HAN RULE IN CHINA'S FAR WEST:

A STUDY OF THE XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPS

Dr. Donald H. McMillen
Griffith University

Third National Conference
Asian Studies Association of Australia
Brisbane, 24-29 August 1980.

The Red Flag flutters atop the Tianshan,
Like birds flapping their wings in the skies,
Behind the Red Flag come the warriors of Mao Zedong,
Thousands and tens of thousands of them, courageous, resolute,
Where the Red Flag is planted,
There the people are liberated.

An important symbol of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) efforts to control and integrate the strategic and largely non-Han borderlands of the People's Republic of China (PRC) after liberation in 1949 has been an organization called the Production and Construction Corps (PCC). This hybrid military-civilian organization came to exist in many provinces and regions of China by the early 1970s. This paper will trace the evolution of the PCC in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, as it was in this far western region that the first Corps organization was officially established in China in 1954. Before any consideration can be given to the topic, however, it is absolutely necessary to understand the basic setting and historical conditions of this remote region.

Xinjiang: The Place and the People. Xinjiang is the largest political unit of the PRC, constituting one-sixth of the nation's total area. It is located along China's distant western frontier, and is bounded by the Soviet Union (for some 3,000 km.) in the west, the Mongolian People's Republic in the northwest, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir and Tibet in the south. To the east are the provinces of Qinghai and Gansu. While the region is virtually surrounded by high mountains, a series of strategic passes and low-lying gaps have traditionally afforded relatively easy access into Xinjiang from the west. In the east, on the other hand, the only easy route between the region and China Proper was through the Gansu Corridor, which in more recent years has become vulnerable to interdiction from Soviet-dominated Mongolia. Moreover, the distance by road/rail between the regional capital, Urumqi, and Beijing is over 3,000 km.

Xinjiang consists of three major subregions, the Dzungarian Basin in the north, the Tianshan Mountains in the centre and the larger Tarim Basin in the south. The region's most striking physical feature is the harsh Takla Makan Desert in the south. The numerous oases in Xinjiang traditionally supported 90 per cent of the population, which engaged in agriculture or trade. The major oases, such as Hami, Kazgar, Urumqi, and Aksu were important points along the famous "Silk Roads" that linked China via both the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins to Europe. In fact, the alignment of Xinjiang's current east-west transportation network has largely remained identical to these traditional routes. The vast steppelands of the region have traditionally supported nomadic pastoralists, such as the Kazakhs and Tadzhiks. The vicissitudes of Xinjiang's climate, ranging from drought to

flooding and from frost and hailstorms to dry, searing sandstorms, have always plagued agriculture and animal husbandry, as have insect pests, animal and crop diseases, and soil conditions.

Xianjing has abundant natural resources, but systematic exploitation of these potential riches by China began on a large scale only after 1949. The main factors that had previously hampered the Chinese included: (1) the vast distance and inadequate transportation facilities between Xinjiang and China Proper; (2) the greater accessibility from Russia, which in the modern period had allowed the Russians to actively intervene both politically and economically in regional affairs and assume a virtual monopoly over its trade and the exclusive right to exploit many of its natural riches; (3) China's lack of sufficient capital, equipment and technical expertise; and (4) virtually uninterrupted rebellion within Xinjiang and civil war in China Proper. The region's key natural resources include petroleum at Karamai, Dushanzi and Wusu, coal near Urumqi and Hami, and radioactive elements in both the southern and northern mountains. Iron, tungsten and molybdenum, copper, lead, zinc, silver, gold, and jade, as well as timber and furs, are also found there in some quantity.

Ethnically, the population of Xinjiang was over 90 per cent non-Han prior to 1949. The twelve national minority groups in the region are the Uygurs, Kazakhs, Hui, Mongols and Daurs, Kirghiz, Manchus and Sibos, Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Russians and Tatars. It is of no little significance that many of them are ethnically akin to the peoples of Soviet Central Asia. At the time of liberation some 75 per cent of Xinjiang's peoples were Muslim, and a vast majority spoke Turkic languages and used the Arabic script.

In 1949 the total population of the region was around 4 million. After liberation, as shall be discussed later, the CCP authorities undertook a massive program of Han resettlement from China Proper. By late 1979, the regional population was said to be 11 million, about half of whom were Han![1] These figures suggest that, at the minimum, there was a rough parity in numbers between the Han people and the Uygurs.

In 1949 Xinjiang was a province whose historical past had left many important legacies. In general, these legacies constituted obstacles to the integration of this vast, inhospitable frontier region with the new Communist regime. The long tradition of ethnic and religious animosities among the native peoples, and between them and the non-Muslim Han people from China Proper, had provided the conditions for continued mistrust, resentment, and turmoil in the region. As a result, Xinjing had remained largely an autonomous appendage of the Chinese state in modern times. It

became the subject of a great deal of outside influence and penetration, especially from Russia. After the mid-nineteenth century, Russia was often able to take advantage of local ethnic unrest without much fear of intervention from a weakening Qing authority in China. By terms of the treaties it signed with the Manchus, and later with local Chinese warlords in Xinjiang whose power rested upon her military backing (such as Sheng Shicai from 1933 to 1943), Russia gained vast tracts of territory in Chinese Turkestan, numerous diplomatic privileges, wide-ranging and monopolistic economic and trade concessions, and the right to exclusively develop and exploit the province's rich natural resources. For over a century this Russian influence grew until the province became a virtual Soviet satellite. Many of the border areas in the province became almost wholly oriented toward Russia, especially the strategically located and resource-rich Yili area, which in the late 1940s was the centre of a Soviet-backed separatist regime called the "Eastern Turkestnan Republic" headed by non (anti)-Han nationals.

Although the Chinese central authorities retained nominal sovereignty over the province despite their various internal and external problems, in reality Xinjiang was more often than not ruled by local Han individuals, but not by China prior to 1949. No Chinese central regime, including the Qing and Nationalists, ever fully controlled the province to the complete exclusion of outside influence for any long period of time, nor had any Chinese regime ever been able to develop the region's wealth independent of foreign interests. While the central authorities briefly conquered Xinjiang by military means, attempted to maintain control there through such devices as military colonization, and tried to sinicize it by limited Han immigration, their influence remained superficial. Local affairs were left primarily in the hands of native leaders who, so long as Chinese power and influence was sufficiently strong, accepted Han over lordship. Whenever Chinese power and influence declined, however, there was a prevailing tendency for local groups to throw off central control. The basically opportunist and exploitative nature of Chinese and Soviet policies in Xinjiang, when coupled with internal turmoil there and elsewhere in China, did not set a proper climate for extensive reforms in the province. Nor had the Chinese Communist movement ever cultivated much of a presence (or program) in Xinjiang. Thus, in 1949 and Xinjiang was an attitudinally non-Han, religiously Muslim, and politically divided "province" of China. It was under these conditions that the CCP "peacefully liberated" Xinjiang and set about the enormous task of bringing "socialist order".

Early Post-Liberation PLA Production and Construction Activities in Xinjiang

The evolution of Xinjiang after 1949 is largely the story of the First Army Group of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) First Field Army. The commander of these troops was Wang Zhen and the political commissar was Wang Enmao. From 1940 to 1944, Wang Zhen had led Brigade 359 of the Eighth Route Army into the Nanniwan region of Sha'anxi southwest of Yan'an to undertake land reclamation and agricultural production. Wang and those officers and soldiers who participated in the production and construction endeavors there later became the rather heroic symbols in CCP literature as the living models of battle hardened veterans who were willing to undertake mundane and arduous work in remote and difficult areas. This "spirit of Nanniwan", came to epitomize "self-sacrifice" and "self-reliance" in the Maoist credo.[2]

On 25 September 1949, Tao Zhiyue, the Nationalist Xinjiang Garrison Commander, cabled a "peaceful surrender" to the PLA troops that were poised for entry into the province from Gansu.[3] On 12 October, Wang Zhen's PLA troops entered the province and occupied Hami, which was then garrisoned by units under the command of Guo Peng. Troops under Wang Zhen arrived in Urumqi a week later, and some of these units then went on to establish positions at Shihezi, Yining, Wusu and Altai. Other subordinate units under Wang Enmao had turned southwest into the Tarim Basin and moved on the Yanqi, Kuerle, Aksu and Hetian (by 1951, one unit had even reached the Aksai Chin in far western Tibet). In these places the PLA established local garrison "camps", most of which would later be centers for production and construction divisions".[4]

On 18 December 1949, Peng Dehuai proclaimed the formal establishment of the Xinjiang Military District (XJMD). He also announced that the majority of the Guomindang troops under Tao Zhiyue were to be reorganized, reeducated and incorporated into the PLA, (as the 22nd Army Corps), as were the forces of the Yili National Army under Saifudin (designated the 5th Army Corps). By early 1950, all troops in the province had at least nominally been integrated into the PLA and placed under the authority of those CCP elements who constituted the core of leadership of the PLA 1st Field Army Group there. The headquarters of the XJMD in Urumqi was staffed almost exclusively by officers from this group, with Wang Zhen emerging as the ranking officer and Wang Enmao his chief subordinate, until late 1952 when he assumed the top military and Party posts in Xinjiang. Both Tao Zhiyue and Saifudin became titular vice-commanders. The XJMD was functionally divided into two large subdistricts north and south of the Tianshan, both of which were further subdivided into local garrison

commands at the special district level.

As a general rule, the non-Han troops of the former Yili National Army were slowly regrouped into mixed units with the Han PLA troops. During the early 1950s some company level units continued to be composed primarily of soldiers from the national minorities. A number of the troops belonging to the 5th Army Corps were eventually demobilized for civilian work of various types. Moreover, by 1954, nearly 200 minority cadres from the 5th Army Corps had been transferred to participate in work elsewhere within the various organs of the XJMD.[5] The implication was that the XJMD authorities were redistributing the leading officers of the Yili National Army throughout Xinjiang and placing them under Han superiors, while at the same time moving Han PLA officers and troops into the Yili base to replace them.

The reorganized PLA troops in Xinjiang probably numbered between 175,000 and 225,000 in 1950. Less than 10 per cent of the military forces in the province were minority nationals. About one-fourth of the total number were kept on active duty as frontline border defense or garrison troops responsible for public security and the suppression of active counterrevolutionary elements during the early post-liberation years. In late 1954, when the XJMD became the Xinjiang Military Region (XJMR), it was made a "direct control region" under the central military organs in Beijing. As a frontier and predominantly non-Han populated region, Xinjiang was considered to be of great strategic importance, and the central authorities undoubtedly felt that they should retain a more direct line of command over the troops stationed there, expecially during times of crisis. During more normative periods, however, an indirect line of command tended to predominate whereby the XJMR authorities in Urumqi played a more active role in the command structure and in the formulation and implementation of policies passed down from Beijing.

Wang Zhen's long experience in leading Red Army troops involved in production and construction tasks was reflected by a speech he delivered to the Xinjiang Finance and Economics Committee in January 1950 outlining the tasks ahead in such work by a majority of the military units in the province. By a decree of 20 January, a reported 110,000 of the 193,000 men in the 22nd Army Corps and a part of the troops under Wang, including Brigade 359 as the hardcore, responded to Mao Zedong's 5 December 1949 directive of "turning the army into a working force."[6] The latter group remained lightly armed, and its leading cadres were generally placed in positions of authority over the former.

These demobilized troops, which became known as the Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army, constituted the prototype for and were the forerunners of the Xinjiang PCC. They were ordered to take up positions on the fringes of the wastelands near the major oases north and south of the Tianshan, in the steppelands of western Dzungaria, and along the main transportation routes linking Urumqi with interior China. There, in compliance with the slogan of "transforming nature and reforming man", they began such undertakings as land reclamation, water conservancy, agricultural and animal husbandry production, sideline production, and capital construction. There was wisdom in the decision to locate these centers near the population centres. By so doing, the units could protect key transportation routes, thereby improving the regime's strategic posture vis-a-vis potential external threats or dissident internal groups, and exploit (or "develop") nearby natural resources without appearing to be imposing upon the local population.

Some of the demobilized troops were assigned to engineering construction units and posted in areas where basic industries, housing, transportation facilities, mines, and other enterprises were to be further developed or established. The demobilized soldiers were told that their efforts in socialist construction, national defense, and reform through productive labor would be on a long-term basis. In later years, these army production and construction personnel were to be instrumental in the development of Xinjiang's rather backward economy, and were to constitute a model of collectivized labor that was to be emulated by the masses. They also were to be an important part of the driving-force behind modernization in Xinjiang.

The lightly armed PLA contingent of the demobilized army troops also provided backup support for the frontline border defense, public security, and garrison forces of the PLA in Xinjiang. To a significant degree they assumed a share of the local police and security functions,[7] and served as an arm of the CCP in the rural and, especially, pastoral areas where Party strength and authority was otherwise weak. After 1950, the PLA hardcore units of these troops became increasingly active in the various political and socio-economic reform movements launched by the Party in Xinjiang. By March 1954, for example, it was reported that between 7,000 and 10,000 cadres of the provincial army production and construction units had been sent to the basic levels to participate directly in the development of the rent-reduction and anti-local landlord campaigns.[8] In October, another 2,500 cadres of good political standing and with production experience were transferred to 549 agricultural producers' cooperatives in

twenty-five xian along the proposed route of the Xin-Lan Railway to give long-term and systematic assistance, ranging from production techniques to business management. Their objective was said to be that of helping the peasants develop production, thus fully demonstrating the superiority of collectivization and attracting the laboring masses to follow the socialist road.[9] In fact, these units served as both "aides" and "models" in such collectivization endeavors. The province's first collective farm was set up by an army unit in early 1952. It involved an army donation of land to a mixed group of Han, Uygur, Kazakh and Russian families, some of whom were said to have been moved for the purpose out of poor sections of Urumqi.[10] From late 1952, with technical advice from Soviet specialists, large state farms were inauqurated in the province.[11]

The Emergence of the Xinjiang PCC. Beginning in August 1954, the various army units which had been demobilized and assigned to labor in Xinjiang were officially merged to form the Xinjiang PCC. The organization was placed under the Ministry of Agriculture in Peking and its subordinate organs in Xinjiang in matters of production, and under the XJMD in military affairs. In actual fact, however, it was subordinated to the Party, namely the provincial CCP committee and the Party organs within the various units of the PCC. It was referred to as "the backbone of CCP rule in Xinjiang."

The inaugural meeting of the Xinjiang PCC leadership was held on 5 December 1954, during the First Representatives Meeting of the XJMD CCP Committee. At this meeting, come 800 persons outlined its future tasks and officially confirmed Tao Zhiyue as its titular commander. Wang Enmao assumed the position as first political commissar of the Xinjiang PCC and first secretary of its CCP Committee, while Zhang Zhonghan, another veteran of the PLA 1st Field Army group, was named ranking deputy political commissar and second secretary of its CCP Committee. Thus, the real authority within the PCC rested in the hands of Wang and the veteran Han CCP elements of the PLA 1st Field Army group.

In May 1956, the newly established Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation in Beijing took over responsibility for the Xinjiang PCC from the Ministry of Agriculture. Wang Zhen was naturally chosen as minister of this cabinet-level organ. As head of the ministry, he was probably called upon more than any other minister to inspect the outlying regions of China, including Xinjiang, where reclamation work was being conducted. Until 1958, Wang concurrently headed the PLA Railway Corps as well, whose functions and responsibility were in many respects complementary to those of the new ministry. Significantly, then, the members of the PLA 1st F.A.

group dominated both the central ministry and the Xinjiang PCC, thus creating central-provincial ties which were to be of great importance later.

The headquarters of the Xinjiang PCC at Urumqi was composed of military staff units as well as agriculture, animal husbandry, water conservancy, industry and commerce, finance and trade, supply and marketing, and transportation control departments. There were also research institutes for the agricultural, forestry, and pastoral industries, and courts, hospitals, schools, and factories under the authority of the PCC headquarters (see Table 1).

The second-level organs of the Xinjiang PCC included agricultural production and reclamation divisions and civil engineering divisions. Each of the divisions maintained a military organizational structure, being divided into regiments, battalions, and companies, and the triangular system was generally adopted at and below the company level. The divisions were responsible for geographical areas of varying size, and thus the number of subunits and personnel under each division differed accordingly. There came to be ten agricultural divisions and three civil engineering divisions in the PCC, and the existence of "independent regiments" indicated that the number of divisions was subject to expansion. Altogether, there ultimately were to be some 120-odd ministries, departments, sections, and subsections down to the regimental level in the PCC.

Generally speaking, the military staff departments at various levels within the Xinjiang PCC were reduced to a minimum, while those for political work remained at normal size. The intermediate cadres of the PCC were primarily veteran PLA officers who had served under Wang Zhen, but also included reformed GMD officers. The officers of the PCC un its were given the status of reserve officers, but received pay as active-duty officers, while the soldiers received their pay under the status of demobilized servicemen. Other members of the PCC were paid at civilian rates on the basis of work points and shares of profits (at the rate of approximately 18-20 yuan per month).[12] For the most part, the demobilized soldiers took up their original occupations whenever it served the needs of the PCC.[13]

The agricultural divisions of the PCC were assigned to different reclamation areas, with headquarters at Yining, Tacheng, Altai, Wusu, Shihezi, Urumqi, Yanqi, Hami, Aksu, and Kazgar. Each agricultural division established state farms and livestock ranches (see Figure 1). They were to continue rendering aid to the peasants and herdsmen of the various nationalities in economic development and cooperativization by providing

Table 2
Organization of the Xinjiang PCC



1. Commander
2. Deputy Commander
3. Chief of Staff
4. Deputy Chief of Staff
5. Political Commissar
6. Deputy Political Commissar
7. Party Committee Office
8. Labor Wage Dept.
9. Cultural Work Troupe
10. Supplies Dept.
11. Machinery Dept.
12. Transport Dept.
13. Troop Carrier Aircraft Dept.
14. Capital Construction Dept.
15. Control Dept.
16. Budget & Finance Dept.
17. Trade Dept.
18. Health Dept.
19. Personnel Dept.
20. Air Transport Dept.
21. Engineer Dept.
22. Rear Services Dept.
23. Political Dept.

A. Other Technical Rear Services Units
B. Independent Regiment(s)
C. Hospitals
24. Divisions' Hospitals
D. Engineer Construction Divisions
25. 1st Engineer Construction Division
26. 2nd Engineer Construction Division
27. 3rd Engineer Construction Division
E. Agricultural Divisions
28. 1st Division
29. 2nd Division
30. 3rd Division
31. 4th Division
32. 5th Division
33. 6th Division
34. 7th Division
35. 8th Division
36. 9th Division
37. 10th Division

F. Schools
38. Hami Agricultural School
39. Xinyuan Agricultural School
40. Urumqi Agricultural School
41. Wulaosi Junior School
42. Hami Fifth Agricultural School
43. Shihezi Hydro-Electrical School
44. Manass Hydro-Electrical School
45. Shihezi Political Cadre School
46. Urumqi Art Theatre
47. Shihezi Agriculture College
48. Shixia Junior School
49. Beitun Tenth Agricultural School

G. Plants
50. Main Tractor Plant
51. Tianshan Foodstuff Plant
52. Army Martyrs' Family Shoe Plant
53. Xishan Ceramic Plant
54. August 1st Iron & Steel Plant
55. Urumqi Leather Tanning Plant
56. East Wind Boiler Plant
57. Tianshan Iron & Steel Plant
58. August 1st Cotton Textile Mill
59. August 1st Weaving & Dying Plant
60. August 1st Woolen Textile Mill
61. Synthetic Ammonia Plant

Source: Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion...," pp. 39-40.

them with political and organizational guidance and technical assistance. This was facilitated by the fact that the various state farms and ranches of the PCC were technically and scientifically more advanced than their civilian counterparts. With the aid of Soviet advisors in the early 1950s, the PCC developed more efficient and modern agricultural and animal husbandry techniques, better varieties of food grain and cotton seeds, more reliable methods of preventing crop and animal diseases and insect pests, a higher degree of control over soil alkalinity, a greater use of



Agricultural areas.

Approximate delineation of PCC areas (by divisions).

1A Agricultural 1st Division (at Aksu)
2A Agricultural 2nd Division (at Tunqi)
3A Agricultural 3rd Division (at Kazgar)
4A Agricultural 4th Division (at Yining)
5A Agricultural 5th Division (at Polo)
6A Agricultural 6th Division (at Urumqi)
7A Agricultural 7th Division (at Guidun)
8A Agricultural 8th Division (at Shihezi)
9A Agricultural 9th Division (at Hami; first reference in September 1969)
10A Agricultural 10th Division (at Altai)

1E 1st Engineer Construction Division (at Urumqi)
2E 2nd Engineer Construction Division (at Shihezi)
3E 3rd Engineer Construction Division (probably at Kazgar; formed in 1965)

Note: The PCC has under its jurisdiction a number of independent regiments, such as the 106th, 129th, and 191st, indicating that the PCC is still expanding its organization.

water resources through irrigation and water conservancy projects, and a larger degree of agricultural mechanization. Peasants and herdsmen were often given practical training on the farms and ranches of the PCC, and members were periodically sent out from the farms and ranches of the PCC to provide training and guidance or undertake investigations. The PCC frequently turned over reclaimed land, seeds, tools, and other materials to the surrounding coops or communes.

Units of the three civil engineering divisions of the Xinjiang PCC were stationed in those localities where major construction projects were to be undertaken, including Urumqi, Shihezi, Yining, Hami, Aksu, and Kazgar. In order to achieve self-sufficiency these units also established

their own farms and factories. Much of their growth was achieved by the ploughing back of profits. To the end of 1954, these engineering divisions had established and turned over to local management more than a dozen large, backbone factories, and had constructed ninety-two processing plants.[14] They had begun the construction of new cities at Alaer and Shihezi, and were engaged in the building of a new industrial district in Urumqi. Units of the PCC were also involved in the repair and construction of highways and communication networks, and were involved in the building of the Xin-Lan Railway.

Figure 2.

Xinjiang PCC units Reclaiming Wastelands in the Tarim Basin.

Source: Atlas of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1971), p. 25.

By the early 1960s, the Xinjiang PCC was said to be cultivating one-third of the regions farmland, or nearly 11 million mou,[15] and over 60 per cent of its work was mechanized. Its major crops included foodgrains, in which it was said to be self-sufficient, and economic crops, such as cotton (over one-half of the regional total), sugar beets, hemp and silk. It was also raising over 2 million head of livestock. The PCC was lauded for its achievements since liberation in conducting scientific research on a "comprehensive scale" in agriculture.[16] In late 1965, there were a reported 243 state farms in Xinjiang (in all of China there were 2,011 state farms).[17] Of these, the PCC was operating 149 agricultural farms and twenty livestock ranches. The remainder were local state farms run by the civilian authorities. The areas in which the greatest amount

of expansion in the number of state farms occurred after 1958 included the Manass River areas around Shihezi, the Yili River Valley and the surrounding pastoral areas, the area along the route of the railroad from Urumqi to Hami, the northern Tarim Basin in the vicinity of Aksu, and the areas near the Kazgar and Hetian oases.

Table 2
Expansion of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 1953-65.

Year	Land Reclaimed by PCC (in 100,000's)	Total State Farms in XUAR/PCC Farms[b]	Estimated PCC Membership
1950	440	6(?)/	96,500 - 110,000
1951	978		
1952	1,602		
1953	888		
1954	1,538-1,867		200,000+
1955	1,689-1,700	/30[b]	
1956	1,730		300,000
1957	--	107/	
1958	--	/74	
1959	9,950		
1960	10,000-10,350		500,000
1961	11,000	297/146-182	
1962	--	/200	
1963	10,389	373[c]/	
1965	15,000+	373/243	

[a] Including agricultural and livestock farms operated by PCC and local state-owned agricultural and livestock farms.
[b] Agricultural and livestock farms operated by PCC only.
[c] NXRJ, Nos. 10-11 (1964), cited in SCMM, No. 40 (October-November, 1965), pp. 1-4.

Sources: Compiled by the author from various reports in the China Mainland press and radio.

The PCC was also hailed for its contributions to the region's industrial development. It was said to be a

> ...technological force (italics mine) of tens of thousands of workers who are contributing significantly toward broadening the field of building engineering..., and the servicing and manufacturing of building machinery.[18]

It had contributed substantially to building the 550-plus large modern factories and an increasingly efficient economic infrastructure in the region by late 1965. Moreover, it was running hundreds of small to medium sized industrial enterprises of its own. Great publicity was given to the thriving industrial city of Shihezi, which the PCC had built beginning in 1950.[19] On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Wang Enmao pointed out that it was necessary to support the further development of the PCC since it had become such an important component of the region's economy.[20]

The PCC and Han Resettlement. The role of the Xinjiang PCC, over 90 per cent of whom were Han nationals, was reminiscent of that played by the military colonists in the region under the Manchu emperors. In fact, colonization became an important function of these units during subsequent years when large numbers of additional demobilized PLA-men and Han personnel from China Proper, including skilled workers, peasants, and "social" or educated urban youths, would join their ranks. The PCC provided an organization to which Han settlers could be assigned for production and construction, and which could be used to increase the Han component in Xianjiang's population.[21] In the early 1950s, many of those who joined the army production and construction units were skilled individuals, some of whom were assigned for fixed terms or specific projects. As the Korean Conflict cooled in 1952, increasing numbers of soldiers were demobilized and sent to the region. In the autumn of 1954, the PCC numbered more than 200,000 members.

In that year, cadres from the PCC were sent to various provinces and cities in China Proper to recruit workers and youths for participation in the work of building up the frontier in Xinjiang. Eventually, the PCC established and maintained liaison offices in many such areas. In Xinjiang, the PCC opened reception stations to receive the Han settlers and provide them with further physical and ideological training prior to their assignment to various PCC enterprises. From their place of origin to their ultimate destination in Xinjiang, the settlers were nearly always kept in groups. Each settler was normally required to sign a written pledge to serve the Party and the people of China in the frontier region, initially for a period of about three or four years, but in the early 1960s the regional media was claiming that the settlers were being assigned there permanently. Throughout the history of Han resettlement in the frontier region, there was always the element of coercion in the case of some migrants, while in others it was done enthusiastically for zealous ideological or patriotic reasons.

By May 1957, the PCC membership had reached over 300,000, largely due to the influx of Han from China Proper. In that same month, a trade union was established within the PCC. It was to be incorporated into the national agricultural production and water conservancy trade union. Over 90 per cent of the PCC's workers were to be enrolled in the new trade union by the end of that year. The creation of such an organization within the PCC was said to be justified by the fact that

> ...the change in the nature of the production missions and the participation of the new members have rendered

> the ration system ineffective, and crops of new problems relative to labor organization, administration of the various enterprises, wages and welfare, and education have come up ... The PCC, while serving as a detachment of the PLA engaged in the construction of the Fatherland, has gradually been transformed into a state-owned enterprise. The majority of its members, remaining as fighters of the PLA, have become workers whose main source of income is wages. This situation has urgently demanded the establishment of a trade union within the PCC to guide socialist emulations, welfare, and ideological work.[22]

It is not surprising that a rapidly growing organization like the PCC, which was predominantly Han yet functioning in a non-Han region and so mixed in terms of the places of origin, political backgrounds, ages and occupations of its members, should experience some problems internally and externally. In August 1955, for example, the Public Security Department of the PCC reportedly uncovered a "counterrevolutionary espionage organization" which was linked to the "China Democratic Party" in Shandong.[23] Its leaders were said to be ex-GMD functionaries who had "caluminated the Party's leadership, incited backward elements against the government, stolen weapons, and committed arson after joining the PCC" in the early 1950s. In May and August 1957, "rightists" in the PCC were accused of serious sectarianism, robbery, larceny and corruption.[24] Later that year it was announced that 16,700 cadres in the PCC, or 62 per cent of the total, were to be transferred from higher level organs to take part in productive labor at the basic levels.[25] The xiafang of such large numbers of PCC cadres indicated that a rather widespread campaign had been launched to demote some of the former GMD soldiers (and perhaps veteran PLA-men and resettled Hans as well), possibly because they had not been completely reformed ideologically. Research suggests that "organized resistance groups" may have existed within the PCC. They may have had links with such counter-revolutionary groups as the "National Unity Party" or the "Chinese Worker-Peasant Party" which had been uncovered in the region late in 1957. It is not unlikely that the Party used such anti-rightist movements to single out for criticism, remolding, or "elimination" those elements deemed untrustworthy or, perhaps, those who had been influenced by Soviet advisors. Also, it may have been felt to be necessary to publicly "slay a few token sacrifical lambs" in response to earlier charges by minority nationality cadres that some Han PCC cadres did not respect them, that some PCC departments had no minority cadres at all, that the customs and habits of the indigenous peoples were not respected by the PCC, and that the Han people were "nothing but colonialists".[26]

During the periods 1958-59 and 1963-65, which respectively

coincided with the Great Leap Forward and the public revelation of tensions along the Sino-Soviet border and unrest among the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang, tens of thousands of young and middle-aged Han settlers poured into the region. Initially, the settlers came from Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui provinces,[27] but later those from Shanghai and its environs came to dominate the movement. Over three-fourth's of all settlers went to various units and enterprises of the PCC. In fact, the PCC work group in Shanghai promoted the region, coordinated recruitment activities, and provided clothes, shoes and tickets for the long jouney. Drama troupes from the PCC were also sent to the municipality, as were "selected" Shanghai rusticates who had been sent to Xinjiang earlier. Efforts were made to convince the parents of Shanghai youths that Xinjiang was not a "strange and wild territory" and that their offspring would do well to serve the revolution there. This "Shanghai-Xinjiang connection" (and similar, but smaller, programs with other cities like Tianjin and Wuhan) operated for over a decade, until 1967. By early 1965, some 70,000 Shanghai youths who had recently arrived in Xinjiang were serving in the PCC.[28] According to a later report, over 100,000 educated youths had joined the PCC from Shanghai, Tianjin and Wuhan during 1963-66.[29] Sixty thousand of them had been assigned to PCC enterprises in the Tarim Basin. Two per cent later became Party members, 20 per cent entered the Youth League and 11 per cent became "cadres".

Han immigration to Xinjiang was not only a device that the Party felt would aid in integrating the region and its non-Han population into China politically, but one that would also help to bring about the conditions necessary for large-scale economic development and modernization there under Peking's direction. Xinjiang increasingly needed manpower and skilled labor for both agricultural and industrial development by the early 1960s, especially following the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisors at about the same time.

The resettlement of Han in Xinjiang also provided an outlet for those areas in China Proper where overpopulation, military demobilization, and unemployment were viewed as serious problems. The bulk of the new settlers were educated urban youths who could not be absorbed into the existing labor force of intramural China. It is likely that the sending of such youths to Xinjiang was, at least in part, also ideologically motivated. The Maoist group within the Central Party leadership was probably anxious to ensure that such youth not become elitist and separated from the rural masses, not grow accustomed to comforts, or develop the attitude that there was no need for "tempering" in revolutionary struggle.

The Maoist radicals may have also used the rustication movement as a device for infiltrating sympathetic young followers into the basically "conservative" PCC. For the most part the educated youths, at any rate, were assigned to manual labor on the farms and ranches of the PCC and placed under the command of veteran officers.

By 1966 the membership of the Xinjiang PCC had risen to between 500,000 and 600,000.[30] In terms of composition, the organization remained almost wholly Han. The veteran (over thirty years of age) component had decreased significantly compared to that of the youth. The vast majority of the PCC membership, therefore, was composed of urban youths who had recently arrived in the region to be "steeled in labor".[31] In contrast, the much smaller veteran group generally had long experience in production and construction work in Xinjiang and continued to hold all positions of authority within the PCC. The latter group included both ex-PLA fighters who had served under Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao and former GMD officers from Tao Zhiyue's units who had undergone reform.

The leadership of the Xinjiang PCC remained virtually unchanged to 1966, with Tao as commander and Wang Enmao as political commissar. The PLA 1st F.A. group held over 80 per cent of the "leading positions" at and above the divisional level. In 1965, there were, however, indications that "outsiders" were beginning to "infiltrate" the PCC leadership. For example, Ding Sheng, from Lin Biao's PLA 4th F.A. group, was identified as the ranking vice-commander and first deputy political commissar of the PCC, listed ahead of Zhang Zhonghan in the latter position.

The Cultural Revolution and the Xinjiang PCC. Early in 1966, it was reported that over 90 per cent of the youths in the Xinjiang PCC, who were described as the "young revolutionary successors from all parts of China" were studying and applying Chairman Mao's writings flexibly on a regular and persistent basis.[32] They were, however, receiving this political "tempering" from the veterans of the PCC, some of whom were reformed GMD-men. It might be expected, therefore, that the veterans were indoctrinating these youths through study and manual labor according to their own personal experiences and views of local conditions. It was reported, for example, that many of the youths had arrived in the region with great enthusiasm and high political consciousness, but as soon as they came in touch with reality some of them had various kinds of ideological problems, were discontent with assigned duties, and were skeptical about their future in the region.[33] With the large-scale influx of educated Han youths from China Proper, the "generation gap" within the Xinjiang PCC had widened significantly. In recognition of the common view that

youths were generally susceptible to radical trends and could be easily mobilized around "causes," the regional authorities probably saw the portents of potential unrest among the younger generation in Xinjiang. The youths had, moreover, brought with them many values and habits which differed greatly from those of the indigenous minorities and the veteran Han cadres who had long served in Xinjiang. It was not inconceivable, therefore, that the values and habits of these youths would foster misunderstandings and disagreements with the regional leadership over policies there. It is also undeniable that the majority of the youths were not always pleased with the fact that they were being "tempered" through practical struggle (labor) in the most difficult circumstances under conditions of hardship throughout Xinjiang.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the regional leadership under Wang Enmao showed a strong preference for gradual, moderate, developmental policies, While always remaining firmly committed to the region's ultimate integration with China, Wang had come to realize that policy style and implementation in Xinjiang was complicated by regional conditions and needs, and thus required a large degree of flexibility and moderation. Moreover, it was evident that what he (and even Beijing) had often wanted to do in this region, which remained so vulnerable to Soviet influence, was different from what he was compelled by circumstances to do. His view of those radical policies that were more universalistic and less attentive to local conditions or problems had been generally not enthusiastic. This is not to say that Wang considered ideological consciousness to be unimportant, nor is it to be implied that his Party rule was not firm. He did, however, show a definite inclination to support only those radical policies that he felt contributed to national security, internal stability and unity, and economic prosperity in Xinjiang.

Most significantly, Wang's policy stance in 1966 was at odds with that of Mao, who was setting the wheels in motion for the radical campaign of ideological resurgence and Party rectification that would shake China, and Xinjiang, for the rest of the decade. Thus, because of his policy stance and his well-entrenched power base in Xinjiang, Wang and his colleagues (and the various institutions that had evolved under their guidance, including the PCC) constituted logical targets for the emerging leftist tide that was being generated by Mao. In Mao's eyes, Wang had come to personify the evils of regionalism and revisionism. When the GPCR unfolded with great violence in China, Wang attempted to isolate Xinjiang from the worst excesses of the campaign for as long as possible. In essence, his stance

was that socialist legality rather than proletarian violence should govern the movement in the strategic border region. Until late 1966, the GPCR in Xinjiang was played out almost wholly by local Han actors under Wang's close supervision and control. When the leftist Red Guards from Beijing brought the movement with all of its extremism into Xinjiang, however, Wang responded with repression. In part, his actions were also undoubtedly based upon a desire to save his own position in Xinjiang.

Radical influence amongst the educated youth in the PCC, however, had increased dramatically by December 1966. On the 25th a violent clash took place at Shihezi between radical Red Guards and PCC veterans who had formed a conservative, pro-Wang organization called "The Xinjiang Military Region Production and Construction Corps August First Field Army Swearing to Defend the Thought of Mao Zedong to the Death."[34] Although tensions cooled somewhat, a month later another incident occurred at Shihezi while Wang Enmao was in Beijing. A tentative reconstruction of the "Shihezi Incident" based upon various Red Guard accounts suggests that it began on the evening of 25 January when radicals of the August First Agricultural Institute attempted to seize power in a textile factory and arrested several veteran PCC officers.[35] The next morning, the conservative PCC August First Field Army sent in ten truckloads of armed troops. The radicals were then shot and grenaded, and "scores of persons were killed and more than 500 were reported missing."[36] The conservatives rounded up a large number of the radical young rebels at Shihezi, and sent them off to detention camps.[37] They then set up a blockade around Shihezi and cut off all telephone communications.

During the height of the violence at Shihezi, similar incidents against radical Red Guards who attempted to seize power were reported at Karamai under the PCC 4th Agricultural Division, at Mosowan under the PCC 8th Agricultural Division, and at Dushanzi. The conservatives of the PCC also attacked radical strongholds in Urumqi, and street fighting broke out there. The conservatives managed to briefly commandeer a dozen tanks against the radicals in Urumqi. Seeking to avenge their comrades in Xinjiang, radicals in Beijing raided the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation and placed some sixty officials under arrest, including the minister, Wang Zhen.[38]

The "Shihezi Incident" had been significant in pointing out the seriousness of the situation in the frontier region, especially within the PCC. A sense of emergency was revealed by the central authorities on 28 January 1967, when the Military Affairs Committee issued a directive calling the GPCR to be carried out "stage-by-stage and group-by-group" in those

military regions which constituted the "first line of defense against imperialism and modern revisionism," including Xinjiang.[39] The directive ordered that the GPCR was to be postponed for the time being due to the fact that the "imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries were itching for stronger action" against China. These military regions were told to stabilize themselves in order to safeguard national defense.

On 11 February 1967, Beijing went even further by issuing a "Twelve-Point Regulation" which placed the XJMR in direct control of the Cultural Revolution in the PCC.[40] The regulation stated that the PCC was not an ordinary force for land reclamation but a production force equipped with arms, as such it was imperative that military control be exercised over it while the "new stage of class struggle" was being unfolded.

Although the Mao-Lin group "officially" ordered the cessation of all GPCR activities in Xinjiang, this did not assure that the radical or the conservative factions would abide by such a directive. In fact, contention and violence continued, despite Beijing's public directives to the contrary. There were later indications that the Mao-Lin faction privately sanctioned the radical's continued activities against Wang. So, for nearly two years Xinjiang lapsed into a state of virtual chaos. While it was reported that Wang retained the loyalty of all but one (unknown) division of the PCC and most of the regional PLA troops,[41] his power base was slowly eroded. He was demoted in late 1968, obtaining a Vice-Chairmanship of the new Revolution Committee under Long Shujin. In early 1969 Wang was removed from the region altogether. Many of his regional colleagues were also struck down by the radicals, including a majority of the leading 1st Field Army veterans of the PCC such as Tao Zhiyue who was replaced as PCC commander by Zhang Jiecheng, a veteran of Lin Biao's 4th Field Army faction.

During the height of the Cultural Revolution turmoil in Xinjiang, many of the rusticated youths in the PCC returned to their homes in Shanghai and elsewhere in China Proper. Some of them may have been abetted in their escape by veteran regional Party authorities and PCC leaders who did not want potential Red Guards in their midst.[42] Some of the returned Shanghai youths later claimed that they had been unjustly banished from Xinjiang by the Party and PCC leadership, while others asserted that they had gone to the municipality voluntarily so as to "exchange revolutionary experiences" and participate in the GPCR there.[43] Whatever their reasons for leaving Xinjiang, once the youths returned illegally to their homes they lacked residence permits, ration coupons, and the various other documents required by the authorities there. They generally became an additional burden in

their home areas, and were increasingly viewed as unwelcome guests. Since they could only survive by stealing, black-marketeering, and engaging in other shady activities, they contributed further to the instability in such places as Shanghai. As a result, the authorities, who were beseiged with problems of their own, began calling upon the returned youths to "fight their way back to Xinjiang." The "Shanghai-Xinjiang Connection" of the pre-1966 period, however, had been permanently severed.

The Xinjiang PCC in the 1970s

Preliminary research has suggested several significant developments that have affected the Xinjiang PCC during the 1970s. First, the PCC remained fairly unsettled during the early part of the decade due to continuing factional contention between the radicals and conservatives.[44] Under the regional leadership of Long Shujin, some radical policies were attempted, but not with much success. The drive to eliminate material incentives, including work points and bonuses, and to eliminate all private ownership apparently led to problems, including an increase in theft, speculation and black marketeering.[45]

After 1971, a general trend toward policy moderation and retrenchment developed rather rapidly in the region, as elsewhere in China. In fact, by the time Xinjiang celebrated its twentieth anniversary as an "autonomous region", most of the more "developmental" policies previously advocated by Wang Enmao had been brought back. However, there were signs of radical displeasure and reaction to these events within the region, particularly within the PCC,[46] and the "two-line struggle" that was to characterize Chinese politics for the remainder of the decade was reflected in Xinjiang as well.

Perhaps one factor which helped to keep a lid on the situation was the resettlement of former Red Guards and other youths from the region's cities. By the end of 1972, some 200,000 "educated youths" had been "sent down".[47] A later report revealed that a total of 450,000 "educated youths", including those from Shanghai, Wuhan and other big cities in China Proper and towns within Xinjiang, had settled in or returned to the countryside in the region.[48] It would seem that the authorities were equally concerned with the problem of sending youths from urban areas to rural areas within Xinjiang and with the reestablishment of rustication between the region and China Proper. That the latter was still operative was indicated by a Urumqi Radio report of 20 February 1972 which said that over 3,000 college students from various parts of the country were "accepting reeducation with an open mind" on PCC farms.

The campaign to resettle these youths did not always proceed smoothly. There were indications in early 1976 that the "Gang-of-Four" had attempted to "infiltrate" the movement in Xinjiang with former radical Red Guards who had joined the PLA in China Proper and were later "demobilized" to the region.[49] In later 1979, Guangming ribao revealed that "for the past several years" some border areas inhabited by the national minorities had "universally reported" that intellectuals from the interior who had gone there to work were "flowing back" to China Proper in very large numbers.[50] It had apparently reached the point where it was becoming difficult to hold courses or conduct research in some universities. Working conditions were said to be poor, equipment outdated, books and research materials lacking, and material remuneration "not completely rational".

As part of their response to these problems, the authorities launched a campaign to learn from Yang Yongqing, an educated youth from Shanghai and deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Youth League who had volunteered (apparently convincing her demobilized soldier-husband to join her) to return from Urumqi to the "forefront of agricultural production" at the No. 145 Regimental Farm in Shihezi.[51] The regional Education Bureau and office in charge of settlement of educated youths in the countryside published frequent requests to various units in Xinjiang urging them to help all young people who wanted to enter college by providing adequate time for them to review their lessons and prepare for entrance examinations.[52]

In mid-1979, Xinjiang Daily sounded the keynote for the future when it called upon everyone to unite, look ahead and work for the "Four Modernizations".[53] It admitted that the internal damage done to the Party in Xinjiang by the "Gang" was "very serious" and had not yet been completely healed. Although it claimed that much had been done to set things right, including redressing many cases of "frameups, false charges and wrong sentences" against cadres, it warned against becoming "entangled in past events." At the end of the year, much publicity was also given to the importance of intensifying reeducation on nationality policy, which was to stress combating Han chauvinism--described as the "key" for readjusting relations among the various nationalities.[54]

Second, following the establishment of the new Xinjiang CCP Committee in May 1971[55] and the "Lin Biao Affair" later that year, efforts were made to diminish the political power and authority of the military. Concurrently, a movement was undertaken to rehabilitate cadres who had been placed under struggle by radical Red Guards during the height of the Cultural Revolution[56].

For example, while Zhang Jiechang remained commander of the [illegible], Li Zhiyue reappeared as a vice-commander sometime in late 1977. In the emerging regional leadership, conscious efforts were made to separate the top civilian and military posts by assigning different individuals to them. For example, in 1973 Seypidin (Saifudin) was appointed 1st Secretary of the regional Party committee, Chairman of its revolutionary committee, and political commissar of the XJMR. Yang Yong was transferred from Shenyang to become commander of the XJMR and the second-ranking Party and revolutionary committee leader. The new collective leadership that emerged was not dominated by any one all-powerful individual, nor was it monopolized by a single factional group. It constituted a carefully balanced composite of "insiders" and "outsiders", old and new cadres, civilian and military elements, and, superficially at least, non-Han as well as Han nationals. To a large measure, a system of "checks-and-balances" was built into this leadership group. The net result, then, was a regional elite that was more responsive to central authority and control.

Following the death of Mao and the launching of the campaign against the radical "Gang-of-Four" in late 1976, Seypidin was removed[57] from his regional positions due to the region's poor economic performance[58] and alledged ties with the "Gang's" followers, and replaced by Wang Feng as the top Party person in the region. A succession of new XJMR commanders followed Yang Yong's departure for Beijing in July 1977, including Liu Chen, Wu Kehua and Xiao Quanfu.[59]

Third, from the mid-1970s, in line with the general build-up of Party authority vis-à-vis the military, civilian (Party) influence and control over the PCC was increased. One report suggests that in those areas where PCC units had been functioning largely under the control of the military since the height of the Cultural Revolution there was a reversion to civilian control.[60] Formerly, the various state farms and enterprises under the PCC were nearly always described as units of a certain PCC division, but increasingly they were referred to without any reference to the PCC whatsoever, with the exceptions of Tibet and Heilongjiang. A typical example was the "No. 143 Regimental Farm at Shihezi", which was mentioned in September 1978 as having been "inspected" by Hua Guofeng on his return to Beijing from Europe.[61] Later references to former PCC state farms in Xinjiang went even further by dropping the word "regimental" altogether. None of this means, of course, that in a region as strategic as Xinjiang the military would retain no interest or influence in such an organization.

In early 1979, the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation was reestablished in Beijing, and shortly thereafter it was noted that the "Xinjiang General Bureau of State Farms and Land Reclamation" was functioning as the coordinating body for the redesignated PCC agricultural units, the "Xinjiang Regional Farmland Capital Construction Command."[62] Prior to the reemergence of the Ministry and its regional organs, the responsible civilian authority for this "command" was probably the "Xinjiang Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Committee", headed by a member of the regional Party standing committee, Li Jiayu.[63] The only leader identified with the new "command" was its deputy head, Timur Dawamad (a Uighur) who is also a secretary of the regional CCP committee. Wang Feng undoubtedly remained the top Party person associated with these units.

It is possible that the change was more than a nominal one, and that the larger units of the PCC were operationally separated and put under the direct supervision of various organs. This decision may have been taken as a result of the perceived needs of the "Four Modernizations" movement, including specialization, or local conditions. That such was the case was illustrated by the "Xinjiang Railway Engineering Command", which was said to be composed of railway corps units and reclamation fighters.[64]

One of the main reasons for these changes may have been the admitted failure of the state farms to run efficiently and at a profit from 1966 to 1976. It was said that in the ten years of turmoil starting in 1966, the management system that had previously been so sound was seriously disrupted and production fell drastically.[65] In fact, the total loss for the period was reported to be 3,500 million yüan. Measures had been taken in the nation's 2,048 state farms since 1976 to strengthen their leadership, improve management over them, extend the right of self-management and improve business accounting, develop diversified economy and allow bonuses in addition to basic wages.

Following his visit to state farms in Xinjiang in 1979, Hua Guofeng suggested that China's farms be run in the same way as enterprises, integrating farming, industry and commerce on a trial basis.[66] Accordingly, eighty-seven such "complexes" were launched under the Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation in twenty-seven provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.[67] The "complexes" were allowed to market their products directly or process them for sale on condition that they deliver and sell to the government purchasing departments the amount of products as demanded of them. The old practice had been that the state

farms could only produce what they were asked but had no right to market their products directly. As the Vice-Minister of State Farms, Zhao Fan, stated:

> Setting up agricultural-industrial-commercial complexes is bound to help advance the transformation of the entire economic system in the interest of the country's modernization.[68]

As a result of measures designed to improve efficiency, enhance the initiative of workers and managers, increase production and lower the costs of production, it was claimed that the state farms in 1979 showed a profit of 300 million yüan.[69] In mid-1980, however, Xinjiang's Party 1st Secretary Wang Feng indicated that there was still resistance to and hesitation in the application of such new rural policies in Xinjiang following an inspection of the region.[70] His observations were that

> (1) The peasants or herdsmen, especially the cadres among them, have been used to equating such concepts as 'big, public, equal and poor' to socialism. Thus, taking the farm brigade as the accounting unit was always [seen to be] more socialist than taking the smaller farm team as the accounting unit. Private plots, individual families owning cattle, or poultry or a few trees around their houses were, or at some places are probably still, frowned upon. Egalitarianism was considered the only socialist mode of distribution and a poor peasant was always more revolutionary and socialist than the other guy who earned a few yüan more than he.
>
> (2) Not having got rid of such concepts, some cadres still think it safe not to be too enthusiastic about the new policy. Having been critized before, they are afraid that they could be criticized again for practising capitalism or revisionism when the new policy is superseded by the old line. Worse, there are also cadres who have found that the egalitarian distribution actually benefited their not so hard-working dependants and relatives.
>
> (3) People as a whole prefer the new policy and have benefited by it. But there are also those who are afraid that it may not last. Others are afraid that cadres who are devoted to the new policy may be transferred. Yet others have seen with their own eyes how directives publicizing the new policy were distorted in the process of their transmission down the administrative ladder.

From such observations, Wang drew the conclusion that the people should "be given reins" in their quest for a better life, and that the mentality of some cadres who were proud of their teams being poor should be changed. By all indications, then, there was still a radical influence in the region, particularly in some of the (former) PCC units, that may have been resisting the wholescale introduction of policies that were deemed overly "liberal and remunerative".

FOOTNOTES.

1. Beijing Review, No. 38 (21 Sept. 1979), p. 6. See also Beijing Review, No. 22 (28 May 1976), pp. 27-28 which reports that the Uygurs number 5 million and the Kazakhs 700,000.

2. The Nanniwan experience was continuously celebrated in the CCP media after 1949. A recent article commemorated Mao's inspection there in July 1943. See Peking Review, No. 2 (7 Jan. 1977), pp. 25-29.

3. "The Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang", Renmin shouce [People's Handbook] (Shanghai: Dagong bao, 1950), cited in Current Background, No. 365 (25 Oct. 1955), Appendix, p. 44; and Xinjiang ribao (XJRB), 28 Sept. 1949. Burhan, representing the provincial government, followed suit on the next day.

4. Lynn T. White, III, "The Road to Urumchi: Approved Institutions in Search of Attainable Goals During Pre-1968 Rustication from Shanghai", The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979), p. 488.

5. XJRB, 10 March 1954.

6. Zao Jing, "An Analysis of the Situation in the XUAR," Issues and Studies, Taipei, 5:2 (November 1968), pp. 10-16; Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion of Communist China's 'Production-Construction Corps': A Study of Its Conditions and Functions," Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), Taipei, No. 3 (March 1970), pp. 12-34; and Wu Zhao, "A Study of the Chinese Communist Build-up of the Production and Construction Corps along the Sino-Soviet Frontiers," Issues and Studies, Taipei, 6:2 (November 1969), pp. 56-61.

7. Including the supervision and reform of political prisoners and criminals. See, e.g. H. Schwarz, "The Chinese Communist Army in Sinkiang," Military Review, 45:3 (March 1965), p. 73.

8. XJRB, 10 March 1954; Tao Zhiyue, "PLA Units Engaged in Production and Construction in Xinjiang Struggle to Realize All Tasks of the Transitional Period," Renmin ribao (RMRB), 27 Sept. 1955; and New China News Agency (NCNA), Urumqi, 29 Oct. 1954.

9. Wang Jilong, "Strive to Strengthen Further the Solidarity of All Nationalities in Building a New Xinjiang Together," Minzi tuanjie (MZTJ, Nationalities' Unity), No. 12 (December 1961).

10. NCNA, Urumqi, 18 April and 21 March 1952.

11. A half dozen smaller state farms were opened by army units in 1950 on a trial basis. Soviet aid and assistance was outlined in XJRB, 11 March 1954; NCNA, Urumqi, 21 January 1952; and XJRB, 6 September 1955.

12. An early article on the PCC stated that revenues on the army farms were divided as follows: 40% to soldiers directly engaged in production; 20% set aside for accumulation; 20% paid to the XJMD for "expenses"' and 20% for the payment of taxes. A.G. Yakovlev, "The Role of the PLA in Economic Construction in the Outlying Districts of the Chinese People's Republic in 1950-55, Citing Xinjiang as an Example," Kratkiye Soobschcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya, No. 21 (1956), cited in Central Asian Review 5:2 (1957), p. 147. A later source cites a December 1949 directive of the Military Affairs Committee of the Party to the effect that profits derived from production by army units should be divided with 40% going to the producer and 60% to the State. Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion...," p. 18.

13. XJRB, 11 March 1954.

14. Yakovlev, op. cit., p. 148.

15. Wang Zhen, "Strengthening the Building of State Farms," Hongqi (Red Flag), April 1961, cited in Peking Review, No. 17, 28 April 1961.

16. Xiao Jiyong, "An Analysis of Land Reclamation and the Establishment of State Farms on the Chinese Mainland," Issues and Studies, 2:2 (November 1965), p. 26.

17. Wang Enmao, "The Great Victory of the Thought of Mao Zedong in Xinjiang," NCNA, Urumqi, 30 September 1965.

18. RMRB, 10 October 1965.

19. Dagong bao, Beijing, 30 September 1965 and China News Analysis, No. 591 (3 December 1965), p. 6.

20. Wang Enmao, "Great Victory...," NCNA, Urumqi, 30 September 1965.

21. A recent article outlines three main rationales for the resettlement of Han in frontier regions, especially young educated urban "rusticates". One is the ethical, which highlights the moral, ideological, personality-changing or national-integrative value of giving urban dwellers the life experiences of its peasant masses. A second is the developmental, which stresses economic and social change in non-metropolitan areas. The third is demographic, which seeks to reduce urban populations by exporting "non-workers" and cutting social overhead costs. See White, op. cit., p. 482.

22. Lu Xinliang, "Why Has the Army Production Corps Decided to Establish a Trade Union?", Gongren ribao (Worker's Daily), Peking, 4 May 1957.

23. XJRB, 18 August 1955.

24. XJRB, 25 August and 12 November 1957.

25. RMRB, 17 December 1957.

26. XJRB, 26 May and 6 June 1957. See also, Saifudin, "Report on Local Nationalism at the Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee on 6 December 1957," RMRB, 26 December 1957.

27. The reported number arriving from these areas in 1959 was 110,000. Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion...," p. 18.

28. Urumqi Radio, 4 May 1965.

29. RMRB, 10 May 1973.

30. Zhang Yuntian, "The Establishment and Expansion...," p. 17.

31. By March 1966, for example, the "veteran fighters" who had pioneered farming in Xinjiang reportedly represented only 20 per cent of the various farms of the Xinjiang PCC. NCNA, Urumqi, 13 March 1966.

32. Song Richang, "Shanghai Youths Can Do Much in Xinjiang", Wenhui bao, Shanghai, 17 January 1966.

33. NCNA, Urumqi, 17 March 1966.

34. This organization and its supporters reportedly numbered between 10,000-20,000. See, e.g., Zhao Zong "An Account of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Part 31)" Zuguo yuekan (China Monthly), Hong Kong, No. 77 (1 August 1970), pp. 17-18; and Prague Radio, 3 March, 1967.

35. "The 'January 26' Counterrevolutionary Sanguinary Incident at Shihezi Xinjiang," a mimegraphed handbill jointly prepared by the Revolutionary Rebel Regiment of the Xinjiang Corps' August First Agricultural Institute, the Red Rebel Column of the Chu Opera Troupe of the Seventh Agricultural Division of the Corps, the Hongqi Combat Column of the Revolutionary Rebel Regiment of the Corps' Gonger Opera Troupe, and the Red Rebel Column of the Xiaoxing Opera Troupe of the Corps' First Agricultural Division on 30 January 1967, full text from a Hong Kong Mingbao

report, translated in SCMP, Supplement No. 188 (22 June 1967), pp. 28-31.

36. Another source claimed that the toll was 120 killed and over 500 missing. Facts and Features, 1:2 (15 November 1967), p. 12.

37. See, e.g., "Smash the Fascist Concentration Camp of the 23rd Regiment, Eighth Agricultural Division, Xinjiang Construction Corps," Tianshan fenghuo (Tianshan Beacon Fire), published by the Eighth Agricultural Corps of the Xinjiang Red Guard Revolutionary Headquarters and the Revolutionary Workers of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Nos. 4-5 (15 January 1968), in Current Background, No. 855 (17 June 1968), pp. 5-8.

38. P.H.M. Jones, "Sensitive Sinkiang," Far Eastern Economic Review, 55:6 (9 February 1967), p. 190.

39. Translated in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-67 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 216.

40. Translated in Ibid., pp. 258-61.

41. China Topics, No. 206 (16 March 1967), p. 2 and "The Diary of the Cultural Revolution," Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, May 1967, p. 48.

42. P.H.M. Jones, "Autonomous Wang," Far Easten Economic Review, 58:13 (28 December 1967), p. 569.

43. Shanghai youth interviewed by the author in Hong Kong, 11 June 1973.

44. "CCP Central Committee Directive on Frontier Security and Unity", issued 28 August 1969, in China Topics, No. 541 (28 January 1970), Appendix A, pp. 1-2.

45. See, e.g., Urumqi Radio, 21 January 1971.

46. See, e.g., Seypidin, "Advance Victoriously Under the Guidance of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line...Greeting the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the XUAR," Hongqi, No. 10 (1975), quoted by Urumqi Radio, 6 October 1975 and Urumqi Radio, 8 February 1971.

47. Urumqi Radio, 21 and 22 December 1972.

48. Peking Review, No. 11, 12 March 1976, p. 3. Another source claimed that a total of over 357,000 educated youths in Xinjiang had gone to the countryside, with 20,000 doing so in 1976. Urumqi Radio 21 December 1977.

49. Guiyang Radio, 9 May 1976 and Fuzhou Radio, 27 May 1976.

50. Guangming ribao editorial, 11 December 1979.

51. Beijing Radio, 14 March and 10 April 1979 and Urumqi Radio, 29 May 1979. See also, Beijing Review, No. 13 (30 March 1979), pp. 5-6.

52. Urumqi Radio, 20 May 1978.

53. XJRB, editorial, 4 July 1979.

54. Urumqi Radio, 30 December 1979. In fact, the Party's concern about maintaining stable ethnic relations in Xinjiang was underscored by the appointment of Zhou Renshan to the post of 2nd secretary of the Xinjiang CCP Committee. Zhou had considerable experience in Qinghai and Tibet as a nationalities and united front specialist prior to the cultural revolution.

55. RMRB, 8 May 1971.

56. It is interesting to note that Wang Enmao reappeared as a political commissar in the Nanjing Military Region in late 1975. On 30 March 1977, Changqun Radio announced that he had been appointed the top

Party and Revolutionary Committee person, as well as the political commissar, in Jilin Province.

57. Urumqi Radio, 31 January 1978. Wang had spent most of his career in the northwest as a Party specialist in minority nationality affairs and served as a Vice-Chairman of the Nationalities' Affairs Commission of the State Council prior to the Cultural Revolution.

58. Beijing Review, No. 38 (21 September 1979), p. 5.

59. The Xinjiang Military Region was redesignated the Urumqi Military Region in 1979, the main reason being that its area of responsibility was extended over the western part of Tibet in the Aksai chin region. Donxiang, Hong Kong, No. 18 (16 March 1980), p. 8. Also, in January 1979 a third large military district, called the East Xinjiang Military Command (District) was formed following a Military Affairs Commission decision. It is composed of the sub-districts at Zhangqi, Turfan and Hami, as well as part of the South Xinjiang Military District. Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, 5 February 1979.

60. That is to say, under the control of the relevant administrative bodies responsible to the regional Party committee and the Party committee of the military region. See, e.g., Zhonggong yanjiu, July 1975, pp. 37-45, cited in China New Analysis, No. 1052 (3 September 1976), p. 2.

61. Urumqi Radio, 14 April 1979 and Beijing Review, No. 31, (4 August 1 80), p. 21.

62. Urumqi Radio, 14 April 1978.

63. Dagong bao, Hong Kong, 5 April 1979 and Urumqi Radio, 16 April 1979.

64. Beijing ribao, 4 January 1979. These troops, under the supervision of the PLA Railway Corps, were responsible for building the 476 km. section of the Southern Xinjiang Railway from Turfan to Kuerla in the period 1971-79.

65. Beijing Review, No. 16 (21 April 1980), p. 7.

66. Beijing Review, No. 31 (4 August 1980), p. 21.

67. Dagong bao, Hong Kong, 10 April 1980. See also Beijing Review. No. 31 (4 August 1980), p. 19

68. Ibid.

69. Beijing Review, No. 16 (21 April 1980), p. 7.

70. Dagong bao, Hong Kong, 19 June 1980.