

Demographic and Economic Changes in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region

MICHAEL FREEBERNE

In this brief survey recent developments in Sinkiang are considered in terms of the rapidly changing characteristics of population which have resulted from post-1949 economic, social and political events occurring within the Uighur Autonomous Region.¹ These changes are dominated by the increase in the numbers of Han Chinese, a trend which marks the latest phase in the history of the movement of Chinese into the far north-west.

Certain features in the composition of Sinkiang's population are closely related to the geographical environment. (See Map 1.) Lofty mountains up to 20,000 feet high, the Tienshan, separate two vast basins, the Tarim Basin to the south and the Dzungarian Basin to the north. The Tarim Basin, averaging between 2,000 and 3,000 feet in height, and virtually encircled by the Tienshan and the Pamirs (in places above 20,000 feet) to the north and west, and the Kun Lun and Altyn Tagh, to the south and east, covers more than half of the total area of Sinkiang and includes the extensive Takla Makan Desert. As in all parts of rain-deficient Sinkiang an adequate water supply is vital to permanent settlement. Oases fringe the basin; Kashgar, Khotan and Aqsu being amongst the largest. The summer run-off from melting glaciers and snow in the surrounding


¹ It is impossible to attempt a detailed technical analysis of the demography of Sinkiang, as the necessary information is simply unavailable, even assuming that it exists. Instead, the present article is largely descriptive, although highly fragmentary statistics are incorporated based upon the limited range of Chinese sources which are accessible. These figures are of questionable value, not only because of the original techniques used but also due to the fact that frequently the information is entrusted to mass-media news channels and shorn of meaningful context with regards to definition, dating, etc.

Relatively lengthy quotations from Chinese sources have been retained in this article, particularly in the sections dealing with the settling of pastoral peoples, and relations with the Soviet Union, because of their peculiarly polemic-saturated quality, which is immediately destroyed by paraphrasing. The strongly political context of Chinese statements does not necessarily make it impossible to reconstruct a general picture of demographic and economic developments, however, and the claims concerning the broad outlines of population growth and distribution; the spread of urbanization and industrialization; advances in the agricultural sector; and certain improvements in social conditions, are largely acceptable. Indeed, in some instances, Chinese claims are likely to err by understatement rather than overstatement, as, for example, in the absolute figure of population recorded for the region, and news about the discovery and location of further mineral resources. The reason for possible underreporting and concealing of information lies in the immense strategic importance of Sinkiang, not merely as a vast multi-racial region of dispute sandwiched between 'China proper' and the Soviet Union but also as an area rich in minerals, notably in this context, oil and uranium, and a zone of growing industrial importance.

At the same time, in attempting to describe current developments, striking inaccuracies and inconsistencies emerge in the Chinese sources, and these will be underlined. The degree of objectivity of the Chinese statements describing, for instance, the attitudes towards migration and the reactions upon arrival of new settlers; the ecstatic life of Sinkiang's minorities; the speed, scale, and efficacy of the extension of social amenities; and above all the successful settling of the nomadic peoples must be strenuously challenged. In this last respect the Chinese are on their weakest ground, and this particular facet of life in Sinkiang has been highlighted as the theoretical, ideological aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict have degenerated into practical power-politics.

mountains, as well as underground water resources, help to supplement the low rainfall; for example, Kashgar receives an average of only 4 inches of rain a year.

North of the Tianshan, the Dzungarian Basin is lower in height, averaging over 1,000 feet, has higher rainfall, about 10 inches per annum, which supports more pasture and less desert, and is orientated towards the Soviet Union. Agriculture is dependent upon irrigation almost everywhere in Sinkiang, with pastoralism more common north of the Tianshan, although also found on mountain slopes south of the divide and in the extreme south-west. There are extensive timber reserves in the Tianshan and Altai mountains.



Map 1

SOURCES: (a) *The Times Atlas of the World*, Vol. 1.
 (b) *China Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 1959.

Sinkiang is rich in mineral resources. Karamai and Tushantze possess large oil reserves, and there are probably important fields south of the Tianshan. Coal is widely distributed and reserves total 3,000,000 million tons.² The most important deposits are near Chuguchak, Hami and

² *The Chinese Coal Industry*, Part 1, Joseph Crosfield & Sons, 1961, p. 55.

Urumchi. Extensive low-grade iron ores are found north and south of the Tienshan. Also, significant deposits of barite, copper, gold, gypsum, halite, jade, lead, mica, molybdenum, sulphur, tungsten, uranium, and zinc have been discovered.

POPULATION GROWTH

Sinkiang occupies 627,600 square miles, roughly one-sixth of the total area of China, or, alternatively, an area three times that of France. Because of its remoteness, situated in the extreme north-west of China, approximately 1,000 miles inland from the eastern seaboard, and with its vast size and small population, Sinkiang has been compared with the American west of the nineteenth century. In contrast to certain extravagant claims, such as that of Schomberg, who in 1932 estimated that the Tarim Basin alone could support a population of 160 millions,³ Chang, in 1949, was pessimistic: '... there appears to be little prospect for Chinese colonization in the territory in the future'.⁴

Sinkiang figured in Sun Yat-sen's dream of a modern China, however, and since 1949 Sinkiang's population has grown considerably. In 1949 the total population was about 3.7 millions.⁵ The 1953 census recorded a mid-year population of 4,873,608, whilst the last official year-end figure, for 1957, was 5,640,000.⁶ By October 1962 it was claimed that the population had reached 7 millions.⁷ Although it is impossible to distinguish between natural increase and growth due to immigration with any degree of accuracy, it is clear that this rapid increase has been achieved mainly through large-scale immigration.

Han Chinese numbered between 200,000 and 300,000 in 1949. The Chinese claim that the minority population has increased by 22.5% since 1949, so that there were possibly about 2.6 million Han by the end of 1962. Table 1 shows the number of Han Chinese in 1953 as still only 300,000, in which case the increase must have occurred mainly between 1953 and 1962, at the rate of about 255,000 a year. This estimate probably hides a marked upward, if fluctuating, curve in the number of Chinese immigrants, starting from a relatively low base of considerably less than

³ Lieut.-Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, D.S.O., 'The habitability of Chinese Turkistan', *The Geographical Journal*, December 1932, pp. 505-511.

⁴ Chang Chih-yi, 'Land utilization and settlement possibilities in Sinkiang', *Geographical Review*, 39, 1949, pp. 57-75.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁶ *Ten Great Years*, Peking, 1960, p. 11.

⁷ NCNA, Urumchi, 25th October 1962. In fact a number of conflicting statistics were issued for the total population of Sinkiang after the mid-year figure for 1953. Hu Huan-yang (*Ti-li Chih-shih*, No. 9, 1957, pp. 390-391) gave 5,144,700 as the year-end figure for 1954. Wang Wei-ping and Hu Ying-mei gave the 1955 population as 5,200,000, but failed to state whether this was a mid-year or end-of-year figure (*The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region*, Commercial Press, Peking, 1959, in Chinese). At the same time the NCNA and *Jen-min Jih-pao* cited figures of between 4.8 and 5.0 millions. *K'o-hsueh Hua-pao* (*Science Pictorial*), for August 1956, stated that Sinkiang had a population of 5.3 millions without giving any date. In 1958 the *Sinkiang Jih-pao* (Urumchi, 29th September 1958) gave the population as 5.8 millions, whilst between March and November 1959 the same paper gave the population as 6,000,000 or 'about 6,000,000' (Urumchi, 13th March and 1st November 1959). As late as 1964 another source still listed the 1957 figure (Jen Yu-ti, *A Concise Geography of China*, 1964, p. 7).

255,000. For instance, the official population figures for 1953 and 1957 already mentioned indicate that the average yearly growth between these dates, from immigration and natural increase combined, was only 170,000.⁸

The Chinese repeated the claim of a population of 7 millions, first made in October 1962, in April 1964, and again in October 1965,⁹ but obviously the population has not remained static during the last three and a half years. The Chinese may simply be reiterating the latest available statistics; alternatively, the figures might have been rounded excessively by the agencies handling the information, and for argument's sake an increase of from 7.0 to 7.9 millions might be obscured; or there may have been a deliberate attempt to conceal actual increases. In any event, especially in view of the general economic development and strategic importance of the area, the present population of Sinkiang is probably more than 8 millions, and may be considerably higher as a result of undisclosed Han immigration.

The classification of migration formulated by the American demographer William Petersen fails to describe adequately this north-westward movement of Chinese, for it is not wholly primitive, forced, impelled, free or mass.¹⁰ Instead, the term *channelled* migration is suggested to describe internal movement of population in a communist state where there is a synthesis of individual and collective ideological fervour, combined with political persuasion and force, where the motivation is in part voluntary, in part containing some measure of coercion.

The press and radio appeal to socialist awareness, patriotism and the spirit of adventure in encouraging youths to emigrate to Sinkiang, but the harsh environment caused an initial backwash of population. In consequence advance parties were established to prepare the way, as in the case of demobilized army units, whose members with families in the eastern provinces might send for them after an interval of a year or so.

Efforts are exerted to help the new settlers and comforting missions are organized. When questioning youths from Hupeh province one mission was told 'that the factories or mines where they are working were better than their homes and that the Party was more concerned with their welfare than their parents were. . . . About 95% of them (have) decided to settle down (in Sinkiang) and (are) in high spirits'.¹¹

⁸ Clearly the above calculations are based on highly unsatisfactory and inadequate information. For example, the statement that the total minority population increased by 22.5% suggests that the minorities increased from about 3.5 millions in 1949 (itself a suspect base year) to roughly 4.4 millions. This estimate does not agree, however, with an NCNA report dated 2nd June 1962 which gave Sinkiang's total minority population as 'over five million people'. If this last figure is the more accurate, then the number of Han Chinese in Sinkiang by 1962 would be less than 2 millions, which means that the estimates of Han migration given above are too high. For instance, an NCNA (Urumchi) report dated 20th September 1965 stated that the eleven non-Uighur and non-Han Chinese minorities accounted for 13% of the population. With the Uighurs totalling 67%, on this basis the Han Chinese make up only 20% of the population, or approximately 1,400,000 of the 1962 total population of 7 millions, or more than 1,600,000 if the 1965 total is over 8 millions, as suggested; these figures indicate an average yearly increase in the numbers of Han Chinese of at least 100,000, less than half the estimate above. Unfortunately, therefore, only the crudest of calculations of Chinese immigration can be made.

⁹ NCNA, Urumchi, 7th April 1964 and 1st October 1965.

¹⁰ William Petersen, 'A general typology of migration', *American Sociological Review*, 23, 3 (June 1958), pp. 256-266.

¹¹ *Sinkiang Jih-pao*, Urumchi, 8th December 1959.

Within the last few months it has been reported that a growing number of educated youths from urban areas are leaving for the border regions, in answer to the Party's call to devote their youth to building up border areas, and 'to steel and prepare themselves to become worthy successors to the revolutionary cause'.¹² During the last two years 50,000 youths have left Shanghai for Sinkiang,¹³ ambitiously proclaiming: 'we carry away the sand of the vast Gobi in our willow baskets and open tens of thousands of hectares of fertile fields with our trowels'.¹⁴

As recently as July 1965, whilst returning from Cairo, Premier Chou En-lai and Vice-Premier Chen Yi made a fleeting but significant stock-taking tour of inspection of the Shihhotzu Reclamation Area. This served the dual purpose of giving two of China's top-ranking leaders a first-hand impression of conditions in Sinkiang, shortly before the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Autonomous Region, as well as providing immigrants with a political morale booster. Also, the visit serves to underline the long-standing importance and renewed emphasis attached to Chinese settlement in the area. The two leaders talked to a group of educated youths from Shanghai. Apparently, 'the young people felt warm all over. The Party shows concern for our growth every minute of the day'.¹⁵

Such large-scale immigration is reflected in the modified age-sex ratios, marital status and ethnic composition of Sinkiang's population. Under existing conditions young and middle-aged male Han migrants predominate, although interestingly enough Chinese sources are at pains to point out that young women are employed, for example, on the most arduous of surveying expeditions, and photographs of groups of young settlers often include a pretty face or two. The changing age-sex ratio necessarily makes marriage more competitive. Inter-marriage between Han Chinese and the minority groups, assuming the political and social climate is favourable, would facilitate complete assimilation and is presumably at least permitted if not actually encouraged. On the other hand, where mixed marriage is involved racial prejudices may well conflict with any ambitions towards absorbing the minorities (or at least cementing party unity) which the Chinese might have. In 1959 the Marriage Law, previously 'considerably modified in Sinkiang, was strictly enforced with particular stress on monogamy and legal sanction for divorce', whilst changing attitudes have released more women from household ties so that they may take part in agricultural and industrial production.¹⁶

Sinkiang's population includes thirteen 'nationalities': Uighur, Han, Kazakh, Mongolian, Hui, Khalkha, Russian, Uzbek, Sibo, Tadjik, Tartar, Tahir and Manchu. (See Table 1 and Map 2.) Official Chinese statements indicate that the Uighurs with 67% of the total population are by far

¹² *Peking Review*, 27th August 1965.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Kwang-ming Jih-pao*, 10th May 1965.

¹⁵ *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*, Peking, 10th August 1965.

X ¹⁶ J. P. Lo, 'Five years of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, 1955-60', *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1961, p. 101.

TABLE I. *Ethnic composition of the populations of Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia*

SINKIANG, 1953*

A. Turkic peoples	
1. Uighurs	3,640,000†
2. Kazakhs	475,000
3. Khalkhas (Kirghiz)	70,000
4. Uzbeks and Tartars	13,000
B. Chinese peoples	
1. Chinese	300,000
2. Huis (Dungans)	200,000
C. Mongols	120,000
D. Manchus, Sibos, etc.	20,000
E. Tadjiks	15,000
F. Russians	13,000
G. Others	8,000
	Total 4,874,000

* SOURCE. 'With the exception of the Uighurs there are no official population figures for Sinkiang. The following table is drawn up on the basis of modern Chinese sources and Owen Lattimore's *Pivot of Asia*.' Abridged translation of S. I. Brak's article: 'The ethnic composition and distribution of population in the S.U.A.R. of the C.P.R.', *Sovetskaya Etnografya*, No. 2, 1956 (*Central Asian Review*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1956, p. 434).

† The Uighur population was given as 4 millions in 1964 (NCNA, 28th June 1964).

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, 1959‡
(including Kazakhstan)


A. Turkic peoples	
1. Uzbeks	5,961,000
2. Kazakhs	3,193,000
3. Turkmen	981,000
4. Kirghiz	955,000
5. Tartars	780,000
6. Kara-Kalpakhs	168,000
7. Uighurs	74,000
B. Eastern Slavic peoples	
1. Russians	6,265,000
2. Ukrainians	1,035,000
3. Byelorussians	108,000
C. Tadjiks	1,378,000
D. Koreans	213,000
E. Dungans	10,000
F. Others	
Jews	94,000
Poles	53,000
Armenians	20,000
	Total 21,288,000

‡ SOURCE : W. A. D. Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands*, 1962, p. 12.

the largest group,¹⁷ although on a percentage basis their numbers have declined from 75%;¹⁸ but almost certainly these figures deliberately obscure the influx of Han Chinese. Amongst the non-Han

¹⁷ *China Pictorial*, October 1965.

¹⁸ NCNA, 2nd June 1962. 'In Sinkiang the number of Uighurs under the Ching dynasty and Kuomintang rule was more than halved. Before 1949 the birth rate was very low, and the mortality high, with infant mortality as high as 70% (Liu Ch'ao, *Animal Raising in the Northwest*, Shanghai, 1955, p. 16).



Map 2.


SOURCE: Jen-min Shou-tse (People's Handbook) Peking 1957.

follow the Kazakhs; other peoples of Muslim faith include the Huis, Khalkhas (Kirghiz), Tadjiks, Tartars and Uzbeks. In spite of repressive measures by the Chinese to weaken Islam, religious traditions and sentiment remain a powerful cohesive and therefore anti-Chinese influence. Autonomous *chou* and autonomous *hsien* have been established for the Kazakhs, Mongolians, Huis, Khalkhas, Tadjiks, and Sibos. (See Map 3.) Table 1 also includes a summary of the ethnic composition of the population of Soviet Central Asia. The racial similarities are of vital importance in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations; this will be discussed later in the article (see pp. 121 ff).

The introduction of greatly improved educational facilities, with Chinese as the official language, represents but one method adopted to break Islam's hold and further the sinification of the local population, 95% of whom were illiterate before 1949.¹⁹ It is claimed that as many as

¹⁹ NCNA, Urumchi, 19th September 1965.

So% of all school-age children now attend school, and 'eight institutes for nationalities have been set up (in China) by the government since 1950 to train minority functionaries'.²⁰ Attempts at language reform, designed to 'promote cultural exchange and solidarity among the various nationalities', universal education and modern science and technology, as well as to strengthen ties with the Han Chinese,²¹ have progressed comparatively slowly, although experiments with new written languages for the Uighurs and Kazakhs replacing Arabic, first, with the Cyrillic alphabet, but now, for obvious political reasons with a slightly modified Latin alphabet, are said to have proved successful. Since 1960 20,000 instructors have been trained and 600,000 primary school pupils and 200,000 adults have studied the new written languages 'and found them easy to earn. . . . The new scripts will be used to wipe out illiteracy'.²²



Map 3.

SOURCE: C.I.A. Atlas.

²⁰ NCNA, 21st September 1963.

²¹ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking, 10th February 1960; NCNA, Urumchi, 23rd January 1965.

²² NCNA, Urumchi, 23rd January 1965.

Due in part to better medical facilities, which are reported to have wiped out smallpox and brought leprosy, malaria, typhoid, venereal diseases and other infectious diseases under control, and drastically cut the mortality rate of infants and mothers, the number of people belonging to national minority groups has increased by 22.5% since 1949, compared with a doubling of the total population. The number of Tahurs, the smallest group, has risen by 50%,²³ the Sibos and Manchus by 50%, the Mongolians by 38%,²⁴ and the Tadjiks by 30%,²⁵ whilst the Uighurs have increased by 25%.²⁶ The region's birth rate in 1964 was 41% higher than in 1949.²⁷

These fragmentary figures raise a number of interesting problems. Their demographic significance is in fact very slight, as there were neither accurate statistics of the minority populations in 1949 or in the years immediately following, nor figures for the overall birth rate. Nevertheless the political importance of the figures is considerable. Strikingly, the smaller groups, including the Tahurs, Sibos, Manchus, Mongolians and Tadjiks are the ones which are reported to have grown fastest. With the predominant group, the Uighurs, increasing at an above average rate, other groups must have increased at a rate of less than 22.5%. The Kazakhs, traditionally nomadic, form the most important of these groups. Finally, whilst the Chinese publicize the percentage increases recorded by selected minorities they make no reference to the impressive increase in Han Chinese numbers.

URBANIZATION

Over 60% of Sinkiang is uninhabited,²⁸ and it might have been expected that bleak environmental conditions, especially isolation, blistering summers and bitter winters, extreme aridity, skeletal and alkaline soils, and sparse vegetation, would have precluded any sudden and dramatic shifts in population distribution away from the main irrigated concentrations north and south of the Tienshan, and in the south-western crescent which includes Kashgar and Khotan; but in fact internal movements have been marked since 1949, although there is no available, detailed, cartographic evidence. Economic planning, particularly agricultural and pastoral developments; the tapping of natural resources, such as oil, coal and uranium; and industrialization, is transforming the population distribution. Increased urbanization is perhaps the most notable feature.

In 1953 the urban population formed about 15% of the total. Table 2 represents an attempt to list the population of the main centres between 1949 and 1963. (See Map 1.) The table reveals

²³ NCNA, 30th August 1963; 26th April 1964. 'The population of . . . the Tahir people has risen to over 3,000. At the time of liberation it was 1,800' (NCNA, Urumchi, 15th October 1965). These latest figures suggest an increase of over 60%.

²⁴ NCNA, Urumchi, 20th September 1965.

²⁵ NCNA, Urumchi, 17th July 1964.

²⁶ NCNA, 2nd June 1962.

²⁷ NCNA, Urumchi, 18th September 1965.

²⁸ S. I. Bruk, 'The ethnic composition and distribution of population in the Sinkiang Uighur A.R. of the C.P.R.' (*Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 2, 1956). (For abridged translation see *Central Asian Review*, 4, 4, 1956, pp. 433-437.)

TABLE 2. *Main urban centres*

	1949	1953 ^a	1955 ^b	1957 ^b	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Urumchi	80,000	141,000	207,519	280,088	320,000 ^b	400,000		700,000		400,000
Kuldja		108,000			85,000 ^c					107,400
Kashgar	30,000	91,000			100,000 ^c			140,000	100,000	
Aqsu		90,000								
Yarkand		80,000								
Hami	10,000						100,000			

^a *Central Asian Review*, 4, 4, 1956, p. 433.

^b *Ti-li Chih-shih*, 12, 1959.

^c M. B. Ullman, *Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958*, 1961, p. 36.

SOURCES. Official Chinese news agencies, except where stated.

marked fluctuations, especially in the case of Urumchi between 1958 and 1963. Factors which may account for these fluctuations as well as other inadequacies, not least of omission, include: first, statistical inaccuracies *per se*, as in the use of the unsatisfactory base year of 1949, unsophisticated counting, estimating and recording techniques, ambiguous dating and inaccurate reporting. Secondly, change in administrative units; for instance, in April 1958 the area of Urumchi was expanded from 81.3 to 640 square kilometres; it is not known to which of these areas the post-1958 figures in Table 2 refer. Thirdly, long-distance immigration, and local rural-urban and urban-rural transfers of population. Finally, military build-ups may have contributed to urbanization.

Because of the lack of reliable data, evidence of the spread of urbanization is based upon descriptive reports. For example, first, the growth of the capital, Urumchi, and other administrative and expanding light industrial centres – Hami, Kashgar, Kuldja and Shihhotzu. Secondly, resource exploiting centres, such as the oil boom-town of Karamai and the oil-refining town of Tushantze. Thirdly, the growth of ‘new towns’, such as Shihhotzu, Atushi and the Tash Kurghan, which are associated with the reclamation of virgin agricultural and pastoral lands, and, as in the case of Atushi, with the permanent settling of formerly nomadic peoples. (See Table 3, which again illustrates the inadequacy of Chinese statistics, and Map 1.)

This is how the growth of Atushi new town is described. ‘Atushi, capital of the Kezlesu Khalkhas Autonomous *Chou* in western Sinkiang, has emerged together with several other towns on a stretch of wilderness ringed by towering mountains on the edge of the Great Gobi Desert. To-day it has a population of tens of thousands, with all the amenities of a modern township – office buildings, factories, hospital, cinema, department store, bank, post office and schools. In the autumn of 1952 a number of Khalkhas peasants, driven from their farmland by the oncoming floods rushing down the mountain, settled down here with the help of the People’s Government and became the first inhabitants of the present town. Later more Uighur peasants and Khalkhas herdsmen came to join them.’²⁹

²⁹ NCNA, Peking, 20th November 1960.

TABLE 3. *New towns*

Atushi	?(1952)	'tens of thousands' (1960)	5,000 (1964)			
Karamai ^a	-(1956)	43,000 (1958)	50,000 (1959)	'tens of thousands' (1961)		
Kueitun ^b Shihhotzu		'a tiny community' (1950)	70,000 (1959)	60,000 (1961)	50,000 (1962)	70,000 (1964)
Tash Kurghan	50-100 (1949)					8,000+ ? (1964)
Tushantze ^c						

^a Karamai was ranked as one of Sinkiang's 'four major cities' together with Urumchi, Kuldja (Ining), and Kashgar (NCNA, Urumchi, 15th September 1963).

^b 'Shihhotzu, Kueitun, and Karamai, where vast tracts of marshland were located, have become new industrial cities' (*Ta-kung Pao*, Peking, 30th September 1965).

^c A report which referred to Tushantze stated 'New cities are rapidly growing . . .' (J.P.R.S., 1027-N, 15th December 1958, p. 91).

SOURCES. Official Chinese news agencies.

The Chinese summarize the significant spread of urbanization in Sinkiang by pointing out that in 1949 there were only 12 towns with a population of more than 2,000; by 1964 there were 70 cities and towns exceeding this size.³⁰ 'No modern standard atlas published abroad can keep up with the rise of cities and towns in Sinkiang. In the last 14 years, on the heels of developing livestock-raising and farming, dozens of new towns have sprung up in this once vast backward area. . . . All in all by 1964 there are close to 80 cities and towns compared to a dozen in 1949.'³¹

INDUSTRIALIZATION

Prior to 1949 Sinkiang's industrial base was virtually non-existent, consisting of about a dozen ramshackle enterprises. In 1960 the Chinese claimed to have built 1,513 'modern factories' in the two years 1958 and 1959, compared with 259 factories and mines between 1949 and 1957.³² In spite of this seemingly impressive growth the situation five years later is obscure and confused, with one Chinese source referring to the fact that 'to-day there are large, medium sized and small mining and industrial enterprises by the thousands',³³ whilst another report states that only '550 new, modern factories have sprung up in the region'.³⁴ This last source refers to oil, iron and steel, machine-building, electrical power, coal, textile, and chemical industries.³⁵

During the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57) five main industrial zones emerged, centred in order of importance (based on the number of factories built) upon Kashgar, Kuldja (Ili District), Urumchi, Hami, and Sharasume (Altai District). Field noted early in 1961 that Kashgar, the Ili and the Altai sectors are all located within the border area, and that Soviet and Chinese industrial

³⁰ NCNA, 7th January 1964.

³¹ *Peking Review*, 27th March 1964.

³² NCNA, Peking, 5th April 1960.


³³ *China Pictorial*, October 1965.

³⁴ NCNA, Peking, 20th September 1965.

³⁵ NCNA, 18th December 1965.

complexes were moving closer together, an indication 'that such mutual fears and antagonisms as may exist are being kept within bounds'.³⁶ Since 1960, however, the pace of Chinese industrialization in general has been reduced greatly, although a renewed upward trend was reported by the Chinese in 1964 and 1965; Sino-Soviet relations have shown a marked hardening; and the long projected Lanchow-Sinkiang railway has still not been linked with the Russian railway network. In the light of these developments Field's judgment was perhaps premature.

Two dislocated manufacturing belts running roughly in a west to east direction may be distinguished. The more important belt lies north of the Tienshan, and includes Kuldja, Shihhotzu, Urumchi and Hami. The second, to the south of the divide, and forming a south-western crescent, includes Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan (see Map 4). There is surprisingly little reference to the



Map 4.

SOURCES: Chinese, various.

1. Iron and Steel. 2. Machinery. 3. Cotton. 4. Linen. 5. Woollens. 6. Silk. 7. Carpets. 8. Cement. 9. Food Processing. 10. Consumer Goods. 11. Handicrafts, 12. Chemicals. 13. Oil Refining. 14. Coal Mining. 15. Tanning. 16. Electric Power. 17. Timber. 18. Paper. 19. Sugar Refining.

³⁶ A. R. Field, 'Strategic developments in Sinkiang', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1961, pp. 312-318.

area immediately south of the Tianshan beginning at Aqsu in the west and stretching eastwards towards the Lop Nor region. Urumchi, the Ili district, Hami and Kashgar continue to expand, but there is no news of the Sharasume area. Since 1958 Shihhotzu has grown rapidly and exhibits a varied base.

In a period of 14 years, industry's share by value of Sinkiang's total production increased from 1.53% in 1949 to over 50% in 1963,³⁷ based upon local mineral, agricultural and pastoral wealth. The Chinese claim that 'more than 2,000 industrial products are made, compared with a mere eleven' in 1949.³⁸ Light industry has shown the most notable expansion, and a wide range of consumer goods is now produced. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4. *Selected consumer goods produced in Sinkiang*

*Batteries	Pharmaceuticals
Cigarettes	Porcelain, Pottery
*Cotton cloth	*Refined sugar
Electrical bulbs	Rubber footwear
*Enamelware	*Salt
Glassware	Silk fabrics
*Leather goods	*Soap
*Matches	Thermos flasks
Paper	Woollens

SOURCE. NCNA, 4th July 1962; 12th July 1963; 18th December 1965.

* Sinkiang is self-sufficient in products so marked. (Peking home service, 28th September 1964; NCNA, Urumchi, 13th September 1965.)

Many factories were developed from extremely primitive beginnings, as in the case of the Urumchi Enamelware Factory. A few years ago this was a small tinsmith's co-operative equipped with 105 hammers and 41 pairs of scissors. 'A certain amount of equipment was bought with government money, but the factory was largely built up by the workers themselves', and now produces well over a million pieces a year.³⁹ Processing plants for meat, milk, fruit, wool, cotton, hides and timber are also important. For example, 'there was not a single plant processing dairy products in Sinkiang six years ago. Now almost every pastoral area has its own powdered milk plant. Dried milk is supplied to other parts of China, apart from meeting local needs.'⁴⁰

The growth of light industry is acting as a population stabilizer, and this is even more true of the heavy industrial plants which are partially dependent upon skilled labour from the eastern provinces. More than 200,000 workers from these provinces are aiding industrial construction, although a new minority skilled worker elite numbering over 40,000 has been trained.⁴¹ Industries

³⁷ *Peking Review*, 18th October 1963.

³⁸ NCNA, Urumchi, 16th September 1965. Compare: 'Sinkiang now manufactures more than 1,000 varieties of industrial products' (NCNA, 29th April 1964).

³⁹ NCNA, Urumchi, 13th September 1965.

⁴⁰ NCNA, Urumchi, 12th July 1963.

⁴¹ NCNA, Urumchi, 8th September 1963. 'There are more than 50,000 industrial workers and more than 3,000 engineers and technicians of minority nationalities in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region' (Peking Radio for Taiwan, 2nd May 1964). Women workers form an important part of the labour force, especially in textiles, where they number over 10,000, including Han Chinese (NCNA, Urumchi, 6th March 1965).

established in this former industrial vacuum include: iron and steel (Urumchi, Hami, Kuldja, Kashgar); machine building⁴² (Urumchi, Hami, Kuldja, Kashgar, Shihhotzu); textiles (cotton, linen, silk, wool) (Urumchi, cotton; Shihhotzu, woollens, cotton; Kuldja, woollens; Kashgar, cotton; Yarkand, silk; Khotan, silk, carpets; and Aqsu); cement (Urumchi, Hami, Kashgar); food processing (Urumchi, Hami, Shihhotzu, Kuldja, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan); consumer goods (Urumchi, Shihhotzu, Kuldja); handicrafts (Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan); chemicals (Urumchi, Shihhotzu); oil refining (Tushantze, Kuldja); coal-mining (Urumchi, Hami, Kuldja); tanning (Urumchi, Kuldja); power,⁴³ both thermal and hydro-electric (Urumchi, Hami, Shihhotzu, Kuldja, Kashgar); timber (Urumchi, Shihhotzu); paper (Shihhotzu); and sugar refining (Shihhotzu). Although a partial picture of industrial location patterns can be pieced together, an almost total lack of production figures since 1960 makes it impossible to give any indication of the size of industrial undertakings.

Sinkiang now exports manufactured goods as well as raw materials both to other parts of China and overseas. At the 1965 Canton Fair fine quality wool, together with a curious selection of products which included muskrat and marmot furs, bear's gall, deer's antler, raisins, melons and preserved fruits, are said to have attracted the attention of foreign businessmen. Significantly the Chinese claim that 'in addition to its traditional range of export items, Sinkiang is now also exporting chemicals and textiles manufactured in brand-new industrial enterprises developed since liberation'.⁴⁴

Initially poor communications hampered the growth of industry. Expansion was aided greatly by the building of the Lanchow-Sinkiang railway which was originally planned to link up with the Russian railway network, but which in all probability has advanced no further west than the oil-refining centre of Tushantze. Apart from its immense strategic significance in binding Sinkiang more securely to China proper, whilst for the time being at any rate avoiding further contact with the Soviet Union, the Lanchow-Sinkiang railway has helped in industrial construction, making it easier to transport machinery, equipment, workers and settlers, as well as providing an outlet for raw materials, oil and other urgently needed minerals, and agricultural produce, especially food and cotton. It is now planned to link the capital with areas south of the Tienshan by building a railway line between Urumchi and Kashgar.

Meanwhile the road network has been much improved both north and south of the Tienshan, providing connections with the Soviet Union, Tibet and the eastern provinces. The Chinese claim that all the 89 counties and cities are now linked by road; 'even almost inaccessible and secluded mountain villages are now open to transport'.⁴⁵ If this is true then the remoter areas are likely to

⁴² For example, the Chinese make the remarkable claim that there are 'farm tool plants operating in 78 out of the 83 cities and counties' (NCNA, 29th April 1964).

⁴³ Electricity supplies both industry and agriculture (irrigation, drainage, food processing, etc.), as well as domestic consumers. There are 300 plants of varying size, with a combined generating capacity five times as great as in 1955 (NCNA, Urumchi, 22nd September 1965).

⁴⁴ NCNA, Canton, 5th November 1965.

⁴⁵ NCNA, Urumchi, 23rd September 1965.

be served by only the most rudimentary of seasonal tracks. Sinkiang is said to have 'tens of thousands of motor vehicles'⁴⁶ and 'a dozen motor vehicle repair plants, which also mass-produce spare parts'.⁴⁷ Also, postal and tele-communications have been greatly extended.⁴⁸

An international air route joins Alma Ata with Urumchi, and the capital with the main towns, Hami in the east, Kashgar and Hotien in the south, Kuldja in the west, and Karamai in the north. Sinkiang now has an outlet to the Arctic Ocean, owing to Russian work on the Upper Irtysh, and 'plans have been drafted by Kazakh scientists for the construction of a 620-mile waterway linking the Ili, Chu and Syr-Darya rivers, thus affording Sinkiang a connection by water with the Aral Sea'.⁴⁹ The expansion of a transport network in Sinkiang will play an increasingly important role in the re-distribution of settlement.

Despite the development of industry in Sinkiang, a perplexing situation has emerged wherein there is conflict between China's ambition to achieve a more rational national distribution of industry, by establishing inland bases safe from conventional naval attacks, nearer to the sources of raw materials, and more evenly spaced, and the increasingly disturbing strategic implications of siting industry near the border with the Soviet Union.

AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL DEVELOPMENT

It is clear that both the great extension of pastoral⁵⁰ and especially agricultural land through reclamation, and the particular form of collective organization employed, have had pronounced effects upon population distribution.

The area of cultivated land has been more than doubled, with an area about the size of Wales converted into farmland. 'Out of wilderness 28 million *mow* has been carved',⁵¹ whilst the irrigated area is now three times that of 1949.⁵² State farms are most important in China's border regions. Sinkiang's 149 state farms and the Production and Construction Corps of the People's Liberation Army play a major role in reclamation,⁵³ and particularly in the increased production of grains and cotton; large-scale farming methods are practised, and it is claimed that 10,000 tractors are at work in the region. Half Sinkiang's total crop area is under winter or spring wheat. Maize, rice,

⁴⁶ NCNA, Urumchi, 21st September 1965.

⁴⁷ NCNA, Urumchi, 23rd September 1965.

⁴⁸ NCNA, Urumchi, 25th September 1965.

⁴⁹ W. A. D. Jackson, *The Russo-Chinese Borderlands*, New York, 1962, p. 77.

⁵⁰ Livestock numbers have increased 2.5 times since 1949 (NCNA, Urumchi, 20th September 1965). Lo, *op. cit.*, pp. 93 and 97, gives the following livestock figures: 1950, 12 million; 1954, 17 million; 1958, 22 million.

⁵¹ *Peking Review*, 8th November 1963; 1 *mow* equals 0.1647 acres. The same figure is mentioned some two years later (*China Pictorial*, October 1965).

⁵² NCNA, 17th September 1963.

⁵³ NCNA, 3rd August 1963. At the First Session of the Third People's Congress early in 1965 General Tao Chih-yueh described how 'with rifle in one hand and spade in the other, the officers and men . . . safeguarded the security of the frontiers of the motherland and helped in the socialist construction by engaging in agriculture during the past few years' (NCNA, Peking, 2nd January 1965).

kaoliang and millet are also important. With high temperatures and a long frost-free season (220 days), the Tarim Basin and the Turfan Depression especially are ideal for cotton. Fruit (accounting for 4% of the total cultivated area),⁵⁴ oil-bearing crops, tobacco, sugar beet, beekeeping, sericulture, fishing and hunting provide additional sources of income.

Saifudin stated that in 1958 grain production had increased almost three times and cotton output eleven times compared with 1949.⁵⁵ Seven years later the Chinese refer to the fact that grain production is at more than twice the 1949 level, with cotton increasing ten times.⁵⁶ These figures are coloured by the inflated claims for 1958, but also may indicate partial stagnation in the agricultural sector since 1960.

The Chinese claim that Sinkiang is now largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs and this has allowed for an extension of settlement into the reclamation areas. The wide dispersal of the major reclamation centres of Altai, Aqsu, Hami, the Ili River, Kashgar, Kawako, Khotan (Hotien), the Kurbantongut Desert, the Manass River, the Tarim River, Shihhotzu, and Urumchi results in a pocket-like formation of settlement, which exhibits an ever-quickening tendency to coalesce.

These embryonic, pioneer urban clusters are described by the Chinese as follows: 'Several dozen towns have sprung up on Sinkiang's revitalized land, some with cotton mills and sugar refineries; all have theatres, hospitals, post offices and other public services and recreational facilities'.⁵⁷ Numerous smaller settlements have been established also. For example, in the Khotan (Hotien) area alone 40 villages were set up by the 45 people's communes between 1959 and 1961, and these are in turn linked with over 100 small new settlements nearby.⁵⁸ Four years later more information was provided describing how 42 new oases, covering over 53,000 hectares along the southern fringe of the Takla Makan, had been carved out. 'Like great tongues of emerald the oases thrust north as far as 100 kilometres into the desert.' In 1959 alone, 60,000 Uighur peasants set out northwards into the desert. Formerly the Khotan area was unable to support its 800,000 population; now it has a grain surplus, and this in a region with only 1.5 inches (30-40 mm.) of rain a year (comparable to the Death Valley of California).⁵⁹

In the last three years 'more than 1,000 new villages have been constructed by the communes'; currently, 260 new villages are under construction throughout the region.⁶⁰ If these new villages house between 100 and 500 people each, permanent homes for between 26,000 and 130,000 people will be provided, be they settlers from the east, immobilized nomads, or communized peasants extending agricultural land in virgin zones. Even greater numbers would be resettled if the villages are on the scale of the new Kazakh settlements (see p. 109); these may have as many as

⁵⁴ NCNA, Urumchi, 26th September 1965.

⁵⁵ *Chung-kuo Nung-pao*, 8th October 1959.

⁵⁶ *China Pictorial*, October 1965. Elsewhere it was claimed that grain production increased threefold between 1949 and 1964, whilst cotton output rose ninefold (*Ta-kung Pao*, Peking, 30th September 1965).

⁵⁷ *Peking Review*, 8th November 1963.

⁵⁸ NCNA, Urumchi, 10th December 1961.

⁵⁹ NCNA, Urumchi, 17th September 1965.

⁶⁰ NCNA, Urumchi, 2nd April 1966 and 24th August 1965.

2,200 each, so that this would involve accommodation for considerably larger numbers of up to 572,000.

Another account describes a new village, So-tun-pu-la-ko, which lies south of the Ili and which was built through the co-operation of Kazakhs, Uighurs and Hans. 'A new socialist village has appeared. . . . Streets and lanes in the village are neat and orderly. There are trees everywhere. Even shops, a hospital, a bank, a post office, and a school are available in the village. After dark, the whole mountain village is brightly illuminated by electric lights.'⁶¹

What remains to be seen with regards to the extension of agricultural and pastoral lands is whether there is an adequate water base to support irrigation and settlement; and whether existing and projected water conservancy projects will prove sufficient and reliable, or alternatively, whether in fact the Chinese will push their schemes beyond critical margins and suffer from disasters similar to those met with during American expansion into arid lands. If the Chinese are successful in gaining a permanent foothold in the dry lands, on the scale of the operation now in progress, and if they avoid the creation of unproductive bad lands, then this might prove a unique achievement. On the basis of existing information, and without extensive field work, it is impossible to predict the result with certainty. The challenge is tremendous; the outcome is vital, but very much in the balance.

The Chinese are approaching the problem of water deficiency as it relates to the extension of agricultural land in two ways. First, with water conservancy and irrigation projects, which vary greatly in size. For example, the Mokuhu reservoir on the Manass River, completed in December 1958, has a storage capacity of 158 million cubic metres,⁶² but much of the work consists of many small reservoirs and canals. Secondly, with multi-purpose schemes such as the Kash River project,⁶³ which combine water conservancy, irrigation and hydro-electric power production. Both types of project may utilize supplementary underground water resources as well as glacial meltwater.⁶⁴

Similarly the settling of pastoral peoples has wrought striking population changes, according to the Chinese. Four of the minority groups are traditionally pastoralists: the Kazakhs, Khalkhas, Mongolians and Tadjiks, but the Chinese claim that since 1949 'they have gradually taken up farm work too'.⁶⁵ The Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou*, for instance, has a population of more than 1 million, over half of them Kazakhs,⁶⁶ and the Chinese claim that 'nine years of regional autonomy have brought a settled life for all Kazakh nomads. The People's Government has helped them set up

⁶¹ *Kung-jen Jih-pao*, Peking, 27th September 1965.

⁶² *Ten Great Years*, Peking, 1960, p. 68.

⁶³ NCNA, Ining, 6th November 1965.

⁶⁴ Michael Freeberne, 'Glacial meltwater resources in China', *The Geographical Journal*, 131, 1 (March 1965), pp. 57-60.

⁶⁵ NCNA, Urumchi, 1st October 1965.

⁶⁶ NCNA, Ining, 20th September 1963. Compare: 'It is impossible to distinguish between the effects of inaccuracy in Chinese Communist census figures and the impact of migration, but it is worth noting that Theodor Shabad, *China's Changing Map* (New York, Praeger, 1956), notes the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou* population as 770,000 "of whom the Kazakhs are a bare majority", while *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 21st June 1959, . . . gives the *Chou* population as "over 800,000" of whom Kazakhs number only 43.4 per cent' (Allen S. Whiting, 'Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet Relations', *The China Quarterly*, July-September 1960, p. 35).

thousands of new settlements. . . .⁶⁷ This veritable transformation is described in the following idyllic, Arcadian terms:

In the past (before 1949) the Ili River was given to sorrow and lamentation day and night . . . (but now) how cheerful it is. Frolicsome carp are gliding in the stream, while steam boats, displacing over 30 tons each, shuttle back and forth for the first time. The sun rises and sets. Then out comes the moon. Day after day and night after night, the songs are wafted over both banks of the river:

"The green pastureland is irrigated by the melted snow from the Altai. Our happy life depends on the planning of Chairman Mao."

and

"The cheerful Ili River like a playful girl quietly engages in endless singing in day time and at night. Its tunes spread far and wide."⁶⁸

Within the last few months the Chinese have stated that 'most' (not all) 'of the Kazakh and Mongolian herdsmen have ended their nomadic life'. They live in houses built by their communes, in 300 new settlements, 'each with dozens of families', built near adjacent pastures and forage and grain farms throughout the Ili Kazakh grasslands; 'there are schools, shops, clinics, and veterinary services'.⁶⁹ Assuming a combined Kazakh and Mongol population of at least 668,000 (i.e. 500,000 Kazakhs plus 168,000 Mongols), this would mean that the average size of the new settlements is in the order of 2,200 inhabitants, a figure difficult to equate 'with dozens of families'.

The resurgence of population in Altai, an area of some 200,000 square kilometres and one of the three districts of the *Chou*, is attributed to greatly improved medical facilities and standards of living, in a stereotyped summary: 'Steady impoverishment, emigration and a heavy death rate due to the atrocious misrule of the reactionaries reduced the population from 100,000 to 50,000 before liberation. With liberation and people's rule, the population has grown from 50,000 in 1949 to the present 110,000.'⁷⁰

A novel form of state housing has been introduced in the Altai area for the small tents used by the nomads have been replaced by:

'commodious felt yurts. In the past the people wore sheepskins all the year round; now they wear clothes of all kinds, even made of woollen and silk fabrics. Whoever saw nomad households in the past containing sewing machines, clocks, radios, flashlights, and pots and pans made of aluminium? Now there are plenty of them. . . . (There are) now eight well-equipped, modern hospitals in the county towns and large numbers of clinics and maternity centres in the people's communes. . . . (Behind) these changes are big economic gains. The total stock of animals in the Altai has increased six times since 1949 to 2.6 millions. There was practically no agriculture there before liberation but now there are more than enough locally grown grains. The whole district did not have a single middle school; now it has 12 middle schools and 96 primary schools.'⁷¹

⁶⁷ NCNA, Urumchi, 6th September 1963.

⁶⁸ *Kung-jen Jih-pao*, Peking, 27th April 1961.

⁶⁹ NCNA, Urumchi, 20th September 1965.

⁷⁰ *Peking Review*, 27th September 1963.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

GEO-STRATEGIC FACTORS AND SETTLEMENT

Sinkiang has been variously characterized as 'the geographical centre of gravity between the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific and Indian Oceans';⁷² as China's 'soft under-belly';⁷³ as a 'pawn or pivot';⁷⁴ and as 'the future marshalling yard of Central Asia'.⁷⁵ None of these several roles is entirely obsolete.

Under no circumstances is it possible to agree with Mehnert's thesis that: 'To-day Sinkiang can scarcely be regarded as a seriously disturbing element in the relationship between Moscow and Peking',⁷⁶ especially in view of the history of Sino-Russian conflict in Sinkiang, and the fact that throughout the 1950's there was persistent and at times serious minority unrest in Sinkiang. The strong ethnic affinity of Sinkiang's population with that of adjacent Soviet territories (see Table 1) must influence worsening Sino-Soviet relations, as former co-operation is replaced by deepening tension, and as the ethnic, cultural and religious ties of the peoples on both sides of the border are affected by large numbers of immigrant Han Chinese. In these respects the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou* is an especially tender spot.

As recently as 1960 Soviet aid to Sinkiang was gratefully acknowledged.

'The Soviet Union, our friendly ally, has given sincere and disinterested aid to the (People's Liberation Army) . . . during the past ten years. . . . Apart from giving large supplies of first-class technical equipment . . . the Soviet Union also sent to Sinkiang scores of accomplished specialists in farming, water conservancy, machine-building, soil (improvement), engineering, and animal husbandry to give technical guidance.'⁷⁷

Since then conditions have become so strained that in April and May 1962 there was a considerable migration out of Sinkiang and into neighbouring Kazakhstan. The Chinese referred to the incident only as late as September 1963. The Soviet leaders were charged with having 'enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. . . . This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries'.⁷⁸ Without denying these accusations, the Russians issued a statement on 21st September 1963 claiming that during 1962 alone the Chinese violated the border on more than 5,000 occasions. Early in 1964 the Russians charged the Chinese with a similar number of border violations during 1963.

Unrest continued throughout 1964 and into 1965, with an impressive build-up of troops on both sides of the frontier. The Russians were accused of 'trying to poison the relations among the various nationalities of (the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou*) in order to undermine (China's) national unity . . . constantly creating border incidents and attempting to disrupt production in the border areas'.⁷⁹ Elsewhere these charges were presented in some detail to delegates attending the second

⁷² Owen Lattimore, in his introduction to Martin R. Norins, *Gate to Asia: Sinkiang*, 1944, p. 11.

⁷³ *The Times*, London, 1st August 1962.

⁷⁴ Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, 1958.

⁷⁵ Tibor Mende, *China and her Shadow*, 1961, p. 214.

⁷⁶ Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, 1963, p. 273.

⁷⁷ *Sinkiang Jih-pao*, Urumchi, 16th February 1960.

⁷⁸ Joint article by the editorial departments of *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Hung Chi*, 6th September 1963.

⁷⁹ *Peking Review*, 11th September 1964.

session of the Fourth People's Congress of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou* held in Kuldja between the 26th and 29th August 1964. The Chinese account is of considerable interest.

The Chairman of the *Chou*, Irhali, described the political and economic progress, declaring 'that these achievements had been made in the course of struggle against sabotage by the Khrushchev revisionist clique', and that 'the harder this clique worked to make trouble the more it exposed itself in all its ugliness. . . . Irhali said that the Khrushchev revisionist clique had not accepted defeat. It was attempting new subversive and sabotage activities. He said:

'Since April of this year in particular, it has been using its broadcasting services, newspapers, magazines and other means of propaganda in a strenuous effort to spread lies slandering the leadership of the Communist Party of China. It has been attacking Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of our people of various nationalities, distorting the history of this autonomous *Chou*, and trying to poison the relations among the various nationalities of this area in order to undermine our national unity. Still more outrageous is the fact that the Khrushchev revisionist clique has been creating constant border incidents and attempting to disrupt our production work in the border areas. We must enhance our vigilance against the ambitions behind these criminal activities of the Khrushchev revisionist clique. We must firmly smash all its schemes of sabotage,' Irhali concluded'.⁸⁰

Although these charges were aimed at the 'Khrushchev revisionist clique' in particular, Russia's new leaders were also warned against harbouring designs on this 'sacred, inalienable part' of China, when delegates attending the Regional Peoples Congress in Urumchi declared: 'We do not want an inch of land from others but will absolutely not permit others to encroach upon one inch of our land. Any ignoble scheme aiming to divide the unity of our fatherland and undermine the great solidarity among all our nationalities will be doomed to end in shameful defeat.'⁸¹

Quite clearly, however, the Russians view the situation in a rather different light. They fear that the Chinese are anxious not merely to preserve the *status quo*, and in fact see Chinese activity in Sinkiang as an extension of an 'absurd demand for a re-examination of the state boundary of the U.S.S.R. in favour of China'.⁸²

Because of these and similar pressures, the attitude of the nomads towards permanent settlement remains in a state of flux. It is thought that within the last four years or so many tens of thousands of nomads, mainly Kazakhs, have crossed the border into the Soviet Union; in some instances it has been probably a case of crossing and re-crossing the frontier.

Due to the restlessness and mobility of the indigenous population and in order to protect her interests in the area, as well as relieve extreme population pressures in congested eastern provinces,⁸³ Chinese attempts to settle and develop Sinkiang may well be intensified. One unsubstantiated report refers to a huge migration into Sinkiang of 40 million people.⁸⁴ Even with their predilection for long marches, it is clear that this account is grossly exaggerated; present lines of communication

⁸⁰ NCNA, Ining, 2nd September 1964.

⁸¹ NCNA, Urumchi, 5th November 1964.

⁸² B. N. Ponomaryov (Editor), *The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class* (reference in NCNA, Moscow, 28th February 1965).

⁸³ Michael Freeberne, 'Birth control in China', *Population Studies*, 18, 1 (July 1964), pp. 5-16.

⁸⁴ Geoffrey Thursby, *Sunday Express*, 11th October 1964.

and reception facilities are totally inadequate to cope with such an influx. At the same time, it is possible that the report is indicative of a great new effort to redistribute China's population internally, as well as to counter threats to her hold over Sinkiang.

In any event recent Chinese statements exhibit a buoyant, almost truculent mood. On the themes of unity and production they claim: 'An extremely favourable situation prevails in the Region and victories have been scored in the three revolutionary movements of class struggle, production struggle and scientific experiments. The unity of the Party and of all nationalities is unprecedentedly high, and the unification of the fatherland and the proletarian dictatorship are more consolidated than ever before. . . . In 1965, we must energetically organize a new upsurge in industrial and agricultural production while developing the socialist education movement in rural and urban areas.'⁸⁵

Elaborating upon the importance of the socialist education movement, which was launched in 1964 and 'which greatly raised class awareness and stepped up socialist ideas', the *Sinkiang Jih-pao* in a thinly disguised reference to the Soviet Union stated that through the movement 'we can consolidate our socialist positions and the dictatorship of the proletariat, *destroy the social foundations of revisionism . . . and further develop production and build the frontier of our mother land. . . .* It is also necessary to implement further . . . Chairman Mao's instructions on putting the work of the people's militia on a solid basis organizationally, politically and militarily. *It is essential to strengthen class education among the people's militia so that they would dare to fight and win. We must always put politics into command and learn hard from the PLA. . . . We must arm ourselves as well as the masses of working people and cadres with the thinking of Mao Tse-tung*'⁸⁶

As the Russians initially refrained, in the main, from public polemic after Khrushchev's fall, they failed to rise to the bait. Strangely enough, China, too, largely avoided fighting talk with particular reference to Sinkiang in the first half of 1965, only to resume with blistering attacks as the tenth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Autonomous Region approached. The following Chinese and Russian quotations illustrate just how deep the waters of Sino-Soviet discontent run, and how both countries attach the greatest importance to current events within Sinkiang.

Amongst those who condemned the activities of the Khrushchev revisionists were Saifudin, Chairman of the Region; Wang En-mao, First Secretary of the Sinkiang C.C.P.'s Regional Committee; Vice-Premier Ho Lung, Head of the Central Delegation attending the anniversary celebrations; and Hsieh Fu-min, Chairman of the N.P.C. Nationalities Committee. Significantly, Hsieh was the only one to refer to a 'handful' of 'local' nationalists and other counter-revolutionaries working in the service of revisionism';⁸⁷ the other three all associated revisionism with imperialism. For instance, Wang En-mao 'condemned the Khrushchev revisionist clique for its subversive and disruptive activities in Sinkiang which, he said, "are an important part of the joint anti-China

⁸⁵ *Sinkiang Jih-pao*, Urumchi, 1st January 1965.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Italics added.

⁸⁷ NCNA, Peking, 2nd October 1965.

⁸⁸ *Peking Review*, 8th October 1965.

scheme for the Khrushchev revisionist clique, the United States imperialists and the Indian reactionaries”'.⁸⁸

In a lengthy article published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Saifudin furnished more precise details of the alleged crimes of the revisionists. These ‘renegades from communism and lackeys of imperialism’ were charged with ‘harbouring a deep-seated hatred’, ‘carrying out constant subversive and sabotage activities’, and ‘unceasingly spreading rumours and slanders and making virulent attacks on us’.⁸⁹ Moreover, the Khrushchev revisionists ‘slander our (socialist) revolution as “alien to Marxism-Leninism”, a “chauvinistic movement” and a “movement at the expense of the minority nationalities”’; the revisionists ‘slanderosly charge that Sinkiang (has seen) “no development in industry” after liberation, that “its agriculture has gone bankrupt”, and that “the people’s livelihood there is in a state of poverty”’. Finally, the revisionists ‘slanderosly allege that Sinkiang is China’s “colony”, that a policy of “deception and national discrimination” was practised, etc., in an attempt to undermine and disrupt our national unity’. Saifudin warned, however, that ‘whatever subversions and sabotage the Khrushchev revisionists may attempt in the future they will not succeed and will only meet with still more shameful defeats’.⁹⁰

As if to underline this last assertion the Chinese now characterize Sinkiang as a ‘solid bastion’. ‘The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is a fortified frontier and a great wall in defence of our motherland. In the storm of struggle, it will for ever stand majestically on the western frontier of our motherland.’⁹¹ Nevertheless, Chinese policies in the area have suffered a severe shock from Russian attitudes and conduct. In contrast to the rapid industrialization envisaged in the First and Second Five-Year Plan periods (1953–62), there may have been a drastic rethinking in terms of projected economic development, although Chinese sources are contradictory. On the one hand, it is stated that during the Third Five-Year Plan (1966–70) ‘Sinkiang will not be taken as a selected area for developing industry’. Instead, industrial progress is to be held in check: ‘we must energetically develop agricultural production so as to usher in a great industrial development in Sinkiang at a later date, and support the socialist construction in Northwest China and other parts of the country’. Whilst improving ‘the living conditions of the people of various nationalities in Sinkiang’ it is also necessary to ‘be prepared for possible war and calamity’.⁹² On the other hand, concerning the future growth of industry another news item describes the ‘sound foundations’ already laid ‘in experience and technical personnel as well as in the material sense, for rapidly forging ahead in the Third Five-Year Plan’.⁹³

World attention was focused dramatically on this westernmost part of China by the explosion of China’s first atom bomb, near to Lake Lop Nor, on 16th October 1964, but it is not solely as a nuclear testing ground that Sinkiang will remain a region of critical importance.

⁸⁸ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking, 30th September 1965.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ NCNA, Urumchi, 30th September 1965, and NCNA, Peking, 29th September, 1965.

⁹² Urumchi regional radio service, 5th December 1965.

⁹³ NCNA, Urumchi, 17th April 1966.

Summary Statistics on Indenture and Associated Migration affecting the West Indies, 1834—1918

G. W. ROBERTS AND J. BYRNE

By comparison with the major shifts of population from Europe to North America, immigration into the West Indies represents a relatively minor movement. Although it lasted for about eighty years, the total inflow into the Caribbean which it ensured amounted to no more than 536,000, which is only 2% of the total entering the United States from Europe during the period 1831 to 1913.¹ Nevertheless the intricacies of its organization, the many ethnic strains it involved and its decisive impact on population growth and demographic characteristics of the Caribbean, make this migration of consequence from the demographic standpoint and of significance for the history of the region.

The early control exercised over immigration into the West Indies, which to some degree was associated with the fact that much of it was effected through the expenditure of public funds, has meant that fairly reliable records of its extent have been kept during the post-slavery period. These records did not extend to inter-Caribbean migration (apart from the movement from Barbados to British Guiana this aspect of West Indian migration was not covered), nor did they include emigration to foreign countries which developed on a considerable scale after the 1880's. Nevertheless, available information affords a reasonable picture of indenture immigration from India, Madeira, China, Africa and other places, which, it was contended, was essential to the maintenance of the plantation labour force. While the great majority of immigrants from India, China and Africa evidently entered the region under schemes of indenture, probably few of the small number of Europeans fall under this category, indeed, persons from Madeira coming to British Guiana after 1858 were unencumbered by any system of indenture.

Some limitations to the available data must be noted. There is no unbroken series covering Indian immigration, and consequently problems arise in seeking to splice series in order to secure a picture of the entire course of the movement. Also inconsistencies are found in the composition of the migrants included in some of the series. Thus in later years three classes of immigrants might have been included in the data published by the Immigration Agent General of British Guiana: those entering under formal indenture; those paying their own passage from India; and casuals, that is persons coming on their own from neighbouring West Indian islands. The last-mentioned are described as 'not immigrants according to legal definition . . . but as they are precluded from obtaining employment without certification from this Department, it has been

¹ Between 1831 and 1913 immigration into the United States from Europe amounted to 27,855,000, according to *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*, pp. 33-34, Series B 305, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1949; quoted in Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1954.