sabri, Mohammed Emin and Aisabel Aleptekin maintained, on the other hand, that there were not 14 different "stocks" in Sinkiang, and that the vast majority of its inhabitants were descended from

one "Turkic" people[4].

Such officials, most of whom had participated in the Pan-Turanian movement before joining the Kuomintang, refused to accept the term "Uighur." They preferred the designation of "Turki" and insisted that most of the inhabitants of Sinkiang were descended from common "Turkic" ancestors. On the basis of what anthropological evidence is available, this theory about the peoples of Sinkiang is not any more scientific than the old Kuomintang theory of "one Chinese family." But as measured in terms of group consciousness in Sinkiang, at least as it applies to the majority group known to the Chinese as "Uighurs," it has more political validity there than the "one Chinese family" concept.

Under any circumstances, "Turk" is a linguistic rather than an ethnic term. For purposes of classifying the various Turkic-speaking nations, Czaplicka divided them into two main groups: 1.) the "Western Turks," including what she estimated (in 1917) to be 8,000,000 to 9,000,000 people living in the areas extending eastward from Constantinople (Istanbul) to Persia and Afghanistan; and 2.) the "Eastern Turks" (Turanians), embracing what she then estimated to be 10,000,000 people living in Turkestan as far up as Mongolia and China.[5]

Such writers as Czaplicka and Lattimore have accepted the hypothesis that the two basic racial elements in Sinkiang are Aryan (Alpine) and Mongoloid. The Aryan element may be identified in terms of such physical attributes as "white" skin, heavy beard, relatively large body, and gray, brown and even blue eyes; the Mongoloid in terms of light brown skin, black eyes, small body, little body hair and "Asiatic" features. Masud Sabri,

Aisabek and Mohammed Eimin could blend easily with the middle-class types one meets in Istanbul. Borhan, the Sinkiang Tatar, is fair-skinned with light brown hair, and resembles pictures of Lenin. Osman Bator, the Kazakh chieftain, was also fair-skinned, with a heavy black beard and blue-green eyes.

Lattimore[6] has divided the languages spoken in Sinkiang into ten groups falling under three major categories, as follows:

I. URAL-ALTAIC

A. Turkic

1. Uighur
2. Kazakh
3. Kirghiz
4. Uzbek
5. Tatar

B. Mongolian

6. Mongolian

C. Tunguistic

7. Manchu

II. INDO-CHINESE

8. Chinese

III. INDO-EUROPEAN

9. Iranian
10. Russian

By another classification[7], the Turkic-Tatar languages are divided into Jagatai (Uighur, Koman, Jagatai, Uzbek, Turkoman and Kazan); Tatar (Kirghiz, Bashkir, Nogai, Kuman, Karachai, Kara-Kalpak, Meshcherak and Siberian); and Turkish (Derbent, Azerbaidjan, Crimean, Anatolian and Rumelian).

The linguistic and ethnic divisions that exist in Sinkiang are admittedly complicated, but the complexity may easily be exaggerated. There

are close similarities between the Tatar and Jagatai dialects, for example, as Czaplicka points out. Jarimhan, the Kazakh, and Aisabek, the Uighur, could converse in their own dialects and understand one another. Furthermore, while there is less similarity between the Sinkiang Turkic dialects and Istanbul Turkish, Masud Sabri said that he had gotten along fairly well with Sinkiang Turkish when he went to Istanbul (Constantinople) to study in his youth.

a. Present-Day Peoples in Sinkiang

Whether designated as "Uighur" or "Turki,"[8] this blended people--consisting of persons who look upon themselves more or less as a distinct group-- is in the preponderant majority in Sinkiang. The Uighurs constitute three-fourths of the population. The Kazakhs, comprising 10 percent of the population, form the second largest group, as shown in the following table based on figures made available to the writer in 1948 by the Sinkiang Commission on Civil Affairs:

The "14 Groups"

Group	Number	Percentage of Total
Uighurs	3,036,500	74.8
Kazakhs	424,800	10.4
Chinese	235,700	5.8
Tungans	103,100	2.5
T'aranch'is	79,300	1.9
Kirghiz	59,200	1.4
Mongols	57,900	1.4
"White Russians"	19,300	.5
Uzbeks	10,800	.4
Hsipos	10,600	.3
Tadjiks	9,800	.2
Tatars	5,600	.1
Solons	2,500	(Under 1/10th of 1 percent)
Manchus	800	(" " " " " ")

As in the case of the languages of Sinkiang, the heterogeneity of the population of Sinkiang-- as revealed in the above figures-- may be over-emphasized. With the Uighurs constituting 74.8 percent of the population, there is a substantial nucleus that is bound together by the same group identity. More than 90 percent of the population, excluding the Chinese, Mongols, Russians and the "Tunguistic" groups (Hsipo, Solon and Manchu), is Moslem by tradition if not in actual present belief.[9] This does not mean that there are not strong rivalries between the various groups listed above and within the individual groups themselves. It remains important, nevertheless, to point out these factors of homogeneity, because they can be exploited politically under new conditions just as factors of heterogeneity were exploited in the past.

The Uighurs are concentrated in the four southwest zones of Kashgar, Aksu, Hotien (Khotan) and Soche (Yarkand), where Sinkiang's demographic center of gravity is located. The 2,632,700 Uighurs who live in these four zones constitute 66 percent of the entire population. Other concentrations of Uighurs are found in the Tihwa and Ili Zones.

By and large, the Kazakhs are concentrated in the three northwest zones of the former "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic"-- Ili, T'ach'eng and Ashan, where they outnumber the Uighurs by four to one. The Chinese are concentrated in the Tihwa Zone, but there are also some in the Ili and T'ach'eng Zones. The Tungans are concentrated principally in the Tihwa Zone, too. Some Tungans also live in the Ili Zone.

From all indications the Uighurs are primarily a mixture of tribes who originated in Outer Mongolia and the "Turkic" groups who entered Kashgaria

from the southwest in growing numbers after the 10th Century. Two confederations of Uighur tribes in what is now Outer Mongolia-- the On-Uighur ("Ten" Uighur) and Togus-Uighur ("Nine" Uighur)-- participated in the Central Asiatic Empire of Baghdur (Mötö) from 209 to 179 B.C.[10] Between 744 and 847, the Uighurs had their own empire in Outer Mongolia, with 14 khans ruling in this period from a capital at Karakorum on the Orkhon River. During the existence of the Uighur Empire and after its overthrow by the Kirghiz, Uighur warriors penetrated into Jungaria and then below the T'ienshan Range into Kashgaria.

Most of the Uighurs in Sinkiang today are farmers, but they also engage in village handicrafts and in the commerce of the bazaars.

The Kazakhs, who concern themselves almost entirely with nomadic livestock breeding, are sometimes classified as part of a Kirghiz-Kazakh grouping[11] that goes back to a people originally inhabiting the Upper Yenisei River area in Siberia. It was along the path of migration into Central Asia that the Kirghiz came into conflict with the Uighur Empire in the Ninth Century. A clue to the present distinction between the Kirghiz and the Kazakh, and indeed to the hatred between the two, is provided by two different interpretations of the word "Kazakh." Jochelson[12] says the word means a "free, independent people," while Lattimore[13] comments that it is believed to mean "a fugitive or masterless man who has separated himself from his tribe."

Beginning in the 15th Century, while the Kirghiz were living under an Uzbek confederation in the territory bordering southwest Sinkiang, detachments of Kirghiz are said to have split off from the main group and migrated

northward into what is now Soviet Kazakhstan. In the following century these detachments of splinter Kirghiz became divided into three major groupings or hordes living under a Kazakh khan. A Kazakh historian in Tihwa told the writer in 1948 that there were still three major Kazakh hordes-- the Naiman, the Kirei and the Ouwak. In Sinkiang, he said, there were 12 Kirei tribes, nine Naiman tribes and three Ouwak tribes.

Of all the peoples in Sinkiang, the Kazakhs are most closely related to a counterpart on the Soviet side of the border. Our Kazakh historian in Tihwa claimed, however, that the Soviet Kazakhs were primarily Naiman. Himself a Kirei, he pointed out that most of the Kazakhs living in the Ili Zone were also Naiman. This explanation helps to account for the Kuomintang tactic of cultivating the Kirei Kazakhs in Sinkiang as a counterfoil for the Kazakhs who lived under the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic."

In 1948 the Kirei Kazakhs in Sinkiang were under the nominal rule of Prince Ailin Wang, a hen-pecked little man who was completely dominated by his Amazonian wife, Hatewan, whom the Kuomintang got elected as district officer of Tihwa. Although the Kazakhs are Moslems, their women go about unveiled and do much of the work in the pasturelands, tending flocks, manufacturing felt and brewing kumis[14]. Notwithstanding their labors, however, the Kazakh women-- with their black boots, nun-like headdresses and long white gowns, to which lucky bird-feathers are attached-- keep a respectful distance and stir up the kumis while the Kazakh men receive visitors.

Many of the Chinese now living in Sinkiang spring from the Hunanese who arrived with Tso Tsung-t'ang, the Yunnanese who flourished under Yang Tseng-hsin, the Kansu men who had the inner track under Chin Shu-jen and

the Honan famine victims who were resettled there in 1943. There are also a number of trading families who came originally from various parts of North China. Among the Manchurians there are the descendants of the Manchu Solon and Sibo soldiers who entered Sinkiang during Ch'ien Lung's time and the families of those Northeast Army troops who succeeded in escaping from Manchuria after the 1931 Mukden Incident by way of the Soviet Union.[15] After traveling over the Trans-Siberian and Turk-Sib Railways with Russian help, they wound up in the Ili area just in time to be incorporated into Sheng Shih-ts'ai's army.

The Tungans ("returners"?) in Sinkiang go back at least as far as the reign of Ch'ien Lung, whose military commanders found these Chinese Moslems useful and effective as soldiers. In the 19th Century, when the later Manchus crushed the successive Moslem rebellions that broke out in Northwest China, many other Chinese Moslems took refuge in Sinkiang. In more recent times they appeared as invading troops during the campaigns of General Ma Chung-ying in the early 1930's and after 1945 as garrison soldiers attached to General Ma Cheng-hsiang's Fifth Cavalry Army.[16]

Aside from their function as soldiers, the Tungans have played an important role in Sinkiang as merchants and money-lenders. It is noteworthy that, despite the religious links between the Tungans and the Uighurs and Kazakhs, the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang have disliked the Tungans even more than they have disliked the Chinese. That is perhaps the inevitable fate of the cross-breed. Over and above this consideration, however, the Tungans were hated for their allegedly sharp business practices. One of the pursuits in which Tungans were engaged in 1948 was the financing

of Kazakh flock-herds, a practice that turned the poorer Kazakhs into nomadic tenants. In such cases, the Tungans owned the flocks and the Kazakhs tended them, with owner and renter sharing the profits.

As was pointed out in Chapter II, the T'aranch'is are the offshoots of Uighur "cultivators" who were resettled in the Ili area during the reign of Ch'ien Lung.[17] The "White Russians," who entered Sinkiang during and after the Bolshevik Revolution, are concentrated in the northwest zones of Ili (9,400), T'ach'eng (6,000) and Ashan (2,200).[18] Most of them are now Soviet citizens.

Among the "White Russians" still living in Sinkiang after 1945 were a number of religious groups who were moved to Shanghai and other cities of China Proper in 1946 and 1947 as displaced persons. These included members of an "Old Ritualist"[19] sect who had entered Sinkiang from Siberia after 1917, Mennonites from the old German communities in the Ukraine and Russian Pentecostalists[20]. Among the others shifted to China Proper were German-speaking Catholics, Lutherans and Seventh Day Adventists who had lived formerly in both Germany and Russia.

The history of the Mongols in Sinkiang, as reflected in the careers of such figures as Jagatai (son of Genghiz Khan), Galdan, Tsewan Rabdan, Tsewan Dordji Magyal and Amursana, is far more illustrious than the surviving Mongol population that now constitutes only 1.4 percent of the total number of people in Sinkiang. Many of the present-day Mongols in the province were, in fact, resettled there by the Manchus to destroy the last vestiges of Öirat influence.

Data obtained by the writer in Sinkiang in 1943 showed the Mongol concentrations as follows:

Torgut South League (3 banners) in the Yenki Zone
Torgut North League (3 banners) in Northeast Sinkiang
Torgut East League (2 banners) in the areas northwest of Tihwa
Torgut Western Group (1 banner) near Wusu, just northwest of Tihwa
New Torgut League (2 banners) in the Peitashan area of Northeast Sinkiang
Hoshot League (3 banners) in the Yenki Zone
Independent Hoshot Banner (1 banner) in the Yenki Zone
Chahar Mongols (2 banners) in the Ili Zone
Koksu River Öirat Mongols (1 banner) in the Ili Zone
Tekes River Öirat Mongols (1 banner) in the Ili Zone
Ebinor Torgut Mongols (1 banner) in the Ili Zone
T'ach'eng Öirat Mongols (2 banners) in the T'ach'eng Zone
Altai Mongols (2 banners) in the Ashan Zone

The Uzbeks (Uzbegs), who have a republic of their own in Soviet Asia, are believed to be related in origin to the Kirghiz[21]. Actually, Uzbek is a political rather than an ethnical term. Sometime after the 14th Century, when the Uzbeks became Moslems, they adopted the name of the khan (Uzbeg Khan) to distinguish themselves from Central Asian Turks who still practiced shamanism.

Like the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, the Tadjiks also have a republic of their own in Soviet Asia. They are also believed to be related in origin to the Kirghiz. Speaking an Iranian language and adhering to the Aga Khan-branch of the Moslem faith, the Sinkiang Tadjiks are concentrated in the Sarikol (Tashkurgan) Valley in the extreme southwest corner of the province. The Sarikol revolt of 1945 bears testimony to Skrine's observation that the inhabitants of this mountainous area are "an unruly lot."[22]

The Tatars of Sinkiang, of whom present Governor Borhan is one, are found principally in the Ili and T'ach'eng Zones. Lattimore[23] claims the Sinkiang Tatars are descended from both the Tatar traders who settled there

in Tsarist times and the anti-Soviet refugees who entered Sinkiang from Kazan after 1917. Jochelson[24], however, points out that there was a branch of Altaian Tatars that was subjugated by the Öirat Mongols. But these two observations are not necessarily contradictory, for it is possible that the Altaian Tatars living in or on the fringes of Sinkiang were reinforced by Tatars who later entered Sinkiang from remoter areas in Russia.

b. Physiography and Land Utilization

Surrounded by ranges that provide access through various passes and valley corridors, with the solidest blocks of mountain concentrated in a semi-circle along its western, southwestern, southern and southeastern frontiers, Sinkiang itself is a combination of moutains, deserts and oases. The remarkable variation in terrain is highlighted by the difference between the altitude of the Khan Tengri peak in the T'ienshan Range (23,600 feet) and the depth of the Turfan Depression (928 feet below sea level).[25]

The mountain system of Central Asia is superimposed on Sinkiang so that it tends to encompass and divide the province in the form of the symbol $\in$.

On the northern border of Sinkiang are the Altai Mountains, whose northwest-southeast axis terminates in a lower spur known to the Chinese as the Pei Shan ("North Mountains"). On the south are the K'unlun Mountains (part of the Himalaya concentration), which extend eastward to form the Nan Shan ("South Mountains") cluster that straddles Ch'inghai and Kansu Provinces and southeastward to merge with the Tibetan Highlands. On the southwest are the Pamirs, which reach up into Soviet Tadjikstan. On the west in Russian territory is the forearm of the T'ienshan Range, which

stretches eastward for about 1,000 miles across the width of Sinkiang.

The Pei Shan and Nan Shan ranges, which tend to close along the Sinkiang-Kansu border, leave open a gap so that land travelers from China may proceed up the Kansu corridor and into Sinkiang by way of Suchow and Hami. Farther up access to Sinkiang from the east is also possible across the Gobi to Suchow. Four major passes lead westward from Sinkiang into the Soviet Union. In the south there is the Terek Pass and in the north the Black Irtysh pass near Ch'enghwa, the valley roadway near T'ach'eng and the Ili River pass at Ining. The roads from Sinkiang south to India lead to the difficult routes over the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and the Karakoram.

The key physiographic feature in Sinkiang is the T'ienshan Range ("Celestial Mountains"), which runs east and west and divides the province into two unequal parts-- about one-third to the north of the range and two-thirds to the south.

Between the T'ienshan and the Altai Mountains in the north lies Jungaria, which comprises the complex of valleys on the northwestern Russo-Sinkiang frontier, alternating stretches of grassland and wasteland, and a Gobi-type desert in the northeastern part of the province. Between the T'ienshan and the Pamirs and K'unlun Mountains in the south lies the huge Taklamakan Desert (largely sand), fringed by a ring of oases. Rivers rising in the southern mountains flow north, with the largest river-- the Tarim-- rising in the Pamirs and flowing northwestward and then westward across the Taklamakan Desert.

The Tarim River system has produced an alternate name for Kashgaria: the Tarim Basin.

As Cressey[26] points out, no area in the world is as remote from the moderating climatic influence of the ocean as Sinkiang. Where the snow-covered mountains fail to feed streams that can be tapped for irrigation purposes, the dominating climatic feature in the lowlands is aridity. Sinkiang's geographic location and physiographic make-up are such, however, that while all the province is remote from the influence of the sea, Jungaria-- facing the Atlantic across a vast continental land mass-- is relatively less arid than the extremely arid Kashgaria.

On the mountain slopes, the yearly precipitation (winter snow and summer rain) reaches 20 to 30 inches, while in Soche (Yarkand) there is less than one inch of rainfall each year. The climate in Sinkiang varies from torrid heat to extreme cold, and there is a sharp variation between the day and night temperatures both in the cities and in the desert. One night in the Jungarian Desert is enough to convince one that it is possible to freeze as well as roast in a desert.

Basically, physiography has determined the economy of Sinkiang-- nomadic livestock-breeding in the mountain slopes and grasslands in the foothills, agriculture in the oases irrigated by snow-fed rivers and streams rising in the mountains. Although there is some dry-farming in Jungaria, rainfall is deficient in most parts. Highly dependent on irrigation, the farming communities tend to hug the edges of the mountains. This dependence on water also has determined the location of the major cities.

The inner edges of the mountain rim enclosing the Taklamakan Desert on the northwest, west, southwest and south are dotted by such oases as Yenki (Karashar), Kuche, Aksu, Soche (Yarkand), Hotien (Khotan), Yutien

(Keriya), Cherchen (Charchan) and Charklik[27].

With the exception of Ining (Kuldja), T'ach'eng (Chuguchak) and Ch'enghwa (Sharasume), which lie off by themselves in Northwest Sinkiang, the major cities of Jungaria-- Hami, Chensi (Barkol), Kuchengtze (Kitai), Turfan, Suilai (Manas) and Wusu-- are contained in a narrow belt running from east to west along the axis of the T'ienshan[28]. The character of the oases system is less well-defined in Jungaria than it is in Kashgaria.

Some parts of Northeast Sinkiang are suitable for livestock grazing, but there is not a single important city in this sector of Sinkiang. There is an especially great scarcity of water in the wasteland northeast of Kuchengtze. Along the primitive road extending northward from Kuchengtze to Ulun Bulak, the last Chinese outpost in the Peitashan part of the Altai Mountains, there are only two reliable watering places. This was the road guarded against the Outer Mongols by Chinese Moslem troops of the Fifth Cavalry Army in 1943.

Sinkiang is by far China's largest province-- more than two-and-a-half times larger than the next biggest, Ch'inghai. But notwithstanding its size, most of Sinkiang is unuseable either for agriculture, forestry or pasturage. A breakdown of figures compiled by the Geological Survey Office in 1947 shows that only about 17.5 percent of the province could be used for agriculture provided enough water was available. Forest and pastureland area is listed as covering 47.2 percent of the province, including high mountains suitable for summer pasture and low mountains useable as winter pasture.

Thus, unless some of the wasteland proves to contain mineral resources

that are worth exploiting at great difficulty, 35.3 percent of the province is of "little or no use" economically, as shown in the following table based upon the 1947 survey figures made available to the writer in Tihwa in 1948 by the Chinese Geological Survey Office:

	Composition of Terrain	
Utility	Type of Land	As Percentage of Total Area
Little or No use	Desert	21.2
	Glaciers and Snow-Covered Mountains	4.4
	Piedmont Gravel	9.1
	Lakes (Salt and Fresh)	.6
		35.3
Forest and Pasture	Summer Pasture	23.7
	Winter Pasture	23.5
		47.2
Agriculture[29]	Oasis Regions	12.6
	Saline Soil Regions	4.9
		17.5

Although these figures provide the basis for broad generalizations on the diversity of the Sinkiang terrain, they do not by any means project the picture of present land utilization in the province. Nor do they necessarily project the agricultural future of Sinkiang in terms of cultivable land that could be added to that already being tilled.

Actual land utilization figures gathered by the National Government's Geological Survey Office[30] in 1947 revealed that not more than one percent of the entire territory of Sinkiang was then being utilized for agriculture.[31] The amount of cultivated farmland in the "oases" (productive areas) varied locally from 23 to 67 percent of the theoretically productive land in the ten zones of the province, as shown in the following figures:

Zone	Oasis Area (Sq. Kms.)	Population Density (Per Sq.Km.)	Cultivated Fields (In Mow)	Mow of Cultivated Fields Per Person(Av.)	% of Cultivated Land to Total Oasis Land
Kashgar	4,628.6	207	2,250,431	2.4	30
Soche	3,217.3	174	3,508,543	6.2	67
Hotien	3,634.2	167	2,299,337	3.8	39
Aksu	4,603.0	130	3,989,622	6.7	53
Ili	4,210.0	114	3,219,993	6.8	47
Tihwa	3,479.5	113	1,556,345	4.0	28
T'ach'eng	1,512.0	112	561,992	3.3	23
Yenki	953.7	111	679,774	6.0	44
Ashan	315.0	266	133,924	1.6	26
Hami	353.9	164	174,806	3.0	31
	26,907.4 Sq.Km. or		18,374,767 Mow or		
	10,388.9 Sq. Miles		3,062,461 Acres or		
			4,785.0 Sq. Miles[32]		

Using the Geological Survey figures both for the area of Sinkiang (669,700 square miles) and the land presently under cultivation (4,785.0 square miles), the amount of cultivated land is 0.71 percent of the total. Allowing for land used by nomads in marginal farming pursuits, the percentage of cultivated land probably approaches closer to one percent.

Notwithstanding the 1947 survey's overall breakdown on the composition of the Sinkiang terrain (12.6 percent "oasis regions" and 4.9 percent "saline soil regions"), it is doubtful that the amount of cultivable land can be extended fully from the one percent utilised in 1947 to the theoretical maximum of 17.6 percent. According to Wang Heng-sheng, former head of the Geological Survey Office, water is available for adding about 10,000 square miles to the land now being cultivated[33], including some saline soil land that can probably be "washed out."

"It is calculated," he told the writer in 1948, "that the extension of irrigation by means of available water facilities would enable Sinkiang to

support a population of 10,000,000 instead of the present 4,000,000-- but probably not more than this."

About 10 percent of the mountain area and 4.8 percent of the total area was being used for pasture in 1947, according to the Geological Survey, which noted that an additional 32,046 square miles could be used for pasture.

It should be pointed out, however, that the nomad-- like the farmer-- is confronted with technical problems that preclude the use of all available pastureland at any given time. His various types of animals require different kinds of pasture, and he must choose an optimum pastureland that meets the needs of his entire mixed herd of sheep, goats, camels, horses and cattle. The terms "winter" and "summer" pasture also tend to simplify the problem of moving the herds, for they are shifted up and down the mountains in more frequent stages related to climatic changes within the four seasons.

Although there are limits to the extension of land utilization in Sinkiang, there seems to be no question that the amount of agricultural land can be extended by irrigation and that there is more pastureland than is now being used. Undoubtedly, there is also room for increasing agricultural output (said in 1949 to be lower per mow than in China) and boosting live-stock and wool production by improved techniques.

Furthermore, Sinkiang can not be discussed solely in terms of sharply-defined land categories or in terms of an overall provincial self-sufficiency. To do so would be to ignore the dynamics of economic and political change. To some extent, it is possible to alter the land relationship between agriculture and pastoral livestock-breeding by assigning marginal

land to one or the other-- or, indeed, by reorganizing the nomadic structure so that the nomads do more farming as an adjunct to their main pursuit. At the same time, much depends upon the prospect of industrialization in Sinkiang and the province's future economic relationships with the Soviet Union and China.

c. The Economy of Sinkiang

The present economy of Sinkiang may be broken down most conveniently into the following categories:

1. Pastoral nomadism
2. Agriculture
   a. Oasis agriculture of Kashgaria
   b. Oasis agriculture of Jungaria
   c. Some dry farming in Jungaria
3. Village handicrafts
4. An almost negligible industrial base
5. Bazaar trading
6. A small but important foreign trade

Pastureland areas in the province are concentrated along the slopes of the three basic mountain units: the T'ienshan, the Altai and the K'unlun. In 1947, according to the broad survey conducted by the Geological Survey Office, the livestock population included 9,828,400 sheep, 2,437,600 goats, 1,659,500 cattle, 1,028,000 horses, 629,100 donkeys and 84,900 camels.

In the survey figures made available to the writer, the annual output of livestock products was estimated to be about 2,500,000 raw sheepskins, 350,000 goatskins, 170,000 cowhides, 40,000 horsehides and 2,000,000 pieces of sheep intestines. As a result of the nomads' pastoral pursuits, Sinkiang also produces locally-manufactured carpets, saddle-rugs, and leather and felt boots.

The chief non-industrial crops in Sinkiang are wheat, corn, barley,

kaoliang, rice, millet, oats, soybeans, peas, green beans, mustard, sesame, rapeseed and linseed. Melons, pomegranates, grapes and other fruits are also grown in the Turfan and Hami areas. The chief industrial crops are cotton, silk and some tobacco.

According to figures made available by the Geological Survey Office in 1945, grain production in 1944 totalled 612,744 short tons[34], of which wheat accounted for more than 40 percent and corn for about 25 percent. Cotton production was estimated in 1948 to be about 30,000 tons a year[35], while the 1942 silk production peak of 385 tons had dwindled by 1948 almost to the vanishing point. The poor-quality tobacco grown to meet some local needs in Sinkiang was not an important factor in the overall agricultural pattern of 1948. Sinkiang depended at that time on cigarettes brought in from Shanghai.

By region, the agricultural picture in Sinkiang assumes the following form in terms of local production:

Ashan: Emphasis on grain production, which is not enough, however, to meet the needs of this zone.

T'ach'eng: Emphasis on grain production, which virtually meets local needs.

Ili: This zone, without any question, is the agricultural backbone of Jungaria. Dr. Wang, the head of the Geological Survey Office in 1943, observed that it was the only zone in Sinkiang where he had been able to find "true black soil." Its agricultural products include wheat, barley, millet, oats, corn and, to a lesser extent, mustard, sesame, linseed, vegetables and tobacco. Normally, the Ili Zone provides both grain and meat

for Tihwa and also offsets the food deficiencies of the remainder of Jungaria.

Other Jungarian Sectors: The principal agricultural centers in the rest of Jungaria are the Manas River area northwest of Tihwa (rice and Chinese vegetables); the Turfan Oasis to the southeast of Tihwa (kaoliang, cotton and fruit); and the Hami Oasis east of Tihwa (multiple grains and fruit). Both Hami and Tufran are famous for their melons, grapes and other fruit.

Kashgaria: The basic crop in the areas south of the T'ienshan is wheat, but corn, kaliang, buckwheat, rice and oil-yeilding plants are also grown along with cotton. Aside from Turfan, the main cotton-producing areas are Soche, Aksu, Kashgar and Hotien. Before the break between the Soviet Union and Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1943, there was a fairly substantial Kashgarian silk industry based on silkworm production at Hotien, Cherchen, Soche, Charklik and, in a smaller way, at Aksu and Kuche. The raw silk produced was exported to the Soviet Union, India and Afghanistan. In 1948, according to the then Commissioner of Reconstruction, Mohammed Eimin, only a small silk factory at Hotien was in operation.

The principal ingredient of the Uighur diet is wheat bread. Both rice and wheat are mixed with lamb, beef and chicken to produce the pilaff eaten by most Uighurs. Among the Kazakhs, the typical diet consists of lamb, kumis, tea, goat cheese and wheat hardtack. Some of the Kazakhs engage in marginal agriculture, but the main emphasis is on livestock breeding. They exchange their animals and animal products for brick tea, sugar, salt and cloth, doing their trading either in the bazaars or with Chinese and Tungan

merchants who come to visit them.

Kazakh land is owned or at least used communally, but each family owns its own yurt and livestock. Those yurt families we encountered in the T'ienshan in 1948 included from five to seven persons, with the average family owning about 20 to 25 sheep, 15 to 20 horses, two or three camels and one or two cows. There are extremes of wealth and poverty, with the wealthy Kazakh owning far more livestock than the average family, adorning his yurt with rich carpets and often engaging in money-lending. The poorest Kazakhs rent their livestock, either from other Kazakhs or from Tungans.

For Western foreign visitors in the past, the Kazakhs and Kazakh life provided the most picturesque element in the mosaic of Sinkiang. The yurt communities in the T'ienshan, with shepherds grazing their sheep, goats, horses, camels and cattle along the deep green slopes and the icy mountain streams giving off their rippling sounds in the cool, clean air, provide a setting of peaceful existence that is hard to find in an industrialized society. On the other hand, the Kazakhs are also security-conscious and they can go on rampages, too.

It was not an altogether peaceful atmosphere that we encountered in Osman Bator's camp in 1948. Rifles and sub-machine guns were stacked in the corners of the yurts, and even the 12-year-old's had been taught to use them. Just what Kazakh raids can amount to was suggested by an exhibition in which Osman's hard-riding horsemen, with their sheep-lined belted great-coats and their feather-decorated, flap-eared war bonnets, thundered across the hills on their sure-footed ponies, brandishing their rifles and shrieking shrill battle-cries. Even when the Kazakh is singing in less agitated

moments, his near-falsetto singing voice has a haunting quality about it.

The Uighur-populated oases of Kashgaria, watered by irrigation devices that tap the mountain streams and separated from each other by stretches of wasteland, correspond more closely to the popular conception of an oasis than do the "oases" of Jungaria. In Jungaria those "oases" that are not actually mountain valleys are the most fertile parts of grassy flatlands whose outer fringes can also be used to some extent for dry farming and the farm-breeding of livestock.

As in China Proper, the cities of Sinkiang are surrounded by walls[36] containing one or more bazaars that serve as the trade mart for the district. Farming is carried out outside the wall by peasants living in households on or near the land they till. As compared with the average farmstead of 5.1 acres in the wheatlands and 2.8 acres in the ricelands of China Proper[37], the average Kashgarian farmstead is said to be from 4½ to 6 acres[38]. Chinese officials in Tihwa siad in 1948 that the average Uighur family ranged anywhere from 5 to 8 persons. Where the ratio of cultivated land to per capita population is usually reckoned at less than one-half acre[39], the ratio in Sinkiang is close to three-fourths of an acre[40].

Although the Sinkiang standard of living was certainly not high in 1948, my impressions then were that the average Uighur and the average Kazakh were eating much better than the average Chinese in China Proper. Such observations as I could make and such information as I could gather indicated, too, that while there was a substantial amount of land tenantry, most Uighur peasants owned their own land. Dependent as they were on water and credit, however, the less well-to-do peasants seemed to be at a serious disadvantage

with regard to the money-lenders and those local sharpers who dominated the water-supply system.

By and large, the "industrial" system of Sinkiang in 1948 was based on village handicrafts-- with small local enterprises turning out mata (a woven cotton cloth), carpets, saddle-rugs, boots, felt, embroidery, carved Khotan jade and some silk. During the reign of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a start was made in industrial development with the aid of the Russians. But in 1948 the industry of the Chinese-held parts of Sinkiang consisted of a few power plants, three factories at Tihwa-- clothing, glass and cnimal serum-- and the small silk factory at Hotien (Khotan).

The fate of Tihwa's industry under Kuomintang rule is indicated by the condition of its sulphuric acid plant, its projected textile mill and the half-finished iron ore smelter at Shui-mo-k'ou in the eastern suburbs of the capital. The acid factory, established in 1942, was producing 6,320 kilograms of acid in January, 1948, but the vats began to leak and production stopped soon thereafter[41]. Toward the close of the Japanese war, the Sinkiang Provincial Government bought 5,000 surplus cotton spindles in Chungking for transport to the province, but it was never able to raise sufficient funds to cover transportation charges. The smelter plant was almost completed in 1944. For want of about 150 tons of necessary equipment, however, production never did get started.

"Because the machinery was held up, the workshops cannot be used," a Chinese writer commented in 1948. "In the last three years, the buildings have been damaged by weather."[42]

Throughout Kuomintang rule in Sinkiang, the local authorities were strapped for funds. In 1947 the provincial budget totalled SD$49,000,000,000, with provincial incomes amounting to SD $18,000,000,000. Provincial deficits, however, were not the invention of the Kuomintang. Wading Sinkiang's financial system work has long been a difficult job.

Despite Yang Tseng-hsin's reorganization of the 1912 multiple currency system and his attempt to control the printing of paper money, his new funded currency already had depreciated by 20 percent when he was assassinated in 1928[43]. There was an accelerated process of inflation during the reign of Chin Shu-jen, under whom provincial revenues accounted for only 1/20th of the budget in 1932[44]. The second reorganization of the currency system under Sheng Shih-tsai in 1939 introduced greater stability, with the Sinkiang dollar being hitched to the rouble. But the Sinkiang currency collapsed again after his break with the Russians in 1943.

Much has been written on the unexploited "phenomenal" mineral wealth of Sinkiang. Wang Heng-sheng, former chief of the Geological Survey in Sinkiang, told the writer and his colleagues in 1948, however, that only 3.6 percent of the province had been adequately surveyed. His working notes listed deposits of iron, coal, oil, gold, wolfram, zinc, lead, copper, molybdenum, arsenopyrite and gypsum, with the surveyed deposits up to that time being:

Coking Coal	88,000,000	metric tons
Non-Coking Coal	2,038,430,700	" "
Iron	46,016,000	" "
Lead	9,400	" "
Wolframite	9,000	" "
Molybdenite	2,900	" "
Arsenopyrite	900	" "
Oil (field area)	1,100	square kilometers

These figures, it should be emphasized, are based on a survey of only 3.8 percent of the province.

According to members of the Geological Survey Office, the Russians sent in about 300 geologists to Sinkiang during the Sheng Shih-ts'ai regime. Referring to earlier and rougher surveys made by Chinese geologists in Sinkiang, but which his field men had not had an opportunity to check themselves, Mr. Wang expressed the opinion that Sinkiang was not as "fabulously rich" as many supposed, but that its resources were substantial enough to be considered "important." He estimated some of the reserves as follows:

Total Coal Reserves	52,900,000,000	tons (mostly lignitic bituminous)
Total Iron Reserves	700,000,000	tons
Oil Reserves (area)	7,300	square kilometers[45]
Gold Reserves (area)	17,600	square kilometers[46]

"We think Sinkiang has larger oil reserves than Kansu, which places it number one in China," he said. "It is third behind Shansi and Shensi in coal and second behind Liaoning (Manchuria) in iron. Its gold is valuable, but the reserves are not quite as large as in Heilungkiang (Manchuria)." He added that Sinkiang's zinc was "rich," its gypsum "very good" and its copper "not important." Although Dr. Wong Wen-hao[47] told correspondents in Nanking in 1947 that Sinkiang probably contained uranium, the head of the Tihua Geological Survey Office said he had discovered none in his preliminary survey.

China is so deficient in petroleum that the discovery and development of large oil reserves in Sinkiang could be a major boon for the Chinese People's Republic, notwithstanding the high cost of transportation to China[48]. Elsewhere in China, the Japanese developed synthetic shale-oil production in Manchuria and the Chinese Communists exploited a small oil

preserve in Shensi Province; but, heretofore, the Yumen fields of Kansu have been the only major source of domestically-produced petroleum. An American engineer at the Yumen fields pointed out in 1948, however, that the fields could only take care of the then-existing needs of Northwest China.

The most important oil preserves of Sinkiang, the Chinese geologists told us in 1948, are concentrated in the area between Tihwa and Wusu, about 200 miles northwest of the provincial capital. During the Sheng Shih-ts'ai regime, Russian technicians were responsible for the development of the Tu-Shih-Shan field near Wusu and the field was exploited on a 50-50 profit basis until 1943. A 1948 geological map also pointed to the presence of oil in the northwest part of the Ili Zone, in the area just north of Aksu and in the area north of Kashgar.

Coal deposits have been discovered in many parts of Sinkiang, with the major deposits concentrated in the T'ienshan, in the Borotala Valley of the Ili Zone and in the mountains of the T'ach'eng Zone. Iron is also found in the T'ienshan and in the mountains of Ashan and T'ach'eng. The three major gold areas, according to the geologists in 1948, are the Altai fields on the Ashan-T'ach'eng border, the K'unlun preserve just south of Hotien (Khotan) and another K'unlun preserve southwest of Charklik.

In 1948 the two known major sources of wolfram in Sinkiang were the area of Fuwen, southeast of Ch'anghwa in the Ashan Zone, and the area of Wench'uan, just north of Ining in the Ili Zone. After the 1947 break between the Chinese and the "East Turkestan Republic" in Sinkiang, the latter continued to exploit the Altai goldmines, the Wusu oil preserve and the wolfram deposits at Fuwen and Wench'uan. At that time Uighur travelers

from the northwest zones supported Chinese contentions that Russian technicians were being used in all these places, with the output going to the Soviet Union. There were indications, however, that none of the deposits was being worked on a major scale.

The Chinese geologists in Sinkiang told us in 1948 that the best gypsum deposits are located north of Aksu. Zinc is found together with lead and copper in the Aksu and Yenki Zones, with the Hotien Zone long being known for its jade. All of the ingredients necessary for the manufacture of cement are present in sufficient quantities so that the province could undertake an impressive building and road-construction program. Aside from the Soviet Consulate in the southern suburbs of Tihwa, the only imposing structure in the capital in 1948 was the limestone building of the Sinkiang Provincial Bank in the heart of the city.

Based on a cellular oasis agriculture and the pursuits of the nomad, with a primitive communications system and a crude division of labor, the economy of Sinkiang still follows the lines of provincial and regional self-sufficiency to a large degree. There is indeed a nexus connecting the nomad, the oasis farmer and the town and village handicraftsman, with the bazaar serving as the trade catalyst for the exchange of grain, cloth and tobacco for livestock, riding horses, wool and hides. The institutions of the middle-man and the money-lender are well-developed. But the economic relationships that exist are obviously more simple and direct than they are in more highly-developed commercial and industrial societies.

By and large, domestic production is geared to domestic needs. On a relative basis, foreign trade is less important; on an absolute basis, the

volume of foreign trade is small. But the role of foreign trade, both in the past and in the present, cannot be ignored. Sinkiang has had to import textiles, tea, sugar, matches and whatever mechanical equipment it wanted for its own development. Furthermore, previous Russian demands for Jungarian livestock and Kashgarian cotton have attuned such producers to a pattern in which prosperity is gauged in terms of foreign as well as local demand.

The cotton production of Sinkiang was especially important to the Russians from the 1850's up to the 1920's, when the Bolsheviks began developing cotton production of their own in their Central Asian areas. When large cities began developing under the Bolsheviks in Soviet Asia, the meat of Sinkiang became more important to the Russians than cotton.

In the past Sinkiang has conducted trade with Russia, China, India and Afghanistan, with Russia being by far its most important trade partner. It was difficult in 1948 to obtain reliable trade statistics in Tihwa. In answer to a request for such statistics, the provincial government supplied the following figures for trade between the Soviet Union and Sinkiang in 1935:

Sinkiang's Exports to Russia

Item	Amount
Wool	5,000 tons
Skins	2,000 "
Cottons	1,000 "
Animals	17,000 head
Raw Silk	60 tons
Carpets and furs	1,100,000 roubles

Sinkiang's Imports from Russia

Item	Amount
Cotton Cloth	2,500 tons
Sugar	2,500 "
Oil Products	3,000 "
Metals	700 "
Electrical Goods	1,300 "
Matches	115 "
Pottery	250 "
Rubber Goods	15 "
Confections	140 "
Tobacco	160 "

According to Hsiung Ta-lun, Commissioner of Customs, Soviet imports on which duty was paid in 1947 totalled CNC $144,530,584. Between January and June, 1948 (with the value of the CNC depreciating), he said, duty was paid on Soviet imports totalling CNC $411,970,000. Mr. Hsiung pointed out, however, that these figures covered chiefly airborne freight declared at Tihwa. He had no way of knowing how much trade was going on between the Soviet Union and the northwest zones of Ili, T'ach'eng and Anhau.

Such factors as smuggling, political divisions, manipulation and fluctuation of currencies, Sino-Soviet and local barter arrangements not reflected in official figures and the lack of accurate statistical procedures make Chinese figures on Sinkiang's foreign trade suspect. For many of the same reasons, Soviet monetary figures must also be questioned. Using Soviet statistics, however, both Norins[49] and Conolly[50] agree that the volume of Russo-Sinkiang trade in 1932 was 28,000,000 gold roubles. According to Norins, the trade volume for this relationship was 60,527,000 gold roubles in 1937-- 34,753,000 roubles worth of Soviet exports to Sinkiang and 25,774,000 roubles worth of imports from Sinkiang.

The comparative weight of Sinkiang's foreign trade relationships is indicated by figures gathered by Norins from a Chinese publication. As Norins himself notes, the figures he cites-- based on the publication's use of 1931 Russo-Sinkiang trade statistics and other statistics it attributed to a 1927 British consular report-- are highly suspect from the standpoint of statistical accuracy. Nevertheless, they do provide a rough indication of Sinkiang's comparative foreign trade, as shown in the following table derived from Norins[51]:

Sinkiang's Foreign Trade
(In Roubles)

Country	Exports to	Imports From
Russia (in 1931)*	10,563,000(Incomplete)	13,333,000(Incomplete)
China#	737,250	1,771,000
India#	1,620,848	976,230
Afghanistan#	386,000	1,361,950

Traditionally, Sinkiang's trade with Russia has consisted of sheep wool, leather, livestock and cotton for finished textile goods, petroleum products, sugar, metals, electrical equipment, matches and confections. Trade with China has consisted of such items as fur, camel and goat wool, mata cloth[52], sheep intestines, medicines and gold for tea, silk, cotton yarn and, in the post-war period, Shanghai cigarettes, flashlights, soap, towels and other miscellaneous articles. The Sinkiang-Indian trade has consisted of copper, gold, silver, livestock, mata, felt and leather goods for European-manufactured cloth and woolen goods, paints and dyes, spices and tea. In its trade with Afghanistan, the province has exchanged mata, felt, silk floss, livestock and Khotan silk for opium, goat gut, fur skins and almonds.

Beginning in 1918, when Yang Tsêng-hsin took steps to organize a joint-stock company for petroleum exploitation, there developed a tendency-- as in China-- for monopolies to play an increasingly important role in the economic life of Sinkiang. Monopolies flourished under Chin Shu-jen, but did not get on a solid footing until the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who established both a Provincial Trading Company and a series of "Local Resources" Companies. After V-J Day, when General Chang Chih-chung became Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest, Sheng's old Sinkiang Trading Company was reorganized as part of a new and larger Northwest Trading

Corporation.

The expanded company, which engaged in trade and undertook to develop the six provinces of Sinkiang, Shensi, Kansu, Ch'inghai, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, had an initial planned capitalization of CNC $4,000,000,000 that was supposed to be advanced by the Sinkiang Provincial Government[53]. The other five provinces were expected to advance similar amounts, but it is questionable that they ever did-- or that Sinkiang advanced all the CNC $4,000,000,000. In 1948 the Northwest Trading Corporation was engaging in trade only between Sinkiang and Kansu. When I interviewed General Chang Chih-chung at Lanchow in 1948, I asked him how the corporation was doing. He smiled and said the volume of its trade was not big enough to write about.

d. Communications

Sinkiang had telegraph service by 1896, a radio station by 1930 and long-distance radiotelephone by 1942. Up until 1948, however, a charitable spirit was stillnecessary to refer to the telegraph and radiotelephone systems by the word "service." The fact that telegraph and radiotelephone systems were available in that remote part of China was, nevertheless, impressive.

The road system of Sinkiang in 1948 was as follows:



—— road ---- road little used because of bandit raids and scarcity of water +++++ railroad

..... trail ~~~~~ damaged road

Thus, there are two roads connecting Sinkiang with China Proper and a trail that leads to China Proper via the Inner Mongolia Gobi. Of these three routes, only the Lanchow-Hami route was in use in 1948.

There is one road leading from Kuchengtze to Ulun Bulak on the Outer Mongolian border and a caravan trail from Outer Mongolia that links up with the Sinkiang road system northeast of Hami.

There are two caravan trails leading to India over the most difficult mountain routes in the world.

And there are three major roads and two trails leading to the Soviet

Union and the railway net of Soviet Asia.

The road map sketch above helps to explain why Sinkiang is naturally oriented in the direction of the Soviet Union rather than in the direction of China, Outer Mongolia or India. It is less than half as far from Tihwa to Alma Ata than it is from Tihwa to Lanchow, and Alma Ata is an industrialized railway city whereas Lanchow is not. Moreover, the major cities of Northwest and Southwest Sinkiang are closer to developed Soviet cities on their respective western borders than they are to each other. The extension of the Soviet railway net into Sinkiang and the construction of a railway from Lanchow to Tihwa would still leave the advantage with the Soviet Union.

In 1948 there were two airlines operating in Sinkiang: the Sino-Soviet Airline, which operated a weekly round-trip schedule between Alma Ata and Hami via Ining and Tihwa; and the Chinese Government-owned Central Air Transport Corportation, which operated a bi-monthly schedule from Shanghai to Tihwa via Lanchow. Both lines used twin-engined Douglas transports (DC-3's).

The Sino-Soviet Airline was established in 1939 under a 10-year agreement that was a collateral feature of the Sino-Soviet Trade Treaty also signed in that year (June 16, 1939). Under the aviation agreement, a joint corporation was set up with an initial capitalization of $1,000,000 and with Russia and China each holding 500 shares. The board of directors was to consist of six members (three Chinese and three Russians), with the Chinese naming the chairman of the board and the Russians naming the general-manager. A secret clause in the agreement specified that the Russians were to provide

the bulk of the technicians[54]. In 1948, however, the Russians were running the line as they saw fit. In August 1948 Liu Tze-yung, representative of the Nanking Foreign Ministry in Sinkiang and chairman of the airline's board of directors, noted that the board hadn't met in four years notwithstanding a provision requiring an annual meeting.

Privately, Chinese authorities in Tihwa charged in 1948 that the Russians were using the airline to smuggle Ili agents back and forth between the northwest zones of the "East Turkestan Republic" and Chinese-held territories. Before the expiration of the ten-year agreement, the Nanking Ministry of Information announced that the aviation pact would not be renewed. It was subsequently renewed, anyway, by Foreign Affairs Commissioner Liu Tze-yung as part of the diplomatic manouvering of General Chang Chih-chung in the last days of the Nanking Government.

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NOTES

1. The China Year Book, 1937-1945, pp. 1-2, lists Sinkiang's territory as 1,828,418 square kilometers and its population as 3,730,052. This population figure is as of December, 1943.

2. The ten zones are 1.-Tihwa (Urumchi); 2.-Ili (Kuldja); 3.-Kashgar; 4.-Aksu, 5.-T'ach'eng (Chuguchak); 6.-Ashan (Altai); 7.-Hotien (Khotan); 8.-Yenki (Karashar); 9.-Hami (Qamul); and 10.-Soche (Yarkand).

3. Czaplicka, op. cit., p. 13.

4. Cf. Pivot of Asia, pp. 112-113.

5. Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

6. Pivot of Asia, p. 106.

7. Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

8. This group is usually designated as Uighur in this manuscript.

9. Most of the Sinkiang Moslems remain devoutly religious to this day.

10. Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

11. Cf. Jochelson, Waldemar, Peoples of Asiatic Russia, American Museum of Natural History, New York, 1928, p. 77. He makes a distinction between Kaisak (Kazakh)-Kirghis and Kara (Black)-Kirghis.

12. Ibid., p.77.

13. Pivot of Asia, p. 129.

14. Kumis is fermented mare's milk. It tastes like a mixture of skim buttermilk and stale beer, without any carbouization.

15. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

16. The Fifth Cavalry Army was dispatched to Sinkiang by General Ma Pufang, Moslem Governor of Ch'inghai, in 1947 to augment the Kuomintang garrison there. It consisted of the Seventh Cavalry Brigade, which confronted the Outer Mongols in the disputed northeast Peitashan border area, and the Sixth Cavalry Brigade, which protected the northwest approaches to Tihwa against Ili troops of the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic." Kashgaria was garrisoned by Chinese troops. Without question, the Fifth Cavalry Army was the cream of the Kuomintang garrison forces, which had an official count of about 100,000 and an actual combat strength of probably not more than 60,000.

17. Manchu, Sibo and Solon soldiers were also given land in the Ili area during Ch'ien Lung's time.

18. "White Russian" population figures noted here are from the 1948 report of the Sinkiang Commission on Civil Affairs.

19. The secularization of the Greek Orthodox Church in Russia, which began under Peter the Great, gave rise to a cult of "Old Ritualists" or "Old Believers" who were persecuted by the Tsarist State. (Cf. Vernadsky, G., A History of Russia (New Revised Edition), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, pp. 123-126.) Before the 1946-1947 evacuations, there are said to have been 1,000 "Old Ritualist" families in the Ili Zone. According to stories current in Tihwa in 1948, the "Old Ritualists" in Sinkiang would not eat or drink from vessels used by non-members. Also, the men never shaved.

20. These were offshoots of the Stundo-Baptist movement in Russia. Vernadsky (op. cit., p. 212) points out that the term "Stunda" was derived from the German word stunde (hour). The Stundites, who flourished in Russia in the 19th Century, also came under the persecution of the Tsarist State.

21. Jochelson, op. cit., p. 85.

22. Chinese Central Asia, p. 42.

23. Pivot of Asia, pp. 150-151.

24. Peoples of Asiatic Russia, pp. 28-29.

25. Cressey, George B., Asia's Lands and Peoples, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1944, p. 155. Cressey lists the height of the Khan Tengri at 23,616 feet, Goode's Atlas at 23,662. (Goode's School Atlas, J. Paul Goode (Ed.), Rand McNally & Company, New York, 1946 Edition, Map of China and Japan, pp. 152-153.)

26. Asia's Lands and Peoples, pp. 151-156.

27. As listed here, this procession of cities runs counter-clockwise.

28. Hami and Turfan are situated south of the T'ienshan and Chenhsi in the T'ienshan. The other principal Jungarian cities lie north of the range.

29. The figures listed in this category are deceptive. In addition to land used for agricultural purposes and non-utilized land for which water is available, they also include land that could be used if water could be made available.

30. The land utilization, population and resources statistics attributed herein to the Geological Survey Office and the Commission of Civil

Affairs were made available by these official agencies to Messrs. Morrison, Barnett and the writer on our trip to Sinkiang in 1948. They were drawn up for us at our request.

31. The 1929-1933 University of Nanking land utilization study for 22 provinces of China Proper disclosed that 27 percent of the land was utilized for crops, 4.6 percent for pasture and 3.7 percent for forest, with the remaining 59.7 percent being either valueless or used for other purposes. Buck, John Lossing, Land Utilization in China, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1937, p. 6.

32. Using different figures for the amount of cultivated land in Sinkiang, Clubb (op. cit., p. 26) declares that the cultivated area is 1,320,000 hectares. This agrees fairly closely with the figures cited above-- for 1,320,000 hectares equal 3,200,400 acres and 5,094.3 square miles. The discrepancy between Clubb's figures and the Geological Survey figures of 1947 is 309.3 square miles.

33. Adding 10,000 square miles to the land now under cultivation would increase the amount of cultivated land to 2.2 percent of the territory of Sinkiang.

34. The official figure was 11,140,800 piculs, which the writer has converted at 110 pounds to the Sinkiang picul.

35. Clubb, op. cit., p. 29, notes that Sinkiang's cotton production in 1931 was given as 24,050 metric tons.

36. In Tihwa, for example, the wall extends along a 3½-mile perimeter around the city proper. The "Chinese City" and "Moslem City" are inside the wall, but there is also a "New City" outside the wall in the southern suburbs.

37. Buck, op. cit., p. 45.

38. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 169. The writer was unable to obtain concrete figures on the size of farm plots and the extent of farm tenantry in Sinkiang. Chinese authorities in Tihwa offered to make these figures available, but they were not forthcoming.

39. Pelzer cites the China figure as 0.47 acre per capita. Pelzer, Karl J., Population and Land Utilization, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, p. 102.

40. The Sinkiang ratio is 0.73 acre based on the table listed above (p. 64), with six mow being counted as one acre. Converting the mow figures in this table, the ratio of cultivated land to per capita population in Sinkiang, by zone, is as follows: Ili-- 1.13 acres; Aksu-- 1.11; Soche-- 1.03; Yonki-- 1.00; Tihwa-- 0.66; Kotion-- 0.63; T'ach'eng-- 0.58; Hami-- 0.50; Kashgar-- 0.40; and Ashan-- 0.26.

41. Cf. Northwest Semi-Monthly, Peiping, Vol. II, No. 1, January 15, 1948.

42. Ibid.

43. The Chinese Year Book, Commercial Press, Chungking, 1938-1939, pp. 124-125.

44. Ibid.

45. 2,818 square miles.

46. 6,795 square miles.

47. Dr. Wong Wen-hao, a noted Chinese geologist, was for a long time head of the Central Government's National Resources Commission and then served briefly as premier.

48. The word "could" is used because much depends on the actual allocation of oil under the 30-year Sinkiang mineral exploitation agreement signed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic at Moscow on March 27, 1950. As announced by the Russian Telegraph Agency (Tass) and the Peiping radio, both parties are to share equally in providing the capital, exercising control and splitting the profits of two joint companies set up to develop oil production and production of nonferrous minerals. (New York Times, March 29 and 31, 1950.) Presumably, the Soviet Union is to supply the basic capital equipment and provide most of the technicians. The Russians had similar arrangements with Sheng Shih-ts'ai. It is noteworthy that the new Sinkiang agreement follows out the diplomatic project sponsored by General Chang Chih-chung during the last days of the Nanking Government.

49. Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, p. 180.

50. Conolly, op. cit., p. 120.

51. Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, pp. 180-181. (*) Norins quotes no total for these 1931 Russo-Sinkiang trade figures; this writer has added the items in his table. (#) The figures for trade with China, India and Afghanistan are those that are supposed to be based on the 1927 British consular report. For these figures, Norins quotes the totals.

52. Kata is a coarse cotton cloth manufactured by Sinkiang handicraftsmen. The province has exported some of this cloth to Tibet, Kansu, India and Afghanistan in the past, but most of its output is consumed locally.

53. Yi Shih Pao, Peiping, June 10, 1946.

54. The writer examined a complete official copy of this agreement, including the article on technicians, at Nanking in 1948.

IV. THE RISE OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA

Russian penetration into Central Asia post-dates Russian penetration into Siberia. In fact, the Central Asian thrust did not gather full steam until after the Crimean War (1853-1856), whose outcome appears to have lent impetus for a defeated Russia to seek compensation for its European reverses by expanding its Asiatic empire.

Although more than 200 years of Mongol rule in Russia did not end until the latter part of the 15th Century, the trading city (republic) of Novgorod already had begun dispatching fur-trading expeditions to Siberia in the 14th Century[1]. Goaded on by the dream of wealth and the harassment of border "barbarians," the developing Russian State pushed steadily to the east.

Before the death of John the Dread (r. 1533-1582), Russia already had penetrated beyond the Urals. Trade, exploration and border wars went hand-in-hand in the course of Russian expansion to the east. The early expansion process, which began with the Tsarist salt-fur-and-metal monopoly granted to the Stroganov family, was highlighted by the exploits of the Cossack free-booter Yermak (Vassily Timofeevich Olemin) in Siberia. By 1642 the Russian pioneers had founded Yakutsk on the Lena River in Northern Siberia and by 1647 a band of Cossack had reached the Pacific Ocean and founded Okhotsk. To keep the supply line open to Northern Siberia, the Cossacks waged war on the Buriat Mongols and in 1651 established a central bastion at Irkutsk on the southwest shore of Lake Baikal[2].

As in the case of Siberia, the conquest of Russian Central Asia was also part of the frontier expansion process. Three routes of advance into

Central Asia were used by Russian expeditions during the reigns of Peter the Great, the Empress Anne and Catherine the Great. One led down the Irtysh River from such Trans-Uralian cities as Tobolsk (founded in 1587) and Tara (founded in 1594)[3] towards what became the city of Semipalatinsk. Another led from Samara (Kuibishev) to Orenburg (Chkalov) and beyond towards the Aral Sea. The third led from the Caspian Sea across the Turkestan flatlands towards the Khivan Khanate.

All three routes led the Russians into the lands of the Bashkir, Kalmuck Mongol and Kirghiz nomads. The history of Russian penetration into these lands is characterized by many of the same features that marked the advance of the Chinese into Sinkiang: the expansion of the national frontier; the motives of trade and the protection of the frontier against "barbarian" raids; the gradation of rule from the collection of tribute[4] to full-fledged annexation; and the techniques of "divide-and-rule," military conquest and massacre mingled with the olive branch.

Catherine the Great pursued a "soft" policy with regard to the Kirghiz. Later General Skobelev, the conqueror, observed:

"In Asia the duration of the peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the natives."[5]

During the reign of Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725), whose visions of an empire in India[6] were never realized, two Russian expeditions proceeded down the east bank of the Irtysh River and established the fortresses of Omsk, Semipalatinsk and Ust Kamenogorsk to the southeast of Semipalatinsk. In 1716, another expedition starting from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea reached the Amu-Darya and went down the river towards the Khivan

Khanate. But all the members of this expedition were captured and executed[7].

The chain of defense fortresses that Peter the Great had planned to build against the nomads took shape through the exploits of two of his disciples, Kirilov and later Nepliuev, during the reign of the Empress Anne. Actually, the renowned Kirilov hoped for more than the defense of territory already acquired. He had high hopes of occupying Turkestan by annexing Bokhara and Samarkand[8], but it was another century before the Russians reached the Sea of Aral.

Kirilov, who died in 1737, provided the cornerstone for an anti-nomad defense chain (after defeating the Bashkirs) in laying the foundation in 1736 for the city of Orenburg just southeast of the Ural Mountains. His successor, Nepliuev, built a new city of Orenburg and constructed a line of fortresses protecting the inner Russian domain from Orenburg to Samara (Kuibeshev) to the northwest and from Orenburg to the Caspian Sea to the southeast. In 1752 the defense line was extended northeastward from Orenburg to the upper part of the Irtysh River, thus fencing Russia Proper in completely from the nomads.

Although the trade route between Orenburg and Bokhara was harassed by brigands, Russian influence spread deep into Central Asia long before the conquest of Turkestan in the 19th Century. The conquest of the Urals, culminating in the establishment of Orenburg (1736), brought large groups of Bashkirs under direct Russian control[9]. As a result of the gradual extension of the Russian frontier, the peoples inhabiting the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes to the south also became the "protected subjects" of the Russian State while continuing to maintain their own rule.

While the Chinese Emperor Ch'ien Lung favored the Kalmuck Mongols, who were invited into Sinkiang to repopulate Jungarian areas formerly inhabited by the antagonistic Öirat Mongols, his contemporary, Catherine the Great (1762-1796) favored the Kirghiz. She promoted the Mohammedan religion and education among the Kirghiz, dispatching Kazan mullahs into the Kirghis areas to serve as teachers and donating the money for establishing a Muslim college in Bokhara. When the Khan of Khiva went blind and requested the services of a Russian doctor, Catherine sent him an oculist[10].

It was during the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) that the Russian advance into Central Asia was resumed. At that time three Khanates, with fluid territorial boundaries, existed on the western border of Sinkiang: Khokand, Samarkand and Bokhara. The Khanate of Samarkand was subject to the Khanate of Bokhara. The following rough illustration provides some indication of the geographical relationships existing in the Central Asian regions subsequently taken over by the Russians:



In 1839-1840 Count Perovsky, then Governor-General of Orenburg, opened a winter desert campaign against the Khivans to punish them for their raids against Russian territory, but the bitter cold virtually wiped out his expedition. After a Kirghiz revolt broke out on the fringes of the Orenburg-Siberia defense line, the Russians apparently decided on a slower and more systematic campaign against the "barbarians" by extending their defense network to the Sea of Aral.

Under Obruchev, Perovsky's successor as Governor-General of Orenburg, a Russian military expedition advanced southeastward from Orenburg to the Aral Sea in 1846. The following year they established the fortress of Aralsk near the mouth of the Syr Darya. Two vessels were transported from Orenburg to the Aral Sea in sections, so that by 1850 Russia had a navy on an inland sea into which the two major rivers of Russian Central Asia empty: the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya[11].

Perovsky made up for his earlier failure against the Khivans by leading a new expedition down the Syr-Darya and capturing Ak-Mechet in 1853. Ak-Mechet, about 450 miles northwest of the Khokand city of Chimkent, was renamed Perovsk in his honor. But the Crimean War put a stop to further Russian advances down the Syr-Darya for the time being, and the campaign was not resumed until 1860, when Colonels Zimmermann and Kolpakovsky routed two concentrations of Khokand troops. Three years later another Russian drive commanded by General Cherniaev resulted in the capture of Chimkent.

The captured territories were coordinated with the provinces of Semirechie ("Seven Rivers") and Syr-Darya under the viceroyship of Cherniaev in 1865. On June 27 of that year Cherniaev seized Tashkent, the leading

city of Khokand. The collateral defeat of the Emir of Bokhara, who went to the aid of Khokand, made it possible in 1866 for the Russians to establish a new governor-generalship for Turkestan. When the Emir of Bokhara defaulted on his war indemnity, General Kaufmann, the new Governor-General of Turkestan, struck out against Samarkand and captured the city in 1868. Under the treaty signed in that year, both Khokand and Bokhara became semi-independent vassaldoms in a Turkestan domain that included the provinces of Semirechie ("Seven Rivers") and Syr-Darya to the north.

Like Khokand and Bokhara, Khiva also became a protectorate, but it was first necessary to subjugate that area by force of arms, too. This was accomplished by General Kaufmann in a difficult campaign that led to the capture of the city of Khiva in June, 1873. In 1875, following an internal revolt against the Khan of Khokand, Khokand was annexed into the Central Asian provincial system as the province of Ferghana. Both Bokhara and Khiva remained semi-independent "protectorates," however, throughout the remainder of Tsarist rule in Russia.

The rest of what is now Russian Central Asia was captured after 1875, when the famous young general, Skobelev, subdued the Turkoman tribes on the Afghan border. Skobelev's advance from the Caspian, which began in 1880 after the failure of several earlier expeditions against the Turkomans, was so planned that Russian engineers and laborers followed up each phase of his advance by laying the initial track for the Trans-Caspian Railway. After a stubborn two-year campaign, Skobelev succeeded in achieving a victory over the Turkomans and Russia seized Merv.

By 1888, the Trans-Caspian Railway had been extended for more than

1,000 miles from the Caspian Sea through Merv and Bokhara to Samarkand. The Turkestan peoples living on Sinkiang's borders were drawn even closer to Russia by the later construction of branch railway lines in Central Asia. These branch lines subsequently linked Samarkand with Tashkent and Andijan[12] Merv with Kushka on the Afghan border and this entire area with Russia's European transportation system following the completion of the Oremburg-Tashkent line in 1905.

Thus, much of the present railway system in Russian Central Asia was established long before the Bolsheviks began building the Turk-Sib Railway in 1927.

By the early part of the 20th Century, Tsarist Russia had laid more than 1500 miles[13] of track in Russian Turkestan. This railway system gave rise to a flourishing trade in which wheat and manufactured goods from European Russia was brought into the area and Turkestan cotton taken out. Exports of cotton from Turkestan increased from 15,750 tons in 1888 to 89,550 tons in 1900 and to 243,100 tons in 1913[14].

Internationally, there were two immediate consequences of Russia's Central Asian expansion. This expansion brought Russia into conflict with the British over both Afghanistan and Sinkiang. It also created another common political frontier between Russia and China, with all the problems incumbent upon such a relationship.

While the Russians were in the process of extending their national empire from Orenburg to the Aral Sea and then down into Central Asia, the British were in the process of extending and consolidating their overseas empire in India and Burma. Between these two expanding empires lay

Afghanistan and Sinkiang.

Although the Russians did not begin a serious push into Central Asia until the early 1860's, Russo-British diplomatic rivalry in Afghanistan predates this campaign by at least two decades. Quite apart from such expansionist designs as the British might have had in Afghanistan, they were also mindful of the Emperor Paul's plan to invade India and the existence of the Khyber Pass as a possible route into India. Both the First (1839-1842) and Second (1878) Afghan Wars were launched by Britain after the appearance of Russian missions at Kabul[15].

Russo-British rivalry during the latter part of the 19th Century and up to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 was reflected in Europe and China as well as in Central Asia. During this same period, and beyond, Russo-Chinese relations were affected by developments in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia (and later in China Proper) as well as in Sinkiang. The writer will restrict himself here, however, to discussing the consequences of Russian expansion as they affected Sinkiang.

When the Russians started advancing towards and into the Khanates of Central Asia, the British developed a considerable sympathy for Moslem leaders standing in opposition to the Russians. As late as 1920, British agents were active both in Russian Turkestan and Sinkiang[16]. The British policy of supporting Moslems against more dangerous anti-British elements survived in India up until India achieved its independence on August 15, 1947 and lingers on in the Middle East to this day.

The British looked favorably upon Yakub Beg's rule in Sinkiang after Yakub invaded Kashgaria from Khokand in 1864 and set up a new caliphate

there, but they did not commit themselves to him fully. Yakub Beg failed. In summing up the causes for his failure, D. C. Boulger, one of his biographers, observed[17]: "He existed under the constant dread of a danger from the north from which nothing could free him short of a British guarantee that was not to be obtained."

a. The Revolution of Yakub Beg

Son of a Tadjik father who served as a Khokand bureaucrat and a mother who was the sister of a minor aristocrat, Yakub Beg was born at Pishkent, some 30 miles south of Tashkent, around 1820[18]. After the marriage of his own sister to the governor of Tashkent, he was introduced through this family connection to the Khokand court and the beginning of a politico-military career. He was married in his 20's to a Kipchak woman and begot three sons: Kuda Kuli Beg, Beg Kuli Beg and Hacc Kuli Beg.

Rising in the Khokand hierarchy to the rank of Kush-Begi ("Lord of the Family"), Yakub appears to have been given his first major military post as commander of Ak-Mechet ("White Mosque") on the Syr-Darya. It was here that the future ruler of Sinkiang had his initial encounter with the Russians. Yakub Beg was commanding the fortress of Ak-Mechet in 1853 when Perovsky moved down the Syr-Darya from Aralsk. The Ak-Mechet fortress was lost after a 26-day siege in which, according to Shaw[19], Yakub sustained five bullet wounds.

This defeat did not end the career of Yakub Beg, for later he was appointed Governor of Kurama. In this post he became involved in Khokand's internal political intrigues to such an extent that at one time he had to flee to Bokhara. He seems to have been out of favor with the ruling Khokand

authorities in 1863 when an emissary from Kashgar, Sadic Beg, arrived in Khokand to report that the Tungans were revolting and that the time was propitious for another military strike by the exiled Khojas. (See Chapter II.) Buzurg Khan, son of the late Jehangir, prepared a new expedition. Alam Kul, then ruling as regent in the strife-torn Khanate of Khokand, assigned Yakub Beg to go along with the expedition as baturbashi ("hero commander").

According to Boulger, the original expedition that invaded Kashgaria through Terek Pass in 1864 consisted of six men. He points out, however, that this detachment picked up other revolutionaries along the way.

The Khokandian expedition was undertaken at a time when the Tungan rebels were already holding most of Kashgaria, with Chinese garrisons still hanging on in the fortress of Kashgar and in Yangihissar to the southeast. No sooner was Khoja Buzurg Khan back in Kashgaria than he proclaimed himself ruler, a declaration that seems to have been contrary to the ambitions of Sadic Beg. Sadic, the man who had invited the Khokandians in, turned on them and had to be eliminated before the invaders engaged in any major action either against the Chinese or the Tungans[20].

As a separate side-show to what became the central military struggle, the Kirghis-- taking advantage of the widespread upheaval-- swarmed in on Kashgar like vultures from the south, west and north[21]. They were routed by the Khokandians, who now prepared to take on the Chinese while reinforcements poured in daily from the motherland in Khokand[22].

With one force under Buzurg Khan applying a siege against the Chinese holding out in the Kashgar fortress, another force under Yakub Beg captured

Chinese-held Yangihissar after making an unsuccessful attempt to seize Tungan-held Yarkand. After Yakub took Yangihissar, the Tungans massed their troops at Karalbashi and attacked southwestwards towards Yangihissar, about 125 miles away. Buzurg Khan relaxed his siege of Kashgar and joined forces with Yakub. This battle with the Tungans was the decisive point of the Khokandian campaign in Western Kashgaria.

The first stages of battle went so heavily against the Khokandians that Buzurg Khan, anticipating defeat, fled with a number of his men[23]. But Yakub rallied the survivors and routed the Tungans. As a result of this battle, the political rivalry that undoubtedly already existed between Yakub and Buzurg Khan slowly developed into an open feud that finally resulted in the arrest of the Khoja king by his ambitious military subordinate. Buzurg was imprisoned and eventually released on condition that he make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Later, according to Shaw, he retired to Andijan.

On eliminating the threat provided by the Tungans counter-offensive, the Khokandians concentrated next on the fortress of Kashgar, and captured it in the winter of 1864-1865 after obtaining the defection of 3,000 Chinese who promptly embraced the Moslem faith when they deserted to the enemy. Karalbashi also fell in the winter of 1864-1865 and Yarkand was taken in the spring of the following year. Yakub achieved the conquest of Khotan by the simple expedient of inviting its ruler, Hadji Habibula Khan, to visit him and having him arrested. By the autumn of 1867, he had captured Aksu and Kuche[24]. In July, 1870 his troops captured Turfan[25].

Once he had established his military power over Kashgaria, Yakub began concentrating on the problem of foreign relations. He could hardly afford

not to, caught as he was between Russia and Britain. Yakub sought Russian recognition to buttress his regime and took the initiative in dispatching his nephew, Mirza Shadi, to seek a commercial treaty with Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, in August, 1868[26]. The construction by the Russians of Fort Naryn in the mountains between Issiq Kol and Aksu in 1868 may have helped to influence this initial overture by Yakub, who also built up his own defenses at Aksu to offset the menace of Fort Naryn. At any rate, his dislike for the Russians is noted by Schuyler, who quotes the following observation by Yakub: "The Russians that have come here look at these localities and become acquainted with the state of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for they are a restless and crooked-minded people."[27]

Kaufmann was away in St. Petersburg when Mirza Shadi visited Verny (Alma Ata) in August, 1868, but Kaufmann's deputy-- General Kolpakovsky-- dispatched a Captain Reinthal to Kashgar in that year to take up the question of a commercial treaty. This mission was a failure, possibly because Yakub felt himself insulted by the appearance of such a low-ranking emissary. When Kaufmann received news in St. Petersburg of Mirza Shadi's visit to Verny, he granted permission for Yakub's nephew to visit him there-- and the nephew did go to the Russian capital, but again there was no agreement.

Following Yakub's capture of Turfan in July, 1870, the Russians countered by occupying Mujart Pass just east of the Khan Tengri in the T'ienshan to block off a possible military thrust into northwest Jungaria. According to Shaw, Yakub actually had planned a campaign across the T'ienshan until the Russians constructed Fort Naryn. Shaw says that the construction

of the fort caused Yakub to content himself with obtaining the nominal submission of the local leaders in Hami, Urumchi and Ili[28].

After the Russians occupied Mujart Pass, Yakub Beg sent an envoy to India in late 1869. The envoy, Akhrar Khan, was welcomed warmly in Lahore and when he arrived in Calcutta was granted an interview with the Viceroy[29]. A year later the first Forsyth Mission appeared in Kashgar.

Yakub received the title of Atalik Ghazi ("Tutor of Champions") from the Emir of Bokhara in 1866[30] and later himself assumed the title of Bedaulat ("Fortune One"). When trade relations failed to develop between the Russians and Kashgar after the preliminary negotiations of 1868, and with Yakub adopting an aloof if not hostile attitude towards the Russians, Kaufmann tried unsuccessfully to get the Khan of Khokand to depose the Atalik Ghazi and take over Kashgaria as part of Khokand.[31]

The Russian seizure of Kuldja in 1871, which sprang from a combination of causes, was preceded by a sequence of developments that included a joint Tungan and Taranchi revolution against the Manchu garrison there in 1864. The Manchu authority was eliminated, but the Tungans and Taranchis then began scrapping among themselves and a struggle for succession took place in which the Taranchi, Abil Ogla, finally emerged victorious. Although Abil Olga set himself up as the Khan of Kuldja, he was not able to maintain order and groups of bandits invaded Russian territory periodically. These forays were a contributing factor to the Russian occupation of Kuldja on July 4, 1871[32].

In explaining his action to the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg, Kaufmann pointed out that he had ordered General Kolpakovsky to seize Kuldja

because it was necessary to defeat Yakub Beg's designs and keep British influence out of an area so vital to the protection of the Russian frontier[33]. Before long the Russians were in occupation not only of Kuldja, but also of the Kash, Kunges and Tekes River Valleys[34].

Nevertheless, Kaufmann's action in taking Kuldja disturbed the Russian Foreign Office[35]. Russia promised to evacuate Kuldja as soon as China restored order. But it was some time before the troops actually pulled out.

Kaufmann blended diplomacy, threat and military action in dealing with the problem of Yakub Beg. After Kolpakovsky's occupation of Kuldja, Kaufmann reopened the question of a commercial treaty by sending to Kashgar a more imposing mission than the one-man mission of Captain Rointhal in 1868. The new mission was headed by Baron Kaulfars, who flattered Yakub highly, and included an engineer, a topographer and a merchant[36]. Finally Yakub signed a commercial treaty with the Kaulbars mission on July 4, 1872 and received permission to send Mullah Tarap Hodja to the Court of St. Petersburg. He was highly elated at this implied Russian recognition of his regime. In seeking permission to send Tarap Hoda to St. Petersburg, he had told Kaufmann: "This will be for me a great mercy, that you should lead me, a man of nothing, to the sun, and that to my share should fall a drop from that great sea."[37]

Despite the commercial treaty, however, friendship failed to blossom between Kashgar and the Russians and Russian merchants continued to encounter difficulty. Yakub Beg clearly preferred the British to the Russians, especially since the British were not an immediate military threat.

In 1873 he dispatched an envoy to the Sultan of Constantinople by way

of India. There were two noteworthy consequences of this trip. The Sultan bestowed upon the Kashgarian ruler the title of Emir-ul-Mu'min ("Ruler of the Faithful"), advised him through the envoy that he ought to maintain friendly relations with Britain as opposed to Russia, and sent to Kashgar 200 rifles, three cannon and three military instructors[38]. Arms also began to flow to Yakub through a trading company established in India.[39]

Britain was interested in trade between Sinkiang and India in 1874[40], but the report on trade prospects made by T. Douglas Forsyth on his first (1870) and second (1874) missions tended to discourage such hopes as existed for a commercial bonanza in Kashgaria[41]. The second Forsyth report also discounted the strategic danger of a possible invasion of India by Russia through Sinkiang[42]. Still Yakub continued to fit in with the British policy of playing off the Moslem world against Russia. And when Yakub was on the verge of defeat, the British made an unsuccessful diplomatic effort to save him. (See below.)

After the Russo-Kashgar commercial treaty of 1872, relations between the two signatories deteriorated to the point where the Russians were preparing to invade Kashgaria. Schuyler notes that the idea of giving China military support to recapture Kashgaria had started gaining currency in Russia, with its proponents arguing that the Chinese would be a friendlier neighbor than Yakub Beg and that the T'ienshan formed such a good physical frontier that it would be unadvisable to extend Russian territory beyond it. On the other hand, he also notes that some objections had been raised to this idea by those who did not favor the reintroduction of Chinese rule in Kashgar.[43] By 1875 the Russians actually had started gathering a force of

20,000 men to depose Yakub, but the 1875 Khokand rebellion intervened and the project was called off[44]. It remained for Tso Tsung-t'ang, a Chinese general, to overthrow Yakub two years later.

b. The Manchu Restoration in Sinkiang

In China, where trouble has been the historical rule rather than the exception, the period from 1840 to 1912 confronted the Manchu Dynasty with 72 especially difficult years.

It was a period of multiple internal upheavals: the T'aip'ing Rebellion (1850-1864), the Nienfei Rebellion (1853-1868), the Mohammedan insurrections (1855-1877 and again in 1895), the Boxer Uprising directed against the foreigners (1900) and finally the republican revolution that overthrew the dynasty (1911-1912).

It was a period of wars with foreigners: the Anglo-Chinese "Opium War" (1840-1842), the second war with the British and French (1858-1860), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the foreign expedition against Peking after the Boxer Uprising.

It was also the period in which Britain, Russia, France, Japan, Germany and even Austria and Belgium engaged in a mad scramble for new territory, spheres of influence and extra-territorial privileges. The United States did not seize any territory, but it also participated in the struggle for spheres of influence and also derived extra-territorial privileges from China. Our attitude with regard to the "Open Door Policy" was that we were entitled to what other nations got in the way of commercial advantages, even though we insisted on the "territorial integrity" of China.

Besides the concessions they had to yield to the foreigners in Manchuria and in the cities along the seacoast, in North China and in the Yangtze Valley, the Manchus lost the left bank of the Amur and the Vladivostok maritime area to Russia; Formosa, Korea and the Ryukiu Islands to Japan; and the area of Hongkong to the British.

Despite these difficulties, the Manchus managed to suppress or to survive all but the last of the internal rebellions-- gradually weaker though they became in the process. They also achieved the reconquest of Sinkiang. But even in Sinkiang, where the Russians had seized the Kuldja area in 1871, the Manchus had to grant further commercial concessions to the Russians and pay them an indemnity for occupation costs.

Tso Tsung-t'ang[45], who reconquered Sinkiang, was born of a gentry family in Hunan in 1812. He started out to become a scholar, like his father, but was diverted into a military career by the T'aip'ing Rebellion at the age of 48. After fighting through the rebellion in Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien, Tso was appointed Viceroy of Shensi and Kansu. He headed north from Hankow in 1867, but before he assumed his new duties in the northwest he participated in the last phase of the campaign against the Nienfei rebels in Hopei. Then he turned his attention to putting down the Mohammedan insurrection in Kansu. As early as October, 1873, however, one of his forces reached Suchow on the Kansu-Sinkiang border in preparation for a campaign against Yakub Beg in Sinkiang. This force advanced to Hami in the summer of 1875.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had planned the Sinkiang campaign carefully, commanded a striking force estimated by Bales at 40,000 men. Boulger

estimated Yakub Beg's Sepoy-officered army at about 17,000 trained regulars and some 10,000 irregulars[46].

Before Tso's troops advanced against the forces Yakub had concentrated in the Turfan area, they wrested control of the T'ienshan cities from the Tungans as far west as Urumchi. It was the spring of 1877 before two of Tso Tsung-t'ang's armies, one advancing southeastward from Urumchi under Liu Chin-t'ang and the other southwestward from Barkol under Hsu Chan-piao, started converging on Turfan and Toksun. Yakub was then making his headquarters at Korla, just below Karashar.

Within a month after this drive started, Yakub's military strength collapsed. Both of Tso's armies entered Turfan on May 16, 1877. Yakub himself was dead by the end of the month. There are at least two versions of his death, one holding that he was assassinated[47] and the other that he committed suicide[48]. A Turkish officer, Mohammed Yusuf Effendi, who was in Korla when Yakub died, expressed the belief that he was poisoned.[49]

By December, 1877, Manchu troops were back in Kashgar and Manchu authority restored in Kashgaria.

Bales' biography of Tso Tsung-t'ang contains some striking details reflecting the different attitudes of the Russians and the British towards Tso's campaign against Yakub. Tso was able to buy large stocks of grain from the Russians to feed his troops, while he was turned down by the British in Shanghai on a loan to finance his Sinkiang expedition[50]. Before Yakub met disaster in the field, the British also made an attempt to keep his regime politically alive by advising the Manchus that they could arrange his military surrender on certain conditions. In 1876 Sir Thomas Wade,

British Minister in Peking, informed the Tsung-li Yamen that Yakub would surrender if he would be permitted to continue his rule under Manchu suzerainty. But Tso Tsung-t'ang sneered at the proposal in recalling for the Tsung-li Yamen how the British had turned him down on the loan and how the British press had taken a hostile attitude towards his campaign[51].

Although Tso Tsung-t'ang could not conceal his distaste for the British, it was the Russians, not the British, who became China's chief problem in Sinkiang after the defeat of Yakub Beg.

c. Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang, 1850-1912

Two years before Perovsky moved down the Syr-Darya to capture Ak-Mechet and 16 years before the governor-generalship of Russian Turkestan was established, the Russians had staked out their first commercial preserve in Sinkiang through the Treaty of Kuldja. This treaty, which was not made public for ten years, was signed on July 25, 1851[52].

Under the terms of the Kuldja Treaty, Ili and Tarbagatai (the Chuguchak and Sharasume areas) were opened to Russian trade, Ili became a no-tax zone and the Russians received the right to appoint a consul to look after Russian affairs in northwest Sinkiang. As a quid pro quo, the Manchu authorities in Ili were given the right to name a functionary to look after the interests of Manchu and Chinese merchants operating in Russian territory. The Russians were also entitled to appoint a syndic (caravan master) to accompany Russian caravans entering Sinkiang, while the Manchus were authorized to send military escorts along with their caravans.

Inasmuch as we are inclined to look at treaties as solemn compacts between states, it should be pointed out here that the Treaty of Kuldja was

a local agreement negotiated between the Manchu Commander of the Fortress of Ili and the Russian frontier officials.

Kaufmann in Turkestan and Muraviev in Siberia, acting as Russian frontier proconsuls, took independent actions that later involved the St. Petersburg Foreign Office in delicate diplomatic maneuvering with China[53].

Similarly, the Commander of the Fortress of Ili, a post established in 1763[54], made on-the-spot decisions with regard to specific problems confronting him in his bailiwick. Although the Commander of the Fortress of Ili lost some of his power after Sinkiang became a province under the governorship of General Liu Chin-t'ang, he still retained the function of conducting diplomatic relations with the Russians in that area.

Under conditions were the Chinese central authority often became only nominal in the border areas, the Russians-- before and after the Bolshevik revolution-- pursued a policy of dealing both with the de facto Chinese border authorities and with the central Chinese government that exercised theoretical sovereignty. Both Tsarist Russia and Bolshevik Russia employed this approach to advantage. In Sinkiang, for example, Tsarist Russia signed two local agreements with the Ili authorities-- the Treaty of Kuldja and the Protocol of Chuguchak[55]. After 1917, Bolshevik Russia negotiated a series of local agreements with Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shen-ju and Sheng Shih-ts'ai[56].

Recognition by the Manchu central authority of the 1851 Treaty of Kuldja was implicit in the Additional Treaty of Peking signed at the Manchu capital in November, 1860. Under Article VI of this treaty, Russian commercial rights in Sinkiang were extended to Kashgar on the same terms that

existed for Ili and Turbagatai[57].

Like the 1851 Treaty of Kuldja, the 1864 Protocol of Chuguchak of September 25-October 7, 1864 was a local agreement negotiated between Zakharoff, the Soviet consul in Kuldja, and the Manchu Ili authorities[58]. This protocol, which delineated the northern Russo-Sinkiang frontier from the Altai Mountains around to the Kuldja area, indicates the Russian concern occasioned by the Tungan rebellion and the invasion of Sinkiang by Buzurg Khan and Yakub Beg. The general boundary principle applied in the Protocol of Chuguchak was that the river watersheds would determine the mountain frontiers, with Russia taking over those areas in which the rivers flowed west and north and China retaining jurisdiction over those areas in which the rivers flowed east and south.

The Russian occupation of the Kuldja area and the city of Kuldja itself in 1871 left China with an important diplomatic problem after the overthrow of Yakub Beg. According to Lobanov-Rostovsky, the Russian Minister in Peking, Vlangali, was instructed by St. Petersburg as early as August, 1871 to take up with the Manchus the question of restoring their control in Kuldja[59]. But this was an idle gesture, for at the time the Manchus were in no position to exercise control anywhere in Sinkiang.

It was not until after Kashgar was recaptured in December, 1877, and the remnants of Khokandian resistance eliminated that Peking undertook to arrive at a settlement of the Kuldja question. Ch'un Ho, a Manchu diplomat who had previously been sent on an apology mission to France[60], was dispatched to St. Petersburg to take up the matter. The result of his mission was the Treaty of Livadia, signed on October 2, 1879, which made so many

concessions to Russia that it brought down the wrath of the Manchu Court on Ch'un Ho's head and led to his arrest. Moreover, the Manchus repudiated the treaty and thereby created a tense situation that carried with it the alarums if not the real danger of a war with Russia.

In Russia Ch'un Ho had agreed to a settlement whereby Russia retained the Kuldja enclave, including the upper part of the Tekes Valley and the Mujart and Narat Passes, and obtained the right to establish consulates throughout the Tarim Basin and at Suchow on the Sinkiang-Kansu border. The Manchu envoy also had agreed to a 5,000,000 rouble indemnity to cover Russian occupation costs.

The Manchus rejected all of the Livadia Treaty except the indemnity clause[61]. Amid the rumbles of war, the Russians concentrated their fleet at Vladivostok, mobilized in Turkestan and along the Manchurian frontier, and demanded that Ch'un Ho be released to efface the insult to the Tsar committed by arresting the signatory of an agreement approved by His Majesty[62]. In Sinkiang Tso Tsung-t'ang also prepared to mobilize for action. He advised the Tsung-li Yamen to try for a peaceful settlement, but added that if such a settlement were unobtainable, there would be no other alternative but to attack Kuldja and so arrange matters that the responsibility for the attack fell on the Russians[63].

Finally, through the mediation of British and French diplomacy, Ch'un Ho was released from internment on June 26, 1880. At about the same time Marquis Tseng Chi-tze, son of the famous Tseng Kuo-fan[64], was dispatched from his post as Minister to England to renegotiate the Livadia Treaty in St. Petersburg. He reached a new settlement with the Russians, and the

danger of war was dissipated.

"His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, consents to the re-establishment of the Chinese Government in the region (pays) of Ili, temporarily occupied after 1871 by the Russian armies." So began Article I of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, which was signed in February, 1881[65].

Under this new treaty, Russia agreed to evacuate the entire Tekes Valley and the city of Kuldja, but retained the western part of the Ili Valley. Already in possession of consular privileges at Kuldja, Tarbagatai and Kashgar, the Russians were now authorized to extend their consulates to Suchow and Turfan and to open additional consulates (with Chinese approval) at Hami, Urumchi and Kucho if future trade warranted it. Inasmuch as Turfan was then closed to trade as a military area, it was noted that Russia would not exercise its right to open a Turfan consulate for the time being. With regard to the question of indemnity to cover Russian occupation costs in the Kuldja area, it was increased from the 5,000,000 roubles specified in the Treaty of Livadia to 9,000,000 roubles.

Marquis Tseng Chi-tze had gotten a better deal than the unfortunate Ch'un Ho, for he succeeded in getting the Russians to evacuate the Tekes Valley and Kuldja itself. Still, he was unable to resist the expansion of Russian commercial influence throughout Sinkiang. Moreover, the money cost of getting the Russians out of the Kuldja area was almost doubled.

When the Treaty of St. Petersburg expired in 1911, Russian influence in Sinkiang had spread to such an extent that Peking was reluctant to renew the agreement.

Although Russian Turkestan under the Tsars became a "colonial" area

that remained primarily agricultural, providing a market for manufactured goods from European Russia and a source of raw cotton, sufficient industrial advances took place there from 1890 to 1910 to enable Russia to exert a greater pull on Sinkiang than China. By 1914 there were more than 700 "enterprises" in Russian Turkestan engaged in such productive activity as cotton-ginning, linseed oil production, flour-milling, cocoon-drying and leather manufacture[66]. The Central Asian railways built between 1880 and 1905, which linked the economies of Russian Turkestan and European Russia, exerted their influence on Sinkiang, too. Sinkiang also was a producer of cotton and livestock, and it was similarly disposed to trade with Russia for manufactured goods. In short, in terms of trade as well as ethnic relationships, Sinkiang was merely an extension of Russian Turkestan.

Aside from the advantages (vis-a-vis China) of proximity and a favorable differential in industrial development, Tsarist Russia also adopted a policy of subsidizing trade with Sinkiang. For example, the Tsarist government offered a bounty on each ponyload of Russian goods that crossed the frontier into Sinkiang[67]. It was obviously difficult for China to compete under these conditions.

After the signing of the 1881 treaty, the Russo-Asiatic Bank set up branches at Kuldja (Ining), Urumchi (Tihwa), Chuguchak (T'ach'eng) and Kashgar[68]. According to Etherton, control of the bank was vested largely in the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg and Russian goods were put on display at the various branches[69]. Like other foreign banks in China, it was a bank of issue. It also financed foreign trade and became the repository for the funds of the Sinkiang provincial government. Inevitably the fate of the

Sinkiang tael was in time more closely linked with that of the rouble than with that of the Peking tael.

The Manchu reluctance to renew the Treaty of St. Petersburg in early 1911 created new Sino-Russian differences over Sinkiang. But these differences were a puff in the wind compared with the much larger storm that started to engulf China in 1911-- the Republican Revolution. Although the Russian Council of Ministers decided in 1911 to present an ultimatum to China and stage a military demonstration in the Ili area if necessary[70], it was not until 1912 that the Cossacks again entered Kuldja and also stationed themselves at Kshgar. But it was for a different reason-- to "protect Russian lives and property" against new disturbances in those areas.

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NOTES

1. Bates, E. S., Soviet Asia, Jonathan Cape, London, 1942, p. 25.

2. Cf. Bates, op. cit., pp. 25 et seq.; Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 61; also, Pares, Sir Bernard, A History of Russia, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1947, pp. 103-104, and Sumner, B. H., A Short History of Russia, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1949, pp. 21-22.

3. Dates listed are from the Soviet Union in Maps, George Philip & Son, Ltd., London, 1947. See map of the London Geolographical Institute on the "Russian Advance into Siberia to the Death of Peter the Great," p. 4.

4. In the Bashkir lands of the Urals, where Russia established its hold in the 16th Century, tribute was collected in fur. The collection of fur tribute continued until the middle of the 18th Century, when the general Russian tax system was introduced. See Lyashchenko, op. cit., pp. 570-571.

5. Quoted by Wilhelm, op. cit.,p. 218.

6. On January 12, 1801 the Emperor Paul actually issued an order for the Don Cossacks to march to Orenburg and then launch an expedition into India by way of Bokhara. He was assassinated six weeks later, however, and his successor, Alexander I, stopped the expedition. See Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 101, for instructions issued by Paul to the Cossack Hetman Orlov.

7. Lyashchenko, op. cit., p. 353.

8. Vernadsky, op. cit.,p. 105.

9. Lyashchenko, op. cit., p. 570, traces the development of mining in the Urals back to this early period of Russian expansion.

10. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 92.

11. Cf. Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 163-164; Pares, op. cit., p. 375-376; Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., pp. 155-160.

12. Andijan is about 400 overland miles northwest of Kashgar by way of the Terek Pass.

13. Lyashchenko, op. cit., p. 614. Lyashchenko lists the railway mileage at 2,368 versts. A verst is 0.6629 of a mile.

14. Ibid., pp. 614-615. Turkestan's cotton production is listed at 873,000 poods in 1888, 4,960,000 poods in 1900 and 13,697,000 poods in 1913. A pood is 36.11 pounds.

15. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., pp. 114-117, also p. 165. The Anglo-Russian controversy over Afghanistan dragged on until 1895, when a joint Pamir Boundary Commission created the buffer of Afghanistan and defined Russian and British "spheres of influence" in the Pamirs.

16. Cf. Bailey, Lieut. Col. F.M., Mission to Tashkent, Jonathan Cape, London, 1946; Etherton, Lieut. Col. P.T., In the Heart of Asia, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1926.

17. Central Asian Questions, p. 225.

18. Cf. Schuyler, Eugene, Turkistan (Vol. II), Scribner, Armstrong & Company, New York, 1877, pp. 316-327; Boulger, op. cit., pp. 360-395.

19. Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand and Kashgar, p. 45.

20. Bales, op. cit., p. 304.

21. Shaw, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

22. Ibid., p. 50.

23. Ibid., p. 55.

24. Shaw time-table on Yakub's conquests, p. 59.

25. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 319.

26. Ibid., p. 317.

27. Ibid., p. 320.

28. Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand and Kashgar, p. 57.

29. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 34.

30. Etherton, op. cit., p. 49.

31. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 320.

32. For a detailed summary of events in Kuldja before the Russian occupation, see Schuyler, op. cit., pp. 178-187.

33. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 187.

34. See map in Bales, op. cit., p. 378.

35. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., pp. 187-188.

36. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 321

37. Ibid., p. 322.

38. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 35.

39. Ibid.

40. Frechtling expresses the view that the British would have recognized Yakub before the 1874 agreement except for fear of Russian counteraction. Frechtling, L.E., Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London, 1939, Vol. XXVI, p. 479.

41. Reed, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

42. Ibid. Although the second report discounted the danger from Sinkiang, it emphasized the possibility that the Russians might be able to use the Hindu Kush and the Karakoram Mountains farther to the west for an invasion route. This fear about "artillery passes" in the Pamirs was dispelled to a large extent in time, but it was still strong enough for the

British to take action in Afghanistan in 1919 when they felt their influence there was threatened by Russia.

43. Schuyler, op. cit., pp. 325-326.

44. Bales, op. cit., p. 317.

45. The material included herein on Tso Tsung-t'ang and his campaign in Sinkiang is derived primarily from Bales' biography.

46. Boulger, op. cit., p. 418.

47. Ibid., p. 394.

48. Bales, op. cit., p. 365.

49. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 38.

50. Bales, op. cit., pp. 336-337 and p. 360, respectively.

51. See excerpt from the Hsien P'u (Annals) quoted by Bales, op. cit., p. 360, on Tso's remarks about the Wade proposal.

52. Hertslet's China Treaties, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1908. Text of Kuldja Treaty, pp. 449-454.

53. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 187.

54. See Chapter II.

55. Hertslet's Treaties, pp. 449-454, 472-478.

56. See Chapter VI.

57. Treaties, Conventions, Etc., Between China and Foreign States (Vol. I.), Statistical Department of the Inspectorate-General of Customs, Shanghai, 1908. Text of treaty, pp. 36-46.

58. Hertslet's China Treaties. Detailed summary of protocol, pp. 472-478.

59. Russia and Asia, p. 188.

60. Bales, op. cit., p. 380.

61. Ibid., p. 381.

62. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 190.

63. Bales, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

64. Tseng Kuo-fan became famous for his military leadership in the defeat of the T'aip'ing rebels.

65. Hertslet's China Treaties. Text, pp. 483-498.

66. Lyashchenko, op. cit., p. 615.

67. Connolly, op. cit., p. 116.

68. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 59 and p. 177.

69. Etherton, op. cit., p. 111.

70. Reed, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

V. THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND ITS RELATION TO SINKIANG

Before the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917 Russia already had established a predominant influence in Sinkiang thanks to the defeat of Yakub Beg by the Manchus and its own relative political and economic power as compared with China. The Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, and its aftermath were to increase this power. By 1927, while Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's authority in China still extended only as far north as the Yangtze River, the Bolsheviks had established their succession to the Tsars in Central Asia.

In taking over Russian Turkestan, the Bolsheviks inherited the geographical and economic advantages already enjoyed by Tsarist Russia with regard to Sinkiang. They added to these advantages by accelerating the economic development of Central Asia, by linking this development to a dynamic revolutionary ideology stressing "national rights" as well as economic well-being, and by applying techniques of propaganda, organisation and control unknown to the Tsars. The rise and growth of Soviet Central Asia in relation to Sinkiang are worth examining here not only for a better understanding of Soviet policy in Sinkiang up to the collapse of the Kuomintang in 1949, but also for possible indications of future Chinese Communist policy in that northwest province.

"The Communist Party of the USSR is our best teacher from whom we must learn," Mao Tse-tung declared on July 1, 1949[1].

Eight months before the Bolshevik Revolution, while the Tsarist armies were fighting a losing battle against the Central Powers on the eastern

front in Europe, a major revolt broke out in Turkestan. The revolt was touched off in July, 1916, by a decree ordering the conscription of the Kirghiz-Kazakhs for military service. The revolt lasted until November, 1916 and was put down with considerable cruelty[2]. Thousands of Kazakhs fled into Sinkiang. At one point Yang Tseng-hsin, then Governor of Sinkiang, estimated that 200,000 Kazakh refugees had crossed the border into the province[3].

When the 1917 revolution broke out in Russia, the Communists in Russian Asia constituted an infinitesimal fraction of the population-- in fact, less than one-half of one percent[4]. Nevertheless, Russian revolutionaries had been operating in Turkestan even before the Kazakh uprising of 1916, with Russian railwaymen helping to organize the local workers into such organizations as the "Union of Toiling Moslems" in Ferghana, the Building Trades Union in Tashkent and Ittafak in Samarkand[5]. Purely nationalist movements also had developed under the leadership of Moslem intellectuals who demanded, not socialism, but constitutional democracy from the Emirs and autonomy from Russia. In Bokhara there were the Young Bokharans and the Djadid ("New") societies, in Khiva the Young Khivans and in Ferghana the middle-class movement that gave rise to the Turkestan National Council movement. (See below.)

During the early stages of the civil war in Siberia and Turkestan, the counter-revolution of the "White Russians" set up a wide barrier separating the "Reds" in European Russia from the Asiatic areas. Power was seized by local revolutionaries, and demobilised peasants and former German, Austrian and Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war were soon remobilised into both the "Red"

and "White" armies[6].

In January, 1918, a Soviet regime was set up in Siberia, but was soon overthrown with the appearance of Allied forces, the arrival of Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war and their formation into an anti-Soviet Czech Legion, and the establishment of Admiral Kolchak's "White Russian" Government at Omsk on November 18, 1918[7]. In Turkestan a Soviet government was established at Tashkent even before the creation of the Siberian Soviet, and it continued in existence after the first Siberian Soviet fell despite a brief uprising in 1919. The prime movers in the Tashkent Soviet, which came into being on September 12, 1917-- two months before the November Bolshevik Revolution in Russia-- were Kolisov, a railway [illegible]er, and Damgatsky, a skilled laborer[8].

The revolutionary splits that existed in European Russia at the time of the Russian revolution of March, 1917 were also reflected in Turkestan. There were three claimants for power in Ferghana: the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government, which was loyal to the Kerensky regime; the Tashkent Soviet, which was loyal to Lenin; and the Turkestan National Council, consisting of Moslem intellectuals, businessmen and others who had grudges of various kinds against Tsarist Russia and wanted autonomy[9].

The Tashkent Soviet soon absorbed the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government and, with the help of former Czech, Hungarian, German and Austrian prisoners of war[10], eliminated the Turkestan National Council.

When the Tashkent Bolsheviks convoked a Congress of Turkestan Soviets in November, 1917, shortly after the new November upheaval in European Russia, Moslems were not permitted to attend. A resolution was passed

declaring that the inclusion of Moslems in the "organs of higher regional revolutionary power" was "unacceptable" for the time being[11]. One Tobolin, speaking for the Bolsheviks, explained that the attitude of the Moslems towards the Soviet was "uncertain" and that they lacked sufficiently strong "proletarian organizations."[12]

Excluded from the Congress, the Moslem autonomists convoked their own congress at Khokand and on December 10, 1917, proclaimed themselves the government of an autonomous Turkestan territory linked "in union with the Federal Democratic Republic of Russia."[13] In February, 1918, the Tashkent Soviet started military action against the Khokand government, which had been recruiting a militia of its own, and the latter regime was overthrown. Chokayev, who was president of the Turkestan National Council, attributes the rise of the anti-Soviet Basmachi movement to the depredations of the Tashkent Soviet troops who plundered Khokand[14].

There is little question that the early Soviet revolutionaries in Turkestan committed gross excesses and manifested a "Russian chauvinism" that alienated large groups of Moslems. Chokayev's bitterness may be discounted to some extent inasmuch as he himself was on the losing end of the political struggle, but the crudities of the early Soviet approach have been noted by other writers, too. Kunitz, who wrote about the Turkestan revolution with an unrestrained gusto, comments on the "inexperience, inefficiency, mistakes and vacillation of the preponderantly Russian Soviet authorities" in the early days[15]. Discussing the same period, Mandel alludes to the "Great Russian chauvinism on the part of some Soviet authorities as well as their sheer ignorance of the customs and languages of the native

peoples."[16]

In 1920 Stalin himself, then the Commissar of Nationalities and the leading Bolshevik expert on national minorities, criticized the border area Bolsheviks for their "precipitance, at times assuming the form of gross tactlessness" and for their failure to take cognizance of the "national sentiment among the toiling masses of oppressed or non-sovereign nations." He emphasized the necessity of creating a native "cadre of instructors" to carry on the revolution in the border areas. He also advocated an "indirect and more cautious" approach in such matters as appropriating superfluous dwelling space and combatting Mohammedanism, pointing out that Communist policy had to adjust itself flexibly to the problems provided by any given stage in the historical development of any given area[17].

The slighting of the Moslems by the Tashkent Soviet was at variance with the fundamental principles on nationality policy proclaimed by the Soviet leaders in Moscow. Three weeks after the Bolsheviks seized power in the November revolution, they established the People's Commissariat for Nationalities with Stalin as commissar (November 26, 1917)[18]. In early December, over the signatures of Lenin and Stalin, the Bolsheviks issued a Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia containing the resolutions adopted by the First and Second Congresses of Soviets:

"Fulfilling the will of these Congresses, the Council of People's Commissars has resolved to place at the foundations of its activity relative to Russian nationalities the following principles: (1) the peoples of Russia are equal and sovereign; (2) the peoples of Russia have the right to free self-determination-- including the right to withdraw and to form an

independent state ;(italics mine) (3) all privileges and limitations of nationalities, and of national religions of every sort, are abrogated; and (4) the national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia shall develop freely..."[19]

Less than one month after the promulgation of the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Soviet Government addressed a Proclamation to "All toiling Moslems of Russia and the East." In this proclamation, which was written by Stalin and issued on December 17, 1917, the new Soviet Government denounced the Tsarist treaties under which Russia had obtained special privileges in Moslem countries and declared that it was against the "seizure of foreign lands."[20] It was addressed to the Asiatic Moslems in the following terms:

"Moslems of the East, Persians and Turks, Arabs and Hindus, all of you whose lives and properties, whose liberties and customs have for hundreds of years been sold and bartered by the blood-thirsty European beasts of prey, all you whose lands are intended to be divided among the robbers who have started the war...."[21]

A special Bolshevik commission, including Frunze, Kuibishev and Kaganovich, was finally dispatched to Turkestan in 1919 to direct the battle against the counter-revolution and to coordinate political policy. Under the influence of the commission, a new Turkestan congress was convoked by the Tashkent Soviet, and this time Moslems participated in the "organs of higher revolutionary power." The new congress proclaimed the Turkestan Peoples' Republic in April-May, 1918[22]. Shortly before this event Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities confirmed "the regulation concerning the

Tatar-Bashkir Republic and had worked out also a regulation as to the Kazakh (Kirghiz) and other autonomous republics."[23]

As the center of Soviet activity in Turkestan, Tashkent became a haven for exiled Young Bokharans who made it a base for waging their revolution against the Emir Saiyid Mir-Alim of Bokhara by propaganda, sabotage and insurrection. Although the Young Bokharans were not Socialists, they found it expedient to enter into an agreement with Kolisov (chairman of the Tashkent Soviet), who promised to supply them with money, arms and men[24]. The first military effort to overthrow the Emir under this agreement in the spring of 1918 failed, but the second attempt in August, 1920 was successful. Saiyid Mir-Alim fled to Afghanistan.

Like the Young Bokharans, the Young Khivans were also pressing for constitutional democracy in their struggle with the Khivan Khan, Saiyid Asfendiar-Bahadur. A new nationalist issue war injected into the fight for constitutional democracy when the Turkoman chieftain, Dunayid Khan, seized power from Saiyid in 1918[25]. Uniting in a struggle against the Turkoman usurper, the Khivan Uzbeks finally defeated Dunayid, who fled to Iran.

By March, 1921, the Russian Bolsheviks had signed treaties with both Bokhara and Khiva recognizing them as new "Soviet People's Republics."[26] Not until 1924 was the term "Socialist" affixed to the designations of Soviet administrative areas in Central Asia.

Although the first acts of Soviet authority date from the November revolution, it was not until July 10, 1918, that the constitution was enacted establishing the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The Soviet Union did not come into being until July 6, 1923 as a federal

state initially encompassing four republics: the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the White-Russian S.S.R. and the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R.[27]

Under the old Tsarist administrative system existing in 1914, Russian Central Asia consisted of the provinces of Semirechie, Syr-Darya, Ferghana and Samarkand, and the protectorate of Bokhara. To the west of Turkestan was the protectorate of Khiva, and to the southwest the large Trans-Caspian province inhabited by the Turkomen. Beginning in 1924 the five present republics of Soviet Central Asia— the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadjik, Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics— began to emerge in a reorganization process that introduced the term "Socialist" into their administrative designations and divided the major concentrations of the various ethnic groups into separate units. The process developed as follows:

1. In 1924 Bokhara and Khorezm (Khiva) disappeared and two new full-fledged union republics were established. They were the Uzbek S.S.R. and the Turkmen S.S.R.

2. In 1926 the territorial unit of Turkestan was dissolved, and the Kazakh and Kirghiz Autonomous Republics were established under the R.S.F.S.R.

3. In December, 1929 the Tadjik Autonomous Republic became the third Central Asian union republic.

4. In 1936 the new Soviet constitution elevated the Kazakh and Kirghiz Autonomous Republics to the status of union republics[28].

a. Civil War, the Basmachi and Collectivization

(1) The "Reds" and the "Whites"

While these new republics were in the earliest stages of formation, all of Russian Central Asia was experiencing the ravages of war, devastation and famine in the years 1918-1920. The food-producing acreage had been curtailed by the Tsarist cotton-growing policy, and Central Asia had become increasingly dependent on food from the outside. Thus, the disruption of communications in the warfare that broke out between the Bolsheviks and Kolchak's "White Russians" hit Russian Turkestan especially hard. It was not until 1920 that the "White Russian" power in Central Asia was destroyed.

In the province of Semirechie, in areas on or near Sinkiang's northwestern border, the Kolchak cause was advanced by such "White Russian" military leaders as Annenkov, Dutov and Admiral Bakich. But the coordination between Kolchak and his Central Asian lieutenants does not appear to have been too close. Brigandage and brutality were part and parcel of the Semirechien civil war, with the peasants supporting first the "White Russians" and then the Bolsheviks, and with soldiers crossing back and forth from one camp to the other until the final collapse of the "White Russians."

Annenkov has been characterized by Etherton as an "opportunist and an adventurer, but withal a brave leader"[29] and by Clubb as a "blood-thirsty hanger of youths and a bayonetter of infants."[30] According to a short biography published by the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society in 1930[31], he was born at Kiev in 1887 and was the son of a wealthy general. After being graduated from the Imperial Pages' School and Nikolai Cavalry School, Annenkov was stationed in Turkestan. He fought the Germans on the

Eastern European front during the first World War, but headed back towards the Urals and made an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Tsar, who had been removed to Tobolsk after his arrest by the Bolsheviks at Mogilliev on March 8, 1917[32].

Dutov, a large landowner, was the leader of the Orenburg Cossacks. It was Dutov whose seizure of Orenburg formed the famous "Dutov cork," which cut Siberia and Central Asia off from food supplies, and which enabled Kolchak's forces to establish a Ural Mountain line based on Orenburg by the summer of 1919. By June of that year, too, Annenkov, who originally had nine regiments under his command, had overrun Semirechie.

Fortune at first favored the "White Russians," but the morale of Kolchak's troops-- many of whom were former prisoners-of-war-- started to collapse and soldiers began deserting in response to Bolshevik propaganda. The peasants also began to turn away from the ruthlessness of the "White Russians." Moreover, after August, 1919, when Frunze assumed command of the Turk front, the Bolsheviks made a determined bid to win the support of the peasants. Land originally confiscated from the Kazakhs by the Bolsheviks was returned to them, some food was shipped in to famine-stricken areas, and an amnesty was offered to all enemy soldiers and officers who were prepared to surrender themselves and their arms[33].

The Bolsheviks started a counter-offensive in October, 1919, and in the following month they seized Omsk, Kolchak's capital. Irkutsk, Kolchak's second capital, fell in January, 1920, and before long the last of his forces in Siberia had been defeated. Kolchak himself was captured and shot by the Bolsheviks on February 7, 1920.

When the "White Russian" cause in Siberia collapsed, some of the Kolchak generals and those of their troops who still remained loyal crossed over from Semirechie. General Scherbakov was one of the first to enter, followed by Admiral Bakich in early 1920. Dutov came next, and finally Annenkov himself in May, 1920[34].

The new influx of "White Russian" troops and refugees into Sinkiang constituted a major headache for Yang Tseng-hsin, especially under circumstances where Sinkiang itself became a front line of the civil war. When Annenkov moved into Sinkiang with the remnants of his troops, he first stationed himself outside Tihwa and then moved towards Kuchengtze, where the Chinese immediately barred the gates. Annenkov's field guns promptly shot down the gates[35]. But that was not all. In April, 1921, Bolshevik troops invaded the Tarbagatai area to eliminate Admiral Bakich and his "White Russian" encampment. Thus, as Clubb points out[36], the last battle of the Russian civil war in Central Asia may have been fought in Sinkiang.

Dutov, who had been placed under house internment by the Chinese when he entered the Ili area, was assassinated by a Bolshevik agent[37]. Annenkov was arrested in 1921 in Tihwa by Yang Tseng-hsin, who already had seen the handwriting on the wall and had switched over the year before from recognition of the "White Russians" to recognition of the Bolsheviks. Etherton[38] says Annenkov entered Tihwa because he was hungering for such fleshpots as could be found in the Sinkiang capital. According to a more dramatic version[39], Yang Tseng-hsin arrested him after enticing him into Tihwa, threw him into a jail cell with an opium addict so he would acquire the habit, and then dispatched him to Kansu so that Feng Yu-hsiang (the "Christian General")

could turn him over to the Bolsheviks. The biographical sketch on Annenkov in the Royal Central Asian Journal[40] says that Feng Yu-hsiang did turn the "White Russian" general over to the Bolsheviks, but also notes that he spent two years operating a farm in Kansu before Feng arrested him.

(2) The Basmachi Movement

Although the "White Russian" counter-revolution was defeated in Central Asia by 1920, it took at least another five years for the Bolsheviks to break the back of the internal revolt waged against them by the Basmachi. The word basmach means "brigand" in Russian. But the Basmachi were not merely brigands. The movement had an anti-Soviet political base, and derived such strength as it had from exploitable Moslem religious opposition to Bolshevism, the economic opposition of middle-class groups dispossessed by the revolution, and the additional combined disgruntlement of the displaced aristocratic leaders and the anti-aristocratic nationalists who had been short-circuited by the Soviets.

All these forces were exploited by such Basmachi leaders as Dualet-Monbei, Ibrahim Bek and the more famous Enver Pasha, who turned on the Bolsheviks and raised the banner of Pan-Islam after being brought into Central Asia by them to aid their cause.

Enver Pasha, the military dictator who commanded the Turkish Army on the side of the Central Powers in the first World War, appeared on the Central Asian scene as a unique Bolshevik bedfellow. After being condemned to death in Turkey in 1919, he fled to Russia and suddenly popped up at the Comintern Congress of the Nations of the East in Baku as an ardent advocate of the Bolshevik cause in Central Asia[41].

Enver Pasha was not the only Pan-Islamist who originally found favor with the Bolsheviks. Others included Mavlevi Mohammed-Barkatulla, who had worked earlier with the Germans against the British in Afghanistan[42], and Mahendra Pertab, who established himself as head of the anti-British "Provisional Government of India."[43] Barkatulla was sent from Moscow to Tashkent and Pertab to Kabul[44].

When the revolution broke out in Central Asia, its effects were transmitted into the British "sphere of influence" in Afghanistan and contributed to the outbreak of the third Afghan war of 1919. The anti-British Pan-Islamists looked to the Bolsheviks for help, and the Bolsheviks were quick to seize upon this apparent opportunity to win over the Moslems of Central Asia and to combat the British in newer areas marked out for revolutionary struggle at the Baku conference of 1920. (See below.) In time, however, Pan-Islamism became anathema to the Bolsheviks— for Pan-Islam got to constitute a threat to the new Bolshevik State insofar as the Moslem leaders had ideas about establishing their own state. It turned out that the December, 1917, Declaration of Peoples' Rights didn't mean exactly what it said about "the right to withdraw and to form an independent state."

According to Kimitz, Enver Pasha lost interest in the Bolsheviks when they signed a peace treaty on March 16, 1921, with his arch-rival in Turkey, Kemal Ataturk[45]. At any rate, Enver Pasha broke with the Bolsheviks and launched his anti-Soviet campaign to establish a Turanian empire in Central Asia[46]. But his career in Central Asia was short-lived, for he was killed in a battle with a Bolshevik detachment in 1922.

Ibrahim Bek (Beg) carried on, but by 1925 the Basmachi movement was

virtually liquidated. Up to 1951, however, the last of the Basmachis were still carrying on raids into the Soviet areas from the mountains of Afghanistan[47].

(3) Collectivization

In addition to the civil war and the Basmachi, the newly-established governments of Soviet Central Asia had to deal with numerous difficulties in socializing the areas formerly dominated by the emirs, mullahs and begs. The opposition came not merely from the vestigial remnants of the old privileged groups. The "middle" peasants and nomads also offered fierce opposition to the collectivization drive that started in 1928. Between 1928 and 1934, millions of sheep, goats, horses and cattle were slaughtered in Soviet Central Asia[48]. One writer on Soviet agriculture holds that the privately-owned livestock of Kazakhstan was "almost wiped out" during this period[49]. Nevertheless, by 1937 virtually all of the peasant and nomad households were collectivized[50].

The socialization of Soviet Central Asia encompassed three phases, divided roughly as follows:

1. A "go-slow" period lasting until 1925, in which landlords continued to hold on to their land and livestock and also participated in the village Soviets and even in the koschi (peasant unions).

2. The period of "Land and Water Reform" from 1925 to 1927, in which land, livestock and water were redistributed.

3. The period of collectivization, which began in 1928, increased in tempo in 1929 and continued steadily thereafter notwithstanding Stalin's famous "Dizziness from Success" letter published in Pravda on March 2, 1930.

in criticism of Bolsheviks who violated the "voluntary" principle in the establishment of collective farms[51].

In keeping with Stalin's advice for an "indirect and more cautious" approach in Central Asia, the Soviet authorities avoided a head-on clash with landlordism and Mohammedanism until 1925-- and even then they used the precepts of the Koran to justify the land redistribution process. The early 1920's, it should be recalled, was the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). Furthermore, even though the party congresses in Central Asia annually stressed the need for land and water reform[52], the local soviets lacked the administrative machinery to carry out such reforms. Although the influence of the begs and mullahs had been reduced, many of them still participated in the village organs of government up to 1925.

Then in 1925 the political and economic purge of the "kulaks" began in Central Asia, with the party organs whipping up a frenzy of excitement and the landless peasants being called upon to take an active part in the "Land and Water Reform" campaign. Itinerant theatrical companies presented such propaganda plays as "The Bey on Trial," squadrons of "agitation trucks" rushed from village to village with posters, orchestras and singers, and later the Uzbek Motion Picture Company dramatized the land reform campaign in film[53]. In the villages general assemblies of "middle, poor and tenant" peasants chose "Commissions of Peasant Cooperation" to work with the hierarchy of Bolshevik-appointed central, regional and local agencies in redistributing the land, livestock and water supply. Where the landlords quoted the Koran to prove that it was morally wrong to take another man's land, the Bolsheviks quoted the Koran to prove that the owner of the land

must himself till it[54].

According to Cholmayev, in Uzbekistan alone more than 200,000 hectares (494,000 acres) of land were confiscated from absentee landlords, from village landlord-tillers who rented out some of their land, and from mosques and other religious institutions[55]. In the Kazakh areas the big cattle farms were abolished and the livestock was redivided along with the meadows and other pastureland[56]. Meanwhile, the peasants and nomads were organized into cooperatives to deal with the buying agencies of the Economic Council of Central Asia not as individuals, but as organized groups[57].

In the slaughter of livestock that accompanied the collectivization drive in Central Asia from 1928 to 1934, Wilhelm estimates that the region's total livestock herds declined by 55 percent, with camels— an important means of transportation— being exterminated almost altogether. He estimates that 15,000,000 sheep, goats, horses and cattle disappeared between 1928 and 1934[58]. Jasny's figures are much higher. He estimates the loss of livestock in Kazakhstan alone as 35,600,000 between 1928 and 1933[59].

The livestock herds of Soviet Central Asia were scheduled to be increased to 36,700,000 under the second five-year plan, according to Hanse[60], who notes that this figure may actually have been reached by 1940 or 1941. Mandel[61] observes that wartime reports indicated that the livestock population of Central Asia again had reached the pre-collectivization level by 1943 as a result of artificial insemination and other scientific methods of livestock breeding.

In any event, the price of collectivization in Central Asia was high.

b. The Revolutionary Offensive

(1) The "Emancipation of the East"

From the earliest days of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, Stalin has attached an especially great importance to the border areas of Russia. In an article appearing in Pravda on October 10, 1920, he wrote:

> Three years of revolution and civil war in Russia have shown that unless Central Russia and her border regions mutually support each other the success of the revolution and the liberation of Russia from the clutches of imperialism will be impossible. Central Russia, the hearth of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn are inevitably doomed to imperialist bondage without the political, military, and organizational support of more developed Central Russia. If the proposition is true that the more developed proletariat of the West cannot finish the world bourgeoisie without the support of the peasant East, which is less developed but which abounds in raw material and fuel, the proposition is equally true that the more developed Central Russia cannot complete the revolution without the support of the border regions of Russia, which are less developed but which abound in essential resources 62.

Stalin was referring to Russia's border areas both in Europe and in Asia. Among the border areas mentioned by him at the time were Poland, Finland and Turkestan[63].

Nothing has happened since 1920 to indicate that Stalin has changed his views about Russia's border areas. In fact, Soviet border area policy and activity under his leadership appear to have implemented these views most faithfully. Out of Stalin's concept of the revolutionary center expanding in waves both to the east and to the west, has developed the Soviet policy of integrating peripheral areas into the Russian economic and political orbit, securing the extended fringe against outside threat and influence, and using the new periphery as springboards for farther expansion.

As the state power of the Soviet Union grew, however, its policy and approach solidified into an increasingly Procrustean mold. Although ideology remains a vitally important force both in terms of national morale and revolutionary expansion, national power has become the overriding consideration in the formulation of policy and in its application at home and abroad. For example, the Soviet Politburoau has replaced the Comintern as the administrative headquarters of world revolution; the original nationality principle giving member states of the Soviet Union the right to secede has— for all practical purposes-- become meaningless; and the initial Soviet economic policy of extending trade advantages to areas bordering the Soviet Union has been replaced by a crasser, strictly-business approach based on Soviet national interest. (See below.)

Even before the Bolsheviks had consolidated their hold on Russian Turkestan, they had begun taking steps to use the Asiatic borderlands as a base for extending the revolution beyond the national frontiers of Russia into other parts of Asia. A League for the Emancipation of the East was established in 1917[64], just about the time Lenin and Stalin were sounding the call to revolt in the Declaration of Peoples' Rights and in the Proclamation to the Toiling Moslems of the East.

In the summer of 1920 the sphere of revolutionary action was broadened when the Comintern convoked the Congress of the Nations of the East at Baku. Zinoviev, then president of the Comintern and later purged by Stalin, declared:

"Real revolution on a world scale will not begin until Asia's eight hundred millions of peoples will join our movement."[65]

As part of the "Emancipation of the East" movement, a propaganda and "agitation" school was established at Tashkent. Students from the Caucasus, Turkestan and other Central Asian areas were recruited to take courses in the principles of Marxism and the economic and social problems of Asia. After completing their study, the new "agitators" were dispatched to prospective centers of revolutionary activity in Central Asia and the Middle East[66].

Although Etherton states that Chinese vigilance caused the "seed" planted at Tashkent to "fall on stony ground" in Sinkiang[67], Kuomintang officials in Tihwa claimed in 1948 that a number of Ili revolutionaries had first encountered Marxism at the Tashkent school.

Economic policy was also fashioned to meet the needs of the "Emancipation of the East" movement. Thus, Sinkiang was among the six non-Soviet border areas that were originally exempt from the confining trade regulations established by the Foreign Trade Commissariat and the Foreign Trade Monopoly[68]. Sinkiang merchants were allowed to trade directly in the Soviet Union rather than through the official monopolies. Sinkiang also benefitted subsequently from the trade principles adopted in 1925 by the Second All-Union Conference of Foreign Trade Commissars, which decided to reduce prices on goods exported to the east, to foster eastern trade on other terms also advantageous to the eastern border areas and not to require a favorable balance of trade with these areas[69].

Eventually, however, the first flush of economic idealism -- designed even them, to be sure, to attain a practical goal advantageous to the Soviet Union -- was replaced by more hard-boiled methods of doing business. The

prices of Soviet goods in Sinkiang tended to remain cheaper than similar goods imported from other areas, but this was more because of cheaper transportation costs than because of a deliberate bounty. In 1930 the Baku and Nizhni-Novgorod Fairs, which had been frequented by Asiatic merchants exempt from the trade monopoly regulations, were closed and the State Eastern Trading Company (Govostorg) was established to deal with the east. The Soviet trade monopoly representatives also proved to be sharp bazaar traders. Thus, in Sinkiang Uighurs and Kazakhs selling cotton and livestock to the Soviet Union received part payment in cash and part in the form of credit to buy Soviet finished goods[70].

An official Soviet statement published in 1932 and quoted by Miss Conolly reflects the developing change in Soviet psychology vis-a-vis trade with the non-Soviet eastern border areas:

> The Soviet Union is endeavouring to industrialise the exploited countries of Asia so as to sever their dependence on world imperialism. ... On the other hand the limitrophe Asiatic countries must promise to export raw materials rather than consumers' goods to Russia, to transact no business with Russian private dealers and not to export goods above the level of world price as often happens in the case of Turkey[71].

Earlier, the 1928 Encyclopedia of Soviet Exports had observed:

> "... We must guarantee a steady market for the raw materials of these Eastern countries and thus ensure their buying our industrial products...."[72]

Politically, the seamier side of Russia's "big brotherliness" towards the non-Soviet Asiatic borderlands manifested itself in 1924 when Urianghai (Tanna Tuva)— recognised by the Bolsheviks as independent of China in 1921— decided to affiliate itself with the Soviet-oriented government of Outer Mongolia. Soviet troops were sent in to suppress the Tanna Tuva revolt, and

that borderland area remained separate from Outer Mongolia. Then, in 1925, the Bolsheviks arranged a treaty of friendship between the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva and the Mongolian People's Republic in the image of the 1921 Soviet-Mongolian agreement[73].

Now that the Chinese Communists have taken over Manchuria and Sinkiang, the Soviet Union appears to be dealing with its allies on a strictly business basis, too. Under the 1949 Russo-Chinese Communist barter agreement for Manchuria, Manchurian food was to be traded for Russian machines, finished goods and medicine[74]. Under the Vyshinsky-Chou En-lai Moscow agreements of February 14, 1950[75], China received a low-interest (one percent) $300,000,000 credit from the Soviet Union, but has to pay back the credit in goods, gold and American dollar exchange. The following month, on March 28, Russia entered into the new profit-sharing agreement with Communist China for exploiting Sinkiang's non-ferrous mineral and oil resources[76].

(2) The Three "People's Principles" in Soviet Central Asia

Under Sun Yat-sen the Kuomintang devised the three "people's principles" of "nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood" as guiding stars for all China. Within this context the Kuomintang also espoused the vaguely-defined national concept of "one family" composed of five peoples: Han, Manchu, Mongol, Moslem and Tibetan. The later Kuomintang failed Sun Yat-sen on the principles of democracy and people's livelihood. Most of the non-Hans rejected the "one-family" theory elaborated by the Hans.

A different kind of "three people's principles" was developed by the Soviet Union in Central Asia. As part of Stalin's approach to the question

of "freedom of national development," the U.S.S.R. stressed the principles of national political expression, economic equalization and cultural autonomy[77]. Politically, a Council of Nationalities was established at the summit of the governmental structure alongside the Council of the Union and the five Central Asian republics were created by 1936 as full-fledged units of the federation on a theoretical par with the R.S.F.S.R. Economically, an impressive program of industrial development began with the first five-year plan. Culturally, the Bolsheviks stressed the use of local language, the promotion of native theaters and newspapers and the extension of compulsory universal education. Thus, the Kazakhs, for example, were provided with grammars and other books written in their own language, but in the Latin alphabet with a few letters added[78].

Attacking Kautsky and others for advocating a single language under Communism, Stalin declared in 1925:

"I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather than for such a theory."[79]

Between 1917 and 1925 Stalin expressed himself often on the "nationality questions." In 1920 he called for putting an end to the "estrangement and isolation of the border regions, to their patriarchal manner of life and lack of culture, and to the mistrustful attitude towards the center."[80] On May 28, 1925, in a speech to the University of the Peoples of the East, he summarized his ideas for a future border area policy as follows:[81]

1. To create industrial centers "as bases on which the peasants can be rallied around the working class."

2. To advance agriculture, especially irrigation.

3. To improve "cooperative organization."

4. To bring the Soviets and the people closer together and to "implant a national Soviet state organization that will be close and comprehensible to the toiling masses."

5. To develop national culture.

There is another side, however, to the Soviet approach to the "national question." Chokayev points out, for example, that the division of Turkestan into separate republics nullified the Pan-Islam effort to unite the peoples of Turkestan[82]. But quite apart from this observation, the development of centralized power in the Soviet Union has had a profound effect on the original idea of "freedom of national development." The peoples of Soviet Central Asia were collectivized from the top notwithstanding the "Commissions of Peasant Cooperation." "Native culture" has been "proletarianized" and regimented by the State. The five-year plans have made "the center" the supreme arbiter of what should be produced, how it should be produced, and who should produce it and under what conditions. Moreover, the border areas have been stripped of the right to determine their own political destiny.

Even before the December, 1917 Declaration of Peoples' Rights, which expressed the right to secession as a flat guarantee, Stalin took the position that this was not an undiluted right. In a speech on May 12, 1917, he said:

> A people has the right to secede, but that does not mean that I compel it to secede. A people has the right to secede, but it may or may not exercise that right, according to circumstances. Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession, according to the interests of the proletariat, of the world revolution.[83]

In 1923 he made his qualification even clearer, stating more bluntly that the Communist revolution took precedence over the right of self-determination. Addressing the 12th Party Congress, he said:

> There are cases when the right of self-determination enters into conflict with another, a higher principle, namely, the right of the working class [i.e. Communist party] to strengthen its regime once it has achieved power. In such a case— and this must be frankly stated— the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as a barrier to the realization of the right of the working class to its dictatorship. The first right must yield to the second. Such was, for instance, the case in 1920, when we were forced to march on Warsaw in order to defend the power of the working class.[84]

By 1936, when the new constitution was brought into being and Kazakhstan and Kirghizia were admitted to the U.S.S.R. as union republics, Stalin was still discussing the theoretical right of Soviet territorial components to secede from the union. He pointed out that only a republic not surrounded on all sides by the Soviet Union could even raise the question of secession. As for the border regions, he added:

"Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR."[85]

(3) The Development of Soviet Central Asia

Although some industrialisation had taken place under the Tsars in Russian Turkestan through the construction of railways and the establishment of a number of semi-processing plants, the industrial development of this area really began with the first Soviet five-year plan (1928-1932)[86]. The construction of the Turk-Sib Railway, for which the preliminary surveys were made before the Bolshevik Revolution, started in 1926-1927. But this railway— which connects Tashkent with Novisobirsk on the Trans-Siberian line via Alma Ata, Sergiopol and Semipalatinsk— was not completed until 1930[87].

The philosophy behind the introduction of industrialization in both Soviet Central Asia and Siberia is outlined in the 1933 Gosplan report to the Soviet Council of Commissars. It was noted in this report that Tsarist Russia had concentrated its industry in European Russia, thus creating an "uneven territorial distribution of productive forces," and that it had failed to make an adequate study of the country's overall "tremendous natural wealth."[88] The report stated:

> The socialist industrialization of the country, the problems of utilizing its natural wealth in every way and of bringing industry into proximity with the sources of raw materials, of outliving the antagonism between town and countryside and of doing away with the economic backwardness of the national minority regions made it imperative to effect a radical change in the geographic distribution of the productive forces as they had taken shape in pre-revolutionary Russia.[89]

Under the first five-year plan, an agricultural machinery plant and a textile combine were established at Tashkent in Uzbekistan along with necessary machine repair shops; a silk mill, leather factory and an other-oil factory were set up in Tadjikstan, where emphasis was also placed on road-building and irrigation; some sugar-beet, meat-packing and textile factories were established in Kirghizia; a sulphur plant and some textile, silk and cotton mills were established in Turkmenia; and three non-ferrous metallurgical plants were established and construction started on a chemical fertilizer plant, a wool-washing plant and a meat-packing combine in Kazakhstan[90].

The industrialization pace was accelerated during the second five-year plan (1933-1938)[91] and continued on into the third, which was interrupted by the German invasion of Russia in June, 1941. During this period, aside from the construction of the Turk-Sib Railway, branch railways were also built

completing the link between the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Kazakhstan coal and copper center of Karaganda and also connecting Karaganda with the Magnitogorsk steel combine in the Urals via Akmolinsk[92].

The advent of industrialization, naturally enough, brought about an internal redistribution of population in Central Asia, so that 24.7 percent of the population was urban in 1939 compared with 13.2 percent in 1926[93]. By 1937, the value of industrial output in Kazakhstan was 60 percent of the total value of production, with the percentage of industrial output in Uzbekistan being even slightly higher[94].

As another inevitable result of the industrialization process, there was a rapid growth in the size of cities. Thus, between the census years of 1926 and 1939, the population of Alma Ata increased five times to 230,528 inhabitants, while Karaganda developed from being an unpopulated part of the Kazakhstan steppe into a city of 166,000[95].

Power output, the basis of all modern industry, increased in Russian Central Asia 8½ times between 1928 and 1937, rising from 45,700,000 KWH to 390,300,000 KWH[96]. During this same period the "gross value of output" of industry, as measured in 1926-1927 prices, was multiplied 9½ times compared with 6½ times for the Soviet Union as a whole[97].

Over a longer period, from 1913 into the late 1930's, the increase in industrial output may be judged roughly in terms of the following comparative figures:

	Towster's Figures[98] (Based on Russian Source)		Balzak-Vasyutin-Feigin Figures[99] (Based on Different Russian Sources)	
	1913-1936		1913-1937	
Republic	Multiple of Growth		Multiple of Growth	1937 Output (roubles)
Tadjikstan	116.0	times	157.0 times	157,000,000
Kirghizia	95.0	"	116.0 "	159,000,000
Kazakhstan	11.8	"	14.0 "	841,000,000
Turkmenia	7.1	"	7.6 "	264,000,000
Uzbekistan	4.4	"	5.4 "	1,512,000,000

The industrial growth figures are impressive, but it should be pointed out that this development took place mainly along the lines of light rather than heavy industry-- that is, chemical works, cotton mills and cotton-processing plants, food-processing plants, and so forth, instead of the kind of steel combines that arose in the Urals and in the Kuznets Basin. Copper smelting has been developed on a major scale[100] and coal production has been pushed in the Karaganda area of Kazakhstan. Both are for export to other areas of the Soviet Union. Karaganda coal goes primarily to Magnitogorsk over a route that is shorter than the distance between the coal of the Kuzbas and the Magnitogorsk steel combine in the Urals[101].

For the most part, the resources of Soviet Central Asia do not seem to be such as would qualify the area for becoming a major heavy industrial base on a par with the Donbas, the Urals and the Kuzbas. However, its industrial importance as a cotton-producing area, as a source of non-ferrous minerals and as a source of coal are not to be minimized. The iron ore reserves of Soviet Central Asia have been estimated to be not more than 2 percent of the total iron ore reserves of the Soviet Union[102]. On the other hand, as a coal-producing area, Karaganda in Kazakhstan is said to rank third after the Don and the Kuznets Basins[103].

The oil production of Soviet Central Asia has increased since the Bolshevik Revolution, but up to the time of the third five-year plan, at least, the region still had to import oil from the Caucasus to meet its needs[104].

From the standpoint of industrial resources, Soviet Central Asia is far better endowed with non-ferrous minerals than with iron. The region-- especially Kazakhstan-- is rich in manganese, copper, lead, zinc and tin, and also has deposits of molybdenum, gold platinum, silver, bauxite, sulphur and phosphates. Kazakhstan, one of the three Soviet republics bordering Sinkiang, has the largest copper, lead and zinc resources in the Soviet Union. Its copper is said to constitute 52.34 percent, its lead 62.16 percent and its zinc 41.90 percent of the total Soviet reserves[105]. Kazakhstan also is supposed to contain one-third of the world's reserves of manganese[106].

Agriculturally, Russian Central Asia has remained primarily a cotton-growing and livestock-raising region under the Bolsheviks. In fact, the area sown to cotton has been increased substantially as compared with a small increase in the area sown to wheat. The difference in emphasis is shown in the following figures on the areas sown, respectively, to cotton and wheat:

Cotton and Wheat Areas of Soviet Central Asia[107]
(In Hectares)

	1928	1934	1937 (Plan)
Cotton	837,400	1,353,700	1,446,000
Wheat	4,553,000	4,704,000	4,727,000

Although the Central Asian cotton area has become a smaller proportion of the total cotton-producing area of the Soviet Union, the region is still

the backbone of the cotton-growing sector of the Soviet economy. Its cotton area was 86.2 percent of the Soviet total in 1928. The planned proportion in 1937 was 71.3 percent of the total area[108].

The output of cotton in Central Asia almost tripled between 1928 and 1937, rising from about 1,000,000 to 2,900,000 bales. Meanwhile, the grain harvest remained about the same, amounting to 1,900,000 metric tons in 1937 compared with 2,000,000 metric tons in 1928[109].

The importance of cotton production, in comparison with other agricultural pursuits, is underscored by Wilhelm's figures for the relative value of different kinds of agricultural output in Soviet Central Asia as measured by 1926-1927 roubles. Between 1928 and 1937, according to these figures, the rouble value of cotton output increased by 2.76 times while the value of other agricultural output declined over this period. His figures for changes in the value of agricultural output reveal the following picture:[110]

Value of Agricultural Output
(In 1926-1927 roubles)

	1928	1937
Output of Cotton	280,300,000	774,300,000
Output of Grain	122,000,000	115,900,000
Output of Other Field Crops	24,100,000	25,400,000
Output of Livestock Products	206,000,000	137,300,000

The area of the five Soviet republics of Central Asia (1,508,445 square miles) is about two-and-a-quarter times the size of Sinkiang and its total population according to the 1939 Soviet census (16,626,760) is about four times as great as that of Sinkiang. Inasmuch as Russian Central Asia had a population of about 10,500,000 in 1913[111], the population there had

increased roughly 60 percent by 1939. At the time of the first Soviet census in 1926, Russians and Ukrainians made up about 18 percent of the population[112], showing that Tsarist colonization was comparatively more successful in Russian Central Asia than Chinese colonization was in Sinkiang.

In 1924-1925 the Bolsheviks forbade further Russian colonization in Central Asia[113], but eventually this ban was lifted and in time many Russians were forced to settle in Central Asia whether they liked it or not. On October 20, 1940, for example, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet enacted a decree investing the Council of Commissars with the right to enforce the transfer of "engineers, designers, technicians, foremen, draftsmen, bookkeepers, economists, accountants, planners and skilled workers to any part of the Soviet Union whatsoever[114].

A breakdown of area and population figures for Soviet Central Asia, by republics, shows the following composition of territory and people:[115]

Republic	Area (Sq.Miles)	Population (1939 Census)	Nationality Composition (1926 Census)
Kazakhstan	1,059,700	6,145,937	Kazakh, 57.1%; Russian, 19.7%; Ukrainian, 13.2%
Turkmenia	171,250	1,253,985	Turkoman, 72%; Uzbek, 10.5%; Russian, 7.5%
Uzbekistan	146,000	6,282,446	Uzbek, 76%; Russian, 5.6%
Kirghizia	75,950	1,459,301	Kirghiz, 66.6%; Russian, 11.7%; Uzbek, 11%
Tadjikstan	55,545	1,485,091	Tadjik, 78.4%; Uzbek, 17.9%

There is sharp dispute on the extent and nature of Communist development of Soviet Central Asia. Legitimately enough, Hensz has taken issue with the "rosy picture" of development portrayed in much of the literature on the region, pointing out that the phenomenal figures on industrial growth often ignore the starting point of zero and that all the "colonial" aspects

of Russian rule there have not been eliminated[116]. Wilhelm also notes that the region was "piteously Sovietized" and that "such elements of culture as religion, family organization, economic arrangements" were forcibly changed to conform with the demands and disciplines of the Soviet State[117].

Wilhelm and Henze are at odds, however, on the relative improvement of the Central Asian living standard by comparison with the living standard of European Russia. Henze maintains that the Central Asian living standard is undoubtedly lower than that of European Russia, while Wilhelm holds that the Central Asian standard reached a par with the European Russian standard in 1935-1937 and probably even surpassed it[118].

We are concerned here, however, more with the development of Soviet Central Asia in relation to Sinkiang than in its relation to European Russia. Despite the original opposition to Soviet totalitarianism manifested in the Basmachi movement and in the fierce resistance to collectivization, the Bolsheviks managed to overcome the opposition and carry out a development program that far surpassed anything the Chinese were able to accomplish in Sinkiang. Whether or not Soviet Central Asia attained a standard of living commensurate with that of European Russia, the Soviet Central Asian standard left that of Chinese-held Sinkiang way behind.

One may hesitate to accept at face value Soviet figures on the speed with which illiteracy was wiped out and the number of schools, hospitals and pre-school nurseries established overnight[119]. But these figures cannot be ignored altogether. There is no question that universal compulsory education— even though regimented— has been pushed. Nor is there any question that there has been a large increase in the number of schools, hospitals,

pre-school nurseries, newspapers and theaters.

The literacy rate in Soviet Central Asia (for persons of nine years of age or over) is said to have increased from 10 percent in 1926 to nearly 70 percent in 1939, the number of schoolchildren (Grades 5 through 10) from 23,100 in 1928 to 216,300 in 1937, and the number of doctors from 200 in 1913 to 3,556 in 1937[120]. The number of native newspapers published in the languages of the various local peoples also increased markedly in a process of development that saw the overall number of non-Russian newspapers in the Soviet Union rise from 84 in 1913 to 2,965 in 1936[121]. Moreover, the number of native theaters increased between 1913 and 1936 from one to 37 in Uzbekistan, from two to 26 in Kazakhstan, from zero to six in Tadjikstan and from zero to five in Kirghizia[122].

A Moslem observer hostile to the Communists in Soviet Central Asia noted, nonetheless, that great strides had been made in combatting illiteracy as early as 1930. But he also noted that it was a special kind of education:

> In the Universities of Tashkent, Bokhara and Samarkand thousands of young people are taking special courses in constructive Communism. The education is in the vernacular of each region, but Russian is also taught. In the villages, where illiteracy is predominant, new methods of instruction and propaganda have been devised by radio and cinema, which reaches even into the remote mountains of the Pamirs.[123]

c. The Effect of the Bolshevik Revolution in Sinkiang

This development of Soviet Central Asia, combined with the ethnic and linguistic ties existing between the peoples of Sinkiang and those living in the neighboring republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tadjikstan, has obviously exerted a strong pull on China's frontier province. By a process of economic growth, political centralization and a well-defined doctrine of revolutionary expansion, the Soviet Union became an even stronger power on Sinkiang's border than Tsarist Russia had been. The Bolshevik Revolution made revolutionaries not only in Soviet Central Asia, but also in Sinkiang.

Quite apart from the revolutionary aims of the Communists in Asia, the Soviet Union has manifested a marked economic interest in Sinkiang. At least two writers[124] have observed that one of the reasons for building the Turk-Sib Railway, if not the principal reason, was the Bolshevik desire to increase trade with Sinkiang. Another has noted that the establishment of the agricultural machinery combine in Tashkent made it possible to market Russian machinery in Kashgar[125]. Still another has elaborated even more fully on how the Bolsheviks went after trade with Sinkiang in Jungaria as well as in Kashgaria[126].

A still more basic Russian economic interest in Sinkiang is suggested by the above analysis of the resource pattern in Soviet Central Asia, which has been tapped to supply coal and manganese for the steel center of Magnitogorsk and which still had to import oil from the Caucasus up to the third five-year plan.

The discovery of large non-ferrous mineral resources in Kazakhstan would almost inevitably have excited interest in the unprospected resources

of the neighboring area of Sinkiang. Although there had been only a sketchy geological survey of Sinkiang up to 1948, it already had been proved by then that Sinkiang contained oil (useful in most parts of Soviet Central Asia) and tungsten (useful at Magnitogorsk).

The Bolshevik experience with the Pan-Islam Movement, the development of Soviet Central Asia as a base for light industries and the building up of the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin as heavy industrial centers appear to have made the Soviet Union even more sensitive to Pan-Turkestan schemes originating in Sinkiang and to the activities of other foreign powers in the Sino-Soviet border areas. The increasing menace of air power, if anything, has intensified Soviet wariness.

Such considerations help to explain why the Soviet Union went to the aid of Sheng Shih-ts'ai against the Chinese Moslem General Ma Chung-ying. They also explain why the Soviet Union combatted the slightest uproopping of first Japanese then American interest in Sinkiang. In 1948, for example, United States Minister Counsellor Lewis Clark was unable to complete a scheduled flying visit to Tihwa on the United States Air Attache's plane because of Soviet objections. The air attache's plane was a demilitarized B-17 "Flying Fortress" that had been converted to civil transport use. Mr. Clark got as far as Lanchow on his projected flight to Sinkiang, which had been cleared originally by the Chinese authorities at Nanking. Nanking suddenly cancelled the clearance, however, and the plane was unable to proceed from Lanchow to Tihwa. It turned out later that the Soviet Embassy had protested the flight of an American "military" aircraft into territory bordering the Soviet Union.

NOTES

1. The People's Democratic Dictatorship (Pamphlet), Hsin Hua News Agency, Peiping, 1949, p. 17.

2. Cf. Mandel, William, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1944, p. 103; Hsiao, op. cit., p.281.

3. Clubb, op. cit., p. 200.

4. Cf. Dallin, David, The Rise of Russia in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, p. 158.

5. Kunitz, Joshua, Dawn Over Samarkand, Coviet Friede Publishers, New York, 1935, p. 85.

6. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 158-159; Etherton, op. cit., pp.154-155.

7. Pasvolsky, Leo, Russia in the Far East, The Macmillan Company, 1922 p. 57.

8. Etherton, op. cit., p. 155.

9. Cf. Kunitz, op. cit., pp. 98-100; Chokayev, Mustafa, Turkestan and the Soviet Regime, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XVIII, 1931, especially pp. 405-409.

10. Etherton, op. cit., p. 154-155.

11. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 406.

12. Kunitz, op. cit., p. 85.

13. Chokayev, p. 407.

14. Ibid., p. 409.

15. Dawn Over Samarkand, p. 102.

16. The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, p. 107.

17. Stalin, Joseph, Marxism and the National Question, International Publishers, New York, 1942, pp. 83-86. The book is a collection of some of Stalin's speeches and writings on the "national question." His attack on "precipitance" summarized here was contained in an article that originally appeared in Pravda, October 10, 1920.

18. Vyshinsky, Andrei Y., The Law of the Soviet State, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948, p. 249. Vishinsky uses the date according to the

Russian calendar, November 26, 1917.

19. Ibid., pp. 249-250.

20. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 154; Kunitz, op. cit., p. 79.

21. Quoted by Kunitz, op. cit., p. 79.

22. Cf. Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 268; Chokayev, op. cit., p. 412.

23. Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 258.

24. Cf. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 414; Kunitz, op. cit., p. 82.

25. Cf. Mandel, op. cit., p. 109; Kunitz, p. 95.

26. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 414.

27. Towster, Julian, Political Power in the USSR, Oxford University Press, New York, 1948, pp. 103, 108.

28. Cf. Towster, op. cit., pp. 106-108; Kunitz, op. cit., pp. 162-164; Mandel, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

29. Etherton, op. cit., p. 188.

30. Clubb, op. cit., p. 206.

31. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XVII, 1930, pp. 334,336.

32. Trotsky, Leon, History of the Russian Revolution, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1932, Vol. I, p. 467.

33. Clubb, op. cit., pp. 208-209.

34. Ibid., p. 220.

35. Etherton, op. cit., p. 194.

36. Clubb, op. cit., p. 220.

37. Etherton, op. cit., pp. 196-198.

38. Ibid., p. 195.

39. Wu, Aitchen K., Turkistan Tumult, Methuen & Co., London, 1940, p. 41.

40. Vol. XVII, 1930, pp. 334-336.

41. Cf. Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 95-96; Kunitz, op. cit., 138-148.

42. Cf. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 412; Etherton, op. cit., pp. 232-239.

43. Etherton, op. cit., p. 237.

44. Ibid., p. 238.

45. Kunitz, op. cit., p. 40.

46. Cf. Etherton, op. cit., p. 237; Kunitz, op. cit., p. 142.

47. Lamont, Corliss, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1946, p. 95.

48. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 220.

49. Jasny, Naum, The Socialized Agriculture of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1949, p. 324.

50. In Uzbekistan, for example, 95 percent of the households and 99.4 percent of the sown area had been collectivized by 1947. Mandel, op. cit., p. 149.

51. For the development of the socialization process in Soviet Central Asia, cf. Mandel, op. cit., pp. 114-118; Kunitz, op. cit., pp. 179-214; Chokayev, op. cit., pp. 415-417; also Qadir Khan, Abdul, (Lecture to the Central Asian Society, March 26, 1930), Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XVII, 1930, pp. 286-290.

52. Kunitz, op. cit., p. 179.

53. Kunitz, op. cit., p. 185.

54. Ibid., p. 185, pp. 188-190.

55. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 416.

56. Ibid.

57. Qadir Khan, op. cit., p. 289.

58. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 220.

59. Jasny, op. cit., p. 324.

60. Hemzo (Part I), op. cit., p. 291.

61. Mandel, op. cit., p. 117.

62. Marxism and the National Question, p. 76.

63. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

64. Cf. Conolly, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

65. Quoted by Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. 71.

66. Etherton, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

67. Ibid., p. 226.

68. The other areas were Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Outer Mongolia and Tanna Tuva. (See Conolly, p. 5.)

69. Conolly, op. cit., pp. 140-142.

70. Ibid., p. 121.

71. Soviet Economic Policy in the East, p. 15.

72. Ibid., p. 9.

73. Friters, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

74. Chieh Fang Jih Pao, Shanghai, August 28, 1949.

75. New York Times, February 15, 1950.

76. New York Times, March 23, March 31, 1950.

77. Towster, op. cit., p. 65.

78. Goldman, Bosworth, Red Road through Asia, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1934, p. 156.

79. Marxism and the National Question, p. 196.

80. Ibid., p. 80.

81. Ibid., pp. 193-194.

82. Turkestan and the Soviet Regime, p. 415.

83. Ibid., p. 71.

84. Quoted by Dallin, op. cit., p. 155. The brackets are Dallin's.

85. Marxism and the National Question, p. 220.

86. The five-year plan was actually "completed" in four-and-a-quarters years. (See Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan, State Planning Commission (Gosplan), Moscow, 1933.)

87. Cf. Honze (Part I), op. cit., p. 295; Goldman, op. cit., p. 148.

88. Gosplan Report (1933), p. 239.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., pp. 254-259.

91. Cf. Honze (Part II), op. cit., Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (Vol. XXXVII), January, 1950, p. 36.

92. Honze (Part I), op. cit., Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (Vol. XXXVI), July, 1949, p. 295.

93. Honze (Part I), op. cit., p. 284.

94. Honze (Part II), op. cit., p. 38.

95. Mandel, op. cit., p. 93.

96. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 221.

97. Ibid.

98. Political Power in the USSR, pp. 79-80.

99. Economic Geography of the USSR, Edited by S.S. Balzak, V.F. Vasyutin and Ya. G. Feigin, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949, p. 206.

100. Cf. Balzak-Vasyutin-Feigin, op. cit., p. 262.

101. Cf. Cressey, George, The Basis of Soviet Strength, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1945, p. 113.

102. Balzak-Vasyutin-Feigin, op. cit., p. 242.

103. Ibid., pp. 211-212.

104. Ibid., p. 213.

105. Ibid., pp. 259 and 262.

106. Honze (Part I), op. cit., p. 290.

107. Ibid., pp. 290-291.

108. Ibid., p. 230.

109. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 220.

110. Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area, p. 222.

111. Henze (Part I), op. cit., p. 282.

112. Ibid.

113. Chokayev, op. cit., p. 417.

114. Bergson, Abram, The Structure of Soviet Wages, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1946. Text of decree, pp. 238-239.

115. Cf. Towster, op. cit., p. 338; Henze (Part I), op. cit., p. 283.

116. Economic Development of Soviet Central Asia (Part II), pp. 39-40 Among the "rosy" books listed by Henze, the writer has examined Kunitz's Dawn Over Samarkand, Mandel's The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, Lamont's The Peoples of the Soviet Union and Davies' and Steiger's Soviet Asia. (Davies, Raymond Arthur; Steiger, Andrew J., Soviet Asia, The Dial Press, New York, 1942.) I am in substantial agreement with Henze on his point about the overly "rosy" picture painted by these writers.

117. Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area, p. 220.

118. Cf. Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area, pp. 223-224; and Economic Development of Soviet Central Asia (Part II), pp. 39-40.

119. See Gosplan Report (1933), pp. 262-266.

120. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 224.

121. Towster, op. cit., p. 83.

122. Ibid.

123. Speech of Abdul Qadir Khan, op. cit., p. 288.

124. Cf. Goldman, op. cit., p. 140; Henze (Part I), op. cit., p. 294.

125. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 221.

126. Conolly, op. cit., pp. 115-125.

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VI. THE RULE OF THE WARLORDS IN SINKIANG, 1912-1944

Although the successor republican regimes inherited Manchu sovereignty in Sinkiang after the 1911-1912 Chinese Revolution, the real rulers of that province in the period from 1912 to 1944 were three warlords who charted their own courses with little regard for the authority of the Chinese central government.

The autonomous warlords were Yang Tseng-hsin (1912-1928), Chin Shu-jen (1928-1933) and Sheng Shih ts'ai (1933-1944). They communicated periodically with the central government, were officially confirmed in their posts by the latter and paid lip service to the Kuomintang after 1927. But during their respective periods of rule, and especially during the decade of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, they operated in closer relationship with Russia than with China.

The 1911-1912 revolution was accompanied in Sinkiang by an outbreak of local uprisings at Ining, Tihwa, T'ach'eng, Yenki, Kucha, Chenhsi and Hami[1]. A group of revolutionists proclaimed the independence of Ili under a "republican" banner[2], but for the most part the uprisings were related to the republican revolution only insofar as the upheaval in China Proper provided a propitious time for another local challenge to Manchu-Chinese rule in Sinkiang.

On March 8, 1912, one month after the abdication of the Manchu emperor in Peking, Governor Yuan Hung-yu of Sinkiang issued a proclamation announcing his allegiance to the new republican government of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Less than five months later, on July 23, the governor fled Sinkiang in the wake of the uprisings against the provincial authorities[3]. It remained for his

military commander, Yang Tseng-hsin, to crush the uprisings and take over leadership in the province.

In summarizing the consequences of the republican revolution in Sinkiang, Skrine observed[4]:

"The only effect on Sinkiang of the Revolution of 1911 and the consequent weakening of the Central Government has been to permit a governor of outstanding ability to establish himself as the virtually independent ruler of Chinese Central Asia."

a. The Rule of Yang Tseng-hsin (1912-1928)

Yang Tseng-hsin was born in Yunnan about 1860, passed the Imperial civil service examination, was appointed a magistrate in Kansu Province and later rose to the rank of tao-t'ai (head of a circuit). As in the case of other Manchu political figures, Yang became a military man as well as an administrator. Thus, he occupied the post of head of the Kansu Military School when he was sent to Sinkiang in 1907 to quell a local uprising at Hami[5].

After his successful mission to Hami, Yang was named tao-t'ai of Aksu. His political rise in Sinkiang was rapid. Just before he became governor in 1912, he was Commissioner of the High Court and also doubling in brass as the commander of Yuan Hung-yu's troops.

Skrine's tribute to Yang Tseng-hsin's ability has been echoed by Hedin, who characterized him as a "man of unusual stature" governing with "shrewdness, vigilance and tact,"[6] and by Wu, who referred to him as the "grand old Governor Yang."[7] Lattimore has pronounced Yang the "most able" of the old "feudal bureaucrats" in Sinkiang[8] and Clubb refers to Yang's special talents

for carrying out a policy of "craft supported by the sword."[9]

The greatest tribute to Yang's ability lies in the fact that he was able to stay in power for 16 years and hold on to Sinkiang notwithstanding the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution. During his tenure as governor, he ruled by a combination of opportunist diplomacy, relatively efficient administration, alternate persuasion and force, and a series of shrewdly-timed political purges and executions. (See below.) In adjusting himself to the new Bolshevik power on his western border, however, he started the Sinkiang tradition of warlordism and cooperation with the Soviet Union as opposed to China.

He was assassinated in 1928-- not by a Uighur, a Kazakh or a Tungan, but by a group of Chinese rebels with apparent Kuomintang leanings.

Yang Tseng-hsin reorganized the currency system of Sinkiang, made the _ambans_ (district officers) personally responsible for disturbances in their areas, ordered the abolition of the old _corvée_ system and reduced the interest rates on loans from the public granaries. On the other hand, he carried out what one Chinese writer[10] has called a policy of "intellectual suffocation," closing the Moslem schools and banning the Moslem press under an overall policy of censorship and thought control.

Lattimore quotes the following observations by Yang Tseng-hsin on an "appropriate policy" for the Chinese in Sinkiang to follow:

> Only by a Republican federation can racial antagonisms be gradually dissolved. Most important of all is to realise political and administrative reform. The land of the Moslems should not be regarded as 'fish or meat'-- an object of exploitation. It must be demonstrated that the indirect rule of the Chinese is superior to the autonomy of the Moslems.[11]

Except for the hsiang becoming directly responsible to the provincial government instead of to the tsao, however, few fundamental administrative changes were made under Yang Tseng-hsin. Notwithstanding Yang's observation about the need for "political and administrative reform," the extent of self-government permitted the Uighurs, Kazakhs and Tungans under his governorship did not go beyond the point already reached in 1908.

On September 1, 1908, on the basis of an Imperial ordinance drafted in Peking, the provincial government convoked a Provincial Council to give advice to the governor. This council was headed by a president and three section chiefs (Interior, Education and Judicial) chosen by the provincial government from among "functionaries and the middle class." In turn, the three section chiefs were authorised to recruit 27 members for the Council. As an organ for "gathering public opinion," the Council advised the Sinkiang governor on ways and means to improve provincial conditions and facilitate the the collection of taxes. It also offered advice on the preparation of the provincial budget[12].

As in the case of his Manchu and Chinese predecessors, Yang protected his power by playing off one group against another as the occasion demanded. Thus, when rebellion broke out in Outer Mongolia after the 1911 revolution in China, Yang favored the Kazakhs over the Mongols in Sinkiang and permitted the Kazakhs to acquire arms from the provincial army. In 1915 he launched an attack on the uncontrolled power of the local begs by decreeing that they had to go through a process of being elected locally, recommended by the district amban (Chinese) and finally approved by himself[13]. At the same time, also in accordance with traditional Chinese policy, he integrated

the native system presided over by loyal begs into a political structure controlled from the top by the Chinese.

Etherton[14] has described in detail the operation of the Moslem local administrative system during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin. As a forerunner of the Kuomintang's pao-chia system, there was a bashi system under which the Chinese ambans presided over districts divided into family groupings. The ming bashi was the head of 1,000 households; the yuz bashi, 100 households; and the can (cn) bashi, 10 households. In commenting on this system, Etherton noted:

> The officials do not learn the language, are unacquainted with the manners and customs of the Turkis, and consequently lack that sense of local touch and sympathy so essential to the successful government of oriental races. The Beg, therefore, acquires an exceptionally strong position, and the success of an applicant for justice, or for favour of any kind, is dependent upon the amount of silver dust cast in the eyes of that official.[15]

The corruption in Sinkiang under Yang Tseng-hsin was not restricted to the begs. For example, there was the rule in Kashgar of the septuagenarian warlord called Ma Ti-t'ai, a Tungan who had been appointed commander-in-chief of Kashgaria by Yang Tseng-hsin in 1917.

Skrine and Etherton, both of whom came to know Ma personally, have recorded the story of this fabulous scoundrel. Skrine has described old Ma as a sensual, cruel and crooked character who maintained an enormous harem, wore a gold-encrusted tunic, made everybody call him Padshah ("king") and "robbed, blackmailed, mutilated, slave-drove and otherwise tyrannised over the inhabitants." According to Skrine, Ma cut off the fingers and toes of those who offended him, taxed the Kashgarians into poverty and forced the Kashgar merchants to buy at monopolistic prices the products of his

shale-oil and paraffin-wax monopolies[16]. Similarly, Etherton has described how Ma once slit the ankles of a group of prisoners to break them of the thieving habit and how on another occasion he had the tongue of a maid-servant cut off because she had incurred the displeasure of one of his wives[17].

Yang finally dismissed Ma Ti-t'ai, and when the latter refused to relinquish his office, Yang sent a military expedition against him. The Tungan was overthrown on May 31-June 1, 1924, and was later executed.

Clubb has compiled a long list of political purges and executions carried out by Yang Tseng-hsin.[18] The best-known Yang Tseng-hsin execution story, however, concerns his dispatch of two fellow Yunnanese when he suspected of plotting against him. Both Wu[19] and Etherton[20] have related similar versions of the story, with Wu giving more details. According to the latter's version, this is what happened:

When Yuan Shih-k'ai turned from the republican cause and tried to establish a new dynasty in Peking in 1915, some of Yang's Yunnanese aides in Sinkiang reacted sympathetically to the revolution that had broken out in Yunnan as a consequence of Yuan Shih-k'ai's action. An informer who brought the story to Yang Tseng-hsin about the prospect of a similar revolt in Sinkiang was executed as a bearer of "false tales," with Yang calling in the indicted Yunnanese to tell them about the incident and registering a vote of confidence in their loyalty. Then the suspected rebels were invited to dine with Yang on the following Chinese New Year. While the guests were toasting each other, Yang slipped out to call in a soldier, who promptly carried out an order to slice off the head of one of the Yunnanese. A

second Yunnanese rose from the table and tried to flee, but was also cut down in his tracks. Then the dinner continued.

According to Etherton, Yuan Shih-k'ai actually had tried to remove Yang Tseng-hsin as governor before this incident took place by appointing the tao-t'ai of Kashgar to replace him-- an act that was nullified by the assassination of the tao-t'ai[21]. On the other hand, Yu[22] speaks of the high regard held for Yang Tseng-hsin by Yuan Shih-k'ai.

Be that as it may, Yang Tseng-hsin succeeded in carving out an autonomous domain for himself notwithstanding the numerous reports he sent to Peking reporting developments in Sinkiang and requesting "instructions." The new government in Peking found it difficult to continue the subsidies formerly granted to Sinkiang by the Manchus. Preoccupied as it was with other problems involved in the formation of a new government, it was also not in much of a position to dispatch troops to as distant a place as Sinkiang to establish its own control.

After setting up a Financial Rehabilitation Office on August 4, 1912, Yang sent a series of dispatches to Peking stressing the need for financial assistance. He noted that inflation was rampant and that the Russian consul-general at Ili had proposed to him a five-percent, 30-year loan of 5,000,000 taels with the mineral resources of Ili as collateral. In a sequence of messages to Peking in 1913, he pointed out that the Russians long had coveted the mineral resources of Northwest Sinkiang and that he needed 1,000,000 taels from Peking to deal with the inflation problem. By March, 1914 he was asking for 2,000,000 taels to combat the worsening inflation. All Peking could do, however, was to advise Yang to be more economical[23].

Unable to get financial assistance from Peking, Yang unified the multiple Sinkiang currency system by introducing a new provincial currency in 1918. Meanwhile, he resisted efforts by Peking to send new administrators into Sinkiang, pointing out that budgetary difficulties made it impossible to pay them and adding the argument that the political situation in Sinkiang was so delicate that new and inexperienced administrators from China Proper would merely complicate matters[24].

Between 1916 and 1920, a period marked in Russian Central Asia by the Kazakh revolt against Tsarist conscription, the Bolshevik Revolution and the "White" Counter-Revolution, Yang Tseng-hsin was also left to his own devices in handling such ticklish problems as the Kazakh refugees, the retreat of the defeated "White" troops into Sinkiang and the whole question of how to deal with the old Tsarist consuls and the new Bolshevik consuls that were sent to replace the former.

Beginning in May, 1918 the Bolsheviks sent a telegram to Yang Tseng-hsin taking up the question of replacing the Tsarist consuls, but Yang resisted this initial advance. Later, in July, 1919, he notified Peking that the Bolsheviks were sending in agitators and distributing leaflets propagandizing for a revolt by all the peoples of Sinkiang against their "feudal overlords."[25]

By the spring of 1920, when the "Whites" were almost completely defeated in Central Asia and most of the surviving "White" generals had taken refuge in Sinkiang, the handwriting on the wall was sufficiently clear for Yang Tseng-hsin. In the summer of 1920 a Bolshevik mission headed by one Limarev arrived at Ining[26]. At about the same time Yang Tseng-hsin negotiated his

first commercial treaty with the Bolsheviks. Confronted as he was by financial difficulties, the victory of the Bolsheviks and a new network of revolutionary intrigue that extended into Sinkiang under the "Emancipation of the East Movement," he had little choice except to deal with the new Russian authorities in Central Asia.

Later, in explaining how he had managed to keep the peace in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin said:

"These things have I done, not with soldiers, for I have none, but with the power of my mind and my pen. I have never troubled to create a large army, for it was clear to me at the outset that my army could not possibly be bigger than those of my neighbor, and if your army is not the biggest, it is safest to have no army at all."[27]

Under the terms of the 1920 local agreement, the Bolsheviks received the right to establish two consulates in Sinkiang, and Sinkiang the right to establish two consulates in Russian Turkestan. The other main provisions of the agreement involved the Bolshevik offer of an amnesty to those "White Russian" civil and military refugees willing to return to Russia from Sinkiang and the Bolshevik promise to Yang Tseng-hsin to consider the question of reparations for Chinese-owned goods confiscated in the Russian areas during the revolution[28].

Shortly thereafter, a succession of Bolshevik trade organizations—Sibvneshtorg (Siberian Trading Company), Kirkraitorg (Kirghiz Regional Trading Company) and Turkraitorg (Turkestan Regional Trading Company)—began to operate in Sinkiang[29].

The terms of the 1920 treaty were extended four years later under a new

agreement related to the complicated Russo-Chinese dealings in China Proper during the early 1920's.

As part of a pattern that became standard for them in China, particularly in the Sino-Soviet border areas, the Bolsheviks were then riding two horses in China-- one actively, another passively, and both for all they were worth. Adolf Jaffe's mission to China as a Bolshevik diplomat in the early 1920's produced two contradictory phenomena: a revolutionary understanding between Russia and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang in 1923 and a formal Sino-Soviet treaty establishing diplomatic relations with the internationally-recognized Peking Government of General Wu P'ei-fu in 1924[30]. Thus, while establishing formal relations with Peking, the Bolsheviks supplied military and political instructors and about $3,000,000 to Peking's Kuomintang enemies in Canton[31].

On October 6, 1924, as an independent feature of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Treaty, Yang Tseng-hsin signed a new agreement with the Bolsheviks under which the number of Russian consulates in Sinkiang and the number of Sinkiang consulates in Russian territory were both increased to five. Russian consulates were established at Tihwa, Ining, T'acheng, Chenghwa and Kashgar; Sinkiang consulates at Tashkent, Alma Ata, Andijan, Zaisan and Semipalatinsk.[32]

The break-up of the Chinese Kuomintang-Communist coalition in 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek carried out his purge of the Communists and severed his relations with Moscow, did not alter Yang Tseng-hsin's relations with the Russians in Sinkiang. The Sinkiang consular agents in Russia published a proclamation declaring that they were "subordinated to the government of Peking, but only in so far as the actions and instructions of that government

are not directed against the interests of western Asia."[33] On January 8, 1928 Izvestiya also published a statement by the Sinkiang consul-general at Semipalatinsk, who said the Semipalatinsk consulate had "nothing in common with southern China" and stressed the "indissolubility and solidity of the friendship of western China with the USSR."[34]

Such ties as Yang Tseng-hsin had with a central government in China were not with the Kuomintang, but with Peking-- where control of the North China government kept passing from the hands of one warlord into the hands of another.

It was the North China Government of General Wu P'ei-fu, who rose to power in the melée following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916, that signed the recognition treaty with the Soviet Union in May, 1924. Wu was displaced when Feng Yu-hsiang (the "Christian General") seized Peking in October of that year. By June, 1927, however, after another involved process of warlord battles and intrigues, Chang Tso-lin was boss of Peking. Then in June, 1928, Chang Tso-lin retired to Mukden and the Shansi warlord, General Yen Hsi-shan, entered Peking with a Kuomintang title bestowed on him by Chiang Kai-shek: Commander of the Peking and Tientsin Gendarmerie.

One month later, on July 7, 1928, Yang Tseng-hsin was assassinated in Tihwa.

Yang was shot to death at a banquet he gave at his yamen following a graduation ceremony at the Russian Language School. The leader of the revolt against hi was Fan Yao-nan, a provincial official who had Kuomintang sympathies and who is said to have been disgruntled at the way Yang treated him[35]. Among the guests at the banquet was the Soviet consul-general in

Yihwa. The "grand old Governor Yang" was assassinated while toasting his guests with rice wine and playing the Chinese "finger game."[36]

b. The Rule of Chin Shu-jen, 1928-1933

After the assassination of Yang Tseng-hsin, power was seized not by Fan Yao-man, but by Yang's Minister of Interior-- Chin Shu-jen, a Kansu man, who started out by executing the rebel who had made his rise to the governorship possible. If anyone ever has had a good word to say for Chin Shu-jen, this writer is unaware of it. Chin was weak, greedy, corrupt, oppressive and totally incompetent.

When I visited Sinkiang in 1948, non-Chinese officials there recalled Yang with a trace of affection and Sheng with a hatred that contained an element of respect for his dictatorial efficiency. But for Chin Shu-jen, there was nothing but contempt.

According to Hedin, who reported later that he was shabbily treated when he appeared in Sinkiang on his road survey for the Nanking Government in 1933, Chin Shu-jen appointed his two brothers to the highest military posts and placed one of his servants in command of a regiment[37]. The corruption that existed under Yang Tseng-hsin became far more widespread under Chin Shu-jen, who increased taxes, spurred inflation by printing more and more paper money, and established a number of monopolies dealing in gold, jade, wool and other products[38].

When his position as governor started to deteriorate rapidly in 1931, Chin Shu-jen signed an agreement with the Russians that practically gave them a free economic hand in Sinkiang. A summary of the major provisions

of the agreement, which was signed on October 1, 1951, follows:[39]

1. Passage of goods will be through the frontier points of Irkeshtam, Khokuta, Bakhti and Jimunai.

2. The Sinkiang Government will permit Sinkiang merchants to export any amount of various products to be sold to Soviet commercial agencies without the necessity of export licenses, except for products whose import into the Soviet Union is forbidden.

3. The Sinkiang Government will permit Soviet commercial agencies to carry on trade at Kashgar, Ining, T'ach'eng, Chenghwa and Tihwa and, further, permit these agencies to send representatives to Yarkand, Turfan, Yenki, Khotan and Aksu.

4. The Sinkiang Government will permit Soviet commercial agencies and Sinkiang citizens to make contracts freely with regard to price, transportation and other terms of contract, with the proviso that such contracts will be registered.

5. The Sinkiang Government will not impose higher customs or taxes on Soviet commercial agencies than are imposed on Chinese merchants.

6. The Sinkiang Government desires the Soviet Union, in the nature of business relations, to provide Sinkiang with machinery, technicians, and technical instructors to train Chinese technicians.

7. The Sinkiang Government desires the Soviet Government to permit passage through Russian territory of Sinkiang products to China and products from China to Sinkiang.

Chin Shu-jen's major troubles actually began in 1930 with the death of Maksud Shah, the Prince of Hami. Seizing up this opportunity to remove the last vestige of the Khojas in Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen abolished the princedom and ordered Maksud's son-- Nasir (Nei Tso-erh)-- brought to Tihwa to serve him as a "high adviser." This decision set off a sequence of events that produced a new crop of uprisings in Sinkiang and paved the way for the incursions of Moslem General Ma Chung-ying from Kansu.

After the removal of the young prince, the district of Hami was divided into three sub-districts: Hami, Kho and Kwu. A survey was made of the prince's former estates and the old Moslem tenants were given the right to continue tilling the land provided they paid taxes to the provincial government. The uncultivated land was thrown open to Chinese colonists. Later, however, there was an attempt to collect arrears on the taxes of Moslem tenants, with the Chinese settlers being tax exempt because they were working newly-cultivated land. When new Chinese refugees entered Sinkiang to escape from the 1928-1930 Moslem revolts in Kansu, many of the Moslem tillers of the former royal estates in the Hami area were ordered off their farms for non-payment of taxes. The new Chinese refugees were settled on these farms and the displaced Moslems were given untilled land as "compensation."[40]

On the outbreak of the first Hami revolt in 1930, Chin Shu-jen mobilized an army of former "White Russian" soldiers and officers to suppress it. They did. A second revolt broke out, however, in February-March, 1931, when a Chinese tax-collector tried to marry a Moslem girl[41].

Outraged at the idea of an infidel defiling a Moslem woman, a crowd of Hami Moslems broke into the tax-collection office, murdered the tax-collector and his bride and seized a number of rifles that were kept on the premises. The revolt spread quickly to Chenhsi and Turfan. As a Chinese general named Hsiung took the field against the rebellious Moslems, two emissaries— Hodja Nyas Hadji and Yollbars Khan— left Hami to seek aid from Moslem General Ma Chung-ying in Kansu. Ma Chung-ying, Sven Hedin's "Big Horse," responded by launching his first expedition into Sinkiang in 1931[42].

The Kansu "Big Horse" was the most famous of three Ma's who were

involved in the fight against the Sinkiang Provincial Government in the days that followed. The others were Ma Fu-ming, a Tungan who seems to have operated semi-independently in the Turfan area, and Ma Shih-ming, another Tungan who commanded troops in Eastern Sinkiang as a subordinate of Ma Chung-ying.

Ma Chung-ying was born at Hochow, a Moslem religious center in Southern Kansu. He was about 23 when the two emissaries arrived from Hami to enlist his aid, and already had had a spectacular career participating in the 1928 Moslem rebellion in Kansu, fighting Feng Yu-hsiang's troops in that province, terrorising the Minghsia countryside as a bandit, and then carving out a domain for himself in Western Kansu.

On his first expedition into Sinkiang in 1931, Ma Chung-ying by-passed Hami, which was still being held by provincial troops resisting the local rebels, and went on to capture Chenhsi on the road to Tihwa. From Chenhsi he advanced on Tihwa and joined battle with Chin Shu-jen's forces midway between Chenhsi and the capital. Wounded in this fighting, "Big Horse" retired with his troops all the way back to Western Kansu, with the provincial forces in pursuit.

When the Chinese General Hsiung was subsequently killed in pressing the attack against Ma Fu-ming, who had seized Turfan, a noteworthy change took place in Chin Shu-jen's field command. General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who had become chief-of-staff in Tihwa, was made the commander of an army that by this time had as its officer nucleus the "White Russians" whom Chin Shu-jen first started mustering into the provincial forces in 1930. Sheng's chief-of-staff was General Papingut, who headed a "White Russian" contingent

estimated at about 1,500 men[43].

Fighting continued through 1932, but no real danger confronted Chin Shu-jen again until January-February, 1933, when Ma Shih-ming and Ma Fu-ming launched a joint attack on Tihwa. The "White Russian" troops again saved Chin Shu-jen. However, Chin's days were numbered. Within a few months, these same "White Russian" troops ousted him.

According to Hedin, Chin Shu-jen not only mistrusted his own "White Russian" troops, but mistreated them-- holding the best horses and equipment back for Chinese troops and letting the "White Russians" carry the brunt of the fighting[44].

Early in April of 1933 the "White Russians" turned against Chin Shu-jen and demanded that he resign, with Papingut, Chong's chief-of-staff, declaring that the governor's "corruption and inefficiency" were imperiling the entire province[45]. When Chin refused to step down, the "White Russians" mutinied on April 11-12 and marched on the governor's yamen. Chin Shu-jen fled over the wall and escaped, but his brother-- Chin Shu-hsin-- was later killed[46]. Subsequently, Chin Shu-jen reached Nanking, where he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison for signing the 1931 Russo-Sinkiang treaty without authorization[47].

At a meeting called immediately after Chin Shu-jen fled the city, the "White Russians" and the remaining Chinese officials established a Sinkiang Provisional Maintenance Council. Liu Wen-lung, the Commissioner of Education, became acting governor and Colonel Tseng Yung-chen, leader of the "Manchurian Northeast Salvation Army" (See below), consented to become temporary head of a Military Council after first declining this post. But

Tseng didn't remain in his new job for more than a few days. When fighting broke out again just outside Tihwa between "White Russian" and Chinese troops, Tseng pointed out to his electors that he was really just a guest in Sinkiang and that he could not accept a provincial appointment. Thus, the Council turned to Sheng Shih-ts'ai and appointed him Sinkiang's new Tupan (Defense Commissioner)[48].

c. The Rule of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 1933-1944

Sheng Shih-ts'ai was born in Liaoning, South Manchuria, in 1893. He was educated in Shanghai and Nanking, and then entered the Shaokwan Military Academy in Kwangtung. On his graduation from the military academy, he was given an introduction to the Manchurian warlord, Kuo Sung-ling, and then joined Kuo's army. So far as Sheng's future career in Manchuria was concerned, this was not a too advantageous connection, for Kuo Sung-ling was later defeated by Chang Tso-lin in the warlord struggle for the Northeast.

A 1940 Who's Who in China states that Sheng also served in the army of "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang (Chang Tso-lin's son), but this does not correspond either with the biographical sketches of Sheng by Norins and Lattimore[49] or with such facts as this writer was able to gather on Sheng's background in Sinkiang. Sheng's career in Manchuria seems clearly to have been related to Kuo Sung-ling's cause.

This affiliation may have helped condition Sheng's respective attitudes towards the Japanese and Russians in Sinkiang at a later time. After rising to the rank of battalion commander in Kuo Sung-ling's army, Sheng was sent to Japan in 1915 under the latter's sponsorship for further military study. However, he was back in Manchuria when Kuo Sung-ling, then stationed west of

the South Manchurian Railway, revolted against Chang Tso-lin in November, 1925. Hse was unsuccessful in his revolt. The Russians made it difficult for Chang Tso-lin to obtain reinforcements from Heilungkiang by barring the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but the Japanese then saved Mukden for Chang Tso-lin by declaring a 7-mile neutral zone on each side of the South Manchurian Railway[50].

Sheng returned to Japan for more "study" after the 1925 debacle, and as an unemployed army officer threw in his lot with the riding force of the Kuomintang in Canton. During the Kuomintang's "Northern Expedition" from Canton in 1926-1927, Sheng was on the staff of General Ho Ying-ch'in, then commander of the Eastern Route Army.

After the Kuomintang captured Shanghai and set up its capital in Nanking, Sheng looked around again for greener pastures. Chang Hsueh-liang had succeeded Chang Tso-lin following the latter's death in the Mukden railway explosion of 1928. For want of a better opportunity, Sheng accepted in 1929 an earlier offer to go to Sinkiang for service under Chin Shu-jen as a military officer. He traveled to Sinkiang by way of Siberia inasmuch as Chang Hsueh-liang's seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway in July, 1929 made travel into Russia impossible over this route.

(1) Russia Helps Sheng Defeat Ma Chung-ying

The events that took place in Sinkiang after Sheng Shih-ts'ai became Tupan in April, 1933, especially the armed assistance given him by the Russians in January, 1934 to liquidate Ma Chung-ying, are related to the political tug-of-war then going on between Russia and Japan in the Sino-Soviet border areas.

In 1933, the same year in which the Soviet Union and Kuomintang China resumed diplomatic relations, the Japanese turned down a Russian offer for a non-aggression pact[51]. Between September, 1931 and February, 1933, the Japanese took over Manchuria and Jehol, with the Russians interpreting the latter action as a step towards opening a corridor into Mongolia, Sinkiang and Russian Central Asia[52]. Beginning in the early 1930's, too, the Japanese undertook more active sponsorship of both a Mongol "autonomous" movement and a Pan-Moslem movement[53].

Ma Chung-ying himself was the Chinese Moslem version of Enver Pasha. He was an advocate of a Pan-Moslem state, with himself as its chief. According to Hedin, Ma's plan was to conquer Kansu, Sinkiang and Russian Turkestan and form a Moslem kingdom extending as far as the Caspian Sea and the frontier of Iran[54]. Among his advisors was an Istanbul Turk, Kemal Kaya Effendi[55].

Although Sheng Shih-ts'ai claimed later that Ma Chung-ying had received Japanese arms sent through Tientsin[56], the members of Hedin's 1933-1934 Sinkiang expedition-- including George Soderbom, who was still in China with his brother, Gus, in 1948-- encountered no Japanese in their experience with Ma's troops. There is no question, however, that the Japanese were interested in Sinkiang.

In the spring of 1919, 12 Japanese officers arrived in Sinkiang to investigate "conditions" arising out of the Bolshevik Revolution in Central Asia. According to Etherton, they visited Kashgar, Tihwa, Ining and the Altai area and spent two years studying the political situation and looking into the possibilities of a "Pan-Asiatic" movement[57]. In a Tokyo talk with

United States Ambassador Grew in 1934, Soviet Ambassador Yurenev singled out General Hayashi, the new war minister, as a man who had worked consistently against the Soviet Union, "particularly in Sinkiang."[58]

It was against this background that Ma Chung-ying returned to the attack in Sinkiang in the spring of 1933, starting out by seizing Kuchengtse (Kitai) on the road to Tihwa. After defeating a force under Sheng Shih-ts'ai just west of Kuchengtse, Ma Chung-ying's Tungans captured Turfan and Yenki.

By this time Ma Chung-ying had been invested by Chiang Kai-shek with the title of commander of the 36th Division. In August, 1933 Nanking also confirmed Liu Wen-lung as governor and Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Border Defense Commissioner in Sinkiang. Thus, with the feuding generals now bearing Kuomintang titles, the Kuomintang seized upon an opportunity to introduce its own influence into Sinkiang by attempting to settle the differences between Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Ma Chung-ying. But two mediation efforts-- first by General Huang Mu-sung and then by Lo Wen-kan, Kuomintang Minister of Foreign Affairs-- failed[59]. Then the Soviet Russians entered the picture.

Even before Sheng Shih-ts'ai took over as tupan in April, 1933, the Sinkiang provincial army had been augmented by the arrival in the province of Manchurian troops who had fought the Japanese in Manchuria under General Ma Chan-shan. According to Beloff, 7,000 members of Ma Chan-shan's "Northeast Salvation Army" managed to escape from Manchuria and reach Sinkiang through Russian territory over the Trans-Siberian and Turk-Sib Railways[60]. Colonel Tseng Yung-chen, who served for a few days as head of the Sinkiang Military Council before he was replaced by Sheng Shih-ts'ai,

was an officer of the "Northeast Salvation Army." But even with these troops as reinforcements Sheng was not able to defeat Ma Chung-ying until he received Soviet assistance.

It was around December, 1933, that Sheng Shih-ts'ai signed an agreement with Pogodin, the Soviet representative, under which he was to receive military assistance from the Soviet Union in return for the following concessions to the Soviet Union in Sinkiang: a commercial monopoly, monopoly rights to exploit Sinkiang's mineral and oil resources, and the right to build a railway from T'ach'eng to Tihwa[61]. The railway was never built, but the Soviet Union later took up its rights with regard to the commercial, mineral and oil monopolies.

As a consequence of this agreement, Sheng's "White Russian" troops were purged but not dissolved. For example, Papingut, Sheng's chief-of-staff, was denounced and shot and another "White Russian," Deichtiev, became one of Sheng's leading aides[62].

When Ma Chung-ying started a new attack on Tihwa in January, 1934, the aid promised Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his agreement with Pogodin materialised quickly. Posing as "White Russians," well-equipped Soviet troops are said to have entered Sinkiang and to have carried out a 45-day blitz against Ma Chung-ying, following which they returned to Soviet territory and left it up to Sheng's provincial troops to complete the mopping-up of Ma Chung-ying's troops in Jungaria[63]. The greatest damage on Ma Chung-ying's forces, however, was inflicted by the Soviet Airforce.

Bermino, who says he was assigned the job of delivering Soviets arms to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, tells the story of the Soviet bombings as follows:

> The capital of the province was already menaced by the rebels. The Politbureau ordered two brigades of G.P.U. troops with air units of the Red Army to clear the roads and liquidate the rebellion. Meanwhile, on the order of the Politbureau, we shipped a number of planes and bombs to the borders of Sinkiang. There they were stuck for some time, as the road to Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang, was blocked by the rebels. Finally the command of the Red Army Air Force operating there took charge of this shipment. They "delivered" the bombs on the rebel forces gathered around the capital, and by landing the planes right on the airfield of the besieged fortress. I was instructed to send the bill for the bombs, as well as the other goods, to the governor.64

By the summer of 1934 fighting in Eastern Sinkiang was over and Ma Chung-ying had fled to Kashgar. Then on July 7, 1934, a striking thing happened that has never been adequately explained. Along with a number of his followers Ma Chung-ying crossed over into the Soviet Union by way of Irkeshtam in an entourage headed by Konstantinov, a member of the Soviet Consulate in Kashgar. Although it was reported later that 1) Ma had died in the Soviet Union and 2) that he was being groomed for future use by the Russians in Central Asia[65], nothing definite has been heard of him since he entered the Soviet Union.

In 1936 the Soviet Russians helped Sheng Shih-ts'ai crush another rebellion-- started this time by a coalition of Uighurs and Kazakhs opposed to Sheng's rule. The new rebellion was also crushed by planes of the Soviet Union[66], which earlier had sponsored the cause of "emancipation" and "self-determination" in Asia.

(2) The Sinkiang-Soviet Alliance, 1934-1943

Although the Kuomintang flag was still flown and although Sinkiang's color on the map was still the same as that of China, the province was drawn completely into the Soviet orbit under the kind of cooperation that developed between the Soviet Union and Sheng Shih-ts'ai. The Soviet Union sent in scores of technicians and advisers, attached liaison men to Sheng's administrative agencies, police bureaus and army units, established a trade monopoly (Sovsintorg) to deal with the Tupan's Sinkiang Trading Company and began exploiting the province's mineral and oil resources[67].

A military academy and aviation school were established with Russian assistance at Tihwa and, according to Barmine, the Soviet representatives equipped 10,000 of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's provincial troops with everything "from boots to Kuomintang insignia."[68] Barmine, who says his own Soviet agency was given the job of sending in engineers to construct roads, airdromes and hangars, adds that Stalin's brother-in-law, Svanidse, was assigned the task of helping Sinkiang work out a reconstruction plan[69].

Dallin says that Pogodin, who signed the 1933 agreement with Sheng, took over control of Sinkiang's secret police[70]. After traveling through Sinkiang as a British correspondent in 1935-1936, Fleming noted that "every department, every regiment" was directed by a Soviet representative[71]. He also reported that the Soviet 4th Kirghis Regiments (the "Tortinjis") took over control of the Kashgarian frontiers[72].

Dallin quotes a Moslem publication, the Moslem World, to the effect that Sheng Shih-ts'ai signed an additional agreement with the Soviet Union on January 1, 1936, containing, inter alia, the following provisions: no

foreign influence except that of the Soviet Union would be allowed to penetrate Sinkiang; the Soviet Union would come to Sinkiang's aid politically, economically and militarily if the province were attacked; and the Soviet Union would support Sinkiang should the province decide to declare itself independent and form a separate state[73]. So far as the writer knows, this has not been confirmed by any other source.

There is no question that a drive was started to eliminate non-Soviet foreign influence. By March, 1939, for example, the Sinkiang Provincial Government ordered all foreign traders in Khotan and Yarkand to turn over their goods and leave within a week[74].

There was a period of relative prosperity in Sinkiang during Sheng's period of cooperation with the Russians, but an atmosphere of tenseness and fear pervaded the entire province. Sheng saw spies in every bush and, according to Clubb[75], even discovered a "Trotskyist plot" in Sinkiang along with "Mongolian plots," "Japanese plots" and "British plots." His jails bulged with thousands of prisoners, many of whom were tortured and executed. Among those who were arrested and jailed by Sheng as "foreign agents" were a British missionary named Hunter (China Inland Mission) and Gus Soderbom, a Swedish national who used to make trips to Sinkiang as a business man.

As a major feature of the Soviet-Sheng Shih-ts'ai alliance, the Sinkiang educational system was reorganized and expanded, with the Russian language and rudimentary Marxist political training being introduced into the school curriculum[76]. The better students were sent to Tashkent to be educated in Communist principles[77]. At the same time a province-wide "Anti-Imperialist Society" was established. It promoted friendship between Sinkiang and the

Soviet Union and carried on propaganda campaigns against Japan and Britain[78].

When the Soviet advisers began entering Sinkiang in force, some notable changes were made in the administrative program originally adopted by the Chinese and "White Russians" who met in Tihwa to form a new government after the April, 1933 ouster of Chin Shu-jen. This group-- which, it will be recalled, finally named Sheng Shih-ts'ai tupan-- adopted a program that called for closer relations between Sinkiang and Kuomintang China. The references to the Kuomintang in the April, 1933 program were conspicuously missing from the "Eight-Point Program" promulgated by Sheng later in 1933 and also from the "Six Great Policies" he announced the following year.

The new provincial government established after the April, 1933 coup d'état consisted of an administrative organ, headed by the governor and embracing three sections dealing with Diplomacy, Finance and Reconstruction, and an Advisory Provincial Committee of 44 members. Among the 44 were 27 Chinese, 5 Uighurs, 4 Tungans, 2 "White Russians," 2 Kazakhs, 2 Mongols and 2 Manchus[79].

In establishing this governmental structure, the informal Tihwa convention adopted a constitution containing 10 points: 1.) Political, educational and economic equality; 2.) Direct or indirect election of all officials; 3.) Freedom of speech, press and assembly; 4.) Elimination of "illegal policies" tending to "subjugate" the people; 5.) Development of communications and expansion and equalization of the way of life; 6.) Development of mining; 7.) A collectivist policy to aid the rural populations; 8.) Assignment of diplomatic power to the Central Government; 9.) Public instruction on the basis of Kuomintang principles; and 10.) Unity of budget

between Sinkiang and China[80]. (Italics mine.)

The so-called "Eight Points" promulgated by Sheng Shih-ts'ai after he assumed power in 1933 were somewhat different, however. The "Eight-Point Program" included the following planks[81]:

1. Racial (nationality) equality
2. Religious freedom
3. Equitable distribution of rural relief
4. Financial reform
5. Elimination of corruption from government
6. Extension of education
7. Encouragement of self-government
8. Reform of the judiciary

There was also no mention of the Kuomintang in the streamlined "Six Great Policies" enunciated by Sheng in 1934. Instead, the 1934 program called for combatting "imperialism" and fostering close ties with the Soviet Union. Following is a list of the "Six Great Policies"[82]:

1. Anti-imperialism
2. Kinship with the Soviet Union
3. Racial (nationality) equality
4. Clean government
5. Peace
6. Reconstruction

During the period of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's alliance with the Soviet Union, there was no collectivization drive and the mullahs hung on in spite of the new Marxist philosophy. His "revolution" also lacked the scope and the fervor of the Bolshevik Revolution in Central Asia. Still there are some noteworthy parallels between the approach he followed and the policies that had been applied by the Bolsheviks in Russian Turkestan.

Sheng hunted for spies, threw thousands into jail and turned Sinkiang into a police state. On the other hand, he gave the non-Chinese peoples more representation in the provincial government, promoted education,

cracked down on corruption, encouraged the various nationality groups to establish their own schools, cultural associations and newspapers, and undertook a planned economic development program with the help of the Russians.

Between 1933 and 1936, those attending school in the province are said to have increased from 3,000 to 150,000, with more than 300 non-Chinese students being sent to the Soviet Union to study medicine, veterinary science, engineering and agriculture[83]. According to Norins, about 2,300 schools had been established in Sinkiang by August, 1936[84]. This writer has some doubts as to whether there were 150,000 full-time students in Sinkiang in 1936. Clubb, for example, puts the number of students in 1938 as over 70,000[85]. Be that as it may, there is no question that there was a large increase in the number of students during the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

Two Soviet loans were given to Sheng Shih-ts'ai-- one of 5,000,000 roubles[86] in 1934 and another of 15,000,000 roubles[87] after he instituted his first three-year reconstruction plan. There were two three-year plans, the first covering the period from 1936 to the summer of 1939 and the second the period from 1939 to 1942. In carrying out the foreign trade and local development phases of these plans, the Sinkiang Trading Company, the Sinkiang Local Resources Company and the provincial Reconstruction Commission[88] worked in close collaboration with the Soviet advisers, technicians and Sovsintorg (Soviet-Sinkiang Trading Company). Sovsintorg brought in Soviet manufactured goods and took out livestock, cotton, wool and hides.

Among the projects that formed part of the first three-year plan were the reorganization of the Sinkiang Commercial Bank and the introduction of a new gold-backed currency based on some of the gold extracted from the Altai

nines. An "agricultural implements" factory with its own airfield also was constructed near Tihwa, work was started on a water plant at Tihwa, agricultural and livestock-breeding experimental stations were established, a logging company was created and several new factories were built to produce such commodities as matches and beer. Under both three-year plans, however, the major economic development effort went into joint Sinkiang-Soviet exploitation of the Altai gold mines, the Borotala coalfields in the Ili area, the oil fields near Yumu and the wolfram deposits at Wench'uan and Fuwen[89].

Stressing the need for developing light industries, the second three-year plan called for the construction of a base of small electrical power plants, a cement plant and other factories to turn out cotton textiles, shoes, silk goods, cigarettes, more matches, tallow, soap and carpets[90]. This second plan never really got started, however, for by 1939 the Soviet Union-- in attuning its China policy to the new situation created by the Sino-Japanese war-- had begun to negotiate agreements involving Sinkiang with the Kuomintang Government in China Proper. Beginning in 1937, as a matter of fact, Sinkiang became a thoroughfare used by the Soviet Union to send military supplies to Chiang Kai-shek.

When the Soviet Union started giving aid to Chiang Kai-shek in 1937, Kuomintang politicians started making some remarkable statements about Sinkiang. For example Chen Li-fu, the right-wing Kuomintang machine leader who was then Minister of Mass Training and Propaganda, glossed over his role in the 1927 purge of the Chinese Communists and interpreted the "real" situation in Sinkiang as follows:

"It is natural that Sinkiang and Russia have close relations, particularly in the economic sphere, since the geographical isolation of Sinkiang from China and its proximity to Russia makes for easier communications. But no attempt is being made to 'communize' the province, which is developing along the lines of the rest of China under General Sheng, who is completely loyal to Nanking."[91]

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July, 1937, the Soviet Eighth Regiment-- wearing the Kuomintang insignia of Sheng's provincial forces-- moved across Sinkiang and stationed itself at Hami[92]. To accommodate the Soviet trucks carrying supplies across Sinkiang for Chiang Kai-shek's armies in China Proper, a new road was also constructed by Soviet engineers and Sinkiang labor from Ining to Hami via Tihwa, with the Chinese repairing the road from Lanchow to Hami.

Following the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 21, 1937[93], the Russians signed a trade treaty with Kuomintang China on June 16, 1939[94], and an aviation agreement establishing the Sino-Sinkiang airline in October, 1939. (See Pages 81-82.) Under the trade treaty, many of the Soviet trucks that brought in military supplies for Chiang Kai-shek's troops returned to the Soviet Union with wolfram (tungsten), tea and wool.

By arrangement with the Russians, Soviet imports from China of wolfram, tea, wool and other products were written off against three Soviet credits to China totalling $200,000,000. The credits were granted in October, 1938, February, 1939, and August, 1939. China was still paying off these credits in 1948, according to Dr. Wong Wen-hao, then head of the National Resources Commission. He told the writer in Nanking during the latter part of that

year that his commission had no way of checking on such minerals as were being taken by the Soviet Union from Sinkiang areas controlled at that time by the "East Turkestan Republic."

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July, 1937, and the world war developments of 1941 and 1942 had important effects both on Soviet policy in Sinkiang and on the future of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

As a result of the Sino-Japanese war, which led the Soviet Union to send military supplies to Chiang Kai-shek via Sinkiang, Sheng lost his isolation from China as a northwestern warlord. As a result of the events of 1941, which included the German invasion of Russia, the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact and the entry of the United States into the war against Japan and Germany, he lost much of his original importance to the Soviet Union.

In going to the aid of Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1933, the Soviet Union acted to forestall the prospect of a Japanese threat to Central Asia either through or in combination with a Pan-Moslem movement. Russia was also interested in the resources of Sinkiang, but Japan and Pan-Turanianism seem to have been the primary considerations. The German invasion of Russia in June, 1941, however, involved the Soviet Union first in a fight for its life and then in all-out counter-offensive that demanded every ounce of national energy. So far as the backdoor of the Soviet Union was concerned, the Soviet Union had succeeded on April 13, 1941, in achieving the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact[95] it had first proposed to Japan in 1932. Although the Soviet Union could not rely completely on this Molotov-Matsuoka agreement, the chances of a Japanese thrust into Central Asia were considerably reduced

when Japan became involved in a Pacific war with the United States in December, 1941.

Sheng may also have helped pave the way for his own absorption by the Kuomintang and his eventual removal by Chiang Kai-shek by underestimating the ability of the Soviet Union to stand up under the German offensives of 1941-1942 and then rebound with the kind of counter-offensive that actually developed. By October, 1941 the Russians had informed the Kuomintang in Chungking that they were no longer in a position to continue sending military shipments to China[96]. Sheng seems actually to have started cutting his ties with the Soviet Union when the Germans staged their offensive against Stalingrad in early 1942. At any rate, Sheng's pro-Soviet periodicals ceased publication in April, 1942[97].

In 1942, also, a procession of Kuomintang officials started visiting Sinkiang by air: General Chu Shao-liang, commander of the Eighth War Zone in Northwest China; Dr. Wong Wen-hao, head of the National Resources Commission; Chaucer H. Wu, newly-named Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and even Madame Chiang Kai-shek. In January, 1943, a Kuomintang (party) provincial headquarters was established at Tihwa. Then in the fall of 1943 Sheng Shih-ts'ai himself flew to Chungking to confer with the Generalissimo, and an agreement was reached under which the Kuomintang began subsidizing the Sinkiang provincial government and some of the Honan famine victims were resettled in Sinkiang[98].

Sheng Shih-ts'ai's new rapprochement with the Kuomintang did not change the nature of his police state, but it did produce a different kind of victim. Where formerly Sheng had arrested "anti-Soviet spies," he now

arrested "pro-Soviet spies." Among those who were executed in the new purge was Mao Tse-tung's brother, Mao Tse-ming, who arrived in Sinkiang in 1937 or 1938 with about a hundred other Chinese Communists to advise and work with Sheng Shih-ts'ai[99]. Sheng Shih-ts'ai's own brother, General Sheng Shih-chi, who-- like the Tupan-- had been ardently pro-Soviet, also died under mysterious circumstances[100].

Once the Russians pulled out, all the enterprises they had sponsored were shut down. The contraction of the Sinkiang economy was accompanied by a new inflationary spurt that developed out of the curtailment of imports from the Soviet Union and the linking of the Sinkiang currency with the depreciating Chungking CNC.

New complications arose in the spring of 1944 when Sheng's provincial troops became involved in a border incident with the Outer Mongols, which led to the bombing of the provincial troops by unidentified aircraft. As a result of the incident, the Soviet Telegraph Agency (Tass) issued a sharp statement in support of the "People's Republic" of Outer Mongolia-- then technically still part of China[101].

The incident originated when Sheng's troops gave chase to a band of Kazakhs in the Peitashan area. Later the Kirei Kazakh leader Osman, whom we[102] interviewed at his Sinkiang mountain camp in 1948, cleared up some of the details of this incident in recounting the story of his career.

Trouble broke out between Sheng and the Kazakhs around 1940, when the Tupan conceived the idea of shifting the Kirei Kazakhs of the Ashan Zone to the south. Osman said he started cooperating with the Outer Mongols in 1942 after Sheng had arrested a number of Kazakh leaders, setting up a

headquarters-in-exile at Tayingkul just inside the Outer Mongolia border. But his Kazakhs continued to rove back to their traditional pasturelands, ignoring a boundary line that in any event has never been clearly demarcated. It was these Kazakhs whom Sheng's troops were chasing across the disputed border in 1944.

The reign of Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang was drawing to a close.

In August, 1944, a National Government "investigation commission" arrived in Sinkiang to look into the border incident and examine the general political situation in the province. On September 11, 1944, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who had been a local dictator for more than ten years, boarded a plane in Tihwa enroute to Chungking. He had been appointed "inister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Central Government!

He lasted about a year in the job. In 1945 the People's Political Council, an advisory political body headed by Dr. Shao Li-tze, suddenly took Sheng Shih-ts'ai to task for his excesses as the tupan of Sinkiang.

Sheng was removed from his post as Minister of Agriculture. In 1948 Chinese officials in Lanchow told the writer that the former Sinkiang warlord was living in "retirement" near Sian. His present whereabouts are unknown.

d. The "Ining Incident"

After the removal of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Chiang Kai-shek named his own Governor of Sinkiang-- Wu Chung-hsin, an Anhwei general who was chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and also a member of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee. Wu Chung-hsin arrived in Tihwa

in September, 1944 with a small personal staff, depending on the men who had worked under Sheng Shih-ts'ai to carry on initially with the administration of the province.

Many but not all of Sheng's prisoners were released. Inflation and hard times continued, however. At the same time Wu adopted a policy of trying to seal off the borders of Sinkiang. The passport fee for non-Chinese who wanted to leave Sinkiang for business or other reasons was increased and political refugees who had left the province earlier to go to Mecca, India, Afghanistan and China Proper were not permitted to return[103]. This later led to a charge by the Ining rebels that the Chinese had interfered with Moslem pilgrimages to Mecca.

Within two months after Wu Chung-hsin's arrival in Tihwa as governor of Sinkiang, and before he had even had time to get acclimated to his new job, the storm broke. On November 7, 1944, the 28th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Kazakh and Uighur rebels attacked the Chinese garrison in the Ili area. This is the uprising that came to be known as the "Ining Incident," after the capital of the Ili Zone.

According to Dallin[104], the November revolt was carried out under the military leadership of a Soviet Uzbek named Farkhad. He also quotes unnamed Chinese sources to the effect that Osman, the Kazakh leader, had two meetings with members of a "Soviet geological mission" near the Soviet border and with an Outer Mongol general in May and September of 1943[105]. As was noted above, Osman himself said he had begun cooperating with the Outer Mongols as early as 1942.

The top indigenous leader of the original Ili movement was Ali Khan

Ture, a Uighur, who later disappeared abruptly from the political scene and was replaced by Achmad Djan Kasimov. Operating under Ali Khan Ture were Achmad Djan, Rahim Djan Hodjaev and Abdul Kair Ture, all Uighurs[106]. Osman Bator, who subsequently broke with the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic," became an Ili military leader when he joined forces with the Ili Army at Chenghwa in September, 1945. Even before Osman threw in his lot with Ili, the core of the rebel army consisted of Kazakhs. For the most part, however, Uighurs then dominated and continued to dominate the political leadership.

The Chinese garrison stationed in and around Ining, a city with a population of close to 80,000, is said to have consisted of two regiments[107]. According to a Chinese account of the Ili battle published in the Peiping Yi Shih Pao, organ of Archbishop Paul Yu-pin, this is what happened[108]:

On November 7, 1944, Kazakh cavalrymen-- armed with rifles and light machine-guns-- began raiding the Chinese residential section of Ining, massacring Chinese and setting buildings afire. Remnants of the Chinese garrison and a large number of Chinese civilian refugees escaped and retreated to Kwoiwanyiao, Allin Art and the airport outside the city. Then the Kazakhs are said to have brought up some mortars and artillery pieces (captured Chinese or Soviet equipment?) and applied a siege that lasted from November 18 until January 31, with the Chinese troops slaughtering their horses for food and melting snow for water.

Some reinforcements under the command of General Li Tieh-chen managed to reach the besieged Chinese and a few planes from China dropped supplies to the encircled troops and refugees. General Chu Shao-liang is said to have sent in additional reinforcements from Northwest China, but the

Yi Shih Pao writer adds that this expedition was frustrated by "the cold" and by Kazakh attacks on the Chinese supply line between Tihwa and Suilai. Moreover, he notes, the Chinese Airforce was unable to dispatch more planes to Sinkiang because it was then preoccupied with the Japanese Kwangsi-Kweichow offensive in China Proper.

Toward the end of January, the Chinese were driven from their positions at Kweihuangmiao and Ailin Park, with the retreating troops falling back to the airfield. But food ran out, and the airfield survivors tried to escape through the Kazakh encirclement on January 31. Those who managed to break out were pursued by the Kazakh cavalrymen and slaughtered.

After the rebels eliminated Chinese resistance in the Ili pocket, they turned north to capture the city of T'ach'eng and then in August, 1945, they started an all-out offensive that won them control over all three northwest zones— Ili, T'ach'eng and Ashan. They moved northeastward from positions in the T'ach'eng Zone toward Chenghwa, capital of Ashan, and eastward from Ili toward Wusu. According to Osman's story of 1948, 6,000 Ili troops reached Chenghwa on September 6. Meanwhile, by that date, the force driving eastward from Ili had captured Wusu and the nearby oilfield area. Then this force continued on past Wusu to the Manas River at Suilai, where troops of the defending Chinese 58th Division blew up the two bridges spanning the river at that town. In 1948, when we visited Suilai, the two bridges were still down.

Thus, while China was still celebrating the end of the war against Japan, a revolution was taking place in Sinkiang.

On September 3, 4 and 5 planes bearing "red star markings" bombed the

Chinese 36th Division, according to Chinese military and civil authorities in Chungking, who also charged that 7,000 Russian troops had participated in the rebel offensive along with 23,000 Ili soldiers[109]. The Central Government in Chungking addressed "inquiries" to the Soviet Union about the bombings. In its reply, the Soviet Union was reported to have ignored these "inquiries" and notified the Chinese, instead, that the rebels were ready to talk peace[110].

When the Ili troops started their offensive in Jungaria in August, 1945, a simultaneous "revolt" took place in Kashgaria-- the so-called "Sarikol Rebellion." The "Sarikol Rebellion" received little if any public attention at the time. In 1948 a British official[111] stationed in Kashgaria told us something about the "revolt." He said that bands of Kirghiz horsemen suddenly began raising hob in Kashgaria in August, 1945, disrupting the road leading westward from Kashgar to the Soviet border and striking out on raiding expeditions that threatened Yarkand, Kargalik and, to a lesser degree, Kashgar itself. Fighting stopped in Jungaria on September 15 following a truce arranged between General Chang Chih-chung and the Ili leaders, but the "Sarikol Rebellion" lasted until the middle of 1946.

The "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" was already a going concern in Ili by the time of the September 15 truce in Jungaria. It was actually proclaimed at a meeting held at the Kweihua Club in Ining on November 23, 1944, three weeks after the "Ining Incident" began and before Chinese resistance on the outskirts of the city had been eliminated[112]. Ali Khan Tore was elected chairman of a council of three, which is said also to have included a Kazakh and a "White Russian,"[113] and the new republic unfurled a green-and-

white flag bearing the Mohammedan star-and-crescent symbol. Although the "East Turkestan" flag bore the star-and-crescent instead of the hammer-and-sickle or the red star, any lingering doubts of its pro-Soviet orientation were soon dispelled.

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NOTES

1. Wu, Aitchen K., Turkistan Tumult, Methuen & Co., London, 1940, p. 37; Clubb, op. cit., p. 163.

2. Wu, op. cit., p. 37.

3. Clubb, op. cit., p. 163.

4. Chinese Central Asia, p. 59.

5. Wu, op. cit., p. 37 et seq.; Lattimore (Pivot of Asia), p. 54; Clubb, op. cit., p. 163.

6. Hedin, Sven, The Flight of Big Horse, E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York, 1936, p. 2.

7. Turkistan Tumult, p. 57.

8. Pivot of Asia, p. 52.

9. Sinkiang: The New Borderland, p. 170.

10. Ho, op. cit., p. 56.

11. Pivot of Asia, p. 55.

12. Ho, op. cit., p. 41.

13. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

14. In the Heart of Asia, pp. 53-54.

15. Ibid., p. 54.

16. Chinese Central Asia, pp. 261-262.

17. In the Heart of Asia, p. 67.

18. Sinkiang: The New Borderland, p. 168-169.

19. Turkistan Tumult, pp. 42-43. Wu claims to have been told the story by a Chinese who attended the banquet.

20. In the Heart of Asia, p. 65.

21. Ibid., p. 65.

22. Turkistan Tumult, p. 35 et seq.

23. Clubb, op. cit., pp. 186-188.

24. Ibid., pp. 191-192.

25. Clubb, op. cit., pp. 214-216; cf. Etherton, op. cit., pp. 161-162, 186-187.

26. Etherton, op. cit., p. 187.

27. Quoted by Wu, op. cit., p. 41.

28. Norins, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

29. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

30. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 210-211; Isaacs, Harold, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Secker & Warburg, London, 1938, pp. 64-65.

31. Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 308.

32. Cf. Wu, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Norins, op. cit., p. 65.

33. Quoted by Dallin, op. cit., p. 198.

34. Ibid.

35. Wu, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

36. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

37. The Flight of Big Horse, p. 2.

38. Cf. Hedin, op. cit., pp.2-4; Wu, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 65-66; Norins, op. cit., p. 40.

39. This summary is based on a copy of the agreement, which was included among a number of Sinkiang treaties made available to the writer by

the Public Information Department of the Chinese (Nationalist) Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1948.

40. Wu, op. cit., pp. 62-64.

41. Cf. Hedin, op. cit., p. 4; Wu, op. cit., pp. 65, et seq.

42. Cf. Hedin, op. cit., pp. 4-5 et seq.; Wu, op. cit., 66-67 et seq.; Norins, op. cit., 40-43; Beloff, op. cit., 232-235. Also see Dallin, David J., Soviet Russia and the Far East, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948, pp. 94-95.

43. Cf. Beloff, op. cit., p. 232; Dallin, op. cit., p. 96.

44. The Flight of Big Horse, p. 8.

45. Wu, op. cit., p. 105.

46. Norins, op. cit., p. 45.

47. Cf. Dallin (Soviet Russia and the Far East), p.96.

48. Cf. Wu, op. cit., pp. 105-106, and Tu Chung-yuan's account as quoted by Norins, op. cit., p. 43.

49. Cf. Who's Who in China (Supplement to Fifth Edition), China Weekly Review, Shanghai, 1940, p. 65; Norins, op. cit., pp. 38-40; Lattimore (Pivot of Asia), p. 70.

50. Jones, F. C., Manchuria Since 1931, Oxford University Press, New York, 1949, p. 17.

51. Beloff, op. cit., p. 165.

52. Ibid., p. 166.

53. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 94-95; Beloff, op. cit., 166-167.

54. The Flight of Big Horse, p. 224.

55. Ibid., p. 59.

56. Clubb, op. cit., p. 253.

57. In the Heart of Asia, pp. 125-26.

58. Grew, Joseph C., Ten Years in Japan, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1944, pp. 123-125.

59. Clubb, op. cit., pp. 245,247.

60. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (Vol. I), pp. 232-235.

61. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., 97-98; Beloff, op. cit., pp. 234-235.

62. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 97; Beloff, op. cit., pp. 234-235.

63. Clubb, op. cit., p. 252.

64. Barmine, Alexander, One Who Survived, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1945, p. 231.

65. For example, Beloff, op. cit., p. 235.

66. Clubb, op. cit., p. 275. Dallin, op. cit., p. 99, quotes United Press and International News Service press dispatches to the effect that Soviet aviation was used a third time in June, 1937 to overthrow General Ma Ho-san, who maintained the Tungan hold on Khotan and Yarkand after Ma Chung-ying entered the Soviet Union.

67. Cf. Fleming, Peter, News From Tartary, Jonathan Cape, London, 1936, especially pp. 254-261, and Dallin, op. cit., pp. 98-103.

68. One Who Survived, pp. 231-232.

69. Ibid.

70. The Soviet Union and the Far East, pp. 99-100.

71. News From Tartary, p. 254.

72. Ibid., p. 255.

73. The Soviet Union and the Far East, p. 101.

74. Beloff, Max, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (Vol. II), Oxford University Press, London, 1949, p. 186.

75. Sinkiang: The New Borderland, p. 254.

76. Cf. Fleming, op. cit., p. 254; Dallin, op. cit., p. 102.

77. Beloff, op. cit., p. 186.

78. Cf. Dallin, p. 102.

79. Ho, op. cit., pp. 114-116.

80. Ibid.

81. Cf. Norins, op. cit., p. 46; Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

82. Cf. Norins, op. cit., p. 47.

83. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 75.

84. Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, p. 104.

85. Sinkiang: The New Borderland, p. 251.

86. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 75; Dallin, op. cit., p. 100.

87. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 75.

88. Cf. Norins, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

89. Based on Clubb, pp. 280-282, and information gathered by the writer about Sheng Shih-ts'ai's regime in Chungking, Nanking and Sinkiang.

90. Clubb, op. cit., p. 282.

91. New York Times, October 31, 1937.

92. Information gathered by the writer in Sinkiang.

93. For text of this treaty, see Moore, Harriet L., Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1945, pp. 187-188.

94. Text, Moore, op. cit., pp. 189-199.

95. Text, Moore, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

96. Moore, op. cit., p. 130.

97. Clubb, op. cit., p. 269.

98. Cf. Lattimore, pp. 78-79.

99. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

100. According to Lattimore (op. cit., p. 78), "Sheng's own Soviet-trained brother and his wife" were "imprisoned." According to Dallin (op. cit., p. 362), "Sheng Shih-ts'ai's brother, himself a Communist" and "Sheng's wife" were "among those killed." As Clubb points out (op. cit., pp. 289-291), there were several versions in Sinkiang about Sheng Shih-chi's death: 1.) that Sheng Shih-ts'ai actually executed his brother because of political differences over the break with Russia; 2.) that Sheng Shih-chi's wife killed him in a fit of jealousy when she discovered he had been having a love affair while she was away on a trip to Russia; and 3.) that Sheng Shih-chi was killed by his chauffeur. At any rate, Mrs. Sheng Shih-chi was executed by order of the Tupan and the late Sheng Shih-chi was later awarded the posthumous rank of Lieutenant-General. Mrs. Sheng Shih-ts'ai does not

seem to have been involved at all.

101. New York Times, April 3, 1944.

102. The "we" refers to Messrs. Barnett and Morrison and the writer.

103. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 86.

104. Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 364.

105. Ibid., p. 365.

106. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

107. Interview with General T'ao Chih-yueh and his deputy at Tihua, August, 1948.

108. Yi Shih Pao, Peiping, February 22-23, 1946. (Two installments.)

109. New York Times, October 21, 1945. (This dispatch was written by Tillman Durdin.)

110. Ibid.

111. The writer is unable to disclose the identity of this source.

112. Yi Shih Pao, Peiping, February 23, 1946.

113. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

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VII. THE POST-WAR YEARS IN SINKIANG

The victory of the Allies over Japan catapulted Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to a new height of popularity and apparent power in China. Thanks largely to President Roosevelt, China was now a member of the "Big Five," and Kuomintang officials in Chungking talked confidently about how China would now replace Japan as the leading power in Asia.

Chiang Kai-shek had the largest and best-equipped army of his career, including 39 fully or partially American-equipped divisions. The United States was also disposed to grant him abundant post-war military and economic assistance, which it actually did to the extent of some $2,000,000,000[1]. Moreover, as of V-J Day the National Government had close to $900,000,000 of its own in gold, silver and American dollar exchange[2].

Despite this symbolic power and these real assets, however, Chiang Kai-shek was not in much of a position to establish his political power in the Sino-Soviet border areas of Manchuria and Sinkiang without Russian concurrence-- especially under circumstances where pro-Soviet movements already had established themselves in both areas. As for Outer Mongolia, its "independence" already had been assured under the 1945 treaty, and the Nationalists muffed what little chance they had of gaining the support of the Hsingan Mongols in Western Manchuria.

When the war ended, a Hsingan Mongol delegation arrived in Peiping from Western Manchuria with the intention of proceeding to Chungking and requesting Chiang Kai-shek to allow the Hsingan Mongols to continue under Chinese rule with the limited autonomy they had enjoyed under the Japanese. Either

on orders from Chungking or by his own decision, Lieut. General Hsiung Shih-hui, then director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northeast, refused to permit the Mongol delegation to proceed from Peiping to the Nationalist capital. Its members returned to Wangyehmiao and entered a Manchurian coalition with the Communists under the leadership of Yun Tse, veteran Mongol member of the Chinese Communist Party. In the last analysis, however, it is doubtful whether a Kuomintang-sponsored Mongol regime in the Hsingan area would have been able to hold out against the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Communists.

Realizing the powerful weight of the Soviet Union in the border areas, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh originally welcomed the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty as a moral victory for the Nationalists insofar as he had obtained Soviet recognition of Chinese Nationalist sovereignty and a Soviet promise not to interfere in either Manchuria or Sinkiang[3]. Later he bent over backwards not to antagonize the Soviet Union in the border areas despite private grumbling about Soviet violation of the 1945 pact. Wang Shih-chieh, a member of the Kuomintang "Political Science Group," was eventually pilloried by the right-wing Kuomintang "C.C.Clique" for his "soft policy" towards Russia. Nevertheless, the Nationalists did not raise the question of Soviet violation of the 1945 treaty in the United Nations until after most of China already had been lost to the Communists.

On the arrival of V-J Day, Lieut. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of the United States China Theater Headquarters, was also quick to realize that diplomacy rather than force was the only way to deal with the Manchurian problem in view of Russian power in the northeast, the advantageous

strategic position of the Chinese Communist armies and the vulnerability of the Kuomintang's China-Manchurian supply line. On November 20, 1945 Wedemeyer reported to Washington: "He (Chiang Kai-shek) will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists."[4]

Under these circumstances Wedemeyer recommended an international trusteeship for Manchuria[5], but this idea was rejected at that time by higher American authorities. After the Wedemeyer Mission visited China in the summer of 1947 to assay Chiang's overall position, the Manchurian trusteeship proposal was revived in Wedemeyer's report to President Truman on September 19, 1947, and was again vetoed[6].

So far as the border areas of China were concerned, the United States was primarily interested in Manchuria after V-J Day for obvious reasons and paid relatively little attention to Sinkiang. The Manchurian problem was also paramount for the Chinese National Government. Notwithstanding the comparative importance of Manchuria and Sinkiang, however, the Kuomintang was confronted with the same basic situation in Sinkiang as it faced in Manchuria.

The key factors in Sinkiang were the Soviet Union and the Soviet-oriented "East Turkestan Republic," which had a territorial base and an army. Militarily, it was even more difficult for the Nationalists to supply Sinkiang than it was to supply Manchuria. In the absence of any major military effort by the Nationalists in that northwest province, there was no alternative there except to negotiate.

On the basis of all the available evidence, the Soviet Union seems to

have been prepared after V-J Day to go along with Chiang Kai-shek— at least for a time— provided that he included the Chinese Communists in the Central Government, included the Ili rebels in the Sinkiang Provincial Government and acceded to Soviet economic demands in both areas. Thus we have the multiple phenomena in 1945-1946 of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in China, Kuomintang-Ili negotiations in Sinkiang, Manchurian talks between Marshal Malinovsky and Nationalist representatives (first Chiang Ching-kuo, then Chiang Chia-ngau) in Changchun, and the more shadowy talks between General Chang Chih-chung and the Russians on the Sinkiang question both in Tihwa and Chungking.

The Moscow Declaration of December, 1945, which called among other things for a "united and democratic China under the National Government,"[7] fitted in with Soviet policy as of that date. But, as indicated by Russian talks with Chinese representatives on the questions of Manchuria and Sinkiang, a coalition government for China was not the full extent of Soviet aims.

The thinly-veiled official hostility of the Soviet occupation authorities toward Americans entering the Sino-Soviet border areas after V-J Day was leavened by sudden outbursts of friendliness[8], but Marshal Malinovsky's vitriolic denunciation of the United States in a speech delivered at Changchun on March 3, 1946[9] made it sufficiently clear that— ally or not— the United States had replaced Japan in Russian eyes as the major Soviet antagonist in Asia. Russian negotiations with the Kuomintang on Manchuria and Sinkiang made it clear, too, that the Soviet Union also had economic as well as political aspirations of its own in both areas.

In Manchuria the Russians pressed for an extension of the terms of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty to include an extensive Sino-Russian industrial partnership. Malinovsky told the Chinese representatives in Changchun that the Soviet Union regarded all Japanese war plants in Manchuria as "war booty" and that it would turn some of these plants over to China as a "gift," but that there would also have to be a joint Sino-Soviet partnership in a large number of former Japanese coal mines, power plants, iron and steel works, chemical works and cement factories[10]. Lieut. General Hsiung Shih-hui, director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northeast, told the writer at Chinchow early in 1946 that the Russians were demanding an industrial partnership on the grounds that the treaty gave them a railway partnership and that much of Manchuria's industry had been developed by the South Manchurian Railway Company.

Backed up by the United States[11], Chiang Kai-shek instructed his representatives in Changchun not to go beyond the letter of the 1945 treaty. After failing finally to get an industrial partnership with the Kuomintang in Manchuria, the Soviet Red Army pulled out of Changchun on April 14, 1946, and out of Harbin about two weeks later. Soviet troops continued to remain in Dairen and Port Arthur, however.

The collapse of General Marshall's mediation mission in China, which achieved such initially encouraging results in the first few months of 1946, actually began with the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Changchun in April of that year. General Chow Pao-chung's Chinese Communist troops started their successful attack on Changchun two hours after the Soviet commandant in that city, General Carlov, entrained for Harbin[12].

Changchun was later retaken by the Nationalists, but April marked the beginning of a series of Communist and Nationalist offensives and counter-offensives that finally torpedoed the Marshall mediation effort.

Russian pressure for an industrial partnership in Manchuria in 1946 was accompanied by less-publicised Russian maneuvering in that same year for the restoration in Sinkiang of the economic privileges the Soviet Union had enjoyed there under Sheng Shih-ts'ai from 1934 to 1943.

Under the so-called "Sinkiang-Soviet Economic Formula" advanced in 1946, the Soviet Union proposed four major provisions: 1.) full Sino-Soviet cooperation in exploiting all of Sinkiang's mineral resources; 2.) unencumbered "free trade" between the "peoples" of Sinkiang and the Soviet Union; 3.) extensive development of barter trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union; and 4.) the right of Soviet commercial vehicles to operate in Sinkiang[13].

"The pact was originally to have been signed by General Chang (Chang Chih-chung) in November, 1946," the Shanghai Ta Kung Pao recalled on February 8, 1949 when the idea for a Sino-Soviet treaty for Sinkiang was revived in Nanking. "But the Foreign Ministry then objected to any authority to foreign nationals for the development of mineral deposits."

Chronologically, the refusal of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to underwrite the proposed Sinkiang treaty in November, 1946 and in the months immediately thereafter bears a striking relationship to what subsequently happened in Sinkiang. This was the time-table of events[14]:

January 2, 1946 — General Chang Chih-chung signs the Kuomintang-Ili peace agreement with three Ili representatives, Achmad Djan, Rahim Djan and Abdul Nair Ture.

April 1, 1946 — Osman Bator, the Kazakh leader, breaks with the Ili movement and establishes contact with the Chinese. His defection creates an important split in the Ili movement, but there is no public fanfare and no fighting.

June 6, 1946 — Chang Chih-chung signs a military reorganization agreement with the Ili leaders, thus completing the overall peace agreement.

July 1, 1946 — A provincial coalition government is formed, with the Ili leaders participating.

November-December, 1946 — The Chinese Foreign Office refuses to endorse the proposed Sino-Soviet agreement for Sinkiang.

February 19, 1947 — Trouble starts with a "liberty mass meeting" at the Uighur Club in Tihwa.

February 21, 1947 — Uighur street demonstration in Tihwa.

February 25, 1947 — Riot in Tihwa.

July 7, 1947 — Uprisings at Turfan, Shanshan and Toksin.

August 26, 1947 — The Ili leaders withdraw from the coalition in Tihwa and return to Inings.

Domestic differences between the Kuomintang and Ili leaders, especially with regard to military reorganization and the composition of the provincial government, emerged as important factors in the collapse of the Sinkiang coalition. In a process of deterioration reminiscent of the 1946 Marshall mediation effort in China Proper and Manchuria, local conniving, assassinations and arrests also led to charges and counter-charges that thickened the atmosphere of mutual suspicion in Sinkiang. From the beginning, too, there was a basic struggle for power inside the coalition between the Kuomintang and the Ili group. The Chinese appointment of Masud Sabri as Governor of Sinkiang in May, 1947 brought this struggle to a head.

Inflation and corruption continued in Sinkiang in the 1945-1949 period and, in fact, grew steadily worse as the overall Kuomintang structure in China disintegrated steadily. But if the Kuomintang had agreed in November, 1945 to restore the Sheng-Soviet status quo of 1934-1945, there is little doubt that the Kuomintang would have been able to reach a firmer agreement with the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic."

a. The Kuomintang-Ili Coalition[15]

The initial Sinkiang peace overture was made on or about September 12, 1945 when the Soviet Union, ignoring Chinese "inquiries" about the Sinkiang bombings of September 3-4-5, notified the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Chungking that the Ili leaders were willing to talk peace. Soviet Ambassador Appollon Petrov explained to the Chinese Nationalists that the Ili leaders had communicated their desire to negotiate to Soviet Consul-General Alexandre Saveliev in Tihwa. He added that the Soviet Union was willing to lend its good offices toward furthering such a project in keeping with the spirit of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty[16].

On September 12, 1945, General Chang Chih-chung, who was then serving as a leading Kuomintang negotiator in peace talks with the Chinese Communists, was suddenly called away from a meeting with the Communists and immediately boarded a plane enroute to Tihwa[17]. By September 15 he had arranged a truce with the Ili leaders and paved the way for the opening of talks on a Sinkiang peace agreement.

Nevertheless, Nationalist troop reinforcements were rushed to Sinkiang from Northwest China[18]. In October, 1945 General Sung Hsi-lien, who had established his military reputation against the Japanese on the Salween

front in 1944, was appointed commander of all Nationalist troops in Sinkiang. Later, however, he became a direct subordinate of General Chang Chih-chung when the latter was named director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest. There was a sharp difference in personality between Chang Chih-chung, the wily Anhwei political general, and Sung Hsi-lien, the hell-for-leather military man.

Just as the Chinese Communists were willing to accept the "leadership of Chiang Kai-shek" in September, 1945[19], so the Ili group at that time was willing to accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in Sinkiang. Even after the Kuomintang-Ili split of August, 1947, the Ili leaders did not advocate breaking away from China and establishing an independent state.

After numerous conferences with the Ili leaders, several air shuttle trips between Tihwa and Chungking and while still keeping his hand in on the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, Chang Chih-chung signed a basic peace agreement with the Ili negotiators on January 2, 1946[20]. This master agreement, which was signed for the Ili group by Achmed Djan, Rahim Djan and Abdul Nair Ture, incorporated the following provisions:

I. A Bill of Rights: Freedom of religion, publication, assembly and speech; the use of both the Chinese and Uighur languages by administrative and judicial organs and in official documents; the right to petition the government in one's native language and the extended use of native languages in primary and middle schools, with both Chinese and Uighur to be used in higher schools; free development of "racial cultures and arts"; adjustment of taxation to the people's "ability to pay"; freedom of domestic and foreign trade within the scope of China's treaty relations with foreign powers; and the release of political prisoners by both sides within 10 days after the signing of the agreement.

II. Reorganization of the Provincial Government: Popular election of hsien (county) councils and the election of hsien magistrates by these councils within three months of the signing of the agreement; the selection of district and assistant district officers "recommended by the people"; the election of a new Provincial Council by the hsien councils; and the reorganization and expansion of the provincial government to 25 members. Ten members were to be chosen directly by the Central Government: the provincial governor, the secretary-general, the commissioners of civil affairs and finance, the chief of the bureau of social welfare, the assistant commissioners of education and reconstruction, the assistant chief of the sanitation bureau, and two commissioners without portfolio. Fifteen members were to be chosen by the elected provincial bodies: two vice-governors, two deputy secretaries-general, the commissioners of education and reconstruction, the assistant commissioners of civil affairs and finance, the chief of the sanitation bureau, the assistant chief of the bureau of social welfare, and five commissioners without portfolio.

Meanwhile, in a separate side agreement, the Ili group was given the right to name 6 of the 15 officials who were supposed to be chosen by the elected provincial bodies. Among the Ili leaders who assumed office in the government officially established in June, 1946 were Ashmad Djan as one of the vice-governors, Abdul Karim Abasov as deputy secretary-general, Seyfuddin as commissioner of education and Rahim Djan as assistant commissioner of civil affairs. (See list of provincial government members on page 48.)

The original peace settlement left open to further discussion the knotty question of army reorganization, and six months passed before the conferees reached an agreement on what to do about the Ili Army. On June 6, 1946, however, the military annex to the January 2 basic agreement was finally signed[21]. It contained the following terms:

1. The Ili Army was to be reorganized into 6 regiments (3 cavalry, 3 infantry) consisting of not more than 12,000 men. Two cavalry regiments and one infantry regiment were to be incorporated into the regular

Chinese National Army, while the remaining 3 regiments were to be incorperated into the Provincial Peace Preservation Corps.

2. The 3 regiments assigned to Peace Preservation duty would remain in the northwest zones of the former "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic" and maintain order there, but troops of the Chinese National Army would take over policing of the Sino-Soviet border.

3. The commander of the 6 Ili regiments was to be chosen by the Ili leaders and given the title by the provincial government of assistant commander of the Peace Preservation Corps. As a concurrent officer of the Chinese National Army, however, he was to obey orders issued by higher National Army echelons.

4. As assistant commander of the Peace Preservation Corps, the Ili military leader would be consulted on the reorganization of Peace Preservation troops at Aksu.

5. The Central and Provincial Governments would undertake to equip and supply the 6 Ili regiments, but the Ili commander would have to report his strength, his troop dispositions and the nature of his equipment to higher National Army echelons.

Now that the agreement had been completed, the august, long-bearded Wu Ye-jen, president of the Control Yuan, emplaned for Tihwa on June 27. He inducted the new members of the provincial government into office on July 1. Upon the signing of the new agreement, too, Chang Chih-chung took over Wu Ching-hsin's post temporarily as Governor of Sinkiang and the unfortunate Wu-- in Tihwa-- left the "New Dominion."

By comparison with the kind of provincial government prevailing elsewhere in China, the system established in Sinkiang represented a new high in provincial democracy.

Many political prisoners were released, tax arrears were cancelled, Uighurs and Kazakhs were given jobs in the civil administration, marriages

between Chinese and Moslems were banned, local elections were actually held, General Sung Mei-lien's troops began to irrigate land and raise their own food to reduce the military-supply burden on the local people, and Chang Chih-chung fought in Nanking for additional subsidies to carry out a development program in Sinkiang[22]. Although the Ili group might have extended its territorial base by military action, the movement-- which obtained six of the fifteen administrative positions assigned to the "elected provincial bodies"-- had not done too badly in view of the fact that it then controlled only three of Sinkiang's ten zones.

Nevertheless, the progressive experiment failed to work out.

On July 18, 1946 the new Provincial Council adopted a grandiose but hopelessly vague plan for the industrial, agricultural, educational and cultural development of Sinkiang[23]. As late as February, 1949 the Sinkiang Provincial Government was still passing such Utopian yearly "Administrative Programs." The 1949 Administrative Program, for example, continued to call for the development of "capable administrators," the extension of education, improvement of communications and transportation, and the drawing up of "constructive plans" to "increase production, strengthen commerce and lay a sound basis for economic stability."[24]

Nor did the provincial elections prove any more successful than the later elections for the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan in China Proper. In our interview with Governor Masud Sabri in 1948, he conceded that the elections had failed as an experiment in democracy, pointing out that the begs, mullahs and bais had managed to get themselves reelected by one means or another. (See Pages 19-20.) Asked for his version of why the

elections had failed, Provincial Secretary-General Aimabek Aleptekin-- who, like Sabri, was a member of the Kuomintang-- went into a bitter tirade against the Chinese Central Government. He said:

"The Central Government is giving Sinkiang very little and has not done what it said it would do. In every line there is corruption, especially in the use of official funds for commercial business. The police and court systems are still controlled by people who worked for Sheng Shih-ts'ai. The elections that were held here after the peace agreement were undemocratic. When the Russians were here they put up people who were pro-Russian. The Chinese put up people who were pro-Chinese."

Wang Tseng-shan, Sinkiang's Commissioner of Civil Affairs, told us in 1948 that the Chinese had adopted a policy of giving more jobs in the provincial government to Uighurs and Kazakhs and that 50 percent of such jobs were at that time held by non-Chinese. He claimed, however, that the shortage of sufficiently well-trained Uighur and Kazakhs made it difficult to carry out such a policy. Subsequently we interviewed Liu Meng Ch'un, Secretary-General of Chang Chih-chung's Northwest Headquarters, who stated: "Because of the errors of previous administrations the racial problem has become political."

Once the Kuomintang-Ili coalition started to fall apart, there was certainly enough discontent to accelerate the process. On the whole the people of Sinkiang (at least in 1948) seemed to be better fed than many peasants one found in the villages of China, but such a comparison would have meant nothing to the Sinkiang Uighur or Kazakh even if he were in a position to make it. There was considerable opposition in China Proper to

arny food levies, taxation in kind, official corruption and administrative malaise. In Sinkiang, with its predominantly non-Chinese Moslem peoples and their long-standing grievances against the Chinese, the hostility engendered by such phenomena was all the more intense. The "Turkis" were even less disposed than the Hans in China to make allowances for the difficulties of the Central Government.

General Sung Hsi-lien, his officers and his troops were no more favorably disposed toward the non-Chinese peoples and looked upon all manifestations of Uighur nationalism, even among the anti-Ili Uighurs, as a cardinal sin. Thus, after the Kuomintang-Ili split of August, 1947, Sung Hsi-lien is reported to have made a speech at Tihwa in which he declared: "If our first enemy is the Ili party, our second is the nationalist group. The nationalists had better forget their slogan, 'Turkestan first,' or there will be trouble."[25] Sung Hsi-lien was transferred to a new command in Hupeh in July, 1948 and was replaced as the Sinkiang commander by Lieut. General T'ao Chih-yueh, a Chang Chih-chung man. Sung's transfer was not mourned by the Sinkiang Uighurs.

Great as such problems were, they were surpassed in direct political importance by the struggle for power between the Kuomintang and the Ili group inside the July, 1946-August, 1947 coalitions.

Chang Chih-chung started out in Sinkiang with the slogan of "Peace, Cooperation, Democracy and Unification"[26], but his idea of China-Sinkiang "unification"-- at least during the 1945-1947 period-- was "unification" under the dominant control of the Kuomintang Central Government. The Ili leaders were prepared to recognize Kuomintang China as the sovereign

government, but they had ideas of their own on who should control the provincial regime.

Under Chang Chih-chung, the activities of the Kuomintang were extended in Sinkiang, with the party enlisting new members and setting up branches of the San Min Chu-I Youth Corps at Tihwa and Kashgar[27]. Although Chang assigned more jobs to Uighurs and Kazakhs in the provincial administration, the Chinese maintained control over the police and the courts. When Chang named Masud Sabri to succeed him as governor on May 23, 1947, the Kuomintang strengthened its control over the provincial government-- and gave the Ili leaders one more reason for pulling out.

The Kuomintang depended for its power inside the coalition on two main groups: 1.) the Kirei Kazakhs, some of whom the Chinese had won over in 1946 and others of whom broke away from the Ili movement in April, 1946 with Osman Bator, an influential Kirei leader; and 2.) the so-called Uighur "Autonomists," including Masud Sabri, Aisabek Aleptekin and Mohammed Kimin.

By far the most important Kirei leader was Osman Bator, a military figure whom we interviewed in the mountains near Kuchengtse (Kitai) in 1948 and whose story is told below. Among the Kirei leaders in Tihwa were Jarimhan, Commissioner of Finance; Salis, Deputy Secretary-General; and the woman Hatewan, District Office of Tihwa. Hatewan was the 250-pound wife of the Kirei Kazakh prince, Ailin Wang, and she completely dominated the hen-pecked little man. Jarimhan was a shrewd, illiterate Kazakh with a heavy gold chain dangling from his crusty vest. Someone else must have written Jarimhan's name for the plate used in printing Sinkiang's paper money, for when I asked him for his autograph during the course of an interview at

him, he asked his secretary to write his name down for him. I got the impression, however, that Jarimban knew how to count.

Masud Sabri, the Uighur governor of Sinkiang, was born in 1894 at the small town of Arabos in the Ili Zone of a landowning-merchant family. At the age of 16, his parents sent him to Turkey to continue his education. Sabri spent 11 years in Constantinople, finishing high school, studying medicine and picking up Pan-Islam ideas. After returning to Sinkiang in 1918, he taught school, practiced medicine and was active in the Sinkiang Pan-Islam movement. Then in 1934, just about the time Sheng Shih-ts'ai began his decade of cooperation with the Soviet Union, Sabri left Ili and made his way to China via India. By 1945 Sabri had been elected to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Chungking.

Aisabek Aleptekin, the Uighur Secretary-General of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, was born at Yangihissar (Kashgaria) of a well-to-do landed family. He spent much of his youth traveling in the Moslem countries, became editor of the Turkistan Avazi (Voice of Turkestan) and, after leaving Sinkiang for China in 1933, eventually took over the editorship of Altai, the Kuomintang's Uighur newspaper in Chungking.

Mohammed Emin, the "Emir of Khotan," also fled to China during the days of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and subsequently joined Aisabek on the editorial board of Altai. On the reorganization of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, Mohammed Emin was appointed Commissioner of Reconstruction by Chang Chih-chung.

All three leaders of the Sinkiang "Autonomists"-- Masud Sabri, Aisabek and Mohammed Emin-- were members of the Kuomintang, but they were

essentially old-style Moslem nationalists who joined forces with the Kuomintang because they considered the Kuomintang a lesser evil than Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the Russians. Like the displaced nationalists of Russian Central Asia during the Bolshevik Revolution, the "Autonomists" wanted a liberal, autonomous and middle-class government for Sinkiang.

Even in Chungking the "Autonomists" took issue with the Kuomintang "racial theorists" on the question of "one Chinese family," holding that the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang was for the most part one "Turkic nation" separate from the Chinese[28]. When we interviewed Aimbek and Mohammed Emin in 1948, they gave vent to sharp criticism of the Kuomintang administration in Sinkiang. Nevertheless, the "Autonomists" remained in the provincial government after the Ili leaders walked out in August, 1947. The "Autonomists" could not exist without the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang would not have had even the semblance of an autonomous provincial government after 1947 without the "Autonomists."

The middleman in the Sinkiang coalition from the start was Borhan, one of the two vice-governors, who seemed in 1948 to be cooperating with everybody at the same time. Borhan, a Tatar, was then 52. He was born in the Kazan area of Russia, but later came to Sinkiang with his family. After studying economics and political science at the University of Berlin, Borhan returned to Sinkiang in 1932 and was subsequently appointed Sinkiang's consul-general at Zaisan by Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Later, however, he was recalled and imprisoned by Sheng.

Fluent in Chinese, Russian, German and Uighur, Borhan has translated some of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's writings into Uighur and also compiled a Uighur-

Chinese-Russian dictionary. He remained in Tihwa as vice-governor after the Ili walkout in August, 1947, but maintained friendly relations with Ining. In early 1948, when Chang Chih-chung resumed negotiations with the Russians on the postponed matter of a Sino-Soviet mineral and commercial agreement for Sinkiang, Borhan was named governor of the province.

"Sinkiang is like a guitar," Borhan told us in 1948. "All the strings must be in tune for it to play well."

b. The Collapse of the Kuomintang-Ili Coalition

Although the Tihwa coalition was not "in tune" from the very beginning, it survived a long series of local incidents and the constant internal political tug-of-war until the crack-up began in February, 1947. The process of disintegration stretched on from February to the summer of that year, when the Kuomintang found itself confronted by both a sequence of uprisings in Sinkiang and the renewal of Sino-Mongolian border clashes in the Peitashan area. The border clashes were renewed in June, the uprisings took place in July and the Ili leaders pulled out of the Tihwa coalition in August.

(1) The Uighur Uprisings

The beginning of the end was signalled on February 19, 1947 by the convocation at the Tihwa Uighur Club of a "liberty mass meeting," which drew up a 55-point resolution of protest and gave Chang Chih-chung 72 hours to reply to this "ultimatum."[29] On February 21 the Uighurs staged a street demonstration and drafted a second length petition. A third petition was drafted on February 23.

Among the demands made by the demonstrating Uighurs were the

following: reduction of provincial taxes by 50 percent; the withdrawal of most of the Chinese troops from in Sinkiang; the abolition of army food levies and purchases of military supplies in the open market; a judicial reorganization in which every single incumbent judge would be replaced; the end of secret police activities and the release of political prisoners; the organization of an all-Uighur police force; and new elections in all "oppressed" districts. The petitions also attacked the Kirei Kazakhs in the Tihwa coalition and demanded the arrest of Osman Bator, the Kirei leader who had broken with Ili in April, 1946[30].

Once the Uighurs started drafting petitions, the Kazakhs and Tungans did the same. But the minor complaints listed in the Kazakh and Tungan petitions addressed to Chang Chih-chung left the impression in Tihwa that the Kuomintang itself had sponsored these petitions to offset the Uighur demands. Even the Chinese of Tihwa held a demonstration on February 25. The Chinese demonstration, however, provoked a riot in which a number of persons were killed and wounded. Martial law was proclaimed and lasted until March 6, by which time tension had slacked-- but without ending the political crisis.

In May, 1947, when Chang Chih-chung visited Kashgar, he ran into a hornet's nest of demonstrators. Chang later charged that Ili agents had "instigated the masses to demonstrate before me, besieging my residence, shouting, booing and creating commotions outside for as long as 15 hours."[31]

After the Kashgar demonstration the Central Government chose Masud Sabri, the Kuomintang Uighur, to succeed Chang as the first non-Chinese governor since Sinkiang became a province. But this appointment merely

aggravated the crisis.

Sabri was vulnerable on several counts. He had long cooperated with the Kuomintang and was, in fact, a member of the party's Central Executive Committee. He had spent many years away from Sinkiang and lacked local political strength either in the form of a popular following or a political organization. His son was active in business deals with the Chinese. More important, his background, philosophy and sponsorship by the Kuomintang machine made him anathema to the Ili group. The fact that the January, 1946 peace agreement gave the Central Government the right to name Sinkiang's governor made little difference.

Sabri was a well-to-do, anti-Soviet, old-style Moslem nationalist who had supported the Pan-Islam movement until that movement became a political anachronism and then had turned to the Kuomintang in the hope of eventually obtaining some degree of autonomy for Sinkiang. He was not a man of great vigor. Although he disagreed with the Kuomintang "racial theorists" and privately criticised Chinese administration, he found himself in the position of being a puppet of the Kuomintang without any real power of his own. The fact that Rahim Djan, one of the Ili leaders, was Sabri's son-in-law did not keep Rahim Djan from opposing him politically. Organised demonstrations were directed against Sabri from the day he assumed office.

Finally on July 7, 1947 simultaneous uprisings broke out at Turfan, Shanshan and Toksin. The Shanshan and Toksin uprisings were small-scale affairs that were quickly brought under control by the local Chinese authorities, but the Turfan uprising required military action by the Chinese. It was suppressed by General Sung Hsi-lien's garrison troops, and a number of

figure were arrested.

Six weeks later, on August 26, 1947, Achmad Djan and the other 11 leaders participating in the Tihwa coalition walked out. Using the facilities of the Sino-Soviet Airline, they flew back to Ining. The Kuomintang-Ili alliance was over.

(2) The Peitashan Trouble

As was noted above, Sino-Mongol border clashes in the Peitashan area were resumed a month before the outbreak of the Turfan, Shanshan and Toksin uprisings. Although the Peitashan Incident of June 5, 1947, may have been caused by special factors unrelated to the overall political situation in Sinkiang, the eruptions that confronted the Kuomintang there between 1944 and 1947 had a way of breaking out in multiplicity and in striking time sequences. Thus the Sheng-Soviet break of 1943 was followed in 1944 by a Sino-Mongol border incident and then the Ili revolt. Also, the Ili Army's Jungarian offensive of August, 1945 was accompanied by the "Sarikol Revolt" in Kashgaria.

The Peitashan, which is part of the Altain Mountain system, is a small range that lies along the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolian border about 175 miles northeast of Kuchengtsu. It forms a natural frontier between the two areas, but the exact border line has never been clearly defined. In fact, the Chinese claimed in 1946 that the "legal" border lay beyond the Peitashan.

Consequently, when the June, 1947 Peitashan Incident came up for examination in the United Nations, the Chinese claimed that the Mongols had attacked a Chinese position 120 miles (sic) inside the Sinkiang border while the Russians claimed that the Outer Mongols had merely taken action

to recover a position that the Chinese had established "illegally" 9 miles within Outer Mongolia's territory. Both sides had "official" maps to support their contentions[32].

While we were in Sinkiang in 1948, the mountain peaks of the Peitashan were controlled by troops of the Chinese 14th Cavalry Regiment. This was part of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, one of two brigades sent into Sinkiang from Ch'inghai by General Ma Pu-fang[33]. The headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Brigade were at Kuchengtze, from which point the Peitashan patrols were supplied over a difficult road leading to Ulun Bulak.

Kuchengtse officers who had fought the Mongols in the border fight beginning June 5, 1947 claimed that the Mongols had attacked with 500 men and five planes and that fighting had lasted for 48 hours. On the other hand, their report on the extent of the casualties in this 48-hour battle-- 3 Chinese and 30 Mongol dead-- indicated that it couldn't have been a large-scale engagement. The Peitashan Incident did not end on June 7. Seventh Cavalry Brigade records showed that 13 clashes had taken place between June 7, 1947 and July, 1948. But these were on an even smaller scale than the June 5-7 battle.

Although the Peitashan clashes were not big battles, they did cause the Sinkiang Garrison Headquarters to concern itself with two fronts. West of Tihwa the Nationalists had to guard the Manas River against the Ili Army's east of Tihwa they had to protect both the Peitashan and the more immediate approaches to a vulnerable supply line leading from Kansu to the provincial capital via Hami and Kuchengtze.

Intelligence officers at 7th Cavalry Brigade Headquarters told us in

1948 that there was liaison between the Outer Mongols and the Ili troops in Ashan. Osman Bator, who worked with the Ili movement in Ashan up to April, 1946, told us the same story in the interview we had with him later. The basic collaboration in 1948, however, seemed to be between Ili and the Soviet Union rather than between Ili and either the Outer Mongols or the Chinese Communists. After Sheng Shih-tsai's execution of Mao Tse-ming and his imprisonment of the other members of the Communist delegation that arrived in 1937-1938, the Chinese Communists played no visible role in subsequent Ili developments until the provincial surrender to the advancing Communist "People's Liberation Army" in September, 1949.

(3) The Chang-Ili Correspondence

After the collapse of the Tihwa coalition, Chang Chih-chung made an effort to reopen negotiations by mail. From September 1, 1947 to April 1 1948 five letters were exchanged between Chang and the Ili leaders, Ashmad Djan and Rahim Djan. But there were no concrete results.

In opening the exchange on September 1, 1947[34], Chang Chih-chung levelled a number of charges against Ili, including the following: failure to carry out the army reorganization agreement and report to the Central Government on the Ili Army's size, dispositions and equipment; refusal to permit Central Government personnel to take over customs control, telegraph service and judicial organs in the Ili areas; setting up secret organizations to subvert the Uighurs in non-Ili areas; promoting demonstrations and uprisings, killing Chinese and slandering Chiang Kai-shek; opposing Masud Sabri and "trying to win party control" of the provincial government. He asked Ashmad Djan if the Ili group was prepared to return to Tihwa for

"sincere negotiations."

Replying to Chang Chih-chung on October 16, 1947[35], the Ili group counter-attacked with an indictment of Kuomintang actions. Among other things, Ili claimed that the Central Government had increased its troop strength from 25,000 to 30,000 men; that it had failed to pay the salaries of Ili troops or equip them in keeping with the military agreement; that it had supplied arms, ammunition and money to Osman Bator and other anti-Ili Kazakh leaders; that its troops and police were interfering in local administrations; that its secret police had carried out numerous arrests and that it had failed to take into account the views of "the vast majority of the Sinkiang people" in appointing Masud Sabri as governor. Then the Ili group raised four demands as pre-conditions for resuming negotiations:

1. The end of Kuomintang "acts of oppression and maltreatment" against "progressive elements" in Sinkiang.
2. The release of all "arrested personnel of Moslem organizations" and punishment of those responsible for the arrests.
3. Removal of Masud Sabri as governor.
4. Strict adherence to the military agreement of June, 1946.

As the exchange continued, the letter-writers got farther away from an agreement rather than closer to one. On December 9, 1947, in a second letter to Achmad Djan and Rahim Djan, Chang Chih-chung undertook to refute the complaints contained in the Ili reply and offered a counter-proposal as a basis for reopening negotiations[36]. He called on the Ili group to show its sincerity by carrying out the following points:

1. The abolition by Ili of measures to carry out the "specialization" of its three zones and the raising of the National flag instead of the "East Turkestan" flag

at government agencies, schools and military installations.

4. The halting of military conscription, and voluntary reduction of troop strength in keeping with the June, 1946 agreement.

3. The cessation of "East Turkestan" propaganda.

4. The restoration of normal communications across the Manas River and the return of seized public and commercial vehicles.

5. The abolition of "discriminatory measures" against Chinese and others opposing the Ili regime.

In their second reply to Chang Chih-chung on February 17, 1948, the Ili leaders ignored Chang's five points and raised a new demand of their own: the arrest of Osman Batur and his punishment at a "public trial by the people." The final letter sent by Chang Chih-chung to Ili on April 1, 1948 was cold and brief. He stated that the Ili leaders had failed to give even "minimum symbolic proof" of their sincerity[37]. That ended the exchange and all hope of reopening negotiations.

When the writer passed through Lanchow in August, 1948 enroute to Sinkiang, Chang Chih-chung was living there as Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest. I asked to see him and was immediately granted an interview. We spent four hours drinking tea, eating the justly-famous Lanchow watermelon and discussing the political situation in China on an "off-the-record" basis. The more I listened the more intrigued I became with Chang Chih-chung, who -- like Vice-Governor Borhan in Sinkiang -- had built a career on a pleasant personality, political shrewdness and the faculty of being all things to all men. Chang had a mind that stood out for subtlety even in China.

He was born in Anhwei Province in 1890 and was a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy. By 1932 he was commander of the Kuomintang's Fifth Army, which cooperated with General Ts'ai T'ing-kai's 19th Route Army in resisting the Japanese at Shanghai. Later he held various posts as commandant of the Central Military Academy, commander of Chinese troops who fought the Japanese in the Shanghai-Woosung area in 1937, Governor of Hunan, chief of the Political Affairs Board of the National Military Council and secretary-general of the San Min Chu-I Youth Corps.

As chief of the Political Affairs Board, he had gone to Sian with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in May, 1944 to open peace talks with the Chinese Communists. Throughout the negotiations that followed Chang Chih-chung managed somehow to retain the trust of Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time ingratiate himself with the Communists.

One of Chang Chih-chung's former subordinates told me in 1948 that the Anhwei general had once offered his disciples a sure-fire formula for getting along with the Generalissimo: "Study the Generalissimo well, as I have, and you will soon discover how to know from his facial expressions the moment you enter the room what to propose and how to propose it." As the Governor of Hunan in 1938, Chang Chih-chung had interpreted an order of the Generalissimo too literally. Ordered to burn Changsha rather than let it fall into Japanese hands, Chang Chih-chung burned Changsha months before the Japanese got there. He was removed as governor for this action[38], but eventually bounced back in the Generalissimo's favor.

When I interviewed Chang Chih-chung at Lanchow in August, 1948, it was not clear whose side Chang was on. He told me that Chou En-lai, one of the

Communist leaders, had been in touch with him "not once-- but three times." I said I wanted to use that in a newspaper story, and he consented. "Only peace can save China," he added.

c. Sinkiang Nationalism and Osman the Kazakh

The Kuomintang-Ili feud was a polarised political conflict that tended to obscure the dilemmas of Sinkiang nationalism and the many internal feuds one encountered in Sinkiang in 1948.

One night in Tihwa we attended a performance at the Uighur Theater, which was jammed with several hundred Uighurs and Kazakhs. There were some relatively well-to-do Uighur merchants in the audience, but the majority seemed to be in Sinkiang's lower income brackets. Even the poorer-looking "Turkis," however, were highly conscious of their culture and traditions.

The audience sat restlessly through one act in which a band using Western-style instruments struggled with something that sounded like a slow fox-trot. But an attractive girl in peasant costume, who sang a song about the exploits of famous Uighur heroes, brought down the house with the refrain: "We must all stick together." It wasn't exactly clear against whom it was necessary to "stick together" and to what end. The president of the Uighur Club, one of Tihwa's leading businessmen, had his special interpretation. Rising during the intermission to make a speech, he shouted "My friends, we must all learn from the song. Buy only native goods." Again the audience cheered wildly.

If the Uighur masses and the leading citizens of Tihwa had any political preference at all in 1948, that preference was certainly full-fledged independence. There was strong anti-Chinese feeling, but there was

also distrust, suspicion and fear of Russia based primarily on memories of the 1934-1943 arrests and concern about preserving Moslem institutions intact.

Still the more articulate Uighurs in Tihwa knew what they were up against. After a series of interviews with non-Ili Uighur leaders, the writer incorporated the following paragraph in a dispatch sent to the New York Times from Tihwa:

"Virtually all Turki leaders here maintain that Sinkiang is too backward educationally, undeveloped economically, and weak militarily to stand on its own feet as an independent buffer. The real choice, they say, is between China and Russia."[39]

This choice in itself, however, added one more conflict to the plethora of splits and feuds that characterised the Sinkiang mosaic of 1948. It was not difficult to whip up Uighur, Kazakh and Tungan demonstrations against the Chinese on practically any issue. Nevertheless, the Uighur and Kazakhs loathed the Tungan money-lenders; the Uighur "Autonomists" in Tihwa were at sword's points with the pro-Russian Ili Uighurs; the Uighurs and Kazakhs fought and scratched for position in any given political organ; and the Kirei Kazakh leaders won over to the Chinese side were at war with the Naiman Kazakh leaders who stayed on the Ili side. There were also feuds between Uighur landlords and tenants and even between the Ili mullahs and the non-Ili mullahs.

As was pointed out above, the Kuomintang found it advantageous to exploit the differences between the Uighur and Kazakh political groups. On the Uighur side, the Kuomintang's man was Masud Sabri; on the Kazakh side,

ike man was the fabulous Osman Bator.

We interviewed Osman (Osman "the Hero") at his summer camp in the Tienshan about 50 miles from Kuchongtse. He turned out to be an enormous man in his late 40's, with blue-green eyes and a thick black beard. Squatted on a carpet in the yurt of his brother-in-law, holding his own small daughter engulfed in one huge arm and drinking bowl after bowl of kumis with his free hand, he told us why he had broken with Ili and "declared war" on the Soviet Union.

"I am fighting Ili for three reasons," he said. "First, Communism is against religion. Second, we are out to protect national territory. Third, livelihood under the Chinese is better than under the Russians. The Russians take things out." He stated that while he had served as Ili's Commissioner of the Ashan Zone from September, 1946 to April, 1947 the Russians had extracted wolfram ore from the Fuwen area, appropriated 28,500 Chinese ounces of gold from the Ashan Gold Mining Bureau and sent in agents to take over a number of police and civil posts.

It soon became evident as Osman went on with his story, however, that the Kirei bator was a supreme opportunist basically interested in preserving his own power. Before he went over to the Chinese side in April, 1946, he had cooperated and broken with Sheng Shih-ts'ai, cooperated and broken with the Outer Mongols and cooperated and broken with the "East Turkestan Republic." While— by his own testimony— the Ili authorities finally asked him to disband his troops, the Chinese supplied him with arms, added three battalions of Peace Preservation cavalry to his own Kazakh military strength and appointed him a roving hsien-chang. Osman was appointed to the

ure exalted post of Kuomintang Commissioner of Aksu when he attacked and captured Chenghwa in August, 1947, but Chenghwa was later retaken by the Ili Army.

According to a story told by Osman in another interview at Tihwa, he was approached by a Russian representative after his break with the "East Turkestan Republic" and offered a guarantee of food supplies to his people for several years if he would return to the fold. Osman said he replied: "Where would I be if you took over the job of looking after my people."[40]

d. The Ili Movement

The only look this writer got at the Ili areas in 1948 was from the Chinese side of the Nanma River near Suilai, where Chinese and Ili sentries faced each other across the icy, slate-gray water. When I visited Ulmasov, the acting Soviet Consul-General in Tihwa at that time, and asked for permission to fly to Ining by means of the Sino-Soviet Airline, he smiled and said it was "up to the Chinese." Liu Tse-yung, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Office in Tihwa, smiled too when I told him the gist of my conversation with Ulmasov. "Ulmasov knew I would have to say 'no,'" Liu commented.

Thus this fragmentary report on the Ili movement is based mainly on information gathered by the writer at Tihwa in 1948 and on subsequent Chinese and Uighur press dispatches.

The three zones comprising the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic"-- Ili, T'acheng and Aksu-- had a 1947 population of 725,900, broken down as follows[41]:

Kazakhs		328,000
Uighurs		90,000
Karanchis		79,000
Chinese (Han)		58,000
Mongols		45,000
Tungans		21,000
White Russians		17,000
Manchus		13,000
Kirghis	Under	10,000
Usbek	Under	10,000
Tatars	Under	10,000
Tajiks	Under	100

Although the Uighurs and Karanchis (Uighur "cultivators" resettled during Ch'ien Lung's time) made up 23 percent of the population by comparison with a Kazakh component of 53 percent, it was the Uighurs who dominated the political structure of the "East Turkestan Republic." The first leader of the Ili movement was Ali Khan Tore, who was characterised by Tibwa Uighurs in 1948 as essentially a religious leader. They said he had "disappeared" in 1946, being succeeded by Achmad Djan Kasimov.

Achmad Djan, whose photograph in 1948 showed a flabby-faced man in a Moslem skullcap, was born at Ining in 1915. His father was a carpenter and seems to have plied his trade at various times on both sides of the border. Achmad Djan, at any rate, was educated in the Soviet Union and for a time taught school in Soviet Central Asia, but eventually returned to Sinkiang and became a schoolteacher at Ining. Lieut. General T'ao Chih-yueh, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison, claimed in 1948 that Achmad Djan was a "Soviet citizen."[42]

Among the other Ili leaders of 1948 were Rahim Djan, related to Masud Sabri both as the latter's nephew and son-in-law; Abdul Karim Abasov, who was educated at Sinkiang College, and Seyfuddin, who was born at Kashgar and educated in the Soviet Union. The commander of the Ili Army in 1948

was Lieut. General Isakh Djam, who was listed as a "Soviet citizen" by the Chinese military authorities in Tihwa.

Intelligence officers at the Tihwa headquarters in 1948 estimated the size of the Ili Army at between 15,000 and 20,000 regular troops, claiming that they had definitely identified six regiments. They added that additional military manpower was available to Ili on the basis of a compulsory military training plan that brought peasants and nomads into the army for short periods of training and then released them back to their normal pursuits. The Ili soldier wore a uniform that was a replica of the Soviet Red Army uniform, except for the star-and-crescent tab over the cap visor.

Chinese claims that Soviet advisers were training the Ili Army were corroborated by an American observer[45] who visited Ining after Chang Chih-chung's arrival in Sinkiang. Aside from Osman's claim about the Russian extraction of tungsten ore from Pawen, there were numerous other reports about the removal of this steel-hardening mineral from both the Pawen and Wench'uan wolfram centers. After the collapse of the Kuomintang-Ili coalition in August, 1947, trade between the Ili areas and the Soviet Union continued while that between the Ili areas and the rest of Sinkiang was disrupted. The Soviet Union also maintained its consulates in the Ili areas at Ining, T'acheng and Chenghua as well as the consulates at Tihwa and Kashgar.

Despite its pro-Soviet economic and political orientation, the "East Turkestan Republic" soft-pedalled discussions of Marxist socialism and posed as the champions of Islam in Sinkiang. The man appointed to be district officer of Ili, for example, was a Moslem religious leader named

Rakim Beg Hoja. At the same time, however, the Ili leaders established a youth organisation called Yashlar Tashkilati under the leadership of the Turfan revolutionist, Seyfullaev, who was educated in the Soviet Union.

While we were in Sinkiang in 1948, a debate was taking place in the Ili press over whether the "East Turkestan Republic" should ally itself with the Chinese Communists or stay aloof from "the Chinese." By May, 1949, however, the debate had been clearly resolved. Thus on May 12, 1949 an Ili handbill was distributed in Tihwa that began as follows[44]:

> TO ALL THE BRETHREN:
>
> Ever since the end of the second world war we have opposed the imperialists and we note people are fighting for freedom and real democracy everywhere. The oppressed people of the 20th Century, in every corner of the world, are striving for freedom and the results are hopeful. The imperialists are crumbling. The people of China, who have been oppressed and cheated by the Kuomintang reactionaries, are carrying on their fight against them and winning unprecedented victories. The people's army is fighting with unity and enthusiasm and giving their very lives for freedom. The few reactionaries, not finding a hole to hide in, are at a loss. The whole world rejoices at the victories of the Chinese Liberation Army.....

In the fall of 1948, one year after the collapse of the Tihwa coalition, the Ili leaders broadened the political base of their movement through the establishment of a "League for the Support of Peace and Democracy in Sinkiang."[45] Among its slogans were "Unite All the Races in Sinkiang." "Down with the Reactionary Elements" and "Fight for Peace and Democracy." Membership in the League was also open to Chinese. The new organisation's program included the following points[46]:

1. Maintenance of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion.
2. Equal rights to work in government organisations without regard to race.

3. Free election of local officials by the people.

4. Organization of societies for the promotion of culture and the improvement of the people's living conditions.

5. Establishment of additional elementary schools for education in native languages; schools for the poor and orphans with free tuition, food and clothing; vocational schools and institutions for the development of specialists in economic matters.

6. Establishment of motion picture theaters and radio stations.

7. Separation of the judiciary from political control, and the use of native languages in judicial proceedings.

8. Extension to soldiers and their families of the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the civil population.

9. Expansion of medical agencies and establishment of a system of public medical care for the poor.

10. Equal rights to all peoples in the private ownership of fields, pastures, houses and lots, domestic animals, industrial equipment and all other property, movable and immovable. (Italics mine.)

An article written by Achmad Djan in February, 1949[47] indicated that the Ili authorities had carried out a land reform program in the northwest zones, but he gave no details. In referring to the work done by the Ili "Peace Organization Committee," he said:

"Let us use to the full this valuable farming season by working under the guidance of the Peace Organization Committee. This committee reorganized the farming system on February 10, 1949. So let us unite around it and increase farm production, since it forms the backbone of our standard of living."

e. Swan Song for the Kuomintang in Sinkiang

Within the year that followed the writer's departure from Sinkiang in September, 1948, the Kuomintang lost more than Sinkiang. It lost all of China. The fantastic wave of inflation that gripped the entire country, especially after January, 1949, led in Sinkiang to the printing of SD $6,000,000,000 notes by the spring of 1949[48] and enabled Achmad Djan to point out in February that a worker in Tihwa making SD $600,000,000 a month had to pay SD $1,000,320,000 for 120 catties of flour, SD $75,000,000 for a catty of meat and SD $10,000,000,000 for a pair of boots[49].

Toward the close of 1949, after the Nationalists already had lost Tsinan, Manchuria and Hsuchow and with the Communists preparing to attack Peiping and Tientsin, General Chang Chih-chung arrived in Nanking to add his voice to others arguing that the only way out was to make peace with the Communists and cooperate closely with the Soviet Union. It turned out later that Chang Chih-chung had a specific plan of action involving Sinkiang. But nothing was done about his plan until after Chiang Kai-shek "retired" as President of China on January 21, 1949, and was succeeded in Nanking by General Li Tsung-jen, the Vice-President.

In 1946, it will be recalled, Chang Chih-chung was about to sign a new Sinkiang commercial and mineral rights agreement with the Soviet Union when the Foreign Ministry suddenly balked the move. In May, 1948, General N. V. Roschin, the former Chungking and Nanking military attache who had been promoted to the Soviet ambassadorship in China, brought up the question of the Sinkiang treaty again in Nanking[50]. Po Tao-ming, head of the West Asiatic Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry, actually visited Tihwa

and Moscow in August, 1948 to look into the matter[51]. Again, however, there were no results.

Now that he was back in Nanking and a new government was in under drastically altered political conditions in China, Chang Chih-chung revived the Sinkiang treaty question and got General Li Tsung-jen and the Sun Fo cabinet to agree to reopen negotiations with the Russians on Sinkiang as a possible means of achieving a Russian-supported peace deal with the Chinese Communists. Throughout the developing negotiations with the Russians on Sinkiang, however, a group of professionals in the Foreign Ministry kept opposing Chang on the proposed pact.

One of the members of this group "leaked" the story of Chang's plan for a 30-year Sino-Soviet treaty in Sinkiang before talks with the Russians started at Tihwa in February, 1949. This source told the writer in Nanking in late January that Chang Chih-chung was pressing for the signing of the agreement on the basis of the following arguments: that the Nationalists did not have anything to lose in Sinkiang since it was lost anyway, that the Russians were suspicious of Mao as a "possible Tito" and that they would much prefer anyway to dominate Sinkiang themselves than to rely on concessions from Chinese Communists at a later time.

The efforts of General Li Tsung-jen's Nanking Government to achieve an eleventh-hour rapprochement with the Soviet Union as a basis for peace with the Chinese Communists had some queer angles. But none was more fantastic than the Nanking regime's proposal to the United States Embassy on January 23, 1949, that Washington should issue a statement in support of Li Tsung-jen to strengthen his hand in striking a Sino-Soviet bargain that would

exclude American influence from China. This maneuver was later discussed in the State Department White Paper as follows[52]:

> On January 23 a representative of the Acting President called on Ambassador Stuart to request a public statement of support from the United States. This representative said that General Li had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy and had worked out a tentative three-point draft agreement between China and the Soviet Union which the Soviet Ambassador had taken with him to Moscow a few days earlier. The three points were: (1) strict Chinese neutrality in any future international conflict; (2) the elimination of American influence to as great an extent as possible in China; (3) the establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia. General Li had agreed to these three points in principle and felt that his hand would be strengthened in negotiating on them if he had a statement of American support. The Department at once replied that it considered it "incredible that Li Tsung-jen should seek a United States statement indicating support for the purpose of strengthening his position while at the same time arranging a tentative agreement with Russia calling for elimination of American influence from China." The Ambassador was instructed to make these views known to General Li.

From January to September, 1949 Chang Chih-chung was an extremely busy man. On January 28 he flew from Nanking to Lanchow via Hankow, where he had a two-day conference with General Pai Chung-hsi, co-leader with Acting President Li Tsung-jen of the "Kwangsi Clique."[53] In Lanchow he called a two-day conference of all the major Nationalist leaders in Northwest China, including Borhan, who had just been appointed to succeed Masud Sabri as Governor of Sinkiang[54]. Then in early February Liu Tse-yung, Foreign Affairs Commissioner in Sinkiang, and Liu Meng-ch'un, Secretary-General of Chang's Northwest Headquarters, began negotiating with a Russian mission headed by Alexandre Saveliev[55].

As the negotiations continued at Tihua, and without any results, Chang Chih-chung turned his attention to the bigger job of negotiating peace with the Chinese Communists. He left Nanking for Peiping on September 1, 1949,

as the chairman of Li Tsung-jen's peace mission. The mission accepted a 24-point Communist peace ultimatum that amounted to surrender for the Nanking Government. When the Li Tsung-jen regime rejected these terms, Chang Chih-chung stayed behind in Peiping and later joined the Communist coalition.

Meanwhile, the inflation in Sinkiang got to the point where the people started using tea bricks for money. In March, 1949 Borhan's provincial government abandoned the use of paper money and introduced the free exchange of silver[56]. The inevitability of Chinese Communist rule and increased Russian influence in Sinkiang was by that time fully appreciated there. When Masud Sabri's newspaper published an article on February 28 containing a passage to the effect that marketplace gossips were talking about how the days of Sheng Shih-ts'ai were about to return[57], the paper was immediately suppressed. This action caused Aimabek's newspaper to respond with an editorial entitled "Fettered Liberty."[58] The editorial asserted:

> To circumscribe freedom will cause trouble for the people. Our race, which has been restricted for years, must guard against new losses of liberty that has long been fought for. We have never accepted limitations concerning public welfare. The recent editorial in Light provides no justification for suppression, since it does not attack the government, its officials or current policies, but merely deals with the people's livelihood. We agree that political phrases will fill no empty stomachs. It is strange that the government should care nothing for popular welfare while preaching about better farming and animal husbandry. Liberty should mean only care for the people, and have no other standard. Actions governed by personal aims other than the public good cannot be called freedom. History has another name for it—dictatorship.

After the Chinese Communists captured Nanking and Shanghai, the Tihwa press began printing anti-American editorials and Soviet cartoons vilifying the United States[59]. For example one front-page cartoon entitled "Wall

Street's Bargain" showed a man in striped pants, with a tommy-gun in his pocket and blood dripping from his hands, holding a balance-scale with "Western Europe" on one side and horsemeat, cigarettes and chewing gum on the other[60].

In August, 1949 J. Hall Paxton, the United States Consul-General at Tihwa, closed the consulate and left the Sinkiang capital for Kashgar with a consular party of 16[61]. This party, which grew in size at Kashgar, eventually made its way to India after a hard trip over the Karakorum Mountains. The British Consul-General, George Fox-Holmes, stayed behind in Tihwa.

Finally on September 25, 1949 General T'ao Chih-yueh, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison, sent a telegram to Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the Communist "People's Liberation Army," announcing that the Chinese officials in the province had decided to abandon the Kuomintang and accept Communist military authority. The message said in part[62]:

> We, the officers and men stationed in Sinkiang during the past three or four years, under the leadership of General Chang Chih-chung, supported the internal policy of peace and the external policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. Since General Chang's departure from the Northwest, the situation in China Proper has changed. General Chang has repeatedly exhibited his concern and instructed us in the great virtues of revolution. He urged the officers and men of all his forces to hasten to join the camp of the people's democracy, thus contributing to the benefit of the country.

An 11-man mission headed by Ch'u Wu, Mayor of Tihwa, went out around October 15, 1949 to welcome Communist General P'eng Teh-hai's advancing Northwest "People's Liberation Army" into Sinkiang[63]. P'eng's troops

entered Tihwa on October 20. A new era had begun for Sinkiang.

But it was to be an era without some of the top leaders of the old "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic." In September a number of the Ili leaders, including Achmed Djan, General Ismail Djan and Abdul Karim Abasov, took off by plane for Peiping to attend the opening of the assembly that was to establish the Chinese People's Republic. The plane on which they were traveling crashed and all the passengers and crew-members were killed[64].

When the People's Consultative Conference was convoked at Peiping, the head of the new Sinkiang delegation turned out to be Seyfuddin, former Minister of Education in the Kuomintang-Ili coalition. In December, 1949 he was officially inducted into the Chinese Communist Party in a ceremony held at Tihwa and presided over by Wang Chen, secretary of the party's Sinkiang Sub-Bureau. On being sworn in as a member of the Chinese Communist Party, Seyfuddin made a speech in which he stated[65]:

> It is only under the leadership of Marxism-Leninism and under the banner of Mao Tse-tung that the Chinese Revolution can march to complete victory and the various peoples of Sinkiang obtain complete liberation. I sincerely wish to be a Communist Party member. I shall contribute all I have for revolutionary enterprise, even if I have to give my life.

On January 31, 1950 Seyfuddin left for Moscow to take part in the talks then being held there between Mao Tse-tung and the Soviet leaders. Then on March 28, 1950 the Soviet Telegraph Agency (Tass) announced that the Soviet Union and China had reached a 30-year agreement on Sinkiang. There was no mention of any commercial agreement that may have been reached, but it was disclosed that two joint Sino-Soviet companies would be established to exploit Sinkiang's oil resources and all other minerals except iron, with

the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic to split the profits[66].

At long last the Soviet Union had reestablished the position it had held in Sinkiang during the 1934-1943 decade of Sheng Shih-ts'ai -- and by a treaty with a new Communist-dominated Central Government in China.

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NOTES

1. State Department White Paper, pp. 1043-1044.

2. Cf. White Paper, p. 129.

3. Cf. White Paper, pp. 130-131.

4. White Paper, p. 132.

5. Ibid.

6. White Paper, p. 260.

7. Cf. White Paper, p. 125.

8. As a newspaper correspondent, the writer first encountered the Soviet Red Army in Jehol in January, 1946 and soon thereafter and for a longer period in Manchuria.

9. New York Times, March 8, 1946.

10. Cf. White Paper, pp. 597-598.

11. On February 9, 1946, for example, Secretary of State Byrnes instructed the United States Embassies in Moscow and Chungking to deliver identical notes to the Soviet and Chinese Governments expressing American "concern" about "current reports" of Sino-Soviet discussions on an industrial partnership in Manchuria. For text of the Byrnes' note, see White Paper, pp. 596-597.

12. The writer was at the Changchun railway station to see Carlov leave and also watched the Communists seize the city in a four-day battle. There were four other American correspondents in Changchun at that time.

13. Ta Kung Pao ("A Study of the Sino-Soviet Local Commercial Pact"), Shanghai, February 5, 1949. During the Sheng Shih-ts'ai regime and after General Chang Chih-chung became director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest, the Ta Kung Pao had the inside track on Sinkiang news. As a university student in Nanking, Sheng Shih-ts'ai studied under Chang Chi-luan, who later became editor of the Ta Kung Pao. Until he went over to the Communists officially in September, 1949, Chang Chih-chung had worked closely with the "Political Science Group" in the Kuomintang. The Ta Kung Pao, which is now Communist-controlled, was also affiliated with the "Political Science Group" even though its editorial views were not always in accord with those of the group's leadership.

14. The dates listed here are based on information gathered by the writer in Sinkiang.

15. A summary of the Kuomintang-Ili negotiations and developments in Sinkiang between 1945 and 1948 is also contained in a report written by A. Doak Barnett for the Institute of Current World Affairs (New York) in 1948. Mr. Barnett was an Institute of Current World Affairs Fellow and also a correspondent for the Chicago Daily News in China. His excellent report has not been issued for general publication. While traveling in Sinkiang in 1948, this writer wrote a series of articles on Sinkiang that appeared in the New York Times on August 26, August 27, August 28, September 3, September 6 and September 7 of that year.

16. Cf. Tillman Durdin, New York Times, March 13, 1946.

17. Cf. New York Times, September 15, 1945. (Durdin dispatch.)

18. Cf. New York Times, October 21, 1945 (Durdin dispatch.)

19. See report of Mao Tse-tung's visit to Chungking in August-September, 1945 in State Department White Paper, pp. 107-108.

20. Text published by Central News Agency, June 29, 1946.

21. Text published by Chinese Central News Agency, June 29, 1946.

22. Cf. Lattimore, op. cit., p. 91.

23. Copy of plan seen by writer in Sinkiang.

24. Sinkiang Jih Pao, February 19, 1949.

25. Quoted by Frank Robertson, New York Times, February 1, 1948.

26. Chang Chih-chung recalled this slogan in a letter addressed to Achmad Djan on September 1, 1947. Text of letter published by Ho P'ing Jih Pao, Shanghai, September 11, 1947.

27. Cf. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 92-93.

28. Cf. Lattimore, pp. 112-113.

29. The word "ultimatum" was used by Chang Chih-sheng when he referred back to the incident in the letter he sent to the Ili leaders on September 1, 1947 after the collapse of the coalition. (Text of letter published by Ho P'ing Jih Pao, Shanghai, September 11, 1947.

30. The various petitions mentioned in this section were examined by Mr. Barnett and the writer at Tihwa.

31. Letter to Ili leaders published in Ho P'ing Jih Pao, September 11, 1947. (The Ho P'ing Jih Pao, incidentally, was the organ of the Nationalist Army.)

32. United Nations Document S/C, 2/SR, July, 1947. Annexes A and B.

33. The other brigade was the 6th Cavalry Brigade, which in 1948 guarded the northwestern approaches to Tihwa against possible attack from the Ili areas.

34. Text, Ho P'ing Jih Pao, Shanghai, September 11, 1947.

35. Text, Ho P'ing Jih Pao, Shanghai, January 12, 1948.

36. Text, Ho P'ing Jih Pao, Shanghai, January 21, 1948.

37. The writer examined translated copies of the last two letters at Tihwa.

38. Cf. New York Times, December 15, 1938.

39. New York Times, September 7, 1948.

40. Cf. New York Times, September 3, 1948.

41. Statistics made available to Morrison, Barnett and the writer by the Sinkiang Commission of Civil Affairs in 1948.

42. Cf. Dallin (Soviet Russia and the Far East), p. 366.

43. The writer is unable to identify this source, but has complete faith in his reliability.

44. Copy of handbill in the writer's possession.

45. Ta Kung Pao, Shanghai, November 29, 1948.

46. Ibid.

47. Algn (Forward), Ining, February 17, 1949.

48. The writer was shown one of these notes in Washington earlier this year by J. Hall Paxton, former United States Consul-General at Tihwa. Inasmuch as the Sinkiang dollar exchanged for the Chinese gold yuan at the rate of 1 to 5, the SD $6,000,000,000 note represented GY $30,000,000,000.

49. Algn, Ining, February 17, 1949.

50. Cf. Ta Kung Pao, Shanghai, February 5, 1949.

51. Ibid.

52. White Paper, p. 295.

53. Chinese Central News Agency, January 30, 1949.

54. Cf. Sin Wen Pao, Shanghai, February 5, 1949.

55. Cf. Sin Wen Pao, Shanghai, February 24, 1949; Shanghai Evening Post, Shanghai, March 15, 1949.

56. Sinkiang Jih Pao, Tihwa, March 26, 1949.

57. Light, Tihwa, February 28, 1949.

58. Freedom, Tihwa, March 4, 1949.

59. Sinkiang Gazette, Tihwa, July 8-9, 1949.

60. Ibid., July 2, 1949.

61. Based on conversation with Mr. Paxton in Washington, February, 1950.

62. Quoted in the China Weekly Review, Shanghai, November 12, 1949.

63. Kuang Ming Jih Pao, Peiping, February 27, 1950.

64. Hsin Min Pao, Nanking, November 25, 1949.

65. Kuang Ming Jih Pao, Peiping, February 27, 1950.

66. New York Times, March 29, 31, 1950.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

If it is true that the Chinese somehow always have managed to absorb their own conquerors, it is equally true that the Chinese thus far have not been able to absorb most of the non-Chinese peoples they themselves set out to conquer. Both the history of China and the history of China's border areas are testimony to the fact that "attachment" by an outside power is more than a matter of conquest. It involves the whole complicated problem of cultural fusion and the ability of the "attacher" to convert "attached" territory into an integral part of a larger politico-economic organism.

The Chinese agricultural frontier was successfully extended into Manchuria, where the Manchus created in the fertile Liao Valley a "Chinese Pale" that later became a base for deeper penetration by migrant farmers[1]. Thus by 1900 about 80 percent and by 1931 fully 90 percent of the population in Manchuria was Chinese[2]. This has not been the case in either Outer Mongolia, Tibet or Sinkiang, where the traditional modes of economic life differed radically from that of China and where-- more important-- the terrain was uniformly less appealing to the Chinese farmer.

Although the Chinese first staked out a claim to Sinkiang during the Han Dynasty in the pre-Christian era, they have not yet succeeded in assimilating this area-- culturally, politically or economically. As was pointed out at the beginning of this study, the Chinese have ruled Sinkiang on and off for about 425 out of the last 2,000 years. They have "attached" and "reattached" Sinkiang at various intervals in history without ever leaving a permanent stamp on it.

As a strategic crossroads in the heart of Asia, Sinkiang has never been able to shut itself off from the many worlds that have surrounded it in history. The ebb and flow of Central Asian peoples, war and conquest, and the rise and fall of empires left behind several residues of blended peoples whose basic economic pursuits were determined by the area's oasis-and-pastureland geography.

Despite the common religious denominator of Islam, Sinkiang's cultural amalgam failed to achieve the internal unity of a nation-state. The Jungarian pasturelands and the Kashgarian oases formed separate uncoordinated economies that were not even unified in themselves. In Jungaria various nomad groups vied for supremacy; in Kashgaria hundreds of miles of desert separated one oasis from another.

This lack of cohesion, which lent itself to political manipulation by an outside power, facilitated Chinese rule over the "barbarians." At the same time, however, dissatisfaction with the Chinese created temporary political alliances that enabled the "barbarians" to shake off this foreign domination from time to time. Furthermore, the Chinese "divide-and-rule" policy made it all the more difficult to integrate Sinkiang into China's national fabric. So long as Sinkiang remained unabsorbed, it was actually a political buffer rather than part of China.

The simultaneous appearance of the expanding Russian State and the expanding British Empire on Sinkiang's borders in the latter half of the 19th Century created a new context of international rivalry in Central Asia. But for a time at least, the Russo-British rivalry tended to confirm Sinkiang in its position as a buffer. Thus, as the stronger powers eyed

each other suspiciously in Central Asia, China-- the weakest power-- was able to regain possession of Sinkiang after Tso Tsung-t'ang succeeded in overthrowing Yakub Beg.

Notwithstanding the temporary international stand-off that left China in possession of Sinkiang, the rise of Russia in Central Asia introduced a new force that China was in no position to combat-- the economic pull of industrialization. The Tsarist industrialization of Russia was not as intensive as the industrialization later carried out by the Bolsheviks, but it was sufficiently great to have a profound effect on Sinkiang's orientation. Tsarist Russia provided a ready market for Sinkiang cotton and livestock and was in a position to offer the relatively small amount of manufactured goods that Sinkiang required from 1850 to 1917.

Neither China nor Britain was in a position to cope with the Russian economic influence that took root in Sinkiang after 1850. The Russians were favored by proximity, terrain, the early construction of a railway nucleus in Russian Turkestan and the ethnic and linguistic ties between the peoples living on both sides of the Russo-Sinkiang border. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, they inherited these advantages and, as was pointed out above, added to them by the intensified economic development of Soviet Central Asia, by a dynamic ideology and by new revolutionary techniques that finally produced a Soviet-oriented rebel movement in Sinkiang itself.

The record of the Soviet Union in Central Asia, including Sinkiang, reveals clearly that the Bolsheviks-- no less than the Tsars-- have been motivated more by the prospects of concrete economic benefits than by self-less idealism. In fact the development of Soviet policy throughout Central

Asia is marked by a dramatic change from a short-lived revolutionary idealism to a less sentimental, sterner and even cynical approach. So far as China and Sinkiang are concerned, however, it is important to note that the Russian "attachment" of Sinkiang began with Tsarist Russia, and not with the Bolsheviks.

This conclusion has immediate bearing on the original purpose of this study, which was to examine the Sinkiang problem in the light of Mr. Acheson's statement on January 12, 1950 about the Soviet "attachment" of the Chinese border areas. If this study has revealed anything, it has revealed the inability of Sinkiang to stand alone, the long history of Chinese misrule there and the steady drift of that area into a closer relationship with Russia beginning in the latter half of the 19th Century.

Given a weak China and a stronger Russia, especially a Russia that enjoyed the geographical and economic advantages listed above, such a drift was inevitable on the basis of this differential alone. Chinese misrule in Sinkiang tipped the scales even more in Russia's favor.

If the predominantly non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang were in a position to choose freely and to make their choice stick, there is little question but that they would choose independence. Dislike for the Chinese is paralleled by fear of the Russians. So long as the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists remains intact, however, it is highly unlikely that these sentiments will have any strong effect on the status of Sinkiang.

Even though the present Chinese rulers of Sinkiang are Communists, the rivalry between China and Russia in that border province is not necessarily

at an end. Although the Chinese Communists and the Russian Communists have agreed to cooperate in the development of Sinkiang, the present situation in Sinkiang is not one that favors equilibrium between China and Russia. The Russians have the advantages of political power, geography and an established economic relationship that causes Sinkiang to lean more towards Russia than towards China. It remains to be seen whether the projected industrial development of Sinkiang will yield any marked benefits to the Chinese People's Republic or whether, indeed, Sinkiang will be completely integrated into the economic structure of Soviet Asia.

There are degrees of "attachment," ranging from close economic and political association to full absorption and control. A vital question in the new Sino-Soviet partnership in Sinkiang is whether the Russian advisers or the officials of the Chinese People's Republic will have the last word. Judging from the 1934-1945 period of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang, it seems probable that the Russian advisers will have the final say in the new Sinkiang condominium.

Under the Sino (Communist)-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid signed at Moscow on February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union has promised not to intervene in the "internal affairs" of the Chinese People's Republic. The same assurance was given by Molotov to the Nationalist Central Government in the exchange of notes that accompanied the signing of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. The new Chinese government is, of course, much different from the Chinese government with which the Soviet Union signed the 1945 treaty. Nevertheless, the pre-war record of the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia and the post-war record of the

Soviet Union in its relations with the Eastern European satellites are not such as to permit the assignment of real value to the new Soviet promise not to intervene in the "internal affairs" of the Chinese People's Republic.

Russo-Chinese Communist cooperation seems to face an even sterner test in Sinkiang than it does in Manchuria.

As evidenced by Russian actions during the Sheng Shih-ts'ai regime and post-war Russian relations with the "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic", the Soviet Union has intervened more directly in Sinkiang in the past than it has in China's northeast provinces[3]. Unlike the situation in Manchuria, where the Chinese Communists won control by inflicting a military defeat on the Kuomintang substantially through their own power, the Communists acquired Sinkiang by the tolerance of the pro-Soviet "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic."

The fact that the Ili Army did not seize all of Sinkiang once the Kuomintang authority crumbled suggests a previous Ili-Chinese Communist understanding based on a Russian decision to permit Sinkiang to come under Chinese Communist authority.

Before the Chinese Communists took over the province in 1949 they played a secondary and relatively minor role in Sinkiang, where the non-Chinese Ili Army and not the Chinese "People's Liberation Army" contested the authority of the Kuomintang. After Sheng Shih-ts'ai executed Mao Tse-tung's brother, and arrested the other members of the Communist delegation that arrived in Sinkiang in 1937-1938, there was no public manifestation of Chinese Communist activity there. Actually in 1945 there were persistent reports in Chungking that the Chinese Communists had taken umbrage at

Russia's decision to let the "East Turkestan Republic" carry the ball in Sinkiang.

Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, in their post-war book on China later referred to these alleged Russo-Chinese Communist differences on Sinkiang as follows:

> What minor frictions there were between the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists no one fully knows. It is known, though, that there was a falling out over the organization of Sinkiang... The Chinese Communists felt that since Sinkiang was a Chinese province, the Chinese party should have the right to organize it; the Russians felt that because of its proximity to Russia, the Russian party should organize it. The issue was settled by reference to Moscow, which decided in favor of the Russian party.

The existence of a separate non-Chinese pro-Soviet movement in Sinkiang with its own army, with followers ethnically and linguistically related to the peoples living on the Soviet side of the border, with leaders sponsored and schooled by Soviet Communists and not by Chinese Communists-- continues to be an important factor there notwithstanding the establishment of Peiping's political control. One wonders, too, how Russo-Ili-Chinese Communist relations have been affected-- if at all-- by the plane crash that led to the death of the two top Ili leaders, Achmad Djan Kasimov and Lieut. General Ismith Djan.

The air route between China and Sinkiang is a hazardous one, with virtually no navigational aids and with heavy mists often obscuring mountain peaks that rise as high as 15,000 feet. Still, in the suspicion-choked world of the Communists, has the crash created any doubts in Moscow and Ili about Peiping's official version that the crash was an accident?

Whether or not the crash was accidental, it enabled the Chinese

Communists to take over in Sinkiang without having to deal with the two veteran Ili leaders. Like Achmad Djan and Ismith Djan, however, the new Ili leader-- Seyfuddin-- was educated in the Soviet Union and was a member of the higher-echelon political group in the original Ili movement. Although Seyfuddin was inducted into the Chinese Communist Party toward the close of 1949, he was given special stature by the Russians when he was invited to Moscow to participate with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in the talks that led to the new Sino-Soviet agreements on Sinkiang and Manchuria.

There were reports in Washington recently that the Ili Army had joined the Chinese Communist troops of General P'eng Teh-huai in taking over the Kashgarian cities. There has been no information, however, on how the Chinese Communists have carried out the military reorganization process in Sinkiang.

Even if more were known about current developments in Sinkiang, it would be foolhardy to predict the future course of Sino-Soviet relations there. The writer has been dealing above not with predictions but with some of the political problems confronting the Sino-Soviet alliance in that province. But this much seems safe to predict. Assuming that the Sino-Soviet alliance remains firm, the history of Soviet Central Asia suggests that while the Communists will undoubtedly encounter local problems in Sinkiang, these problems are not insurmountable.

Like the Russians in Soviet Central Asia, the Chinese in Sinkiang have been confronted with the double problem of achieving the unity of economic and political integration in the midst of cultural diversity.

Without achieving any form of integration, previous Chinese rulers in

Sinkiang aggravated the minority problem in that area by trying on the one hand to "Sinocize" the non-Chinese peoples and by exploiting "racial" divisions on the other to facilitate Chinese rule. The peoples of Soviet Central Asia are similar to those of Sinkiang. They were engaged in similar economic pursuits on similar terrain. In dealing with the Russian-held areas of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks approached the problem of unity by means of regimented education, industrialization and police compulsion. On the other hand, they introduced the leavening influence of a nationality policy that stressed individuality of culture within the broader framework of economic and political unity.

Today Kazakhstan is a Soviet republic, with the Kazakhs there constituting 57 percent of the population. In Sinkiang, where the Chinese previously emphasized the existence of "14 races," the Uighurs constitute 75 percent of the population. Under the Chinese Communists, however, Sinkiang may yet become a Chinese "Uighurstan."

Among the conspicuous failures of the Kuomintang in Sinkiang was its failure to work out a successful national minority policy. The Kuomintang had such a policy, but it existed only on paper. Practice was never in accord with theory, and the theory itself was vague to begin with and became even more muddled as time went on.

In his "General Principles for National Reconstruction," which was adopted by the First Kuomintang National Congress at Canton on January 20, 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen defined the Kuomintang nationality policy as one of guiding the "weak and small racial groups" in China "toward self-determination and self-government."[5] Even those who advocated this approach, however,

could not get away from the notion of Chinese cultural "superiority."

Thus, in a lecture to the Kuomintang's Central Political Training Institute at Chungking on April 8, 1940, Dr. Sun Fo-- Sun Yat-sen's son-- emphasized the need for "equality of status for all racial or ethnic groups" and added:

"Chinese, being more advanced than some of the other groups, may serve as elder brothers and teachers in helping the less advanced to go on to a higher state of culture."[6]

The notion of Han superiority is also revealed in a speech by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Mohammedan National Salvation Association at Chungking on July 29, 1939. While seeking to foster national unity in the war against Japan, Chiang observed: "Mohammedanism has many good points; its weakness is its lack of sufficient understanding of the nature of society, with the result that Mohammedans tend to become an isolated group of people."[7]

Although Chiang Kai-shek continued to refer in his speeches to Sun Yat-sen's division of the peoples of China into five categories (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Moslems), the Generalissimo himself espoused the basic theory that all the peoples of China were really members of one "Chinese nation."[8] In Chungking a Kuomintang theorist, Li Tung-fang, elaborated on this concept and claimed that the "various stocks" in China constituted one "race."[9]

On the other hand Mao Tze-tung, whose expressed views on the Chinese nationality question are similar to Stalin's expressed views on the Russian nationality question, has advanced the thesis that China is "composed of a

conglomeration of peoples."[10] In his report on "Coalition Government" to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party at Yenan in April, 1945, Mao Tse-tung attacked the Kuomintang's "Pan-Hanism" as follows:[11]

> The anti-people groups within the Kuomintang deny the existence of different minorities in China, and call the Mongolians, the Turkomans, the Tibetans, the Yis, the Miaos and the Yaos "clans from a common ancestor." They follow the same reactionary policy taken by the Manchu and the Northern warlord governments by oppressing and exploiting these minorities. The massacre of the Mongolians in 1943, the use of force against the national minorities in Sinkiang since 1944, and the mass killings of Kansu Turkomans in recent years are proof of this. This fascist Pan-Hanism, a false nationalism and a wrong national policy, is diametrically opposed to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles.

The ideas contained in Mao Tse-tung's writings and the Bolshevik approach in Soviet Central Asia suggest that future Chinese Communist policy in Sinkiang will be molded by the following tinity: industrial development; the "New Democracy" and the "People's Democratic Dictatorship"; and Stalin's nationality principle. Once the Chinese Communists seize Tibet and Formosa, it would not be at all surprising to find them establishing a new group of border area republics to fit into the overall structure of the Peiping Central Government in much the same way that the Soviet republics now fit into the federal structure of the U.S.S.R.

Earlier in this study the writer quoted Wang Heng-sheng, former head of the Sinkiang Geological Survey Office in Tihwa, to the effect that the development of irrigation in Sinkiang would enable the provinces to support a population of 10,000,000 instead of the present 4,000,000. Much depends, however, on Sinkiang's future relationship vis-a-vis both the Soviet and Chinese economies. If it turns out to be feasible to carry out large-scale industrial development in Sinkiang, for example, it is not out of the

question that the Soviet Union will provide the extra food needed from the outside.

As both Dobb[12] and Wilhelm[13] have pointed out, the industrial development carried out by the Soviet Union through collectivization and planning has made necessary a reexamination of traditional Western economic theory about a State's ability to develop a backward area with relatively little or no net capital aid from the outside. The determinants to Sinkiang's future development, in this writer's opinion, will not be capital or labor, but the ability to maintain a stable Sino-Soviet political relationship, natural resource factors and decisions taken about how Sinkiang ought to fit in with the Soviet and Chinese economies.

Until the Chinese Communists are in a position to develop the northwest areas of China Proper and extend railway communications into Sinkiang, the natural economic relationship will continue to be between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union rather than between Sinkiang and China. Although the new Sino-Soviet oil-and-nonferrous mineral partnership in Sinkiang calls for a 50-50 split of profits, it also stands to reason that in the foreseeable future the bulk of Sinkiang's oil and non-ferrous minerals will be devoted to satisfying existing demands in the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, the immediate economic benefits that the Chinese People's Republic will be able to derive from Sinkiang promise to be indirect rather than direct. Presumably the rouble profits accruing to China from the mineral-and-oil partnership will be available for the purchase of Soviet goods and equipment that can be used in other areas besides Sinkiang. Undoubtedly Peiping will also be able to use some of the products

of Sinkiang's early mineral and oil output in China Proper, notwithstanding the high transportation costs.

But China's ability to exploit Sinkiang for its own development is related to the question of China's overall industrialization. Only time will tell whether the Sino-Soviet political alliance can remain firm throughout the entire process.

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NOTES

1. Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, pp. 138-139.

2. Jones, op. cit., p. 5.

3. The Soviet Union also has intervened more directly in Outer Mongolia than in Manchuria. To combat a Chinese Central Government in Manchuria, the Russians still have to deal through other Chinese. The same has not held true for Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. In both areas the minority ethnic position of the Chinese and the anti-Han temper of the non-Chinese majorities gave the Russians extra political leverage in the past. Outer Mongolia is no longer part of China. Although Sinkiang is still under the Chinese flag, the continuing minority position of the Chinese there remains a political factor in Russia's favor.

4. White, Theodore H., and Jacoby, Annalee, Thunder Out of China, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1946, p. 240.

5. Chinese Handbook, 1937-44, p. 39.

6. Sun Fo, China Looks Forward, The John Day Company, New York, 1944 pp. 12-13.

7. Chiang Kai-shek, The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Compiled by the Ministry of Information, The John Day Company, New York, 1946. Vol. I, p. 306.

8. Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, p. 3.

9. Cf. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 109.

10. Mao Tse-tung, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China, China Digest, Hongkong, February 15, 1949.

11. Mao Tse-tung, On Coalition Government, Hsin Hua News Agency, Yenan, 1945.

12. Dobb, Maurice, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, International Publishers, New York, 1948, pp. 9-11.

13. Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area, pp. 225-227.

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