

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the United States on January 1, 1979, we have had many consultations and meetings on the implications which the new relationship of the two countries have on North American churches. Included in this issue are two people's views (Professor James T. C. Liu's and Dr. Randolph C. Sailer's) that were expressed at the January and February China Panel in New York. These two represent only a small part of the ongoing discussion that has been continuous since. The lead article in this issue by Arne Sovik of the Lutheran World Federation China study program in Geneva is an updating of activities in China related to religion and their implications for the future. Dr. Sovik's article was one of the major papers* which were presented at the China Consultation held in Chicago, May 4-5, 1979 on Christian Perspectives toward the New China, sponsored by the Chicago Cluster of Theological Schools, the Divinity School of The University of Chicago, the Chicago Institute of Theology and Culture, and the Six Continent Mission Program of the Lutheran Church in America.*

The final article by Mr. Philip Wickeri is a report of the significant visit by Mr. Zhao Fusan, the Deputy Director of the Research Institute of World Religions in Peking, to the Interchurch Center where he met with some representatives of the churches. Mr. Zhao was in New York from April 22-27, 1979 as part of a 10-person delegation of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on tour in the U.S.A. contacting scholars and administrators of academic and research institutions.

*Papers of the proceedings of the Chicago China Consultation will be available from Professor James A. Scherer, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, 1100 East 55th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60615 after July 1, 1979.

RELIGION, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND RELIGIOUS POSSIBILITIES IN CHINA

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One must begin with a rudimentary recapitulation of the ideological basis of Chinese government and society insofar as it deals with the subject of religion. I shall not attempt to spell this out in detail. But unless we are aware of the ambivalence that characterizes all communist parties and socialist governments when they deal with the fact of religion, and of the inevitable political character of religion—and the religious element in ideology—we cannot understand what is going on in China.

There is, I believe, only one socialist state in the world that does not guarantee freedom of religious belief, that is unambiguously and radically suppressive of religion—Albania, where not only the party but also the state is declaredly atheist. Pol Pot's Kampuchea, trying to make the gigantic leap to full communism without going through the stage of socialism, was another.

Elsewhere in the Marxist world religion is seen as an element in the social superstructure, a part of the popular life culture that is to be sure false but that has not been without its uses in history. For Marxists religion will die with the other elements of feudal or capitalistic life and thought as scientific socialism takes over the minds of people.

Religion has its counter-revolutionary aspects. To be a believer is *ipso facto* evidence of non-comprehension or non-acceptance of Marxism and the revolution; for how can one be

a true participant in the historical process if his mind is controlled by an unscientific world view? Historically religion has been an instrument of the dominant classes for the oppression of the people, and even in a socialist society its tendency is reactionary. Religion is a competitor to the state of the people's loyalty and is thus potentially subversive. Finally religion is wasteful, useless and as superstition harmful to the people's welfare.

On the other hand in a time of transition there are certain things that justify patience and even collaboration with religious believers and institutions. In the post-revolutionary stage, as has been demonstrated again and again, religion can serve the purposes of the state, be a supporting factor in the process of socialization. Stalin discovered that the church in

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the Soviet Union was a strong support in time of war. More recently other eastern European states have found working out a cooperative relationship with the church more helpful than provoking its antagonism through suppressive action. In China too the party has found the United Front, which brings together non-party groups of all kinds, a useful instrument in bringing unity and progress to the nation.

Religion, whatever its failings, has been the cradle for cultural expression and the seed of cultural creativity; it is thus not without value and even truth. If some of its expressions are harmful, there are others that provide an outlet for the people's need for diversion from the burdens of routine, that stimulate art, relaxation, social cohesion and ethical standards.

Finally, religion cannot be eradicated by force. "It is the peasants," said Mao as early as 1927, "who made the idols, and when the time comes they will cast the idols aside with their own hands; there is not need for anyone else to do it for them prematurely..." In 1950 Chou En-Lai told the Chinese Christians: "So we are going to go on letting you teach, trying to convert people... After all we both believe that truth will prevail; we think your beliefs untrue and false, therefore if we are right the people will reject them and your church will decay. If you are right, then the people will believe you, but as we are sure you are wrong we are prepared for that risk."

Chinese traditional attitudes toward religion have reinforced the ambiguous attitude of Marxist ideology. Confucian agnosticism, the state cult, the broad tolerance of popular folk-religion so long as it did not threaten the state structure and in modern times the belief of the educated classes in the power of science, all these, with the Marxist position, are the roots of the ambivalent and often self-contradictory government policy and action on religion that has marked the past three decades. The oscillation between tolerance and suppression has differentiated periods in recent history but treatment of religion has also differed in different parts of the country and even varied with reference to different strata in society.

The revolutionary period immediately after Liberation was a blow to many believers, particularly religious professionals. While there was no systematic persecution of religions; there were old scores to settle and there were many over-zealous local cadres whose Marxism was not as sophisticated as it might have been. The change in social system had immediate effects. Church schools and hospitals were yielded to or taken over by the authorities. The extensive landholdings that supported Buddhist monasteries and temples were lost, and in consequence monks and nuns were laicized or at best compelled to work the land left to them. Local religious buildings were diverted to other than religious purposes (not the first time this has been done). Sometimes rent was paid to their owners. Religious professionals were encouraged to find "useful" employment. But after the initial wave of revolutionary change religious life tended to continue, except that very early the religious institutions were called upon to demonstrate not neutrality, but active support of the new order.

A Bureau of Religious Affairs was established to be liaison between government and religious institutions, to help interpret government policy, to encourage conformity and to bring the unity that would help religions to play their part under the

United Front policy in the building of the new China.

This meant hardship for those who could not accept the new order or who withstood the purposeful politicization of religion. Christians, with their foreign ties, were particularly subject to pressures to demonstrate complete loyalty. They responded for the most part with enthusiasm, for like the nation as a whole the churches had "stood up" with the coming of the new socialist, anti-colonial government. Those, both Protestant and Catholic, who could not in conscience work with the two associations that were established in place of the older unifying agencies (the Chinese Christian Patriotic Three-Self Movement and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which declared its independence of the sovereignty of Rome) were in some cases imprisoned for re-education; in others they simply withdrew from the formal church structures to practice their faith discreetly at home.

The churches were cut off from their foreign financial support when the Korean War broke out. Under the Three-Self Movement Protestants took steps towards one unified structure that took into consideration the dwindling numbers of active Christians. Relationships with Christians abroad dwindled, and the last representation at an international ecumenical gathering took place in 1961, when a delegation attended a Christian Peace Conference meeting in Eastern Europe. Without disguising their fundamental ideological disagreement, the churches declared their full participation in the pragmatic task of building a socialist nation, of serving the people. All this was not done without severe tensions at various times, as for example when accusation meetings were held in the churches in the 1950s, or at the time of the "Hundred Flowers" in 1957.

Religious activity inevitably declined. Buddhist monasteries and temples were deserted; shrines were closed and torn down; temple festivals were abandoned, and while the household gods were not forgotten everywhere, the hold of Buddhism on the new generation dwindled. Taoist priests and necromancers disappeared if only by lowering their profiles. Muslims were less affected in part because they were regarded as an ethnic group and their religious practices were seen as cultural rather than religious: but they too in their institutional life learned to stress their responsibility in socialist reconstruction.

Yet the religious situation was not satisfactory to all dedicated Marxists. In 1963-65 a debate on the subject took place in the Chinese press. To quote W. Gluer's summary in a paper read in 1978:

One writer advocated a liberal religious policy that denied freedom to "feudal superstition" (folk religion and superstitious acts) but upheld the freedom of the more developed religions for which he foresaw a rightful place in socialist society. This view was based on the assumption that these religions had, at a time of more than a decade after liberation lost their pre-revolutionary feudal and imperialist faults. Practically, this meant an end to class-struggle and was, therefore, rejected by his opponents. The author's assertion of a gradual decline of religion in the transition to communist society did not render his propositions palatable to his opponent, nor did his repeated professions of his personal atheism. His view appears to have been motivated by pragmatism.

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similar to Mao's advice of toleration, rather than by an appreciation of any merits of religion. Yet those theoreticians who objected to his deliberations felt that time was running out, and the decline of religion, in fact, was too slow. They proposed, therefore, the systematic application of measures that would speed up the extinction of religion. To them, such measures in 1965 were still conceived of in terms of theoretical mass education.

With the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 other means were employed. For traditional religion and for the traditional forms of Christianity the Cultural Revolution, which now shook the country to its roots, was catastrophic. Temples, mosques and churches were closed so the nation could concentrate on the business at hand, the rooting out of the "four old things." Traditional literature, including all the religious books that could be found, was confiscated, and almost all was destroyed, although there are reports that in some places those who wanted to identify themselves could later reclaim their Bibles. Religious organizations, like other social groupings, were de-activated if not entirely abolished. Priests, pastors, and other religious leaders were humiliated and subjected to re-education or punishment. From the radical revolutionary point of view it was logical that to practice religion was to be backward, and to be backward was to be counter-revolutionary, however harmless or even supportive of the system one might appear to be.

But when the Cultural Revolution had run its course it became apparent that while Chinese religion would never be the same again it was not extinct. Mao had been right in his opinion that religion should not be eliminated by violence. By the early 1970s there were reports that the private and discreet practice of religion was widely tolerated. A Protestant and a Catholic church were opened in Peking in 1971, but their congregation were almost entirely composed of foreigners. Chinese Christians did not go back to the use of churches for their worship, not only because they were too expensive to maintain but also because of what they symbolized (K. H. Ting made his point) and perhaps because to use them would raise too high a profile. Temples and monasteries were refurbished here and there. Incense was reported to be on sale, openly or under the table. And it was apparently possible for the ordinary peasant to take part in religious worship without difficulties. For the educated people, however, to be known as religious might or might not be troublesome, depending on the local climate.

The fall of the Gang of Four and the ascendancy of the present pragmatist government brought expectations to some of a noticeable change in policy. They have not been disappointed. The Chinese government has not seen fit to announce its general aim with respect to religions, but in the last year or two and especially within the last six months there has occurred—and been reported—a rapid series of events that indicate clearly that the policies of the present leadership extend to religion as well as to other aspects of culture.

Let us note some of these events, beginning with internal events and then proceeding to some that have foreign policy and foreign relations implications. In early 1978, for the first time since before the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference included among 3,450 participants, representatives of religious faiths: including several Christians. Y. T. Wu, who had been chairman of the Three-Self Movement, was named to the standing committee.

A further straw in the wind was the state funeral accorded

to Archbishop Pi Shu-shih, who was head of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and a member of the National Assembly; the eulogy, curiously, was given by General Secretary Chao of the All-China Buddhist Association. (One could comment at some length on the symbolism of this broad ecumenism.) Again, when the king and queen of Spain visited China the Bishop of Peking celebrated mass with unusual pomp.

In September last year, after some months of preparations, the Research Institute of World Religions was opened in Peking, a unit of the Academy of Social Sciences. The purpose was to study religion from a Marxist point of view and "in the service of proletarian politics" (*China Talk*, No. 1, 1979).

The director had prepared the way by the publication in *Guang Ming Ribao* (September 27, 1977) of an article establishing Mao's backing for the project.

Chairman Mao (he wrote) wanted us to strengthen our efforts to study the three great religions—Christianity, Islam and Buddhism—which have to this day exerted wide influence on the world's population, in order that we might come to know them better; wanted to have a research institute guided by Marxism, to see some worthwhile journals published, to have more articles written from the standpoint of historical materialism. . .

Chairman Mao said. . . that if we do not criticize theology we cannot write good history of philosophy, and we cannot write good literary history or world history either. (Trans. in *Ching Feng*, XX 3 (1977), pp. 171, 173. It may be noted that in a 440 page *Outline History on China* published by the Foreign Language Press in 1958, two pages are given to Confucius, two to Buddhism; Christianity is mentioned only in connection with western imperialism.)

Shortly afterwards a Christian scholar was appointed deputy director of the Institute. Before the end of the year it had sponsored, with Nanking University, a forum on atheism which noted among other things that the result of Lin Piao's policies had been the revival of religious superstition and the distortion of political ideology into religious dogma. A Chinese Association of Atheism was formed with headquarters in the university philosophy department (*Guang Ming Ribao*, January 6, 1979).

On January 1st, Nanking Theological Seminary—which had not had students for a dozen years—became the (Center for Religious Studies of Nanking University.) Of this structural change, Mr. K. H. Ting wrote:

We shall take a number of graduate students whose specialty is to be Christianity. They can be Christians or Marxists or those still uncommitted but eager to sort things out. We shall do some work in the field of religious literature both existing and translation. Here we expect to get the support of the university community and the Christian and other groups all across our country. . . we will be glad to give lectures on Christianity for (university) students and teaching staff. . . Then, of course, we will be glad as ever to take any job entrusted to us by our national and provincial church leading bodies.

(letter to E. H. Johnson, January 1979)

Mr. Ting does not seem to anticipate a major role in the training of local church leaders. Has the incorporation into the university deprived the school of the opportunity to do that

essential task? Or is the time simply not ripe yet? That there will on the other hand be opportunity for Christian-Marxist dialogue is inevitable: it will be a demanding task.

On January 9th, at a more popular level, 800 religious "personages" met in Shanghai to denounce the restrictions on religion and the injustices of the past years under Gang of Four influence, to call for the normalization of religious activity and the rehabilitation of victims. The Religious Affairs Department of Shanghai, which presumably had something to do with this mass meeting, was assigned, according to a Radio Shanghai report, the task of helping "religious patriotic organizations to develop normal activities and to unite the masses of religious believers and religious figures to make contributions towards realizing the four modernizations." (*China Study Project Bulletin*, London, No. 9, p. 31.)

A month later a hundred scholars met in Kunming for a conference on the study of religions, again under the aegis of the Institute in Peking, and again an association was formed and long-term plans were laid. Among the papers read was one by K. H. Ting on liberation theology and one by Dr. Edmund Hsu on theology in the primitive Christian community. Kiang Wenhan, once general secretary of the YMCA, was named to the executive committee of the new association (E. H. Johnson). A little later it was announced that the government would finance a new printing of the Koran, and authorize the opening of a *madressa* in Kunming (*Le Monde*, April 4, 1979).

Earlier the Bible had disappeared from the exhibit of banned imports at the Lowu customs station: a recent report tells of a visitor bringing 200 copies with him from Hong Kong, an act that may have been unduly provocative.

Temples have been refurbished and opened for worship in Lhasa and apparently in many other places. A Buddhist delegation from Hong Kong worshipped with monks in China recently. Yet only in April a wall paper in Peking reports that its writer, when he applied to a temple to become a monk, was told that "they were not allowed to accept people for the priesthood any more" (*Reuters*, April 26, 1979).

Reports of the release and rehabilitation of priests and pastors some after 20 or more years of imprisonment, have been received; in at least one case a priest was given back pay for more than two decades. Among others recently reported released was Wang Mingdao, the famous evangelical independent preacher, now 79 years old, and Catholic Archbishop Kung of Shanghai, both after over 20 years of imprisonment.

Religion and matters relating to religion have become increasingly common in the media, although they are still rare enough to remind one of the marginal place religion occupies in the Chinese mind. A recent visit to the United States by a group of Chinese journalists resulted in a series of descriptive articles in the *Ren Min Ribao* by one Wang Jo-shui, who comments at some length on the importance of religion in American life. "Few people in China have a religion," he notes, "hence we tend to overlook the role played by religion in other countries." "That religion has retained such powers in a country as advanced in science and technology as America," he continues, "can only be explained by the needs of the ruling class and by man's inability as yet to control his destiny." (Trans. in *China Notes*, Autumn-Winter 1978-79.)

The trend is also visible in foreign relations. A growing stream of visitors from foreign churches, including a large proportion of overseas Chinese, have been admitted to China, singly or in groups, and report uniformly friendly reception. Among Catholics the three-month long tour of Father Louis Wei Tsing-sing in the autumn of 1978 brought back informa-

tion that characterized the situation as "unhesitatingly optimistic" in an interview but also as "very serious" in a written report. Father Wei had lived in Paris for over forty years and written two books sharply criticizing Vatican diplomatic policy toward China. He reported that the number of Catholics had probably declined to one million, that of 145 dioceses only thirty were still served by bishops, and they were aging. The only priest in Yunnan was the bishop, who was a professor of philosophy in the university. Almost all priests and religious were engaged in a variety of secular professions and had limitations of both time and authorization in their clerical duties. A community of fourteen priests in the diocese of Peking (of whom the youngest was 47 and the oldest 82) were not authorized to baptize, ordain or perform marriages, but could administer the other sacraments. Most earned their living as physicians, engineers, teachers, office workers. A group of Catholic laymen whom he interviewed said that they could themselves practice their faith, but that to teach their children was considered "counter-revolutionary." It was from the interest of the young people in what he had to say that Father Wei derived his optimism; and from the general character of Chinese society, which he compared to a religious community in its social ideals. But unless some steps were taken soon in Rome to recognize "that one could be both Chinese and Catholic," the picture looked dismal for the Church. At the close of his visit, Father Wei was offered a chair in history in Beijing University. Early in 1979 Mgr. Peter Tchao, dean of mission studies in the Urban University in Rome, also visited China and was received with great courtesy.

In March, newspapers carried a brief announcement that the Chinese government "had offered through the French Embassy in Peking to reopen the former Jesuit Aurora University in Shanghai as a French teaching medical school. They said they would welcome back the former professors." (*Reuters*, March 19, 1979.) The French Embassy would admit, however, only that the government had suggested that the French "take over a university and teach pertinent subjects." (*China Bulletin*, Pontifical Urban University, Center for Chinese Studies, March 1974.) Nothing further is known, but it has been reported elsewhere that the British have been invited to operate a technical college and the West Germans a school of economics. Should in fact the Jesuits return to China (which would hardly be under a French protectorate), it would be continuation of their scientific service to China that began in the Ming Dynasty.

Further it would raise the question of the entry of "missionaries" to China, a possibility that is exciting many western and overseas Chinese Christians. In fact, there have been and are a small number of westerners (and Chinese of overseas background) who occupy, with a sense of Christian vocation, teaching positions in Chinese schools. Indications are that this form of Christian service may well develop considerably, as may the chance to serve China in other professions. But the experience in other socialist countries and the character of the Chinese society lead to the conclusion that foreigners will not be permitted to enter China as professional evangelists. And it is questionable if that would in fact be the best way to bring Christian witness in modern China. A further question that may arise is whether the Chinese government, like that of Nepal for example, might contract with foreign religious organizations for the provision of qualified specialist personnel. In spite of increasing contacts, there is so far no evidence that this might be possible. Unofficial Chinese initiative in establishing relations with certain Christian groups overseas has

however now been taken, with the present visit of Mr. Zhao Fusan to the United States (May, 1979).

Meantime, the present atmosphere has made it possible for religious believers, including Christians, to exhibit, their faith more openly. Worship is seen to take place in Buddhist temples. Christians declare themselves to overseas visitors. Local worship is apparently increasingly open, as is listening to foreign religious and other broadcasts. There are suggestions that some churches may soon be opened again. Chinese Christians from Hong Kong have contact with local groups of Christians, particularly in the south-east coastal region. Letters are exchanged. Pastors and other Christian believers who were considered reactionaries are being rehabilitated. In March, a group of twenty Hong Kong Protestant pastors visited China and in Peking were received by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. The stigma Christians once bore because of their foreign relations and their reported "denationalization" is for the moment at least not apparent. Yet memories are long enough so that they are hesitant about establishing any formal relationships.

What are the possibilities? There is nothing so hard to predict as the future. But one thing seems reasonably sure and that is that China will remain a socialist state. The pragmatism of Teng and the presently dominating elements in the Politburo are not to be seen as a rejection of Marxism. If this is true, the first corollary is—and this is reinforced by Chinese agnosticism and the faith in science that marks modern China—that there will remain a basic official antagonism to religion.

The second corollary is that the tendency to oscillation between the hard and the soft line, between emphasis on the United Front and on Party power, will continue. Recent indications are that the limit has been reached in freedom of expression, and we can expect a certain definition of the lines acceptable dissent, criticism and aberration from socialist norms, or even the drawing of tighter lines. The religious believers seem to be operating well within those lines at the present time.

The reactivation of the Bureau of Religious Affairs and other state-related instruments such as the patriotic associations are of course a recognition that religion—so unnoticeable to visitors in recent years that some concluded it was defunct—is in fact an element to be reckoned with in Chinese life.

The third corollary is the lack of a code of law and an independent judiciary system, the absence of which makes arbitrary action and inconsistency in the dealing with citizens rights the rule. The constitutional guarantee of religious liberty is not to be discounted, but it is of limited value, as the past has shown. The religious offender is susceptible to criticism not on religious grounds but on political ones. Reports of progress in the compiling of a code of law are a hopeful signs.

Given those constraints, one can still look to the future with hope as well as faith. It is almost inevitable that the revival of government regulatory structures indicates the intention to allow increasing and open religious activity. As long as these structures are benevolent the response will be a gradual institutionalization of religion. Organizations will appear, perhaps rudimentary, but nevertheless effective enough to get done what needs doing—teaching, discipline, the development of leadership. What forms these will take it is difficult to say.

So far as national Christian structures go the Catholic Association needs only the recognition of Rome, perhaps, to legitimize it fully. Yet it cannot accept such recognition, for

that would be a denial of itself. Father Wei's concern is valid.

The Three-Self Movement is likely to have some difficulty in unifying the Protestant community, for if reports that have come to Hong Kong are indicative of the mind of the Protestants who have lived through these last difficult years, the Movement tends to be seen by many groups as a political rather than a religious instrument. The tension that is the heritage of the accusation meetings, and of the differences between the "faithful" and the Christians who compromised or left the faith during the Cultural Revolution period has already created a problem reminiscent of the Donatist controversy of the fourth century church. As long as these memories last, there is likely to be either great reluctance to develop a unified Protestantism or a tendency toward something analogous to the Baptist churches of the Soviet Union, where unrecognized groups live in insecurity and some suspicion of the recognized church which has accepted government registration. If in the last generation the western denominational differences have broken down, there seems to be evidence of a threat of other divisions, the result of theological differences to be sure, but also of different responses to the problem of life in socialist China.

Of the vitality of the Christian groups there can be no doubt. All indications are that they are also loyal citizens of socialist China. But there is doubt either that their generation-long isolation and the circumstances under which they live have produced a kind of Christianity which is quite different from ours. Who is to say which is the greater aberration?

In coming years contacts between Chinese and foreign Christians will grow more numerous. Opportunities for help in both direction are likely to arise. There will be need to try hard to understand, to listen and to respond in a way that will bring unity and health to the church and a strengthened Christian service to China.

WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH CHINA?

By James T. C. Liu
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This opportunity to explore with you the subject of Christians' relations with China is a very rare privilege for one who is not a Christian, only a friend of many Christians. On the other hand, friends are sometimes helpful to a religion without belonging to it. There was, before Christianity, the case of Buddhism in China. Also foreign to China in origin, Buddhism encouraged its clergy to interact with sympathetic intellectuals, who were known as "associated fellows." At Yenching University, outside Peking, in the late 1930s I was privileged to join the Christian Fellowship, which explicitly stipulated that it was nonexclusive, not limited to Christians but open to all. This is the solid basis of my friendship with Philip Wickeri who has given me much inspiration for this talk. And this is my credential, which I hope you will graciously accept.

Speaking of Yenching University, one naturally recalls its president, Dr. J. Leighton Stuart. Born in China to missionary parents and serving China all his life, Dr. Stuart found his old age disheartening: his university was gone, his ambassadorship forgotten, his good name tarnished in the heat of the Korean War, and he was often labelled a cultural imperialist. Yet his faith remained stout, for he was always convinced that the American and Chinese people would eventually come together again. Such example of faithful foresight certainly encourages

the discussion here.

The great turnabout in American-Chinese relations has now come; what then can be done *with* China? Undue optimism is not called for. The limited reopening of China, as of socialist countries elsewhere, does not permit American missionaries to be *in* China. So the question really is: Are there possibilities of other meaningful work? I submit that within limits there are. Will the church and congregation membership at home support such meaningful possibilities? You know far better than I do; but I respectfully suggest that with a good understanding of the situation, they would. The basic trust lies with the good sense of the American people.

Before exploring these possibilities, permit me to make a few observations on the past. First, the social-gospel approach still has plenty of witnesses in China. Missionary hospitals and school buildings, surviving great upheavals, go on serving the same purposes. Furthermore, there are Chinese individuals who remember the *spiritual* background of these facilities. In talking about the past, what they object to is a certain patronizing air or a paternalistic attitude. What they want is, of course, to go forward in their own way that is still evolving.

Second, criticisms arise with respect to the so-called accommodation approach. This approach, initiated by the Jesuits in the 16th century, tolerated many elements of Chinese culture, insofar as they did not infringe upon Christian doctrines: (a) The approach was primarily applied to upper-class, conservative Chinese, who preferred to keep their high culture, rather than to the poor Chinese; (b) Although the approach was seemingly openminded, the rock-bottom was also paternalistic. The word "accommodation" seems to say: "We don't think your secular culture is right, but keep it up if you like, as long as you believe in Christ." (c) However, the strongest criticism is that the accommodation approach implicitly accepted the new way of life and did not deal with China's agonizing but imperative modernization. Any faith or belief in China, if valid, has to be relevant to and engaged in this gigantic transformation of the whole society.

Moreover, instead of the missionaries accommodating it should be the Chinese acculturizing—learning from other societies what they need to know and applying that knowledge themselves to their own situation. Perhaps the best missionary was Paul, who said in the Philippians: "Not only as in my presence, but much more in my absence, work out your own salvation." In other words, the departure of missionaries does not matter much. It would and *should* come, sooner or later. What matters is for the people themselves to develop their spirit.

Third, objections are even stronger to the evangelical approach. While it works in the context of a Christian society, with the long tradition already there, how is it supposed to work with a society that has a different culture and undeniably a different future? While it transmits the gospel, it does so by a *Western* set of words, terms, music, hymns, symbols, and rituals. An average Chinese may well ask: Is this *set* really sacred? It is much superior, for example, to the old Buddhist set, which has long been discredited and discarded?

Without going into this complex issue, let me just illustrate the case in the area of translations, about which I happen to know something. Take the Chinese term for the Bible, *Sheng-jing*. Literally, it means "sagacious or sacred classic." It was coined long ago, when the Bible was in competition with the Confucian classics. But time has changed. Modernization has downgraded all classics, the so-called Christian classic included. If so, what about a new Chinese term for the Bible? I would

venture to suggest *Xin-shu*, meaning "the faith book." For the name God, the Protestant translation is *Shang-di*, meaning "high emperor" or "uppermost emperor." In the late 20th century how many people would welcome an emperor? The Catholic translation seems better: it is *Tian-zhu*, meaning "heavenly master." Even so, it may not sit well with people who do not have the Christian heritage but who want emancipation or democracy. My suggestion would be to coin a new term, such as *Tian-dao*, meaning "heavenly guidance," "heavenly transmission," and "heavenly communication."

These translation examples are not a digression. They serve to emphasize the cardinal principle of an international religious enterprise: it has to be transcultural. Therefore, such an enterprise must prepare to apply translanguagual communication a transphilosophical framework, and transtheological concepts—by no means the evangelical approach, which insist on the format of Western culture.

Since I sound so very critical, perhaps even impolite, you may well wonder why I didn't stay home instead. Let me then go on to my positive image of Christian missionary friends. With an unassuming air, they render service to the people around them *unconditionally*. They do not go around telling people what to do, but *untiringly* and *understandingly* keep on asking people what should be done and how can they help. Once I put this description, which fits Dr. Randolph C. Sailer, to a prominent Chinese who had been a close friend of Edgar Snow (the late author of *Red Star Over China*, buried by his request on the campus of the former Yenching University, now Peking University). This prominent Chinese, no friend of the church at all, nodded his head in agreement and repeated the word "unconditionally."

The lesson is emphatically clear. A good international religious program should be an unassuming, unconditional and unceasing manifestation of faith and spirit through *people-to-people service*. You who are familiar with theology, church history, and the missionary record—your own splendid experience with missions included—know more than I do that this approach is nothing new. The question is how to apply it with China now.

First, the booming China trade. Visiting China are many representatives of American business and industries. The Chinese see them as quick in spotting profit, efficient in business deals, without much time for or interest in talking about life ideals and cultural values, let alone religion. That impression reinforces the Chinese prejudice that most Americans are only interested in making money. On the other hand, the visiting Americans report back that China has a low standard of living; an even lower quality of enjoyment as compared with the old days, though it is still exotic; much material progress, with more to come—but requiring much hard work for a long time, to catch up in modernization. These reports reinforce the usual American prejudice about China. Thus the Chinese prejudice and the American prejudice both get, through such contacts, a new lease of life—a mutually self-fulfilling bad image of the other.

Why not try to improve this situation? Some businessmen in China trade must be members of their home church. Why not brief them before their departure on the Christian work in China in the past and the Christian interest in working with China now? Why not get them to debrief to the church on what might be done with China in the absence of missionaries? With touring also booming, why not help finance church groups to see China themselves, albeit briefly? Is "Christian-fellowship tourism" not worth exploring—not even as an initial investigation of possible contacts.

Second, the educational exchange. There is now an official exchange program through the National Academy of Science. China will be sending hundreds of scholars here for training in science and technology, and the United States will send dozens of students in return. In this negotiation, the American government has overlooked a vital difference. The Chinese send scholars in science and technology only; that is what they want. But America is a pluralistic society which should have a much broader representation. Why not request Chinese consent to our sending, in addition to academic scholars, some doctors, nurses, pharmacologists, agriculturists, machinists, musicians, artists, and the like? They too will have something meaningful to learn in China.

When the exchange of a variety of vocational people becomes feasible, the church can help with selection and financing. Some of these people will be Christians; while in China they will be "service Christians." They are not lay preachers, but could they not be looked upon as lay missionaries in vocational service, without being labelled missionaries? Does the overseas ministry have to be *exclusive*, to the exclusion of "service Christians"?

Third, service corps. When the educational exchange becomes broadened, the time will come when Christian leaders can negotiate with the Chinese Government, patiently exploring the possibilities of sending to China, not missionaries as such, but various service corps, such as science service corps, technology service corps, medical service corps, and the like—even English-language service corps. Yes, they would be like the Peace Corps, except they would be non-governmental. Something like a Peace Corps with a spiritual devotion to service would be the best corps. They do not have to be called missionaries or act in the usual manner.

This, admittedly, will take a monumental decision in church organizations. It will require a great exploring of an explosive question: Do Christian enterprises abroad have to *retain* the legacy of the past *exclusively* in existing forms, regardless of changing times, changing foreign cultures, and changing circumstances, from here to eternity? May not overseas ministry undertake nonexclusive experiments?

Such "service Christians" on their return from China could help many Americans at home to understand the Chinese. They could report to the American people what they had learned in China and provide much information beyond that given by government, mass media, and corporations. People-to-People service is no one-way street.

Fourth, book donations for China. China, for her modernization, needs science, technology, and English to deal with them. In great demand are English texts (usually called "teaching English as a second language" and originally designed for Spanish-speaking people in the United States); English dictionaries, thesauri and the like; high school and college texts in science and mathematics; health journals; professional journals; and nonpolitical popular journals, such as *National Geographic* and *Scientific American*. Some practical advice in order. Investigation here may lead to wholesale bargains and clearances of slightly outdated editions of many useful books that publishers are eager to remove from their warehouses. Often what is wasteful in an affluent society may be a great asset in service overseas. The main difficulty is to provide necessary funds for shipping or mailing, in addition to organizational cost.

Fifth, friendship message. Donors, especially of small gifts, should be helped to communicate with the Chinese people who receive these gifts. Donors should send greetings, prefer-

ably on a picture postcard. A space should be left blank on the postcard for some church organization to supply, as a service, a simple Chinese translation of the greetings. It is reasonable to expect that the Chinese respond individually in the same manner, perhaps along with gifts in return such as stamps, needlework, simple folk-art objects, small handicraft products, and the like. This will show their appreciation of people-to-people service; indeed it will be *their* service to the American people, proffered in the same spirit.

A few suggestions may be made, assuming that settlement of claims regarding former church property in China will shortly come through and some of the money be made available for such projects:

(a) Besides books, China needs audio educational facilities. (Audio-visual education—the visual part—is too expensive to be worthwhile.) China produces some tape recorders, but their quality is still below par. In any event, tapes and cassettes are in short supply. When adequate facilities are at hand, one lecture given in Peking University will be available to all interested colleges in the whole country. What great service this would be! Is it asking too much for the church to take the initiative in coordinating such a program?

(b) A similar project may be organized for microfilms, microcards, etc. We shall not go into the details of implementation here. Suffice it to say that a team of a few experts, if the church would finance it, should go to China to explore the possibilities and discuss them with the Chinese authorities.

(c) Long-term interest and in-depth exploration of Christian and Chinese beliefs should be encouraged in institutions of higher learning. Seminars conducted by teams of experts, on Christianity and on Chinese thought would provide a great opportunity for research fellows, both clergy and lay, to generate much information and clarification. Unlike the usual academic courses, these seminars should serve as resource centers for all concerned churches and communities that want to know about China and people-to-people relationship and exchange.

(d) Conferences should be conducted on continuing exploration. It is far from enough to discuss China only within church organizations. The pluralistic American society ought to have a national conference on prospects in China, including church, business, academic, professional, and other participation. Follow it up in a few years. At the same time, help organize similar conferences on a regional basis.

Suggestions are cheap. There are plenty of answers to what can be done with China. The time calls for service action. The question really is, what can we do to cement friendship between two great peoples.

COOPERATIVE THINKING BETWEEN AMERICANS AND CHINESE

By Randolph C. Sailer
Professor of Psychology & Education
Yenching University, Peking
(for 25 years since 1923)

I am very happy to have the privilege of following my good friend of over forty years, Dr. James T. C. Liu, in making a presentation on this panel. I spent last night at the Liu home in Princeton and met new friends from China there.

Dr. Liu's transcript was headed "What Can be Done with China?" This *might* be read "What *Can* be Done with China?", as we might ask "What can be done with Johnny?"; he won't

eat his spinach." Surely Dr. Liu and you and I would want to consider "What can be done *with* China?" Today let us center attention on one aspect: "What can American Christians do to develop *cooperative* thinking with Chinese of the People's Republic?" They differ in temperament and viewpoint from one another as do we. I suggest that we think in terms of these many hundreds of millions of Chinese, because of the great new opportunities for communication opening up at the present time.

It is hard for us to keep our attention on *cooperative* thinking. It is far easier to make judgments, to accept or reject information or propaganda, to engage in confrontation and seek compromise, to offer advice as "China experts," or to argue. Each of these may have its value for some purposes, but each is likely to impede cooperative thinking. Many of us find argument especially satisfying. I remember a little pamphlet entitled, "How to Win an Argument with a Communist," full of supposed blockbusters. The title should have been "How to Win an Argument...to Your Own Satisfaction." Today we aim at something different. I suggest that the best chance for such thinking will come from a joint search for the similar aspects of Chinese and American common problems.

At first sight, the differences between China's problems and ours hit us in the eye. These are important, but similarities are still more important.

As I try to offer examples of possibilities I am in trouble already, since common problems should be sought cooperatively by Chinese and Americans together. However, we can do some preliminary thinking that can make us more ready to communicate directly when opportunity arises. Even if it does not come to each of us personally, I think it will promote understanding of China and of ourselves, and will help create a climate that will favor mutual understanding.

How about adequate national defense in a nuclear age, yet without spending so great a part of national income on military hardware that our greatest strength—the health, education and morale of our people is seriously jeopardized?

Again, how to free ourselves from unworthy leaders who seek to entrench themselves in power? Chinese have felt that great harm was done by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. Many Americans wonder whether only the Watergate discovery saved them from a basically untrustworthy President. Each society congratulates itself that it was able to get rid of such leadership. What was the process, and how can its effectiveness be better ensured in spite of the power of incumbency?

Further, how can the structure and institutions of a society be molded to make it more probable that the best leadership will come to power? Most Americans trust our electoral process, even though they may be troubled over the importance of a candidate's TV image and skill in making promises and the necessity of his or her amassing a big campaign chest. What qualities bring leaders to top power in China, and by what processes?

Going still deeper, what problems does each society face in trying to make its leadership *both* responsible and effective? With our antigovernment tradition and faith in checks and balances, the United States seems to have done better with responsibility than with effectiveness. The result seems to be that we have little faith that inflation or government debt or crime or health costs, can be controlled. The Chinese Ship of State seems often to sail resolutely on one tack before swinging to another, perhaps making more for effectiveness than for holding to responsibility. How can *both* be achieved?

How to avoid the dangers of scapegoating, of personifying failure? A perceptive American columnist remarked that we

Americans feel comfortable in attacking our leaders but tend to panic when asked to consider whether some of our cherished structures and values may not be in need of radical change. The Chinese, who traditionally have stressed the importance of wise leadership, also seem more ready to attack those felt to have failed them than to study what it is in their political institutions that has brought such leaders to power.

Bureaucracy. It troubled Mao, and the very word enrages many Americans. It is the great body of nonelected cadres of the government in China and of both public and private employees in America though we do not use the term as readily for those of the private sector. How keep them both energetic and devoted to service to the people?

The problem of centralization vs. encouragement of local initiative and grass-roots control. China has prided herself on the way that groups of commune members or factory workers might earnestly discuss how to increase their production, but national coordination and large-scale technology need central direction. In America the importance of workers having a sense of involvement is increasingly recognized, yet most of our industry is conducted through chains of command.

A fundamental problem for any society is how to internalize ideals of service and responsibility to the public welfare. How to keep the constant reiteration of ideals very imperfectly achieved—"serve the people," "equal opportunity," "freedom"—from giving rise to cynicism rather than offering inspiration. What is the place of hortatory propaganda as compared with remolding society better to express its ideals?

You and Chinese friends can discover what common problems you feel. To explore any one in its ramifications would take hours or days of cooperative analysis, but merely raising problems and sensing the perspective of the other society on them may helpfully stimulate further individual thought. This may lead toward a discussion of the whole place of power and "freedom" in a society. How far can they be distributed? How are they related to economic and political privilege? Must more power for some mean less power for others? In what ways may freedom for some limit freedom for all?

Chinese do not begin serious discussion with people they have not sized up and with whom they do not feel at home. The American desire to barge right in and "waste no time" may turn them off.

What difficulties stand in the way of thinking cooperatively? We Americans may assume that Chinese will not think for themselves but will merely express the party line. It is true that in China individualism has the connotation of selfishness, and there is much emphasis on group thinking. We Americans like to have individual viewpoints and find it hard to recognize party-line assumptions in our own thinking. Or we may find the Chinese are *k'e ch'i*, too polite to want to discuss American problems. However, we may well consider how far the enemy to cooperative thinking is *us*, or at least whether there may not be motes or beams in both sets of eyes. For our part, we can do what we can to create an atmosphere favorable to thinking *with*.

We sometimes feel that we can see China's problems more clearly than the Chinese do, and it is true our outside perspective may have its value. We are less likely to see that we can profit by Chinese perspective on our own problems.

Analysis of common problems can develop further in two ways. First, we may consider which problems in either society can be successfully attacked piecemeal and which are symptoms or natural consequences of basic characteristics of

the society. Think of the problems we Americans consider our most urgent; and for China, those felt most urgent by Chinese.

Second, study of problems will soon involve consideration of solutions. To avoid judgmental argument, let us concentrate on implications, on the tracing of results, on good and bad side effects. Solving one problem may give rise to another. China's success in controlling famine, civil war and disease after the Revolution made her population problem more urgent. What is America's experience in trying to give the underprivileged a better break or in decreasing pollution? Can we and the Chinese study together the unfolding effects of her effort to achieve the four modernizations or ours to reduce federal expenditures?

Strange as it may seem, one great obstacle to cooperative thinking may be the very common and natural assumption that we should seek a balanced and objective view of China and, perhaps, also of America. We may praise China for her accomplishments and deplore her "lack of freedom." We may glory in our individualism and deplore our widespread self-seeking and corruption. Assuming that we can be objective in matters of judgment is likely to obscure the fact that each of us must see another society and his or her own through the lenses of cultural tradition and individual experience and temperament, thus hindering us from studying our own lenses and trying to allow for them.

Agreeing to certain principles is not the same as developing skill in their use. To learn to swim, we must get into the water. There is such a thing as skill in understanding. We may or may not soon find actual chances to converse with Chinese from the People's Republic; developing understanding for ourselves is still very important. Role-playing can help. Any of us with a friend can role-play a conversation between an American and a Chinese, exchanging roles from time to time. We can try out various scenarios. They will not give us scripts to follow or represent the Chinese authentically. Actual conversations never work out just as planned. But we will learn how we naturally operate, will loosen ourselves up as to various possibilities, and will make us more sensitive to other points of view.

Has this session exemplified cooperative thinking? Certainly not so far. We did not choose the problem cooperatively, and I have been doing the talking. If the problem is real to you, may we now try to think cooperatively about it?

(The point of view offered here has been further developed in the pamphlet *Ten Suggestions for Working to Understand China and America Better*, by Randolph C. Sailer and Robert Brank Fulton. Available from R. C. Sailer, 17300 Quaker Lane, Sandy Spring, Md. 20860 at one dollar.)

ZHAO FUSAN VISITS THE INTERCHURCH CENTER

Philip L. Wickeri

On April 25, 1979, a group of nine church leaders from major Protestant bodies and two Maryknoll orders had the opportunity to spend two and a half hours in informal and friendly conversation with Mr. Zhao Fusan, Deputy Director of the Research Institute of World Religions in Beijing, and a prominent spokesperson for Chinese Christianity. The conversation took place at the Interchurch Center in New York City. It represented one of the first occasions for a meeting with a Christian leader from the People's Republic of China on American soil. Mr. Zhao has been visiting the United States as part of a delegation representing the Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences arranged through the Committee for Scholarly Communications with the PRC.

In preparation for the meeting, Mr. Zhao shared with us his paper, "The Chinese Revolution and Foreign Missions in China Seen through the May Fourth Movement." The paper is an interpretation of the history of Christian missions in China. It focussed on the missionary connection with Western imperialism, the impact of the "May 4th Spirit" as expression of a growing Chinese revolutionary consciousness, the awakening of Chinese Christians, and significance of the Chinese revolution for Christianity all over the world. The paper concludes that Chinese Christians,

after long years of social practice and heart searching, have finally come to the conclusion that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the only revolutionary theory that can unite the Chinese people to win liberation.

The importance of this for Western Christians is clear. Zhao writes,

any attempt at influencing China's progress with Christian missions would be futile as well as detrimental to the development of friendship with the Chinese people... We are convinced Christians of Western countries would become good friends of the Chinese people if they would know more about the history and interplay between the Chinese revolution and foreign missions over the past one and a half centuries and the present tasks of the Chinese people, and if they would ask for the friendship and cultural interflow between the people of China and of various countries.

The paper set the context and the parameters for the discussion which followed.

The Church in China Today

Zhao began by introducing the experience of the Church in China over the last thirty years, and the meaning of this experience. He did so by highlighting three things in particular. First, Christians have been able to prove their identity as Chinese, and to allow others to realize that Christians are an integral part of the Chinese people. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, Christians suffered dearly, though perhaps no more than the Chinese people as a whole. This was part of the Christian's experience, but in suffering with the people, Christians "paid their dues." "We can say now that there is a Christian Church in China, firmly imbedded in the Chinese soil," Zhao told the group.

Second, in this process, the Chinese Church has been able to prove that Christianity is different from colonialism or imperialism. This is an important step, for in the past the Church was too dependent on foreign missions for support. Looking into the future, Zhao believes that the Church in China will always be a minority Church, but does not view this as a disadvantage.

Finally, in matters of theology, polity, ritual and institution, it is necessary to be patient, to give time for their growth on Chinese soil. There can be no grand design for what the Church is or should be. It would be impossible to manage things uniformly from above.

Speaking of the need of increased Chinese Church work over the next several years, Zhao singled out the special areas of concern: translation projects and the training of a ministry. There are plans being made to reprint the Bible and the Hymnal. Eventually, fresh translations of the Bible and all Christian classics will have to be made, but this cannot be

attempted now, although there is a translation project in Nanjing. For the moment, a new version of the Bible reading from left to right and printed in simplified characters is the priority. Such a Bible would be published by the Three-Self Movement, according to the priorities and availability of resources in the nation as a whole. Although he welcomed the sending of Bibles as gifts, Zhao cautioned that no systematic attempt at Bible importation should be made, for that would be a sign of dependence.

Training for the ministry remains a huge problem to be handled in the years to come. Traditionally in China, a senior monk in a temple would train a few disciples around him. Perhaps this non-institutionalized form of theological education can be attempted in China. Zhao noted that Nanjing Seminary has become part of Nanjing University, encouraged by the openness and initiative of its president, Kuang Yaming.

Zhao concluded his discussion of the Church in China by saying that new life is emerging, and that even some young people are interested in reading the Bible.

The Research Institute of World Religions

The preparatory work for the Institute now directed by Ren Jiyu was begun in 1964, but was suspended during the Cultural Revolution. Since 1976, work at the Institute has gradually resumed. Areas of sociologically-oriented research are divided into seven divisions for the study of the histories of: Chinese Buddhism, Chinese Taoism, Chinese Christianity, Chinese Islam, Western Religion, Western Atheism, and Chinese Atheism. The Institute itself is organized for the purpose of research. But, Zhao noted, there is also a religion department of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in which 22 students are enrolled.

The Institute is now trying to lay a solid foundation for the study of religion as a legitimate expression of cultural life. As such, scholars at the Institute are preparing several basic tools: a dictionary of religious terms; a volume on religion for the Encyclopedia Sinica; and eventually, seven basic histories in the research areas mentioned above. In addition, the Institute wishes to assist colleagues in related areas of the Academy of Social Sciences; the Institutes of Philosophy, Nationalities, Linguistics, History and Literature. Other activities which Zhao mentioned are the sending of a team for research into the Tibetan Buddhist canon in Lhasa, the encouraging of the Social Science Institute in Sinkiang to set up an institute for the study of religion, and communication with universities about the importance of religion as a dimension of social and cultural life.

For himself, Zhao pointed to the need for the study of religion in a socialist society. Before anyone can engage in a critique of religion, he or she must first study it in a detailed and thoroughgoing way. He said that in the future, there might be the possibility of foreign scholars studying at the Institute of World Religions. At present, however, it is necessary to concentrate on organizational and foundation tasks.

Ecumenical Relations

Zhao spoke of future ecumenical relations between Christians here and in China as being very limited. Personal exchanges should be welcomed on both sides. He encouraged

the Western churches' study and interpretation of China in order to help American Christians understand the Chinese reality. Overall, he spoke of the need for Christians to further mutual understanding between the American and Chinese peoples. "This is the Christian mission. It is spiritual. Mutual understanding is the most basic thing."

In response to questions about the ways in which Churches here could assist the Church in China, Zhao pointed to three areas of interest: books, student exchange, the development of a religious resource center. He added that perhaps the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia could use some of its claims assets for these purposes, since the United Board is primarily an educational organization. Churches and religious bodies, however, should move slowly in offers of assistance. They must first make clear that there will be no *resumption of the old type of Christian mission*. "The possibility of Christian missionaries entering China for expressly evangelistic purposes is *nil*," Zhao said.

In response to a question about the need or desirability of ecumenical relations with other Third World (especially Asian) Churches, Zhao seemed interested, but offered no explicit response. Due to the colonial legacy, China knows little about other Asian countries, and lacks resources for that kind of communication.

The Role of Religion in Modern Society

Most of our brief conversation was devoted to the above three areas. In general, we listened and questioned as Zhao spoke. (There was a second meeting with him, on the American religious situation, the following morning.) As a result, there was very little time for a substantive dialogue and exchange of ideas in areas of a less institutionally-religious nature. This difficulty should be born in mind as we look forward to future conversations involving people at other levels of the life of our churches.

Certain aspects of the role of religion in modern society were touched upon, and they should be noted briefly.

On the practical significance of Christianity in a Marxist society, Zhao spoke of the *suffering servant* as the "quintessence of Christian faith." This was his theological interpretation of the meaning of Christianity in China over the last thirty years. "Since the fall of the Gang of Four, things have been different. Certainly none of us did as much harm to social life as the Gang of Four did."

How did God reveal himself in China during these decades? By "serving the people," at least as a moral ideal. This is a very practical expression of what Christian faith should mean.

Where do you see signs of transcendence in China? Zhao saw this as a Western-oriented question. He said that China has traditionally been agnostic, at least since the time of Confucius and Xuntz. Moreover, it is not religion but political ideology, he claimed, which holds a country together. In 2,000 years of Chinese history, whenever religion has tried to exert a social pressure, it creates a greater problem. Religion as a "quality of life" question is important, but it should be a personal, not social, concern. It is as such that religion has an important cultural function for the society, according to Zhao.

ON BOOKS

Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 369 pp., \$16.00.

For those who wish to have an intelligible overview for understanding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, Hong Yung Lee's comprehensive analysis of its first two and a half years is by far the most helpful.

Using his own extensive index of Red Guard newspapers (compiled at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan) and the tools of social science with great skill, the author helps us to look at the larger picture of the Cultural Revolution (CR) and the complex forces which interacted in the cataclysmic process set in motion by Chairman Mao.

This analysis sees Mao as the centripetal force which held things together from beginning to end. He was the supreme leader. Below the Chairman were four elite groups: 1) the Cultural Revolution Small Group (the precursor of the 'Gang of Four'), 2) the Party Organization, 3) the Army and 4) the Government. These in varying degrees, all tried to manipulate the masses according to their own interests. They had to interact with them, however, when the masses responded spontaneously and differently according their own respective positions of privilege, or underprivilege, in Chinese Communist society.

From analysis of Red Guard newspapers Lee divided the masses into two essential groups: radical and conservative. The radical and conservative mass organizations, the four elite groups above and Chairman Mao himself constitute what the author regards as the seven principle "actors" in the Cultural Revolution.

Lee looks at the seven actors not from a perspective of consensus and harmony, but of conflict and cleavage according to the vested interest of each: Mao was concerned with the question of maintaining the revolutionary elan and keeping the Marxian ideal of egalitarianism from being vitiated by the bureaucratization of the Party. The Party Organization, on the other hand, had acquired institutional integrity and interest of its own which found support in the status quo.

In his own person the Chairman embodied the contradiction of ideology and organization. He wanted the Party Organization to be made up of true believers only, yet he felt responsible for maintaining order, production and continuity. Working outside the formal structures, the Chairman gained the support of the Cultural Revolution Small Group in which his wife Jiang Qing played a prominent role.

While all the actors owed allegiance to the supreme leader, each also interpreted Mao Thought according to its own social position in the Chinese Communist establishment, whether inside or outside. Those within the Party Organization would participate in the CR by directing their criticisms at generalized targets ("monsters and freaks" and "remnants of the bourgeois class") which did not threaten their own secure positions of power in the bureaucracy. The Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Radical Mass Organizations, on the other hand, would name actual "power-holders within the Party taking the capitalist road."

The masses who were drawn into the CR would bring with them their own support of, or grievances against, the establishment depending upon their place of privilege or underprivilege in Chinese society. The Radical Red Guards (which included discontented youth, workers, and others who did not gain from the system) would be most critical of the

powerholders. The Conservative Red Guards, who benefitted from the system, would act accordingly with the net result of supporting the status quo. The conflict between radicals and the conservatives, both on the level of the elites and the masses, is seen by Lee as being manifested in their respective understanding of class origin. Those from "bad" class background (bourgeois, landlord), and were therefore outside the benefits of the system, became radicals and saw class as a subjective awareness which could be gained from a study of Mao Thought. Those who were born into the right class (usually children of cadres and army men) were inside the system, and they became the conservatives who upheld the "theory of natural redness." The difference between the two was one of spirit and flesh.

In the almost three-year struggle of the CR the government, according to Lee's conflict model, was the least active. The Army tried to remain neutral but had to follow Mao's directive at the end. It fulfilled its appointed institutional role of maintaining law and order when the CR led to anarchy and chaos. The author concludes that in the final analysis, "the radical and the conservative mass organizations all behaved in ways which appear to have been consistent with their best interests."

In today's China, we might ask, where is the place for ideals? In the PRC's drive for modernization and production, how are the revolutionary values and egalitarian spirit which Mao promulgated to be maintained? The question of ideology and organization and maintaining the creative tension between them remains. In Weberian and Troeltschian terms more familiar to us, is charisma always to be routinized and is the sect (revolutionary) always to end up being the established church? *Can ecclesia reformata semper reformanda* ever be a reality? The present leadership in China is determined not to evaluate the Cultural Revolution at this juncture of history. But Hong Yung Lee's case study has given us a helpful schema to look at the CR which will shed light on the conflicting values and politics in the People's Republic today and in the years to come. One would need, however, to see the privileged/underprivileged struggles, analyzed so competently in this volume, in the larger historical picture which includes the ideological struggle between the Two Lines of the early 1960s.

Stan Steiner, *Fusang: The Chinese Who Built America*. New York: Harper & Row, 1979, 251 pp., \$11.95.

Within the last 15 years the immigration of Asians to the United States has been phenomenal. Asians today are among the fastest growing source of new Americans. This book is an attempt to help people understand the Chinese in America.

Written with journalistic flair and imagination, this volume is small canvas for the large picture which the author tries to paint of the Chinese in broad sweeping strokes. Steiner spans a history of over 1500 years, from legendary 5th century China to some current realities of the Chinese in America of the 1970s, often claiming more for the Chinese than they perhaps would for themselves. With much empathy the author tells about today's problems such as restless Chinese-American youth in search of their identity in Mao's China and of lonely old men evicted from their Chinatown abode by urban changes. The bulk of the book is devoted to describing the industry and plight of the Chinese in the second half of 19th-century America, and his description caters to curious souls who seek the exoticism of orientals and the horror of racist America. Though wary of writers who adorn their work with long bibliographies, Steiner supplies one of his own which is impressive and undisciplined.

Arthur Miller, "In China" in *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1979.

This piece is a magazine article of two dozen pages written with candor and honesty by playwright Arthur Miller. About an equal number of sharp photographs by Inge Morath, the author's wife, is added help to the reader to visualize what Miller does so well already in word-pictures.

Both photos and words present the reader with an experience that is comparable to reading a good book on contemporary China. With sensitivity and human depth Miller describes China through people, Americans as well as Chinese. The reader is brought into the conversations, and he sees China through the author and the people with whom the author speaks.

There are: Chiao Yu, the poet and playwright, who had never heard of Faulkner; the San Francisco-born Chinese girl who almost was barred entry to her hotel because she blended so well with the local people; the old man who lived around the corner from the tourist hotel, yet not aware of what was happening; Miller's boyhood friend from New York who uncritically repeats the official line; Bill Hinton, longtime friend and agricultural advisor to China, unrehearsed and caught off-guard yet persevering; and the chief conductor on the train, enraptured by Inge's book of Tang poetry.

Through these human beings and what they themselves say so poignantly, Miller helps us to see the new China and the great distance it has to travel before modernity is reached. Throughout the article Miller himself comes through as a person of humor and jokes, curious about sex mores in China, preoccupied with law and individual rights, always looking for universals in human nature (and claims to have found them in China), appreciative of his privileged status as a guest, and not uncritical of himself and his own society. His description of Tai Chi as being done gracefully with "tensed" hands betrays

the fact that he has obviously never tried it. This was Arthur Miller's first trip to China. From his reporting we can learn that honesty can carry us a long way.

In China he was asked his opinion about a play immediately after its performance. Before the director and the entire cast, Miller quite candidly said that he found it "boring" because of its repetitiousness. There was dead silence, but after a period everyone burst into applause as if struck by a new revelation. He had touched base with them. "It is dishonesty that creates our barriers," the author believes, "far more than cultural differences or even language." The article is one of the best of its kind and well worth the reading. It (and photos) will be expanded into a book, *Chinese Encounters*, to be published in October by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

BOOKS RECEIVED:

- Kieran Broadbent, *A Chinese/English Dictionary of China's Rural Economy*. Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, Farnham Royal, Bucks, England, 1978, 406 pp., \$70.00.
- Jean Chesneaux, *China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1979, 255 pp., \$15.00.
- Pa Chin, *Cold Nights*. A Novel translated by Nathan K. Mao and Liu Ts'un-yan. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978, 181 pp., \$8.95.
- Valentin H. Rabe, *The Home Base of American China Missions, 1880-1920*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978, 299 pp., \$15.00.
- Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1979, 294 pp., \$16.50.
- Curtis Ullerich, *Rural Employment and Manpower Problems in China*. White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979, 130 pp., \$12.50.

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