CHINA'S WEST in the 20th CENTURY

Bruce J. Esposito

THE increasing importance of China's West—the province of Sinkiang—suggests the need for a survey of its strategic military aspects, its economy, population and history.

Strategic and Military Aspects

The Sinkiang border with the USSR stretches for 1,800 miles from the hub of the Pamirs to the trijunction of the USSR, Mongolia and China. The Chinese claim that Czarist Russia seized several hundred thousand square miles of Chinese territory in Central Asia.[1] However, the likelihood of Chinese expansionist aims in Central Asia remains limited. The Chinese centers of industry and population make additional territory in this area uneconomical and militarily indefensible. Moreover, the Soviet Central Asian Republics[2] are closer to the main centers of Russian population and industry. The people of the Soviet Central Asian Republics have a strong anti-Chinese bias. This does not mean that the peoples are strongly attached to the Russians, but it is suggested that these people prefer Russian rule to Chinese.

Sinkiang, from a strategic point of view, is extremely difficult to defend. To the south and southwest lie the Kunlun and Pamir mountain ranges which provide natural protection. However, from the north, west and northeast, Sinkiang is relatively open to external threat. In contrast, Soviet Central Asia has an extensive road and rail network across an essentially flat area which would facilitate deployment of military forces. There are three main avenues of potential invasion into Sinkiang from Russian and Mongolian territory. The rich Ili Valley permits easy access from the Soviet frontier. The Ili, long a sought-after prize of the Czars, is rich in natural resources and fertile land. North of the Ili Valley is the ancient invasion route into China—the Dzungarian Gate. Once the gate is passed, the whole of the Dzungarian Basin is open to an invader. In 1955, the Soviets com-

pleted a spur from the Turkestan-Siberian Railway to the gate. To the southeast of this lies the Tarim Basin which on its western side has a mountainous frontier with the USSR, and the penetration of this barrier would be relatively difficult.

The main problem for the Chinese defense planners is the relative ease with which Sinkiang could be separated from lines of communication with China Proper. The Chinese have only three highways and one railway reaching into Sinkiang. The railway begins in Lanchow and ends at a point northeast of Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang. Alongside this railway is one of the main roads to Sinkiang. This railway and road are close to the Mongolian border when they go through the Kansu corridor. It would be relatively easy for a motorized enemy force to sally forth from Mongolia and interdict the lines of communication at that point although the lack of a road and rail network in Western Mongolia would conceivably make the operation more difficult.

Early in the history of the People's Republic, the Chinese sought to develop alternate routes to Sinkiang. Beginning sometime in the early 1950s, the Chinese began to construct a secret road across allegedly Indian territory in the Aksai Chin territory in Ladakh. The road, when finished, was extremely useful in shuttling troops from Sinkiang when the Khambas revolted in Tibet in the early 1960s. Of course, the road could move troops in the opposite direction as well. The efficiency of the road is open to debate, however, because the climate and the topography of Tibet makes it difficult to maintain passage in all seasons. Moreover, the Khambas have the ability to seal off sections of the road periodically[3].

The third road from China Proper to Sinkiang is the most important from a strategic point of view. After leaving Lanchow, this road heads in a westerly direction and splits before the Tsaidam Basin, one approach taking a northern route and the other a southern route. These roads rejoin at Mang-yai and continue westerly to Charkhlik where the road again branches onto northern and southern routes encompassing the Tarim Basin. From available reports, this road appears to be an all-weather route capable of sustained heavy traffic.

In the event of hostilities, the position of Sinkiang would be quite precarious. It would appear likely that the Chinese would fight a delaying action in Sinkiang, awaiting decisive battles elsewhere. Most probably, the Chinese would attempt to block an incursion from Western Mongolia along the Sinkiang Railway in the Kansu corridor. If an attack from Mongolia were synchronized with one from Soviet Central Asia, Chinese troops in the

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northern half of Sinkiang could be effectively squeezed between the two pincers.

In the 1960s, the Chinese developed a doctrine aimed at defending their homeland. This defensive doctrine attempted to provide the first available conventional and revolutionary defense against a spectrum of possible attacks. According to one noted analyst:

. . . the principal type of an attack in mainland China that is foreseen as a possibility by Peking is a sudden attack by long-range nuclear strikes combined with a massive invasion employing both atomic and conventional weapons. Lesser threats are seen to include an invasion that utilizes conventional arms far superior to those possessed by the Chinese armed services.[4]

In response to such scenarios, the Chinese military presence in the border areas has taken three forms—one is the stationing of regular military units and public security border forces. Another is the development of militia units in the area. The last is the creation and expansion of the "Production and Construction Corps (PCC)," a paramilitary organization.

The growth of the militia in China has been an integral part of its military development. Maoist ideology demands a strong militia. The number of militiamen in China has been a small percentage of the total men available, with a range of 12 to 19 million being commonly accepted. Since the emergence of the public display of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s, there has been an emphasis by the government to build up the militia, particularly in the border areas.[5] This practice has been accelerated by the border clashes, some of which evidently occurred as early as 1963.[6] The 1969 border clashes resulted in further governmental efforts to reinforce the frontier militias. The border militia units during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were urged "to defend the frontiers of the motherland night and day. . ." and build the "long stretch of outposts along the frontiers into an indestructable 'great wall of steel,' "[7]

Regular Chinese troops along the entire Sino-Soviet frontier total .6 million, frontier militia units about two million, and PCC members about one million.[8] The number of militiamen in Sinkiang is not known, but these troops do provide another measure of defense in depth. The number of regular troops and public security border guards on duty in Sinkiang, according to one estimate, was one-fourth million in the summer of 1966.[9] During the early 1960s and on into the cultural revolution period (1966–69), there were continuing reports of additional fortifications being built in Sinkiang.[10]

The PCC was initiated in 1949 as a political and economic stabilizing force in Sinkiang. The PCC is under the control of the Sinkiang Regional Military Command and appears to have grown rather quickly to about one-half million men.[11] The main military functions of the PCC are the supply of the regular army with agricultural products and helping to provide logistical support troops for regular units. In addition, it is known that the PCC possesses light infantry weapons and some tanks.[12]

The main nuclear weapons test areas around Lop Nor in eastern Sinkiang[13] provide the region with additional military value. It is known that Sinkiang is one of the world's major producers of uranium ore. In Urumchi, the region's capital, there is a major uranium ore processing plant.[14] The main missile-launching site is in Inner Mongolia at Shuang-ch'eng-tsu and has most of its range in Sinkiang.[15]

In passing, one should note the Soviet attempts to reinforce their side of the border militarily. In the 1960s, several

China Pictorial

A glacier in the Kunlun Mountains

military regions in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East were consolidated. This provided that one Soviet commander would command the entire Sino-Soviet border east of Mongolia. In 1969, evidently in response to an August border flareup in Sinkiang, a new Soviet command known as the Central Asian Military District (Kazakstan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan) was established.[16] The aim of the Soviet military is to develop in each military region a basic defense industry which could supply basic weapons and munitions for defense.

According to one report, the Soviet Union in 1970 had 30 divisions facing China, a 50 percent increase over 1968. In addition, in 1970, the deployed military on the border could be transported quickly throughout the border region by air or rail. Soviet forces along the border have been supplied with the latest type of equipment including rockets with nuclear weapons.[17] The Soviets have also strengthened their air force in the border region. According to a late 1969 report, one-third of the air force is deployed in the border regions.[18]

Economic Aspects

Sinkiang has in the past made a limited contribution to China's economic development and will probably continue to do so in the future.

Half the total crop area of Sinkiang is sown with wheat; corn, rice, kaoliang, barley and melons are also grown.[19] Reportedly, increasing acreage is devoted to cotton production. It is probable that the region is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. However, the PCC reportedly turned 6700 square miles of wasteland into good agricultural land over the past two decades and continues this work.[20]

Sinkiang has deposits of coal, iron ore, gold, sulphur, jade, gypsum, salt, oil and uranuim, but only the latter two are exploited in a major way.[21] The oil fields at Karamai and Wu-su are some of China's major suppliers. Similarly, the oil refinery at Tushantze is a major producer of refined petroleum products.[22] Some light industry has been developed in Sinkiang—mainly a cotton mill at Kashgar, a silk textile plant at Khotan, a sugar refinery plant at Shih-ho-tzu, and cement and agricultural factories at Urumchi.[23]



Ethnography, Population and Policy

Sinkiang is a multinational area where the Han Chinese have generally sought to integrate the minorities into the Han tradition.

Roughly 90 percent of Sinkiang's people lives in the cultivated area which is less than five percent of the whole of the region. Almost two-thirds of the region is uninhabited. The greatest concentration of the population is south of the Tien Shan Mountains in the southwest corner of the region near the Soviet border.[24]

A preliminary census conducted by the Nationalist Government in 1945 indicated a population of 3,870,954.[25] The 1953 census (first and only one conducted since the Communist takeover) counted 4,873,608.[26] The latter figure is divided among the 13 nationalities which inhabit the area: Uigurs, Kazaks, Han (Chinese), Hui (Chinese Muslims), Khalkhas, Mongolians, Russians, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Tartars, Daurs, Sibos and Manchus.[27] However, in 1953, the Uigurs (80 percent) predominated, followed by the Kazaks (nine percent), Han (Chinese) (five percent) and all others (six percent).[28] Since the census was taken, there has been an influx of Chinese settlers and students into the areas, substantially raising the proportion of Han (Chinese) to the ethnic minorities.

In 1957, it was reported that the province contained 6.64 million people, and a 1967 report stated eight million.[29]

Certainly, the rapid increase in population cannot be explained by a natural increase, but, rather, the influx of Chinese settlers. Perhaps as much as a quarter of the population is now Han Chinese.

Nationalist Government policy toward the minorities before 1949 was one of lack of interest. The general attitude of the Chinese was that these people were culturally inferior. Of the several Nationalist constitutions promulgated, only the last, in 1946, contained more than the most perfunctory platitudes toward the minorities. It appears that the Nationalists had other, more pressing problems to contend with.[30]

With the advent of the People's Republic in 1949, minority policies were developed. Great Han Chinese chauvinism was denounced. Minorities were given the right to govern themselves at the village level and were given preferential treatment in elections. Also, minority affairs committees were established at all levels to advise the government. Finally, the Chinese Communists called for development of minority culture, religion and education.[31]

The application of this minority policy has alternated back and forth between a soft and a hard policy. On occasion, the minorities are allowed to exercise their rights, and, at other times, the Chinese have severely limited the rights and scope of minority peoples. Over the long run (since 1949), the minorities in Sinkiang, as well as China, have had their "rights" increasingly encroached upon.

The official Chinese line on the minorities has been recently restated. In the draft constitution of 1970, the right of self-government of the minority peoples and the autonomy of the areas they inhabit are restricted. A new clause in the draft constitution enjoins the Central Government organs to help the minorities exercise their autonomy and to advance "Socialist resolution and Socialist construction." In contrast to the 1954 constitution, the new draft contains no provision about minority participation in local government and no mention of nationalities being free to maintain their customs. Article 4 of the draft constitution merely states that all nationalities are free to use their written and spoken languages. In practice, however, such superficial aspects of culture as minority dress and dance are emphasized and the more significant aspects, such as language, are denigrated.[32]

Politics in the 20th Century

Sinkiang's history in the first half of the 20th Century demonstrates that the provincial government was quasi-independent of the central authorities. The advent of the Communist government initiated major changes in this relationship.

The area now called Turkestan has had relations with China for over 2,000 years. At the earliest recorded time, China called this area Hsi Yu or Western Land. In 101 B. C., Emperor Wu sent General Li Kwang-li with an army to attack Fergana and subject it. Thereafter, all the Hsi Yu territories paid tribute to the Chinese emperor. Further, military expeditions were sent to Hsi Yu under the later Han and the Tang dynasties. With the rise of Genghis Khan in the east, the whole region was conquered by the Mongols.

After the fall of this great empire into very small states in the 16th and 17th Centuries, it was not until the reign of Emperor Ch'ien Lung of the Ch'ing dynasty (1736–95) that this territory was again under Chinese rule. It was during this Manchu period that the territory was renamed "Sinkiang," meaning "New Dominion," and treated as a tributary state again. It was in this century, the 18th, that Russian penetration into this territory started. At the beginning of the 19th Century, Russia accelerated its



China Pictorial

A spur of the Lanchow-Urumchi Railway

efforts in conquering Central Asia. The 19th Century saw increased tension between China and Russia over the question of Sinkiang's boundaries and trade position. Also, during the 19th Century, there were many internal rebellions against Manchu rule in Sinkiang. The best known is the rebellion of Yakub Beq (ca. 1860–77) which was steeped in the European international rivalries of that day. With the death of Yakub Beq in 1877, his empire fell apart. The Central Chinese Government again reasserted authority in the area.

The writer is indebted to Professor James Nichols for suggesting several distinct phases of Sinkiang political history.[33] One such phase, 1912–29, is characterized by isolation under traditional Chinese administration; the second phase, 1930–44, involves Soviet penetration of the province through the Chinese intermediaries; and the third phase, 1944–49, was a confused transition period in which ethnic leaders made a strong bid for independence from Chinese control. Lastly, the period from 1950 to the present has seen the implementation of Chinese Communist programs, and Chinese rule has been firmly established.

The Revolution of 1911 in China brought Yang Tseng-hsin to the governorship of Sinkiang in 1912. Yang quickly proved to be an efficient administrator and negotiator. However, Yang ruled the province as an autocrat, taking very little notice of the Central Government. In the 15 years of his rule, Yang built up a family hierarchy in the province. Throughout his rule, he was troubled by fear of revolt and showed extreme caution in handling nationality affairs.

With the October Revolution, a White Russian refugee problem developed. Yang acted in a neutral way by disarming the White Russians and allowing them to remain in Sinkiang if they wished. Further, he negotiated with Moscow for amnesty for all White Russians who wanted to return to Russian territory. In his dealings with the new Soviet Government, Yang Tseng-hsin was cautious, but not hostile. In 1920, Yang concluded a trade agreement between Sinkiang and the local authorities in Soviet territory. Under this agreement, he encouraged the return of Russian refugees, while the Soviet authorities at Tashkent agreed to a friendly attitude on the problem of Chinese citizen's private property which had been affected by Soviet confiscation. In 1924, Yang allowed the Soviet Government to open new consulates in several cities. In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek broke Chinese relations with the Soviet Union, Yang continued normal relations with the Soviet Government.

Yang's assassination in 1928 provoked five years of civil war in the province, as well as political succession problems. Soviet military assistance to one or another of the quarreling parties helped maintain the chaos in Sinkiang.

In 1933, about 10,000 Manchurian troops under General Sheng Shih-Ts'Ai arrived in Sinkiang. These troops were the remnant forces of General Ma Chan-san who had fought the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931–32. These troops were defeated by the Japanese and retreated to

Siberia where they were interned. In April 1933, the Soviet Government transported them to Sinkiang. Sheng, in a matter of months, staged a coup and became de facto ruler of the province. In August 1933, Sheng was formally appointed by the Nationalist Government as Border Defense Commissioner—thus confirming Sheng's power.

Sheng inaugurated an "Eight-Point Policy" and "Six Great Policies" which initiated nationality equality, clean government, anti-imperialism and rapprochement with the USSR.

In 1935, Sheng granted the Soviet Union economic concessions, without Central Government approval, in exchange for military support. Many opponents of the Soviet Union among the Chinese and the White Russians were either removed from office or shot. The Soviet Union viewed this intervention in Sinkiang as countering the plots of Japanese fascists in Sinkiang. As further evidence of Soviet support, Moscow equipped 10,000 Sinkiang troops, and Stalin sent his brother-in-law, Svanidze, to take charge of a commission to Sinkiang to draw up reconstruction plans for the province.

Late in 1933, there were rumors of an impending Russian loan to Sinkiang. This prompted the Nationalist Government to remind the Soviet Government that financial loans, in order to be valid, had to be authorized by the National Government. In July 1934, Sheng reported that he was negotiating with Soviet officials for a loan. Sheng exchanged cables with Nanking, but he never sent them drafts of the proposed loan. Finally, on 16 May 1935, he signed the Soviet draft without authorization from Nanking. The National Government protested to the Soviet Union, but to no avail. The National Government case on this issue was weakened by the previous agreements between local governors and Soviet officials. The conclusion of the loan strengthened the Soviet grip in Sinkiang. Soviet engineers, physicians, military instructors and other experts arrived in large numbers. Factories and mills were all built under Soviet supervision. English was replaced by Russian in the public schools. Hundreds of students went to Tashkent to study military science.

A new era opened in Sino-Soviet relations in 1937. Japanese troops attacked at Marco Polo Bridge, and the Japanese invasion of China Proper began in July. On 21 August, the Chinese and Russian representatives signed a nonaggression pact which had economic and military consequences for China. And, on 22 September, the Chinese Communist Party, in a declaration, signaled the acceptance of Chiang Kai-shek's terms and the "united front" began. These events all had their effects on Sinkiang. With the nonaggression pact between China and the USSR, Sinkiang was the main avenue of supply for China.

In early 1937, a Muslim revolt broke out in southern Sinkiang. In May, because of Sheng's inability to suppress the revolt, Soviet Army units moved into Sinkiang and assisted him in quickly suppressing the rebellion. The participation of Soviet troops did not evoke protest from the National Government because of its involvement with Japan. With the end of the rebellion, most of the Soviet troops left except for a self-contained task force that remained at Ha-mi.

Beginning in 1938 and lasting until 1941, the province fell under increasing Soviet economic and political control. In 1938 and 1939, aircraft and munitions continued via Sinkiang to China Proper.

Also during this period (1938–41), the Soviets reintensified geological surveys and drilling for oil in the Tushantze area, and they subsequently built oil refineries. In an agreement between Sheng and a Soviet representative con-

cerning tin, dated 26 November 1940, to be valid for 50 years, the Soviet Union was granted extensive privileges in Sinkiang which made it almost independent of the Sinkiang provincial governments and from the Central Government. Article 1 gave the Soviet Union "exclusive rights for the prospection, investigation, and exploration of tin and its ancillary minerals." With this right came the power to build all power lines, transportation lines and communication networks necessary to the project without outside interference. Soviet personnel also received unlimited entry privileges and enjoyed unrestricted movement in Sinkiang. Armed guards controlled corporation property which was immune from provincial police intervention. The economic provisions offered the Soviet Union extremely favorable terms. All exports were to be duty free. Rent was paid in kind at the rate of five or six percent of production. No share in net profit and no participation in management was given to provincial or central governments. In return, Sinkiang would receive free all facilities without compensation at the end of a 50-year period.

In this period (1938–41), Sheng's views followed the Soviet Communist party line. He condemned the National Government as being reactionary, while lauding the "progressive friends" in the Soviet Union. In June 1941, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the imperialist war suddenly turned into a "war against fascism."

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941, tended to relieve the Soviet pressure on Sinkiang. However, if Soviet support was to be drastically reduced, the Sheng regime might be plagued with fresh revolts and increased Central Government pressure. Under the circumstances, only a détente with Chungking offered a promising alternative. But such a move entailed long negotiations, and this was borne out by the events of 1942.

In March 1942, a high Kuomintang general secretly visited Urumchi as Chiang Kai-shek's emissary. As further proof of a new leaning, Sheng conducted another purge, arresting certain Communist leaders such as Mao Tse-men, brother of Mao Tse-tung.

By mid-1942, a final agreement was made with the Central Government. This was dramatized by the visit of Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Urumchi on 29 August 1942. Thus ended a decade of increasing Soviet influence and the slow beginning of Central Government's authority in Sinkiang. By September 1944, Central Government authority had reached the point that it could force Sheng to resign his position and accept a new one in Chungking, capital of the Wartime Nationalist Government.

After the disposition of Sheng, the Nationalist Government named in rapid succession several governors of Sinkiang. Thus, Sinkiang entered the orbit of Kuomintang party politics. Opposition to the new trend in Chinese rule was not long in crystallizing. A rebellion broke out in the Ili Valley in November 1944. The rebels defeated several government forces and set up the Eastern Turkestan Republic, evidently with Soviet aid. After long negotiations (June 1946), an agreement was reached with the rebels granting greater local autonomy. Generally, these agreements were never carried out, and unrest in the province continued until the Communist conquest.[34]

Beginning in 1950, the Chinese Communists quickly began to consolidate their rule in Sinkiang. Hostile Kuomintang forces were hunted down. A large military force under General T'ao Ch'ih-yeh was put to work on land development projects, and these forces were the nucleus of the Production and Construction Corps.

Peking implemented its nationality



Central Intelligence Agency

Members of the Production and Construction Corps clear land prior to planting

policy and cautiously established autonomous units for the various national minorities. This process was completed in October 1955 when the province was formally recognized as the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region.

By the late 1950s, Chinese rule was firmly established despite occassionally acute tensions between the Han Chinese and minority people. One particular outburst of minority resentment led to an estimated 60,000 non-Chinese (mainly Kazaks) fleeing to the USSR in the spring of 1962. But, after 1962, a *modus operandi* had been reached between the Han Chinese and the minorities, and this situation was to prevail until the inauguration of the cultural revolution in 1966.

Sinkiang and Cultural Revolution

The eruption of the cultural revolution in Sinkiang in mid-1966 was viewed with apprehension by the local government leaders. In part, because religious beliefs and traditional customs were so strongly entrenched among the minorities, these became objects for destruction by the cultural revolution. Many local Han Chinese leaders felt this would lead to a resurgence of nationalist feeling and would threaten the stability of the area.

By November 1966, rival Red Guard factions were clashing—one faction backed by Wang En-mao, the military commander of the region, and the Provincial Party Committee and the other by the cultural revolution group in Peking. The People's Liberation Army in Sinkiang generally backed Wang, but some units did support the Red Guards. Reportedly, large-scale clashes, with hundreds killed or wounded on both sides, began to occur in January 1967.

Wang En-mao, the major political and military figure in Sinkiang, went to Peking to attempt to arrange some compromise. Reportedly, Chou En-lai played a large role in the compromise which was evolved in late January. However, sporadic fighting continued, and Wang En-mao suffered severe criticism in Red Guard posters in Peking and Sinkiang. On 25 February, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced that it had decided to suspend cultural revolution activities in Sinkiang. Still, further incidents continued through 1967 and into 1968.

Heavy criticism of Wang En-mao continued, and it was not surprising that, when the new ruling body of the region, the Revolutionary Committee, was

formed in September 1968, Wang was demoted. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee was Lung Shu-chin, a long-time associate of Lin Piao, and Wang was made a Deputy Chairman. Wang also lost his position as Commander of the Military Region to Lung.

The end of the cultural revolution came in April 1969 with the Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress. Sometime thereafter, an attempt was made to re-establish provincial or regional Party Committees to replace the Revolutionary Committees. In May 1971, Sinkiang was one of the last areas to establish a Party Committee. Lung Shu-chin was the First Secretary, the highest position on the committee, and Wang was not even appointed. This led to speculation that Wang was purged.

The political demise and death of Defense Minister Lin Piao in September 1971 prompted the purge of Lung as Commander, as well as First Secretary. In 1972 and early 1973, the leadership pattern is unclear. Saifudin is the Second Secretary of the Party Committee, but it is unlikely he would be given full power to govern because of his minority nationality and his past association with the Soviet Communist party before 1949. More likely is that Ts'ao Ssu-ming, the Political Commissar of the Military Region and Secretary of the Party Committee, along with others, will form a collective leadership in governing Sinkiang.[35]

The cultural revolution period and the postcultural revolution period in Sinkiang indicates that Chinese rule was maintained, Soviet influence was kept out during this crucial period, and the temporary breakdown in Han Chinese minority relations was quickly repaired. However, stable political leadership in the region remains distant, and this could lead to minority unrest if political leaders seek to raise the minority issues and tensions.

Conclusions

The deteriorating state of the Chinese-Soviet relations in the decade of the 1960s and early 1970s has led to the intensification of economic development, military buildup and political indoctrination efforts of both sides of the frontier. Certain strategic conceptions appear to have preoccupied the Chinese and the Soviets. The Soviets have sought to make their geographical regions economically and militarily self-sufficient. The Chinese have been much less concerned with economic development of the frontier areas, reflecting higher developmental priorities elsewhere. The Chinese have relied on increasing their military strength on the frontiers, building fortifications to develop a system of defense in depth and intensifying their political activities.

This state of affairs further reinforces the strategic military importance of Sinkiang. It is likely that the non-Han Chinese people of the area will continue to be pawns in the dispute between these two giant Communist states.

NOTES

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9 Domes, *op. cit.*, p 267.

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11 Wu Chao, "A Study of the Chinese Communist Buildup of 'Production and Construction Corps' Along the Sino-Soviet Frontier," *Issues and Studies*, November 1969, p 59.

12 *Ibid.*

13 *Military Review*, August 1972, p 105.

14 *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, China, 28 June 1968. See also *Military Review*, August 1971, p 105.

15 *Military Review*, August 1971, *op. cit.* See also *Sunday Times*, London, Eng., 2 July 1967.

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18 *Tokyo Shimbun*, 5 November 1969, as translated in US Embassy, Japan, *Daily Summary of the Japanese Press*, 8–10 November 1969, p 17.

19 Yu-ti Jen, *A Concise Geography of China*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1964, pp 210 and 221. One report, rather dated (1943), places the number of sheep and goats at 11,720,000; cattle at 1,550,000; horses at 870,000; and camels at 90,000. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1950, p 155.

20 Yu-ti Jen, *op. cit.*, p 209.

21 Chun-hing Wang, *A Simple Geography of China*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1958, p 217.

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23 Yu-ti Jen, *op. cit.*, p 211.

24 Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p 103.

25 George B. Cressy, *Land of the Five Hundred Million: A Geography of China*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N. Y., 1955, p 329.

26 *Ibid.* (Typographical error in Cressy should read 4,873,608 not 5,873,608.)

27 Chun-hing Wang, *op. cit.*, p 213.

28 Cressy, *op. cit.*, p 329.

29 Urumchi Radio in Mandarin, 28 April 1967.

30 Henry G. Schwarz, *Chinese Policies Towards Minorities*, Program in East Asian Studies, Bellingham, Wash., 1971, Occasional Paper Number 2, p 11.

31 *Ibid.*, p 13. See also *The Party and the National Question in China: Chih-l Chang*, Edited by George Moseley, Translation of *Chung-kuo ko-ming ti min-tsu wen-ti ho min-tsu cheng-ts'e chiang-hua*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1966.

32 For a translation of the 1970 draft constitution, see Chinese Information Service, *Background on China*, B.70–81, 4 November 1970, 5 pp. For a translation of the 1954 constitution, see Peter S. H. Tank, *Communist China Today*, Praeger Publishers Inc., N. Y., 1958, Volume 11, pp 90–110.

33 James Nichols, "Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang From 1911 to 1966: The Decisive Half Century," Unpublished Paper Given at Northeast Regional Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, May 1971.

34 For a discussion of Sinkiang's political history from 1911 to 1949, see Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951*, Oxford University Press Inc., N. Y., 1953; Tienfong Cheng, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1957; David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1948; Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1945; R. C. North and X. J. Eudin, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1957; Martin Richard Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, John Day Co. Inc., N. Y., 1944; Eric Teichman, *Journey to Turkistan*, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, Eng., 1937; Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-Ts'Ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot*, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich., 1958; Aitchen K. Wu. *China and the Soviet Union*, John Day Co. Inc., N. Y., 1950.

35 The above discussion was mainly based on New China News Agency news releases, radio broadcasts intercepts, and Ta Tze-bao (Big Character Posters of the Red Guards). Useful secondary sources are *China News Analysis*, Number 859, 22 October 1971; *The New York Times*, 17 January 1969, p 4; and Tsao Ching, "An Analyses of the Situation in Sinkiang," *Issues and Studies*, November 1968, pp 8–16.