

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES
PURSUED BY THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE ATTEMPT TO
CONSOLIDATE THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WITHIN RUSSIAN CENTRAL
ASIA (1917-1934) AND SINKIANG (1949-LATE 1957)

by

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Preface

The purpose of this study is to correlate similar periods of development during the respective consolidations of power by the Bolsheviki in Soviet Central Asia and by the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang. Because the periods covered (1917-1934 in Soviet Central Asia; 1949-1957 in Sinkiang) represent some of the most eventful years in the history of both Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang, it is obviously beyond the scope of this study to present a detailed account of all the important occurrences of these two periods. Therefore, this study will attempt to select those important political and economic events which appear to this writer to reveal, most clearly, the similarities and differences that these two periods of development (the "political consolidation" period and the "economic consolidation" period) manifested during the course of their respective existences in Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang.

A word should be said about sources. One of the great disappointments of this study was the limited usefulness of the translated newspaper articles of the Survey of the Mainland China Press and the Current Background series. Materials from these two publications in regard to Sinkiang proved to be largely of a vague nature. The Chinese language and Russian language materials that were used are available in the Columbia University Libraries, the Harvard University Libraries, the Library of Congress, and the Union Research Files of Hong Kong. Many of the Chinese newspaper articles (especially the Sinkiang Jih Pao and Sinkiang Pao Chih articles) are available only in microfilms of the Union Research Files of Hong Kong.

Finally, it will be apparent that this study is merely the first step toward a comprehensive study of the transformation of these two largely Turkic regions by their respective central governments.

A.C.H. Jr.
December 1, 1964

It is necessary at the start of this study to establish a common terminology by which one could state that Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) are suitable for a comparative study of this nature. I propose to advance four categories of social characteristics (ethnic, cultural, economic and political) in which I believe that these two regions, prior to the establishment of Communist regimes, were strikingly similar. Essentially, both regions are inhabited by very different groups, however, while many of the same groups appear in both Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang, their numbers and importance are very different in the two regions. For example, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Tajiks, who form the major ethnic entities in Soviet Central Asia, are all represented in Xinjiang where they, however, are greatly outnumbered by the Huians, who are represented in Soviet Central Asia by a mere 100,000 individuals.¹ A list of the various ethnic groups of Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang will be found in Appendix I.

However, it is notable that, in spite of the fact that the Huians, Kirgiz, Mongols, and Kazakhs form the local majority in some clearly

¹ Though it is contrary to official Soviet practice, throughout this paper the term Soviet Central Asia will include Kazakhstan along with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan.

² The ethnic composition of the Huians, Journal of the Royal Central Asia Society, (July-October, 1961), 215-26. About 75 per cent of Huians' population are Muslims.

Introduction

I. Criteria for Selecting the Two Areas Under Study

It is necessary at the start of this study to discuss the criteria by which one could claim that Soviet Central Asia¹ and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) are suitable for a comparative study of this nature. I propose to advance four categories of social characteristics (ethnic, cultural, economic and political) in which I believe that these two regions, prior to the establishment of Communist regimes, bore striking similarities.

Ethnically, both regions are inhabited by many different groups. However, while many of the same groups appear in both Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang, their numbers and importance are very different in the two regions. For example, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Tadzhiks, who form the major ethnic entities in Soviet Central Asia, are all represented in Sinkiang where they, however, are greatly outnumbered by the Uighurs, who are represented in Soviet Central Asia by a mere 100,000 emigres.² A list of the various ethnic groups of Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang will be found in Appendix A.

However, it is notable that, in spite of the fact that the Uighurs, Kirghiz, Mongols, and Tadzhiks form the local majority in some clearly

¹ Though it is contrary to official Soviet practice, throughout this paper the term Soviet Central Asia will include Kazakhstan along with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan.

² "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XLVI (July-October, 1959), 205-6. About 75 per cent of Sinkiang's 6,000,000 people are Uighurs.

defined area of Sinkiang and constitute minorities in other areas,³ the ethnic distribution in Sinkiang is less clearly definable than in Soviet Central Asia. The Uighurs who constitute three-fourths of the province's population are actually in the majority in both Dzungaria and Kashgaria.⁴ While the towns in Dzungaria are mainly inhabited by Chinese and Dungans (Hui), the Uighurs, who are merchants and settled farmers, inhabits the Ili district, the Turfan, and Hami oases have sizable representation in all the larger towns of Dzungaria. In Kashgaria, in southern Sinkiang, the Uighurs compose nearly the entire populations of the Oases of Keriya, Cherchen, Qarghaliq (Karghalik), Yarkand, Merket, Maralbashi, and Kucha.⁵

The Kazakhs, who live largely on the frontier of the Kazakhstan SSR, in the Ili, Tarbagatay (Chuguchak), and Altai districts; the Kirghiz, who live in a crescent-shaped area enclosing the Uighur oases of Kucha, Bai, Agsu, Kashgar, Yarkand and Guma; and the Mongols are largely pastoral nomads.⁶

In contrasting the ethnic composition of Soviet Central Asia with that of Sinkiang, one finds that the Uzbeks play the dominant ethnic role in Soviet Central Asia (a role comparable to the Uighur role in Sinkiang). They are the largest ethnic group in the region. They comprise nearly

³ Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia (Boston, Little, Brown, 1950), P. 122.

⁴ Sinkiang can be divided topographically by the Tien Shan Mts. into two regions (Dzungaria in the North and Kashgaria in the South).

⁵ S.I. Bruk, "Etnicheski sostov i razmyeshchenie naselyeniya v Sin'tszyanskoy Uigurskoy Avtonomnoy Raionye Kitaiskoy Narodnoy Respubliki," Sovetskaya etnografiya, No. 2 (1956), 92.

⁶ Ibid., p. 93. It might be noted here that not all the Kirghiz of Sinkiang are nomads. Some cultivate cotton.

six million indigenous natives.⁷ They are largely settled agriculturalists and numerically dominate the Fergana Valley, which is the region's main oasis and richest area. As in Sinkiang, the other ethnic groups, the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen are largely nomads.

Culturally the Uzbeks and Uighurs are very similar. In language and religious practices they are very close.⁸ As is apparent from the above discussion, they occupy similar economic positions (merchants and cotton growers) in their respective regions.⁹ The Kazakhs, in both regions under study, are Muslims, but they are relatively lax in the observance of Islamic rules.¹⁰ The Kirghiz in both regions practice Islam but with heavy elements of shamanistic influence.¹¹

In both areas there are some elements which disturb the basic cultural uniformity. In Soviet Central Asia there are 1,200,000 Iranian-speaking Tadzhiks who alone of all major indigenous groups do not speak a Turkic language. In Sinkiang not only are there Kirghiz but also Mongols, who practice Lamaistic Buddhism. Sinkiang also has 19,000 Tungusic-speaking Sibo.¹² Both regions also have urban-dwelling representatives of the major nationality--i.e. Russians and Chinese--of the respective

⁷ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XLVII (April, 1960), 108. These figures are taken from the 1959 census and exclude the 7,201,900 Slav inhabitants of Soviet Central Asia.

⁸ Lydia Holubnychy, "Chinese Treatment of the Nationality Problem in Sinkiang," The East Turkic Review, II No. 4 (December, 1960), 83.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 128-32.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 132-34.

¹² "Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region," Current Background No. 365 (October 25, 1955), 1.

country of which these areas under discussion form a part. The peculiar distribution of these representatives will be examined later in the paper.

To discuss the economic and political characteristics of the two regions, it is necessary to give some physical statistics. Soviet Central Asia comprises 1,432,238 sq. mi. compared to Sinkiang's 659,073 sq. mi. Soviet Central Asia also has roughly four and one half times the population of Sinkiang.¹³ Both regions have been subjected to great power political and economic machinations. The nineteenth century saw the incorporation of Central Asia into the Russian sphere as the Tsarists attempted to consolidate their Central Asian position. The Russians wished to prevent British power based in India from gaining ascendancy in this region. The area was a natural avenue of Tsarist expansion both in a political and economic sense. With the British positioned behind the Pamirs and with the Persian and Ottoman Empires relatively weak, Russia loomed as the logical power to gain control of this rich region. By the twentieth century the region had been incorporated into the economic structure of the Tsarist Empire. This economic incorporation will be discussed later in the study.

In contrast to Central Asia's position vis-a-vis Russia, Sinkiang was isolated from China Proper by formidable natural and communications barriers. In the twentieth century one finds that "the province's trade center nearest to China Proper was Hami, roughly 1,200 miles from the rail-head at Paotow in Suiyuan Province"(now in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region). "For caravans this meant a three-month trip at best. For motor vehicles, the two weeks of arduous passage over rough roads and through

¹³ S.I. Bruk, op. cit., p. 91

treacherous passes made only passenger goods and luxury traffic feasible."¹⁴ However, in the other direction, one finds that less than 200 miles separated either Chuguchak or Kuldja from the Tursib Railway. Better roads in Russia also aided the westward orientation of the province.¹⁵

In view of this logistical situation, it is not surprising that Russian armies could at times enter Sinkiang with greater ease than the forces of any Chinese government. Such a situation, placed the Sinkiang provincial authorities in a position where at times they could attempt to assert or resist the authority of the Chinese central government by employing foreign forces. Examples of this will be referred to in the first chapter.

Finally one finds that in both areas the dominant internal economic and political pattern was a constant struggle between the settled agriculturalists and the nomadic elements. This pattern was marked by nomadic raiding of the oases and by periodic rebellions, usually led by nomadic Kazakh or Kirghiz elements.¹⁶ In other words, because the native peasants in both Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang lived in scattered and isolated oases, they had become politically and economically fragmented. "Except for their elaborately organized system of water distribution, few factors entered in to support a consciousness of unity..."

Tribal bonds existed only among the nomads on the outskirts of the area, while the ancient urban artisan and merchant guilds

¹⁴ Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 5.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6. Tursib Railway (Turkestan-Siberian Railway).

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

among the natives were in a process of disintegration, under the impact of new economic conditions which arose after Central Asia's annexation to Russia. The only force which served to unite the native population of this area was the faith of Islam, its clergy and its mosques.¹⁷

What Zenkovsky states above concerning Soviet Central Asia applies equally to Sinkiang with the exception that the artisans and merchants in Chinese Turkestan, because of the province's physical remoteness from China Proper did not experience to the same extent the new economic pressures of a market economy which had transformed Russian Central Asia.

One could say that while local aspirations toward autonomy did exist, they could hardly have been called nationalism. The very heterogeneity of the peoples in both regions precluded the development of any truly powerful national movement. While a successful rebellion such as Yakub Beg's in Sinkiang in the nineteenth century was based on the fusion of Uighur and Kazakh anti-Chinese sentiment, it did not produce any lasting sense of unity.¹⁸

II. Criteria Used in Correlating Periods of Development.

The actual consolidation of power can be divided into two periods. The first is the period of "political consolidation" which lasted from 1917 to 1928 in Soviet Central Asia and from 1949 to mid-1954 in Sinkiang. This period is distinguished by the absorption and elimination of local left-wing regimes. This can be seen in the Soviet absorption and

¹⁷ Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 225-6. The physical cohesion that was created by the irrigation system can be appreciated by the fact that 80 per cent of the total population lived in the central oases between the Amu and Syr Daria rivers.

¹⁸ Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., p. 5.

elimination of the early Tashkent Soviet regime and the later Jadid-dominated government in Tashkent. In Sinkiang, the East Turkestan group meets with a similar fate. During the "political consolidation" period, the basic Communist political forms were introduced and finally established. These included the Communist Party organization and Soviet-type governmental institutions. Finally in the economic sphere this phase was characterized by the transfer of the ownership of the basic means of production out of the hands of the former ruling classes and into the hands of the peasantry. During this period, agricultural production was universally dominated by the small farmer.

In contrast to this, the "economic consolidation" period, which occurred in Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang during 1928-1934 and mid-1954 till late 1957 respectively, was characterized by the transfer of the ownership and control of the basic means of production out of the hands of the peasantry and into the hands of the state. This phase witnessed the construction of a new economic foundation for both regions. Along with this revolutionary economic destruction and construction, one finds that there was unprecedentedly intense supervision of the local population of these regions by the state.

CHAPTER I

A DESCRIPTION OF RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA AND SINKIANG ON THE EVE OF THE ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNIST REGIMES AND A COMPARISON OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSUMPTIONS OF POWER

The beginning of the twentieth century found Soviet Central Asia in three administrative divisions. These included the autonomous Emirate of Bukhara, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Tsarist administrative center at Tashkent.¹ The Bukharan and Khivan regimes were remnants of the medieval period and at this time represented the most reactionary political elements in the area. The most dynamic political movement among the Muslim population at this time was a Pan-Turkic drive headed by the Tatars of Russia, who were working to achieve "the unification and leadership of the Turkic peoples--in fact of all the Moslems of Russia."²

The official Bolshevik policy for Central Asia was in line with the very liberal Bolshevik approach to the problem of Russia's nationalities. Bolshevik policy was enunciated in 1913 at the "summer meeting" of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik faction) and thereafter became widely publicized.

¹ Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 85. The Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva were outside the borders of the Tsarist General Governorship in Central Asia. Hence they were also beyond the reach of Russian Law. The administration at Tashkent was known as the General Governorship.

² *Ibid.*, p. 105. By 1905-7 the Pan-Turkic movement had alarmed the Tsarist government by its definite Ottoman orientation. The potential appeal of the movement could be gauged by the fact that 90 per cent of Russia's Muslims were ethnically Turkic.

A special resolution of that meeting stated that

the right of all nationalities forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states must be recognized. To deny them this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing them its practical realization is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation.³

Lenin also asserted that each particular situation would have to be independently studied "from the standpoint of social democracy."⁴ He further claimed that social democracy entailed the development of an international culture of the world's workers to the exclusion of any national cultural autonomy.⁵ Interestingly, the Russian Communists employed the word "Muslims" in a secular sense. For the Soviets, Muslims were merely peoples who were part of the Muslim world in a historical and cultural sense. In the Bolshevik view the term "Muslims" referred to certain oppressed colonial peoples.⁶

At the time of the February, 1917 Russian Revolution, one finds that in Central Asia there were "no independent Bolshevik organizations capable of leading the revolutionary struggle of the masses."⁷ It can be said that nearly all the Russians in Central Asia considered the Muslims to be "politically immature and socially backward."

³ Ibid., p. 160. There was no other Russian political party that could match the boldness and radicalness of the Bolshevik nationality program.

⁴ Ibid., (Cited in KPSS v rezoliutsiakh s'ezdov [Moscow, 1953] II, pp. 315-6.)

⁵ Ibid., p. 346. The Bolshevik position on the minority cultural question was decided at the Petrograd City Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Party (April 14-29, 1917).

⁶ Walter Kolarz, Religion in the Soviet Union (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961), p. 407.

⁷ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XLVII (January, 1960), 16.

Of all the Russian parties in Central Asia only the Social Democrats came out for autonomy, and at their June 1917 congress they recommended formation of "a politically autonomous Turkestan based on the national-cultural autonomy of various individual nationalities populating the region."⁸

It is interesting to note that the Bolsheviks at this point had abandoned Lenin's earlier view (mentioned above) that an international culture was fundamental to the erection of a social democracy. This obviously was a shift dictated by practical considerations.

After the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on November 7, 1917 (Western calendar), Tashkent's Left Social Revolutionaries and the Left Mensheviks, along with a weak group of Bolsheviks supported by Red Guards, workers, some regular troops, and a few Muslim militia men, forced General Korovnichenko (the local representative of the Provisional government) to capitulate.⁹ The Left Social Revolutionaries who dominated the new group organized the Revolutionary Committee of the Tashkent Soviet. This group of adventuristic socialists, which lacked truly broad support from the resident Slav population and had no connection with the natives, but which was basically supported by railroad workers (the main proletarian force in Central Asia), some regular soldiers (who had turned into Red Guards), and the Communist "internationalist" battalions recruited from among the Hungarian, Austrian, and German prisoners-of-war, was to rule in Central Asia (their domain expanding and contracting with the vicissitudes of war)

⁸ Zenkovsky, op.cit., p. 228.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 230-1. Prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power in November, 1917, the Tsarist Central Asian government had been overthrown. "When news of the Kerensky-Kornilov affair reached Tashkent the stronger allies of the weak Bolsheviks, the Left Social Revolutionaries and the Left Mensheviks, elected a new executive committee for the Tashkent Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies. This body arrested the local administration." However supporters of the Provisional government executed a counter-coup on September 16, 1917.

for the next two years in a state of virtual independence from any outside authority including that of Moscow.¹⁰

Under the auspices of this Tashkent Soviet, the Third Regional Congress of Soviets and the Third Muslim Central Asian Conference assembled simultaneously in Tashkent on November 15, 1917. At this meeting the Soviet proclaimed its policy of not allowing the native population to participate in the organ of revolutionary power because of their "indefinite attitude toward the rule of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies" and because of the fact that the native population lacked any proletarian class organizations.¹¹ In spite of this policy of exclusiveness toward the native population, and because of the reality of the physical separation of Turkestan from Soviet controlled territory in Russia Proper until September 1919, the central Bolshevik regime in Moscow "proclaimed through the Fourth Regional Congress of Turkestan Soviets of January 1918 that Turkestan was an autonomous republic" of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.¹²

This Turkestan government soon was opposed by the Basmachi guerrilla movement which represented a native reaction to the bad treatment which the Tashkent regime was according to the indigenous peoples. The Basmachis were basically composed of elements of the semi-nomadic and mountain tribes

¹⁰ Ibid., The nearly two years of isolation was caused by White General Dutov's blockade of the northern reaches of Central Asia.

¹¹ G. Safarov, Kolonialnaia revoliutsiia (Moscow, 1921), p. 70.

¹² Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 27.

which lived in the vicinity of the Fergana valley.¹³ Their anti-Tashkent activities commenced after the Tashkent Soviet's armed forces sacked and destroyed the center of the Ulema-sponsored government at Kokand on February 19, 1918. The rise of the Basmachi movement was the only instance, during the first two years after the Bolshevik seizure of power, in which the native Central Asian population actively and for a long period successfully opposed by military means the expanding power of the Tashkent regime. More will be said of the Basmachis below.

A very important factor in the ability of the Tashkent regime to consolidate its control in Central Asia was the arrival in early 1918 of a group of Young Bukhariotes who desired to ally with the Tashkent Reds for the purpose of eliminating the rule of the Emir of Bukhara. These Young Bukhariotes, who for a brief period in 1917 had been able to put their reform program into operation in Bukhara, were during 1918-1919 to become exiles and revolutionary partners of the Jadids in Tashkent and Samarkand.¹⁴ The desire of the Young Bukhariotes to ally with the Tashkent Reds was facilitated by the fact that the Bolsheviks in late 1917 had decided to make the Young Bukhariotes the subject of influence and attention.¹⁵ The failure of a combined Red-Young Bukhariote expedition

¹³ Zenkovsky *op. cit.*, p. 226. "The semi-nomadic and mountain tribes on the outskirts of Central Asia's central mesopotamia--as, for instance, the Yomud Turkomans in Khiva, Kipchaks in Fergana, Lokais and Kara Kitais in Bukhara, and Tajik mountaineers of Karategin and Darvaz (southeastern Bukhara)--differed greatly from these settled natives in behavior, mentality, and military preparedness." It was these peoples who filled the ranks of the Basmachis.

¹⁴ The Jadids were Turkic radicals who had been strongly influenced by the reform program of the Young Turk movement in Turkey. They were atheistic and desired a complete secularization of Turkic life. They further desired to unite all the Turkic peoples within Russia's borders and also those outside of Russia into a single political entity.

¹⁵ Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

against the Emir of Bukhara in March 1918 was followed by a concentrated and relatively successful effort on the part of the Young Bukhariotes (with Moscow's blessing) to gain substantial power within the Central Asian Communist Party organization during the years 1919-1920.¹⁶ In spite of the failure of the expedition of March 1918 against the Emir of Bukhara, one can discern in this operation several important and standard Bolshevik tactics for dealing with "reactionary" regimes.

This overt attack upon the Emir's domain was one of the first examples of the Soviet technique--used shortly thereafter in the Baltic, in Transcaucasia, and in Mongolia--of sending Red Army units into an area to overthrow a local government upon the pretext of rendering assistance to local national revolutionary groups.¹⁷

Therefore, after an uprising had been engineered against the Emir in August, 1920 by the Bolsheviks, M. V. Frunze's Red Army moved into Bukhara and the Young Bukhariotes on September 2, 1920 proclaimed a People's Soviet Republic. This new government was dominated by the Maksimovs and Hojaevs, two wealthy merchant families which had supported the liberal movement in Bukhara. This government followed the Young Bukhariote program which was "characterized more by nationalist slogans than by Communist doctrine."¹⁸

In Khiva, a Young Khivan Party (similar to the Young Bukhariotes) plotted against the Khivan Khan and on February 1, 1920, after the Khan was killed, this party proclaimed a Khorezm People's Soviet Republic.¹⁹

¹⁶ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 239.

¹⁷ Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 30

¹⁸ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 249. (Cited in O. Glovatskii, Revoliutsia pobezhdat (Tashkent, 1930), pp.27-8.)

¹⁹ Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 31.

The political regimes that were introduced in Bukhara and Khiva "combined the bourgeois structure of the contemporary Middle Eastern society with the Communist system of control."²⁰ This situation was regarded by the Communists as a transitional phase which would lead to the "normal" Soviet system outlined by Lenin.²¹

To return to Tashkent, one finds that, after the destruction of Kokand in February 1918, the main political development was the maneuvering between Moscow and the Tashkent Soviet. Moscow was faced with a situation in which the destructiveness of the Red Guards and the exclusion of the native population were undermining the position of the Communists in Central Asia. In April 1918 Moscow sent a special commission headed by Kobozev to Tashkent. Kobozev convoked the First Regional Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (June 17-22, 1918) which laid the foundation of the Communist Party in Central Asia and revealed the weakness of the Tashkent Soviet (it was exposed that among the one-half million inhabitants of Tashkent there were only 261 "European" and 50 Muslim Communists).²² The first Regional Party Congress passed resolutions calling for the creation of a "Muslim" section which would be attached to party organizations and to the Soviet of Deputies. The resolutions ordered the adoption of the "Muslim" tongue as the state language and its use in publications on equal footing with Russia. The resolutions also called for the introduction into the administration of experienced workers

²⁰ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 249. This combination of seemingly contradictory elements can be viewed as the first manifestation of the type of government which in Mongolia in 1921 and in Central Europe in the immediate post-World War II period was referred to as the "People's Democracy."

²¹ Ibid.

²² Safarov, op. cit., p. 86.

familiar with local conditions and for the formation of Muslim military units to be stationed in Soviet Central Asia.²³ However, the procrastination of the Tashkent Soviet was sufficient to paralyze the Moscovite attempts to allow more native participation.

During Kobozev's second visit in 1919, Moscow made continued efforts to get more native participation. Its efforts resulted in the mass infiltration of the Soviet apparatus by the Jadids who had recently been "converted" to Communism. In September 1919 at the Eighth Congress of Central Asian Soviets, the Turkestan Central Executive Committee came under the control of a Muslim majority.²⁴ On November 19, 1919, a special Moscow-appointed Turkestan commission arrived in Tashkent and immediately purged all the surviving members of the original Tashkent Soviet. At the Fifth Regional Party Conference in mid-January 1920, the Jadids with the support of Kobozev and Moscow, gained firm control over the Central Asian Party apparatus by "sending an absolute Muslim majority to the party Regional Bureau."²⁵ Several ominous developments (from Moscow's point of view) that occurred at this Fifth Regional Conference of the Communist Party of Turkestan were the changing of the names of the Turkestan Section of the Russian Communist Party and of the Turkestan Republic to the Turkic Communist Party and the Turkic Republic respectively.²⁶ In addition the Jadids, in reality, advocated Turkic national statehood and Pan-Turkic political objectives. Also, their program of political unification was

²³ S. Muraveiskii, Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizhenia v Srednei Azii (Tashkent, 1926), p. 21.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 27-8.

²⁵ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 248.

²⁶ Eudin and North, op. cit., p.28.

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to include Turkic peoples that did not constitute a part of Russia. In line with their merchant background, the Jadids "flatly repudiated the theory of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat."²⁷

The Bolsheviks, seeing a Turkic Communist Party as a fundamental threat to the centralistic organization of the party, counterattacked at the Fifth Congress of the Turkestan Branch of the Russian Communist Party, which met on September 12-18, 1920. With Frunze's army in the background, all Jadids and their sympathizers were removed from the Turkestan Commission and the Turkestan Central Executive Committee. Also the Soviet Central Committee appointed a new Turkestan Commission devoid of any Muslims and Russians.²⁸

The misrule of the Tashkent regime, which had necessitated the creation of the Turkestan Commission by Moscow, also fed the fires of the Rasmachi movement of which we have spoken previously. This anti-Tashkent movement of nomadic and mountain peoples had been in progress since the ruthless sacking of Kokand on February 19, 1918, by Tashkent forces. When the Emir of Bukhara was dethroned in September 1920, many of the

²⁷ Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 245. The Jadids "followed the ideas of Ismail bey Gasprinsky, who, as early as 1905, stated that the predominantly agricultural Moslem society of Russia was not stratified into classes, and hence no class struggle could develop within it."

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-52. The new members of the Turkestan Commission were "L. Kaganovich, G. Safarov, G. Sokolnikov-Brilliant and the notorious Latvian Chekist, Ya Peters. These were to act as neutral arbiters, since none of them were either Moslem or Russian...The new Turkestan Bureau was not elected by the local party congress but was appointed by Moscow at the recommendation of the Turkestan Commission. Its membership included many Uzbeks and Kazakhs, who formed the majority; these men were not intellectuals, as were the Jadids, but such 'worker-internationalists' as Tiuriakulov, Atabaev, Sultan Hojaev, Rakhimbaev, and others who adhered obediently to the instructions of the center." The Turkestan Central Committee, in turn, eliminated most of its Jadid members and elected Rakhimbaev as chairman.

Emir's supporters joined the Basmachis and operated in eastern Bukhara. The Basmachis continued to gather strength, and in the autumn of 1921 they were further strengthened by the defection of several prominent Young Bukharans.²⁹ However, the movement received its greater encouragement when Enver Pasha, a former Turkish Minister who had been dispatched by Moscow to Central Asia for the purpose of quelling the guerrillas, suddenly switched sides and in December 1921 took at least nominal command of the Basmachi movement in eastern Bukhara. Yet, in spite of some spectacular victories in early 1922, the Basmachis, even under the generalship of Enver, were fatally divided.³⁰ Large scale fighting continued until 1924 in the regions of eastern Bukhara.³¹ The Basmachis were equally opposed to the atheism of both the Pan-Turkists (including the Jadids) and the Bolsheviks. They were not fighting for any ideology but instead were attempting to prevent the destruction of their traditional way of life.³²

29 "The Muslim Republics," JRCAS, XVIII (January 1960), op. cit., p. 18. Early in 1922 the last remnants of the Red Army garrisons were driven out and the whole of eastern Bukhara was in the hands of the Basmachis.

30 Ibid. "The Basmachis, far from being a solidly united opposition were, in fact, even under Enver's generalship, torn into factions. Ibrahim Bek, one of the most powerful of their leaders, never wholly accepted Enver whom he saw as a dangerous reformist because of his association with the Young Turk movement. Indeed on more than one occasion Ibrahim Bek's Lokays fought with the Red Army and against Enver and his successors."

31 Kolarz, op. cit., p. 408. The mullahs of Bukhara supported the armed opposition to the Soviet to the end. Dyushambe (in Tadzhikistan) was still in anti-communist hands until the summer of 1922. However, "smaller skirmishes between Soviet forces and nationalist Muslim bandits occurred until 1928, when the band of the Khivan Dzhunaid Khan was routed. There was a last flare-up of fighting in 1931 when a force of Bokharan Muslim refugees invaded Tadzhikistan from Afghan bases." (Cited in L. Klimovich, Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo na vostoke i religia [Moscow-Leningrad, 1929], p. 50.)

32 Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 226.

Turning to Sinkiang, one finds that the pre-1949 reign of Shen Shih-ts'ai, in view of its unique nature, deserves some attention. Sheng, who attained power in Sinkiang in 1933, resembled his predecessors Yang Tseng-hsin (ruled 1912-1928) and Chin Shu-jen (1928-1933) in that he regarded Russia as the dominant power in the area. Sheng, who claimed to have become a self-made Marxist in his youth, never actually advocated Communism for Sinkiang.³³ However, his regime in January, 1934, had depended upon Soviet military intervention to defeat Ma Chung-ying's siege of Urumchi. Sheng collaborated intensively with the Soviets from 1934-42, during which time his foreign policy speeches and writings were largely dominated by the Marxist approach to international events.³⁴

Because of repeated uprisings, Sheng's sense of insecurity increased to the point where in 1938 he concluded the famous Tin Mines Agreement with the USSR. The unparalleled heights to which Soviet political and economic penetration of the province now soared is indicated by the fact that even the provincial police were excluded from the mining corporation's properties. In addition "all exports of produce were to be duty free, compensated for by a two per cent ad valorem charge."³⁵ Equally interesting was the fact that these agreements were made between the Soviet Union and a province of China, in disregard of any wishes and interests which the Chinese central government might have had. Sheng further emulated Moscow by allowing Soviet advisors and police officials to

³³ Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., p. 34

³⁴ Sven A. Hedin, The Silk Road (New York, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1936), pp. 183-84. Ma Chung-ying was a Kansu Muslim general who had succeeded in whipping up support in Sinkiang among the many dissatisfied elements.

³⁵ Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., p. 67

conduct extensive purges in 1937 and in 1940.³⁶ In 1938 Sheng became a member of the CPSU.

However, as 1941 was coming to a close and the Nazi armies continued to advance on Moscow, Sheng sensed that the Soviet Union would probably no longer be able to provide him with adequate support for the maintenance of his rule. He thereupon moved for a detente with Chungking in anticipation of possible pressure against him from the Chinese central government. In April 1942 Sheng disbanded the Anti-Imperialist League in Sinkiang and nearly all Reds, together with most intellectuals, were arrested.³⁷ When Sheng, in late 1942, did switch his allegiance from Moscow to Chungking, the Soviets, left without a pliant provincial government in Sinkiang, turned to the only remaining potential instrument for their designs in the province. This was the dissatisfaction of the minorities, which had been fanned by Chiang Kai-shek's plans for the development of northwest China. In 1942 Chiang had "pledged large sums of money to finance the transfer of some 10,000 officials, together with their families, to bolster Sinkiang's administrative, educational, and technical affairs."³⁸ This undoubtedly was planned to strengthen Chinese influence and control at the expense of the representatives of various minority groups who were being employed in Sheng's regime. In 1943 Moscow

turned to the "tribes" of Kazakhs, Uighurs and other groups, furnishing them with a few leaders, commanders and weapons,

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 57,69.

³⁷ David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), p. 362.

³⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942: China (Washington, D. C. State Department, 1956) p.260.

while remaining officially aloof, to protect its nonintervention in Sinkiang affairs.³⁹

By the summer of 1944 the areas of Sinkiang adjacent to the Soviet Union had come under the control of rebels. By this time Sheng's regime had been replaced by the KMT controlled-government of Wu Chung-hsin, and the revolt, which probably had started as an anti-Sheng movement in view of the "indiscriminate arrests" and oppressive methods that marked the last years of his rule, now assumed the nature of an anti-Chinese movement.⁴⁰ In November 1944, when the rebellion had spread throughout the districts of Ili, Tarbagatai, and Chuguchak (the northwestern part of Sinkiang), Osman Bator, the District Officer of Ashan and a Kazakh rebel leader, captured Kulja and made it the center of the insurrection.⁴¹ The rebels thereupon proclaimed an Eastern Turkestan Republic. The republic was headed by the representatives of several nationality groups with Akhmedjan Kasimi, a local left-wing Pan-Turkist, acting as the leader.⁴² However there exists no definite evidence that this movement was either controlled by or heavily infested with Communists.⁴³

³⁹ Dalling, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-64. The propaganda of these rebels praised the livelihood of the minorities in adjacent areas of the USSR.

⁴⁰ A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 247, 272.

⁴¹ A. G. Yakovlev, "K voprosu o natsional'no-osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii narodov Sin'tszyana v 1944-1949 gg." Uchenie zapiski instituta vostokovedeniia, XI (Moscow, 1955), 165.

⁴² Sinkiang Pao Chih (新疆報), (November 12, 1950).

⁴³ Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 272. This nationalist movement, which was opposed by Uighur conservatives wealthy begs and mullahs who supported the Chinese, was led largely by "representatives from the middle class, and from iconoclastic youth, many of whom have been educated in the Soviet Union or strongly influenced by Soviet propaganda."

At this point the Soviet consulate in Urunchi offered its "good offices" to mediate the dispute. The situation certainly suited Soviet interests, for as of September, 1945, the Eastern Turkestan Republic included the parts of Sinkiang that possessed the rich mineral resources which the Soviets had exploited under their agreements with the Sheng regime.⁴⁴ In the final accord which was signed on June 6, 1946, the rebels were granted virtual autonomy through their rights to elect all local officials and to maintain a twelve-thousand man army. Also the three resource-rich districts of Ili, Tacheng, and Altai were excluded from nationalist influence and inspection.⁴⁵ It appeared that a more favorable situation for the reestablishment of a Soviet sphere of influence could hardly have been imaginable.

However, the nature of this Eastern Turkestan movement soon proved to be more than that of a simple Soviet front organization. From 1944 to

⁴⁴ Whiting and Sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 109. "In particular, the final attack of the insurgents carried them well beyond the Tushantze oil fields, thereby excluding this valuable area from nationalist control."

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110. The Second Annex to the Peace Agreement of January 2, 1946 which was signed by Chang Chih-chung for the central government and representatives of the Eastern Turkestan Republic "provided for the reorganization of the Ili troops into three cavalry and three infantry regiments with a total strength not exceeding 12,000 men. One infantry and two cavalry regiments were to be enlisted in the Nationalist Army, and the other units incorporated into the Provincial Peace Preservation Corps. The responsibility of these troops was to be exclusively that of maintaining peace and order in the three northwestern administrative districts..." (Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 249.)

The wealth of the Eastern Turkestan Republic's domain can be appreciated by the fact that it included "one-fifth of the total population, as well as the only two working tungsten mines, the only working oil wells, and some of the best gold mines in the province. The Ili River Valley... is the most fertile agricultural region in the province, and the belt of pasture land stretching from Ashan District to Ili District contains some of the best grazing regions in Sinkiang." (Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 268.)

1949, a definite schism had manifested itself between a nationalist wing under Osman Bator and his Kazakhs and a left-wing under Akhmedjan Kasimi. Kasimi increasingly departed from his Pan-Turkic background and adopted much of the Communist line.⁴⁶ One finds also that, during this period of confrontation between the Kulja elements and the Nationalist Chinese authorities, the Pan-Turkic and Uighur nationalists throughout Sinkiang were advocating "the establishment of an independent Turkestan State along authoritarian lines."

The Pan-Turkists took over almost the entire Uighur press and organizations and occupied many positions in the government, army and schools.

The Pan-Turkists also penetrated into the territory of the Kulja regime and for some time had friendly relations with its government, while remaining strongly anti-Soviet in their outlook.⁴⁷

While the future of the Eastern Turkestan Republic, in view of apparent Soviet backing, appeared bright, several incidents swiftly inhibited its prospects. On August 27, 1949, a mysterious airplane crash occurred which killed Akhmedjan Kasimi, Isakh Beg, and other key Kulja leaders, and left only Saifudin Azizov to represent the Eastern Turkestan movement.

⁴⁶ Statements by Kasimi which reveal his ideological shift can be found in A.G. Yakovlev, "K voprosu..." *op. cit.*, 186. The schism in leadership may have arisen in part from ethnic differences. While the leadership of the rebels was predominantly Uighur, the population under the Ili regime was largely non-Uighur. Over half the population was Kazakh. The progressive alienation of Kazakhs undoubtedly played a part in emergence of Osman Bator's Kazakh guerrilla forces. The degree to which Russian influence was responsible for the split is difficult to ascertain for "the available evidence indicates that...the Ili regime is following policies that are primarily nationalistic rather than ideological. To date it has neither sovietized nor socialized the region it controls. It has maintained the Chinese forms of organization including the Hsien and the Administrative district, and apparently no comprehensive economic reform politics have been formulated as yet. In regard to religion, the region has followed a completely non-Marxist policy, and the District Officer of Ili is a venerable Muslim religious leader named Hakimbeg Khaja." (Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-70.)

⁴⁷ Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, 83. The 1947 Uighur uprising is discussed in (Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 252.)

Saifudin soon began to speak of the rebellion as having been merely the opening wedge in the liberation of Sinkiang from "feudal oppression, enslavement, and killing."⁴⁸ All rebel hopes of a special privileged position in a Communist Sinkiang (because of Kulja's friendly relations with Moscow) evaporated when, after the peaceful liberation of the province by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on September 26, 1949, the Reds ordered the dissolution of the armed forces in the insurgent area.⁴⁹ In spite of the extinguishing of the military power of the Kulja regime, Osman Bator's guerrilla forces which had broken with Kasimi's Kulja government in mid-1946 continued to fight the Communists until February, 1951.⁵⁰ The year 1951 also witnessed a large-scale purge in the three Eastern Turkestan Republic districts of Ili, Tacheng, and Ashan. Most of the original rebel leaders who had not been killed in the airplane crash of August 27, 1949, were eliminated in this purge.⁵¹

Finally, I would like to discuss the nature of the Red liberation of Sinkiang. The province, on September 26, 1949, when the Nationalist Army commander Tao Shih-yueh defected to the entering PLA, was ruled by Governor Burhan Shahidi, formerly a prisoner of Sheng Shih-tsai, who had been

⁴⁸ Whiting and Sheng, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

⁴⁹ Allen S. Whiting, "Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, XXV No. 1 (January, 1956), pp. 9-10. Right after the airplane crash, the Kulja armed forces were disbanded and integrated into the Twenty-second Army Group of the PLA Fifth Army.

⁵⁰ Current Background (October 25, 1955), op. cit., The official Communist view of Osman's continued resistance was expressed in a New China News Agency Release of October 7, 1954: "during the liberation of Altai, armed cabals under the leadership of the American imperialist spy, Osman Bator, staged riots though the People's Liberation Army exterminated these bands." (Hsinhua News Agency Releases, Peking, October 7, 1954.)

⁵¹ New York Times (December 23, 1951). This article quoted official Chinese Communist broadcasts.

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appointed as governor in December 1948, by the Kuomintang (KMT).⁵² General Tai Shih-yueh and Governor Burhan Shahidi, on September 25 and 26, 1949 respectively, had sent cables to Mao Tse-tung announcing their severance of ties with the KMT and their willingness to submit to the "people's democratic camp."⁵³ Thus the way had been opened for the peaceful transfer of power. Burhan and Saifudin (the vice-chairman of the Kulja regime) continued as important civilian leaders in the province. In 1951 Saifudin became the vice-chairman of the Provincial Government of Sinkiang and Fourth Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party.⁵⁴

In comparing the respective assumptions of power in Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang by the Russian Communists and the Red Chinese, one is struck by the different strategic positions of the two regions under study. In Soviet Central Asia there was no outside power that was serious.

⁵² Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, 95. Burhan a wealthy merchant and middle of the road Russian Tatar, was appointed governor of Sinkiang in December 1948 by the KMT.

Burhan made his position clear when he in 1952 "attacked the Pan-Turkic ideology of certain Uighur nationalists, which was spreading at that time in Sinkiang and declared that neither people speaking Turkic nor practising Islam, form a single integral nation, for they lacked a common territory, a common economic way of life, and a common culture. He proclaimed that all Pan-Turkic theories were 'mistaken from beginning to end.'" (SCMP No. 297 [Hong Kong, March 18, 1952], 34-5.)

⁵³ "Appendix" *People's Handbook* (1950). On October 12, 1949, the PLA began its march into Sinkiang. On October 13, the PLA arrived at the city of Hami.

⁵⁴ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (人民日報), (October 2, 1951). Burhan Shahidi was appointed as governor of Sinkiang by the KMT in December, 1948. When the CCP took control of Sinkiang, Burhan was appointed as the Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government. In 1954 Burhan was transferred to Peking "where he became Director of the Institute of National Minority Languages of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Committee of Afro-Asian Solidarity and Chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association." (Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, 95-6.)

ly involved. In contrast to this, the Soviet Union was heavily involved in Sinkiang before and after (to be discussed below) 1949. As was mentioned above, Sinkiang's natural economic and transportation links are with Soviet Central Asia and this undoubtedly was the vital factor in the existence of substantial Soviet political and economic interests and in the virtual non-existence of Chinese Communist influence.

While rebellions by minorities occurred in both regions, the remoteness of Sinkiang from China Proper undoubtedly was the factor which made possible the relative successes of Yakub Beg, Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen, Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the Eastern Turkestan Republic (vital factors in the twentieth century also were the political chaos in China Proper from 1911 till 1949 and the disintegrating effects of Japanese aggression). Another difference which arose from Sinkiang's remoteness was the fact that the province's economy was never integrated with the Chinese economy, in marked contrast to the important role which the Russian Central Asian cotton crop played in the Tsarist economy. Though, it is also true that the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva were never economically integrated into the Russian economy.

The revolutionary organization in Russian Central Asia, prior to the arrival of central Bolshevik armed forces in late 1919, was composed of the adherents of various socialist parties (particularly the Social Revolutionaries). However, in spite of the fact that the Bolshevik organization was minute and weak, the Tashkent revolutionary government in January, 1918 through the Third Regional Congress of Soviets at Tashkent, proclaimed its allegiance to Moscow. The interesting situation that thereafter developed was one in which Moscow increasingly applied pressure upon the Tashkent regime (which had drawn its members almost exclusively from the Slav

elements in Russian Central Asia) to admit natives. This maneuver on the part of Moscow, which eventually led to the takeover of the Tashkent regime by the Jadids, and the later expulsion of the Jadids in September of 1920, emphasizes the fact that Moscow was manipulating the events in Russian Turkestan. It should be emphasized here that the Jadids, Young Bukhariotes, and Young Khivans (all basically of middle class merchant background) were put into positions of power with the decisive aid of the central Bolshevik regime in Moscow. In short, Moscow was connected with the leading non-Bolshevik progressive elements in Russian Central Asia and was manipulating them for its own purposes.

This is in marked contrast to the Chinese Communist role in the coming to power in northwestern Sinkiang of the Eastern Turkestan movement (also basically a middle-class led revolutionary group).⁵⁵ While both the Jadids and the Kulja regime espoused separatist or autonomy objectives based upon Turkic uniqueness, the Chinese Communists upon entering Sinkiang found themselves faced with a Turkic nationalist regime which with the aid of a foreign power was ruling the richest portion of the province. One could say that the Chinese Communists were confronted with the traditional situation of a foreign-backed regime which was making its appeal for support on the basis of the dissatisfaction of local nationalities. Since the Kulja regime, after the elimination of the Sheng Shih-ts'ai government, had become oriented towards a policy of autonomy, the CCP faced a hostile situation which was certainly not of its own making. Because of this "fait-accompli," the Chinese could not argue nor act as the Bolsheviks had done in Bukhara and Khiva where Moscow had used the tactic of invading in order to aid local national revolutionaries in their attempts

⁵⁵ Check footnote 43 of Chapter I.

to establish progressive regimes. The Eastern Turkestan Republic was the progressive regime. In view of this the Chinese Communists, when they had established control in Urumchi, set out not upon the task of allying with progressive underdogs, but instead of disarming a potentially threatening foreign-oriented regime that was based upon local nationalist sentiments. It might be added here that the situation in Sinkiang of the indigenous people's dislike of the Chinese (based upon Tungan economic superiority⁵⁶ and historical Chinese suppression of nationalist aspirations) found some counterpart in Russian Central Asia where the Slavs were viewed as heretical conquerors. The almost total Slav make-up of the early Tashkent Soviet government also caused some suspicions of the Bolsheviks on the part of the indigenous peoples.

In discussing the role of religion in the above-described events, one finds that Islam did not play any constructive role in the revolutionary events of either Soviet Central Asia or Sinkiang. In Soviet Central Asia the clergy showed no interest in autonomy or independence but instead confined itself to condemnations of the Jadids and other leftist parties "whom they condemned as godless renegades."⁵⁷ To the further confoundment of their flocks, the Ulema soon decided to support the new Soviet power and participate in the Tashkent government.⁵⁸ In Sinkiang the mullahs were at one with the conservative and wealthy begs in their support of stability and Chinese rule.⁵⁹

The only groups which succeeded to some extent in defying Communist

⁵⁶ Barnett, op. cit., p. 273.

⁵⁷ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 229.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 232.

⁵⁹ Barnett, op. cit., p. 272.

rule were the Basmachis and the forces of Osman Bator. Both of these movements were basically attempts to preserve traditional modes of existence from the encroachment of the twentieth century. They succeeded for a time because they were tied to the rugged traditions of relatively backward nomadic peoples and because they manifested themselves in the form of difficult-to-extinguish guerrilla bands operating in remote and difficult terrain.

Finally, the failure of Pan-Turkism merits some attention. In spite of its espousal by such powerful groups as the Jadids and Eastern Turkestan rebels, Pan-Turkism had no definite or realistic program for the areas under study. The movement was distinguished by its vagueness. The recalling of the feats of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane could not provide the basis for a dynamic and progressive political and social movement.⁶⁰ In view of the fragmentation of the Turkic peoples into separate linguistic groups and into distinct territorial groupings, it is a wonder that the movement progressed as far as it did.

⁶⁰ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 273.

CHAPTER II

A DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND IN COMMUNIST SINKIANG DURING THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION

The Bolsheviks viewed Russia's Muslims as a part of the peasant areas of the East whose destiny constituted a decisive factor in the struggle between the Soviets and the imperialists. The Soviets believed that, if the non-Russian nationalities of the eastern Soviet Union, many of whom were related both ethnically and religiously to peoples in adjacent Asian countries, were set forth upon a progressive path, they would serve as shining examples of what life could be like for the non-Soviet peoples of Asia under a Soviet-type system.

Lenin in 1916 put forth the basic framework within which Soviet nationality policy always has operated at least in theory. He claimed that the goal of socialism was to bring nations closer together and eventually cause their fusion. Lenin felt that a nationality's right to secede (proof of the fact that the nation in question was no longer oppressed) was a necessary step in the inevitable fusion of nations.¹ At the November 7, 1917 Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it was proclaimed that Soviet authority "guarantees to all the nations dwelling in Russia the genuine right of self-determination."² This same congress on November

¹ V.I. Lenin, Sochinenia XIX (Moscow, 1929), p. 40

² Andrei Y. Vyshinsky editor, The Law of the Soviet State (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948) p. 249.

8, 1917 established a People's Commissariat for Nationalities headed by Stalin. The official act which outlined the self-determination of nations and the basic principles of Soviet nationalities policy was the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia "written by Stalin and signed by Lenin and Stalin on November 2 and 15, 1917 respectively."³

In analyzing the Soviet theoretical approach, one is struck by the complete subordination of self-determination to the interests of the sovietized masses of laborers. The national bourgeoisie was to have no voice in the matter.⁴ Following Lenin's 1916 pronouncement, Bolshevik leaders defined self-determination as merely a temporary phase which preceded the phase in which "all the self-determined nationalities would unite in a single, centralized, indivisible proletarian state which was to pursue one common task namely the establishment of a socialist order."⁵ The federative structure of the future proletarian state was not to be along ethnic lines, but instead along the lines of regional proletarian groups.⁶ However, with the Soviet abandonment of a federative structure based on ethnic lines, one suspects that the theoretical Soviet view of future nationalities in reality denied their continued existence.

On January 15, 1918, after the secession of Finland (December 6, 1917) and Lithuania (December 11, 1917), Stalin denounced all the opposition of borderland countries as an attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to gain power and as being completely unrelated to self-determination as the Com-

³ Ibid.,

⁴ Politika sovetskoi vlasti po natsional'nym delam za tri goda, November 1917-November 1920 (Moscow, 1920), pp. 8-9.

⁵ I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia IV (Moscow, 1946), pp. 351-55, 360.

⁶ Politika sovetskoi vlasti po natsional'nym delam za tri goda, November 1917-November 1920, op. cit., p. 9.

Communists defined it. The following passage offers an official explanation.

In a colony or semicolony in which a struggle was still being waged against "feudalism" or "medievalism" and in favor of bourgeois democracy, the national-democratic bourgeoisie might legitimately exercise the right of self-determination, including secession; but in countries in which the struggle against "feudalism" had been won and a new struggle was being waged to transform bourgeois democracy into soviet or proletarian democracy, as was the case in Russia, there only the proletariat could legitimately exercise the right of self-determination and secession.⁷

In view of the fact that only a Moscow-dominated party would be considered as the true spokesman for the proletariat, it was virtually impossible to imagine a "proletarian" party that would secede. For the Bolsheviks, the principle of self-determination was a weapon in the struggle for socialism, and the various interests of nations and their right to self-determination were to be subordinated to the principles and objectives of socialism.

In addition to the threat of bourgeois nationalism, the Bolsheviks faced a counter-revolutionary threat from Sultan Galiyev, a Tatar Muslim Communist, who held a high position in the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs. Sultan Galiyev "developed a movement which centered round the conviction that the exclusively German or Russian interpretation of Marxism was unsuited to the Muslim world, and that it would eventually become obscured by Russian chauvinism. He aimed at modifying Marxism as conceived by the industrial West, in order to render it applicable to the fundamentally agrarian society of Asia."⁸ Needless to say Sultan Galiyev was denounced and dismissed from the Party.

The instrument for implementing the above-discussed Bolshevik principles of nationality policy was the Commissariat of Nationalities (founded November 8, 1917). Its powers have been described in the following manner:

⁷ Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 20.

⁸ Lt.-Col. Geoffrey Wheeler, "Race Relations in Soviet Muslim Asia," JRCAS, XLVII (April, 1960), p. 96.

it had jurisdiction over the entire sphere of interrelations of the Soviet government and nationalities. It initiated the entire Soviet legislation on the matter of nationalities, including the acknowledgement of independent Soviet Republics, the establishment of autonomous Soviet Republics, measures concerned with the economic and cultural uplifting of nationalities, and so forth. As an operating organ, the Commissariat established close bonds with the communist organizations and the worker masses of different nationalities and took an active and leading part in organizing independent and autonomous republics and regions.⁹

On May 19, 1920, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee directed that a Soviet of Nationalities, composed of representatives of the autonomous republics and regions, be formed within the People's Commissariat of Nationalities to which it would act as a consultative representative organ.¹⁰

An important immediate function of the Commissariat of Nationalities was its military role. It was charged with the task of organizing national units within the Red Army. This basically meant the absorption of existing military formations into the Red Army.¹¹ Finally, the structure of the Commissariat of Nationalities was such that each national group had a corresponding national commissariat or section within the framework of the central commissariat.¹²

The above-discussed functions of the Commissariat of Nationalities were carried out in the Turkestan Republic after the September, 1920 expulsion of the Jadids from positions of power. On April 11, 1921, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee promulgated a new constitution for the Turkestan Republic, officially converting it into an Autonomous

⁹ Vyshinsky op. cit., pp. 259-60.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

¹¹ Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 23. This was of particular importance in the Ukraine.

¹² Ibid.

Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR. For the purpose of further maintaining Moscow's control,

a Provisional Commission, including I. Rudzutak and M. Tomsy was created for regulating the affairs of Turkestan. Its functions were (1) the direction of affairs pertaining to the exclusive control of the central government, and (2) supervision of the execution of directives elaborated by the central government.¹³

In contrast to the Turkestan Republic, the Khorezm and Bukharan People's Republics, through their Compacts of Union (concluded with Moscow on September 13, 1920 and March 4, 1921, respectively) differed substantially from the other autonomous republics in their relationship to the RSFSR. These compacts did not call for the unification of certain branches of the administration and the economy.¹⁴ The armed forces were not unified with those of the RSFSR or the Turkestan Republic, and Soviet socialist economic controls were not introduced.¹⁵ It was only in October, 1923, that the Khorezm People's Republic was reorganized into a socialist republic. A dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasantry was proclaimed, and the exploiter classes lost their political rights.¹⁶ Bukhara already had led the way in these respects, save for the proclamation of a socialist republic, in August, 1923.

However, during this same period (1920-23), efforts were made, politically and economically, to integrate the People's Republic of Khorezm and Bukhara into the RSFSR. In February, 1922, the Bukharan and Khorezmian Communist Parties were absorbed into the RCP. In May of 1922 the

¹³ Pravda (April 14, 1921).

¹⁴ Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 265.

¹⁵ Joshua Kunitz, Dawn Over Samarkand (New York, International Publishers, 1935), p. 123.

¹⁶ Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 265.

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Turkestan Bureau (Turkbyuro-formerly the Turkestan Commission) was transformed into the Sredazbyuro (Central Asian Bureau) and was given authority over all Communist organizations in Soviet Central Asia. In March, 1923, a Central Asian Economic Council was established which had authority over the now unified economies of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm.¹⁷ Following these developments, a socialist republic was proclaimed in Bukhara in September, 1924.

Yet, before Bukhara and Khorezm could be admitted to the USSR (established on January 31, 1924 by the Second Congress of Soviets), national delimitation had to be carried out in Soviet Central Asia. In August of 1921, the Government of the RSFSR decreed that in principle Turkestan should be administratively divided by nationality.¹⁸ At the end of June 1924, the Sredazbyuro appointed a territorial commission with representatives of sixteen nationalities which was authorized to organize political, Party, economic, statistical and national commissions.¹⁹

By September, 1924 the national commissions had determined the new boundaries. Four new republics (Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan), delimited on the national principle, were created. Tadzhikistan and Kirghizia, until 1929 and 1936 respectively, remained as autono-

¹⁷ A.A. Gordienko, Sozdanie sovetskoi natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti v Srednei Azii (Moscow, State Publishing House of Legal Literature, 1959), pp. 125-26.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 166. In the political sphere, the national commissions were to prepare plans for the republican constitutions, for the new administrations, to prepare election campaigns, and to summon Soviet constituent congresses; in the territorial sphere, to define national boundaries and administrative divisions; in the economic field, to draw up national development plans for all branches of the economy.

mous republics within the Uzbekistan SSR.²⁰ After the announcement of the delimitation, there were protests from several of the nationalities concerning their respective shares.²¹ On November 1924, Revolutionary Committees were established within each new national state to administer it until the formation of the new governments. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan all became Union Republics on May 13, 1925.

According to the official explanation, the reasons for the delay in delimitation (from 1921 to 1924) were the political and economic backwardness of Bukhara and Khiva as compared with the rest of Soviet Central Asia, the national hostility among the various peoples of Central Asia, the existence of "nationalist deviations," and the shortage of trained Communists.²²

As a Bolshevik maneuver, the national delimitation was quite brilliant. By dividing Soviet Central Asia into clearly defined states, the Bolsheviks effectively undermined Pan-Turkism, while at the same time, as will be discussed below, they opened Central Asia to social reforms and

²⁰ Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled: Revised Edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 369, 379.

²¹ Gordienko, op. cit., p. 168.

Both the Uzbeks and Kazakhs demanded the formation of a Great Uzbek State and a Great Kazakh State, the Uzbeks wanted to incorporate the Kazakhs of the Syr-Dar'ya and Semirech'ye oblasts, and the Kazakhs wanted the Uzbeks of Syr-Dar'ya and Tashkent to form a part of the Great Kazakh state.

The Kirghiz nationalists, besides their territorial demands, spoke of the need for creating separate state structures for the Kirghiz tribes.

²² Ibid., pp. 132-33.

intensive economic development directed from the center."²³

In further examining the federative structure of the USSR, one finds that the Constitution of 1924 (promulgated on January 31, at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets) provided for three levels of People's Commissariats. The all-union commissariats (solely on the central government level) included foreign affairs, the military, and foreign trade. The second level was the union-republic (unified) commissariats (which existed in both the USSR government and the union republic government). These included the Commissariats of Food, Labor, and Finance. On the third level there were the republic commissariats which "existed only in the union republics and had no counterparts in the government of the USSR."²⁴ Included within the sphere of the republic commissariats were internal affairs, justice, education, health, and social welfare. However, it should be noted that the USSR government still retained the authority to define the basic principles in all these fields.²⁵ In view of these facts, it is apparent that Soviet national autonomy was defined within narrow bounds and probably was designed chiefly to placate minority feelings and to act as a showpiece for impressing undiscerning foreigners.

Since it seems apparent that the Soviets did not intend to allow

²³ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII (April, 1960), op. cit., p. 107.

"This new division was a heavy blow to the Jadids' ambition of unifying Central Asia into one Turkic state. Its Turkic population was now split into three national bodies, each of whose local tongue was promoted to a national language. Of even greater importance for the future of Central Asia was the creation of Tajikistan as a non-Turkic, Iranian-speaking republic. This development put an end to the further Turkization of the land." (Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 253.)

²⁴ Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 367-68.

²⁵ Ibid.

substantial political autonomy, it is important also to review their treatment of Islam and Islamic institutions. The Bolsheviks, at first, decided to refrain from assaulting Islam. On November 20, 1917, Stalin issued a manifesto to all the Muslims of Russia in which he did not mention the internationalist and atheistic elements of Marxism and Leninism. Instead, he concentrated on appeasing the religious and national feelings of the Muslims. His denunciations of Tsarist violations of Islamic beliefs and customs led to the Soviet Shariatist movement which attempted to merge Islam and Marxism. The Soviets themselves at first set up a Commissariat of Muslim Affairs, which in mid-1919 was dissolved. With its dissolution, the Reds also expunged the term "Muslim" from all Soviet organizations.²⁶ The basic problem facing Islam, in Soviet Central Asia, in the period immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, was a split between the conservative Muslim dignitaries who desired to continue opposing the atheistic regime and the "progressive" Muslims who called for support of the Soviet regime. Both sides referred to the Koran in supporting their respective positions.²⁷

The Muslim clerics who supported the Soviet regime (cooperation was established from 1922 on, although an earlier offer of support by Sher-Ali Liapin, leader of the Ulema, had been rejected by the anti-native, Social Revolutionary-dominated Tashkent government)²⁸ were intellectually very

²⁶ Wheeler, JRCAS, XLVII, op. cit., 95.

²⁷ Kolarz, op. cit., p. 409. "In Fergana, the chief of the Moslem ecclesiastical administration still urged believers as late as 1927 to boycott Soviet medical services.

...in the same year 1927 the Moslem religious dignitaries of Kokand wanted to take part in the communist demonstration celebrating the Tenth anniversary of the October Revolution." (Cited in Bezboznik, No. 4, [1927].)

²⁸ Safarov, op. cit., p. 68. (Cited in Nasha Gazeta [Tashkent, November 23, 1917].)

conservative, but were unconcerned with political and economic affairs (the main spheres of contemporary Bolshevik activities).

It might be noted that in some respects there are interesting similarities between Islam and Communism. Both teachings are authoritarian in nature and concern themselves with social justice. One might say that, once the individual Muslim had reoriented his emphasis from the spiritual to the temporal, "the concept of an administration of the people aimed at social justice [would be more understandable to him] than the Western idea of a government by and for the people lacking any concrete social objectives."²⁹

The appeal of Communism for the Muslim laity was chiefly in regard to economic and social affairs. For the Muslim woman the Bolshevik Revolution meant emancipation from her age-long degradation. For many Muslim men it meant freedom from the oppression of their former feudal lords.

In joining the collective the former semi-slave farm labourer becomes independent, a new life begins for him and he readily abandons his old religion which had taught him submission to his master.³⁰

The success of any effective anti-Communist appeal was hindered by the collision of religiously-oriented Muslims on the one hand and the atheistic Pan-Turkists on the other hand. To the further detriment of the creation of any effective anti-Bolshevik movement, the Jadids, during their brief and opportunistic honeymoon with Moscow (when they gained control of the Taskent regime from mid-January 1920 till September 1920), had actually

²⁹ Nabih Amin Faris, "Islam and Communism," Islamic Review (June, 1956), p. 30.

³⁰ Julius F. Hecker, Religion and Communism (London, Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1933), p. 226.

accomplished "the task of popularizing Communism and assisting in the growth of revolutionary forces in the East."³¹ The Basmachis, who fought for their traditional mode of life, for their tribal social order, and for the Islamic faith, were the only ones who succeeded in organizing any sort of effective resistance.

While the above discussion reveals that the Bolsheviks, in their initial policies in Russian Central Asia (because of Moscow's preoccupation with the Civil War and the repairing and sovietizing of the economy of Russia Proper) desisted from attacking Central Asia's Islamic institutions, it should not be assumed that they did not ultimately plan to attack these Islamic institutions. The Soviet plan for transformation, as will be seen, was methodical and effective. The plan of attack envisaged the weakening of the "three main legal-institutional" supports of Islam:

first the Vakufs, the religious endowments, mostly in the form of church lands, which provided the means for the upkeep of mosques and religious schools; second, the Koranic schools, and third, the religious and Shariat courts.³²

Because, in the immediate future, they were unable to provide any secular alternative, the Bolsheviks were compelled to sanction the continued existence of the Koranic schools. They even agreed to "the establishment of a special Muslim educational society called 'Makhkamai Shariya' which worked for a compromise between religion and Communism in the sphere of education. It was entitled to own Vakufs for financing its activities."³³

The Soviet regime recognized the competence of the Shariat courts, although in 1921 S. M. Kirov alerted Bolshevik activists to the possible

³¹ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 251.

³² Kolarz, op. cit., p. 412.

³³ Ibid.

danger of hostile agitation against the Soviet regime operating under the cover of these courts. He specifically mentioned counter-revolutionary Muslim clerical elements as the chief potential trouble-makers.³⁴ The Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (1923) adopted a resolution establishing anti-religious agitation and propaganda.³⁵ All these events fitted into the pattern of assault which followed. From this point, the Soviets proceeded systematically to curtail the competence of and reduce the number of the Shariat courts.³⁶ However, the persistent reduction of the number of Koranic schools and Shariat courts, along with the abolition of the Vakufs, did not bring about the immediate extinction of Muslim educational and legal institutions; they continued to survive in the rural areas.

One must not assume that the Bolshevik plan, in this early period, attempted systematically to eliminate all Islamic and Central Asia patterns. The Soviets allowed Friday to replace Sunday as the official Sabbath. They also, as will be pointed out below, made great efforts to introduce the use of the various nationality languages into the administration and the Party, as well as into the postal and telegraph services. Also "many natives" were recruited into the government and Party apparatuses.³⁷

³⁴ N. A. Smirnov, "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR," a Book Review, CAR, III No. I (1955), 77.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Kolarz, op. cit., p. 412. "In 1925, as many as eighty-seven such courts were in being in Ubekistan alone. By 1926 this number was reduced to twenty-seven. In 1927, only seven Shariat courts were left and in the next year not a single one remained in the whole of Soviet Central Asia." (Klimovich, op. cit., p. 121.)

³⁷ Turkestanskaia pravda (January 21, 1923).

As the final portion of this description of the political developments in Soviet Central Asia during the "political consolidation" phase, I shall discuss the development of the role of natives in the Communist Party. The Russian Revolution of November 1917 found Russian Central Asia lacking even a nucleus of native civil servants. The native intelligentsia which did exist was microscopic, and educationally and politically it was a part of the "feudal" and "exploiting" classes.³⁸ Compounding the complexity of the situation was the early Tashkent Soviet's preference for recruiting among the proletariat (nearly all Slavs) to the exclusion of what it regarded as the politically unconscious peasantry. For all practical purposes this led to a Slav-dominated Communist Party apparatus in Tashkent.

After the elimination of the members of the old Tashkent Soviet (mid-January 1920), Moscow encouraged the Tashkent Party organization and the party organizations in Bukhara and Khorezm to admit thousands of new members.³⁹ In spite of these efforts, as late as 1922, Great Russians

³⁸ Wheeler, JRCAS, XLVII, op. cit., 97.

³⁹ Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan 1918-1927 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 128. "The Kirghiz Party...which had approximately 8,500 members in July, 1919, increased its membership to well over 11,000 after a drive to enlist natives in 1919 and 1920. By 1921 the Turkestan Party organization had swelled its ranks to 65,000. ...At the Sixth Region Congress (late summer, 1921) over one half of the delegates were Moslems."

formed over 72 per cent of the Bolshevik Party's membership.⁴⁰ This was probably due to the need for Russian-speaking personnel and the fact that the Bolsheviks drew their main support from the urban centers which were largely Russian-inhabited. One-complicating factor which developed in Soviet Central Asia, in regard to the erection of large native Communist Parties,⁴¹ was the ambiguous attitude of the native Reds towards Islam. This ambiguity was probably encouraged by the relative leniency with which Moscow treated Islam during the "political consolidation" phase. During this phase many native Reds "still believed in Allah and observed the traditional services."⁴² In view of these difficulties, it is a tribute to the Soviets that they actually did make very serious efforts to recruit native personnel into the Party and to employ them in public administration (some in posts of considerable responsibility).⁴³

⁴⁰ Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 269. (Cited in I. P. Trainin, SSSR i natsional'naiia problema (Moscow, 1924), p. 26. This figure of 72 per cent is for the total nation-wide composition of the Russian Communist Party. However, the Great Russians constituted only about half the population of the country. In contrast the indigenous peoples of Soviet Central Asia excluding the negligible number of Kazakh members, composed at this time 3.5 per cent of the Russian Communist Party (Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York; Random House, 1959), p. 233.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 475. "During NEP, the party's policy towards the non-Russian nationalities was centralized control of the national parties, comparable to the type of control which was maintained over the subordinate party organizations of the RSFSR."

⁴² Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 410-11.

⁴³ Park, op. cit., pp. 186-7. (See footnote 80, p. 186 of Park.) "Yet Russians continued to dominate critical agencies--the ministries of internal affairs and state security, the ministries of justice, and the state banking and economic planning agencies--in the non-Russian republics." (Park, op. cit., p. 386.

Because of this influx of many impure elements into the Turkestan Party, it was virtually inevitable that a purge to cleanse the party would become necessary. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on January 11, 1922, directed the Communist Party of Turkestan "to harden its native cadres and to rid itself of 'colonizers.'"⁴⁴ A purge followed which lasted from 1922 to mid-1923. All the Communist Party organizations, even on the lowest levels, were involved. According to a report in Pravda on August 2, 1923, the membership of the Communist Party of Turkestan "stood at 13,156 members and 4,000 candidates, a bare one-fourth of the 1921 figure."⁴⁵ The Communist Parties of Kirghizia, Bukhara, and Khorezm were greatly reduced also.

In marked contrast, the Kazakhstan administration did not suffer any great purge at this time. This was chiefly because, during the period of "political consolidation," the administration of Kazakhstan was almost entirely in the hands of Russians (Kazakh and Russian were official languages). Even in 1926, less than ten per cent of the Kazakhs were literate.⁴⁶ The decision of the "Kraikom" (territorial committee) of the Kazakh Party meeting of May 8, 1926 to fill those posts in the administrative system which had the most to do with the public with Kazakhs, or persons knowing the Kazakh language was inadequate to "nativize" the administration.

By 1927, out of 11,068 "functions" [funktsii] in all provinces, 2,567, or 23.2%, had been "nativized," while in republican institutions 195 of 342 "functions" had been "nativized," or 23%.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Park, op. cit., p. 129.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 129-30. Check footnote 40 of this chapter.

⁴⁶ A. P. Kuchkin, "K voprosi a korenizatsii sovetskogo apparata v Kazakhstane v pervoe desyatilietie sushchestvovaniia respublik 1920-1930," Istoricheskie zapiski, No. 46 (1954), 203.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 215-16.

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This virtual monopolization of leadership in Kazakhstan by Slavs can be attributed to three things, the relative backwardness of the republic's nomadic population, the republic's proximity to Russia Proper, and the fact that the urban centers that did exist were largely inhabited by Slavs.

This period also witnessed the growth of the Komsomol. However, it was only after the middle twenties that it achieved a large membership. By mid-1927 the Uzbek Komsomol had 36,131 members, the Kirghiz Komsomol had 10,107 members, and the Turkman Komsomol had 7,048 members.⁴⁸

In turning to the Chinese experience, one finds that, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, the Chinese Communists had considerable dealings with Muslims prior to the Red victory in 1949. During the Long March (October, 1934 to October, 1935), the Reds had come into contact with many minority peoples including Muslims. There was even a Muslim Red Army attached to the Chinese Communist First Front Army.⁴⁹ Since the Reds were establishing a position in north Shensi, which was separated from Soviet Russia and its Outer Mongolian satellite by areas inhabited by Muslims, it became imperative that they achieve some level of co-operation with these Islamic peoples. When the Red armies had passed through Chinghai, Ninghsia, and north Kansu, they encouraged young Muslims who were propagandizing against the "Kuomintang running-dog" Ninghsia regime of Ma Hung-k'uei.⁵⁰ The Reds also conducted extensive instruction among their First and Fifteenth Corps in order to educate the soldiers in reference to the Chinese Communist

⁴⁸ Park, op. cit., p. 140. Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization).

⁴⁹ Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 282.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 348. The Reds swayed some young Muslims by promising to end Ma Hung-k'uei's conscription, to cancel taxes and old debts, to protect Islamic culture and to guarantee religious freedom.

position on the Muslim question.⁵¹ The Reds definitely attempted to overcome the historic animosity between the Chinese and the Muslims by gradually transforming it into a class antagonism. In September 1936, a provisional Muslim Soviet Government committee was elected. By the end of 1936, Mongols, Muslims, Tibetans, Formosans and Miao and Lolos tribesmen were enrolled in the Red Academy at Yen-an.⁵²

In regard to the minority nationality question, the Chinese Communists followed the lead of Joseph Stalin. They advocated that the culture or way of life of the nationality group should be, in the words of the familiar slogan, "national in form, socialist in content."⁵³ Nationality groups should be granted a maximum of cultural autonomy in the spheres of national language, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, and art forms. The Chinese Communists defined a minority nationality as:

a community of common origin bound together by a common language, a continuous area of residence, and a sense of group identity in economic and social matters as well as in standards of behavior and other distinctive traits.⁵⁴

The very definition seems somewhat vague, and the Communists were quite willing to recognize the claims of a myriad of groups that aspired to the status of minority nationality.

In the fall of 1931, the First All-China Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiangsi approved the Provisional Constitution of the "Chinese Worker-Peasant Democratic Republic" (Soviet Republic) which openly

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 353.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 254-56.

⁵³ Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works, III 1939-1941 (New York, International Publishers, 1954), pp. 151-55.

⁵⁴ Hu Chang-tu, editor, China, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven, HRAF, 1960), p. 64.

endorsed the equality of the various nationalities of China, and furthermore stated that

in such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang...the nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their independent states, or join the Union..., or to form autonomous regions within the Chinese Soviet Republic.⁵⁵

On November 6, 1938, at the Six Central Committee meeting after the Sixth Party Congress Chairman Mao pronounced that the Mongols, the Hui, the Tibetans, the Miao, the Yao, etc. peoples would enjoy powers equal to those of the Chinese in order to resist the Japanese together.⁵⁶ In the 1941 Program of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border-Area Government, the phrase, "the same treatment equal to that of the Chinese," was included in the text, and at this time autonomous areas and villages were established.⁵⁷

Although a Chinese Communist wartime civil constitution maintained that every minority nationality had the right to secede, Mao Tse-tung, at the Seventh Congress in 1945, in his report "On Coalition Government," claimed that the Chinese Communists were at one with Sun Yat-Sen's desire to grant equality and the right of self-determination (but not to the extent of secession) to the minority nationalities, after the Han nation had been liberated.⁵⁸ It should be added here that the 1954 constitution declared the minority areas (which form 60 per cent of China's territory and are rich in raw materials) an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR).⁵⁹ Therefore it can be stated that, according to the 1949

⁵⁵ Lattimore, op. cit., p. 115.

⁵⁶ China News Analysis No. 431 (Hong Kong, August 3, 1962), 1.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, IV (New York, International Publishers, 1956), p. 301.

⁵⁹ Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of China (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 10.

Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China theoretically is a "multinational state" composed of different but equal nationalities.⁶⁰

Immediately after "liberation," Peking implemented Article Fourteen of the Common Program which sanctioned the establishment of a "system of military control" in all liberated areas

so that the local people's governments could be "formed of persons appointed by the Central People's Government or by the front-line military political organs."⁶¹

At this time the real authorities that emerged in the Chinese Communist-controlled portion of Sinkiang were General Wang Chen (Commander of the Sinkiang Military District), and the leadership of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP which was headed by Wang En-mao (First Secretary) and three secretaries including Saifudin.⁶² The PLA established "organs of military control" (military committees) which co-operated with local People's Governments in all areas where such governments had been set up (this excluded the three northern districts). The functions of the military committees were outlined by Liu Shao-ch'i as follows:

to crush reactionaries by force and simultaneously protect and inspire the people and help them to set up Conferences of People's Representatives--organs of people's power of all degrees which...will gradually receive full power.⁶³

The reactionaries whom Liu desired to crush were largely composed of

⁶⁰ "The Common Program," China Digest (October 5, 1949), supplement.

⁶¹ Holubnychy op. cit., p. 97 (Cited in Zakonodatelnye akty Kitayskoi Narodnoi Respubliki [Moscow, 1952] p. 54.)

⁶² Current Background, No. 153 (February 15, 1952), 1-2.

⁶³ "Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR, VII No. 4 (1960), p. 447. This article contained the substance of K.F. Kotov, Vestnaya natsional'naya avtonomiya v Kitayskoi Narodnoi Respublike (na primere Sin'tszyan-Uygurskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti) (Moscow, 1959).

Osman Bator's bands and remnant KMT groups.

In December 1949, the CCP set up a "united democratic government" in Sinkiang which had thirty-one members (nine Uighurs, three Kazakhs, two Chinese, two Dungans, and one representative of each other nationality).⁶⁴

The old KMT "pao-chia" system was replaced by a new Communist form of local government. Local people's governments were established in districts, counties, areas, rural areas, and villages. Of the seventy-eight county (hsien) chairmen forty-five were Uighurs, thirteen Kazakhs, eleven Chinese, four Mongols, three Kirghiz and one Tatar.⁶⁵ Of the ten chairmen of district governments, four were Uighurs, three Kazakhs, two Han, and one Mongol.⁶⁶

In the second half of 1950, a governmental reorganization occurred in the three northern districts of Tarbagatay, Altai, and Ili. The Eastern Turkestan regime, whose armed forces in September 1949 had been

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 448.

"The 'pao-chia' system of the KMT was modelled on the ancient Legalist prototype which grouped families 'in units for mutual guarantee, each unit responsible for the acts of all the others--a surveillance system par excellence, which set neighbor to spy upon neighbor and kin upon kin. Ideally one hundred families formed a 'chia' and ten 'chia' formed a 'pao.' The KMT theory was that through this heirarchy of subunits the government could train the people during the period of political tutelage to prepare them for local autonomy...Beginning with the family household it was provided that families should be grouped more flexibly, on community lines, to form 'chia' and 'pao.' A number of pao should then form villages or towns, which in turn would be under the hsien government... Each 'pao' should form an assembly and elect two representatives, who would in turn function in a village or two assembly." (John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 189-90).

"To replace the old KMT pao-chia system a new system of local administration was set up: local people's governments were established in districts, counties, areas, rural areas, and villages." ("Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR VIII No. 4, op. cit., 448.)

⁶⁶ Kazakhstanskaja pravda (October 15, 1955).

incorporated into the PLA, was supplanted by Administrative-Control Boards, and local people's governments were established in counties, areas and villages. In the rest of the province, only a few months after the establishment of military controls, "power began to pass into the hands of the local Conferences of People's Representatives of All Strata of the Populace and to the local people's representatives elected by them."

These Conferences, were a transition stage of popular representation, existing while the economy of the country was being reconstructed. They existed at the village, rural area, county, city, and province level. Their most important functions were to debate and make proposals about the work of the people's governments and to publicize the decisions of the governments among the people. During the first period of their activity their resolutions were no more than recommendations. From the middle of 1951, however, they began to exercise the powers later possessed by the assemblies of People's Representatives. After this date the Conferences selected the corresponding people's governments, controlled their activities and confirmed their budgets, and their resolutions had the force of commands.⁶⁷

In Sinkiang, this development was completed by the end of 1952. However, since the consultative councils, which represented the Conferences between sessions, met only four times a year at the provincial level and once a month at the city and county level, it appears that the Conferences, in spite of their official powers, actually could not maintain effective control of the local governmental units or of the provincial government.⁶⁸

When the First Five Year Plan was inaugurated throughout most of China (but not Sinkiang) at the start of 1953, the Conferences were re-

⁶⁷ "Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR, VIII No. 4, op. cit., 448.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 449. "At the first session of the Provincial Conference (April-May 1951), of the 530 delegates 470 had been selected by various social organizations, State institutions and the Chinese Army and the rest had been nominated by the Provincial Government. Workers, peasants, traders, intelligentsia, students, the Communist and other parties and Buddhist, Muslim and other religious groups were represented." Since 25 per cent of the delegates were Chinese, it is probably safe to assume that the representation of the urban areas was heavily weighted.

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placed by People's Congresses which were elected by the general elections that were carried out in stages during 1953 and 1954. The institution of these Congresses was not implemented in the livestock-breeding areas where at this time Conferences of People's Representatives were called into being.⁶⁹

In attempting to satisfy the aspirations of the minorities, the Chinese Communists devised three types of autonomous regions. The first type encompasses one minority only (e.g. the P'ingwa-Tibetans--in northern Szechwan). The second type consists of one large national minority, with enclaves of other minorities of comparatively small population (e.g. the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region). The third type is called a "joint autonomous region" and is inhabited by several national minorities (e.g. Lungsheng in northern Kwangsi Province is inhabited by T'ung Chuang, Miao, Yao and Ling). The autonomous units have three administrative levels: hsiang, ch'u, and hsien.

In regard to Han populations residing within autonomous districts, Article 5 of the Program for Enforcement of Nationality Regional Autonomy stated that:

The state power organs of Han Chinese localities within the national autonomous districts shall adopt the existing system generally adopted in the country and need not carry out regional autonomy; but in the Han localities within the autonomous district where Han Chinese form a majority, democratic nationality coalition government shall be established.⁷⁰

Autonomous units were to be established in any area where minorities constituted an appreciable proportion of the population. Thus far the Chinese

⁶⁹ Ibid., 449-50.

⁷⁰ SMCP No. 394 (Hong Kong, August 14, 1952), 12. Wherever practical, attempts were made in multi-minority autonomous units to draw representatives of all the ethnic groups into a "democratic-coalition Government."

Communist approach can only be credited as being sensible and constructive.

According to Article Sixty-Seven of the 1954 Constitution, the traditional forms of local government, while they survived in name, were, in all essential respects, not to deviate from the nationally uniform standard of being based on principles of "democratic centralism" and the system of people's congresses. Furthermore, while the "Constitution granted limited power to adapt the laws, regulations, and decision of higher authorities to the requirements of the particular nationality," the central authorities must approve the regulations drawn up by local authorities.⁷¹

On the levels of the administrative region, the province, and the district, there existed Nationalities Affairs Committees, which represented the Nationalities Affairs Commission. This Commission, which is the Chinese counterpart to the Commissariat of Nationalities in the Soviet Union, officially handles minority problems. However, unlike its Soviet counterpart, the Nationalities Affairs Commission has had no military functions in the minority areas.

In the march toward autonomy for Sinkiang, events fell into place in the following pattern. At the Second Enlarged Session of the Nationalities Affairs Commission in December 1951, a draft program for introducing regional autonomy in the minority areas was formulated.⁷² On August 8, 1952, a program was ratified by the Central Government Council which declared that "all national autonomous districts shall be inseparable parts of the territory of the People's Republic of China," while the organs of these districts "shall be local state power organs under the united leadership of the Central People's Government."⁷³ In September of

71 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
72 Hsin Hua News Agency Release (Peking, August 12, 1952).
73 SMCP No. 394, op. cit., 12.

1952, at the Second Session of the Provincial Conference, a Preparatory Committee was set up to solve the problems of autonomy for the nationalities. During the summer of 1953 intensive preparations (including "practice elections" in thirty-six hsiang in order to gain experience) were made for the first general elections in Sinkiang which were held in early 1954 in eighty-two counties and towns and in 2,175 hsiang. According to official Communist sources 91.65 per cent of the electorate voted.⁷⁴

From November 1953 and during 1954, the above-mentioned Preparatory Committee aided in the formation of five autonomous districts (chou), six autonomous counties (hsien), seven national areas (ch'u), and nine national rural areas (hsiang).⁷⁵ The Communists have even granted autonomy on the village level.

Consolidation within Sinkiang was accompanied also by a series of purges. The 1951 purge within the three districts of the Eastern Turkestan Republic has already been referred to in the first chapter. In the

⁷⁴ Ch'un Chung Jih Pao (群眾日報), (January 7, 1954).

Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (July 23, 1954).

Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (October 5, 1954). Of the 375 deputies, 231 were Uighurs, forty-eight Kazakhs, forty-five Chinese, fourteen Dungans, nine Mongols, nine Kirghiz, five Tatars, four Uzbeks, three Tadzhiks, three Sibo, two Russians, one Daur, one Manchu.

⁷⁵ Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (December 10, 1953; January 28, 1954; February 6, 1954; February 10, 1954; April 10, 1954; April 24, 1954; April 25, 1954; July 11, 1954; July 20, 1954; July 22, 1954; July 24, 1954; August 7, 1954; September 25, 1954; September 30, 1954; October 16, 1954; December 11, 1954).

Sinkiang Pao Chih (新疆報紙), (February 6, 1954; April 18, 1954).

At this time in Sinkiang there were five autonomous chou (two Mongol, one Kazakh, one Dungan, one Kirghiz), six autonomous ch'u (two Kazakh, one Dungan, one Mongol, one Tadzhik, one Sibo), seven autonomous hsien, and nine autonomous hsiang.

province-wide regime Durhan Shahidi, by New Year's Day 1952, had announced over Radio Urunchi that Sinkiang had been purged of 120,000 "enemies of the people."⁷⁶ Sinkiang also participated in the nationwide "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" campaigns which were directed against "counterrevolutionaries" of all types. As late as April 30, 1952 at the Fifth Session of the Northwest Military And Administrative Committee, the call was made for carrying to completion the "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" campaigns.⁷⁷ Therefore it is apparent that the Chinese Reds combined official concessions (establishment of autonomous units) and penetrating repressions in their attempt to consolidate their hold on Sinkiang.

In reference to the problem of recruiting members of the minority nationalities for membership in the Communist Party and for participation in cadre groups, the Chinese Communists found themselves in a dilemma which resembled that of the Russian Communist Party in Soviet Central Asia. In spite of the Red pronouncement that local rule in Sinkiang had to be carried out by members of the local minority nationality, the Communists were hard put to produce many native Communists or native cadres. In 1950 there were only 12,841 native cadres out of a population of five million in Sinkiang. By the end of 1955, this number had risen to just 36,000 cadres.⁷⁸ Native membership in the Communist Party, of course, grew more slowly. Minority nationality members in the CCP in Urunchi during 1951

⁷⁶ Hans de Weerd, "Durhan Shahidi," CAR, VII No. 1 (1953), 95.

In early 1952, Durhan, in conjunction with the continuing "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" movements, attacked the Pan-Turkic tendencies of certain Uighur groups. (See footnote 52 of Chapter I.)

⁷⁷ Hsi An Ch'un Chung Jih Pao (西安群眾日報), May 13, 1952).

⁷⁸ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (Peking, September 24, 1955).

numbered only 27. By 1957 this figure had risen to only 608.⁷⁹

Throughout the "political consolidation" period, Peking attempted to denounce "greater nationalism" on the part of the Han or any other majority group in an area as well as "narrow nationalism" on the part of a minority group which displayed an "attitude of fear and hostility toward the larger group."⁸⁰

Finally, in the religious sphere, one finds, in some contrast to the Soviet experience, that the Chinese Reds proved remarkably tolerant during the "political consolidation" period. The lands belonging to religious establishments (vakufs) were left untouched, "except for certain plots already transferred to the peasants. Members of religious orders had equal rights with the peasants in the possession of land."⁸¹ The Chinese further attempted to give the Muslims a sense of participation by means of the Chinese Islamic Association which was founded in 1953 and is Peking's front in dealing with foreign Islamic organizations. Peking, in view of its extensive success in establishing diplomatic relations with Muslim nations, regards the maintenance of an apparently vigorous and united Islamic community in China as a matter of great importance. This further gives Peking--since China contains a sizeable Muslim minority (twenty million)--a claim to an interest in affairs which affect any part of the Islamic world.

In attempting to analyze the above-mentioned Soviet and Chinese poli-

⁷⁹ "Enlarged Conference of CCP Sinkiang Commission," Current Background No. 512, (July 10, 1953), 2.

⁸⁰ Peter S. H. Tang, Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies (New York, Praeger, 1957), p. 203.

⁸¹ V. F. Kasatkin, "Reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa v Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike," Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, No. 4 (1956), 22.

tical policies, it first should be recognized that both Moscow and Peking interpreted the concept of self-determination as a weapon in the struggle for socialism. Self-determination was seen as part of the process of destroying the feudal and bourgeois ways of life. However, in spite of their desire to destroy the old societies, the Soviets and Chinese manifested flexibility in their respective approaches. The Soviets, contrary to their early plans of organizing autonomous political units on the basis of regional economic units, established political subdivisions in Central Asia on the basis of ethnic groups. Furthermore, the Compacts of Union which Moscow made with the Khorezm and Bukharan People's Republics showed, in their lack of provisions for military and economic union, a certain tactful realism which was to become less manifest as development of the area was to progress in later periods. The Chinese Reds displayed tact in the peaceful manner in which they set up their organs of military control in Sinkiang. No doubt the peaceful surrender of the KMT forces in Sinkiang contributed to this situation, but the CCP appears also to have handled Akhmedjan Kasimi's regime in such a way as to have avoided a civil war.

Yet the last paragraph leads us into one of the fundamental differences between the policies of Moscow and Peking in this period. This is the extraordinary role of the PLA as opposed to the secondary role of the Russian Red Army. This difference is basically a manifestation of the respective historical developments of the army-Party relationship in the Russian and the Chinese Communist movements. The Bolsheviks took power in 1917 without an army. The army that was soon formed included many Tsarist officers and from the Red point of view was seen as an organization outside the original Bolshevik Party which had captured the country. The army was formed only because the Bolsheviks were threatened by power.

ful enemies (the Whites and the Poles). No one in the top echelon of the Bolshevik party was a professional military man.⁸² As if to reinforce this peculiar relationship between the army and the Party, one finds that the Bolsheviks had contacted and officially accepted the early Tashkent regime as Moscow's "manifestation" in Central Asia for two years before the arrival of Frunze's forces in September 1919. Thus the Party again actually had an organization in being in Central Asia (although it--the original Tashkent regime--did administer the area with nearly complete independence from Moscow), prior to the appearance of Red military forces. While one must admit that Frunze's army was used to purge and subordinate the Tashkent regime, it also must be mentioned that the Bolsheviks, except for the task of suppressing the Basmachis, saw fit to de-emphasize the role of the Red Army in the political and economic developments of Soviet Central Asia, and even went to the extreme of granting the Commissariat of Nationalities the right to integrate the military forces of the minorities.

In contrast to the Bolshevik experience, the Chinese Communists came to power by means of a twenty-year civil war. The division between the PLA and the CCP at times has been quite unclear. For example, as of 1962, of the five Vice-Chairmen of the Central Committee, three were Marshalls of the Red Army. The chairman, Mao Tse-tung, is internationally recognized as a military theorist of the first rank. Of the nineteen members of the CCP Politburo, eight are Red Marshalls.⁸³ In further contrast to the Bolshevik experience, prior to the entrance of the PLA into Sinkiang, there was no Chinese Communist organization in the province. The PLA

⁸² Leon Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1941), p. 269.

⁸³ Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (New York, Random House, 1962), p. 745.

brought CCP organization and authority into Sinkiang. In the first months of Red rule in the province, authority was vested in the Commander of the Sinkiang Military District, and the Leadership of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP. The substance of this dual authority has been discussed previously in the section on Chinese political reforms in this chapter. The extraordinary economic functions of the PLA will be discussed in the next chapter.

The patterns of governmental structure that evolved in these two areas can be described in the following manner. The Soviets, in theory, established a federative structure which allowed for five union republics and five national Communist parties.⁸⁴ Moscow also set up the structure of the above-mentioned three levels of people's commissariats. The Chinese in contrast to the Soviets did not establish union republics or national Communist parties. The Sinkiang government was set up on the basis of proportional representation in a "united democratic government." This was nothing more than a provincial regime which included representatives of the various nationalities of Sinkiang. In spite of the formal structural differences, it appears that neither system, in view of the unity of the respective Communist parties and the admitted limitations which the Soviets and Chinese have imposed upon the powers of their respective autonomous political units, allowed any significant aspect of political life to be beyond the authority of the respective central government.

⁸⁴ Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-64. "But such parties functioned in all essential respects as administrative subunits of the Russian Communist Party. They sent delegates to its congresses and were expected to subordinate themselves to the directives of the Central Committee and other leading bodies of the Russian Party."

In analyzing further the Chinese departure from the Soviet structural pattern, one discovers that Peking has failed to offer any rational ideological explanation for its refusal to set up union republics. Certainly Sinkiang qualifies according to Stalin's famous three point definition,⁸⁵ which requires an area to be a borderland territory and to contain a relatively large, homogeneous and compact group (the Uighurs constitute three-fourths of Sinkiang's populations and dominate the Dzungarian oases of Turfan and Hami and the Ili district; in Kashgaria the Uighurs comprise nearly all the population running in a crescent from the oases of Kucha, Agsu, Kashgar, and Yarkand to the oases of Keriya, Cherchen, and Qarqhalic). The Kirghiz nomads who surround this crescent area could have been given autonomy within a Uighur union republic. The third of Stalin's criteria was that each republic should have a population of at least one million persons. It is evident that the Uighur community of Sinkiang fulfills Stalin's criteria.

Another Chinese policy which appears peculiar in comparison with Soviet practice is the granting of autonomy at the village level. From this practice and from the creation of "joint autonomous regions" (regions

⁸⁵ Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-73. Edgar Snow in The Other Side of the River discussed this question with Lin Yao-hua, the director of the History Department of the Institute of National Minorities. "Now Tsarist Russia, on the other hand, was an imperialist country which held many smaller nations in subjugation,....When revolution occurred it liberated both Russia's working class and the colonial nations. As these nations were already "bourgeois nationalist" states they had to be recognized as "autonomous republics" with national political autonomy. In China the minorities never reached the stage of "bourgeois nationalist" states. They are minority nationalities, but minorities of the one nationality they share with the Han majority--that is, Chinese." (Snow, *op. cit.*, pp. 597-98.

Certainly there is much evidence to question an assumption that the pre-1917 peoples of Russian Central Asia had achieved anything but the most remote first steps in the direction of "bourgeois-national" nationhood.

which are inhabited by several national minorities) one gains the impression that Chinese Communist nationality policy is a loose and flexible mechanism that can be adapted more readily to varying circumstances than its Soviet counterpart which was directed towards the more single-minded goal of fashioning all the major national groups into union republics. In summation, it can be stated that the autonomous political units in China are, in a formal sense, comparable to the oblasts and rayons which exist within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

In the process of creating their respective Central Asian political structures, both Moscow and Peking employed the purge as an instrument for purifying the local communist organs in order to further the consolidation of Red rule in Western and Eastern Turkestan. The purges in Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang during the "political consolidation" phase came in two waves. The first wave was the elimination of "right wing" accomplices of the Reds (in Soviet Central Asia they were the old Tashkent group and the Jadids (November 1919-September 1920); in Sinkiang they were comprised of the unreliable elements within the Eastern Turkestan Republic organization (mid-1950-1951). The second wave occurred in Soviet Central Asia from 1922 to mid-1923. It was directed against the swollen party apparatus. In Sinkiang, the second wave officially was in conjunction with the nationwide "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" campaigns (1952-1953). It appears that it was directed mainly against lingering "counterrevolutionaries" such as Pan-Turkic elements and Uighur nationalists.

However, in examining these waves of purges, an interesting and foreboding phenomenon makes itself apparent. This is the absence of a purge in Kazakhstan. The significance of this manifests itself if one

remembers that the second purge-wave was directed against unfit minority elements. In short, the dominant role that the Russians were playing in Kazakhstan and its later intensification and spread to Kirghizia identifies a process which in the future will in all likelihood result in drastic cultural and ethnic changes in most of Soviet Central Asia.⁸⁶ Probably, because of the more formidable physical barriers, a comparable process developed somewhat more slowly, at least within the scope of this paper's periodization, in Peking's relationship with Sinkiang.

The final point of comparison which is pertinent to this summary concerns the handling of Islamic legal and educational institutions. While, as has been mentioned above, both Moscow and Peking, during the early stage of their respective "political consolidation" periods, showed great tolerance, it readily becomes apparent that after 1924 Moscow, by its destruction of the "vakufs" and its progressive circumscription of the authority of the Shariat courts, was not prepared to tolerate Islam any more than was absolutely necessary. Peking was able to restrain itself from a massive assault until late 1957. (Refer to footnote 68, Chapter IV.)

⁸⁶ Since the spectacular growth of this phenomenon takes place after 1934 in Soviet Central Asia and after 1957 in Sinkiang, it is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. (See footnotes 32 and 57 of Chapter IV.)

CHAPTER III

A DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PERIOD
OF POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION

As has been previously stated, the economic integration of Tsarist Central Asia with Russia Proper in the nineteenth century was responsible for the transformation of the region's economy from a "self-sufficient rural one into a market-oriented one . . ."1 Cotton became "the main product of native Central Asia agriculture" and a native middle class (cotton ginnerers and buyers, merchants and moneylenders) began to rise and struggle against the domination of feudal forces.²

In facing the task of running the Central Asian economy, the early Tashkent regime, in line with the practice of Moscow, set up in May, 1918, a Regional Council of National Economy which had the authority to reorganize the economy of Turkestan. The Regional Council's success in nationalizing the few industrial enterprises was accompanied by sharp declines in industrial output and cotton acreage.³ The New Economic

¹ Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 80.

² Ibid.

³ V.V. Zaorskaia-Aleksandrova, "Tezisi doklada po promyshlennosti Turkestana," Khlopkovoe delo Mes. 1-2 (January-February, 1922) 44-5. The original Tashkent Soviet expropriated the cotton industry, the railroads, steamship companies and the oil industry. The resulting decline in labor

Policy (NEP) which was proclaimed in March 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Part, laid down further guide lines for the economic development of Central Asia. The NEP stipulated that the state, by means of government supervision over and taxation of the private sector which was restricted to small-scale trade and industry would be relieved of "the necessity of pouring its limited funds into the manufacture of many types of consumer goods" and would receive "additional resources for use in the reconstruction of socialist industry, communications and transport."⁴

Moscow exercised its economic desires through political agencies in Central Asia which were subordinate to the RCP. In March, 1923, the Central Asiatic Economic Council (CAEC) was established in Tashkent. The CAEC

not only acted as a superior planning agency for Central Asia's agriculture, irrigation, state trading and co-operatives, but assumed direct responsibility for unifying the region's monetary systems, foreign trade, transport, and communications.⁵

After the 1924 delimitation, the Central Executive Committee of the CPSU gave the CAEC supreme economic power (in conformity with Moscow's directives) in Central Asia. From the above it is apparent that Moscow intended to maintain centralized control of Central Asia's economy on a

discipline and productivity, state of disrepair of equipment and increased absenteeism, were largely the consequence of the Soviet's attempt to replace experienced management personnel with hastily formed factory committees, incapable of operating efficiently the expropriated industries.

⁴ Park, op.cit., p. 265.

⁵ Ibid., p. 267. A discussion of inter-republic economic development can be found on pp. 70-5 of Park, op. cit.

local as well as regional basis. Henceforth, Central Asia's economy was to be integrated into the all-union economy.

In examining further the NEP period, one finds that, industrially, it was characterized by an attempt to revive and expand state-owned enterprises. However, because Central Asia in this period had a grave shortage of investment funds and a minute and, to some extent incompetent, industrial labor force, the Soviets refrained from embarking on programs of new development and instead concentrated largely on reviving existing industries.⁶ Complementing this approach was the Soviets' failure to develop Central Asia's known sizable mineral deposits which included iron ore, nonferrous metals and rare earths.

The previously-mentioned lack of funds and skilled labor also hindered Soviet attempts to bring into being an efficient industrial labor force. The attempt to create an efficient labor force was further hindered by Moscow's desire to include as many native workers as possible. Unfortunately, few native workers were adequately trained or efficient. The process of the "nativization" of the work force had by 1926 reached the point where the native workers, though they were concentrated largely in the bottom echelons of the industrial latter, comprised a slight overall numerical majority.⁷ The trade union movement, the success of which

⁶ A. Khavin, Sotsialisticheskaya industrializatsiya natsional'nykh respublik i oblasti (Moscow, 1933), p. 81. The Bolsheviks even abandoned some Central Asian industries such as the salt industry which had collapsed during the revolution. The chief emphasis of this small scale expansion took place in the power resources (particularly mechanical and electric power).

⁷ Park, op. cit., pp. 278-79. "After the 1923 purge, natives composed 15 per cent of the 64,000 workers in Central Asia." 1924 marked the low point of industrial employment soon to be followed by sharp increases. (Cited in Turkostanskoe Biuro, V.Ts.S.P.S., Rabota profsoivzov, Turkestana v novykh usloviakh; otchet Turkbiuro V.Ts.S.P.S. IV Kraevoi Turkostanskoi

was plagued by the stunted growth of the labor force in Central Asia, finally, by 1925 had achieved a membership of 112,853, of which the natives comprised 31,516.⁸ Because the trade union structure, which was controlled by the Communist Party, extended from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions down to the factory level, Moscow was provided with an avenue for the transmission of directives from the top to the bottom. Yet one can say that, during the "political consolidation" period, the Bolsheviks, because of the pressure of Slav workers for the available industrial jobs and the lingering abuses against native laborers, were unable to establish a strong native proletarian foundation for Soviet power in Central Asia.⁹

One might add here that the trade unions also participated in the formation of the "kustar" (producer co-operatives). The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan in September, 1920, in view of the fact that the collapse of Russia's consumer goods industry had allowed the small independent producer to occupy a vital supply position in many areas, proclaimed Party and government sponsorship of producer co-operatives. The

Konferentsii Professional'nykh Soiuзов za vremia: aprel' 1922 g.-dekabr' 1923 g. (Tashkent, 1923), pp. 4, 13, 15.)

⁸ Ibid., p. 143-4. "Not only were they (trade unions) assigned industrial tasks but they were expected to assist in the liquidation of survivals of patriarchal-feudal relationships, in the development and strengthening of Soviet statehood, in the establishment of a judicial and administrative system conducting business in native languages, and in the development of a press, school, theater, and other cultural institutions using local languages." (Cited in Professional'ne soiuzy v Srednei Azii 1924-1925 god: otchet Sr.-Aziatskogo Biuro V.Ts.S.F.S. k pervoi Sredne-Aziatskoi Konferentsii krai'soiuzov (Tashkent, 1925), p. 4.)

⁹ Ibid., p. 279-80.

trade unions quickly got into the act by creating "special Kustar" divisions within the general union organization," and by recruiting native artisans into the new co-operative structures.¹⁰

Now I would like to discuss the various land reform policies that were pursued in Soviet Central Asia during the "political consolidation" period. Under the early Tashkent regime, no real land reform policy was put into effect. Although the Sixth Regional Congress of Soviets (1919) decreed the nationalization of all land in Turkestan, no redistribution of the land took place.¹¹ Instead, Red Army units, because they were forced to live off the land, actually destroyed much of the crops and laid waste a great amount of the land. The following figures reveal the scope of the destruction. Between 1915 and 1922 the amount of irrigated land in Central Asia fell from 9,248,900 acres to 5,386,800 acres. From 1917 to 1923, Central Asian livestock fell from 18,819,402 head to 6,555,940 head.¹² Because the Red Armies confiscated all stocks of cotton, the acreage of cotton declined drastically (between 1917 and 1919 the total planted area decreased by 64.4 per cent).¹³ Food output also slumped sharply. All these agricultural catastrophes contributed to the

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 284-85. (Cited in "Professional'noe dvizhenie v Vostoke," Zhurn' natsional'nosti, VI No. 1 (1923), 17.

¹¹ Ilias Alkin, Sredniiaia Azia: ekonomiko-geograficheski ocherk Kara-Kalpakstana, Kirgizstana, Tadzhikstana, Turkmenistana; Uzbekistana (Moskva, Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1931), p. 349.

¹² Park, op. cit., p. 299. Park's source for the acreage decline is S.P. Trombachev, "Sredne-Aziatskoe vodnoe khoziaistvo," Vestnik irrigatsii, V No. 10 (October, 1927), 3-4. His source for the livestock decline is I.P. Trainin, SSSR i Natsional'naiia problema, op. cit., p. 90.

¹³ Ibid., (Cited from I.G. Alexandrov, "Narodnoe khoziaistvo Turkeстана i ego vosstanovlenie," Khlop'ovoe delo, Nos. 1-2 (January-February, 1922), 23-36.

severity of the famines which struck Central Asia each year from 1920 through 1923. Under such circumstances any drastic socialization of agriculture would have certainly led to further confusion and famine.

After the elimination of the original Tashkent Soviet group in November, 1919, the Soviet Government's first move on the land question was to reverse the prevailing trend of the preceding two years, and by means of a decree of March 4, 1920, to proclaim that Slav immigrants had to return all lands that had been confiscated under the revolution to their former owners.¹⁴ This approach was further strengthened at the Ninth Regional Congress of Soviets, which met in September, 1920, and deprived immigrant peasants of special privileges and ordered the return to the natives of all lands taken after the 1916 Central Asian Revolt.¹⁵ Also, this Congress abolished private property in land and ordered the nationalization of Central Asian lands on an equalized land tenure basis. This was to be done first among share croppers and agricultural workers, second, among landless peasants and last in soviet farms, agricultural communes, artels and co-operatives.¹⁶ While this appears to have been a comprehensive start towards land reform in Central Asia, in actuality these principles were not carried out in the predominantly non-Slav areas. The Soviets barely eliminated the Russian "kulaks" in some native areas

¹⁴ Alkin, op. cit., pp. 358-59.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 356-57.

¹⁶ S., "Zemel'naya reforma v Uzbekistana," Vlast' sovetov, IX No. 7 (February 14, 1926), 8.

and redistributed their land.¹⁷ Yet even this aspect of the reform could not be called an unqualified success. Soviet procedure was such that:

the confiscated land was turned over to tribal or communal units for disposition by them rather than being presented outright to individual peasants. Tribal chieftains thus became the real arbiters of the reform and in some cases utilized it for their own aggrandizement.¹⁸

Soviet failure to aid the new owners with technical help and tools permitted the large land owners, within a two or three year period, to gain control of much of the recently redistributed lands.¹⁹

At this point it would appear to most observers that Soviet attempts at land reform in Central Asia accomplished little if anything. One of the vital factors in this apparently immobile situation was the unrevolutionary attitude of the overwhelming majority of the Muslim peasants.

Alexander Park has described it aptly:

Ties were not only feudal but patriarchal. The bey, the mullah, and the peasantry belonged to the same tribe or clan, and often had identical interests.²⁰

Such a situation could best be overcome only by means of a period of concerted "education" and propagandizing.

One more topic deserves discussion prior to an investigation of the period after the 1924 national delimitation. This is the subject of cotton. Because of the Bolshevik desire to be independent in textile manufactures, Moscow proved quite conciliatory towards the cotton growers.

¹⁸ Park, op. cit., p. 325.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 325-26. (Cited in E. Zel'kina, Ocherki po agrarnomu voprosu y Srednei Azii, p. 73.)

²⁰ Ibid., p. 330.

As early as 1920 the central government adopted a four-year program of reconstruction work and enacted decrees which guaranteed price supports, offered bonuses to cotton producers, and provided for the organization of cotton growing.²¹

The Soviets in 1919 had revived the prerevolutionary cotton-growing co-operatives. By 1923, membership in the co-operatives had reached 100,000 and the cotton acreage had reached 340,145 acres. In 1927, there were 631,510 co-operative members and they had 1,665,975 acres under cotton cultivation.²²

In summarizing this period prior to the 1924 delimitation, it is obvious that Soviet Central Asia did not experience an agrarian revolution. Despite the periodic abolition of private property in government decrees, private property maintained its position in the region. Large landowners still retained their lands and powers. On the positive side it can be stated that the Soviet effort to force Slav immigrants to return their land to its original native owners did aid in establishing temporarily, more peaceful political circumstances.²³

The key to the Soviet land reform measures, as they were put into

²¹ Ibid., p. 312. (Cited in Vostnoi Vserossiiskii S'ezd Sovetov Rabochikh, Krest'ianskikh Krasnoarmeiiskikh i Kazak'ikh deputatov dekabr' 22-29, 1920 g. (Moscow, 1921), pp. 102-3.)

²² Ibid., p. 314. (Cited in A.E. Aksel'rod, "Khlopkovoe delo za 10 let (1917-1927)," Khlopkovoe delo, Nos. 11-12 (November-December, 1927), 841.) Cotton acreage expanded relatively more rapidly than did the area under other crops. By the end of the New Economic Policy cotton output had achieved prewar levels, although the total planted area was only eighty per cent of prewar. (Taken from S.Ya. Gessen, "K voprosu o Khoziaistvennom stroitel'stve Srednei Azii," Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, No. 1 (6) (January, 1927), 62.)

²³ A. Vinogradova, "Khorezmskaia Sovetskaia Narodnaia Respublika," Zhizn' natsional'nostei, No 1 (January, 1923), 188.

operation in 1924, was the Turkestan CEC's adoption in May 1924 of the "Temporary Regulations for the Waters of the Turkestan Republic," which emphasized public ownership and control of water supplies and established the class principle as the major criterion in determining the right to use water.²⁴ After the completion of the national delimitation in 1924, the Soviets initiated a broad campaign of agrarian reform that was accompanied by a purge of the local Communist Party organizations and the local governmental apparatus. The Bolshevik approach was to promote warfare between the masses of poor peasants and the landlords, without involving the small independent farmer (middle peasant).²⁵ Such an approach faced great difficulties for the following reasons.

In Central Asia, history had created no sharp lines of demarcation between the rich and middle peasant and between the middle and poor.... There were no landowning courtiers representing a special caste, hostile ideologically to and differentiated culturally from, the mass of the peasantry. Large feudal property had disappeared after the Russian conquest and only a few vestiges of it still persisted. Here the large landowner usually came from the village and, culturally and spiritually, was bound up closely with the peasantry. His estate seldom exceeded 110 to 135 acres and in many cases contained no more than 30 acres.²⁶

²⁴ I. S. Kraskin, editor, Zemel'no-vodnaia reforma v Srednei Azii: sbornik materialov (Moscow, 1927), pp. 135-40. Soon after the national delimitation, the governments of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan employed the "labor use" principle to reduce sharply the water rights of the "miulk," "wakf" and other "non-toiling forms of land tenure".

²⁵ Park, op. cit., p. 333-34.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 334.

The Soviets, in typical fashion, directed all Soviet and republican Party agencies to work with a commission, which was to be established by each national Party organization and was to have the task of assuring that the execution of the reforms by the land-and water commissions was in conformity with local conditions.²⁷

In December 1925, the Uzbek CEC, at an Extraordinary Session, decreed the nationalization of all Uzbek lands, forests, waters, and natural resources.²⁸ The decree specified that most of the land to be expropriated would come from the holdings of the "nonlaboring" landowners and some of the lands of the rich peasants. The lands thus expropriated were re-distributed among tenant farmers, poor small holders, farm laborers, and poor and landless peasants.²⁹ Similarly, on the preceding September 24 (1925), the Turkmenistan Government decreed the confiscation of endowment properties and "miulk" (feudal property).³⁰ However, in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, these land reforms could be carried out in certain centrally located areas only (Ferghana Valley and the Merv and Poltoratsk districts). The outlying areas of Uzbekistan (Surkhan Daria, Kashka-Daria, and Khorezm) experienced these reforms only in the late 1920's after the collectivization movement had begun in 1927 in the more advanced

²⁷ Gurevich, op. cit., p. 65. Most of the members of these commissions were urban dwelling persons of European background.

²⁸ Kraskin, op. cit., p. 163-64.

²⁹ Park, op. cit., pp. 338-39. "The government allowed even small traders and low-ranking Moslem clerics to participate in the redistribution."

³⁰ Kraskin, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

areas.³¹

In carrying out these reforms, the Soviets were very careful to justify their actions by citing those Islamic laws and traditions which supported land redistribution and social justice.³²

The results of the economic reforms instituted during the "political consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia can be described in the following manner. For all practical purposes, the Soviets had eliminated rural landlessness. Yet, by means of the land redistribution they had created many small and poor farms which could not effectively survive without state aid.³³ In short, the Soviets, in the areas where the reforms were carried out, had systematically eliminated the feudal relationships and had replaced them with a pattern of limited land ownership which, because of the uneducated state of the small holders, could survive and progress only with the co-operation and aid of the state. The binding forces of the past - the traditional foundations of village unity - were completely undermined by the elimination of the larger landowners.

This undermining of the traditional economic unity of the village also manifested itself by a drastic decline in livestock production in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It might be added here that in areas

³¹ Gurevich, op. cit., pp. 59-61. Not only did the Bolsheviks face a situation in which these outlying areas manifested few exploitable issues between the tribal elders and the peasants, but these areas were heavily imbued with both anti-Soviet feeling and Basmachi remnants.

³² Kunitz, op. cit., p. 190.

³³ Park, op. cit., p. 346. (Cited in E. Zel'kina, "Zemel'naiia reforma v Srednei Azii," Revoliutsionni vostok, No. 3 (1927), 162.)

where the reforms were not introduced on a broad scale, such as Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan, the livestock production increased.³⁴

In examining the Chinese Communist economic reforms in Sinkiang, it is interesting to note that Peking, in a fashion similar to that of Moscow, did not press forth immediately with drastic reforms. This policy of moderation was pursued in nearly all minority areas save Inner Mongolia. The economic situation in Sinkiang was particularly precarious. From 1950-1952 the province had no financial budget and in reality was dependent upon central government appropriations.³⁵

In view of the backwardness and heterogeneity of the population of Sinkiang and also the fact that most of the wealth in terms of land, irrigation rights, and livestock was "in the hands of the propertied classes," Peking in 1949 began its program of reform "with the introduction of a progressive system of taxation, an increase in the amount of land leased to the peasants and a lowering of rents, the prohibition of the sale and parcelling out of land," and the regulation of the distribution of water.³⁶ The tax and rent reforms which were instituted in 1950 caused the quick termination of landlord monopolies on irrigation systems and the annulment of rent arrears and other debts.³⁷

³⁴ Alkin, op. cit., p. 371. In Kirghizia the share of livestock production increase from 31% to 34% between 1914 and 1925-1926. In Tadzhikistan it increased from 44% to 56%. By 1926-1927 the livestock herds of Soviet Central Asia were only 71.6% of their 1914 size.

³⁵ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 24, 1955).

³⁶ I.V. Shevel "Osushchestvlenie agrarnoi reformi v provintsii Sin'tszyane," Sovetskaiia vostokovedenie, No. 3 (1955), 74.

³⁷ A.G. Yakovlev, "Podgotovka i provedenie agrarnoi reformi v Sin'tszyane," Uchenie zapiski instituta vostokovedeniia, XI (Moscow, 1955), 246-50, 254.

During 1952 and 1953 "landowners and rich peasants were deprived of all land except that which they worked themselves and of all working animals, implements, living accommodation and grain in excess of their own needs."³⁸ An article in the January 5, 1953 Sinkiang Jih Pao outlined the Red agrarian technique by declaring that while the landlord was to be totally eliminated by 1953, it would be only after the next year that the drive would begin on the rich and middle peasants.³⁹ However, until that time, the middle peasantry, constituting one-third of the peasantry in Sinkiang, was to be courted as an ally of the poor peasantry. In contrast, the rich peasantry was to be neutralized during the liquidation of the landlords.⁴⁰

The special desire to eliminate the landlords sprang from the fact that three to four per cent of the landlords in Sinkiang had "usurped" over fifty per cent of the land and had leased sixty to seventy per cent of this land to the peasants.⁴¹ Furthermore, the Communist policy of waging a "class struggle amongst the rural population required that the ruling class in the rural areas be set up as a target and destroyed by the poor and middle peasantry in order to facilitate the consolidation of the Party's control over the peasantry.

Yet, in Sinkiang one can note a definite variation from the norm of class warfare that prevailed throughout China Proper. In contrast to the almost universally applied policy of confiscating all landlord property,

³⁸ "Sinkiang: The Collectivization of Agriculture," CAR, VIII No 3 (1960), 332.

³⁹ Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (January 5, 1953).

⁴⁰ Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (January 12, 1953).

⁴¹ Hsi An Ch'ün Chung Jih Pao (西安群眾日報), (October 9, 1952).

the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang followed a more flexible approach. Landlords who resisted the reforms were punished without mercy by the "peoples' courts." However, landlords who did co-operate in the reforms received quite lenient treatment and were allowed to retain their commercial and industrial concerns in an undisturbed state.⁴² While these reforms were being implemented, the Reds also began introducing "labor mutual-aid teams." These teams were structured in the following manner.

Each individual peasant household still engaged in its own production. The collective work of the teams was effected through the common use of man-power, animals and tools.⁴³

The animals, land, and tools were still privately owned.

As in Soviet Central Asia one finds that these reforms were put into effect first in certain specially selected areas.⁴⁴ Thus the progress was uneven geographically except for the fact that more rapid progress was made in Kashgaria. In mobilizing the human resources of the region, the Chinese Communists attempted to get individuals from all walks of life to

⁴² Shevel, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8.

⁴³ Hsueh Ma-chiao, The Socialist Transformation of the National Economy of China (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 112-13. "On December 1951, the CCP Central Committee issued its first draft decision on mutual aid and co-operation in agricultural production to the local Party organizations. In February, 1953, the Central Committee officially published this draft as a formal resolution."

"These teams were especially used for seasonal tasks" (Editorial Commentary, "Two Revolutions for the Farm," China in Transition (Peking, 1957), p. 75).

⁴⁴ Hsi An Ch'ün Chung Jih Pao (西安群众日报), (October 9, 1952), *op. cit.* According to the prepared plan nine special areas, 58 hsien and more than 1500 hsiang were swiftly to complete this reform.

participate.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Communists, since they did not have the problem of being associated with a group which had restricted the activities of minority nations as the Bolsheviks did when they had recognized the early Tashkent regime, proceeded immediately to advance a consistent policy of catering to the aspirations of the various nationalities within the framework Communist plans for development. This policy was extremely useful in the CCP attempt to create the illusion that the class struggle was an internal affair of each nationality which excluded the interference of the Han authorities. The majority of participants in the "teams" which were implementing the agrarian reform were of the same nationality as the landlord whose property they were expropriating.⁴⁶ Soviet sources indicate that the Chinese Communists succeeded in developing a land reform program in Sinkiang which was accompanied by a fierce class struggle with terror and assassinations.⁴⁷

In view of this, it should be noted that at the end of 1952, the Chinese, unlike their Bolshevik counterparts in Soviet Central Asia, called a retreat in recognition of the existence of serious socialist mistakes. It was admitted that "pressure instead of persuasion had been too frequently used and that the Party activists had tried to go too far in imposing advanced socialist forms on a backward peasantry."

⁴⁵ Cheng, *op. cit.*, p. 24. Mao called for an acceptance of the middle peasants as allies in the struggle against the landlords in spite of the fact that the middle peasants had strong petty-bourgeois inclinations. (Cited in *Mao Tse-tung Hsuan Chi* (毛澤東選集) IV [1960], p. 1,312)

⁴⁶ A. G. Yakovlev, "Podgotovka i provedenie agrarnoi reformoi...." *op. cit.*, p. 253.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

In January 1953 the Party reaffirmed the right to private property and relaxed its pressure, so much so that by the end of the year the number of "labor mutual-aid teams" had dropped by a half.⁴⁸

While the exact reasons for this retreat remain unclear, it did signify that in the early period of their rule, the Chinese Communists were capable of proceeding cautiously in the absence of a truly catastrophic situation.

Despite this retreat, the Reds assumed their land reform policies and during the spring of 1954 (somewhat later than the schedule for the rest of China) completed this program of land reform for Sinkiang.⁴⁹

Now it would be appropriate to discuss one aspect of the Chinese economic program in Sinkiang which has no real counterpart in the Bolshevik economic reforms during the "political consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia. This of course was the use of the PLA for carrying out important and varied production tasks. When, on December 5, 1949, the People's Military Revolutionary Council of China called upon the PLA to aid in economic construction throughout the entire nation, this task, except in "economically backward and distant regions," was quickly accomplished.⁵⁰ In early 1950 the Sinkiang Military District Production and Construction Corps was organized and from that time on has been engaged "in farming, building water conservancy works, reclamation of

⁴⁸ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII (July-October, 1960), 201-2.

⁴⁹ Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (October 5 and 9, 1954).

⁵⁰ A.G. Yakovlev, "Rol' narodno-osvoboditel'noi armii v ekonomicheskom stroitel'stve na okrainakh Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki v 1950-1955 godakh," Kratkie soobshchenia instituta vostokovedeniia, XXI (1956), 54.

wasteland, as well as industrial construction."⁵¹ By means of a January 20, 1950 decree 110,000 out of the 193,000 troops stationed in Sinkiang were to engage in productive work.⁵²

The first task of the corps was to insure food supplies. Since most of the cultivated areas in Sinkiang depend upon artificial irrigation, it was natural for the army production units to repair and construct irrigation works.

Besides extending the area under cultivation the army has, by introducing modern techniques, been able to increase productivity. "In 1949 and 1956 ...productivity on the army's land was...no more than on the peasants' land. In 1954 the soldiers harvested over three times as much from the same area of land as they did in 1950."⁵³

The army farms were organized either on a co-operative or state farm basis.

All the means of production...are either state property (land, irrigation works etc.) or collective property (machinery, implements, cattle, etc.). Of the revenue of the army farms, 40% is divided among the soldiers who are directly engaged in production, 20% is set aside for accumulation, 20% is spent in defrayment of the expenses of the whole military district, and 20% for payment of taxes.⁵⁴

Because these farms were constructed with the requirements of mechanized farming and the system of rotation of crops in mind, their continued development had, in a fashion similar to that of the establishment of pilot collective farms in Soviet Central Asia prior to 1928, laid some basis for the establishment of state farms.

⁵¹ Current Background (October 25, 1955), op. cit., 2-3.

⁵² Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), (January 23, 1950).

⁵³ Sinkiang Pao Chih (新疆報紙), (November 18, 1953).

⁵⁴ People's China, No 3 (1951), 10.

The army production units also played a leading role in the struggle to raise cotton output. Several experimental cotton farms were established in various regions of Sinkiang to raise the average cotton yield. From 1949 to 1954 cotton farming fields expanded by 74.61 per cent and the total output increased by 217.86 per cent.⁵⁵ This success has led to the erection of textile kombinats in Sinkiang.

In addition the army production units have helped to industrialize the region. By 1955 the Sinkiang Military District was operating 92 industrial enterprises. These enterprises in part supplied the needs of the local population.⁵⁶ As this period progressed, the CCP developed a degree of diversity in the industry of Sinkiang which included textiles, silk-weaving, flour-milling, oil-processing factories, and large non-ferrous metal-working mills.⁵⁷ Probably the most important industrial development in Sinkiang has been the establishment of a modern oil industry. During this early period, the Soviet Union provided all the equipment for the oil operations and engaged in a program of training Chinese and indigenous experts.⁵⁸

In connection with these efforts at industrialization it should be mentioned that Peking, in contrast to Moscow's actions during the "political consolidation" period, definitely gave great importance to the development of communications in its part of Turkestan. The emphasis was

⁵⁵ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (October 1, 1955).

⁵⁶ Sinkiang Pao Chih (新疆報紙), (November 13, 1955).

⁵⁷ Kazakhstanskaja pravda (October 15, 1955).

⁵⁸ Ibid. The Soviets withdrew from the oil projects in 1955. (Christian Science Monitor [August 26, 1963].)

on the construction of new roads. An important role was played by the army transport units.⁵⁹

The following analysis not only will compare the above-discussed Chinese and Russian economic policies, but also will attempt to reveal some of the intrinsic differences between the natures of the respective Russian and Chinese "political consolidation" periods. In beginning, it would be best to admit that the early Tashkent regime, because of its Communist nature in both the ideological and organisational spheres, had no real counterpart in Sinkiang. This is true inspite of the fact that Sheng Shih-ts'ai from 1933 till 1941 had repeatedly shown his affinity for the Soviet Union and "Marxism." He even went so far as to apply for membership in the CCP in 1937. Even though Stalin ordered the CCP to refuse his request,⁶⁰ Sheng's record of allowing Soviet secret police activities in his territory and of receiving delegations from the CCP headquarters at Yen-an definitely marks him as a peculiar opportunist who seems to have carried out a kind of lower stage "original Tashkent clique" program in that, while he was not Communizing the economy and governmental structure of Sinkiang, he acknowledged Moscow's desires and interests. Therefore, his rule appears to have been opposite in character to the original Tashkent clique in that the clique popularized and established Communist governing institutions while it resisted Moscow's desires in

⁵⁹ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (April 17, 1954). During the period 1950-1955, in which Peking appropriated 60,247 million yuan for roadbuilding in Sinkiang, "eleven roads with a total length of 4,987 kilometers were repaired and built in Sinkiang with the help of the army." (Sinkiang Pao Chih (新疆報紙), [February 19, 1955].)

⁶⁰ Whiting and Sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-6. Mr. Whiting cites an interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao in Hong Kong on August 1, 1955 as the source of this information.

regard to the nativization of these governing institutions. Also prior to his rapprochement with the KMT in 1942, Sheng employed the participation of natives in his administration as a method, in line with Soviet concepts, of building up indigenous support for the purpose of opportunistically collaborating with a foreign power instead of collaborating with the central government of the country. This liaison with the Soviet Government clearly enunciates the differing environments and purposes of the Sheng regime and the original Tashkent group. The later Eastern Turkestan regime also had to develop within the context of a situation which was dominated by the fact that the powerful Soviet Union was situated on the border of Sinkiang.

Thus it can be stated that the Sheng regime which was replaced by a KMT provincial regime in 1944 never carried on a relationship with the Chinese central government or the CCP that was similar to the relationship between the original Tashkent group and Moscow. The Eastern Turkestan government because of its apparent relationship with the USSR and its apparent lack of connection with the CCP can not be said to have had a relationship comparable to the early Tashkent regime's two year isolation from its self-acknowledged leader in Moscow. During the two years of isolation (1917-1919), Russian Central Asia, because of the severance of economic ties with Russia Proper and also the depredations of various military bands, suffered a serious economic decline. The region, during this two year period, reverted to a self-sufficient type of economy. Sinkiang did not suffer such depredations.

In this sense the return of Moscovite power in the form of Frunze's army in September 1919, and the entrance into Sinkiang of the FLA on September 26, 1949 can be viewed as dates on which the Russians and

Chinese respectively start to assert firm control over their respective parts of Central Asia. Both Moscow and Peking faced somewhat similar economic situations in that, at those respective dates, neither one's part of Central Asia was economically integrated with the rest of the country. The fact that the two areas under study did not develop in the same direction economically, can be explained as a reflection of the different political, strategic, and economic situations which the Russians and the Chinese faced in their respective portions of Central Asia during the "political consolidation" period.

The Chinese Communist proclamation (soon after the liberation of Sinkiang) that "Northwest China, hitherto one of the nation's most backward and underdeveloped areas, has all the material prerequisites for becoming, like Manchuria, another major industrial center of China"⁶¹ signaled a Chinese departure from the previous Soviet pattern. One factor in this deviation from the Soviet example was that the known mineral deposits of Sinkiang loomed greater in importance for the Chinese than did the known resources of Soviet Central Asia for the rulers of the fabulously resource-rich Soviet Union. Soviet Central Asia's mineral wealth was to take a secondary developmental role to the exploitation of the more easily accessible and abundant resources of western Russia and the Ural area. A second factor was that, while both Russian Central Asia and Sinkiang were remote from the political and economic centers of Russia and China respectively, Sinkiang in 1949 was adjacent to the areas of the Soviet Union which, because of the Nazi occupation of western Russia, had been hastily

⁶¹ People's China (Peking, April 16, 1950), 1.

industrialized in order to aid the Russian war effort. In short, with the quick postwar recovery of the Soviet industrial plant, Moscow, after 1949, was capable of playing a role in the industrialization of Sinkiang that had absolutely no counterpart in the situation of isolation and backwardness that characterized Soviet Central Asia during its "political consolidation" period.

Peking's determination to industrialize rapidly Sinkiang was reflected in its extensive use of the PLA for industrial tasks. The previously mentioned diversity of industrial enterprises and the program of road building which the PLA engaged in reveals that Peking, by its use of the army production units, attempted to make up for a lack of capital and a lack of trained laborers. These two deficiencies were among the key factors which retarded the industrialization of Soviet Central Asia during its "political consolidation" period. This mutual lack of trained laborers and technicians coupled, on the Chinese side, by the above-mentioned policy of allowing those landlords who co-operated in land redistribution to retain their commercial and industrial concerns, resulted in the Russians and Chinese implementing a similar policy of first allowing the smaller privately owned industries to survive. However both Moscow and Peking during the "political consolidation" period increasingly restricted and finally eliminated these relics of the pre-Communist era.⁶²

In turning to an analysis of the respective Soviet and Chinese agricultural policies, one finds that Soviet Central Asia prior to the 1924 delimitation, and Sinkiang prior to mid-1953, experienced policies which could be described as cautious and conciliatory towards the peasant

⁶² Tang, op. cit., p. 214.

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farmers. The Soviet policy of distributing land through tribal and communal units, because it tended to strengthen economically the position of the tribal leaders, at first might appear to have been in direct conflict with the ultimate Soviet aim of destroying the feudal leaders and bourgeoisie of Russian Central Asia. Yet, on closer scrutiny, this policy, which, because of the Soviet failure to aid the newly created small farmers with modern techniques, allowed the tribal leaders to seize much of the redistributed land, in reality worked to the Soviet advantage in the political sphere by exacerbating the prior (though almost non-existent) class antagonisms between the feudal leaders and the peasants.

The Chinese did not have to face a problem of redistributing lands that had been seized by colonizers, as did the Soviets. With this advantage, Peking, prior to 1952, instituted a lowering of rents for the peasants and a progressive system of taxation. The Chinese Communists, in a fashion similar to the Bolsheviks, also ended the monopoly of the landlords over the regulation of water distribution (irrigation).

The 1924-1927 period in Russian Central Asia was occupied with the destruction of the feudal landlords and the creation of small independent farms which largely were unviable economically without state aid. Some model state farms were erected but "sovkhoses" and "kolkhoses" were merely in the experimental stage and definitely were not widespread. Thus Soviet expropriations, in this period, were confined to the lands of "nonlaboring" landlords and some of the lands of the rich peasants.

In Sinkiang one finds that during 1952 and 1953 the big landowners and rich peasants were deprived of all land save that which they themselves worked. As has already been noted, the CCP, in their dealings with the landlords, deviated from the Soviet pattern by practicing a policy of

leniency towards those landlords who co-operated with the regime. In a further deviation, the Chinese during 1952 began to institute "labor mutual-aid teams" which were a kind of intermediate stage between private ownership and collectivization. However by the end of 1952 the Chinese had to retreat in regard to this campaign and it was only later, in 1953, that the campaign was resumed.

The agricultural role of the PLA units should be emphasized because of their vital work in the fields of water conservancy and land reclamation. The army farms, which were set up on a co-operative basis, indicate further the uniqueness of the PLA's role when compared to the part played by the Red Army in Soviet Central Asia.

Not surprisingly the Soviets and the Chinese seem to have pursued similar goals in regard to cotton output. The Russian establishment of cotton co-operatives under very favorable conditions was balanced on the Chinese side by the leading role which the army production units had in setting up the experimental cotton farms in Sinkiang. In both countries the central government viewed increased cotton output as vital to the development of economic self-sufficiency.

In the field of livestock raising, it has already been noted that the Soviets, because of the depredations of various military forces during the civil war and the resistance of the landlords to the redistribution of their properties, suffered severe losses. However, the Soviets did not collectivize livestock in the areas where it was the dominant economic product. In Sinkiang possibly because of the absence of a civil war in the province and the fact that landlords were treated more leniently if they co-operated, there apparently did not occur a drastic decline in the number of livestock. The Chinese policy in reference to the collectiviza-

tion of livestock was similar to that of the Soviets in that, during the "political consolidation" period, the areas in which livestock breeding was the dominant mode of production experienced no agrarian or radical reforms.⁶³

In summary it can be stated that both Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang lagged behind in the completion of the respective Soviet and Chinese nationwide agrarian reforms of this period. Furthermore, throughout this discussion it has been apparent that the Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communists aimed at the intensification of regional specialization in agriculture. Both Moscow and Peking, in their attempts to increase cotton production were implementing a policy of deemphasizing local self-sufficiency. It is apparent also that neither Moscow or Peking pursued a violently destructive policy. Instead they executed centrally directed plans to undermine gradually the traditional structure of social practice and institutions and to destroy the solidarity and inertia of the native communities.

63 Shevel, op. cit., p. 78.

CHAPTER FOUR

A DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
DURING THE PERIOD OF ECONOMIC
CONSOLIDATION

The "economic consolidation" period in the Soviet Union lasted from December, 1927 (Fifteenth Party Congress) till mid-1934 (Seventeenth Party Congress). Governmentally, save for the elevation to union republic status of Tadzhikistan in 1929, Soviet Central Asia remained unchanged from the political structuring of the "political consolidation" period. The main political activity in Soviet Central Asia during the "economic consolidation" period was a series of purges of native leaders.

The purges of this period were all-union in scope and reflected Stalin's attempt to eliminate Bukharin and bring about his own final consolidation of power. Stalin's termination of the NEP program in 1928 (a policy which Trotsky had advocated earlier in the face of opposition by Stalin and Bukharin) was one of the factors which set him in conflict with Bukharin's view of the NEP program as an evolutionary road to socialism and industrialization. In addition, Stalin's desire to collectivize in a quick and ruthless manner was in opposition to Bukharin's policy of treating the peasants with moderation. While a thorough discussion of the Stalin-Bukharin conflict is certainly beyond the scope of this paper, the formal ideological basis for the struggle concerned itself with the rate

at which collectivization was to be imposed.¹ However the backbone of conflict was a fight for power within the structure of the Party. This struggle was intensified up to the Sixteenth Party Congress (June 26 to July 13, 1930) when Rykov and Tomskii finally made humiliating confessions. Bukharin was absent from the proceedings.²

In concert with the elimination of Bukharinites from the Party and government, there occurred a purge of Central Asian Party members and non-Party intellectuals in an attempt to eliminate "centers of local chauvinism."³ The result of this purge was that by the early 1930's "all the leading national Communists in the non-Russian republics were liquidated."⁴ Prior to this purge, Soviet efforts at nativization or "korenizatsiya" had not shown impressive progress. In the first place, Soviet Russian standards and procedures had been adopted in setting up the administration of Central Asia. Such an organization was a force in itself for Russification, since the most competent and experienced men in the administration and the Central Asian Parties were Russians. Also important was the influence of the predominantly Russian Red Army. The drive for nativization was further hindered by the Communist Party's fear of creating national

¹ For a general discussion of the struggle between Stalin and Bukharin, see Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 382-90.

² Ibid., p. 388.

³ Fainsod, op. cit., p. 370.

⁴ The entire group of Pan-Turkic national Communists which was led by Sultan Galiev and included Ikramov, Khodzhayev, Ibragimov, Adigamov, Volidov, Yenbayev, Shamigulov, Riskulov, Khalikov, Murtazin, Firdevs and others were eliminated during this period. (Holubnychy, op. cit., 109.)

deviations within the USSR. As of July 1, 1930, during the life of the Sixteenth Party Congress, native Central Asians comprised the following percentages of their respective national Communist Parties.

Kirghizia	42.8	%
Turkmenistan	43.2	
Kazakhstan	45.2	
Tadzhikistan	47.9	
Uzbekistan	48.5	% ⁵

The purges from 1928 through 1934 were accompanied by a comprehensive assault on Islam. Many mosques were closed or secularized by order of town and village meetings at which the people were induced by threats or lures to obey the Party's dictates.⁶ A somewhat more detailed account of the Soviet handling of Islam in this period is justified by the fact that in Communist eyes, Islam, during the period of "economic consolidation" is not only seen as a social heritage but also as a competing ideological base which could serve as the nucleus for political obstructionism. The

⁵ Some of the difficulties that the Soviets encountered in recruiting natives are apparent by the fact that "as late as 1932 36.7% of the Tadzhik and 24.9% of the Uzbek Party organizations were officially classified by the Party Central Committee as illiterate." (Fainsad, *op. cit.*, p. 257.)

"The 'nativization' of the Party in Kazakhstan accompanied the campaign for the 'nativization' of the administration. The number of Kazakhs in the Party rose from 6,645 in 1925 to 18,369 in 1929. The percentage of Kazakhs was in 1925, 30.7% in 1926, 36.5% in 1927, 36.5% in 1928, 37.9% and in 1929, 41.2%...."

In 1930 the personnel of the 41 republican institutions was 20.2% 'nativized'; the personnel of local organs of government, 25.2%; the heads of offices, 35.5%. Government directions were issued in Kazakh and Russian in areas of mixed population, and in Kazakh in areas of purely native population, where the courts and legal actions were entirely 'nativized'." (Kuchkin, *op. cit.*, p. 223.)

⁶ "Their arrest [Muslim leaders] was carried out under article 156 of the Uzbek Penal Code, which did not figure in the Penal Code of Russia Proper and was especially designed to fight Islam. The article dealt with: 'Exploitation of religious prejudices of the masses with the aim of overthrowing the Workers' and Peasants' government or of provoking resistance against its laws and decrees.'

The way in which the Moslem houses of worship were taken away from the believers hardly differed from the manner in which the churches were confiscated. Meetings of citizens were convened in towns and villages

main Soviet maneuver against Islam was set in motion during the spring of 1927. It was known as the "Hudjum" or the attack on the wearing of the veil by Muslim women. The wearing of the veil was strictly observed throughout Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan but not among the nomadic Kazakhs, Kirghiz, or Turkmen groups.⁷

In reality such an approach by the Soviets was quite clever. The Communists, instead of attacking Islam as a monotheistic, justice-preaching faith, assaulted a Muslim social practice, which, while admittedly reactionary in nature, unfortunately allowed the Reds to challenge Islam on one of the religion's weaker positions. The Soviets now demanded that the people choose between Islam on the one hand and the rights and equality of women on the other. However, the immediate success of the drive can be measured by the fact that the years 1928 and 1929, which followed a great veil burning ceremony on March 8, 1927 (International Women's Day), were marked by a high incidence of anti-feminist murders.⁸ Obviously these murder victims, who were looked upon as martyred freedom-fighters, became effective propaganda against the mullahs and conservative menfolk. While it is certain that this Soviet policy of repression resulted in a drastic decline in the number of active mosques and mullahs, by 1939 it had become apparent that the drive had achieved little more than a facade of change.⁹

which were bullied into deciding 'voluntarily' that the local mosques should be converted into schools, clubs, cinemas and reading rooms." (Kolarz, op. cit., p. 413.)

7 Ibid., p. 416.

8 Ibid., p. 417.

9 Ibid., pp. 421-22.

In turning to the economy of Central Asia during the "economic consolidation" period, one finds that the area, in a fashion similar to the rest of the Soviet Union, was subjected to a ruthless program of collectivization. There will be no attempt made in this paper to determine the as of yet undiscovered conclusive reasons for Stalin's sudden assault on the countryside.¹⁰ While the party leaders at the April 6th to 11th, 1928, Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission made a definite denial that NEP was to be abandoned, they also planned to exact more food from the countryside to meet grain shortages in the cities and towns. However, at the meeting of the CEC of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, Stalin introduced a new land law which

proposed to deprive the peasants of their unrestricted right to use in perpetuity of land cultivated by their own labour; to confine this right to peasants who joined an existing or new collective farm; and virtually to deprive all those declared by the electoral commissions to be Kulaks (a very fluid category) of all right to any land.¹¹

Stalin showed his "reasonableness" by withdrawing this proposal when much opposition manifested itself. Yet at the Sixteenth Party Conference (April 23 to 29, 1929) both the First Five Year Plan and the plan for rapidly collectivizing agriculture were adopted.

In Soviet Central Asia the Uzbek Party led the way and in December of 1929 decreed that the Fergana Valley would be completely collectivized by the spring of 1931. The Party, on February 2, 1930 further decreed that the Kulaks' land was to be confiscated and they themselves expelled

¹⁰ Schapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 383. Leonard Shapiro has put forth several probable reasons for the assault on the peasants.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

to other rayons and oblasts.¹² The Kazakhstan Party Central Committee followed the Uzbeks by decreeing on January 5, 1930 that kolkhozes were to be established in the agricultural districts by the spring of 1932.¹³ Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan quickly followed suit. All the Soviet Central Asian republics at first tended to de-emphasize the collectivization of the nomads.

The Bolsheviks, sensing the great difficulties that would accompany the collectivization of Central Asia, attempted to aid the movement by dispatching the now famous "Twenty Five Thousand" politically trained technical workers from the European part of the USSR. These technical specialists worked in the kolkhozes, the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) and industries throughout Soviet Central Asia and especially in the Fergana Valley. These experts also took charge of all the industrial centers of Soviet Turkestan.¹⁴ However, the industrialization of Soviet Central Asia, despite the many official claims of great advancements, was never planned seriously by Moscow during the "economic consolidation" period.

¹² I.Yu. Ibragimova, "Istoriia kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v Uzbekistane," pp. 85-87. This study constitutes the second part (pp. 35-123) of the three part work Materiali k istorii Sovetskogo Uzbekistana: sbornik statei (Tashkent, Akademiia nauk Uzbek SSR, 1957).

¹³ A.B. Tursurbaev, "Nekotore voprosi istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v Kazakhstane," Materiali ob'edinennoi nauchnoi sessii posvyashchennoi istorii Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana: epokhi socializma (Alma-Ata, 1958), 322. However, in nomad and semi-nomad areas, the establishment of kolkhozes was postponed until 1933.

¹⁴ S.T. Yacubovskaia, "Likvidatsiia fakticheskogo neravenstva natsii," Istoricheskie zapiski, 48 (1954), 195-97.

The degree to which the Kazakhs were taking part in the gradual industrialization of their republic may be illustrated by the following figures. During 1926-27, of the 46,768 workers in the republic, 16% were Kazaks. They comprised 34% of the 163,966 workers during 1929-30. Also, Kazakhs formed 26.5% of all the clerical workers of the republic in 1929.

To return to agriculture, one finds that the Central Asian clan system constituted a major stumbling block to effective collectivization. The clans decided to join the kolkhozes and use them as covers for their own continued existence.

...the Tegizchilik kolkhoz united 900 households belonging to 11 clans, each "governing" itself to the prejudice of the kolkhoz management,...

Kazakhstan experienced a similar situation.

At the time of collectivization, clan kolkhozes were set up in a number of outlying auls, and their heads were the clan aksakal beys. They attempted under the form of kolkhozes, to maintain the old clan relationship between the lord and subject.

However, throughout Soviet Central Asia disorganization and disaster attended the rites of collectivization. peasant abandonment of "swollen 'giant' kolkhozes" became a serious problem. The very speed of collectivization was a major factor in the deteriorating situation. By means of force, threats, and indoctrination, 37.2 per cent of the Kirghiz households instead of the planned 28.9 per cent were collectivized by March 20, 1930.

...in some rayons as many as 80% were forced into kolkhozes. some rayons, like those of Chu and Karabalty, carried out the task in only three months.

(A. Anushkin, "Natsional'nie kadri," Revolutsiia i natsional'nost', No 7 (1930), 101.

15 Istoriia Kirgizii, Vol II (Frunze, Akademiia nauk, Kirgizii SSR, Institut istorii, 1956), pp. 194-95.

16 D. Koshibekov, O feodalno-baysskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenti (Alma-Ata, 1957), p. 15.

17 Ibragimova, op. cit., pp. 95-6. The Party Central Committee, in view of the difficulties, emphasized the need for preparatory work based on local conditions. Also the state taxes which the kolkhozes had been required to pay were dispensed with for two years. (Ibid., pp. 96-9.)

18 Istoriia Kirgizii, op. cit., p. 182. Similar deviations were

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It should not be thought that the kolkhozes were the only organizational form introduced during this period.

In 1930 there were twelve state farms covering an area of 39,821 hectares of newly irrigated lands - 25,013 in Uzbekistan, 8,008 in Tadzhikistan, and 6,800 in Turmenistan.¹⁹

Another important part of the collectivization program was the establishment of the MTS. Each MTS served the surrounding collective farms with tractors and technical advice.

The usual contract between an MTS and a kolkhoz is signed for a period of five years...the MTS is obliged to provide the collective with a specified number of tractors, implements, and various services. ...the MTS is also obliged to make all the repairs of and provide all the necessary parts for the collective's own machines... All expenses involved in repairing its own machines and implements, in providing the necessary fuel and lubricants, as well as in employing agronomists and technicians, are to be fully paid for by the MTS.²⁰

Obviously the MTS was another instrument of state supervision.

At approximately the same time that the above-mentioned collectivization was proceeding, the Soviets launched a limited program to suppress nomadism. The main purpose of the campaign to eradicate nomadism was to destroy the patriarchal system which promoted clan loyalties to the detriment of loyalty to the state. In settling the nomads, the Soviets hoped to end the dependence of the poorer elements on the beys. The 1930

made by the authorities in Kazakhstan and the nomads were their main victims. In February 1930 within a few days, the number of collectivized households rose from 26% to 5.1% while in a number of the most backward rayons between 80% - 100% were driven into kolkhozes. (N. Abdykalykov and A. Pankratova ed. Istoria Kazakhskoi SSR (Kazogiz, 1943), p. 534.

¹⁹ Kunitz, op. cit., p. 207.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 208-9. MTS (Machine-Tractor Stations).

Kazakhstan decree that called for the founding in cattle-breeding areas of transitional structures in which the lands would be held in common, actually was preceded by a 1928 action by which about 700 beys were deported after their goods had been confiscated. The booty of this action included nearly 150,000 head of cattle along with farm implements, buildings, means of transport, etc.²¹ Kirgizia during this same period also initiated action against the beys and the nomadic system. While these initial moves against nomadism were limited in scope, both the Kazakh and Kirghiz Parties in January 1930 declared that nomadism would be eliminated by the end of the First Five Year Plan in 1933.²²

Yet this sudden and brutal drive for collectivization throughout the USSR now reaped a violent reaction on the part of the peasants and kulaks. Some peasants made common cause with the kulaks and initiated anti-Soviet revolts. Others reacted by slaughtering their animals and wrecking farm machinery.²³ When it became apparent to the Soviet leaders that the peasants were putting up desperate resistance, Stalin, on March 2, 1930, pretending that his instructions had been misinterpreted, claimed that

²¹ Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR, op. cit., p. 516. In 1927 it was decided to take a similar course of action. "The important beys and manaps were considered dangerous because they used their material wealth and clan survivals to incite national and clan antagonisms and to engage in anti-Soviet activities..." (Istoriia Kirgizii, op. cit., p. 154)

²² However in nomad and semi-nomad areas the completion of collectivization was postponed until the end of the First Five Year Plan in 1933. In general the semi-nomad areas were more easily collectivized than the nomad areas. On October 1, 1928 there were 939 kolkhozes and by January 1930 there were 2,096. (Tursurbaev, op. cit., p. 322.)

²³ Ibid., pp. 324-25.

"it was stupid and reactionary to form collectives by force and blamed the excesses which had taken place on 'giddiness from success'."²⁴ Within six months, by September 1930, the percentage of collectivized farms dropped from 58 to 21.²⁵ The de-emphasis of collectivization continued until 1933 in which year only sixty per cent of all peasant holdings throughout the USSR stood collectivized.²⁶

The violent reaction provoked by the rapid collectivization of farmers and to a lesser degree of nomads, which occurred between the last half of 1929 and January 1930, initiated such turmoil in the settled farming lands and nomad areas that a famine struck in 1932 and lasted into 1933.²⁷ Even before the famine occurred, the February 1931 Plenum of the Kirghiz Party decreed in accordance with the policy of less rapidity that in the next four year 85,000 nomad and semi-nomad households should be settled on the land.²⁸ At the end of 1933, Turkmenistan followed Kirghizia and re-initiated its drive on the nomads. However this renewed drive on the nomads was more cautious and subtle in that in Kirghizia the Party directed that:

²⁴ Schapiro, op. cit., p. 384.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 385.

²⁶ Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 182.

²⁷ J.V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (New York, International Publishers 1934, p. 480). By 1931 the number of cattle in Kirghizia had decreased by 35.9%; horses by 20.9% and sheep and goats by 47%. (Istoriia Kirgizia, op. cit., p. 195.)

In Kazakhstan this period witnessed a 73% decline in the number of cattle; an 83% decline in the number of horses; and an 87% decline in the number of sheep. (Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia [Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1959], p. 303.)

²⁸ Istoriia Kirgizii, op. cit., pp. 204-5.

forcibly communalized livestock must be returned to its owners and in fact the kolkhozniks received back their animals and some cattle - breeding kolkhozes specializing in manufacturing food stuffs were dissolved. The republican authorities of Kirghizia exempted the settled nomads and semi-nomads (60,000 farms) for a period of two years from supplying their quotas of grain and from other obligations towards the state.²⁹

The Central Committee of the Kazakh Party followed suit and in cattle-breeding areas the population received allotments of arable land and farming implements. Also, those who wanted cattle could buy on easy terms from the sovkhoses and kolkhozes. In the period 1933-1934, 90,000 head of cattle were sold in this manner.³⁰ In a further attempt to ease the economic disarray which marked the Soviet countryside, the Soviet authorities in 1933 established MTS political departments which from 1933 to 1934 "purged the kolkhozes of beys and other 'enemies of the people'."³¹

In summarizing the above-described economic events, one is struck by the limited nature of the "economic consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia when contrasted with the situation in European Russia. The First Five Year Plan had as its ethos the subordination and exploitation of agriculture by means of collectivization in order to amass capital for the grand design of rapidly industrializing the Soviet Union. In all of the areas of major population concentration (Moscow, Stalino [Donetsk], Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad, Smolensk, Kazan, Kuibyshev, Saratov, Stalingrad [Volgograd], the Ural cities etc.) save the Central

²⁹ "Stabilization of the Nomads," CAR, VII No 3 (1959), 227.

³⁰ Istoriia Kazakhskoi, op. cit., pp. 541-42.

³¹ Ibid.

Asia area, the Soviets pushed forth in frenzied attempts to industrialize. In short, Soviet Central Asia participated, only partially, in the economic transformation of the period. Central Asia's cities remained largely un-industrialized and her countryside was exploited to help supply the capital which was transforming European Russia.

In view of this, the "economic consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia was characterized by one fact: a thorough disruption of the social and economic base. The clan system and its leaders were eliminated. In their place stood the collective and state farms which were instruments of Bolshevik control and exploitation. Much progress was made in collectivizing the nomads also. All of these events brought great misery and even starvation to Soviet Central Asia. Furthermore, this suffering was aggravated by the social confusion brought on by the attempt to do away with the veil and also the virtual elimination of the top native party leaders. Finally one lingering mystery of the period is the decrease by one million of the Kazakh population which meant that the Russians for the first time outnumbered the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan itself.³² However, the implications of this development are beyond the scope of this paper. In view of the preceding discussion, save for the introduction of some modern agricultural machinery and the further subordination of the region's

³² Treadgold, *op. cit.*, p. 303. I have refrained from developing the subject of large scale population shifts because the most important aspects of this phenomenon take place after the period of Soviet history covered by this paper. The sudden shift in the balance between the Kazakh and Russian segments of Kazakhstan's population in the early 1930s is not the result of a program of large-scale Russian immigration, but instead reflects the elimination or starvation of approximately one million Kazakhs during a period of famine. (See footnote 57 of chapter 4 for a discussion of Han migration into Sinkiang.)

economy to Moscow, the "economic consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia must be seen in a negative light.

The "economic consolidation" period in Sinkiang (mid 1954 to late 1957) differs from the corresponding phase of Soviet Central Asian political development in two important respects. First, it was in this period, and not, as in Soviet Central Asia, during the "political consolidation" period, that Sinkiang achieved its mature political structure. Second, there was no sweeping purge of leading or native personnel in the Sinkiang governmental or party eschelons.

At the start of this discussion it should be mentioned that the position of equality of the minorities of China was officially reaffirmed in the Constitution of 1954 which was drafted by the First All-China People's Congress (September 15th to 28th, 1954). Article Three of the 1954 Constitution proclaims that all the nationalities are equal and it prohibits any "discrimination against, or oppression of a minority nationality."³³ Article Seventy states that "the organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties administer their own local finances within the limits of the authority prescribed by law...and organize their local public security forces in accordance with the military system of the state."³⁴ The 1954 Constitution established the permanent instruments and official form of Chinese Communist government.

However, the same can not be said for Sinkiang. The reasons given for this delay in Sinkiang were the following. Peking claimed that it was

³³ Constitution of the People's Republic of China, op. cit., p. 9.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 41.

necessary to alter the antagonistic relations between the various nationalities and also the distrust between the nationalities on the one hand and the Chinese on the other. The CCP emphasized the need to eliminate "narrow nationalism" and opposition elements in the form of the remnants of the East Turkestan groups (the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy).³⁵ Finally, under the direction of the central authorities, the August 2nd, 1955 session of the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government Council decided officially to reorganize the province into an autonomous region by October 1, 1955.³⁶ However, it should be pointed out that, in actuality, the provincial regime since October, 1953 had been introducing autonomy, from lower to upper levels among the various nationalities of Sinkiang.³⁷ During 1954, five nationality autonomous areas (the Payinkuoleng Mongol, the K'otzulosu Kirghiz, the Ch'angchi Hui, the Poerht'ala Mongol and the Ili Kazakh) were established. In 1955 these five nationality autonomous areas were renamed autonomous chou.³⁸ The extent of Peking's enthusiasm about granting "autonomy" can be gauged by the fact that by September 30, 1955 there were seventy-two

³⁵ Tang, op. cit., pp. 210-11. More information on the nature of the various opposition groups can be obtained from (SMEP, No 961 [Hong Kong, September 30, 1954], 6-7).

³⁶ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (Peking, September 25, 1955).

³⁷ Ibid. (September 24, 1955).

³⁸ Current Background (October 25, 1955), op. cit.
At the end of 1956 "the directorate of the specially empowered Ili district was abolished and its functions transferred to the People's Committee of the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district." The territory of the former Ili district was split between the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district and the Baralalinsk-Mongol autonomous district. ("Sinkiang 1928-59," CAR, VIII No 4, op. cit., 451.)

self-governing national areas, forty-five self-governing (autonomous) hsien and twenty-seven self-governing ch'ü.³⁹ However, in conformity with an above-mentioned similar process, one finds that from December 1955, the national areas were being transformed into hsiang, ch'ü or hsien in accordance with their size.⁴⁰

Simultaneous with this exhibition of Peking's apparent flexibility in political structuring went the continuing and determined drive to nativize the Sinkiang governmental and party personnel. A special note should be made here concerning a difference between the official policy of Peking in reference to nativization and the policy theoretically pursued by Moscow on this matter in Soviet Central Asia. Peking claims that its primary objective in this field is to establish the numerical predominance within the Sinkiang administration of Party-member cadres. That these individuals be nationality cadres is a secondary though not unimportant consideration. In March of 1957 a special Party decree emphasized this approach by declaring that "every Chinese cadre was bound to learn within three to five years one of the minority languages of the region in which he worked."⁴¹ This type of nativization does not call for the removal of Han or other non-indigenous cadre from the Sinkiang administration. Therefore it is different from the Soviet calls for the Kazakhization or Uzbekization of Soviet Central Asian governmental, party, and educational administrations.

39 Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (Peking, September 30, 1955).

40 Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (June 27, 1958).

41 "Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR, VIII No 4, op. cit., 445-46.

In short, Peking officially endorses the massive saturation of the Sinkiang administration with Han Party-members as long as they are ideologically orthodox. This clearly places the ethnic group in a position secondary, at least in practice, to the maintenance of an ideologically qualified administration. Such a practice would appear to be more brazenly imperialistic than the more camouflaged and less ideologically exacting practices of Moscow in Soviet Central Asia. One might add here that, while Peking's policy could be seen as mitigating against a wholesale influx of minority peoples into the administrative organs of the party and government of Sinkiang, it also at least in theory, by means of its demand for the ideologically orthodox, mitigated against the rise of "great power chauvinism" on the part of the Chinese.

However, it should not be thought that the Reds did not make efforts to train minority cadres. From 1949 to September 1955, the Communists produced over 36,000 minority cadres in Sinkiang.⁴² In order to accelerate this growth the central authorities have been educating and training several thousand minority students at the Institute of National Minorities in Peking and at the Northwest Institute for Nationalities.⁴³ By 1957, the minority cadres in Sinkiang had grown from 12,841 in 1950 to 63,935, nearly a five-fold increase. The year 1957 also revealed that "35.13 per cent of the total number of all cadres of the hsien level and above" were cadres from the national minorities of Sinkiang.⁴⁴

⁴² Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 24, 1955).

⁴³ Kuang Ming Jih Pao (光明日報), (January 18, 1957).
More information concerning the training of minority cadres can be found in "Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR, VIII No 4, op. cit., 453.

⁴⁴ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 24, 1955).

The power structure in Sinkiang, following the path of the seemingly purge-immune CCP, did not experience a replacement of leading Turkestan political figures during this period. However, when the provincial regime was replaced by the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region on October 1, 1955, there was a shifting about of major Sinkiang government officials. Saifudin, who had been Fourth Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub Bureau, became Chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Kao Chin-chung, who previously had been Second Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub Bureau of the CCP, became vice-chairman behind Saifudin who increasingly, as will be noted later, became the dominant figure in Sinkiang. Also, Wang Chen, the former Commandant of the Sinkiang Military District of the Chinese People's Army was transferred to the post of Commander of the Railway Troops (a special branch of the Chinese Communist Army).⁴⁵

However there were political problems below the immediate surface which revealed themselves partially during 1956 and 1957. In these years, there appeared in Sinkiang the growth of "local nationalism." Since this movement is inextricably involved with the events which follow the period covered by this paper, it will not be elaborated upon.

In discussing the economic reforms in Sinkiang during the "economic consolidation" period, it becomes evident that this period was devoted to the collectivization of agriculture, the establishment of pastoral co-operatives, and the further expansion of industry. The agricultural situation that faced the Reds in Sinkiang during this period was one

⁴⁵ Current Background (October 25, 1955), op. cit. Wang En-mao who prior to the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region had been First Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub Bureau of the CCP, on October 1, 1955, became the First Secretary of the CCP Committee for the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (Current Background [October 3, 1958]).

characterized by the wide-spread existence of "labor mutual-aid teams" in the settled farming areas. However, in December 1953 the Party had decreed that "agricultural producer co-operatives" would be established throughout China. It is important to point out that there was a "lower" type and a "higher" type of "agricultural producer co-operative". The differences were that

in the "lower" or "semi-socialist" type the peasants still owned land individually but pooled their finances and equipment, while in the higher type all land, cattle and implements were owned collectively...peasants received interests on their landholdings as well as a share of the crop for work done. Finally, in the socialist co-op, or collective farm, the land and bigger farm implements became common property and work done was the sole source of income.⁴⁶

The pace of the drive to implement the Party's December, 1953 decree can be grasped by the following statistics. At the end of August 1954, there were 58,773 "labor mutual-aid teams" in Sinkiang. At this time, there were 1,700 "agricultural producer co-operatives" of the "lower" type in Sinkiang.⁴⁷ Yet by the first half of 1955,

5% of the peasants were grouped in co-operatives and 66.4% in "teams", compared with 30% in "teams" and a negligible number in co-operatives at the end of 1953.⁴⁸

While the progress appeared to be slow, it should not be thought that this "lower" type of collectivization was being advanced in isolation. At the beginning of 1955, there were in existence over thirty state farms and, in

⁴⁶ Editorial Commentary, "Two Revolutions for the Farm," China in Transition (Peking, 1957), p. 75.

⁴⁷ Kazakhstanskaia pravda (October 15, 1955).

⁴⁸ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII, op. cit., 202.

anticipation of the collectivization drive, HTS were being set up also.⁴⁹

However, in spite of the ambitiousness of the program for collectivization, Chairman Mao on July 31, 1955, leveled a strong attack against "right-wing" deviationists whom he claimed were slowing down the progress of collectivization. Mao, at that time, "called for the completion of collectivization within the next few years."⁵⁰ Achievements followed this call to action. The majority of the "teams" were transformed into co-operatives of the "lower" type.

By the spring of 1956 practically all the peasants of Sinkiang belonged to agricultural producer co-operatives of the lower type and after the spring sowing of that year, these began to be transformed into co-operatives "of the higher type".

⁴⁹ Kazakhstanskaia pravda (October 15, 1955).

⁵⁰ "Sinkiang: The Collectivization of Agriculture," CAR, VIII No 3, op. cit., 333.

Mao Tse-tung advanced a three-point argument for accelerating collectivization.

First, industrialization cannot be carried out in isolation, separate from agricultural collectivization. If in a period of roughly 3 five-year plans, China cannot fundamentally solve the problem of agricultural collectivization - jumping from small-scale farming with animal drawn farm implements to large-scale farming with machines - it must fail to resolve the contradiction between the ever-increasing demand for marketable grain and industrial raw materials and the present generally lower yield of staple crops. If thus, industrialization goals could not be attained.

Second, in the course of industrialization, a considerable part of capital is drained from agriculture: some from the agricultural tax, and another by way of the development of light industry. But no large-scale expansion of light industry is possible within a small peasant economy. It can only be based on large-scale farming, which in turn requires collective agriculture.

Third, the rising capitalists in the countryside must be smashed down by firmly socializing it. (Cheng Chu-yueh, Communist China's Economy 1949-1962 [Seton Hall University Press, 1963], pp. 330⁴.)

Mao's above-stated ideas were accepted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh CCP Central Committee meeting (October 4-11, 1955).

By October, 1957, 95.49% of the peasants belonged to co-operatives of the higher type and the collectivization drive was considered to have been fulfilled.⁵¹

Another important shift during this transformation was the change in the official attitude towards the rich peasant from one of "preservation" to one of "limitation and gradual liquidation."⁵²

Throughout the "economic consolidation" period, the FLA continued to perform many vital tasks. While the army co-operatives, as mentioned previously, were directed by the Production Committee of the Sinkiang Military District and by production committees of the military units, "in December 1954 the 'production units' of the army were united in a special 'production-construction army' under the District Command."⁵³

This army was assigned the task of establishing state farms in rural areas. However, its main tasks were

- (1) to achieve a level of agricultural production which would not only meet demands of the developing local industries for agricultural raw materials, but which would also make it possible, once the Lanchow-Urumchi railway is complete, to export a considerable quantity of cotton and other raw materials to the inner provinces of China;

⁵¹ "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII, op. cit., 202. More specifically, "by December 1955, 2,001 agricultural co-operatives had been formed in Sinkiang, consisting of the union of more than 52,000 peasant holdings. There were also 6,600 permanent "mutual aid teams" covering 59,000 holdings, which had applied for transformation into co-operatives." (Jen Min Jih Pao [人民日報], (September 30, 1955; December 11, 1955; January 9, 1956). Also Hsin Hua News Agency (March 2, 1956).

⁵² "Sinkiang: The Collectivization of Agriculture," GAR, VIII No 3, op. cit., 333.

⁵³ A. G. Yakovlev, op. cit., p. 60.

(2) to give every possible help to the co-operative movement in Sinkiang in order to hasten the process of socialist transformation;⁵⁴

Thus the main efforts of the "production - construction army" were directed towards the establishment of high agricultural levels, the setting up of state farms, the promotion of the socialist transformation of agriculture, and the creation of favorable conditions for industrialization.⁵⁵ Their tasks were multiple and interwoven. The ambitious agricultural plans of the Reds in Sinkiang, which have been discussed above, should be seen in the light of an October 1, 1955 People's Daily article by Han Chiang.

The future of development in Sinkiang of agricultural production is limitless. Either by expanding the plowed area or by increasing the production per unit land, there is immense potential.⁵⁶

In line with these visions of fantastic agricultural development, there has been in Sinkiang since 1955 a movement similar to that in post-Stalinist Russia for the reclamation of virgin land. This effort, which is heavily involved with the PLA's erection of state farms, is to a con-

⁵⁴ Ibid.

There are at present (September 30, 1955) in Sinkiang 73 state farms (including the farms run by the PLA production units) which together work approximately 5% of the entire cultivated area of the province. Machines work 60% of the one million mow of land under the cultivation of the State and the military farms. The 72 tractor and agrotechnic stations which have been established have become effective in guiding and influencing the peasants of the different nationalities in improving their farming techniques. 1,702 agricultural producer co-operatives, comprising 47,328 agricultural households (or 5.3% of the total number of agricultural households of the province) have been established. The co-operatives work 7.6% of the province's total cultivated acreage. (Jen Min Jih Pao 人民日報, (September 30, 1955).

⁵⁵ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 27, 1955).

⁵⁶ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (October 1, 1955).

siderable degree concentrated in the Urumchi, Qara Shahr, Ili and Hami districts.⁵⁷

The ambitious visions for Sinkiang on the part of Peking were not confined to the agrarian sphere. As industrialization proceeded in this period the national minorities, in September of 1955, came to compose over ten thousand workers (or 40 per cent of the total number) in Sinkiang.

They are distributed among non-ferrous metals, petroleum, iron and steel, machinery, power and textile industrial departments.⁵⁸

Stress was being placed upon developing an independent base for producing agricultural machinery.

⁵⁷ The post-1949 migration of Han people to China's Northwest (including Sinkiang) has taken three distinct forms. Prior to 1956 nearly all migrants were individuals whose skills were in great demand in this remote area. This group included engineers, technicians, managers, party cadres, army veterans, and some young men and women.

The second period 1956-1957 was characterized by grandiose plans which resulted in confusion and reorganization. Large numbers of Chinese were resettled in ill-prepared minority villages and towns. The resultant strain upon human relations and the disruption of the economic supply systems forced the Communist authorities to reconsider the methods employed. The year 1957 witnessed a great decrease in the resettling movement. Those that were resettled contrary to the 1956 practice were established in new all-Han settlements. Needless to say many Chinese attempted to flee Sinkiang and return to their homes. Henry G. Schwartz gives the following figures for migration to the Northwest and Inner Mongolia.

1954-55	= 7,733	1958	64,600
1956	= 246,600	1959 (to September 30)	4,000

The third period from 1958 to the present has been characterized by the slow development of migration and only lately a quickening of migration due largely to ideological and border conflicts with the USSR. As Henry G. Schwartz has pointed out in his article, there are no accurate figures available concerning the size of Han migrations to Sinkiang. Any effort to determine the scale of migration is impeded by contradictory official reports and official admissions that many settlers have escaped back to China Proper. (Henry G. Schwartz, "Chinese Migration to North-West China and Inner Mongolia 1949-1959," The China Quarterly, No. 16 [October-December], 62-74.)

⁵⁸ Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 25; September 30, 1955).

At the present time Sinkiang has a modern machineryworks and a motor assembly plant. The machinery plant serves the needs of agricultural and pastoral production especially, and is devoted largely to the manufacture of modern agricultural tools.

The modern motor assembly plant which was built with the aid of Soviet experts, the October Motor Vehicles Assembly Plant, has had installed machinery capable of completely overhauling two thousand vehicles per year.⁵⁹

With the mechanization of agriculture in Sinkiang, it was believed that a firm base for far-reaching industrialization would be established.

In regard to the condition of trade in Sinkiang during the "economic consolidation" period, one finds that private trade was consistently brought under state supervision and control. Between 195⁴ and 1955, the share of private interests in the retail trade of Sinkiang fell from 42.1 per cent to 31.3 per cent. By the end of 1956, 95.6⁴ per cent of the retail trade had undergone "socialist transformation."⁶⁰

The final topic for discussion in this chapter is the collectivization of the nomadic way of life. The importance of the Sinkiang nomads can be seen by the simple fact that in 1955, more than sixty per cent of China's wool production came from Sinkiang. In late 195⁴ the Reds had already established 83 animal husbandry farms.⁶¹

In contrast to the pace of agrarian collectivization, the collectivization of stock-breeding, probably because of the great strength of the tribal and nomadic way of life, proceeded quite slowly.

The movement started in 1955 and by the end of 1956 about 20% of the stock-breeders had

59 Ibid., (September 25, 1955).

60 "Sinkiang 1928-1959," CAR, VIII No. 4, op. cit., 451.

61 Kazakhstanskaia pravda (October 15, 1955).

joined co-operatives and about 30% belonged to mutual aid groups.⁶²

It was not until late 1958 that the "lower" type of collectivization of the stock breeding areas could be called complete. Peking in its approach to the nomads deviated from the methods used in agricultural areas.

Officially there was no class segregation or open class conflict. An article by Saifudin in the September 30, 1955 edition of People's Daily further elaborated this "moderate" approach.

...the multitude of herdsmen are actively led and organized to launch the drive to increase the breeding and protection of livestock; the grazing grounds are rationally controlled; the conflict between the hired hands and the owners over wages has been mediated.⁶³

Preparation for the organization of a new co-operative includes propaganda, drafting a constitution, registering animals, fixing shares, and finally a festivity to celebrate the opening of the new co-operative.

It is urged that the clan structure of nomad society, their religious prejudices and general backwardness should be taken into account and that there should be no rushing of those who were still unwilling.⁶⁴

Because of this cautious approach, by November 9, 1957 only slightly less than one in two (46 per cent) of all the nomadic households in Sinkiang

62 "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII, op. cit., 202.

63 Jen Min Jih Pao (人民日報), (September 30, 1955). Over the past six years, the People's Government granted to the herdsmen loans amounting to 4,700,000 yuan, thereby helping the poor nomad people resolve their difficulties in raising funds for developing production....There are at present 86 State ranches in the province. Three animal husbandry producer co-operatives, 78 permanent and over 1,800 seasonal "mutual-aid teams," comprising about 6,000 households, have been organized.

64 "Borderlands: Current Developments in Sinkiang," CAR, V No 2 (1957), 159. Cited from November and December articles in Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報).

were participating in the "lower" type co-operatives of which 1,078 had been formed.⁶⁵ It should be emphasized at this point that this policy of leniency towards the stock-breeders did not extend into China Proper. There, by the end of 1956, 96.3 per cent of the stock breeding households had joined the co-operative movement and of these 67.8 per cent were participating in co-operatives of the advanced type.⁶⁶ This policy provoked a mild reaction on the part of the stock breeders who through their apathy allowed a sharp rise in the mortality rate of draught animals.⁶⁷

In summarizing the events of the "economic consolidation" period in Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang, it would be helpful to list five important differences between the policies of Moscow and Peking in the political sphere during these years. The first two have already been mentioned earlier in the chapter. These were the absence of any further major political alterations in Soviet Turkostan and the absence of any major purge of minority nationalities personnel in Sinkiang. The first difference has already been adequately discussed at the beginning of the Sinkiang portion of the chapter. However, the second difference seems to be related, at least in part, to the third, which was the difference between the Soviet and the Chinese concepts of nativization.

⁶⁵ Hsin Hua News Agency (Urumchi, November 9, 1957).

⁶⁶ Cheng, op. cit., p. 34 (Cited from Ching Chi Yen Chiu [經濟研究], Economic Research Monthly, No 10 [Peking, 1959], p. 3.)

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 35 (Cited from Jen Min Jih Pao [人民日報], (April 19, 1957). Some 60,000 head died in Kiangsu during the winter and spring of 1956-57. "In Shantung province 30 per cent of the draught animals were declared to be weak or incapacitated."

The Soviet concept of nativization implied a training of minority nationals so that they might assume vitually all the duties of government and Party within their respective political entities. Its emphasis was chiefly to bring members of the minorities up to a level where they could perform the duties of governing, competently. Although one can question whether this policy, in reality, ever was seen as a practical goal capable of being attained, one certainly can recognize it as a goal theoretically consistent with the formal federative structure of the USSR. On the other hand, the Chinese position, which subordinated the principle of complete ethnic nativization of a political entity's governmental and Party apparatuses to the practical and theoretical objective of achieving an ideologically orthodox ruling group regardless of its ethnic purity, tends to be more consistent with the theoretical and practical structuring of the People's Republic of China as a unitary state. This difference which, in Soviet Central Asia, resulted in the elevation of numerous indigenous personnel to positions of prominence also exposed these individuals to the danger of being drawn into the vicissitudes of the struggle between Stalin and the "right opposition." In view of the fact that many of these native leaders were relatively inexperienced and therefore expendable, the weakness of their position in the governmental and party machinery was intensified further by their Muslim background in an era of all assault on the Islamic way of life in the USSR.⁶⁸ All of these facts made the native

⁶⁸ The first large scale Communist assault on Islam in Sinkiang took place in late 1957 and extended into early 1958. In spite of the fact that the Chinese Communist in several constitutions had guaranteed "the inviolability of 'vakf' lands, state appropriation of these lands [in China Proper] in fact had begun as early as 1952...." As a rule, confiscation pursued a general pattern. Communist pressure was brought to bear on the imam of the local mosque to announce his voluntary enrollment in the cooperative, which then automatically annexed the 'vakf' land. (A. Kashin,

leaders of Central Asia especially subject to the whims and machinations of a "suspicious" Stalin. China experienced neither a catalysmic inter-
cine party struggle nor a co-ordinate assault on Islam during this period.

The fifth difference can be viewed as an outgrowth of the dissimilar political structures represented by the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic. This difference was the emergence of the Slav element as the largest group in Kazakhstan. Because Soviet Central Asia was delimited into five national republics, this proportional increase of Slavs, in view of the fact that it occurred in the wake of a mysterious reduction of the Kazakh population by one million, should be viewed as the result of a piecemeal policy of encroachment which the entire area of Sinkiang (with the Chinese playing the role of the encroachers) also would experience.⁶⁹ Its importance lies in the meaning that it holds for the future. However, a detailed study of this phenomenon would concern itself largely with the "post-consolidation" periods of both regions.

In turning to the agricultural sphere, one stark difference makes itself apparent. This is that the Chinese handled their collectivization in Sinkiang with subtlety and restraint while the Soviets showed little patience in their transformation of Central Asian agriculture. The emphasis on speed and terror that characterized the Soviet drive to convert peasant holdings directly into collective farms finds little in common with the subtle Chinese approach which de-emphasized terror and provided two intermediate stages ("labor mutual-aid team" and "agricultural producer co-operatives") in the transition to collectives.

The East Turkic Review, Vol. II No. 3 (September, 1960), 107-108. Cited from articles in Ho Pei Jih Pao (河北日報), (January 20, 1958) and Sinkiang Jih Pao (新疆日報), August 25, 1958).

⁶⁹ See footnotes 32 and 57 Chapter 4.

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The Chinese also displayed this tact in their more slow-moving campaign to settle the nomads. The contrast between Stalin's March 2, 1930 call for retreat and reason and Mao Tse-tung's July 31, 1955 statement denouncing obstructionism on the part of certain minority groups and demanding an acceleration of the collectivization program aptly illustrates the differing tempos of the two campaigns. In view of the fact that in 1957 over 90 per cent of Sinkiang's peasants were in collectives, while in 1933 just over one half of Soviet Central Asia's peasant holdings were collectivized, one must view the more reasoned approach of Peking as the superior.

The experiences in collectivizing livestock merely reaffirmed the bankruptcy of the initial Soviet approach. The fantastic livestock losses which Moscow incurred in Central Asia had no comparable counterpart in Sinkiang. Soviet policy acknowledged its error by adopting a more lenient policy after the retreat of 1930-1931.⁷⁰

It is interesting to note that both Moscow and Peking employed elite labor corps (the Twenty-Five Thousand in the USSR and the FLA's "production-construction army") to carry out important agricultural and industrial tasks. However, as previously mentioned, Moscow did not press ahead with any plan for the early industrialization of Soviet Central Asia. In this respect, Peking's continued efforts of industrializing Sinkiang in the "economic consolidation" period were merely a continuation of the deviation which was discussed in the preceding chapter. Nonetheless, in both Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang, this period witnessed the near-elimination of

⁷⁰ See appendix B.

privately controlled retail trade. The Soviet First Five Year Plan's establishment of co-operative and state-owned stores coupled with the levying of confiscatory taxes succeeded in destroying the distribution system of the NEP men⁷¹ as effectively as did the 1954-1955 government seizure of retail trade in Sinkiang. Finally one can see in these events a major difference between the policies of Moscow and Peking in the "economic consolidation" period. Peking, unlike Moscow, carried out both agricultural and industrial transformations in Sinkiang. Moscow was to wait until the Second World War to initiate the latter transformation in Soviet Central Asia. In both areas this period marked the takeover by the state and Party of all economic enterprises of any importance.

71 Sidney Harcave, Russia: A History, New York, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1956, pp. 553-54.

CONCLUSIONS

This conclusion will not be an attempt to summarize the foregoing chapters. Its purpose is to enunciate some general conclusions. This study reveals that neither Russian Central Asia nor Sinkiang offered any ideology or movement which espoused a program of political and economic reform that could seriously compete with the respective Communist programs for these regions. Islam proved to be a passive force which, finally in desperation, manifested opposition in the form of the guerrilla bands of the Basmachis and Osman Bator. However, both of these anti-Communist movements were basically rural-oriented opposition to the incursions of the twentieth century. The failure of the Pan-Turkist movement to develop a viable program has already been discussed.

One fact which increasingly manifests itself in this study is the political and economic influence that the USSR had in Sinkiang during the period under study. Moscow emerges as the master manipulator of non-Bolshevik progressive elements in Tashkent (Jadids and original Tashkent regime) and Sinkiang (Sheng regime and Eastern Turkestan government). Therefore, the CCP, from the start of its rule in Sinkiang, had to cope with a group of "progressive nationalists" (Eastern Turkestan regime) that was being manipulated for the purposes of the national interests of the USSR, which was a fraternal Communist country.

Both the CPSU and the CCP employed the instrument of "self-determination" to overthrow "reactionary" regimes (Khiva and Bukhara) and to eliminate "progressives" (Jadids and Eastern Turkestan Government) who, either had outlived their usefulness or had become the tool of forces (the USSR in Sinkiang) detrimental to the complete incorporation of the territories of the "fatherland."

The differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communist concepts of "nativization" deserve some attention. The original Soviet "internationalist" scheme of organizing political units on the basis of regional economic units instead of on a national or ethnic basis as the CCP officially did (long before it came to power), reveals the gulf that separated the early Bolsheviks from the non-proletarian and even non-bourgeois societies of Asia. The CCP, having won a twenty-year civil war in the rural and remote areas of China, was clearly conscious of the economic backwardness of the many minority peoples of China.

While the Soviet view was altered when Moscow established regional political units based upon distinct ethnic groupings, the results, because of the dominance of Slavs in the scant proletariat that did exist in the Soviet Central Asian cities of that era, were marked by an unintentional exclusion of "indigenous" peoples and the formation in Soviet Central Asia of Party organizations which were almost totally Slavic in composition. In contrast, the Chinese Communists held out the hand of possible collaboration with all classes in Sinkiang, including landlords and rich peasants. (Durhan Shahidi was of middle class background.) Furthermore, the CCP approach to "nativization" stressed ideological purity more than giving preference to "indigenous collaborators" over Han cadres. It seems that the CCP believed that if a high level of ideological purity was attained

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among the Han and "indigenous" cadres of Sinkiang, the basis of the rivalries and hatreds that had previously existed would disappear under the influence of Marxist "internationalism," and the questions of "great power Chauvinism" and "local nationalism" would recede.

The Russians, somewhat in contrast, proceeded arduously to build up the numbers of the "indigenous peoples" in all of the heavily Slav-dominated Party and government organizations of Soviet Central Asia. In other words, the Soviets were creating "indigenous proletariats" which would eventually take over formal control of the Soviet Central Asia parties and governments. Therefore, the CPSU was basically concerned with the establishment of national republics officially governed by "indigenous proletarians." The Chinese, in line with their concepts of a "multi-class" dictatorship and a "multi-national" coalition government, were more interested in establishing an ideologically orthodox ruling group in Sinkiang without even attempting to stress (as Moscow was in Soviet Central Asia), the unrealistic concept of ethnic purity. Since it is apparent from this paper that Moscow was unsuccessful in this venture for ethnic purity, one could state that on the practical level the domination of Soviet Central Asia by Slavs and the similar domination of Sinkiang by Chinese were attained through policies which, while ostensibly different in their aims, in reality, produced similar situations.

In regard to the periodization which has been applied to this study, it should be apparent that it is not intended to be inflexible. One encounters incongruous elements such as Peking's institution of "labor-mutual-aid teams" during the "political consolidation" period and the fact that the final political structure of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region was not achieved until the "economic consolidation" period. These

are hazards that are encountered in any attempt to correlate similar periods of internal development which take place within different countries and within the contexts of different periods of international politics.

The Chinese dependence on Soviet technical aid in their drive to establish an industrial base in Sinkiang during both the "political and economic consolidation" periods, which has no counterpart in the experience of Soviet Central Asia during these two periods, is a prime example of the inherent disparities which must be acknowledged in a study of this nature.

The Soviets also experienced this intermingling of periods of development in that, while at the end of 1933 only slightly more than 50 per cent of the Soviet Central Asian households were collectivized, the Seventeenth Party Congress (January 26-February 10, 1934) by its unusual emphasis on the dangers of "local nationalism" initiated the period of the "repression of local nationalism" (1934-1954).

However, as this study has made clear, these incongruent elements were highly influenced by the internal situations existing in Russia and China during the respective periods under study and by inherent differences in the respective central governments of the countries which ruled these two regions under study. Obvious incongruities in the lengths of the periods under study developed from the contrast between the military and political confusion which characterized Russia because of the foreign intervention against the Bolsheviks, the death of the revered Lenin, and the struggle for succession, which had no real counterpart in the coming to power of the CCP by means of its huge PLA and cadre organization or in the absence to date of any succession problem. The Korean war did not sever Sinkiang from China Proper. Instead Sinkiang being in an interior

position, safely bordering the "friendly" USSR, was called upon, with Soviet technical assistance, to make important contributions to the growth of national strength.

Examples of the incongruities manifested by inherent internal governmental differences are the different relationships between the Party and army which existed in the USSR and China. Another is the frenzied pace of collectivization that Soviet Central Asia experienced. This pace could be attributed at least in part to the fantastic ten-year (1924-1934) struggle for power which Stalin waged against an assortment of enemies and which finally attained its maturity in the form of the Great Purges (1935-1938).

In spite of the unavoidable problems that have been discussed above, it can be stated that in both the "political and economic consolidation" periods, the respective developments in these two regions bear remarkable similarities.

In concluding, one can say that the Chinese Communists, possibly in part because they enjoyed the benefit of having been able to study the previous errors of Moscow in its programs for Soviet Central Asia, seem - at least within the period covered by this study - to have carried out their consolidation of political and economic control over Sinkiang with less destruction and loss, and with greater subtlety, than did Moscow in its consolidation of control over Soviet Central Asia.

APPENDIX A

THE PEOPLES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
AND SINKIANG

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
POPULATION

	<u>1926</u>	<u>1939</u>
Kazakhstan		6,146,000
Kazakhs	57%	2,335,500
Russians	20%	2,619,900 (includes Ukrainians)
Ukrainians	13%	
Uzbekistan	4,445,600	6,282,000
Uzbeks		4,083,300
Russians		728,700
Tadzhiks		320,400
		308,100
Kirghizia	993,000	1,459,000
Kirghiz		657,700
Tadzhikistan	739,500	1,485,000
Tadzhiks		883,600
Uzbeks		353,400
Russians and Ukrainians		152,900
Turkmenistan	855,100	1,254,000
Turkmen		742,400
Russians and Ukrainians		234,500
Uzbeks		106,600

(Cited in Kazakhskaya SSR ekonomiko-geograficheskaya kharakteristika, Moskva, 1957, p. 130; Uzbekistan za 40 let sovetskoi vlasti, Tashkent, 1958; "The Muslim Republics of the USSR," JRCAS, XLVII (April, 1960), 106-116.

SINKIANG
POPULATION

Uighurs	3,600,000
Kazakhs	500,000
Kirghiz	75,000
Mongols	30,000
Russians	20,000
Sibos	19,000
Tadzhiks	14,000
Uzbeks	13,000
Tatars	6,000
Hui	Difficult to ascertain
Manchu	Negligible
Solons	Negligible
Han	250,000

(Cited in "The Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region," Current Background, No 365 (October 25, 1955).

APPENDIX B

SOVIET LIVESTOCK LOSSES

1914

	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	<u>Kirghizia</u>	<u>Tadzhikistan</u>
Horses		555,700	103,200	533,200	123,400
Camels		116,100	187,900	37,700	12,400
Cattle		1,636,300	340,800	477,300	612,300
Sheep		3,790,900	2,856,000	3,247,200	1,331,400
Goat		992,100	1,130,300	417,800	571,100
Donkeys and Mules		280,300	81,800		64,900
Pigs		3,100			
	<u>35,000,000</u>	<u>7,374,500</u>	<u>7,376,500</u>	<u>4,700,000</u>	<u>4,755,700</u>

1925 - 1926

	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	<u>Kirghizia</u>	<u>Tadzhikistan</u>
Horses		216,800	67,500	304,900	52,700
Camels		76,000	179,600	19,500	3,500
Cattle		1,101,600	261,100	385,900	441,800
Sheep		2,277,900	956,600	1,900,400	794,400
Goats		723,900	810,000	244,200	499,100
Donkeys and Mules		266,200	81,800	4,800	80,600
Pigs		5,000		46,400	
	<u>26,000,000</u>	<u>4,767,400</u>	<u>2,358,600</u>	<u>2,906,100</u>	<u>1,672,100</u>

(Cited in T.R. Ryskulov, Kirghizistan, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929; A.P. Kuchkin, Likvidatsiia Kazakhskich baev-mashchfeodalov, Moscow, 1928; A.P. Kuchkin, "Likvidatsiia Kazakhskich baev-polufederalov v 1928 g.," Istoricheskie zapiski, No. 35 (950), 7. (Cited in "Narodnogo khoziaistva Kazakstana v 1925-1926 g. (Materialam Kon'iunktturnogo biuro Kazgosplana)," (1929), p. 123.)

1928

	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	<u>Kirghizia</u>	<u>Other Republics</u>
Sheep and Goats	28,916,000	5,321,700	13,104,000
Horses	3,735,000	716,300	742,006
Cattle	7,379,000	1,030,300	3,302,000
	<u>40,030,000</u>	<u>7,068,300</u>	<u>17,148,000</u>

(Cited in T.R. Ryskulov, op. cit., p. 60.)

1938

	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	<u>Kirghizia</u>	<u>Tadzhikistan</u>
Sheep and Goats	5,287,800	3,980,000	1,830,900	1,886,100	1,634,900
Horses	638,700	381,400	64,100	361,600	102,200
Cattle	3,095,400	1,410,900	233,300	486,000	500,100
Donkeys		305,500			
Camels		48,300	82,100		
Pigs	367,900	76,300	22,700	91,000	21,900
	<u>9,389,800</u>	<u>6,202,400</u>	<u>2,233,100</u>	<u>2,824,700</u>	<u>2,258,200</u>

(Cited in Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo Soiuza SSR, Moscow, 1939; Malaja sovetskaja entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1940, Cols. 575-591, 897-915, 971-990.)

APPENDIX C

EQUIVALENT POLITICAL UNITS

Chinese	Russian	English
<u>chou</u>	<u>okrug</u>	district
<u>hsien</u>	<u>uezd</u>	county
<u>ch'ü</u>	<u>raion</u>	area
<u>hsiang</u>	<u>volost</u>	rural area

APPENDIX D

ABBREVIATIONS

- CAEC Central Asiatic Economic Council.
- CAR Central Asian Review.
- GEC Central Executive Committee
- CCP Chinese Communist Party.
- CPR Chinese People's Republic.
- CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- HRAF Human Relations Area Files.
- JRCAS Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.
- KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese Party).
- KPSS Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- NEP New Economic Policy.
- PLA People's Liberation Army.
- RCP Russian Communist Party.
- RSFSR Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (after 1924
it stands for Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic).
- SSR Soviet Socialist Republic.
- USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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