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INNOVATION IN POWDER METALLURGY

By Eng. Z. Ministr

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SINKIANG HIGHER EDUCATION IS DEVELOPING RAPIDLY

[Following is a translation of an article by Kuan Ou-lo, Deputy Chief, Department of Culture and Education, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Party Committee, in Jen-min Jih-pao, Peiping, 10 July 1960, page 4.]

Following the glorious victories of the Socialist revolution and Socialist construction, higher education in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, under the leadership of the Communist Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao, and the regional Party Executive Committee developed in pace and scope unmatched in history.

During the first period after the liberation in 1949, there was only one incomplete and sub-standard college (Sinkiang College), with only 370 students and 36 faculty members. From 1949 to 1957, Sinkiang tried to salvage the old academy. At the same time, the agricultural school, the language school, the medical school, and the normal school were added to fulfill the needs for productive construction. In 1958, brightened by the Party's socialist general construction program, impelled by the Big Leap in agricultural and industrial production, and spurred by the success of the people's commune system, five more colleges were opened to new students; thus, correctly implementing the Party's educational policy of sharing the responsibility of education between the Party and the people. The five new institutions of higher education specialized in petroleum, mining, business and finance, railroading, and agriculture. This second agricultural school in the autonomous region was named Shih-ho-tzu Agricultural College. In 1959, higher education was consolidated and the over-all standards were higher. The school of language was incorporated into the normal school. The system of higher education in this autonomous region was then complete, with separate schools of agriculture, medicine, education, communications and finance

Like the institutions of higher education all over the country, higher education in Sinkiang went through incessant revolutions as directed by Chairman Mao. After several political movements, all the teachers and student body succeeded in raising their degree of political awareness. The Party organizations in colleges increased and expanded. The Party leadership in the colleges was strengthened. After the rectification campaign in 1957, the anti-rightist campaign, and the anti-regional nationalism conflicts the Party's position in schools stood unchallenged.

At present, Marxism-Leninism ideology and the political work of the Party are the spirit and leaders in all phases of work in higher education. The common goal of every student is to become "red and expert". The percentage of students who come from families of laborers and peasants is increasing. They make up 58% of the enrollment in institutions of higher education.

In 1958, the Party Central Committee proclaimed the policy of "education as service to the proletariat class and education in cooperation with productive labor". All of the Sinkiang institutions of higher education began to enthusiastically operate factories and farms. Many of the faculty members and students volunteered to work in the factories and on the farms in order to participate in productive labor and gain practical experience. The work program afforded them the opportunity to cultivate their minds and at the same time, the experiences gained supplemented and improved to a great extent classroom knowledge.

Working experiences further create a favorable background for the development of scientific research, and the work yields material wealth for our national construction. For example, the faculty members of Sinkiang College designed and made a trial model of an electronic computer; and the Pa-i Agricultural College students experimented successfully with many types of fertilizers.

At present, all higher education is in the process of combining education, production, and scientific research into a healthy system of Socialist education. The new system is already having a very positive effect in the production of both "red and expert" students.

The cultural and educational standards in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region were very backward. But, within a short ten year period, higher education has developed quite rapidly. This fact cannot be separated from the inspired leadership of Chairman Mao

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and the Party Central Committee together with the support from other brother provinces and cities.

At the same time, the Party Committee in Sinkiang has always emphasized the training of national minorities and the development of higher education. A new program was produced with special stress on the following key problems.

Even though we paid much attention to the development of education in Sinkiang after the liberation, due to the poor foundation of the old system of education, we were neither able to staff the schools with qualified instructors nor able to fill the institutions of higher education with senior middle school graduates.

But the wheels of productive construction were turning faster than ever. Productive construction desperately called for higher education to furnish it with qualified technicians and experts. Faithful to the policy of education as a service to politics and construction, Sinkiang persisted in the gradual development, in proportion to her ability, of a sound educational foundation by raising the standards. For the first eight years after the liberation, due to the lack of qualified instructors in higher education, we concentrated on the development of middle level education. Then we set up a skeleton for higher education with three new higher schools. The courses in these schools were offered to junior middle school graduates. The function of these schools was to produce, in quantity, intermediate level technicians in order to meet the urgent demands of productive construction.

In the process of developing and raising the standards of middle level education, it has laid the foundation for the development of higher education by producing qualified candidates for admission and for future training as instructors. Therefore, with the accelerated development of senior middle level education in Sinkiang, institutions of higher education were added one after another on the solid foundation of a high standard middle level education.

For example, the schools specializing in mining, petroleum, railroading and finance were all founded on the basis of a solid senior middle level education. In 1958, colleges which have previously admitted only technical students were able to accommodate more and more non-technical senior middle school graduates. Following the above mentioned procedures, Sinkiang College, Pa-i Agricultural School, and Normal College

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succeeded in raising their professional standards and at the same time developed rapidly enough to meet the needs of productive construction.

Because of the insufficient supply of qualified students and adequately trained instructors, it was quite impossible to establish a complete system of higher education overnight. On the other hand, it was not practical to wait until all the conditions were favorable before developing higher education. Therefore, within a given period of time, higher education in Sinkiang must still be developed according to the demands of economic construction. The rate of development should be regulated by the urgency of the situation. The growth of higher education must be in step with needs which develop.

For example, from 1949 to 1957, due to the needs of the nomadic-agricultural society of this autonomous region and the urgent demand to train more qualified instructors for middle level education, the emphasis on higher education was placed on teacher training and the study of agricultural sciences. After 1958, the railways began to stretch farther and farther westward, bringing heavy industries into heretofore isolated regions. In order to better prepare for the big leap in the national economic construction program, five more technical colleges were added on the solid foundation of high standard senior level middle schools. These five technical colleges train students to specialize in communications, business-finance, agricultural sciences and technological sciences. A fifth technical school was built on the original site of Sinkiang College. Sinkiang University will admit new students this fall. In this manner, higher education in Sinkiang has not only kept pace with economic construction, but it has also been of great service to production. In the process of productive development, higher education in Sinkiang gradually took form and grew into a scientific system.

Education is the people's responsibility. Only when the Party and the people unite in upholding the educational policy of "walking on two legs" can education be developed smoothly and rapidly. The original productive power of the Sinkiang society was pathetically backward. But she has always been very rich in natural resources, and in order to utilize these resources to change the barren characteristics of Sinkiang, many new industries with ample support from

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the central government were established. All of these new industries were adequately staffed with qualified experts and the physical conditions were comparatively good.

At the same time, there was still a great need to absorb more newly trained technical personnel. Therefore, in the development of higher education in Sinkiang, all the latent potential of the new industries were fully utilized. Higher education did not become the sole responsibility of the departments of higher education. It was the responsibility of all the new industries.

After the State Council directive "Pertaining to the Direction of Higher Education," was made public in 1953, the "walking on two legs" climax was reached in the development of schools.

With the development of various building industries, the technical colleges began to grow. At present, there are nine institutions of higher education in Sinkiang. With the exception of Sinkiang College, the Medical College, the Pa-i Agricultural College, and the Normal College which come under the jurisdiction of departments of higher education, the remaining five colleges are being directed by the related industries.

In order that higher education in Sinkiang will develop more rapidly, it is necessary to train more native instructors. This was one phase of work which was met with special emphasis directly after liberation. On the one hand, professors and instructors from colleges in brother provinces were engaged to help out during the first stages. Their instruction stressed education through translation. Through translation, they were able to instruct the national minorities and train them to become instructors.

On the other hand, depending on the needs and the vacancies, native middle school graduates were sent to colleges in brother provinces so that they could qualify as instructors when graduated. Through these methods, native instructors in Sinkiang colleges grew to a sizeable number. Before liberation, there was not a single native teacher in Sinkiang College. Today, there are over 1,200 proud native instructors, making up 31.8% of the total teaching staff in the Sinkiang higher education system. Even with this great increase in native instructors, the number is still far from sufficient to meet the swift pace of development in higher education.

On the solid basis gained in the victories of the 1957 rectification campaign, the anti-rightist campaign, and the anti-regional nationalist campaign, the degree of political awareness among native instructors has on the average, been rising. Thus all the Sinkiang institutions of higher education required the native students to study the Chinese language for one year after which major courses were given in Chinese. This opened a new and broad approach to the mass training of native instructors. It enabled the native students to use Chinese references more conveniently, and this in turn helped them to raise their professional and political standards.

Our determination to implement the Party's educational policy is the guarantee to the rapid development of higher education in Sinkiang. The course of the rapid development of higher education in Sinkiang is also the course of conflict between "two roads" and two ideologies. This conflict is manifested in Sinkiang as the conflict between Socialism and regional or local nationalism. The goal of Socialist education is to "cultivate a Socialist consciousness and cultured laborers". We insist that higher education in Sinkiang must follow the road of Socialism. All work in institutions of higher education must have for its spirit and leadership Marxist political-ideological education in addition to Party work. The capitalist elements and the regional nationalist elements insist on the "special condition of Sinkiang", thus they oppose the spreading of Marxism-Leninism among the students on the flimsy excuse that political education might divert the students' attention from their regular studies.

In our educational policies, we insist on those that would be beneficial to the unity of nationalism and to the intermixing of culture between nationalities. We are of the opinion that institutions of higher education should be opened to all national minorities, with the students separated into different grades. The regional-nationalism elements believe in the distribution of schools according to geographical locations and that each school should serve a different nationality. In general, they spread all kinds of capitalistic and regional-nationalistic poison, hoping to usurp the leadership in higher education from the Communist Party. The vicious plot of the capitalist and regional-nationalist elements vicious will never succeed. The struggle concerning the two educational

programs will continue to be a battlefield for a long time.

Hereafter, we must continue to raise the red flag of Chairman Mao's educational ideas and persist in the Party's educational policies. At the same time, we must continue criticize the educational ideas of the capitalists and oppose the regional-nationalistic policy of decentralizing the education of the national minorities.

We must further criticize rightist ideas and continue to follow the Party's general policy of Socialist construction by swiftly and economically developing higher education in Sinkiang, so that it may better serve both political and productive construction.

The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, like other areas in China participating in Socialist construction, has entered the stage of high speed development and a sustained period of "big leap". A technical revolution on the basis of mechanization and semi-mechanization automation and semi-automation is unfolding rapidly and the total mobilization for such a technical revolution is spreading on an enormous scale.

Following the repair and the commencement of through service on the Lan--Sin [Lanchow to Sinkiang] Railroad, a new wave of construction will begin in Sinkiang. These conditions call for the accelerated training of native personnel. In order to meet the needs of Socialist construction, we plan within a few years, to establish in every autonomous chou the basic agriculture, medical, normal and higher technical schools. At the same time, we must add colleges specializing in textiles, fuels, geology, art and physical education. By that time, colleges will be distributed all over the vast lands of Sinkiang.

We firmly believe that higher education in Sinkiang, under the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao and the Party Executive Committee of the autonomous region, will develop and expand every day. In the not too distant future, it will become a "red and expert" force of working class intellectuals. All the national minorities in Sinkiang will have the opportunity to acquire a high degree of scientific and cultural knowledge. The barren characteristics of Sinkiang will undergo a basic and complete change.



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# A Study of the Chinese Communist Buildup of "Production and Construction Corps" Along the Sino-Soviet Frontiers

By

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## I. Introduction

The Peiping regime's military programs are geared to serve the goals set by its so-called "people's war." In addition to their regular army, navy and air force, the Chinese Communists have local armed units and militia constituting the three principal tools for fighting their "all-round people's war." In light of the growing tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier, Peiping in recent years has taken positive measures to beef up the so-called "production and construction corps" in the northeast provinces, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. The corps, designed to bolster border defense both militarily and politically, has since become a new branch of the Chinese Communist war machine. Based on available data, an analysis on the production and construction corps is given in the following paragraphs.

## II. How the Corps Came into Being

It was in Sinkiang where the produc-

tion and construction corps first appeared in 1949. Communist commander Wang Chen entered Sinkiang with his troops to militarily occupy that province. Among his first tasks was to reorganize Sinkiang's military forces which included former government units commanded by turn-coat general Tao Shih-yueh and indigenous armed bands of such local national minorities as Ili, Tacheng and Asan tribes. Consequently, Wang Chen was commanding a massive force of some 500,000 men. But the economically poor and politically confused Sinkiang presented a number of problems to its new rulers. First of all, there was the supply problem. Large shipments of food and other necessities for the troops had to be brought in over vast distances by the Lanchow-Sinkiang railroad. One alternative was to cut troop strength but this consideration was dismissed because that would make effective control over Sinkiang impossible. Next was the problem of Soviet Russia's deep-rooted influence in the area representing a latent Russian force which could not be eliminated unless local pro-Soviet chief-

tains of the national minorities were brought under effective control. A third problem was the variety and number of national minorities inhabiting Sinkiang with their different religious beliefs and ethnic traditions which made these people natural antagonists to the dogmatic ideology of Communism. Short of total military control it would be impossible to set up a Communist administration in Sinkiang. This led to the Chinese Communists' adoption of the bygone Chinese policy of "border exploration" in their attempt to solve these problems. Recalling his own experience in successfully employing soldiers to produce their own food and other necessities at Nanniwan in northern Shensi during the War of Resistance against Japan, Wang Chen put his Sinkiang troops to work. They started with land reclamation and farming in the Tarim Basin, built irrigation facilities, and developed an agricultural and dairy products processing industry. Subsequently, in 1950-54, all the armed forces in Sinkiang were reorganized, including the original units Wang Chen had brought in to take over Sinkiang. Except for a small number of them who retained their "national defense" designation and remained at border security assignments, the bulk of the military units in that province now became the "Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps." Tao Shih-yueh, the turn-coat general, was placed in command (the current commander is Chang Hsi-chin.) Meanwhile, educated youths from inland cities were forced to come to Sinkiang under Peiping's "send down" program and were assigned to the corps. At present, units of the corps have opened up farm districts in the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins, and, by involving everyone in the districts in productive industries, they have become what is called "a great army of production" consisting of people of all professions and from all walks of life. Through this measure, the Peiping regime not only solved the supply problem for troops

in Sinkiang but also achieved with considerable success the objective of ridding Sinkiang of Russian influence. Now the partially armed corps units are stationed throughout the province of Sinkiang. The Chinese Communists have been able to exercise effective control over the national minorities in the province. In view of the corps' successes, Peiping in 1955 set up similar outfits in the northern provinces, Inner Mongolia, Shensi, Kansu, Tsinghai and Tibet. All told, they added to another half million men bearing the designation of "agriculture and construction troops." These troops are mainly Korean War veterans, demobilized servicemen and urban youths banished to the frontier regions. Recently, these troops were separately reorganized and stationed in Shenyang (Mukden), Peiping and Lanchow Military Regions and have since become local armed corps for defense against Russian military and political infiltration along the frontier regions of Northeast China and Inner Mongolia.

### III. The Expansion Program

The production and construction corps is militarily organized but partially armed and its units are charged with the dual mission of production and defense. As military units, the corps comes directly under the command of the first level military regions or the provincial level military districts. As production units, it is organizationally under the direct command of the central ministry of agriculture but receives instructions and supervision from the "people's committee" or its subordinate bureaus or departments in their respective regions or the provinces. In Sinkiang and Tibet, however, the production and construction corps has been under the sole leadership of the military regions. This concentration of authority and responsibility has enabled the corps in these two regions to perform their production and construction tasks more effectively.

along the frontier regions, the corps' organization and designation are quite inconsistent. For instance, the production and construction corps of Tsinghai Province and the "agricultural development divisions" of Shensi and Kansu provinces are under their respective military districts on military matters but controlled by their provincial "people's committees" on production activities. In Inner Mongolia, the "Huangho (Yellow River) Water and Soil Conservation Corps" is directly subordinate to the Inner Mongolia Bureau of Forestry. In Heilungkiang, the "agricultural development division" is directed by the Northeast Bureau of Agricultural Development. Since the command system is rather complicated in these regions, the corps and similar outfits are understandably unable to function as effectively and productively as they would under a unified military command. On top of this is the complexity in personal background of the components of these corps. Some are originally from government military units which were reorganized into Communist forces; some are former local armed groups of the national minorities; and others are veteran Communist army soldiers who boast of "meritorious records" in the Communist rebellion campaigns. Hence, there exists a diversity of psychological leanings that eventually has given rise to intolerance with a life of the enslaved. Consequently, cases of mutiny and desertion have been frequent. An eloquent testimony to this was the 1962 desertion of more than 60,000 troops under the leadership of Tsu-lung-tai-yeh-fu, a deputy chief of staff of the Sinkiang Military Region. Consisting mainly of production and construction corps members who were originally of the Ili nationality, these deserters went over to the Russian side of the border and have since caused many incidents of border penetration. During the "cultural revolution" many cases of mutiny and even revolt occurred in the northeast provinces, Inner Mongolia and

Sinkiang. Corps members in groups took to the hills to wage anti-Communist resistance movements. In some cases, they even raided arsenals and granaries and turned weapons and food supplies over to anti-Mao and anti-Communist organizations in their localities.

Early this year as tensions began to mount in the wake of the shooting incident at Chengpao Island, Amur River, the Chinese Communists stepped up their efforts to strengthen their border defense. The production and construction corps in Sinkiang was revamped to attain greater combat capability. The "agricultural development divisions" stationed in Heilungkiang, the Sungari and Ussuri regions were reorganized to become the production and construction corps under the Shenyang Military Region. In Inner Mongolia, the Huangho Water and Soil Conservation Corps was re-designed production and construction corps under the Peiping Military Region. A merger of Tsinghai's production and construction corps and the "agricultural development divisions" of Shensi and Kansu was effected to become the Lanchow Military Region's production and construction corps. Moreover, NCNA reports of last March 21 and 22 and of May 6 and June 7 all told of mass deportations of urban youths to bolster the strength of the various production and construction corps. According to NCNA, "more than 70,000 educated youths from the city of Tientsin alone were despatched since the beginning of this year to Inner Mongolia, Heilungkiang, Shansi and Hopei." It said in another dispatch that more than 1,000 graduates of junior and senior middle schools in Shanghai who were "clad in military uniforms and burning with hatred for imperialism and revisionism and a zeal to develop and defend the border" had gone to Inner Mongolia for resettlement. Another 1,000 persons from Shanghai, the news agency continued, had been resettled in Heilungkiang. From Wenchow in Chekiang Province,

NCNA reported that the city's third batch of educated youths for frontier defense arrived for resettlement at Hsitaisha and Tiehling in Heilungkiang on June 4. Other NCNA reports said more than 5,000 college students from Liaoning and Shenyang had gone to Inner Mongolia for agricultural development work. With regard to Fukien, NCNA reported that this south China province had scheduled to despatch 270,000 educated youths for a send-down campaign during this year in support of the production and construction corps in Inner Mongolia. According to the agency, Chekiang Province in March this year had also sent 18,000 educated youths to the same production and construction corps. All these NCNA reports indicate that production and construction of Inner Mongolia and the northeast provinces are continuously being beefed up.

#### **IV. Deployment of the Production and Construction Corps**

Altogether the Chinese Communists have more than 1,000,000 men in four production and construction corps stationed along the Sino-Soviet frontiers. Deployment of these corps is as follows:

(1) The Sinkiang Military Region Production and Construction Corps. Headquartered at Urumchi, the corps is commanded by Chang Hsi-chin and has a second political commissar, Tan Kai-yin. It has a total strength of about 500,000 and is deployed in northern Sinkiang's Ah-le-tai, Shih-ho-tzu, Pu-lo, I-ning, U-su, Kuei-tun, Urumchi, Hami and in southern Sinkiang's Yen-chi, Ku-erh-le, Ah-ke-su and Ke-shih. In addition to light infantry weapons, it is known to possess armored tanks produced from Chinese Communist arsenals at Loyang.

(2) The Peking Military Region Production and Construction Corps. This unit is headquartered at Huhehot with Ho Feng-shan as commander and Ni Tzu-wen

as political commissar. Numbering 200,000 men, the corps is deployed in five districts: Pi-ke-chi, Ching-shui-ho, Tsin-yu-chu-mu, Hsin-chi, Teng-kuo and O-chi-nan.

(3) The Shenyang Military Region Production and Construction Corps. Harbin is the headquarters of this 150,000-man corps. Areas of deployment are Heilungkiang, the Sungari, the Sanchiang plains of Ussuri, and Kirin Province. Its equipment includes light field artillery.

(4) The Lanchow Military Region Production and Construction Corps. With headquarters at Lanchow and a strength of about 100,000 men, the corps is deployed in Tsinghai's Hsi-ning and Ke-ern-mu, Shensi's Yen-an and Ta-li, and Kansu's Yu-men and Chiu-chuan. Its principal mission is agricultural development in the region.

#### **V. The Specific Tasks of the Production and Construction Corps**

The production and construction corps is local itinerant soldier-farmer units deployed exclusively in the Sino-Soviet border areas where material supplies are short. Although extremely limited in their combat capability, the corps is manning "cultivation districts" which are comparable to South Vietnam's "strategic hamlets." But in terms of a purely defensive capability, the "cultivation districts" are superior to the Vietnamese "hamlets." While the Vietnamese use small armed groups to protect whole villages of non-able-bodied inhabitants, the Communist "cultivation districts" are wholly inhabited by troops of the corps. Moreover, troops of the corps are basically of regular PLA origin and are therefore experienced in handling weapons. Equipped with light tanks and mounts locally procured, these partially armed troops have sufficient mobility to cover a vast expanse of the frontier with patrols and sentries, there-

fore, the combat capability of the corps should not be regarded lightly.

When the Peiping regime embarked on a program for revamping the Inner Mongolia Production and Construction Corps early this year, emphasis was laid on the specific tasks of the corps. The tasks which can be safely applied to other corps elsewhere are listed as follows:

(1) Creation of the production and construction corps is in compliance with Mao Tse-tung's strategic deployment plan and is an important strategic measure in carrying out Mao's latest series of instructions. In the production and construction corps which is a great school of Mao Tse-tung's thought, soldiers and the masses of educated youths will go through a training in class struggle, production struggle and scientific experimentation—the three great revolutionary movements, and be cultivated into a new generation of Communists possessing class political consciousness.

(2) Creation of the production and construction corps has important significance both strategically and pragmatically in the defense of the frontiers. At the frontiers of anti-revisionist outposts, the cause of opposing "imperialism" and "modern revisionism" and of safeguarding "great socialism" requires a big and powerful border defense not only militarily but politically as well.

(3) Creation of the production and construction corps, which explores and develops the frontier in its dual military-agricultural role, is aimed at carrying through to the end the important strategic measures embodied in Mao Tse-tung's idea of the "people's war." It is a "creative development achieved by Mao Tse-tung's thought on people's war and a people's army under new historical conditions."

(4) Creation of the production and construction corps is a step forward in

declaring the "total bankruptcy" of the "counter-revolutionary" scheme of the anti-Party renegade bloc which has been trying to "disrupt national unity, create national division, and viciously hinder border development."

(5) Creation of the production and construction corps facilitates border exploration and development and expedites full exploitation of the natural resources in the northern frontiers. It also helps to bolster efforts for "socialist construction" and will further realize "Mao Tse-tung's great strategic plans for war preparation, for the preparation against natural disasters and for doing everything for the people."

From the above, it is clear that the Chinese Communist buildup of production and construction corps in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Lanchow and Northeast China is intended to serve manifold purposes. These include: (1) coordination with the "send-down" campaign for educated youth as a means of solving the youth and social problems in the wake of the Red Guard rampage; and (2) solution to the job-placement problem for retired and demobilized servicemen and the continued exploitation of their surplus labor. The most important of the corps' specific mission is as follows:

(1) To bolster border defense against Soviet Russia's military and political penetration without draining the reserve strength of the regular army.

The Sino-Soviet borders run a long 9,800 kilometers from Tu-men-chiang of Northeast China in the east to Fen-chieh-ho of the Pamir plateau in the west. The Northeast provinces are the base of the Chinese Communists' heavy industries. Inner Mongolia is important to the defense of the northern frontiers. Sinkiang assumes vital importance because of the Lop Nor nuclear facilities. If regular Communist troops were deployed to

defend all the border areas, it would mean a thinning out of regular PLA strength in addition to a massive military supply problem. With the vast forces of the production and construction corps guarding the frontier and regular PLA units the vital points and line, the Chinese Communists' border defense possesses operational flexibility. In the event of a real war on the borders, the Chinese Communists can readily fight a "people's war" against the Russians.

(2) To assimilate the minority nationals inhabiting the border regions through production and construction efforts—the political side of the corps' specific mission.

The vast frontiers of the Chinese mainland have a total population of approximately 51.5 million belonging to a complex of minority nationalities. The Han race comprises the majority as it does in China proper. The minority nationalities in the Northeast are Manchus, Huis, Koreans, Sibos, Dakurs, Owenkes and Hechehs; those in Inner Mongolia are Mongols, Olunchuns, Dakurs, and Sibos; those in Sinkiang are Uighurs, Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Huis, Kirghiz, Mongols, Tajiks and Tartars. Each of these ethnic groups has its own way of life and confines its activities very much within its tribal society. The ethnic groups differ from each other in spoken language, writing, religious belief, customs and traditions but share the common characteristics of simplicity, frugality and straightforwardness. The nomadic qualities of bravery in war and simplicity in living are very much in evidence among them. The biggest single nationality in terms of population is the Uighurs of Sinkiang, numbering about 3.66 million. The second largest group is the Mongols, totalling about 1,000,000 in Inner Mongolia. Next comes the Kazakhs of Sinkiang, about 510,000 in population. The population of the other minority groups ranges between 1,000 and

hundreds of thousands. A number of these minority nationalities are easily susceptible to alien instigation due to identical racial origins. Examples are the Mongols who are of the same racial stock as the population in Outer Mongolia, and the minority groups of Sinkiang who have the same origin as the Turkestanis of Russia. Ularfu, former commander of the Inner Mongolia Military Region, once openly led an Inner Mongolian independence movement in 1967 in opposition to Mao Tse-tung. Movements aimed at establishing "East Turkestan" and a "Uighur Republic" have been repeatedly reported from among the Sinkiang minorities. In its attempt to placate the rebellious minority nationalities and to guard against Russian infiltration, Peiping has forced inhabitants to evacuate from a 12-18 kilometer zone on the borders and has stationed the production and construction corps in that zone in order to build up political defenses on the borders. Communist assimilation efforts have gradually taken root in the border regions as a result of the presence of the production and construction corps.

## VI. Future Trend

The production and construction corps is part of a long range "national defense" program on military labor for the exploration and development work. The corps is capable of exploring and developing natural resources in the border areas and has helped bolster border defense militarily and politically. It is a solution to Peiping's problem of employment for retired and demobilized soldiers and to the social problem involving educated youths. With military organization and control, the corps represents a further strengthening of the production management system to serve the regime's designs for the exploitation of manpower resources. Besides these corps of 1 million strong along the Sino-Soviet frontiers similar units have been reported on Hainan Island. It can be expected that more production and con-



construction corps or similar other units will be organized in China proper and along the coasts. Such future outfits may take on different designations and vary slightly organizationally, perhaps in the form of a beefed up militia force. But there

can be no doubt that Peiping, through such soldier-farmer units, will attempt to develop the entire civilian population on the mainland into a massive slave labor structure to serve the designs of Mao's "people's war."

### Chinese Communist Terminology

劳模 (*Lao-mu*)

"Model workers."

This is an abbreviation of 勞動模範 (*Lao-tung-mu-fan*).

勞保 (*Lao-pao*)

"Labour insurance."

This is an abbreviation of 勞動保險 (*Lao-tung-pao-hsien*).


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# REGIONAL AFFAIRS

CHINA

## Sensitive Sinkiang

By P. H. M. Jones

IF THERE is one part of China where revisionism, in the sense of a tendency to take the lead from Soviet Russia, is to be feared, it is the vast Northwestern dependency of Sinkiang. Peking has certainly not forgotten the events of the 1930s, when the Chinese governor was able to maintain himself against a serious rebellion of China's Northwestern Muslims only by calling in Russian help. A pitched battle outside Urumchi, the capital, in 1937 between the rebels and a force of Russian tanks was the result.

This help was not given disinterestedly. In the early thirties the USSR obtained important commercial and military rights in Sinkiang. Soviet loans financed construction of factories and communications, and notably of a road system linking an oil field north of the Tien Shan with Alma Ata, capital of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, on the Turksib railway. Further agreements in 1939 and 1940 led to the formation of a Sino-Soviet air company to operate between the USSR and the important city of Hami, and the grant to Russia of extensive mining concessions.

Ten years later Stalin, who in Western Sinkiang had recently been supporting a widespread nationalistic rebellion against the Chiang Kai-shek government, obtained from the new Communist government at Peking the establishment of joint Sino-Soviet companies in oil and

non-ferrous metals. These however were liquidated when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Peking in October 1954—which shows that Peking disliked them; the Soviet shares handed over to China were to be paid for out of local production.

For the moment the story of Russian political and economic penetration of what shortly became the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region was interrupted. Then, as the Sino-Soviet alliance began to disintegrate, it appeared that Russia was again intriguing in the Region. From early 1963 rumours of risings in Northwest Sinkiang began to reach the outside world. They were confirmed in September, when a Peking broadcast alleged that in early 1962 the CPSU had "used its organs and personnel in Sinkiang to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union". To Peking's extreme indignation, Russia refused to repatriate these refugees, who were mostly members of a vigorous Muslim people, the Kazakhs, who number 300,000 or so in Sinkiang but 7 million or more in Russia, on a plea of "Soviet legality and humanitarianism".

In early 1964 Russia was accused more or less specifically of fostering a secessionist movement in Sinkiang. She was indeed reported to be attempting to revive the East Turkestan Republic which Kazakh and other rebels had set up in 1944-49; the leaders of the movement apparently died in an air crash while travelling to Peking in 1951. About the beginning of December 1963 one Zunun Taipov described (in the *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* published in

the Soviet Union) a massacre allegedly perpetrated by the Chinese on a group of people who were applying for permission to go to Russia. And these, said Taipov, were the one-time heroes of the war in Sinkiang. It was these people of the Northwest Sinkiang frontier areas who had smashed the Chiang Kai-shek army and paved the way for the Communist assumption of power.

Former MVD Man

Taipov, who is probably a Kazakh, has been said to be a member of a group of M.V.D. men who organised the 1944 rebellion. He subsequently became, it seems, a Major-General in the Chinese army and in 1958, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Sinkiang Army District, was condemning anti-Chinese sentiment in the Region. Presumably he went over to Russia about 1962, and now seems to have become head of an army of 60,000 refugees from Sinkiang with headquarters at Alma Ata, which claims to raid into Chinese territory. Reporting this a Mr I. Y. Alptekin, spokesman of an Eastern Turkestan Refugees' Association—apparently representing the 5,000 Kazakhs who survived a terrible "long march" from Sinkiang to Kashmir shortly after the Communist take-over of Sinkiang, and were eventually resettled in Turkey—added that the Russians had established a military school for the refugees from Sinkiang where they learnt guerrilla warfare, commando tactics and public administration. Alptekin himself, it seemed, had been Secretary-General of the East Turkestan Republic.

Not all the danger comes from the Russians; the Chinese governors of Sin-



Highways in Sinkiang.

Sinkiang have always been prone to assume semi-independent status. In part this has been forced on them by the necessity of dealing with the foreign power on their borders, and of holding down by force or diplomacy a restless non-Chinese population; in part they have been encouraged in such courses by their extreme remoteness from the central authority and the tenuity of communications. Urumchi is several thousand miles from Peking and joined to the rest of China by a single road and railway, which in Northwest Kansu and Eastern Sinkiang runs through hundreds of miles of desert and semi-desert. Thus the governor of Sinkiang is always something more than the governor of another Chinese province; moreover his first duty, whatever turmoil may afflict China "proper", is to maintain order.

The People's Government has made an all-out effort to develop Sinkiang. A railway has been built through Kansu to Urumchi and a little beyond — originally it was to have joined the Turkestan — and a new and important oil-field has been opened up at Karamai in the far Northwest, not far from the Russian border and in the middle of the Kazakh country. Many industries have been set up such as textiles — Sinkiang is a large cotton and wool producer — paper — there is timber in the Tien Shan — cement, sugar refining, enamelware and others. Coal is mined near Urumchi (population about 400,000) and there are said to be iron and steel mills, flour mills and other plant at Hami (population about 100,000). No doubt these

industries are mostly of local significance, except for the oil and wool, but in aggregate they represent a considerable economic activity.

In addition Lop Nor in the Southeast of Sinkiang has been used as a site for China's nuclear explosions. According to one recent report (unconfirmed) General Wang En-mao, Commander of the Sinkiang Military District, First Secretary of the Autonomous Region and member of the CCP's Central Committee, has "threatened to seize China's Lop Nor nuclear stockpile if Mao Tse-tung tries to take over the provincial government". Lop Nor is in a desert region that could be easily cut off from China.

Peking has also made an intensive effort to develop agriculture in Sinkiang by large-scale reclamation of land from the desert, especially along the Manass river north of the Tien Shan and in the Tarim basin to the south of it. This work has been chiefly accomplished by demobilised Chinese army men, organised into a Production and Construction Corps under military discipline and later reinforced by thousands of young people from Shanghai and other Chinese cities. In consequence of this influx, which represents a massive drive to change the racial composition of Sinkiang in China's favour, the proportion of Chinese in the population had risen from around 6% at the time of "Liberation" to 30% of a total population of 7 million in 1962. By now the Chinese proportion must be considerably higher.

The first news of unrest caused by the Cultural Revolution in Sinkiang appeared in mid-January, when a Japanese newspaper reported that according to wall posters in Peking pro-Mao forces had held demonstrations and sit-down strikes against "bourgeois-reactionary" forces in Urumchi. The demonstrations came, it was said, after Ting Sheng, Deputy Commander of the Army Corps in Urumchi, had rejected some unspecified demands on December 18. At Kashgar, a cotton-spinning city in the Southwest — the most populous part of Sinkiang — supporters of Liu Shao-chi were said to have encircled Red Guard headquarters on December 29, provoking a clash in which 20 people were injured.

Then, on January 25, a Russian literary paper claimed that Muslim refugees from Sinkiang had fled to Russia since the start of the Cultural Revolution. Young girls, it said, had been "dragged from their homes and ordered to marry Chinese under threat of death", and Red

Guards had torn down mosques in the border region, seized Muslim clergy with paint and paraded them through the streets. By and large these are perhaps the sort of excesses that might be expected of fanatical Red Guards — lacking official guidance — in face of a backward local population. It is also the sort of thing that no government in Sinkiang could tolerate if it wanted to avoid an explosion, which would be particularly undesirable in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations.

Then another Peking wall newspaper was reported as saying that "conservative reactionaries" had attacked pro-Maoists in Urumchi and Shihhotzu, a "new town" — and therefore presumably inhabited mostly by Chinese — west of Urumchi, with a population now given as 80,000. The wall newspaper, which was signed by a "rebel revolutionary group" of the PLA in the Sinkiang Military District, said that in the previous few days reactionary forces in Urumchi had "mobilised some 3,000 people daily". These had assaulted the Agricultural Institute and attacked revolutionaries in the streets. In Shihhotzu about 10,000 reactionaries, including discharged soldiers threatened to kill anyone who rebelled against them, and "some commandants levelled their guns against the masses". The wall newspaper appealed to the CCP's Central Committee for prompt action, since Sinkiang was "the front line against Soviet revisionism". Another poster mentioned the "revolutionary rebels" HQ of the Urumchi Industry and Traffic Division as under siege by anti-Maoists.

### 100 Dead?

Later the death-toll at Shihhotzu was said to have reached 100. So far as could be gathered from the confused reports, Wang En-mao's anti-Maoist forces comprised seven of the eight regular army divisions in Sinkiang, including or additional to a force called the "8/1 Field Army", composed of 20,000 former soldiers. It was the 8/1 Army that defeated the revolutionary rebels in Shihhotzu, but by February 1 Peking wall papers were saying that the pro-Mao forces had won the day in Urumchi and Shihhotzu; the 8/1 Field Army, having looted money, food and ammunition, had "fled into nearby mountains, apparently to wage guerrilla warfare". How much truth this story contained there is no telling, but it seems strange that the other army units in Sinkiang should have allowed it to happen. Possibly this poster represented

propaganda from the "Peking office of the Red Guards of the Sinkiang Construction Army Agricultural School"; some 50 officials of the Peking office of the "Sinkiang Agricultural Ministry" are said to have been arrested as anti-Maoist.

According to a "four-point directive" that appeared in Peking on January 31, (Sov. Enjin had offered to talk things over with Wang and with one Ting Wang-Chen, a Politburo (sic) member concerned with construction units) who would, both subsequently, be permitted to return to Sinkiang. The Sinkiang government was also ordered to "enforce an immediate ceasefire", and Chang Chieh-chung, now described as Vice-Commander of the Sinkiang Military District — and once KMT governor of Sinkiang — was to return to his post to deal with the rebellion. But suppose Wang, if pressed too hard, were to follow tradition by turning to Russia?

In the past the main weakness of the governors of Sinkiang lay in the smallness of the Chinese population and of the armed forces at the governor's disposal. Now the situation is changed, so that in some ways the ruler of Sinkiang is better placed to take an independent line than ever before. The recent reports show clearly that the Construction Corps is for Wang. Were the pro-Maoists to be found among the young people from Shanghai? It seems possible, but elsewhere in China the young people who have been sent to the countryside have appeared very disgruntled, and even to have infected the peasants with their own discontent. Life in the wastes of Sinkiang for the young townies is undoubtedly very hard. It would not be surprising if some of these also were ready to revolt; certainly the Red Guards in Sinkiang seem to be found mainly in the towns.

## Seeing Is Believing

By Colina MacDougall

THE CITY OF LANCHOW, capital of Kansu province in China's far west and centre of the nuclear industry, showed no signs of political upheaval in mid-January, said Mr E. W. H. Mills, site engineer in charge of administration at the £25 million Vickers-Zimmer polypropylene plant which is rising alongside the German *Lurgi* installation there. Mr Mills said that he and his fellow British engineers — five of them altogether — were amazed when they heard Western news broadcasts which described China

as being virtually in a state of civil war. "We heard that railway communications had been cut," he said, "and we looked out of the window and saw the trains chugging past as usual." Mr Mills said that they had seen the usual Cultural Revolution equipment, lorries, posters and loudspeakers in the town but there was absolutely no change since he arrived in October, as far as the foreign eye could see in the atmosphere, in the attitude of the workers with whom he came in contact, or in the number of soldiers seen around in the streets.

This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that official Peking sources have mentioned Lanchow as one of the places where the Maoist faction — the "revolutionary rebels" — have been holding "mammoth" rallies. This was announced by *Hsinhua* on January 19, before Mr Mills left Lanchow. An official report from Lanchow on January 17 declared that the People's Liberation Army there was supporting the Dictatorship of the proletariat, so it could be that the city remains quite orderly since the army is loyal. Lanchow has got as far as setting up "revolutionary rebel" organisations which have formed a "liaison committee" (that was announced on January 24), but the struggle has not yet, apparently, proceeded any further. Its turn may come later when cities in the heartland of China have been fully Maoised.

Mr Mills also commented that there had been no interruption in the flow of machinery which arrives by rail from the east coast port where it is unloaded. They had had no indication of any hold-ups in railway transport. In his contacts with the Chinese, he dealt entirely — through his interpreter — with high-level Chinese engineers, and had little contact with other workers; among these, he said, there was no suggestion of anything but complete loyalty to Mao Tse-tung and complete support for all his policies. His Chinese colleagues expressed surprise and some shock at the overseas news broadcasts which he discussed with them.

Lanchow, Mr Mills said, looks as if it has a population of 900,000 or a million; in part very old and in part modern, it is a mixture of one-storey mud houses and new concrete blocks of flats, factories and hotels. The hotel where the British and German engineers are living is on the outskirts of the city, and the British at any rate travel to the plant site by a set route, presumably for security reasons. Each British engineer has an interpreter and he is not allowed

out without him. Details of the project itself remain secret. Mr Mills said, he commented that work on the plant is progressing very rapidly. It is to form part of a much bigger and more complex plant with the *Lurgi* iron-making plant and the Simon-Carré-ICI polyethylene plant but as none of the British engineers speak German there is not much exchange of information on the spot. British engineers are strongly discouraged from making enquiries about Chinese plants, and none of them have visited any.

### Fine Engineering

Mr Mills was very impressed with the quality of Chinese civil engineering, which he said was well up to world standards. In fact, he spotted the Chinese using a technique which was quite new to him: since concrete will not harden in the extremely low temperatures which Lanchow experiences in the winter (it drops to  $-20^{\circ}$  centigrade at night) the Chinese cover the edifice with bamboo mats and apply steam in pipes for 24 hours. In the west a chemical would be mixed in with the concrete; presumably the Chinese have not got it, or do not find it economic. He said he could not judge whether the Chinese engineers would readily understand the very modern process and machinery which *Vickers-Zimmer* were supplying, since the project had not yet reached that stage, but he commented that his colleagues seemed highly trained and very intelligent. As far as he could tell, there was no interference from politics, though there were occasions when the staff would disappear for a day, for, he supposed, militia training.

Mr Mills' eyewitness report on Lanchow raises the whole question of the reliability of the reports, Chinese and foreign, which have emanated from Peking in the last month. Of course, any foreigner who is living in China, at least outside Peking, only sees what he is supposed to see, and if he cannot read or understand Chinese it is not too difficult to prevent him from having much contact with reality. On the other hand, if Lanchow were experiencing a complete breakdown of administration, it would surely be obvious in some way even to the most insulated being.

While evidence is beginning to accumulate from outside sources that there has been some economic dislocation at least in parts of China, it is perhaps too soon to say how far areas like Lanchow, which have figured rather briefly in

# SOKAGAKU



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### CHINA

#### Autonomous Wang

By P. H. M. Jones

NEWS OF EVENTS in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is apt to come by Kuomintang and other suspect channels. It is not therefore necessary to believe that Wang En-mao, Commander of the Sinkiang Military Region and First Secretary of its CCP Committee, has thoughts of turning to the Russians. Obviously he would do so, if at all, only if Russian pressure became overwhelming, or if his domestic enemies seriously threatened his position, and there is little sign of either. Indeed the sources of this kind of story also like to emphasise the success of his defiance of Peking, which implies that he is at least secure within his fief.

Yet the Maoists, with whom Wang has been reported in conflict, do not seem to have been completely crushed. Wang apparently returned to Sinkiang shortly after a conference with Chou En-lai at Peking at the end of January. On February 5 *Urumchi Radio* broadcast a statement by "revolutionary red peasants" that some peasants and herdsmen had been "lured into the cities to make unreasonable demands on the state". The revolutionaries also seem to have met opposition at this time from "local nationalists" and "reactionary elements who don the mantle of religion". On February 9 "proletarian revolutionaries" in Sinkiang claimed to have taken over Party, political, financial and cultural powers on January 25 from the SUAR and Urumchi Municipal Party

Committees and People's Councils, and to have set up a Production Committee. If this was on the lines of the Frontline Production Command set up at Shantung at the same time, it would imply a close alliance of the local revolutionaries with at least some sections of the army, but almost all the army units in Sinkiang seem to be pro-Wang En-mao, and, so far at least, anti-Maoist.

During the upheaval in Sinkiang in late 1966 many of the young people who had been sent to work in Sinkiang from Shanghai and elsewhere returned home, and were abetted in this — if not actually driven from their posts — by "capitalist roaders" in the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps, an ex-servicemen's organisation that seems to be solidly pro-Wang. Presumably the Corps did not want potential Red Guards in their midst — many of the young people had been settled in the important reclamation and agricultural development area of Shihhotzu, a hotbed of Red Guard activity — or had found the townees to be "useless mouths". Now however the revolutionaries urged students, teachers and Red Guards to return home (in Sinkiang) or stay there, and in mid-February appeals were issued to youths in Shanghai, who were said to have been tricked into leaving the frontier, to return to Sinkiang as their departure had seriously affected production and construction.

On February 25 the CCP Central Committee announced that it had decided to suspend the Cultural Revolution in Sinkiang, with Chou En-lai quoted as saying that this was for the good of the country and that the Government would never allow the Region to be exploited by the Soviet revisionists.

However at a rally at Urumchi on March 12, Wang was apparently hailed as a faithful follower of Mao, and it was affirmed that "he will definitely side with the proletarian revolutionaries and carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end". By this time Wang had again gone to Peking, together with a delegation deemed important enough to be received by Mao and Lin Piao.

Wang, it seems, was content to strike revolutionary attitudes for the good they might do him, and Peking, or anyway Chou En-lai, to accept this compromise for fear of much worse. However *Hsin-hua*, Peking's official news agency, has had nothing of consequence to say about Sinkiang for a long time and never mentions Wang En-mao who, it is said, still calls himself First Party Secretary, the only one remaining for any region of China. Nor, it seems, did disturbances in the Region cease. On June 3 a Peking wall poster reported a fight between groups of workers in a Sinkiang petroleum refinery, possibly on the great oil field at Karamai, where fighting had been reported in January. *China News Analysis* of July 7 mentions a report that a wall-poster had accused Wu Kuang, Vice-governor and member of the Sinkiang Party secretariat, of taking troops to surround the building of the *Sinkiang Daily*, which was in the hands of the military, a revolutionary detachment presumably. "Acid and bricks were thrown from roofs. The battle went on for two days with a great number of people fighting on both sides". KMT and other sources reported factions fighting in Shihhotzu and Ili in late November, and sabotage of the railway to Urumchi.

Have relations between Wang and Peking again deteriorated? Whatever assurances he may have given Peking, the ruler of a remote and vulnerable minority area cannot possibly tolerate any divided authority, or any sort of disturbance. The latest rumours suggest some sort of collusion between Wang En-mao and the Mongol, Ulanfu, Chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, whom in April or thereabouts Chou En-lai is said to have called a Russian agent. He has been stated to be under house arrest in Peking, but this has lately been denied. While Ulanfu in fact studied in Russia for some years in the 1920s, his whole career since then has shown devotion to the Chinese Communist cause.

In any event, would Wang En-mao, a Chinese satrap, countenance separatism anywhere in China? Of course he may agree with Ulanfu on the necessity of keeping the Cultural Revolution and its adherents out of their respective border areas, but suggestions that either is flirting with the Russians have the air of pure propaganda.

Where the latest rumours are on firmer ground is in their emphasis on the leverage at Wang's disposal. In February Mao was said to have sent army units into Sinkiang; if so, they have not achieved anything. Apart from the natural strength of his position *vis-*

*à-vis* Peking — Lin Piao is said to have dissuaded Chou En-lai from going to Sinkiang recently on the grounds that it would be impossible to rescue him in case of trouble — Wang controls an important part of China's oil supply. Sinkiang also possesses the nuclear testing ground at Lop Nor. Reports speak of his seizing "two nuclear ballistic missile plants", though there is nothing to show that Sinkiang has any such. On the other hand Lop Nor might have a stockpile of bombs or nuclear "devices"; he is also said to have detained all the nuclear scientists in the Region.

## INDONESIA

### Unhappy New Year?

From O. G. Roeder,  
Our Djakarta Correspondent

THE COMING YEAR may be the year of the last hope for Indonesia, the year of the limit of the people's patience. This was the dramatic message to the Ampera Cabinet's last plenary session in 1967 given by Acting President Suharto — a man who carefully avoids all exaggeration. What inspired General Suharto to make such a gloomy prognostication?

Difficulties have multiplied during recent months. More than two years have passed since the abortive *Gestapu* coup, and nearly one year since the ending of "dualism" (between Sukarno and Suharto) in the conduct of the country's affairs. But internal stability has not yet been achieved. The much-talked-of communist danger may not even be the most serious threat. Despite recent battles between the armed forces and militant communist cadres in the jungles of Western Kalimantan, the illegal new-style *Partai Komunis* is clearly on the defensive and is not ready to launch well-planned actions.

On the other hand, the problem of the "organisation" of the PNI (that is the bringing of the Nationalist Party into the ranks of the New Order — *Orba*) has not yet been solved. Nor have the roles and functions of the other parties, in parliament or in public affairs, been clearly defined. Although basically agreed upon, the foundation of the new *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* has been postponed from month to month. The general election has also been postponed: it will certainly not take place before July 5, 1968 as the People's Congress demanded. Laws on

political parties and the elections are still under discussion. Additional problems — such as the tensions between Christians and Muslims — arise continuously.

The second half of 1967 also brought serious set-backs in the economic sector: a price "explosion" between September and November; a poor export performance and an increase of the annual rate of inflation to more than 100% (against an estimated rate of 65% for the year). Criticism of the Government's determination to balance the budget and institute a tight money policy are being voiced now by such prominent personalities as the former vice-Premier Dr Hatta.

What's wrong in Indonesia? General Suharto, evaluating the achievements of the Ampera cabinet in 1967, stressed that the Cabinet's general policy was in accordance with the directions decided upon by the Provisional People's Congress, but he admitted faults in the execution of those programmes. He further criticised the gap that existed between the Government and the people — a misunderstanding or lack of understanding.

This might indicate that recent rumours about another imminent "re-dressing" (reshuffle) of the Cabinet and what is called in Indonesia a "refreshing" of Parliament were correct. Most members of the *Gotong Royong* House of Representatives (and of the People's Congress as well) were appointed by Sukarno in the "bad old days". Only the seats vacated by the communists were filled by Suharto early in 1967. Thus the parliamentary representation of the different political and functional groups is likely to be changed, and such a "purge" might well be accompanied by structural changes in the organisation of the parties, functional groups and the Armed Forces.

General Suharto seems to be mainly worried about the absence of communication between the leadership and the people. Many great ideas and projects have failed in Indonesia because of such a lack. Nimble Adam Malik, Indonesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, jumped to fill the vacuum with a proposal to form a movement for "the majority of the Indonesian people who strictly adhere to the New Order but are not represented in the existing political parties". The idea of such an "independent group" won some approval in the press — even in party papers. But it is still too early to judge whether a kind of "New Life Movement" as suggested by Minister Malik has much real chance of success.

Other suggestions to overcome the



One of China's nuclear tests: Wang En-mao may have China's stockpile of bombs under his control.



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## Tension and Conflict in Sinkiang

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K. N. RAMACHANDRAN

SINKIANG, which in Chinese means 'new frontier', celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur autonomous region on 10 October, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the twenty-sixth year of its existence. A central delegation led by Politbureau member and Vice-Premier Chen Hsi-lien went to Sinkiang to participate in the celebrations. On this occasion the Chinese official media waxed eloquent on the tremendous achievements of Sinkiang, although a more accurate balance sheet would show that Sinkiang's record in the past twenty years is a mixed bag of progress, stagnation, and uncertainties.

Bordering the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and covering an area of 635,829 square miles — or one-sixth of the total area of China — Sinkiang has remained a distant land of turbulence down the centuries. In the 19th century, Britain, Russia and China were locked in an imperial power game in this area which was nominally under Chinese rule. In the early part of this century, Sinkiang became the bone of contention between the commissars of the Kremlin and the nationalists of Nanking who were more often not even aware of what was happening in this area. The communist victory in China ended its turmoil and strife, and made possible the reassertion of Chinese control over this area.

### INTEGRATION WITH CHINA

The process leading to the political integration of Sinkiang with the rest of China began

formally in 1949 when the local elite under the leadership of Burhan, the Muslim governor of this area, declared its allegiance to the communists who offered regional autonomy to the minority nationalities of Sinkiang. A coalition government was set up in Sinkiang and it included leaders of the separatist Eastern Turkistan Republic, which was proclaimed during the late forties with Soviet support when the nationalist government sought to put an end to Soviet presence in Sinkiang. These Muslim leaders proved too difficult for Peking to manage, but most of them conveniently died in a mysterious plane crash on their way to Peking. And so Saifudin, a less known Uighur leader, was hand-picked by the CCP to champion its cause. Educated in Moscow, Saifudin had earlier joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1950 he accompanied Mao to Moscow to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet treaty. Interestingly enough, when he was in Moscow it was announced that he had joined the CCP. He played a prominent role in discrediting the separatist elements in Sinkiang in 1951. They were found guilty of 'narrow nationalism' and 'pan-Islamism.'

However, the reorganization of the province was delayed because of the existence of more than a dozen ethnic groups there. Sinkiang has often been described as a museum of nationalities. More than half the population of this area are Uighurs, a Turkic people. The Kazakh, Kirghiz, Sibo, Tadzhik, Russian, Uzbek, Tartar, Daur (Han Muslims), Mongol and Manchu minority groups have also settled in this area.

The province was organized into an auto-

nomous region in accordance with the Chinese communist framework for dealing with the nationality question. However, it needs to be pointed out that the CCP's thinking on the nationality question was different from that of the CPSU. The CCP paid lip service to Stalin's celebrated thesis on the nationality question but reached different conclusions. Both Lenin and Stalin had advocated, at least in theoretical terms, the right of the various nationalities to secede from the Soviet state. The CCP, on the other hand, argued that the objective conditions in China postulated a modification of the Soviet concept and basically stressed the unity of all nationalities. It ruled out, even in formal theoretical terms, the concept of secession by minority nationalities from the People's Republic. It emphasized the integration of all nationalities on class lines and argued that the oppressed people of all nationalities shared the common vision of creating a socialist society.<sup>2</sup> However, cultural, social, and religious autonomy was granted in order to smoothen out in the long run the processes toward integration of minority nationalities with the majority Han Group.

In practical terms, Peking created autonomous areas for minority nationalities and left the local administration in the hands of the minorities themselves. Peking recruited leaders from the traditional elite groups, who were willing to co-operate with the communists, to man the government.<sup>3</sup> However, all the crucial decision-making was done by Han leaders. Peking thus combined local autonomy with over-all centralized control. Saifudin became the chairman of the autonomous region, while Wang En-mao, a Han, became the first secretary of the local CCP.

#### SINKIANG BECOMES AUTONOMOUS REGION

Peking established the Sinkiang autonomous region on 1 October 1955. The province was

converted into an autonomous region because it was a Uighur minority-dominated area. However, since Sinkiang was a multi-national province, Peking also established autonomous areas at various levels within the province with a view to providing autonomy for the smaller minorities. Thus provincial subdistricts, counties and subcounty districts were created to provide autonomy to the Kazakhs, the Sibos, etc. These areas constituted minority areas in the dominant Uighur minority region.

While strict central political control over Sinkiang was exercised, in other spheres, particularly in social and economic matters, liberal policies were adopted. For, Peking wanted to allay the traditional minority suspicions of the Hans and hence adopted a gradualist course in the task of bringing them into the mainstream of Chinese life. Thus, Peking refrained from introducing hasty radical reforms in these minority areas. Further, since Sinkiang was rich in minerals and oil, Peking wanted to develop these resources rapidly. Both these factors combined to produce a liberal deal for Sinkiang.

According to official sources, in addition to large state grants to help balance its budget, Sinkiang every year received — and continues to receive — 'a special subsidy and a flexible appropriation regional authorities consider necessary'. The contingency reserves set aside by the state for the region are larger than those for other areas. Besides, the region has priority in getting materials and personnel needed for construction.

Further, it appears the region not only keeps all local revenues for its own use, but also gets huge subsidies from the central authorities. From 1955 through 1974 these subsidies accounted for as much as 53 per cent of its total revenue. Moreover, state investments in Sinkiang's capital construction in 1974 were more than five times the 1955 total, an official source disclosed.<sup>4</sup>

An institutional infra-structure has also been created in Sinkiang in the past twenty

years. Conscious of the need to create minority cadres and technicians, Peking, it appears, has also made considerable investment in this sector.

According to official data, the region now has eight institutions of higher learning and some 50 technical schools, in addition to a large number of primary and middle schools. Their total enrolment in 1975 amounted to 2,000,000 or '13 times more than for the early post-liberation period'. Over 20,000 technicians, research workers, doctors and artists of the Uighur and other nationalities have been trained since 1955.

In order to modernize the primitive tribal and pastoral economy, considerable attention was also paid to agriculture and animal husbandry. The region has set up more than 500 big state farms to engage in agriculture, animal husbandry, afforestation and fishery, a NCNA report said. It added that state allocations, running to a total of 260,000,000 yuan in the past 19 years, are made to meet the special needs of the minority peoples living in Sinkiang.<sup>5</sup>

Further, the state's taxation policy accords special consideration to Sinkiang to facilitate its advance. The small industrial enterprises run by counties, communes and production brigades, are exempted from taxes if their products are directly used to promote local agriculture and animal husbandry. Agricultural tax was about 4.5 per cent of the total grain output in 1974, that is, below the national average. Even lower tax rates are applied to stockbreeding communes and farms — a mere 1.5 to 2.5 per cent of their income.<sup>6</sup>

It is not suggested that the statistical data provided by Peking are accurate or that they truly reflect the progress of Sinkiang in the past twenty years. But it needs to be stressed that Peking has a vested interest in developing this strategic region bordering the Soviet Union. Seen in this context, a heavy dose of central investment and developmental

grants for this province appears logical and credible.

#### ETHNIC TENSIONS

Traditionally the minorities in this area, as elsewhere in China, have looked upon the Hans with considerable suspicion. The Hans too have perceived these non-Han border people as 'barbarians' to be controlled and dominated. These perceptions have survived, notwithstanding Peking's efforts to change them by socio-political and economic means.

As early as 1949 Peking reportedly sent some 200,000 PLA troops as 'shock teams' to spread the ideological cause of the CCP, to promote economic development, and to ensure military control over the area. These 'shock teams' played a leading role in trying to convince the minorities that the communist Hans were different from the reactionary ones. They learnt local languages, participated in local construction programmes, initiated health schemes, and generally strove to break down the barriers between the Hans and the minorities.

When the Sinkiang autonomous region was established, the minorities vastly outnumbered the Han population. According to the 1953 census report, there were only 300,000 Chinese (6 per cent) in a total minority population of 5 million in Sinkiang.

At the beginning of industrial construction in Sinkiang in the early fifties Peking ordered a mass migration of skilled Chinese into Sinkiang. It was reported that by 1957, the Chinese population in Sinkiang had swelled to nearly 30 per cent of the total. It may be noted that this vast migration was also to an extent motivated by long-term considerations of ending the status of Sinkiang as an exclusive minority region, although in theory such a motive was vigorously denied. Further, in order to allay the fears of the minorities, Peking also launched a programme of training

for them for the administrative and professional posts at the middle and lower rungs.

These efforts, however, did not produce the desired results. The old ethnic tensions surfaced with the large influx of the Chinese. The Han cadres were looked upon as 'arrogant' and 'chauvinistic' while the Hans themselves perceived the minorities as backward and 'local nationalists'. These tensions were accentuated during the Great Leap Forward because of the revolutionary zeal of the Chinese cadres, who offended the religious and social practices of the minorities, and attempted to radicalize the population. In September 1961, Saifudin, Peking's man in Sinkiang, openly admitted that Uighurs and Kazakhs, who co-operated with the CCP were branded as 'Jackals serving the Han'.<sup>7</sup>

The CCP was concerned with these manifestations of local nationalism and, in its own long-term interests, postponed further reforms. Teng Hsiao-ping, then Secretary-General of the CCP, emphasized in October 1957 that securing the concurrence of the majority in the minority groups should be a pre-condition for bringing the minorities into the mainstream of national life.<sup>8</sup>

#### CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN SINKIANG

In the decade that followed gradualism again became the keynote of Peking's approach and a large number of minority cadres oriented towards CCP were trained. It was these cadres who played a prominent role during the cultural revolution in Sinkiang.

The cultural revolution provided an opportunity for young motivated cadres to participate in the political upheaval. This was of greater political significance to the mainstream Han area. In this sense, it was the first occasion since 'liberation' that Sinkiang was fully drawn into a nation-wide political struggle. Several groups of Red Guards and left revolutionaries emerged

during the cultural revolution in Sinkiang. This situation was eminently suitable to Peking, because radicalization — a higher stage of political consciousness — of minority of groups constituted, in its view, an important step in the process of integration of minority nationalities with the politically advanced Han population. During the cultural revolution several old leaders of both Han and minority nationalities were discredited. Both Saifudin and Wang En-mao suffered a political eclipse, though Saifudin later staged a comeback.

Nevertheless, the problems of inter-ethnic tensions remain. Twenty years of efforts towards advancing minority interests has not produced impressive results. This was probably the reason why, Chen Hsi-lien referred to this question in his speech at a mass rally in Urumchi on 29 September this year. He said: 'All Party and government leading groups in Sinkiang now include a number of leading cadres from minority nationalities. This is a tremendous achievement. However, we should realize that for the development of socialist revolution and construction, we need more and more cadres, doctors, engineers, scientists, technicians and other personnel of *minority nationalities*. While stepping up the education of cadres of minority nationalities, all Party committees should continue boldly to select and train minority nationality cadres in accordance with the five requirements for successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. This is an important task we must conscientiously carry out in building socialist Sinkiang.' On the question of relations between nationalities Chen underlined the need for the Han cadres to prevent and overcome 'Han Chauvinism' and appealed to the minority nationalities to overcome 'local nationalism'.<sup>9</sup> He thus acknowledged the continued existence of these two negative trends.

### THE ECONOMY OF SINKIANG

On the economic front several changes are taking place in Sinkiang, but it appears that Peking is not satisfied with the pace of progress in Sinkiang. In its view, Sinkiang should make greater efforts to mobilize resources and make a beginning towards creating a self-reliant economy. Chen Hsi-lien observed that after 20 years of construction 'a preliminary foundation' has been created for industry and agriculture. Hence he made it unmistakably clear that in order for Sinkiang to achieve a 'still better result' and to bring about modernization, a 'painstaking struggle' lay ahead.<sup>10</sup> Reflecting similar sentiments, the *Sinkiang Daily* (27 September) criticized those who think that development of Sinkiang is the business of the central government and that there is no need for fully mobilizing local resources and energies.

In sum, after twenty years of development Sinkiang has just reached the preliminary foundation stage. Whether it would make greater efforts to catch up with the Han heartland remains to be seen. But its strategic importance will compel Peking to pay considerable attention to the modernization of Sinkiang, even if local initiative was not forthcoming.

### SOVIET INTERFERENCE

An issue of utmost concern to China regarding the Sinkiang region is the Soviet interference. The none too clean record of Soviet activities in Sinkiang region in the past only heightens this concern. In the twenties and thirties Soviet activities in Sinkiang were similar to those of the imperial Tsars. The Soviet Union entered into 'unequal treaties' with the Sinkiang authorities without the consent of the central government, gained a political presence, and practised economic exploitation like an imperial power.

The establishment of PRC somewhat modified the Soviet policy, but the basic objective of retaining a presence in Sinkiang was not abandoned. The Sino-Soviet agreements of 1950, which Mao was compelled to accept under the then existing conditions, gave the Soviet Union an economic presence in Sinkiang. The joint stock companies which were established under these agreements allowed for equal equity participation by the Soviet Union in the setting up of industries for the exploitation of the mineral and oil resources of Sinkiang.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet Union must have considered these agreements profitable from both the economic and political points of view. It offered an opportunity to the Soviet Union to attempt to create a pro-Soviet faction in this border province. In the light of the Soviet record in Manchuria, where they had backed Kao Kang against Mao, it appears that they hoped to create a similar situation in Sinkiang.

However, the Chinese leadership looked upon Soviet participation in the economic activities in Sinkiang only as a short-term measure. In 1954 Peking made it clear that unequal economic arrangements should end. When Khrushchev and Bulganin visited China in October 1954, the Soviet share in the joint stock companies was formally turned over to China as part of an overall effort to rectify the erroneous policies of Stalin towards the Chinese communists.<sup>12</sup> It may be recalled that the Sinkiang Autonomous Region was established only after the liquidation of Soviet economic interests in Sinkiang.

Nevertheless, when the Sino-Soviet dispute gathered momentum in the late fifties and early sixties, the Soviet strategy to counteract the Chinese included reactivation of its earlier policy of fomenting troubles for the Peking regime in Sinkiang. At the propaganda level, for instance, a book published in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, described the Muslim revolts in Sinkiang between 1864 and 1944 in purely anti-Chinese terms. The

Soviet Union thus backed anti-Chinese local nationalism.

In Spring 1961, with tacit encouragement from across the border, several Kazakh families fled across the border into Soviet territory. In September 1962 China alleged that the Soviets had lured tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets charged China with innumerable frontier violations and admitted that dozens of Kazakh families had migrated to the Soviet Union.

Whatever the truth about the number of Kazakhs who fled China, it appears that Soviet instigation and encouragement was the critical factor in this incident, although the migration also reflected some local resentment against the Peking regime. Among those who fled Sinkiang during this period was one Maj-Gen Zainun Taipov (Zulung Tai Yeh' fu) who was reportedly Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA in Sinkiang in 1960. From his Soviet exile, he charged Peking with suppression of minorities in Sinkiang.<sup>13</sup>

The Sino-Soviet border in the Sinkiang sector had remained alive since the early sixties when Peking advanced territorial claims and both sides strengthened their forces in the border. The Chinese have claimed more than 70,000 sq km of territory which is under Soviet control in the central Asian sector.

The worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute led to the massing of troops on both sides of the border and aggravated tension in the area. The climax was reached in 1969 when the Ussuri clashes took place in the Far Eastern sector. Several clashes were also reported in the Sinkiang sector between March and July 1969. In one such clash, the Soviet Union alleged that China had occupied 24 sq km of Soviet territory.<sup>14</sup> Apart from these specific instances, according to a Soviet source, there had been more than 2,000 clashes since the sixties.

The Sino-Soviet build-up on the border

had registered a steady increase since the sixties, but figures of sector-wise deployment of forces are not available. In general, each side appears to have deployed around 45-50 divisions on the frontiers.<sup>15</sup> However, according to a British report, the Chinese military strength in Manchuria, in Peking area, in Sinkiang and Lanchow consisted of 64 infantry divisions, 5 armoured, 11 artillery and 2 cavalry divisions.<sup>16</sup> Further, according to an estimate, there has been a 30 per cent increase in Chinese deployment of forces in the past five years on the Sino-Soviet border.<sup>17</sup> This is not surprising in the context of the fact that the Chinese Lop Nor nuclear and strategic missile installations are located in Sinkiang.

The Sino-Soviet border tension has indeed created a strategic problem for Peking in Sinkiang. Sinkiang is highly vulnerable to a Soviet surgical operation. In the event of a military confrontation it would be relatively easier for Moscow to march into the sparsely populated Sinkiang, where minority problems could be exploited, than into the predominantly Han populated and industrialized areas in the Far Eastern sector. This is probably the reason why Peking is more concerned with the defence of Sinkiang.

During his visit, Chen Hsi-lien, himself a distinguished military commander, seems to have sorted out the military problems with the Regional Commander, Yang Yung, who has done considerable work in Sinkiang in the past two years. This is the reason why Chen Hsi-lien repeatedly underlined the importance of increased defence preparedness during his inspection tour. Peking may well have consolidated its position within Sinkiang in the last twenty years, but the threat from across the border seems to have increased in proportion. For a different set of reasons, thus, Sinkiang has again become an area of tension and conflict in the seventies, if not beyond.


## NOTES

1. See Peter S.H. Tang and Joan M. Moloney, *Communist China: The Domestic Scene 1949-1967* (South Orange, 1967), pp. 276-677.
2. See the Chinese argument in Chang Chih-i, *The Party and the National Question in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). Translated by George Moseley.
3. See June Dreyer, 'China's Minority Nationalities: Traditional and Party Elites', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 1970-71, p. 511.
4. See NCNA, 27 September 1975.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 26 December 1957.
8. NCNA, 19 October 1957.
9. *Sinkiang Regional Service*, 30 September 1975.
10. *Ibid.*
11. See for details the author's article, 'Origins of the Sino-Soviet Dispute', *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Journal*, vol. 7, No. 3, January-March 1975, pp. 421-25 and 442.
12. See Denise Folliot (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs 1956* (London, 1957), p. 325.
13. See Geoffrey Wheeler, 'Sinkiang and the Soviet Union', *China Quarterly*, No. 16, October-December 1963, pp. 58-60.
14. 'India in World Strategic Environment', *IDS Annual Review, 1969-70*, p. 11.
15. *The Military Balance 1975-76* (London, 1975), p. 9 and 49.
16. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 14 July 1974.
17. Angus M. Fraser, 'Military Capabilities of China,' *Current History*, September 1975, p. 71.









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BOOK REVIEWS

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# Language Planning for China's Ethnic Minorities\*

June Teufel Dreyer

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognizes language as one but not the sole determinant of ethnic identification. Following the analysis of nationality outlined in Joseph Stalin's essay, *Marxism and the National Question*, official Chinese policy recognizes common territory, common economic ties and common psychological ties as of comparable importance to language in determining the existence of an ethnic group or—as it is generally referred to in Marxist terminology—minority nationality. The existence of four criteria allows some leeway for arbitrary judgments, since a group may meet some rather than all the tests (i.e., common language but territorial discontinuity, or territorial continuity and psychological ties but several different languages or very different dialects of a common language). The Chinese government has reserved to itself the right to final judgment on the existence of a national minority, declaring emphatically that a self-reported name of a nationality cannot automatically confirm the existence of such a nationality group.<sup>1</sup>

Within the first 15 years of its founding in 1949, the Chinese People's Republic (PRC) had confirmed the existence of 54 such nationality groups, with linguistic identification playing a significant role in this designation. Approximately 40 million people were included. The list of 54 was considerably less than the several hundred self-reported names amassed in the process of taking the 1953 census, and this paring down made the government's language planning significantly easier.

The CCP had come to power pledging to allow each ethnic group within its borders to develop according to its unique historical characteristics and raise its overall cultural level, with the group's language clearly being considered an important part of this ethnic-cultural

\* This article is based on a paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1978.

<sup>1</sup> Fei Hsiao-t'ung and Lin Yueh-hua, "A Study of the Question of Different Nationalities Among the Minority Nationalities of China," *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily, hereafter cited as JMJP), August 10, 1956.

complex. Several factors conditioned this benign attitude. First, the Soviet Union, which initially served China as a developmental model, had made similar pledges to its non-Russian minority groups. Second, the CCP had taken over most of China's minority areas by force or through last-minute capitulation by local elites when it was obvious that the CCP's victories in other areas of China would make resistance foolish. The majority of these areas were located along China's land borders, generally far from normal communications routes, of difficult terrain, and sparsely populated. Hence the new government of the PRC would have found it exceedingly difficult to enforce any suppression of local languages. Third, the new government was fearful of intervention by outside powers and was aware that suppression of local languages would antagonize peoples whose loyalties it wished to capture. Moreover, the existence of the minorities' languages was expected to present only short-term difficulties. Marxist theory promised a withering away of ethnic group antagonisms under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since minority groups totalled a bare 6 per cent of the population of China and, with the exception of the small Korean group (approximately one million as of 1949), none was as advanced technologically as the majority Han Chinese, the minorities would naturally come to accept the civilizing benefits of the Han and of socialism. Ideological and pragmatic reasons thus converged toward toleration of minority group languages.

The 1949 Common Program of the newly-founded PRC gave "each of the minorities alike . . . the freedom to develop its own language" and the state constitution of 1954 went considerably further, stipulating that minority areas could use one or more of the languages in common use in those areas to transact official business. Courts were to use the local languages in judging and sentencing, and minorities were given the right to use their own languages in litigation. The All-China Minorities Education Conference, held in September 1951, advocated that all minorities having their own written language be taught in those languages at the primary and secondary school levels. Those who did not have a written language, or whose written languages were "imperfect," should be helped to develop and reform their written languages, and could be taught with Chinese-language or minority-language textbooks where the latter existed. The meeting also, however, voted unanimously to establish Han language classes in "various" grades of minorities schools "in accordance with the needs of the minorities concerned."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background* (CB), no. 152, pp. 11-15.

## *China's Ethnic Minorities*

Partly in order to effect these promises and partly because the CCP wished to create a better basis for understanding the minority peoples in order to consolidate its rule over them, there was a good deal of interest in minority languages. Linguistic research emphasizing the study of minority languages was part of the 1951 Work Plan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and a guidance committee for research in nationalities' languages was established.<sup>3</sup> Several linguistics experts and anthropologists were assigned to a branch of the newly founded Central Nationalities Institute dealing with minority language research. Investigation teams were formed and sent for field work in various minority areas. Their expertise was to be used in collecting materials for the formulation of written languages, the compilation of dictionaries, and the preparation of courses of study to train cadres in minority languages. Those minority group members who wished to study Han (the Chinese language) should be given the opportunity to do so, but there must be no compulsion "at the present moment."<sup>4</sup>

By mid-1952, the party claimed to have published over 700,000 books and magazines in the Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur languages, and to be providing radio broadcasts and dubbed films in several minority languages. Work was proceeding on a written language for the Yi, a group whose three million members live in China's southwest. The founding of a Nationalities Press in 1953 facilitated the preparation of works in minority languages: in 1954, 8.73 million such books were published, an increase of 13 per cent over the previous year.<sup>5</sup> Newspapers and magazines also came under the purview of the party's efforts. In mid-1955 there were 20 newspapers and 28 magazines published in 7 languages (Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, Kazakh, Korean, Sibo and Yi).<sup>6</sup> Later in the same year, a conference on minority languages was held in Peking and drew up a three-year plan for its work. Decisions were also made to popularize a new script for the country's 7 million Chiang, to create a script for the smaller (approximately half a million) Hani group, and to adopt a simplified version of Mongolian which would be written horizontally, rather than vertically.<sup>7</sup>

These events give the impression of significant accomplishment. However, there had been occasional statements in the Chinese media implying that the bilingual facilities called for by the party's program

<sup>3</sup> United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (SCMP), no. 194, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> CB, no. 264, pp. 9-13.

<sup>5</sup> CB, no. 360, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> *kuang-ming jih-pao* (Bright Daily; KMJP), May 20, 1955.

<sup>7</sup> SCMP, no. 1130, p. 16.

often existed on paper only<sup>8</sup> and, just a year after the linguistics conference, China's highest-ranking minority group representative complained publicly to the National Party Congress that "no vigorous and practical support is given to devising and promoting minority nationalities' written languages."<sup>9</sup> This was Ulanfu, a Mongol who was concurrently First Party Secretary of the large and strategically located Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), chairperson of its government, and an alternate member of the central government's Politburo. Joining the CCP soon after it was founded, Ulanfu had received most of his education in Peking and had, at that time, been unable to speak Mongolian. Thus his views could not be dismissed as motivated by the nostalgia of misguided ethnic loyalties; this, plus his prestigious position, gave weight to Ulanfu's words.

The year 1956 saw increased efforts to upgrade the research on minority languages and the services available in them. Just one month after Ulanfu's speech, the government announced its first five-year plan for minority languages, embodying principles which will be familiar to the reader: those nationalities still without a written language should be helped to create one quickly; there should be more magazines, newspapers and so forth printed in these languages; the central radio broadcasting station should increase its programming in minority languages; more receiving stations should be set up in minority areas; and more films should be dubbed.<sup>10</sup> It was admitted that the quality of translations was low, and training programs for translators were expanded. Of specific rather than general interest was the announced plan to convert the Turkic Muslim languages from Arabic to Cyrillic script.<sup>11</sup>

Many of these projects were halted or even reversed in the following year. A country-wide "Hundred Flowers" campaign to encourage citizens of the PRC to voice their grievances against party and government had produced types of criticism which the ruling elite felt it could not tolerate, and an investigation of the party's minorities program showed that minorities tended to hold these opinions to a dangerous degree.

An examination of books and papers which had been translated into minority languages revealed many areas which aroused the party's ire. One problem involved the translator's use of words which

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, CB, no. 264, pp. 9-13; SCMP, no. 1456, p. 13; JMJP, February 10, 1957.

<sup>9</sup> CB, no. 418, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (Nationalities Solidarity; MTTC), no. 7, 1959, pp. 23-25.

<sup>11</sup> SCMP, no. 1361, p. 12.

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gave minority readers misleading impressions likely to lead to future political problems—for example, using the same term for both the “liberation” of Shanghai city by the CCP in 1949 and for the independence of Ghana from England a decade later,<sup>12</sup> or translating “central people’s government” as “the imperial house” and “capital” as “the palace in Peking.”<sup>13</sup> A second problem concerned resistance to borrowing Han vocabulary, on grounds that it was structurally inappropriate to the minority language concerned. Where the minority language did not have a term for a new concept, translators were found to go to unacceptable lengths to coin a new word from existing elements of their language or, worse yet, would adopt a word from a foreign language.<sup>14</sup> Such theories of “pure national language” and “national form as sacred” were thoroughly criticized as covert slanders against the Han language and literature.<sup>15</sup> Books in minority languages were also found to belittle “the advanced experiences of the Han elder brother” through such acts as placing the verses of the nationality’s own poets in the front of the volume while relegating the poems of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te to the rear. In general, books for minorities exhibited objectionable levels of local nationalism, religious sentiment, capitalist thought, and tendencies to “aloofness from politics, reality and production.”<sup>16</sup>

The CCP counterposed its mass campaign to elicit people’s opinions with another mass (“anti-rightist”) campaign—this time to correct such dangerous thoughts. Shortly thereafter it began an even larger campaign, the Great Leap Forward, to move the economy into a higher stage of socialism while raising productivity. Previous policy toward minority languages was one victim of the new campaigns.

Whereas heretofore the remedies for poor quality translations were assumed to be larger and better training programs, the new policy held that minorities should learn Han. Resistance was admitted, but felt to be the result of misunderstanding. When minorities complained that they did not wish to learn Han because it was too difficult (“There is no alphabet. The characters are more numerous than the hairs on one’s head; therefore, it’s not [a] good [language] to study”), they were told this was a problem which could be overcome. If minority group members argued that only those who worked in Han

<sup>12</sup> JMJP, February 15, 1958.

<sup>13</sup> *Min-tsu yen-chiu* (Nationalities Research; MTYC), June, 1959, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> MTTC, no. 6, 1959, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> MTYC, June 1959, p. 5.



areas should have to study the Han language, they were told that "such people regard the Han language as only a means to explain things to Han people. They neglect the important aspect of Han being a means through which to study the [wisdom of the] Han elder brother." The more astute minority cadres were said to realize that "if you can't speak Han, you're deaf. If you can't read Han, you're blind."<sup>17</sup>

A new "high tide of enthusiasm" for learning Han was alleged to have emerged among the minority masses. This being the case, and since translation facilities were expensive to maintain and took people away from labor with more direct relevance to production, it seemed useless to continue much of the investigatory work on minority languages. Mass media criticized "fuzzy thinking" on language planning, including the idea that every minority ought to have its own spoken and written language. In cases where one nationality had for some period of time been using the language of another, it was entirely right and proper for them to continue to do so. Where two nationalities had similar languages, choosing one or the other, or creating an "alliance" between the two was the suggested solution. And all minority languages, no matter what their backgrounds, should be standardized in accordance with the newly adopted *pin-yin* alphabet developed on the basis of the Han phonetic system.<sup>18</sup> This would include the Turkic Muslim languages which the party had earlier announced would use Cyrillic.<sup>19</sup> Though it does not appear that the 1956 decision to replace Arabic with Cyrillic was widely implemented, its subsequent reversal in favor of *pin-yin* had important political implications: in addition to symbolizing the growing coolness between China and the Soviet Union, using *pin-yin* would serve to separate Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs from Uighurs and Kazakhs who were Soviet citizens, and would render communications between them more difficult.

Investigatory work into minority languages was cut back or halted entirely. Linguistics experts were said to have thought "without evidence" that they had to "catch up to an international standard, write huge books and collect ever more material." In trying to compile a 50,000 character Han-Yi dictionary "to rival [the huge compendium of the Chinese language commissioned by Ch'ing dynasty emperor] K'ang Hsi" they had taken 8 years in their labors, during which time

<sup>17</sup> MTTC, no. 7, 1958, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> MTTC, no. 2, 1958, pp. 6-7.

<sup>19</sup> SCMP, no. 1799, p. 28.

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the Yi people had been without a written language.<sup>20</sup> (This contradicts information given above on the publication of Yi books and magazines in 1955.<sup>21</sup>) Similar delays were alleged to have characterized the work of the group commissioned to study the T'ai language. Researchers also erred in their tendencies to exaggerate the uniqueness of minority languages while neglecting the ways in which they were similar to each other and to Han. Detailed, complete dictionaries were said to exemplify "throwing off politics, reality and the masses." Simple dictionaries of a few thousand characters which would meet the needs of production were considered suitably socialist and practical. Minority group members who protested were accused of being "local nationalists" who espoused "national splittism" at the expense of the unity of the country, and those linguistics experts who objected to cutbacks of their projects were branded "bourgeois scientific objectivists" who were using capitalist methods.<sup>22</sup>

The policies of the Great Leap Forward in general aroused intense resistance, both in Han China and in minority areas. Economic chaos, political dissension and, in a few areas, outright rebellion ensued. Many of the Leap policies were modified or reversed, and the party's attitudes toward minority languages were among these. In view of Ulanfu's previous defense of the role of language planning, it is interesting to note that one of the first evidences of the party's more benign view of minority language study came from his province, the IMAR. In January 1962, a conference on nationality language and educational work was held "under the direct supervision of the regional Party Committee" in the IMAR's capital, Huhehot. The party's efforts in encouraging and developing the study of Mongolian were praised, as were its achievements in research on the dialects thereof, and in unearthing, collating and translating Mongolian literature so that the whole country could benefit from it. Statistics were given on numbers of Mongolian language broadcasting stations and numbers and circulation of Mongolian language newspapers and magazines. Mongolian was also the language of instruction in primary and secondary schools, though students "also pay attention to learning Han."<sup>23</sup>

A few months later Fu Mou-chi, a linguistics specialist writing in the journal *Nationalities Solidarity*, expressed rather different ideas on

<sup>20</sup> MTTC, no. 5, 1958, pp. 4-5.

<sup>21</sup> See above, footnote 6.

<sup>22</sup> MTTC, no. 5, 1958, pp. 4-5.

<sup>23</sup> KMJP, February 15, 1962.

borrowing vocabulary from Han than had prevailed during the Great Leap Forward. Though advanced rather diffidently, with the author apologizing for his "inexpert opinions," their political impact must have been considerable. Fu granted that minority languages would absorb increasing numbers of words from Han in the future, but cautioned that borrowing should be done carefully, taking into consideration the structure and past development of the individual languages. With languages such as Chuang, Dai, Miao and Lisu, much Han vocabulary could be easily absorbed. However, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur and Kazakh could not be considered in the same category. "We must take a long look at the influence of Han on specific minority languages . . . we must be meticulous and keep close relations with the masses, not simply deciding for them."<sup>24</sup>

In the following year, the same journal devoted a long article to the story of a Mongolian poet, quoting a speech he had made in 1956—i.e., before the anti-rightist campaign and Great Leap Forward—to the effect that ". . . one's own nationality language is best able to express that nationality's lives, feelings and character. Using it in one's works not only can directly enthuse one's own people to work and struggle, it can also add unique fresh flowers to the literary garden of the ancestral land which no other nationality's can be substituted for."<sup>25</sup> In other words, the development and use of nationalities' languages promoted not only literature but production and patriotism as well. *Nationalities Solidarity* also ran an article entitled "Strengthen Nationalities Press Work" which again advocated careful training of translators.<sup>26</sup>

This liberalized policy toward minority languages continued for the next several years, and the magazine *Chinese Youth* proudly announced that since liberation "over 10" nationalities had been helped to create written languages and three more were aided in improving their existing scripts. Twenty-two nationalities now had their own written languages and 18 of these published "various kinds of illustrated books" while 11 put out newspapers and magazines.<sup>27</sup> Han people who worked in minority areas were encouraged to learn the languages of those areas. As late as March 1966 a Chinese newspaper carried a story entitled "Learn to Speak Minority Nationality Languages for the Revolution" in which a Han employee of a People's

<sup>24</sup> MTTC, no. 3, 1962, pp. 25-27, 36-37.

<sup>25</sup> MTTC, no. 5, 1963, pp. 37-40.

<sup>26</sup> MTTC, no. 1, 1963, pp. 9-12.

<sup>27</sup> *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien-pao* (Chinese Youth), November 1963, p. 4.

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Bank branch in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region told how learning Kazakh had facilitated his dealings with the Kazakh people and simultaneously advanced the cause of socialism.<sup>28</sup>

1956 also saw the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and, with it, another attack on minority languages. The four minority language editions in which the magazine *China Pictorial* had been published (Chuang, Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur) disappeared at the beginning of 1957, as did much broadcasting in minority languages. Ulanfu was purged; among his long list of alleged crimes was giving orders "to organize a movement in the whole IMAR to study Mongolian in order to compete with and resist the mass movement for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works." This was held to be part of Ulanfu's larger plot to encourage the separation of Inner Mongolia from China.<sup>29</sup> His removal from office presumably also meant the end of efforts to study Mongolian, and his region was reduced in size by two-fifths. Through this division, several ethnically Mongol areas were attached to neighboring provinces.

However, the new policies met either resistance or incomprehension on the part of minorities who did not understand Han. One report from Inner Mongolia suggests that both may have been involved. The leading party newspaper, *People's Daily*, carried an article in 1968 detailing the efforts of People's Liberation Army (PLA) cadres in bringing Cultural Revolution propaganda to Mongolian herdsmen:

... All of a sudden, a number of commune members failed to turn up for several successive evenings. A poor herdsman went to look for them, but they would not come. When comrades of the Third Machine Gun Company went to ask them, they still would not come, claiming they were "sick." With each day more and more people used this pretext to absent themselves from the study class . . . a whisper was going around the village: "the PLA soldiers speak Chinese; we can't understand them. If we want to study, we will find people who read and write Mongolian to instruct us." The Company's party branch quickly became aware that class enemies were attempting to exploit ethnic and linguistic difficulties to sow dissension between the soldiers and people and destroy the Mao Tse-tung study class.<sup>30</sup>

The story ends with the PLA ferreting out the rumor-monger, having the herders denounce him, and drawing the study-class back together again.

This policy of restricting the use of minorities languages remained

<sup>28</sup> *Ta-kung-pao* (Impartial Daily), March 3, 1966.

<sup>29</sup> Radio Huhhot, January 12, 1968.

<sup>30</sup> JMJP, October 21, 1968.

in force for the next several years, with programming and publications in such languages at a minimum. A *People's Daily* article in 1970, describing the visit of an elderly Mongol lady to Peking for medical treatment, made a point of mentioning that she had repeatedly chanted to herself in Chinese good wishes to the Party and to Chairman Mao,<sup>31</sup> and a language forum held in Sinkiang concentrated on the absorption of new words, presumably borrowed from Han, into Uighur and Kazakh.<sup>32</sup> In the spring of 1971, *People's Daily* urged people to "quickly overcome all the obstacles which prevent the national minorities from reading the works of Mao Tse-tung in Chinese."<sup>33</sup>

This Cultural Revolution attitude toward minority languages changed abruptly very soon after the article cited above was written. In May 1971, Radio Peking began a series of broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh; in October the Kwangsi provincial broadcasting system resumed the Chuang language programming which had been defunct since 1967. During that month also two of the Mongol areas which had been removed from the IMAR in 1969 and attached to other provinces began broadcasting in Mongolian. The media began to make frequent references to the activities of nationalities' presses, citing impressive statistics on numbers of volumes being published, the large increases in circulation of ethnic language newspapers, and so forth. In 1972, modern Tibetan-language printing equipment went into operation in the Tibet Autonomous Region, work began on revising the 1964 edition of the Han-Tibetan dictionary, and a decision was made to manufacture more Tibetan typewriters.<sup>34</sup>

The new revolutionary operas introduced during the Cultural Revolution under the auspices of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, were also modified: it now became acceptable to use minority musical instruments for accompaniment, and to adapt the dialogue to minority folk song forms sung in minority languages. The adaptations to Pai, Korean, Uighur and Kazakh languages were said to be most popular, and particular publicity was given to the latter two transplants. The Uighur version utilized the traditional "12 mucam" form, and its Kazakh variant employed a poem-recitation style said to be unique to Kazakh folklore.<sup>35</sup>

The efforts of local writers who used the vernacular were also much praised. *At The Foot of Kyzyl Mountain*, a novel singled out for

<sup>31</sup> JMJP, February 8, 1970.

<sup>32</sup> Radio Urumchi, December 30, 1970.

<sup>33</sup> JMJP, May 22, 1971.

<sup>34</sup> Radio Peking, August 3, 1974; Radio Lhasa, June 9, 1975.

<sup>35</sup> Radio Peking, May 26, 1976.

special attention was said to "richly portray Uighur life and characteristics" using a wealth of Uighur proverbs<sup>28</sup> in the execution of its socialist morality play plot. A major new effort was begun to induce Uighurs and Kazakhs to use the *pin-yin* version of their script,<sup>29</sup> previous efforts in that direction having fallen into abeyance.

These changes closely coincided with the fall from power of Lin Biao, the man who had emerged from the Cultural Revolution as second only to Mao and who had been named Mao's successor. The subsequent campaign to vilify Lin listed many misdeeds, including "wadding nonsense" about minorities and causing splits in the unity of nationalities. However, Lin's attitude toward nationality languages is not among these alleged misdeeds, and it would be over-interpreting the available evidence to infer that Lin himself felt strongly about restricting the use of minority languages.

In January 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress met, approving a new constitution which reaffirmed that all nationalities had the right to use their own spoken and written languages.<sup>30</sup> However, this guarantee is a good deal less explicit than that of the 1954 constitution it replaced, which said

Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The people's courts are required to provide interpreters for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality. In an area entirely or largely inhabited by a minority or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in the people's courts are to be conducted in the language commonly used in the locality and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are to be promulgated in that language.<sup>31</sup>

This change may indicate the belief of the framers of the 1975 constitution that the rights given by the earlier version, being new, had to be spelled out in some detail. However, 21 years later these rights had become accepted as a matter of course, and such an enumeration was no longer necessary. On the other hand, removing the specific guidelines interpreting minorities' freedom to use their own languages might also be construed as a move toward a more assimilationist form of linguistic policy.

<sup>28</sup> Radio Peking, March 17, 1976; Radio Peking, April 21, 1976.

<sup>29</sup> See Radio Peking, August 23, 1976 for a discussion of the steps leading to the adaptation of Uighur and Kazakh to *pin-yin* and the continuing efforts to popularize the *pin-yin* script.

<sup>30</sup> Peking Review 18, 4 (January 24, 1975), p. 14.

<sup>31</sup> Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, People's Publishing House, 1954, article

Actual policy at the time of the Fourth National People's Congress seemed quite tolerant, and even encouraging, of the use of minority languages. However, the more restricted nature of the guarantees on the use of minority languages written into the constitution plus the fact that the use of minority languages was restricted during the Cultural Revolution, although Lin is not accused of responsibility, may indicate that a group other than Lin (and not purged with him) was responsible. Such speculation is reinforced by accusations made when the so-called "Gang of Four," including Mao's widow and three leading party figures from Shanghai, was purged in 1977. Denunciations of the Gang which accompanied their fall from power included accusations of their negative attitude toward minority languages. For example, it was said that when a minority group member from Sinkiang used an interpreter in delivering his work report to a group including Chiang Ch'ing, Chiang Ch'ing was deeply offended, objecting "Next time you talk to us, will you speak without an interpreter? You make me feel like a foreigner."<sup>40</sup> The Gang was also said to have called for the elimination of minority languages on grounds that they were "useless" and it was "retrogression" to employ them.<sup>41</sup> It was further alleged that although the adaptation of the revolutionary opera, *Red Lantern*, to Uighur was done with Premier Chou En-lai's personal approval, the Gang of Four had opposed it, with Chiang Ch'ing only "pretending" to voice her support.<sup>42</sup>

Just what effects the Gang of Four had on minority language work after 1971 is not clear, particularly if the other members thereof followed Chiang Ch'ing in only pretending to voice support for adaptations into minority languages. Certainly the modified revolutionary operas were performed in minority languages, and there were frequent references in the press lauding Han cadres who had learned to speak the languages of the areas they worked in.<sup>43</sup> As has been noted above, radio broadcasting in minority areas increased markedly, and Sinkiang even reported progress in developing television programs especially for its Uighur viewers.<sup>44</sup> The Gang may have been responsible for the less explicit guarantees on the use of minority languages contained in the 1975 constitution, and it may also have figured in August 1975 and July 1976 conferences on the arts held in Sinkiang

<sup>40</sup> Radio Peking, January 30, 1977.

<sup>41</sup> Radio Peking, May 16, 1977.

<sup>42</sup> Sinkiang Radio, December 16, 1977.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g., Radio Huhehot, October 6, 1974.

<sup>44</sup> Radio Urumchi, September 17, 1975.

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whose published reports dwelt on the weeding out of the old erroneous manifestations of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism in literature and said virtually nothing about adaptation of art forms.<sup>46</sup>

If the charges levelled against the Gang of Four are an accurate representation of their views on minority languages, they would seem to have been able to slow down, but not do away with, many of the measures of toleration toward these languages. In any case, after their purge, more interest in minority language work was evident, with the measures taken differing from those characterizing the 1971-75 period not in kind but in degree.

Several meetings were held to discuss the publication of Mongolian-language books, drawing together representatives of the eight provinces in which China's Mongols live. Compilation work began for a new Mongolian-Han dictionary, and the price of Mongolian language books was revealed to be less than the same book in Han, due to government subsidies.<sup>47</sup> New regulations on admission to higher educational and vocational schools issued by the IMAR in 1977 allowed minorities to take entrance examinations in their own languages except for those applying to the Han and Mongolian language departments, in which case exams were to be taken in Han or Mongolian, respectively.<sup>47</sup>

In Szechwan, an experimental program was begun to teach the Yi to read Yi-language materials, thereby "solv[ing] a big problem in the cultural emancipation of the Yi people." A new version of standardized Yi was being used to dub movies, translate books and government documents, and in "creative literary works."<sup>48</sup> Volume Five of Mao Tse-tung's works was published in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh, and Korean at approximately the same time as its Han language edition appeared.<sup>49</sup>

Judging from the relative lack of references to popularizing the new *pin-yin* script for Uighurs and Kazakhs since 1976, efforts to enforce its use may have lessened. There have been frequent allusions by the Chinese media to "frenzied attacks and slanders" against the reform of the Uighur and Kazakh scripts carried out over a long period of time by alleged agents of the Soviet Union and class enemies who were "fabricat[ing] and spreading rumors in an attempt to undermine

<sup>46</sup> Radio Urumchi, August 27, 1975; Radio Urumchi, July 22, 1976.

<sup>47</sup> Radio Huhehot, May 17, 1977.

<sup>47</sup> Radio Huhehot, November 8, 1977.

<sup>48</sup> Radio Peking, May 16, 1977.

<sup>49</sup> Radio Peking, July 1, 1977.



reform work."<sup>50</sup> Whatever the reasons for resistance, attachment to the Arabic script seems to be strong. The Soviet Union publishes a newspaper specifically for Turkic Muslim refugees from China to the USSR. Called *Yeni khayal* (New Life), it uses Arabic rather than the Cyrillic alphabet employed by newspapers for native Soviet citizens of Turkic Muslim ancestry.<sup>51</sup>

The PRC policy toward minority languages has swung between attitudes of tolerance during periods associated with the prevalence of conservative policies among the ruling elite and more repressive policies associated with periods when more radical views prevailed among the ruling elite. Whatever the ideology of the group in charge, and despite party promises to help each nationality develop a written language, actual policy has consistently, though to different degrees at different times, tended to favor those written languages which were already well-developed before 1949 and to which cultural attraction has been strong. These are, notably, Tibetan, Mongolian, Uighur, Kazakh and Korean. Another consistent feature of the party's policy has been to teach all minorities to read and write Han Chinese. Given the fact that the language of 94 per cent of the country is Han, and that scarce resources are consumed in the process of compilation and translation, the party's desires to avoid a proliferation of minority languages is understandable. So also are the desires of various minorities to resist any restrictions on the use of their languages and their lack of enthusiasm for learning Han.

Just how far the policy of teaching Han to minorities has progressed is difficult to ascertain. Scattered interview data from Han refugees who have been sent to minority areas for some period of time and then left China indicate that many younger minority-group members have learned at least to speak, if not to write, Han, while older members of those groups in general had not learned either. On-the-job relations between Han and non-Han were relatively tension-free; minorities would speak to Han using Han, while to each other and in their homes, they would use their native tongue. Occasionally minorities might even invite a Han workmate to a local festival. The campaign to induce Han to learn the local languages seems not to have been a great success, most people learning only a few words. However, this sample is far too small for statistically valid conclusions, and says nothing about the Han language capability of those minorities who do

<sup>50</sup> Radio Peking, August 23, 1976.

<sup>51</sup> Christopher S. Wren, "Kazakhstan Beckons Refugees from China," *New York Times*, April 24, 1976, p. 8.

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not have Han work-mates. Still, with many Han being sent to minority areas, it may come to represent the common rather than unusual situation in the future.

It should be noted that the swings from toleration to repression of minority languages do not represent a significant divergence in the views of the elite group on what the content of the message should be, but only on the medium through which it is expressed. The Uighur author of *At the Foot of Kyzyl Mountain* may have used Uighur proverbs and the Uighur language, but what was produced was a standard work on the struggle to build a model commune. Similarly, Korean folk tunes and the Korean language were used to present a Han-socialist opera. The present policy of encouraging the use of minority languages may, if it continues for any length of time, have the unintended result of reinforcing interest in nationalities' cultures and their uniqueness rather than the desired result of consolidating all groups into a unified and mutually tolerant supra-ethnic state. However, the former alternative is clearly not the intent of the group now backing policies of toleration toward minority languages. Their goal seems rather to be symbolized by Radio Peking's account of the twentieth anniversary celebration of the founding of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1975, in which a band composed of the traditional instruments of all the nationalities played vigorously "while the masses of more than ten nationalities were singing in their respective languages the same songs: 'We Wish Chairman Mao a Long, Long Life,' and 'Socialism Advances Triumphantly Everywhere.'"<sup>82</sup>

*Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, April 1978*

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<sup>82</sup> Radio Peking, October 2, 1975.

# ASIA MAJOR

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## MERCHANT, TRADE AND GOVERNMENT IN LATE T'ANG

by DENIS TWITCHETT

The period from about 750 to 1000 A.D. is one in which Chinese society underwent a fundamental transformation. However one is to describe this process of change, and the interpretations which have been put upon it have been as various as the scholars who have written upon the period, it is common ground that it marks a watershed in the history of political institutions, in economic organization and in the basic structure of Chinese society. One of the most striking features of this great social transformation is the enormous expansion of trade, and accompanying this the growing complexity of commercial organization, the emergence of a solid money economy, progressive urbanization, and the emergence of an identifiable urban class with its own sub-culture. These changes were accompanied by an almost equally radical change in official policy towards commercial activity and the merchant community, and a fundamental re-alignment of government financial policy, which mark off the ninth century as the end of an era in economic theory and practice.

To work on any question concerning merchants and trade in pre-modern China confronts the historian squarely with a very difficult methodological problem. The modern scholar working on the period prior to about 1000 A.D. is almost completely dependent upon the products of the highly sophisticated tradition of official historiography, written deliberately for the record. Even when we are able to confront this historical record with independent contemporary literary material, this surviving literature too derives almost entirely from the same closely-knit élite of literati from amongst whom the official historians were recruited, and who shared with them a common ideology and common social attitudes. Although the intellectual conformity of the T'ang literati can be greatly exaggerated, and although the official "Confucian" ideology allowed for a very wide spectrum of acceptable views on many questions, on some broad fields the official orthodox ideology and commonplace élite attitudes were almost invariable. One of these areas of near unanimity is the antipathy shown towards those social groups who were potential rivals to the established ruling group of scholar-official bureaucrats. In government the eunuchs, operating from a totally different power-base, the financial specialists whose concept of government was based on the account-book rather than on the ethical

precepts of Confucian ideology, and the military élite, were all despised and their achievements consistently played down. The official histories, written by bureaucrats for bureaucrats, and concerned above all with the activities of the bureaucracy and with the exercise of political power and authority, systematically underplay their importance, and particularly in the case of the eunuchs almost always deal with them from a hostile viewpoint. The merchant community fared even worse at the official historian's hand. Eunuch, finance minister and general were at least all engaged in the affairs of government, the career towards which all élite education was aimed, the only avocation which provided a completely acceptable social ambition. The merchant, on the other hand, played no active role in politics or government, and appears in the histories only as the passive object of official policy, or as an offender against the authority of the State.

What information we have about merchants is then not to be found tidily arranged and systematically presented in the T'ang histories and other official compilations. We are thrown back upon casual information contained in literary texts, upon Ch'uan-ch'i fiction dealing with social themes, and above all, upon early ninth century poetry. This material shares much of the anti-mercantile "Mandarin" outlook of the historians and presents additional interpretative problems of its own, for such literature had its own stereotypes and descriptive formulae, even more complex and difficult to evaluate than those of the histories. But for the historian its principal shortcoming is that it almost all derives from a very short period, roughly 780-845, and it thus gives little opportunity to detect secular change.

The official attitude towards merchants had already been formulated, even before the emergence of the first unified empire, in the theory of the "Four Social Classes", which was still, in T'ang times a millennium later, embodied in a clause of Statute law.<sup>1</sup> Society comprised the scholar officials, whose business it was to rule; the farmers, the artisans and the merchants, all of whom were to be ruled. Among these latter however, the profession of

<sup>1</sup> See TLT 3, p. 31a-b: "They should distinguish between the four classes (*ssu-jen* 四人; *jen* is a taboo substitute for the classical *min*) of the empire, causing them each to specialize in their own profession. Those who practise learning, both civil and military, are the scholar-officials (*shih*). Those who exhaust their strength in ploughing and in sericulture are farmers (*nung*). Those who make goods and exchange them are artisans (*kung*). Those who are butchers and wine-sellers and traffic in goods are merchants (*shang*). [Artisans and merchants are all those whose families specialize in such professions in search of profit. It does not include "weaving fabrics, ribbons or cords" (i.e. domestic weaving; - the phrase 織紉組紉 is a quotation from the Nei-tse section of *Li-chi*.)] The families of artisans and merchants must not associate with the officials. The people who live on official emoluments must not rob the inferiors of their profits." See also the shorter passage in CTS 48 p. 3b, and an almost identical passage (but omitting the commentary) in CTS 43, p. 7a; c.f. also Niida Noboru, *Tōryō shūi* 唐令拾遺, p. 244-5 for a related quotation from *Ryō-no-shūge* and other passages.

agriculture was looked upon as the "fundamental" productive occupation, whereas the artisan producing luxuries and the merchant living by trading in the products of other men's hands were classed as "secondary" professions. This theory, like so many of the ideas on social and economic matters current during the T'ang period can be traced back to the "Legalist" writers of the Warring States period for whom the object of official policy was to evolve a rigidly regimented society completely subservient to an all-powerful state apparatus.

For such a state, a stable and passive peasantry, who would both produce abundant revenue in time of peace, and provide ample manpower for military purposes, was a prime necessity. This conception of a rural population organized in such a way that they would provide regular revenues and at the same time be readily mobilized in time of war, remained a powerful motif in Chinese political thought. In T'ang times it was embodied in the *Fu-ping* militia organization, which was the basic military institution during the seventh century. The whole system of land allocation and taxation which was developed between late Han and early T'ang times was also built on the same premise that the prime objective of state policy was a settled, stable and contented peasant population, carefully registered and controlled, which would provide regular and ample taxation in kind, and be readily available for labour service or military service when required.<sup>2</sup>

In such a society, the merchant was conceived of as a disturbing factor, and as a potential danger to the established order. Not only did he convert to his own profit much of the peasantry's surplus production, which might rather have gone to swell the Imperial revenues. Not only was he the advocate of a materialist attitude diametrically opposed to and fundamentally repugnant to the ethical precepts of Confucianism, with its stress upon government by moral precept and persuasion, upon personal ethical cultivation, and its de-emphasis of material rewards. He also provided the population with a model of a possible means of social advancement based purely on the acquisition of wealth, which was an alternative to the officially acceptable ladder of advancement through military or civil services to the State. Moreover, he was an unstable element in society, and very difficult to control effectively. He was lumped together by the early legalist authors with travelling politicians, unemployed intellectuals, and professional knights-errant, disturbing elements in society "who can carry all their personal capital around to any house on earth".<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless, for all that the merchant and artisan were lowly esteemed, and considered as unproductive and potentially disruptive social elements,

<sup>2</sup> This aspect of the land system of T'ang and pre-T'ang times is very extensively studied by Ho Ch'ang-ch'un 賀昌寧 in his excellent *Han-T'ang chien feng-chien t'u-ti suo-yu-chih hsing-shih yen-chiu* 漢唐間封建土地所有制形式研究 Shanghai, 1964.

<sup>3</sup> *Shang-chün-shu* 6, p. 6a, Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang*, p. 220.

it was recognized that they fulfilled an essential function in society: "Making near and far come into touch, communicating between those who have and those who have not". The question for government was not how to eliminate them, but how to ensure that they carried on their business under strict supervision.<sup>4</sup> Some pre-Ch'in Legalist writers advocated that in an ideal society merchants should live in separate hereditary communities, partly to preserve their own stability and social identity, but mainly to prevent the primary producers, the peasants, becoming envious of their superior conditions of life since:

"Today, those who follow the secondary pursuits can earn enough in a day to live on for five days, while the farmer labours ceaselessly throughout the year and still cannot obtain enough to maintain himself."<sup>5</sup>

The merchants then, from the time of the first unified empires of Ch'in and Han, were accepted in Society on sufferance, as a necessary evil and as a group morally inferior to the peasantry. They were nonetheless recognized to be indispensable and were accorded free (*liang* 良) legal status. Their social position should not be confused with that of the various types of bondsmen (*chien-min* 賤民), or with the members of such "untouchable" professions as beggars, butchers, prostitutes etc. The main concern of the state was to contain them, to prevent their disrupting the fabric of rural society, and to ensure that they could not become so powerful by the exercise of their wealth that they could menace the prestige and authority of the official ruling class.

To fulfil these purposes, the government during the Han Dynasty and later periods down to and including the T'ang employed two distinct sets of policies towards merchants. The first was designed to ensure that their social status and condition of life were permanently depressed to prevent their forming an élite based upon wealth which would rival the established political élite of officials and scholars. They were thus subjected to certain legal disabilities, and to strict sumptuary laws designed to prevent their openly displaying their wealth in flagrant ostentation. The second set of policies attempted to restrict their commercial activities and to keep these under strict official control. Seeking justification in the belief that "whenever trade flourished the peasant producer suffered," the government attempted to restrict trade to officially controlled markets, subjected the travelling merchant to close and continual surveillance, and spasmodically imposed various types of tax and levy upon his commercial transactions.

The sumptuary regulations affecting the merchant were only a part of the immensely complex system of regulations which distinguished the manner

<sup>4</sup> See for example *Kuan tzu* I, 5, v, *Wu shih shih*, I, 5, vi, *Shih nung kung shang*, XV, 48, *Chih kuo*, etc.

<sup>5</sup> *Kuan tzu*, VIII, 20, *Hsiao k'uang*, *Kuo Yu* 6, *Ch'i yü*.

of the various status groups making up society. There was a most marked and rigid distinction between the forms of dress, carriages and riding animals, houses, furniture, personal adornment, ceremonial and religious observances, permitted to the commoners on the one hand and to the holders of official rank, on the other; for it was the maintenance of the superior prestige, social position and way of life of the official class which was the prime object of the whole system. Merchants, however, were subjected to even more rigorous restrictions than were the ordinary commoners. Under the Han and later they were forbidden to dress in fine silk and furs, to ride in carriages or on horseback, or to carry arms.<sup>7</sup> Like all commoners they were not permitted to wear ornaments of gold, silver, jade or precious stones.<sup>8</sup> Under the Sui they were even forced to dress in black, as were butchers and members of other degraded professions, to set them apart from the commoners who wore white.<sup>9</sup> Their houses were restricted in size and decoration<sup>10</sup>, their weddings and funerals and other ceremonials were supposed to be conducted frugally and simply. As with all social groups their style of life was expected to conform to their legal status, and they were forbidden to employ their wealth in maintaining a standard of luxury and ostentation reserved for the officials.

Such laws remained in force in China until the end of the Manchu dynasty, but must always have been difficult to enforce according to the strict letter of the law. They were certainly flouted even in periods of strong government power, and were disregarded quite openly by the 8th century.<sup>11</sup> A much more real disability for the merchant lay in the legal restrictions arising from his status. Under the Ch'in and the Han, for example, registered merchants and the descendants of merchants were among the groups to be called up first in case of military conscription or corvée duty.<sup>12</sup> Merchants who wished to use the official markets had to be specially entered on a "market register" (*shih-chi* 市籍), and to pay the authorities a rent for their shop or stall.<sup>13</sup> Under the T'ang, artisans and merchants did

<sup>6</sup> There is no good account of the sumptuary regulations of T'ang times. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, *Law and Society in Traditional China* (La Haye 1961), pp. 135-154 gives the best general description of this type of restriction.

<sup>7</sup> See *Han shu* 1B, p. 13a, Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. I, p. 120, *Han shu* 24B, p. 3b, Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 231, and the discussion on pp. 24-5.

<sup>8</sup> See *TT* 61, p. 350a-b, *THY* 31, p. 569, *CTS* 45, p. 13a, *HTS* 24, p. 9a.

<sup>9</sup> See *CTS* 45, p. 13a. Under the T'ang commoners wore either white or yellow. See *CTS*, loc. cit., *THY* 31, p. 569, *HTS* 24, p. 9a.

<sup>10</sup> *THY* 31, p. 575, *TLT* 23, pp. 14b-15a. The rules on restrictions on size and style of buildings were incorporated in the *Statutes* (see Niida, *Tōryō shūi*, pp. 802-4) and this Statute was backed by a specific article of the *Code* 26, art. 15 which prescribed a penalty of a flogging of 100 strokes for infringement of the sumptuary regulations.

<sup>11</sup> See the series of edicts issued after 827 and included in *THY* 31, p. 537 ff.

<sup>12</sup> See Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 24-5, 50.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 115, 231.



not receive grants of land under the general system of allocation, except in areas where there was a surplus of vacant land and even there they received only half of an ordinary peasant's share.<sup>14</sup> They were also subjected to heavy assessments under various supplementary taxes<sup>15</sup> and were liable to various types of special duty.<sup>16</sup>

The greatest disability of all, however, was the denial to the merchant and to his sons and grandsons of the opportunity for official employment. This had already been the case under the Han when selection of officials was comparatively informal.<sup>17</sup> During the third to the sixth centuries, when office was largely dependent on birth and China was ruled by a small aristocratic class, and society divided into caste-like status groups, the merchant was naturally excluded from official employment.<sup>18</sup> When the Sui and T'ang set up their new systems of examinations designed to recruit able men for the civil service from a much broadened social background, merchants and artisans were again specifically excluded from entry, and from inclusion in the prefectural quotas of candidates.<sup>19</sup> They were thus denied the opportunity of entry into the official class, and of acquiring in addition to their wealth, political power and the undisputed right to a superior mode of life, and social esteem.<sup>20</sup>

In such ways, the merchant's status was more restricted than that of the ordinary peasant. But nonetheless, he remained a freeman commoner (*pai-ting* 白丁), and not a member of the "mean" bondsmen group.<sup>21</sup> His

<sup>14</sup> See *TT* 2, p. 16b; *TFYK* 495, p. 23b, Twitchett, *Financial administration under the T'ang dynasty*, p. 129.

<sup>15</sup> See Twitchett, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 38.

<sup>16</sup> See Twitchett, "Local financial administration in the early T'ang", to appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*.

<sup>17</sup> *Han shu* II, p. 3b, 24B, p. 3a-b.

<sup>18</sup> See Miyakawa Hisayuki, *Rikuchō shi kenkyū* 宮川尚志: 六朝史研究 (1956), p. 194 ff.

<sup>19</sup> See *TLT* 2, p. 26a; *PSLT* 24, p. 90a; *Code* 25, art. 9. Cf. Niida Tōryō Shūi, p. 294. For the ban upon entry to the examinations see *CTS* 43, p. 3b; p. 7a; *WHTK* 37, p. 347a; *HTS* 45, p. 1a (cf. des Rotours, *Le Traité des Examens*, p. 215). *TT* 14, p. 81a gives the same rule for Sui times.

<sup>20</sup> On the different standard of life permitted to officials and to commoners, see Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-69.

<sup>21</sup> Niida Noboru 仁井田隆 *Shina mibun-hō shi* 支那身分法史 (1941), p. 560, points out that during the Northern Wei period members of ordinary commoner families (*shu-min* 庶民) were forbidden to intermarry with artisans, merchants, yamen runners or members of the 'mean' classes. He cites this as a case of 'group endogamy' among the common people analogous to the endogamy practised at a higher level by scholar official (*shih-ta-fu*) families and by a hierarchy of limited aristocratic groups. (See *Wei shu* 7A, p. 13a; 7B, p. 3a.) He also cites a rather similar rule from T'ang times, again grouping merchants with semi-servile groups, from the rather dubious "Edict attributed to Kao Shih-lien" appended to the list of local eminent lineages, no. *wei* 67 of the Peking collection of Tun-huang MSS. Here artisans and merchants, *ying-men* 營門, *tso-hu* 雜戶, *mu-jung* 募容 and 'mean' (*chien*) persons who have been manumitted and become 'free' (*liang*), are forbidden to intermarry with ordinary

household was registered for legal and fiscal purposes just in the same manner household. The fact that he *also* appeared on a register did not mean that he was considered a member of a class completely apart or as contracted out of normal social obligations, as for example the separately registered Buddhist monks and Taoist priests.<sup>22</sup>

To the average merchant the restrictions of social status and way of life which he suffered were perhaps less irksome than the various ways in which the government attempted to control commercial activity, for here government policy struck at his real strength, his wealth.

In T'ang times the most important form of government control was the system of official markets<sup>23</sup> The origins of this system almost certainly antedate the unified empire of the Ch'in. It was already well established under the Han and it persisted, with many variations of nomenclature and of practice, until the end of T'ang times. Under this system the "central markets" of county towns and larger administrative centres, in which inter-regional and large-scale commerce was concentrated, were placed under strict government supervision. All commercial transactions were restricted to the market, held in a separate section of the city, and controlled by an official market supervisor with his own specialized staff. This market office was the only independent court of summary jurisdiction outside the local magistrate's court, and was not only entitled to exercise summary punishment for offences against public order within the market, but was also responsible for maintaining strict trading hours, supervising weights and

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commoner families, even if they possess a genealogy. Serious doubt has been cast on this document's authenticity, by Ikeda On 池田温 "Tōdai no gumbō-hyō - kyū, jū seiki no Tonkō shahon wo chūshin toshite" 唐代の郡縣表—九十世紀の敦煌寫本を中心として *Tōyō gakuhō*, 42, iii (1959), pp. 59-95; 42, iv, pp. 40-58. Another slender piece of evidence of the same sort is to be found in Hu San-hsing's admittedly very late commentary to an Edict of 674, quoted by *TCTC* 202, p. 6373, which reads "Commoners (*shu-min*) should wear yellow, with girdle ornaments of bronze or iron. Those who are not *shu-min* are not permitted to wear yellow." Hu says that 'those who are not commoners' means 'artisans, merchants and *tsa-hu*' 非庶民謂工商雜戶. However, this evidence is far too slight to counterbalance the fact that merchants and artisans are *never once* mentioned as a legal status group in any T'ang legal text, and there is no specific statement anywhere, to my knowledge, that merchants were not free men (*liang*).

<sup>22</sup> See Twitchett, *Financial administration*, p. 204, note 46, and "Monastic estates in T'ang China", *Asia Major* (n.s.) 5, ii (1956), pp. 123-46. See also Akitsuki Kan'ei 秋月観暎 "Tōdai shūkyō keihō ni kansuru kanken" 唐代宗敕刑法に関する管見 *Tōhō shūkyō* 4/5 (1954), pp. 137-52.

<sup>23</sup> See Twitchett, "The T'ang market system", *Asia Major* (n.s.), 12, ii (1966) pp. 202-48, and the literature there cited. See also the article by Satō Taketoshi 佐藤武敏, "Tōdai no shisei to kō - toku ni Chōan wo chūshin toshite", 唐代の市制と行—とくに長安を中心として, *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 25, 3 (1966), pp. 32-59, which appeared shortly after. Hino Kaisaburō 日野岡三郎 "Tōdai no entai-sōshi no hattatsu" 唐代の壘城草市の發達 *Tōhōgaku* 33 (1967), pp. 44-53 also adds something to our knowledge of the growth of small market towns by stressing the growth of rural markets around haulovers on canals and rivers.

measures and the quality of money in circulation, supervising the quality of goods on sale, issuing certificates of sale for such things as livestock, slaves or real estate, and preventing such unfair trading practices as cornering the market in commodities, unfair price fixing, or deceiving the public. The market office additionally had the difficult task of regularly reviewing prices, and fixing standard prices.<sup>24</sup>

Even in the capital cities, the immensely complex metropolitan markets were administered by special offices under the Court of Treasury, which kept equally strict control over what were probably the busiest centres of commerce in the whole world at the time, where commodities from all parts of China and from as far afield as the Near East, Central Asia and the South Seas were sold to provide the needs of the teeming urban population and the great concentration of wealthy officials and ministers, the vast military garrisons, the innumerable monks and nuns of the great metropolitan temples, and the Imperial Household and its retinue numbering tens of thousands.

The government also exercised even more stringent control over the especially lucrative overseas trade. At the port of Canton, chief gateway for trade with South-east Asia and the Islands, and later also at Hanoi, there was a special customs office which exercised a virtual monopoly on imports, charging a very high duty on luxuries, and making compulsory purchases, at its own prices, of goods destined for the use of the Imperial Household. The same sort of monopolistic markets with the government as the chief, if not the only purchaser, were set up at the terminal points of trade routes on the land frontiers with Manchuria, the northern steppes and Tibet.

Besides this strict control over markets, the government also exercised very close surveillance over the movement of merchants. On the great trunk roads, which provided the government with its arteries of communication, the traveller had to pass frequent check points where his goods and papers were examined.<sup>25</sup> Nobody could travel without official credentials or documents issued by his county of origin.<sup>26</sup> These constant investigations

<sup>24</sup> See Twitchett, *loc. cit.* Very recently an extremely detailed and important new study of the system of official prices has been published by Ikeda On 池田温 "Chūgoku kodai bukka no ichi kōsatsu" 中國古代物價の一考察 *Shigaku zasshi* 77, i, pp. 1-45; 77, ii, pp. 45-64 (1968). This presents far better texts of the fragmentary price-schedules from Central Asia than the earlier study by Niida cited in my previous article. It also raises a number of highly interesting and controversial issues in economic history.

<sup>25</sup> On the control of travellers, see Aoyama Sadao 青山定雄 *Tōsō-jidai no kōtsū to chishi chizu no kenkyū* 唐宋時代の交通と地誌地圖の研究 (1963), pp. 127-59, and Reischauer, *Emmin's travels in Tang China* (1955), pp. 138-52.

<sup>26</sup> See, on this system, Niida Noboru, *Tō-Sō hōritsu monjo no kenkyū* 唐宋法律文書の研究 (1937), pp. 843-56, Komai Toshiaki 駒井義明 "Kōken to kasho" 公驗と通所 *Tōyō gakuho* 40 (1957), pp. 218-22. See also the classical study of Naitō Torajirō 内藤虎次郎 "Mūdera shozō no Tō kasho ni tsuite" 三井寺所藏の唐通所に就て in *Kuwabara Hakase kanreki-jūnen Tōyōshi ronsō* (1931), pp. 1325-42. Several actual

were of course not only a nuisance and source of irritation to the merchant, but also an opportunity for the officials or their underlings to extract transit fees, either legally, or in the form of barely concealed bribes.<sup>27</sup> These forms of surveillance were particularly strict in the case of aliens, who formed a large part of the mercantile community, particularly in early T'ang times.<sup>28</sup>

The government also circumscribed the power of the merchants by the very close control which they exercised over the cities. The city in T'ang remained first and foremost the seat of administrative power, a fortified conurbation centred around the district offices of the prefect or magistrate in charge of the surrounding district. The city itself did not even form a separate administrative entity, and its citizens held no particular status. It was carefully policed, and rigidly divided up into small walled wards which were locked up and isolated at night. All trade was restricted to the enclosed market, which was opened only between set hours, and was directly supervised by officials. There was no participation in city administration by merchants or indeed by any other citizens. Guild-type associations existed, but remained relatively powerless.<sup>29</sup>

Lastly, the early T'ang government pursued a whole complex of basic financial policies which, although not directly aimed at the merchant community, must nevertheless have had a strikingly inhibitory effect on trade. The basic forms of taxation, inherited from the rather primitive semi-barbarian dynasties who had ruled northern China in the two centuries before the T'ang, were taxes collected in kind – in grain and in cloth – from all adult males of taxable status.<sup>30</sup> Tax grain was used partly to build up strategic stockpiles to guard against famine, partly to provision the armies, but overwhelmingly to supply the needs of the great cities, especially the capital Ch'ang-an with its population of roughly a million, which was set down in a region of undependable climate, low productivity and declining rural population. The collection, transportation and eventual distribution of tax grain was conducted by the government, employing corvée labour and an extremely complex and enormously expensive transportation network. The size of this grain traffic grew rapidly during the early eighth century, when the self-supporting militia troops who had been the basic military

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T'ang travel documents issued to various Japanese monks survive in Japanese temple collections. A facsimile of one example was published by the Tōhō bunka gakuin (Tokyo) in 1935, under the title "Tō kasho" 唐通所 with an explanatory pamphlet based on Naitō's article.

<sup>27</sup> See for examples Aoyama, *loc. cit.*, and Hino Kaisaburō 日野岡三郎 "Tōdai shōzei kō" 唐代商稅考 *Shakai-keizai shigaku* (1965), pp. 1–28.

<sup>28</sup> For the strict surveillance encountered by Ennin, see Reischauer, *loc. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> On the T'ang proto-guild organizations *hang* 行, see Katō Shigeshi 加藤繁 *Shina keizai shi kōshō* 支那經濟史考證, Vol. 1, pp. 422–60, and for a more recent view Satō Taketoshi *op. cit.* note 23 above.

<sup>30</sup> For a general account of this system see Twitchett, *Financial administration* and the literature there cited.

force at the beginning of the dynasty, were replaced by huge standing armies stationed along the northern frontier. In the 730's the government was annually in receipt of grain revenues amounting to 25,000,000 *shih* (about 43,000,000 bushels) or nearly two million metric tons. The quantity transported to the capital alone was 4,000,000 *shih* (7,000,000 bushels) or 290,000 metric tons per annum, far greater than the biggest bulk grain trade in medieval Europe.<sup>31</sup> The government also took, as taxation, in just the same way, a large part of the surplus production of textiles. Of a total annual revenue of some 7,400,000 lengths of silk and 16,000,000 lengths of hempen cloth, no less than 13,000,000 lengths were sent annually to the treasuries of Ch'ang-an.<sup>32</sup>

Since rural productivity, in spite of some improvement, remained low, and surpluses above needs of subsistence were probably not great after taxation, the government was thus in effect itself handling the bulk of the long-distance inter-regional trade in the two basic commodities, grain and textiles. Taxation did not, of course, take off by any means all surplus production, so that there was a good deal of private trade, but merchants making massive fortunes by bulk trading in grain and textiles do not appear until money taxation had taken firm roots in late Sung times.<sup>33</sup> Government competition, employing cheap corvée labour for transportation, must have made trade in these staple commodities relatively unprofitable for the private merchant.

In addition the government, with immense stockpiles of grain at its disposal (about 7 million metric tons in 749), was able to employ these to avoid the worst extremes of price fluctuation, buying in grain at above the current price in times of glut, and selling their stocks at cheaper than market prices in times of shortage.<sup>34</sup> Such a policy obviously made speculation in grain very risky for the private merchant, since in some years such relief sales in Ch'ang-an alone amounted to 50,000 tons of grain.<sup>35</sup> It is perhaps significant that the only cases of successful large-scale speculation

<sup>31</sup> See Twitchett, *Financial administration*, pp. 87-90. As an example of the vast scale of this traffic, in 751 the grain fleet, collected together at Shan-chou above the San-men rapids, was swept by a disastrous fire, which destroyed 215 official grain ships and a million *shih* of grain, together with a hundred private merchant vessels. See *CTS* 37, p. 13a.

<sup>32</sup> See Twitchett, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-5.

<sup>33</sup> For an account of the development of the grain market in Sung times, see the extremely important new work of Shiba Yoshinobu 新波義信 *Sōdai shōgyōshi kenkyū* 宋代商業史研究 (1968), pp. 142-84, and the earlier study of the same author, "Nan-Sō kome-ichiba no bunseki" 南宋米市場の分析 *Tōyō gaku* 39, pp. 258-93 (1956). See also Sudō Yoshiyuki 関藤吉之 *Sōdai keizaishi kenkyū* 宋代經濟史研究 (1962), pp. 74-320 for a very detailed account of the changes in technique and improved productivity of agriculture which were the background to this.

<sup>34</sup> On this policy, see Balázs "Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der T'ang-Zeit" *MSOS* 35 (1932), pp. 66-71.

<sup>35</sup> See *CTS* 49, p. 8a ff., *THY* 88, p. 1615 ff., *TFYK* 502, pp. 26a-28a for examples.

in grain which I know of in T'ang times involved not merchants, but local officials who could employ the machinery of government to fix prices favourable to themselves.<sup>36</sup>

Another field in which government policy impinged heavily upon the whole field of commerce was that of currency. The T'ang government from a very early stage made a determined effort to provide a viable currency, such as had not existed since the Han period. However, the supply of copper coinage in circulation always lagged far behind the demands of commerce, while the standard copper cash was of such low value that copper coinage was impossibly cumbersome for any large transactions.<sup>37</sup> For large sums the normal medium of exchange was the standard-sized length of silk cloth, such as was paid in for taxes. Both in government accounting and in private transactions it was normal to employ this mixed currency of copper cash and silk cloth.<sup>38</sup> The government, with vast stocks of silk at its disposal, was able to maintain some measure of control over its market value, and over its standard quality.<sup>39</sup>

In the period before 755, the government derived very little revenue directly from merchants. Under the standard system of head-taxes the merchant living in a city and holding no lands got off practically scot-free, being liable only to labour service and special duties. It was only under the household levy and land levy – supplementary taxes based upon a property assessment – that merchants actually paid tax to the local authorities.<sup>40</sup>

The local authorities themselves made some use of the technical skills of merchants through the system of special corvée duties (*se-i* 色役). Control over the markets was largely exercised through minor market officials who were recruited from the trading community, working in collaboration with the *hang*, the guild-like associations of merchants of the same trade, who registered traders and assisted in fixing official prices.<sup>41</sup> Other merchants were employed for special duties in connection with tax-transportation.<sup>42</sup> Lastly, one of the principal sources of revenue for current expenditure in the provinces was the system known as *cho-ch'ien* 捉錢. Each local government office was endowed with capital funds which were to be loaned out at interest to produce a regular income. The *cho-ch'ien hu* were wealthy families, usually but not invariably merchants, to whom these moneys were

<sup>36</sup> See the examples collected by Fu An-hua 傅安華 "T'ang-tai kuan-liao ti-chu ti shang-jen hua" 唐代官家地主的商人化 *Shih-huo* 1, vi (1935), pp. 66–83. For a case of speculation in rice at Yang-chou, about 788, see *T'ang yü-lin* 2, p. 44.

<sup>37</sup> See *Financial administration*, pp. 66–83.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70 ff.; Yang, *Money and Credit in China* (1952), p. 17, P'eng Hsin-wei 彭信嘯 *Chung-kuo huo-pi shih* 中國貨幣史 (1958), pp. 201–3, Ch'uan Han-sheng 全漢昇 "Chung-ku tzu-jan ching-chi" 中古自然經濟 *CYYY* 10 (1948), pp. 75–176.

<sup>39</sup> See *THY* 83, p. 1532; *TFYK* 504, pp. 33b–34a.

<sup>40</sup> See *Financial administration*, p. 29 ff.

<sup>41</sup> See Twitchett, "The T'ang market system", *Asia Major* 12, ii, pp. 209, 221.

<sup>42</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 90.

entrusted for management. They were responsible for producing a set rate of interest, but were free to employ the capital sum entrusted to them in any way. Their profit was normally made by making short-term consumption loans at very high interest rates, loans of government monies having a higher permissible interest rate than purely private loans.<sup>43</sup>

But these were exceptional practices limited to local finance, and the central financial administration took no notice of merchants or trade. To sum up, although the merchant escaped very lightly under direct taxation, and was subjected only occasionally to official exploitation through transit taxes or levies on specific commodities,<sup>44</sup> the government still maintained strict control over large-scale inter-regional commerce, and by its fiscal policies excluded the private merchant from certain large scale and profitable branches of trade.

All this was changed in 755 with the outbreak of the An Lu-shan rebellion. Where the early T'ang state had been a strongly centralized empire, with a powerful standardized administrative system reaching to the remotest provinces, the T'ang dynasty which survived the rebellion did so only by delegating much of its authority to the provinces. Some of these, particularly in the north-east, became virtually independent satrapies under hereditary ruling families, others became heavily garrisoned military commands. Only in the south and in the area immediately around the capital did civil administration survive more or less unchanged.

The seven years of bitter fighting which followed 755 was also accompanied by widespread destruction and social disturbance. Much of southern Hopei and Honan was devastated and virtually depopulated, many of the population fleeing to the Yangtse valley. The whole machinery of local government, the systems of detailed registration and of land tenure which had formed the basis of the old taxation system, and which were essential for any orderly collection of direct taxation, fell into chaotic disorder.

During the emergency years of the rebellion itself, the government was forced into various panic measures to raise revenues, many of which were directed against merchants and trade. Forced "loans" were levied on the great merchants of the Yangtse cities and of Szechuan, amounting to 20 per cent of their property.<sup>45</sup> Taxes were also imposed on sales of various commodities.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> On this very interesting system see my forthcoming article mentioned in note 16 above, also Yokoyama Hiroo 横山裕男 "Tōdai no sokusenke ni tsuite" 唐代の提封戸に就いて *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 17, pp. 197-212 (1958).

<sup>44</sup> How reluctant traditionalist statesmen were to engage in policies involving trade taxes can be seen most clearly from a long memorial by Ts'ui Jung, dated 702, which is preserved in *CTS* 94, pp. 3b-6b; *T'ang Wen-ts'ui* 27, pp. 505-8; *CTW* 219, pp. 6a-10a; *TFYK* 504, pp. 17a-21a; and given in résumé form in *THY* 86, pp. 1578-9. See also Chū Ch'ing-yüan 鞠清遠 *T'ang-tai ts'ai-cheng shih* 唐代財政史 (1943), pp. 94-101, and the article of Hino cited in note 27 above.

<sup>45</sup> See *CTS* 48, p. 2a, *HTS* 51, p. 4b.

<sup>46</sup> See *CTS* 48, p. 2a.

Most of these new measures were only temporary expedients and soon abandoned, but one of them, the salt monopoly, was a resounding success and remained a feature of Chinese financial administration until this century.<sup>47</sup> The salt monopoly was particularly attractive to the T'ang administrations after 760 since it enabled them to raise revenue even from areas where central control was tenuous. The regions remaining firmly in government hands happened to include almost all the centres of salt production. Production was placed under strict government control, and the salt was sold wholesale by government agencies to the merchants, who paid a very heavy surcharge which they then recovered from the consumers in all parts of China as part of the retail price. The system was far from foolproof, and there were constant complaints that much illegal salt traffic was evading tax, and that the merchants were taking most of the profit for themselves.<sup>48</sup> Certainly at the end of the century the salt merchants were recognized as an élite among the commercial community.<sup>49</sup> Even so, taxation of salt was by 780 producing a very large revenue accounted for and collected not in kind but in cash.<sup>50</sup>

The years following 760 saw a great increase in the part played by money in government finance and taxation. New forms of land-tax were levied in cash, while the household levy, a progressive money tax based on a property assessment, was reformed and made a major item of revenue after 769.<sup>51</sup> In its new form, this tax was directed especially towards the merchants and artisans, whose tax rates were considerably higher than those of ordinary families. The growth of money taxation reached its peak with the introduction in 780 of a totally new tax structure, the so-called Twice-yearly tax (*Liang-shui fa* 兩稅法). Under this system, the central government abandoned the ideal of a uniform rate of taxation throughout the empire, and instead negotiated with each province an annual tax quota, leaving every province and prefecture free to fix its own tax-rates and collect its own taxes. From this time onwards accounting in cash became the norm, and an ever increasing proportion of taxation was actually levied in cash.<sup>52</sup>

The abandonment of the old system of taxation in kind had a serious effect upon the currency situation. The amount of copper cash in circulation was seriously insufficient to meet the new demands placed upon it. Most of

<sup>47</sup> On the salt monopoly, see Twitchett, *Financial Administration*, pp. 49-58. See also the very detailed study by Hino Kaisaburō "Government monopoly on salt in T'ang in the period before the enforcement of the Liang-shui fa", *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko* 22 (1963), pp. 1-55.

<sup>48</sup> See Hino, *loc. cit.*, p. 22 ff.

<sup>49</sup> See the various texts translated below. See also Yokoyama Hiroo 横山裕男, "Tōdai no enshō" 唐代の鹽商, *Shirin* 43 (1960) pp. 501-518.

<sup>50</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 58, Hino, *loc. cit.*, pp. 41-6.

<sup>51</sup> See *CTS* 48, pp. 5a-b; *THY* 83, pp. 1534-5; *TFYK* 487, p. 22a.

<sup>52</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 42 ff.



the government's stocks of silk were destroyed during the rebellion and further depleted during the 760s and 770s in purchasing cavalry horses from the Uighurs.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, Hopei and northern Shensi, which had produced most of the empire's silk, and almost all of its high quality silk, were now semi-independent, and paid no taxes at all to the central government.<sup>54</sup> Rapidly in the private sector of the economy, and more gradually in the official sector, silver replaced silk as the normal medium for the payment of large sums. This involved a serious weakening of the government's control over the currency as a whole. Whereas the standard quality and size of silk cloth had been specified by government, which moreover could exercise some control over the amount in circulation, silver was never minted by the government into a coinage. The production of silver, which boomed in the last years of the eighth and early ninth centuries, was largely in the hands of private miners, working rich new silver strikes in the mountains of southern Kiangsi and Hunan.<sup>55</sup> It was circulated moreover in the form of ingots, which necessitated continual weighing and assaying. This was performed not by officials but by professional silversmiths.<sup>56</sup> The fluctuations of silver prices against the official copper coinage were beyond the control of the authorities. The period after 760 was marked by the rise of private banking institutions. The silversmiths also functioned as safe-deposit firms and as bankers, offering various credit facilities.<sup>57</sup> Their importance may be gauged from an attempt to raise a levy on the merchant community in Ch'ang-an, in 783-4, when more money was raised from safe-deposit firms and pawn-brokers than from all the regular traders of the markets.<sup>58</sup>

The government took repeated measures to restore the use of the old mixed currency of silk and copper cash until well into the ninth century,<sup>59</sup> but it was doomed.

The increasing part played by money in the economy was by no means an isolated phenomenon. A whole complex of developments had caused a progressive growth in productivity and in the circulation of commodities after the beginning of the eighth century. New methods of culture, early and late ripening varieties of wheat and rice, improved irrigation machinery, the development of great landed estates, the opening up of the great areas of virgin lands in southern and central China, the shift of population to the

<sup>53</sup> See *HTS* 51, p. 5b. See also the material collected in Ts'en Chung-mien 岑仲勉 *Sui T'ang shih* 隋唐史 (1957), p. 299 ff.

<sup>54</sup> See Twitchett, "Provincial autonomy and central finance in late T'ang", *Asia Major* (n.s.) 11, 2 (1965), pp. 211-32.

<sup>55</sup> See Katō Shigeshi 加藤繁 *Tō-Sō jidai ni okeru kingin no kenkyū* 唐宋時代に於ける金銀の研究 (1925), pp. 503-09.

<sup>56</sup> See Katō, *op. cit.*, pp. 574-613.

<sup>57</sup> See Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizaiishi kōshō*, Vol. I, pp. 485-509, Yang Lien-sheng, *Money and Credit in China*, pp. 78-9.

<sup>58</sup> See *TFYK* 510, pp. 6b-7a; *CTS* 12, p. 9b.

<sup>59</sup> See Ch'üan Han-sheng, "Chung-ku tzu-jan ching-chi" (note 38 above).

more fertile southern regions, all had their effect. Increased activity led naturally to a considerable growth of trade.

This new commercial activity, however, was far more widely spread than had been the case in early T'ang times. The rise of the new semi-autonomous provinces did not simply mean the dispersal of political and military authority from the capital. The governors of the larger provinces had large establishments of civil officials and garrisons at their capital cities and kept court in considerable grandeur. There was a marked growth in the scale of these provincial cities, particularly those in the Yangtse area and along the canal route through Honan. Each of these became a market for luxury goods on a scale previously unprecedented outside the capital.<sup>60</sup>

However, the economic development which had most effect on future urbanization was quite distinct from the growth of these regional metropolises and the increased activity of the central markets of the county towns. Official control of markets in the early T'ang had extended only down to this level, where local produce came into a regional pattern of distribution and circulation. The government did not interfere in any way with the pattern of rural periodical markets at a level below the county town. Such rural markets had already existed in pre-T'ang times, but under the T'ang they steadily became far more numerous and more highly organized. By the ninth century many had permanent shops, inns and facilities for travelling merchants, and there is evidence of various regional four-day and six-day market cycles.<sup>61</sup>

During the ninth and tenth centuries many of these rural markets were transformed into sizeable market towns, some of which became minor centres of local administration under the provincial governors.<sup>62</sup> This proliferation of small towns of intermediate size, whose sole raison d'être was economic rather than administrative, transformed commerce. Although much of the business in such small country markets was conducted by barter, between local farmers and local specialist producers, they were increasingly frequented by travelling merchants and artisans, and gradually money began to play a more important part at this level of activity too.

While trade was being increasingly dispersed and diversified in the countryside, the larger administrative cities were also undergoing change. The rigid system of enclosed wards and enclosed markets began to break down, even in Ch'ang-an, and with it the strict curfew and police systems. By the ninth century trade was no longer entirely concentrated in the

<sup>60</sup> The most outstanding of these regional capitals was Yang-chou. See Ch'üan Han-sheng, "T'ang-Sung shih-tai Yang-chou ching-chi ching-k'uang ti fan-jung yü shuai-lo" 唐宋時代揚州經濟景况的繁榮與衰落 CYYY 11 (1947), pp. 149-76.

<sup>61</sup> See Twitchett, "The T'ang Market system", p. 233 ff. and the secondary literature there cited.

<sup>62</sup> See Sudō Yoshiyuki 周壽吉之 *Tō-Sō shakai-keizaiishi henkyū* 唐宋社會經濟史研究 (1965), pp. 783-866.

official market places, but small numbers of specialist dealers had sprung up elsewhere, and irregular night markets began to be held. By the middle of the ninth century the old system of strictly regulated official markets was decaying in the capital and on its way to being abandoned in the provinces.<sup>63</sup>

With the gradual removal of these formal restrictions on trade, the wealth of individual merchants began to grow to an unprecedented degree. At the same time, the influence of the foreign traders who had dominated commerce in early T'ang began to wane, although they still played a considerable role. Even in early T'ang times there must have been some very large individual fortunes. In 734, for example, the property of Jen Ling-fang, 任令方 a great merchant of Chang-an amounting to 600,000 strings of cash was confiscated, either for some unspecified offence or because he had died intestate and without heirs.<sup>64</sup> This sum was almost equivalent to the annual revenue of Su-chou, one of the richest towns in the south-east, during the late ninth century.<sup>65</sup> But even this pales by comparison with the case of the property of a merchant from the great canal port of Pien-chou (汴州), the confiscation of which was dealt with early in the ninth century by the poet Yüan Chen 元稹, then serving as a Censor at Loyang. His fortune amounted to 10,000,000 strings of cash<sup>66</sup> a third of the total cash revenue of the whole empire at the end of the eighth century, and more than the entire annual revenue from the salt monopoly.<sup>67</sup> During the emergency at Ch'ang-an in 783-4 caused by the rebellion of the northeastern provinces, a scheme for exacting forced loans from the greater merchants was discussed. At that time it was assumed that in Ch'ang-an there were ten to twenty merchants who could pay a quarter of a million strings of cash or even more without being put out of business.<sup>68</sup>

Trade boomed, and the merchants grew wealthy. It is hardly surprising that the government toyed with various schemes to exploit mercantile wealth as a source of revenue. The scheme for forced loans which I have just mentioned was only one item in a series of emergency measures enforced temporarily by Tu Yu 杜佑 and later by Chao Tsan 趙贊 in the years 783-4. These measures were dictated by the court's isolation in Ch'ang-an, cut off by the rebels from the normal agrarian-based sources of revenue.<sup>69</sup> The levy

<sup>63</sup> See Twitchett, "The T'ang Market system", pp. 230-3.

<sup>64</sup> See CTS 8, p. 19b.

<sup>65</sup> See *Financial Administration*, pp. 163-4.

<sup>66</sup> See *Yüan-shih Ch'ang-ch'ing chi* 32, p. 1b.

<sup>67</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 58.

<sup>68</sup> See CTS 12, pp. 9a-b.

<sup>69</sup> On these measures, which deserve a special study, see CTS 12, pp. 9a-b; p. 10b, p. 11b; CTS 48, pp. 2a-b; CTS 49, pp. 8a-b, p. 9b, p. 11b; CTS 135, pp. 2a-b; THY 84, p. 1545; TFYK 495, pp. 26b-27a; WHTK 21, p. 205c; THY 88, pp. 1614-5; WHTK 18, p. 173a; TFYK 501, p. 12a; TFYK 510, pp. 7a-b; TFYK 494, p. 26b; TFYK 502, pp. 26a-27a; TFYK 504, pp. 7a-8a; HTS 52, pp. 1b-2a; HTS 53, p. 3b; HTS 54, pp. 7b-8a; HTS 223B, pp. 1b-2a; HTS 200, pp. 13b-14a; CTS 134, p. 5a.

on merchants was simply an emergency exaction, and merchants were again subjected to similar levies by later administrations in 844<sup>70</sup> and 878<sup>71</sup>. Order of Chao Tsan's measures, however, were perfectly viable forms of taxation and pointed the ways in which a government might derive regular revenue from an urban population. They included a tax on buildings, levied according to their size,<sup>72</sup> taxes on various commodities such as tea, bamboo, timber and lacquer,<sup>73</sup> a state liquor monopoly<sup>74</sup> and a 20 per cent sales tax imposed on all sales in the markets.<sup>75</sup> The latter was collected through the *hang* association of the merchants and the brokers operating in the market, and, as in the case of the salt monopoly, it was found impossible to prevent their misappropriating a large part of the profit.

All Chao Tsan's emergency measures were withdrawn when the emperor was reestablished in Ch'ang-an in 785, and were bitterly attacked because of their mercantile bias both by the statesmen of his time and by later historians. The only one of his measures which survived was his monopoly tax on liquor, which proved almost impossible to enforce or to administer.

His tax on tea was also revived in 793 and remained a minor source of revenue until the end of the dynasty. The tea-merchants were an obvious target for predatory tax-collectors since with the rapid spread of the tea-drinking habit they had come to rival even the salt merchants in wealth. They were so powerful in fact that they were able to undertake the payment of the entire tax quotas for their native prefectures or provinces after selling their year's crop in Ch'ang-an, being later reimbursed by the provincial government on their return home.<sup>76</sup>

Merchants and trade were not only subjected to the exploitation of the central government. Local officials also commonly levied taxes of their own. For example the governors of Yang-chou, the greatest commercial city of southern China, imposed a liquor monopoly of their own, a sales tax on all market transactions, and special levies on all sales of livestock and slaves.<sup>77</sup> Even more common were transit taxes and customs dues, which were often levied arbitrarily not only on merchants, but on other travellers in some

<sup>70</sup> *HTS* 214, p. 8a; *TCTC* 248, p. 8005.

<sup>71</sup> *CTS* 19B, p. 8a, *TCTC* 253, p. 8203. In this case the merchants from whom the loans were raised were granted official insignia as 'nominal' Censors. According to *HTS* 214, p. 7a, Li Shih-tao the governor of P'ing-lu province in modern Shantung also raised forced loans from merchants.

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<sup>73</sup> See *CTS* 12, pp. 9a-b; *THY* 84, pp. 1545-6; *CTS* 49, p. 11b.

<sup>74</sup> On the beginning of the liquor monopoly see Marugame Kinsaku 丸龜金作 "Tōdai no sake no sembai" 唐代の酒の専賣 *Tōyō Gakuhō* 40, iii (1957), pp. 286-332; *Financial Administration*, pp. 59-62.

<sup>75</sup> See *CTS* 12, pp. 9a-b; *CTS* 49, pp. 8a-b.

<sup>76</sup> See *Financial Administration*, pp. 72-3, pp. 284-5.

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<sup>76</sup> See *Financial Administration*, pp. 72-3, pp. 284-5.

<sup>77</sup> See *TFYK* 504, p. 8b.

cases even upon officials travelling on duty. This type of abuse was most common along the canal and river routes of Honan and Huai-nan, where officials could easily extort heavy transit fees from merchants' ships using the haulovers between different sections of the waterways. A particularly notorious place was Ssu-k'ou, at the junction of Pien canal with the Huai river, where the local authorities taxed every item of gold, silver, grain, cattle, cash, silk, tea and salt in transit.<sup>78</sup> Other provincial governors set up special transit warehouses for tea and salt in which merchants were forced to deposit their goods, paying a heavy tax for the privilege.<sup>79</sup>

In the north, the armies and semi-independent military governors imposed ever stricter and more complex taxes on trade, and set up their own branch offices for the taxation of trade (*shang-shui wu* 商稅務).<sup>80</sup> By 901 for instance Chu Ch'uan-chung 朱全忠 was drawing over 4,000,000 strings of cash per annum from taxes on trade in the single prefecture of Hua-chou to the east of Ch'ang-an.<sup>81</sup> The merchant taxes which had been so important a source of revenue to the northern military governors came to play an even greater part in the finances of the kingdoms of the Five Dynasties period, which modelled their administration closely on late T'ang provincial models, and under the Sung the Trade Tax (*Shang-shui*) was firmly established as a major source of revenue.<sup>82</sup>

While the government was thus gradually accustoming itself to bringing trade and the merchants into the net of the tax-collector, and accepting commerce as a source of revenue, there also grew up a realization that the old framework of ideas in which trade was considered as a necessary evil which had to be strictly controlled and kept within limits – an attitude which was embodied in the rigid closed market system – was no longer appropriate to real conditions.<sup>83</sup> It was now accepted that since trade could neither be suppressed nor adequately controlled, such control had best be abandoned, and commerce exploited as a source of revenue. As usual, however, orthodox theory was much slower to change than were the ideas of the practical statesmen, and social attitudes lagged far behind administrative practice. Lip service continued to be rendered to the primacy of agriculture as the "fundamental occupation", and to the conception that taxation of land and agriculture should remain the backbone of the state's fiscal apparatus. However, even the most orthodox writers on finance in the late eighth and ninth

<sup>78</sup> *TFYK* 504, pp. 24a-b; *THY* 84, pp. 1547-8; *CTS* 49, p. 10a.

<sup>79</sup> See Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizaishi kōshō*, Vol. I, pp. 461-88.

<sup>80</sup> See Aoyama Sadao, *Tō-Sō jidai no kōtsū to chishi chizu no kenkyū*, p. 134 ff.; Hino, "Tōdai shōzei kō" (see note 27 above).

<sup>81</sup> *TCTC* 262, p. 8562. For the taxes on merchants which had been arbitrarily imposed by units of the Shen-ts'e Armies and by branches of the Salt Commission, see the Act of Grace of 900, in *TTCLC* 5, p. 33.

<sup>82</sup> See Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizaishi kōshō*, Vol. II, pp. 176-221.

<sup>83</sup> An idea of the persistence of traditional attitudes towards trade may be gauged from the memorial of Ts'ui Jung in *CTS* 94, pp. 3b-6b, etc. (See note 44 above.)

centuries were forced to accept that changed circumstances had rendered the models of classical antiquity impracticable. Monopoly taxes on salt and other commodities, commodity taxes, transit levies, and sales taxes had come to stay.<sup>84</sup>

The flourishing of trade and the growing wealth and power of the merchants excited much comment and interest among the writers of the period. The writers of the late eighth and early ninth century *ch'uan-ch'i* stories, which brought a new social realism into Chinese classical fiction, frequently mention merchants, trade and urban life. The poets involved in the contemporary revival of the *Yüeh-fu*, poetry of social protest, also took the rich merchant as one of their stock themes. Perhaps the most eloquent of these poems is that written by Yüan Chen about 810,<sup>85</sup> entitled "The pleasures of the travelling merchant".

The Travelling merchant has no real home,  
Wherever profit is to be made he goes.  
He goes out from the house to seek travelling companions,  
And then returns to take leave of his father and brothers.

Father and elder brothers give him this advice:  
"Go after profit, don't seek fame!  
If you want reputation, some things you must avoid,  
If you seek profit, you can make anything your business!"

He and his fellow merchants bind themselves with this oath;  
"Sell the false, don't sell the true.  
In all transactions, only deal false.  
Care nought whether your own kin gain or lose!"

With this, off they go together,  
Swearing not to change their resolve even unto death.  
Though they pay good heed to their fellows in the market,  
They feel nothing for their own home.

He knocks out bracelets from false blass stone,  
Fakes up necklaces of stones from paste,

<sup>84</sup> For an example of this see the Edict ordering the officials to give counsel on the reduction of salt prices drafted by Lu Chih in 785/6, translated in Twitchett, "Lu Chih (754-805): Imperial Adviser and Court Official". Wright and Twitchett eds. *Confucian Personalities* (1963), p.p 114-5.

<sup>85</sup> See *Yüan-shih ch'ang-ch'ing chi* 23, pp. 7b-8a. For a study of this poem, see Ishida Mikinosuke 石田幹之助 "Gen Shin no gakufu 'Ko-kaku raku'ni tsuite - Tōdai shōgyōshi no ichi shiryō toshite" 元朝の樂府 "估客樂" に就いて - 唐代商業史の一史料として *Tōhō Gakkai sōritsu jūgo shūnen kinen Tōhōgaku ronshū* (1962), pp. 1-9.



And goes to hawk them round the villages,  
 Striking them and claiming they ring true as gold and jade.  
 The girls from the farmsteads  
 Dare not quibble about the price,  
 And with the hundred cash of their wasted savings  
 The merchant already has a ten-fold profit.

By now he looks sleek and well-groomed,  
 His food and drink are sweet and well spiced.  
 With interest and capital constantly breeding rich profit  
 Business daily growing at others' expense.

In search of pearls he will cross the blue ocean,  
 To collect jade go to the headwaters of the Ching and the Heng,  
 Buy horses from the Tanguts in the far north,  
 In the west snare parrots in Tibet.  
 Seek asbestos cloth among the isles of the South Seas,  
 Perfectly woven brocade from Szechuan,  
 Yüeh slave girls with sleek plump flesh,  
 Hsi boy slaves with bright eyes.

Though he strictly accounts for his food and dress,  
 He takes no count of how far he has to travel.  
 His journeys take him everywhere in the empire,  
 Until he ends up in Ch'ang-an.

In the Eastern and Western Markets of Ch'ang-an,  
 Men who have heard of him throng to meet him.  
 They greet him and explain to him  
 "Vast wealth like yours can gain the influence of powerful men!"

The merchant's mind has always been quick to see his chance,  
 But when he hears this he is really startled.  
 At first he seeks out some of the Emperor's courtier attendants  
 And then attends on the great ministers of state.

He frequents noblemen's houses, the residences of royal princesses,  
 Where all the furnishings are of the most elegant.  
 Returning home, for the first time he sits satisfied at ease  
 Knowing that his riches make him powerful as a prince.

The wine and meat he has bought for the market officers smell sweet,  
 The yamen runners build themselves houses from his bribes,

Not only do they watch what they say about him,  
They run to carry out his orders.

His elder son deals in timber,  
Expert in the forms for rafter and ridgepole.  
His younger son goes into the salt trade,  
And thus evades paying local taxes and dues.

For the rest of his life he bends down under his trading profits,  
Darting out to make a killing like some great sea-cleaving whale.  
The fish hook dares not descend near him,  
And if it does, it meets his intractable serried teeth.

All your life savouring the pleasures of a merchant,  
Plainly a life full of enjoyment,  
Now you have two sons,  
When will the battle for money ever end?

This incorporates most of the themes which run through contemporary writing about the merchants: he is a socially irresponsible wanderer, not a regular member of the community; he is unscrupulous, predatory, and dishonest; he makes his profit at the expense of the honest countryfolk; he employs his wealth to buy influence and bribe the officials, he becomes "powerful as a prince"; he establishes a merchant dynasty of his own to perpetuate his baleful power. Liu Yü-hsi 劉禹錫 also wrote a delightful short poem on the same theme, inspired, according to the preface, by the wealth of the salt merchants<sup>65</sup>

The merchant travels on no fixed itinerary,  
He goes only where profit can be gathered.  
He confuses customs, makes no difference between good and bad,  
But takes advantage of every situation to reap what profit can be had.

He lays his plans, reckoning to a hair's weight,  
He jogs and twists to even up the hanging scales,  
Not a scrap the size of an awl's point is thrown away,  
Following the changes of the times, he daily grows more prosperous.

He goes to invoke good luck, praying to the gods of the waves,  
Donates riches to religion and goes visiting temples.  
His wife's arms encircled by chased gold bracelets,  
His daughters wear necklets of strung pearls.

<sup>65</sup> See *Liu Meng-te chi* 21, p. 4b. "Chia-k'o Tz'u".

With wealth like that of an enfeoffed prince,  
 Rarities like those of a favourite imperial minister,  
 He follows the vagaries of fashion like a hawk watching its prey,  
 And guards his hoarded money poised like a coiled dragon.

He cruises the rivers in his great ship,  
 From his tall dwelling he goes to stay at flag-decked inns.  
 Travelling or at rest, everywhere has its pleasures for him,  
 At bridge and custom house he pays no tolls.

Farmer, what are you doing with your life.  
 With bitter hardship serving the cold plough?

Liu Yü-hsi, who spent much of his career among the waterways of southern and central China, returns time and time again to the theme of travel and the floating population of the waterways, which plainly fascinated him. In a *chüeh-chü* quatrain of about the same date<sup>87</sup> he sums up in a few words the merchant's life: wealth, stylish living, superstition and insecurity;

From the towering hulk of a hundred foot merchantman,  
 The "new sound" of the *cheng* with its thirteen strings on their cramped  
 bridges.

The merchant's daughter from the market of Yang-chou  
 Comes to consult the fortune-teller about next month's weather up the river.

These same themes occur in a poem by Chang Chi 張籍 entitled "The pleasures of the travelling merchant"<sup>88</sup>.

On the west bank opposite Chin-ling are many travelling merchants  
 Living out their lives on shipboard, enjoying their existence amid wind  
 and waves.

About to set sail, they move their ships near to the entrance into the  
 Yangtse  
 And on the ships' prows pray to the spirits and libate them with wine.

Putting down the cup they discuss together expectations for their distant  
 journey  
 Into Szechuan through the lands of the Man, a far-distant separation.  
 How they will amass much gold and become great merchants,  
 Sitting up late, night after night, to count their strings of cash.

<sup>87</sup> See *Liu Meng-te chi*, wai-chi 8, p. 11b. "Yeh wen shang-jen ch'uan-chung cheng".

<sup>88</sup> *Chang Ssu-yeh shih-chi* 1, p. 9a. "Chia-k'o lo".

On the autumn river, the new moon and the chattering of apes:  
 The lonely sail sets out by night from the bank of the Hsiao and Hsiang.  
 The sailors ply their sweeps to pull against the dark currents  
 Straight past the mountainous cliffs after the boat ahead.  
 Year after year, in search of profit he goes west and east again,  
 His name and surname are not to be found on any county's registers.  
 You, peasant, dragging out your life weighed down by heavy taxes,  
 You'd do better to give up your job and become another "old dealer in  
 treasures".

Chang Chi repeats this comparison of the life of farmer and merchant in his  
 "Song of the old countryman"<sup>89</sup>.

The old farmer's family is poor, living among the mountains,  
 Tilling and planting three or four *mou* of hill land.  
 The plants are sparse, but taxes so heavy that he cannot eat the grain,  
 It is paid into the official granary, where it rots into dust.

At the end of the year, his hoe and plough lean by the empty house;  
 He calls his children and they go up the mountain to gather acorns.  
 The merchants on the Western River, with their hundred bushels of pearls,  
 Keep dogs on their boats, which live on meat.

The richest of these river traders, who figure constantly in ninth century writing, were the tea-merchants from Kiangsi<sup>90</sup> and above all the salt merchants from Yang-chou. The salt merchants were singled out for special attention not merely because they were the richest, but also because their wealth derived from their status as subordinates of the Salt Commission and from their official connections. To the traditionalist thinker, whether he was orthodox Confucian or neo-Legalist, this whole system represented an unholy alliance of government with the merchants, and a major compromise of moral principle.

One of Po Chü-i's "New Yüeh-fu" ballads, dating from about 808, brings out these points very clearly.:

"The salt merchant's wife"<sup>91</sup>

The salt merchant's wife  
 Has gold and silk in plenty.  
 Yet she does not work in the fields or tend silkworms.  
 Wherever she goes, north, south, east or west, she never leaves her home.  
 Wind and waves are her village, her ship her mansion.

<sup>89</sup> *Chang Ssu-yeh shih-chi* 1, p. 32. "Yeh lao k'o". On this poem see South, *Li Ho* (1967), p. 361.

<sup>90</sup> On the shipping of the Kiangai merchants, see *T'ang huo-shih pu*, hsin, p. 62.

<sup>91</sup> *Po Hsiang-shan chi*, 4, xx, pp. ii, 51-2.

Originally she was the daughter of a small Yang-chou family,  
But she was married to a great travelling merchant of Kiangsi.

Her raven hair bursts forth richly, pierced by many gold hairpins,  
Her white wrists peep plumply out encircled with silver bracelets.  
Before her she calls her menservants, behind scolds at her slavegirls.

I ask her how she came to live in such a style.

"My husband has been a salt merchant these fifteen years,  
He is registered with no prefecture or county, but belongs to the emperor  
himself.

Every year when the salt revenue is due to be paid to the government,  
Little goes to the officials, and most goes into his own pocket.  
The government's profit is little, private profits are great,  
And the President of the Salt Commission is too far away to realize what is  
going on.

Moreover, on the River fish and rice are cheap,  
Red fish-mince, golden citron, and fragrant rice to eat."

Well fed, heavily made-up, she stands on the poop of their ship,  
Her rouged cheeks like two buds about to burst into flower.

The salt merchant's wife,  
Had the good fortune to marry a salt merchant,  
Day in, day out, she eats the choicest food,  
Year in, year out, she wears splendid clothes.

All that food and clothing must come from somewhere,  
You, Sang Hung-yang, should be ashamed about this still!  
Sang Hung-yang may be dead long ago,  
But his evil did not cease with the Han. It continues to this day.

Po Chu-i lays the blame for the extravagant wealth of the salt merchants squarely on the shoulders of the government, and like almost every conventional political thinker of his time disapproved of the salt monopoly although he cautiously blames Sang Hung-yang, its Han-time progenitor rather than the government of his own day. In one of his "Model examination essays" (*Ts'e-lin* 策林) he again puts this position quite clearly<sup>92</sup>

"I have also seen how, from Kuan-chung to the east the richer farmers and the great merchants have all exchanged their wealth to become salt-merchants. They have collected together vast private wealth and

<sup>92</sup> *Po Hsiang-shan chi* 46, pp. vii, 48-9, 'Ts'e-lin' 23, "I yen-fa chih pi".

set up separate business as traders. They pay little of their profit to the authorities, and accept the status of registered subordinates only in name. Where they dwell they are subject neither to corvée nor to military service, and when they travel they are exempt from monopoly taxes, being protected by their being on the Salt Registers. Their profits, nonetheless, all flow into their own families! This being so, it is clear that below they are harmful both to agriculture and to trade, while above they are of no real advantage to the official monopoly . . ."

There was certainly an enormous margin of profit to be made in the salt trade, since the monopoly tax was almost ten times the actual wholesale price of the salt, and the retail price bore little relation to the cost of production.<sup>93</sup>

It is interesting to see however from this passage that Po Chū-i saw the salt merchants not merely as a menace to the peasant producers, but also as a danger to the ordinary legitimate merchants. As Professor Pulleyblank has noticed,<sup>94</sup> in the early ninth century it was the more conservative "Confucian" officials who were more ready to concede an acceptance of the merchant's services to society, rather than the intellectually more "progressive" neo-Legalists. Lu Chih, 陸贄 the great Confucian minister of the 780's and 790's had protested against the salt monopoly, but in practical terms had suggested reform of its operation, not that it should be abolished.<sup>95</sup> The new tea monopoly of 793 was imposed under his administration and was the work of Chang P'ang, 張滂 one of his own disciples.<sup>96</sup> Again, when in 822 Chang P'ing-shu suggested that the government should itself take over dealings in salt, so as to cut out merchant participation, he was fiercely attacked by Han Yü<sup>97</sup> and Wei Ch'u-hou 韋處厚,<sup>98</sup> both of them very firmly at the Confucian-moralist end of the political spectrum, on the grounds that the small trader was performing a legitimate and useful social function and making a perfectly acceptable profit as a result. To them collaboration with the merchants was preferable to further proliferation of direct involvement of government in commerce.

The neo-Legalists were generally more hostile to trade. Tu Yu, their acknowledged leader, was himself responsible for a capital levy on merchants in Ch'ang-an in 782-3.<sup>99</sup> His attitude to trade is also to be found repeated in Liu Tsung-yüan 柳宗元, and in Liu Yü-hsi both of whom were closely associated with him.

<sup>93</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 55.

<sup>94</sup> See Pulleyblank, "Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T'ang intellectual life", in Wright, ed., *The Confucian Persuasion*, p. 106.

<sup>95</sup> See note 86 above, *Lu-Hsüan-kung Han-yüan chi* 4, pp. 62-72; *TTCLC* 112, p. 584.

<sup>96</sup> See *Financial Administration*, p. 63.

<sup>97</sup> See *Han Ch'ang-li chi* 40, pp. vii, 55-60, and full translation in *Financial Administration*, p. 165-72.

<sup>98</sup> See *TFYK* 493, pp. 23b-26b.

<sup>99</sup> See *TCTC* 227, pp. 7325-6; *CTS* 12, pp. 9a-b, etc.

Liu Tsung-yüan, in his charming essay on the benevolent yet nonetheless successful drug-dealer Sung Ch'ing suggests that trade, conducted with long-sighted humanity, can be beneficial and even morally acceptable. What is wrong with trade is the short-sighted petty acquisitiveness and competitive spirit of most traders. But these bad qualities, Liu asserts, are equally to be found among couriers, officials, teachers and the local élite.<sup>100</sup> Yet in a letter to Prefect Yuan of Jao-chou, he again implies an inferior judgement on merchants and artisans.<sup>101</sup>

"The [local] rich families are like the mothers of the poor, and truly must not be destroyed or ruined. But it is equally impossible to allow them to enjoy especially favorable treatment, and impose all corvée duties only on the lower classes. You, my elder brother, say that you fear that the rich will flee and become artisans or merchants, useless vagrants. But, supposing such a policy as you suggest is carried out over-hastily, this is exactly what will happen . . ."

and states categorically that the idea of levying taxes on commerce is wrong. Liu Yü-hsi, who had been on Tu Yu's staff for some years early in life and who together with Liu Tsung-yüan suffered banishment after the failure of the Wang Shu-wen régime of Shun-tsung's reign, had an even more antipathetic attitude to merchants and trade. In a letter addressed to the same Prefect Yuan of Jao-chou, he describes the people of that prefecture, one of the great commercial centres of southern China, as follows:<sup>102</sup>

"Now of the territories of the banks of the River, Jao is the greatest territory. It is the old land of the 'Lord of Fan'. It is still influenced by the customs handed down from Ou-yüeh. In Yü-kan there is land which produces one *chung* from every *mou*. In Wu-lin there is the timber from thousands of trees. Yet its people pit their strength against one another in striving for profit, and are accustomed to think little of violent and ruthless behaviour. Therefore they employ harsh and oppressive methods and get a great reputation thereby. As the mountains are densely covered with tea-shrubs, while of metals there is an abundance of the purest silver, the common folk constantly abandon their mattocks to go and cast metal, neglect silk thread and hemp to employ themselves in plucking and gathering [tea]. They take advantage of the times to fraudulently collect interest twice as great as the capital sum loaned . . ."

Liu Yü-hsi has also left us a description, written a few years before this letter, of the traders in a small town in southern China, which crystallizes the conventional scholar's view of the small traders who conducted the bulk

<sup>100</sup> See *Liu Ho-tung chi* 17, pp. 304-5, "Sung Ch'ing chuan".

<sup>101</sup> See *Liu Ho-tung chi* 32, pp. 513-5 "Ta Yüan Jao-chou lun cheng shu".

<sup>102</sup> See *Liu Meng-te chi* 14, pp. 9a-12a "Ta Jao-chou Yüan Shih-chün shu".

of the empire's business.<sup>103</sup> We are far now from the great salt merchants living in the utmost luxury and flourishing under official protection.

"There were seated hawkers sitting humbly and respectfully, walking pedlars hastening along. Hearts intent on profit are excited. Covetous eyes watch unblinkingly. Groups of merchants in charge of contracts, groups devoted to restricting trade to their own circle, conclude agreements between this one and that so as to push the prices up. Feigning to do good they cause trouble with their crafty words. Fair weight is ruined by crafty hands. They trade on the difference of the slightest amount in weight.

Evil gossip grates on the ear. Defamation and swindling thrive. Treacherous behaviour is everywhere to be seen. They raise a frightful hubbub, stir up the dust and dirt, emanate a rank stink like goats, pile together head-cloths and sandals. Snapping and gnawing at one another they congregate together, and what came to market different goes home the same. They set off to market, already wrangling, at cockcrow. At midday they throng together, ten-thousand feet led by the single thought that they all fear somebody else will forestall them. By the time their business is finished and they return to their homes the sun's glow has reached the west. All are intent only to act like scavenger dogs or carrion crows, delighted to get hold of some putrid left-overs..."

There is no doubt that this violently prejudiced view of the ruthlessly competitive world of the small trader would have found general acceptance, even with Confucianists like Han Yü. The conception of a livelihood based purely on profit, with cheating and sharp practice as accepted means to the end, remained abhorrent to all the educated scholar class.

There are, however, many signs that the merchant who was wealthy enough to live in fine style, ape the manners of the official class, and educate his family, was no longer considered to be completely socially unacceptable as had been the case in earlier times. The breakdown of the old rigidly compartmentalized city, the relaxation of the market system, and the relaxation of the sumptuary laws in the early ninth century removed many of the social restrictions which surrounded the merchant.<sup>104</sup> The first cracks began to appear also in the barriers against merchants' sons entering for the examinations and becoming officials.

Interesting evidence of this relaxation of social attitudes towards the families of merchants is to be found among Po Chü-i's "Model Judgements" (*P'an* 判). Readers of the late Arthur Waley's biography of Po Chü-i will remember with relish his delightful pastiche of one of these

<sup>103</sup> See *Liu Meng-te chi* 25, pp. 5b-7a "Kuan shih". This is translated in full in Twitchett, "The T'ang market system" (see note 23 above), pp. 229-30.

<sup>104</sup> On these developments see Twitchett, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-3.



judgements,<sup>105</sup> and will probably imagine that these hermetic literary exercises hold little historical interest. In reality, however, the two thousand odd surviving examples of this style of composition are an invaluable source for the T'ang historian.<sup>106</sup> Not only do the questions bring into focus a wide range of social problems and matters of practical administration, but the answers, which were expected to be cast in terms of Confucian ethic rather than in statute-book legal form, give us an invaluable glimpse of acceptable attitudes on many social topics, and offer incidentally many invaluable leads to potential areas of conflict between codified law and customary social usage. Po Chū-i's works in this form were written in 801-2 and sold to a bookseller as models for candidates preparing for the examinations. One would then hardly expect to find in them any too radically unconventional views. One of them is an answer to this question:<sup>107</sup>

"When the Prefectures sent in their candidates for the examinations, these included a number who were sons and grandsons of merchants. These were queried by the Ministry (i.e. the Board of Rites) who reported claiming that the most talented members of the group were ineligible to sit the examinations under the 'standard regulations'."

Since the actual law of the time was crystal clear on this point, rigidly excluding descendants of merchants and artisans, one would expect Po to have endorsed the Ministry's decision, and to have backed this up with a string of appropriate classical tags on the merchants' lack of suitable ethical standards, their position as predatory social parasites and so forth. In fact, however, he takes exactly the opposite line:

"The examination system seeks to select only the wise and virtuous men. There is no question whether they come from base origins. How much more does this apply to the most accomplished of candidates. How should they be rejected! In the case of the candidates from this commandery, for anyone to claim that "They are listed on the market registers, they do not come from a lineage of our own kind" is like objecting to mixing together common artemesia with rare orchid. When all the candidates are known to one, how can one possibly reject the ones with the most outstanding talents. Since the only valid objection [to merchants] is that they are petty and low, how can you reject one of them who proves to be excellent and outstanding? If you found gold among gravel, you surely would not refuse to pick it up just because it

<sup>105</sup> See Waley, *The life and times of Po Chū-i* (1949), p. 28.

<sup>106</sup> There are two good general surveys of the surviving T'ang period examples of the *p'an*, Takigawa Masajirō 瀧川政次郎 "*Bun'en eika no 'han' ni tsuite*" 文苑英華の判について *Tōyō gakuho* 28, i (1940), pp. 1-35; 28, ii (1941), pp. 22-45, and more recently Ichihara Kōkichi 市原亨吉 "*Tōdai no 'han' ni tsuite*" 唐代の判について *Tōhō gakuho* (Kyoto) 33 (1963), pp. 119-98. The historical material contained in these documents has never been exploited systematically.

<sup>107</sup> *Po Hsiang-shan chi* 50, pp. viii, 10, "P'an" no. 86.

was found mixed up with worthless material? If you find a piece of timber from a pine which had grown in a deep mountain, would you throw it away because the place where it was found is lowly and humble?

One's only legitimate consideration should be lest the persons selected should prove to be lacking in virtue. A person cannot be discarded merely on the grounds of his lowly birth. Even more so when one remembers that Tu Kuan-shih was descended from a cow-doctor, yet nevertheless was perfectly accomplished in his administration. There is ample proof to be found in past experience that it is possible to select officials from among the children of mean traders. By what "standard regulation" can they be excluded thus?

The Prefecture was adequately justified in submitting these candidates for examination, and the Ministry quite wrong to question their doing so."

It seems clear from another of Po Chū-i's "judgements"<sup>108</sup> that the position of artisans was comparable, and that there was a practice of permitting the recruitment of persons whose kin were artisans after three years had elapsed from the time when they had given up the profession:

"Supposing Chia's close kindred are engaged in the profession of skilled artisans. The Bureau of Personnel (*Li-ts'ao*) therefore considers Chia ineligible to serve as an official. Chia claims that they have now changed their occupation. The Bureau of Personnel still insists that even after changing their profession he would only be allowed to serve after three years have elapsed. We do not know whether he is in fact eligible or not."

Once again, Po's answer comes down firmly in favour of the employment of a man of outstanding talent, even if this offends against the strict letter of the law.

"Among the means of livelihood there are the four social classes (*ssu-min*). But among the responsibilities of officials there is only a single form of service. If a certain person dwells among tradesmen, then he cannot attain to the gates of officialdom. Now Chia had close kindred who declared themselves to be artisans. They were still engaged in menial services on behalf of their superiors. Yet amongst them was this one who had set his ambition upon the emoluments of an official, who cherished a deep passion for the nine genres of literature. But although he himself desires to change his profession, the three year ban has not yet elapsed. How can he be "promoted equally among the great ministers"?

It is difficult to permit Chia to offend against the letter of the

<sup>108</sup> *Po Hsiang-shan chi* 50 pp., viii, 7, "P'an" no. 76.

statutes, and the limitation imposed by the Bureau of Personnel ought rightly to be preserved. If, however, it is a case of a man of extraordinary talents, far above the general run of the people, whose conduct is so exemplary as to make him stand out from the herd, how should one impose such a limit upon him by the standard ruler?

He is himself capable of being raised to the greatest offices; this, and this alone, should be the grounds for considering the case. Who can say that this is not so?"

This attitude was not merely an idiosyncrasy of Po Chü-i. It depends upon the deeply rooted Confucian principle of employing officials on the grounds of ability. At least one "judgement" by another, anonymous, author survives<sup>109</sup> giving a similar answer to the question

"Yi, having performed meritorious service in the army is eligible for appointment to official rank. Somebody makes a complaint that since his kin are engaged in commerce, this cannot be done."

This judgement cites a string of precedents of men who rose to high rank from among the mercantile community on account of their native ability.

To Po Chü-i and his contemporaries, then, merchants and artisans as a class were lowly esteemed, but there was no question of their being thought a *caste* apart, upon whom the practice of trade had placed such an indelible moral stigma that they were unfit to associate with scholars and officials, as had undoubtedly been the case under the Sui, when they were classed as "untouchables" along with butchers etc. There is a certain amount of evidence from other sources too that during the early ninth century the bar on entry to the examinations for the sons of merchants was by no means rigorously applied. There was even one case of an Arab merchant's son taking the *chin-shih* examination.<sup>110</sup> An essay of Han Yü, dated 803,<sup>111</sup> gives us the even more surprising information that not only the examinations but even the state universities (*T'ai hsüeh* 太學) were now largely filled by the children of rich merchants and artisans and other commoners, where in early T'ang times they had been the exclusive preserve of the children of the aristocracy and of the highest ranking officials.<sup>112</sup>

Although such things happened, however, they were still nevertheless considered as exceptions. When Han Yü, having after great difficulty succeeded in the *Chin-shih* examination and yet failed to receive an official appointment, wrote a pleading letter to the Chief Minister, he specifically stated that:

<sup>109</sup> WYYH 531, pp. 1b-2a.

<sup>110</sup> See Schafer, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand*, p. 23.

<sup>111</sup> *Han Ch'ang-li chi* 37, p. vii, 19.

<sup>112</sup> On the rules of eligibility for the State University in early T'ang see Des Rotours, *Le Traité des examens* (1932), pp. 36-40, Taga Akigorô 多賀秋五郎 *Tōdai kyōikushi no kenkyū* 唐代教育史の研究 (1953).

"My name is not registered in the lists of farmers, artisans, merchants or traders. My life is devoted to reading books and the composition of essays, to singing the praises of the way of conduct of Yao and Shun . . ."<sup>113</sup>

The merchant's son might squeeze through the net of the examination system, but only as an exception. The ban on official employment for merchants' sons remained on the statute book well beyond the end of the T'ang dynasty, and was adopted in turn both by the Sung and by the Khitan dynasty of Liao.<sup>114</sup>

However, the examination system was in late T'ang times still only one among several routes to official employment. There can be little doubt that among the large numbers of subordinate officials irregularly recruited both by Provincial Governors and by the Salt and Iron Commission, there were many of merchant origin, employed for their technical skills. Yüan Chieh 元結, writing in 766 during the chaotic aftermath of the An Lu-shan rising in a border district in southern China complained:<sup>115</sup>

"Nowadays merchants and traders, members of the mean classes (*chien-lei*), menial servants and the lowest ranking officials have, in the space of a few months, in the worst cases risen to defile whole ministries and directorates, at the least to bring shame to whole commanderies and counties . . ."

In the context of central government, Yüan Chieh was certainly exaggerating. But in the new provincial governments which arose after 755 the Governor had very wide powers to appoint his own subordinate staff. Such irregular recruitment into provincial government and into the new semi-independent specialized commissions which played an increasing part in central administration seems, in fact, likely to have done far more than the examination system, which in T'ang times probably never recruited more than a small élite within the bureaucracy anyway, to open the door for rapid official advancement to people of really lowly origins during the T'ang period.<sup>116</sup>

While merchants – or at least merchants' sons – were beginning to become officials, there is also much evidence of officials becoming merchants – or at least engaging in large-scale commercial activities. In theory of course, serving officials of more than moderate rank were forbidden even to enter

<sup>113</sup> See *Han Ch'ang-li chi* 16, pp. iv, 50.

<sup>114</sup> On the ban under the Sung see *WHTK* 30, p. 12b; *Sung shih* 155, p. 3a. On the ban under the Liao, see *Liao shih* 20, p. 4b; 27, p. 4b.

<sup>115</sup> See *Yüan Tzu-shan wen chi* 7, p. 10a.

<sup>116</sup> For evidence of the wide range of persons employed in provincial government in late T'ang times, see Sudō Yoshiyuki 周藤吉之 "Godai Setsudo-shi no shihai taisei", included in his *Sodai keizaishi kenkyū* (1962) 宋代經濟史研究, pp. 575–654. It is quite impossible to quantify this statement, or indeed almost any statement about social mobility in T'ang times, as a reasonable sample of cases can be assembled only in the case of the holders of the very highest offices.

the markets,<sup>117</sup> while one of the most often quoted of all classical maxims on finance forbade them to "compete for profit with the common people", a dictum which was incorporated in the *Statutes*.<sup>118</sup>

This however was merely the theory. By the 780's many great local officials were investing their own fortunes and the officials funds entrusted to them in business, particularly in the great cities of the south.<sup>119</sup> Yang-chou was packed with such official-owned enterprises, which were banned, unsuccessfully, in 780.<sup>120</sup> Military officers were particularly active in such enterprises, since army expenditure seems not to have been subject to strict accountancy procedures, and even the soldiers set themselves up in small retail businesses. The main streets of Ch'ang-an and the main trunk roads leading to the city were lined with open stalls and shanties set up by members of the imperial guard, in open defiance of the market regulations.<sup>121</sup> Members of the Shen-ts'e armies 神策軍, the élite troops officered by eunuch generals which formed the crack imperial force in the early ninth century, are constantly mentioned in connection with trade, and several of their generals are known to have grown immensely wealthy.<sup>122</sup>

Officials invested in a wide variety of enterprises. Beside pure commerce, there are many cases of officials engaged in moneylending, pawn-broking, and various industrial enterprises. Other officials speculated in real estate in the capital on a huge scale.<sup>123</sup>

Obviously, there was a rather widespread two-way inter-connection between merchant and official by the ninth century. But these relations remained furtive. Trade remained tainted, disreputable, socially unacceptable, and unthinkable as an open ambition for an educated man. One cannot imagine any T'ang scholar giving the advice which the late twelfth century writer Yüan Ts'ai 袁采 gave to his family:<sup>124</sup>

"Those family members who are incapable of becoming scholars have open to them such careers as fortune-teller, doctor, Buddhist or Taoist priest, farmer, merchant or artisan, which will support them without casting shame on their ancestors."

<sup>117</sup> See *THY* 86, p. 1581.

<sup>118</sup> See *TLT* 3, p. 31b.

<sup>119</sup> On this problem see Fu An-hua 傅安華 "T'ang-tai kuan-liao ti-chu ti shang-jen hua" 唐代官寮地主的商人化 *Shih-huo* 1, vi (1935), pp. 15-8.

<sup>120</sup> See *THY* 86, p. 1582; *TFYK* 504, p. 22b.

<sup>121</sup> See *THY* 86, p. 1576; *CTW* 32, p. 19b.

<sup>122</sup> See *TCTC* 243, p. 7854.

<sup>123</sup> See for example the immensely wealthy Wang O, who made his fortune as governor of Canton. In 817 an Edict forbade the hoarding of cash, and he and a number of other provincial governors of exceptional wealth, the least of whom were said to possess half a million strings of actual cash, rushed to change this into real estate, buying up whole streets and wards, which they paid for 'with cash by the cart load'. See *CTS* 48, p. 12b; *CTS* 151, p. 5b.

<sup>124</sup> See *Yüan-shih shih-fan* 2, p. 40 (Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng edit).

Even in Sung times such an attitude was far from universal<sup>125</sup> and the old distrustful and antagonistic contempt for trade lingered on until our own time. But for it even to appear at all it was first necessary that the social transformation of the tenth and eleventh centuries, with the final disappearance of the old aristocracy, the breakdown of the rigid stratification of society, and the broadening both of the landowning class and of the social base of the bureaucracy, had to take place. Only then was it possible for a prosperous urban bourgeoisie with its own culture and way of life to emerge.

Under the T'ang however, the stage had already been set for these developments. The rapid growth and diversification of trade, the development towards a money economy with an adequate currency and credit institutions, the rapid decline of interest rates, the removal of the oppressive and restrictive control of the higher levels of markets, relaxation of urban control, the rapid proliferation of small market towns in rural areas, the increasing dependence of government on financial policies connected with trade, the employment of merchants to implement government policies, and the relaxation of the more extreme forms of social discrimination against merchants, were all trends which continued after the end of the T'ang and find fulfilment in the vast commercial and industrial revolution of Sung times. At the same time official attitudes and beliefs about commerce had already swung significantly away from the old rigid orthodoxy, so that when the time came the Sung government was to some degree prepared to deal with booming trade and urban prosperity. The oppressive and restrictive policies towards commerce which had been traditional since Han times were by the tenth century either dead or dying. A totally new period in the relationship between government and trade and a new orientation for state economic policies was the inevitable result of the developments of the eighth and ninth centuries.

This paper was originally delivered to the Council on East Asian Studies, Yale University, as the Annual Hume Lecture for 1967.

Abbreviations of the titles of sources, and editions used, conform to the model of Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty* (Cambridge 1963).

<sup>125</sup> See for example Lu Yu's almost exactly contemporary *Fang-sung chia-hsin*, pp. 2a, 9b (Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-ahü edit.) which says that for descendants to become farmers is perfectly respectable, but that engaging in the petty dealings of the market place involved disgrace to the family.

Denis (Bloomington)

## WHAT IS INNER ASIA ?

Five years have passed since I last surveyed the state of the art in Altaic studies. Since that time we have attained some of our objectives and have fallen short in some of our expectations. Time may be ripe for another conspectus. Yet, it so happens that the text of my report presented five years ago has just appeared<sup>1)</sup> and I am understandably reluctant to render new accounts at a time when the balance sheet of the previous exercise had just reached members of the PIAC. I would therefore address myself to a question which, I sincerely hope, is one of common interest, that of a definition in historical and cultural terms of Inner Asia, the world-area which lies at the center of our preoccupations.

I have been interested in this question for about thirty-five years and my view of the problems has naturally evolved although they have not changed drastically. Therefore, what I am going to say is not entirely "new", but rather a summation of research undertaken by others and by myself to give an answer to the question: What is Inner Asia ?

Within the physical and cultural framework of Inner Asia, Tibet constitutes an enclave with considerably autonomy. For this reason, and also because of my own lack of expertise, Tibet has not been dealt with in the pages that follow.<sup>2)</sup>

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Unless they coincide with clearly defined physical boundaries - as in the case, for instance, with Australia - the borders of a cultural area can rarely be established with ease and accuracy. The problem lies to some extent with the highly subjective and often purely emotional criteria by which a civilization is defined. Scores of examples may be observed in our daily life. Humanity has been divided according to languages, races, or religions; states are classified on the basis of their geographic locations, their internal political or economic structure, the degree of development (in what direction?) which they are supposed

to have reached. As for the individual, he is more often than not categorized according to his passport.

The attribute or group of attributes by virtue of which we form peoples into a class must consist of the common essential qualities. Yet what is essential to one individual is not for the other. It is a well-known rule of logic that classifications made on the basis of a single attribute are artificial and of limited use. To be a coherent, organic unit, a cultural area must encompass peoples with the greatest number of points of mutual resemblance and, also, the fewest points of resemblance to members of other cultural areas. Thus, no cultural area can be defined without reference to others.

The problem is not one that has only recently emerged. Europe and Asia are themselves correlative terms neither of which can be understood in its reality without reference to the other. The division of the old world into Asia, Europe, and Africa predates Horodotus (5th C. B. C.), who was already puzzled by the seeming illogicality of such division and could not conceive "why three names ... should ever have been given to a tract which is in reality one." (Book IV. 45)

The impossibility of drawing any clear dividing line between Europe and Asia rests to some extent on the fact that the latter term is not autochthonous in origin, i. e., until recently it was not used by the Asian themselves. Quite understandably no group solidarity existed between peoples living on a tract of land the unity of which was not perceived. The slow emergence of the European concept - for a long time closely associated with Christendom - brought about the gradual crystallization in European minds of the concept Asia. The geographical delimitation of that continent is purely conventional and, even today, is subject to fluctuations. Very few Americans would conceive Israel as an Asian state.

The Eurasian continent is a geographical entity, a huge continuous land-mass stretching for thousands of miles both in east-west and in north-south directions. Well over sixty percent of the world's population lives on it. On its fringes grew and developed the great sedentary civilizations - such as Europe in the west and China in the east - whose attributes are sufficiently numerous to permit easy identification. The definition of some other cultural areas is more difficult to termine; for example the areas of Islamic and Indian culture overlap and lead to conflicts, some of which we have witnessed. And in the center of this continent



...a cultural area with which we are here particularly concerned: Inner Asia. The foregoing remarks had no other purpose but to adumbrate some of the difficulties inherent in almost any attempt at defining in concrete geographical terms the boundaries of a cultural area.

Inner Asia is, essentially, a cultural concept. It is that part of the Eurasian continent that lies outside the boundaries of Europe, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Each of these sedentary civilizations is a unique combination of features, some of which may appear in more than one of them. Yet an association of various components, cultural and linguistic, molded by a unique historical process and greatly influenced by natural environment made each of these cultural spheres different from the others. The same may be said of Inner Asia but in this case the typical features are more difficult to pinpoint. Here more than in the case of the sedentary civilizations the definition of the area at any given point in time can only be given by reference to the bordering civilizations.

A cursory glance at any map of Eurasia will show that the major civilizations developed on the periphery of the great landmass, while the evolution of the heartland of the continent remained slow. It would seem that differentiation on a larger scale did not start before the end of the Upper Paleolithic period during which a fairly uniform belt of civilization stretched from what was to become Europe to what was to become China. From the dawn of recorded history the nuclei of future settled civilizations asserted their own identity and defined their own, distinct personalities largely by contrasting them with those of Inner Asia. Whether in Greece, China, or Iran, to give inner cohesion to the group, the concept of the Civilized was developed to contrast with that of the Barbarian, setting the two into largely fictitious opposition and comparing the would-be superiority of the former with the alleged inferiority of the latter.

Inner Asia, the heartland of the Eurasian continent, differs in its climate from the littorals. To put it in very simple terms, it is colder and drier.

The very size of Inner Asia excludes climatic homogeneity, but every part of it has what is called a "continental climate," characterized by cold winters and hot summers. The arctic littoral which constitutes the only boundary of Inner Asia and the immense marshes of northern Siberia provide very little moisture to the air as, because of the intense cold, they are either frozen or produce

but slight evaporation. The Central Mountain Barrier - extending from the Hindu Kush and the Pamir, along the Himalayas to the Tianshan - obstructs the path of rains coming from the south, and the oceans lying east and west of Inner Asia are far too distant to provide substantial moisture.

The climate's unavoidable effect on the ecology created conditions which - put in simplistic terms - do not favor agriculture. To be sure, in suitable and relatively small areas agriculture has been and is being practised but it has played only a marginal role in the economy of the region. The vast stretches of the steppe are favorable to extensive animal husbandry which has remained the most characteristic occupation of Inner Asian peoples until modern times.

Inner Asia may be divided into four natural vegetation regions stretching from east to west across the Eurasian continent. The frozen marshes known as the tundra constitute the northernmost belt. Southwards, the vast forest belt is itself divided into a northern zone of coniferous trees and a southern tract dominated by mixed, and further south, by deciduous forests. This vast belt, extending over some six thousand miles from Finland to the Pacific constitutes a timber reserve unparalleled in the world. This forest zone is often referred to by its Russian name, taiga, although the term originally applies only to the coniferous forest. The southern margin of the forest belt constitutes a transitional zone known as the wooded steppe, suitable for cultivation because of the quality of its soil (black earth) and the relatively temperate, continental climate which it enjoys. Compared to the width of the forest zone, the steppe of grassland constitutes a relatively narrow belt which stretches from Hungary to the Great Wall of China. The mostly chestnut colored soil of the steppe does not favor agriculture but is suitable for grass. The temperate continental climate ensures sufficient precipitation to make this region an ideal grazing ground. Further south the steppes often merge into desert regions, not quite devoid of vegetation, but unable to sustain even semi-permanent human settlements.

Of the four natural regions of Central Eurasia just mentioned, only one, the steppe, can support a polity of some sophistication and power. The natural conditions prevailing in the three other zones - the arctic tundra, the forest region, and the desert - do not allow the formation of powerful states, as none of them can provide food for a population of a density sufficient to muster the political power necessary to face external forces.

The limited hunting and reindeer breeding that characterize the life of the tundra can ensure subsistence-level existence of its inhabitants only as long as they live dispersed over vast territories.

As the desert could never support any permanent population it played no major role in the history of inner Asia.

The economic resources of the forest region, the taiga, can support a hunter-fisher-gatherer population with relative ease. Perhaps more important from our present point of view is that it is the principal, almost exclusive producer of fur, a commodity much in demand by other civilizations. The routes of the fur trade crossed natural and political boundaries and made available to the hunters raw materials and manufactured goods which they themselves could not produce. However, since a hunting economy is basically predatory and cannot serve as the economic basis for high-density populations, the hunters could never conglomerate to form a state. The taiga has often been described as impenetrable, a formidable obstacle to communication. Nothing could be further from the truth. The hunter not only moved with perfect ease through the thickets, he could also make use of waterways, these super highways of the pre-modern age. Although the principal rivers of Siberia flow from the south to the north, their confluents, when not frozen, constitute an almost continuous east-west waterway. The watersheds are not very elevated and the distances between different systems are so short that portage has never posed a serious problem. In less than one century after the conquest of Kazan in 1552, the Russians stood on the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

The fourth region, the steppe, constitutes the key to the understanding of Inner Asian history. It was this vast pasture that provided the only asset the populations of Inner Asia could rely on in their continuous confrontation with the surrounding, sedentary civilizations. Of course, I refer to the horse and to the cavalry tactics and strategy based on its large-scale use. In the steppe, cattle breeding - whether it be horned cattle, camel, sheep, goat or horse - was always extensive. To ensure economic self-sufficiency, the Inner Asian horse breeders had to remain dispersed, but, unlike the inhabitants of the tundra and the taiga, they could congregate with great speed and could stay together for relatively long periods of time. In other words, the population-carrying capacity of the steppe within a fixed area is superior to that of either the tundra or the forest.

The environment could and did allow the creation of strongly centralized states and was able to maintain such political superstructure for as long as the community could complement its basic production with commodities obtained from other, mostly agricultural regions. In Owen LATTIMORE's words, steppe life

"is based on an economy which is capable of being entirely self-sufficient. Its own resources provide the essentials of food, even fuel (from cattle dung). Nor does it prevent the mining and working of metals on a small scale, as is known from archaeological evidence. The steppe-nomad can withdraw into the steppe if he needs to, and remain completely out of contact with other societies. He can; but so rarely does he so that this pure condition of nomadic life can fairly be called hypothetical. For every historical level of which we have any knowledge there is evidence that exchange of some kind, through trade or tribute, has been important in steppe-nomad life."<sup>3)</sup>

If the steppe-based state no longer enjoyed the quasi-autarchy of a small-scale pastoralist, tribal organization, it had the possibility of compensating for any deficiency either by trade or by military means. Horse breeding on a large scale provided the most essential tools of warfare.

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The key role of the horse in the civilization of Inner Asia is universally organized. Indeed, the picture of the mounted archer has come to symbolize, and rightly so, the force that created some of the greatest, if not the most lasting, states known to history. Until firearms came to dominate warfare, a well-disciplined, well-led Inner Asian cavalry force - provided it was sufficiently large and disposed of an important reserve of mounts - was virtually invincible by armies of sedentary populations. The annals of the Mongol Yuan dynasty of China (1279-1368) could reasonably state: "Yuan arose in the northern areas. By nature they are good at riding and archery. Therefore they took possession of the world through this advantage of bows and horse."

The quality of the Inner Asian breeds and, in particular, their resistance to climatic extremes and their hardiness made them superior to any other warfaring horse, from Scythian times to World War II. Rather unattractive to our eyes, the typical Inner Asian horse is under the average height, has a long and shaggy coat, thick neck and legs, and a large head. These horses possess wonderful powers of endurance and can remain out in the open in extreme cold.

They are capable of digging their food out from under the snow and, in case of need, can survive on twigs, tree bark, or any other vegetal substance.

The first recorded compliment on the Inner Asian horse goes back to Herodotus. Describing the campaigns of Darius I (521-486 B.C.), the Achamaenid king of Persia, against the Scythians he stated (Histories IV, 127): "In these combats the Scythian horse always put to flight the horse of the enemy." In the second century B.C., speaking of the Hsiung-nu who created a powerful empire in Mongolia, a Chinese source remarks: ". . . the territory of the Hsiung-nu and the skill it demands are different from those in China. In climbing up and down mountains and crossing ravines and mountain torrents, the horses of China cannot compare with those of the Hsiung-nu." When, in 1245, the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini made preparations for his pioneering journey to Mongolia, the inhabitants of Kiev, more familiar with conditions there, warned him that were he to continue his journey with the horses he then had "they would all die, for the snow was deep and they would not know how to dig up grass from under the snow like the Tartar horses, nor would he be able to find anything else for them to eat since the Tartars have neither straw nor hay nor fodder."

The military power of the steppe nations rested not only on the excellence of their mounts and the military skill of their soldiers, but also on the number of the horses the latter could count upon. The steppe could produce horses far in excess of the domestic needs. The surplus could be used to obtain, either by barter or through war, goods not produced within the pastoral economic system. In the first case the horses were exchanged for other commodities through peaceful trade, in the second, their military potential was used to obtain by force what could not be gotten otherwise. It was one of the tragic mistakes of traditional Chinese policy towards the northern and western Barbarian - i.e., towards the peoples of Inner Asia - to imagine that by denying him trade and thereby further impoverishing the already poor, the menace he represented along the border would be reduced. Quite to the contrary, it was this centuries-old policy of "containment" that must be considered the direct cause of most Inner Asian invasions of China.

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On the western and southern frontiers of Inner Asia the conflicts were less prolonged and less acute. On a purely speculative basis one might attribute

this to political as well as to environmental causes. Among the first could be counted the relative flexibility of Iranian and European political thinking. While, in practice, many concessions had to be made by the Chinese to the realities of power and to the vanity of their foreign partners or opponents, the basic conception to universal sovereignty was never completely buried and remained the basis of Chinese foreign policy. It is probably safe to say that with the exception of some mainly Anglo-Saxon political behavior of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European, Iranian, and Indian attitudes were much more flexible and much less self-righteous.

The environment was probably an even more important factor in determining the frequency and force of the collisions between Inner Asia and the civilizations that surround it. The range of activity and the very size of the great cavalry forces of Inner Asia were limited by the carrying capacity of the grazing grounds they could use. In the whole steppe-belt no pasture land is as favorable to horse breeding as Mongolia which - and this is an important point - was a convenient base for powerful attacks on China. While on the eastern borders of Inner Asia the grass land brought the mounted archer within striking distance of Chinese political centers, in the west the Balkan peninsula served as an effective glacis in the protection of Byzantium. To be sure, cavalry forces could and did reach the walls of Constantinople, but their size could not compare with those launched against the great cities of northern China and decisive victory was out of their reach. The logistic problems presented could be compared to those faced by a naval power attempting to conquer a landlocked country.

If the political outreach of Inner Asia was limited by the logistic imperatives commanding the effective use of its cavalry, its internal cohesion was favored by geographical factors. The three natural zones - tundra, taiga, steppe - lie athwart the Eurasian continent, constituting three continuous broad belts from east to west. Each of them is a fairly homogenous ecological unit within which man, adapting himself to the natural conditions which he does not attempt to alter, can move freely. In theory there is nothing to prevent an experienced hunter-fisher from mounting a reindeer and riding it from Kamchatka to Sweden. The wooded steppe and the steppe itself permitted the fastest travel known to man before the building of the railways. Armies and peoples could move fast over considerable distances unhampered by natural obstacles or by their own, sedentary

habits. When the need and the will to create it was there, the abundance and the quality of the horses allowed the organization of a relay system far superior to that of the Romans or any other state at any other time.

Communication between the various natural regions has always been easy. The division between steppe and forest is made less harsh by the existence of the wooded zone and the rivers facilitate travel and commercial or cultural interchange between the three major ecological units. The cultural cleavage between steppe and forest dwellers did not always and necessarily entail political separation.

A common script, the greatest cohesive force of any given civilization, has not linked the various nations and peoples of Inner Asia until recent times. Whether these have ever developed a consciousness of their affinities is a moot point. There is some evidence to the effect that a feeling of community must have evolved at least among the various peoples of the steppe referred to as "the peoples living under felt tents," or elsewhere as "the people who live by drawing the bow." Yet Inner Asia has never known complete political unification. The most successful attempts were those of the Mongols in the thirteenth and of the Russians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It would seem that in the cauldron of Inner Asia the various racial, ethnic, social, and linguistic units were floating freely, initially kept together not so much by a cohesive force of their own making but rather by outside pressure. At the risk of overstretching the metaphor I would suggest that the cauldron referred to above was cast by the encircling civilizations.

The cultural cleavage separating Inner Asia from the high civilizations is to a great extent, although not exclusively, the result of ecological factors. Within the boundaries of Inner Asia the tripartite ecology (tundra, taiga, steppe) did not prevent a certain cultural unification, characterized by distinctive features of a great variety. Perhaps the most important among these is the interrelatedness of the Inner Asian languages which can be subdivided into five principal groups: Finno-Ugric, Samoyed, Turkic, Mongol, and Tunguz. The extent and the nature of the interrelatedness of these groups is subject to discussion but its existence has been established beyond reasonable doubt. There is a strong presumption for explaining the similarities and dissimilarities that exist between the various Altaic languages by the prolonged symbiosis of their speakers. It

could well be that some, if not all, of the common features of, say, Turkic, Mongol, and Tunguz are not the remnants of a Proto-Altaiic language their common ancestors may at one time have spoken, but rather resulted from a convergent development determined by millennial intermingling. The basic cultural uniformity of Inner Asia - its tripartite subdivision notwithstanding - includes also a great variety of common features, ranging from the fine arts and poetry to technological peculiarities.

The frontier of Inner Asia is unstable; it varies from age to age, from area to area following the balance of pressure between the civilized and the uncivilized. The Roman province of Pannonia, the Greek provinces of Asia Minor become 'Inner Asia' when occupied respectively by the Huns (5th C.A.D.) or by the Seljuk Turks (11th C.A.D.). Northern China becomes 'Inner Asia' when occupied by the Kitan, the Jurchen, the Mongols, or the Manchus. The pattern and the length of assimilation, absorption, or outright annihilation varied from case to case. In the course of history the assimilation of Inner Asian peoples - the barbarians - has seldom been done by force. This may seem strange to the western man of the 20th century, vaguely familiar with the history of the white man's conquest, or attempted conquest, of the "natives," the "primitive," the "uncivilized." This pattern does not fit the history of Inner Asia. Assimilation by conquest is hardly ever found, the only important example being the Russian occupation of most of the lands that remained within the boundaries of Inner Asia in the modern epoch.

Although the area of Inner Asia is subject to fluctuations, the general trend is that of diminution. With the territorial growth of the sedentary civilizations, their borderline extends and offers a larger surface on which new layers of barbarians will be deposited. The diminution in space of Inner Asia thus follows the pattern of geometric progression; as time goes on, the process of assimilation becomes more and more rapid, in the sense that more and more barbarians can be assimilated within the same span of time.

The barrier that over the centuries has separated the peoples of Inner Asia from those of the surrounding sedentary civilizations is cultural rather than political. It stands in the hearts of men rather than on the ground. It is not dissimilar to the chasm separating the haves from the have-nots, the chosen people



from the Latines.

The term "barbarian" has repeatedly been used on the preceding page. In its earliest, Greek, application it simply meant "foreigner." Later, it denoted successively the non-Hellene, the non-Roman, the non-Byzantine, the non-Christian, and even the non-Italian. In spite of numerous secondary applications, and even misapplications of the word, it is quite clear that in its principal meaning - in which it is used here - the term is the antonym of "civilized" and is, therefore, for all practical purposes synonymous with "uncivilized." Civilized-uncivilized are relative terms. Those who consider themselves civilized are those who are, or consider themselves, endowed with privileges which they intend to protect against those who do not have, and therefore covet them. In the normal pattern of events those who have not and are on the "outside" (a term often used in Chinese sources) attack; those who have and are on the inside resist. But only the center of the civilized world is forbidden to the barbarian. He can, if he wishes, have access to the periphery and form a marginal group in the hope of being assimilated ultimately into the core. On the edges of civilization a regular deposit of barbarian layers increases constantly the area of the civilized world and in the same process forms a protective reef around the initial centers. Thus it is more appropriate to speak of the "conversion" of the barbarian rather than of his conquest or assimilation. Most of the time it is a deliberate political act, a request for admittance, for asylum, one would almost say, that precedes the process of assimilation, which is all the more rapid since it is initiated by the barbarian himself.

It is interesting to remark that in historical times few barbarian layers coming from Inner Asia were added to the core we call Europe. Except for the Russian expansion in Asia, since Roman times the western world has shrunk rather than expanded. The white man has assimilated practically no one: he went out and conquered virtually empty lands such as America and Australia where he exterminated the not too numerous natives. Whenever and wherever he met with an established, sedentary civilization, his methods of conquest yielded but short-term results and ended, or are ending, in shameful retreat. On the western boundary of Inner Asia only the Hungarians and the Bulgars settled down, whereas countless peoples asked and received "admittance" (a technical term used by the Chinese) into China. It is not suggested that over the centuries the Chinese did not conquer by force many neighboring peoples, but the facts worth meditating on

show that many of the conquered were not exterminated, but were given a fair chance to become Chinese.

On several occasions not only the conquered but also the conquerors "converted" to Chinese culture. It is important to remember that during our era five dynasties of Inner Asian origin ruled over China for a total of 950 years, and that the last of these, the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty, ceased to reign as late as 1911. They have all become sinicized. The barbarian tempted by the inducement of the civilized world, when faced with the choice, often prefers to lose his identity rather than to return to his former condition. Some of the Uighurs, who in the 8th and 9th century formed a powerful nomad empire in Mongolia, when driven out, settled in the Chinese province of Kansu. Less than a hundred years later, they politely declined an offer from the first Liao emperor - himself a not yet converted barbarian - to reinstate them in their former empire.

If then we try to define the dominant trait of Inner Asia as a cultural and historical entity we find that it is essentially determined by economic factors resulting from the geographic and climatic fundamentals of the region.

The economy of pastoral nomadism is extensive and necessitates the relative dispersal of the population engaged in it. The number of horses that a square mile of steppe can support is strictly limited. For every given year there was an optimum number of horses the grazing land under the control of one given political power could raise or support. The internal demand for horses had only a limited elasticity and the saturation of the home market was easily achieved. There was no direct advantage to be had through the unlimited increase of horse herds, unless the surplus horses could be used to obtain goods not produced within the Inner Asian pastoral economic system. In order to remain self-sufficient on a subsistence level, the Inner Asian pastoralists had to remain dispersed. If for political or economic reasons - such as the desire to obtain goods not produced by themselves - the pastoralists decided to create a strong, centralized state of some dimension, the pasture could no longer provide for the resulting increased density of their herds. Overgrazing quickly reduced the carrying capacity of the range. Because of its non-diversified economy the new steppe-state either had to export the animal surplus so as to reduce the herds to a size commensurate with the grazing grounds occupied, or it had to make use of the war potential created by the surplus in horses. An Inner Asian nomad empire could

be compared to a hypothetical modern country whose industry consists of tanks. Such a country could ensure its continued existence only by either exporting them or by using these tanks to obtain by force the goods not produced by its own economy. While a horse is more versatile than a tank and its uses are more diversified, beyond a relatively low optimum number horses cannot be profitably employed within the producing state. If the possibilities of trade were insufficient and success in war eluded the leaders, the steppe nation had to disband in order to ensure the survival of the individual. The concentration of horses necessary for large-scale operations could not be maintained in conditions of peace, but scattered groups of horse breeders could always subsist on what the pastures and the woods had to offer.

The political weakness of historical Inner Asia lay in the fact that in the pre-modern age its production could neither be diversified nor increased and that the most important single commodity it produced, the horse, lost most of its "value in exchange." In spite of the political decadence into which Inner Asia had sunk and which resulted in the bulk of its territory being incorporated into the Russian empire, early in the 20th century a British geographer, Sir Halford MACKINDER, recognized its great political importance. He called the core of Inner Asia "the geographical pivot of history," the "heartland."<sup>4)</sup> For him rule over this heartland was tantamount to domination over Eurasia.

While one is bound to disagree with many of MACKINDER's conclusions, he was right in recognizing the capital significance of the area for world history. The fact that it is almost completely landlocked is of no great consequence in an age in which the importance of seaborne power has almost completely vanished. In the present age Inner Asia, unified by the use of a common Cyrillic script, almost in its entirety under a strong, centralized leadership, may be compared to a citadel in danger of beleagerment. Its enemies, if in agreement, may attack it simultaneously. But at the same time its defenders, from their central position, may make devastating sorties taking advantage both of their natural strength and of the relative shortness of their lines of communication. Perhaps one might agree with the statement made by D.F. FLEMING, that "the communization of the vast heart of Eurasia, the world's largest island, is the towering political fact of the twentieth century."<sup>5)</sup>

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be compared to a hypothetical modern country whose entire industrial output consists of tanks. Such a country could ensure its continued existence only by either exporting them or by using these tanks to obtain by force the goods not produced by its own economy. While a horse is more versatile than a tank and its uses are more diversified, beyond a relatively low optimum number horses cannot be profitably employed within the producing state. If the possibilities of trade were insufficient and success in war eluded the leaders, the steppe nation had to disband in order to ensure the survival of the individual. The concentration of horses necessary for large-scale operations could not be maintained in conditions of peace, but scattered groups of horse breeders could always subsist on what the pastures and the woods had to offer.


The political weakness of historical Inner Asia lay in the fact that in the pre-modern age its production could neither be diversified nor increased and that the most important single commodity it produced, the horse, lost most of its "value in exchange." In spite of the political decadence into which Inner Asia had sunk and which resulted in the bulk of its territory being incorporated into the Russian empire, early in the 20th century a British geographer, Sir Halford MACKINDER, recognized its great political importance. He called the core of Inner Asia "the geographical pivot of history," the "heartland."<sup>4)</sup> For him rule over this heartland was tantamount to domination over Eurasia.

While one is bound to disagree with many of MACKINDER's conclusions, he was right in recognizing the capital significance of the area for world history. The fact that it is almost completely landlocked is of no great consequence in an age in which the importance of seaborne power has almost completely vanished. In the present age Inner Asia, unified by the use of a common Cyrillic script, almost in its entirety under a strong, centralized leadership, may be compared to a citadel in danger of beleagerment. Its enemies, if in agreement, may attack it simultaneously. But at the same time its defenders, from their central position, may make devastating sorties taking advantage both of their natural strength and of the relative shortness of their lines of communication. Perhaps one might agree with the statement made by D.F. FLEMING, that "the communization of the vast heart of Eurasia, the world's largest island, is the towering political fact of the twentieth century."<sup>5)</sup>

Notes

- 1) "Stand und Aufgaben der internationalen altaistischen Forschung," in: Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker. Protokollband der XII. Tagung der Permanent International Altaistic Conference 1969 in Berlin. Herausgegeben von Georg HAZAI und Peter ZIEME. Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des Alten Orients 5. (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1974) pp. 35-43.
- 2) This survey leans heavily on some of my former publications and incorporates verbatim quotations from, among others, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," Oriens Extremus 19 (1972), pp. 171-193, and "Inner Asia - Central Eurasia," Indo Asia. Vierteljahrshefte für Politik, Kultur und Wirtschaft Indiens, Heft 3, 1974, pp.214-22. I have limited the bibliographical references to the bare minimum.
- 3) "The Geographical Factor in Mongol History," The Geographical Journal 91 (1938), reprinted in Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers, 1928-1958, (Oxford University Press, 1962), 241-258, p.253.
- 4) "The Geographical Pivot of History," The Geographical Journal 23 (1904), 421-437.
- 5) The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960, I-II. (Doubleday and Co., 1961), II, p.1035.

ACTA



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AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ, BUDAPEST  
1968

# CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHERS' VIEWS ON BARBARIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS (14—16TH C.)

BY

MARY FERENCZY

Around 1345 in the History Office 脫脫 *T'o-t'o*, 歐陽玄 *Ou-yang Hsūan* and others edited three official historical works (正史 *cheng shih*), the 宋史 *Sung shih*, 遼史 *Liao shih* and 金史 *Chin shih* recording the history of the *Sung* period and those of the *Sung*, *Liao* and *Chin* dynasties respectively. The *Sung shih* was subsequently several times revised and its material reconstructed.<sup>1</sup> The revisions are of a later origin, their source material departs from that of the original only in few cases, thus their value as a source is rather low. They are, however, worth attention, because the comparison of the original work and some parts of the revisions may provide us with interesting information concerning the historical conception, the manner of construction of both the original work and the revisions, which is important for a modern valuation and analysis of their values as sources. This article attempts to present one single example concerning only the problem of the contemporary evaluation of the Chinese-Barbarian relations.

The revision the 宋史新編 *Sung shih hsin-pien* used for our comparison was compiled in the 16th century by 柯維騏 *K'o Wei-ch'i*.<sup>2</sup> When reselecting and rearranging the material — besides other important alterations — he reconsidered the views of the authors of the *Sung shih* on the relations of the people and nations in the *Sung* period, that is their views on Barbarian and Chinese relations. Both the original and the revised views are dogmatically laid down in the introductions of the corresponding parts from the *Sung shih* and *Sung shih hsin-pien* alike, in the prefaces to the chapters on the Barbarians.

<sup>1</sup> More details about this in 四庫全書總目提要 *Szü-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao* II, pp. 1008—1010; 金毓黻 *Chin Yü-fu*, 中國史學史 *Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shih*, *Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan*, Shanghai 1957, pp. 106—111.; 范文瀾 *Fan Wen-lan*, 正史考略 *Cheng-shih k'ao-lioh*, Peip'ing 1931, pp. 214—241.

<sup>2</sup> *K'o Wei-ch'i* comes from a scholar family from Fuchien. He became *chin-shih* in 1523. He held this office for a short period and retired because of illness. Beside many other works he worked on the *Sung shih hsin-pien* for twenty years. Cf. *Ming shih* 287, *chüan* 5.b—6.b. The description of his work see *Szü-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao* II, pp. 1109—1110.



The translation of the two prefaces reads as follows:

*Sung shih* 485. *chüan* 1.a 2.a.<sup>3</sup>

«A long time ago *T'ang* dynasty assumed power after the *Sui* dynasty, the *Sui* took the power over from the *Chou* and *Ch'i* dynasties and this goes back to the *Yüan Wei* dynasty. Those regions of the old north-western territories, however, to which the *Han* and *Chin* calendars could not be forwarded [as a token of recognition of Chinese rule] could not be reached this time either, although delegates were sent from both sides and the tribute and the present also arrived from time to time, but nothing else happened.

After the «virtues» of the *T'ang* dynasty had declined, the tribute from the distant regions (龍服 *huang-fu*) was no longer received. The Five Dynasties succeeded each other on the throne, the net of the law got entangled of itself, and when the distant peoples demanded morality, there was nobody whom they could follow.

The founder of the *Sung* dynasty received the heavenly mandate and then all the countries were united and peace and harmony ruled all over the world.

From [countries] like *Kao-li* [*Korye*] and *Po-hai* in the East, although they were separated from us by the land of *Liao* they came to us sailing on the sea from far away and without fear they wandered through the land and seas. From the West that is from *T'ien-chu* [*India*], *Yü-tien* [*Khotan*], the *Hui-hu* [*Uigurs*], the *Ta-shih* [*Arabs*], *Kao-ch'ang* [*Turfan*], *Chiu-tz'ü* [*Kucha*] and *Fu-lin* [*Byzantium*], although the land of *Liao* and *Hsia*-[*kuo*] stretched between them [and the *Sung* empire] the «gift-baskets» still arrived and the quartermasters were kept occupied. The 党項 *Tang-hsiangs*<sup>4</sup> and the tribes of 唃廝囉 *Ku-szü-lo*, 董種 *Tung-chan* and 吐蕃 *Hsia-chêng* from 吐蕃 *T'u-fan*<sup>5</sup> had to fight with the military forces of *Hsia-kuo*. The feared virtue of the *Sung*-house spread

<sup>3</sup> The translation relies upon the text of the *Po-na* Edition, besides the facsimile of the Palace Edition from the *Ch'ien-lung* period was accessible. (Published by *Chung-hua shu-chü*).

<sup>4</sup> Since *Tang-hsiang* is the Chinese name of the Tangutans it seems remarkable that the country of *Hsi-hsia* (the land of the Tangutans) and the tribes of *Tang-hsiang* occur separately, and as each others' enemies at that. In the barbarian chapters of the *Sung shih* besides the *Hsi-hsia chuan* (485—486. *chüan*) *Tang-hsiang chuan* (491. *chüan* 12. a—24. b.) can be found as well. Even a superficial comparison between the material of the two chapters leads us to conclude that this alleged duality seemed to preserve the memory of the fights of some Tangutan tribes from times previous to the consolidation of the Tangutan state, when the nationalities were not dependent on central power yet. The sentence in the text of the preface contrasting the tribes of *Tang-hsiang* and the country of *Hsi-hsia* seems to refer to this period and to these fights.

<sup>5</sup> This term originating from the *T'ang* period and indicating the name of Tibet does not mean Central-Tibet in the barbarian chapters of the *Sung shih* but refers to country of the Tibetan population living on the territories of the today's Chinghai and Kansu provinces. *Ku-szü-lo* is the ruler of *T'u-fan* in the first half of the 11th century. His res-

already over their land too and they gained their help from time to time. [From the land of] *Chiao-chih*, *Chan-ch'êng* [*Champa*], *Chên-la*, 蒲甘<sup>6</sup> *P'u-kan* and *Ta-li* and from all the Barbarians of the coastal area ever since that 劉崇 *Liu Ch'ang*<sup>7</sup> and 陳洪進 *Ch'ên Hung-chin*<sup>8</sup> came and surrendered, the tributes were continuously and regularly received.

The *Sung* dynasty treated them so that they took their road, increasing their population, did not even register their tributes and lent them its glorious name, and did not burden them with harrasments and humiliation.<sup>9</sup> When they came, they were not held up, when they left, they were not pursued. But as the frontiers were adjoining, infiltrations nevertheless occurred from time to time. When orders were given for punitive expeditions, having surrendered, [the Barbarians] were left in their place and troops were not [stationed there] permanently. The method of the ancient rulers was to treat distant peoples leniently, could anything be added to this?

After the dynasty had moved southward, the connections between the northern desert and the south-eastern regions were severed. In the western frontier towns there were still some officials left in order to keep up relations from afar and to give positions and orders, till the downfall of *Sung* and then all this came to an end.

At the beginning of the *Sung* era the *Ju-chens* often brought famous horses in tribute. At other times, regaining strength, they got into conflicts with *Liao* and 阿朶 *A-shu*<sup>10</sup> their revolting subject demanded everything back which then had carried away. At that time the orders of the *Sung* dynasty were recognized yet and they regarded keeping up good relations with them as

idence was called in Chinese 宗哥城 *Tsung-ko-ch'êng* (probably near *Hsining*). Cf. *Sung shih*, *T'u-fan chuan* (492. *chüan*) 11. b—14. b. *Tung-chan* was the successor of *Ku-szü-lo*. Cf. *Sung shih*, *T'u-fan chuan* (492. *chüan*) 14. b—17. a. *Hsia-chêng*: the ruler of *T'u-fan* on the turn of the 11—12th centuries. Cf. *Sung shih*, *T'u-fan chuan* (492. *chüan*) 18. a—19. b.

<sup>6</sup> In the text there is an incorrect spelling 耳 *êrh*, the correct form (甘 *kan*) can be found in *Sung shih* 489. *chüan* 11. b.

<sup>7</sup> The ruler of *Nan Han* after the success of the *Sung* dynasty surrendered to the *Sungs*. For details see *Sung shih* 481. *chüan* 1. a.—12. a.

<sup>8</sup> A general from *Min*, he surrendered under the reign of *Sung T'ai-tsung*. See *Sung shih* 483. *chüan* 13. b—17. b.

<sup>9</sup> Instead of 緝 *ju* occurring in the text read 緝 *ju*.

<sup>10</sup> *Ju-chen* tribal leader, who on account of tribal conflicts fled to the *Liao* empire in 1112. He was accepted and supported by the *Kitan* court, this led to difficulties between the strengthening *Ju-chen* might and the *Kitans* in the following years. This matter was mentioned too among the nominal *casus belli* of the war that finally led to the fall of the *Kitan* empire. Our text avoids to admit that the *Liao* empire was destroyed by the *Ju-chens* at the beginning of the 12th century by the help of this allusion. Cf. K. A. Wittfogel—Fêng Chia-shêng, *History of Chinese Society Liao*, Philadelphia, 1949, pp. 422 and 595.

important. But then they broke the treaty concluded at the sea-shore and caused very great danger. Thus the *Sung* rulers were greatly humiliated, but did it not all happen because of the faults [of the *Sung* rulers] themselves?

At an earlier date in the old history of the *Sung* dynasty (宋傳史 *Sung chiu shih*) there was a capital on the *Ju-chens* (女真傳 *Ju-chen chuan*). [From the present work] we had to omit this part in accordance with the truth because the *Chin shih* was already completed at imperial orders. But we took into consideration that as long as the *Chin* state was independent, the opposition of *Hsia-kuo* [i.e. its independence] was not permanent, therefore we left it [the history of *Hsia-kuo*] as it had been reported by the ancient historiographers.<sup>11</sup>

*Sung shih hsin-pien* 192. *chüan*.<sup>12</sup>

In the countries of the Barbarians, outside our frontiers the customs of the tribes are not the same as those of the Chinese, therefore those [regions] were called *huang-fu*<sup>13</sup> by the ancient kings. While there were no troubles within and without the borders of the empire the tax-collectors collected the tributes every now and then and hardly any inroads occurred. And when unexpectedly the bows were bent and the arrow-heads rang out then there were skirmishes, but the hard accessibility of the mountains and valleys was enough for us to defend ourselves. And if inspite of all this deceits or violence took place all this resulted from the inherent characteristics [of the Barbarians].

Although when *Shao-k'ang* raised the *Hsia* house, the music and the dances were all performed<sup>14</sup> and when *Wu-wang* founded the *Chou* house, arrow-

<sup>11</sup> In the original, 夏國雖偏鄉不常而視金有間故仍舊史所錄存焉. On its interpretation see *Chin shih* 134. *chüan*. 13. a. 遼金宋三國偏鄉無常視三國之勢強弱以爲異同焉. In the text of the *Sung shih* of the Palace Edition we find 聊 *ch'ing* instead of 鄉 *hsiang*.

<sup>12</sup> The translation relies upon the *Sung shih hsin-pien* 200 *chüan*, ed. by 大光書局 *Ta-kuang shu-chü*, Shanghai 1936.

<sup>13</sup> The expression with the traditional meaning of «distant region» (it occurs in the above cited text of the *Sung shih* in this sense) is an actual reference here to the traditional geographical classification of the *Shu ching*. Cf. J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics III. The Shoo King*, Hong Kong 1960.<sup>2</sup> p. 147. where its translation is *the wild domain*.

<sup>14</sup> In the court of *Shao-k'ang*, the ruler who once again brought prosperity to the *Hsia* dynasty, it were probably Barbarians (having arrived from afar) who introduced and offered their music and dances. The strong inner logic of the text suggests such an interpretation of this very short allusion (that is, that we should look for a meaning parallel to the content of the next sentence). This tentative solution seems to be justified by another parallel text displaying the actual existence of the legendary tradition on the above mentioned matter. See 王先謙 *Wang Hsien-ch'ien*, 後漢書集解 *Hou Han shu chi-chieh*, Peking 1959.<sup>2</sup> IV. p. 3095. 85. *chüan*: 東夷傳 *Tung I chuan*, 自少康已後世服王化遂賓于王門獻其樂舞, further the commentaries of 李賢 *Li Hsien* on this sentence, that quotes from parts of the Bamboo Chronicles today not known from elsewhere. 竹書紀年曰后發即位元年諸夷賓於王門諸夷內舞.

head stones were presented.<sup>15</sup> Master 歐陽 *Ou-yang* still said: "Be the government good still it is not certain that [the Barbarians] will surrender, but even if the government is bad it is not sure either that [the Barbarians] will not come [to surrender]. Is it possible at all to establish a constant rule for this?"

From the end of the *T'ang* era and under the reign of the Five Dynasties when the «virtue» declined and the might [of the dynasty] did not put fear [in the world] any more then the frontier towns were laid waste, the region of 幽 *Yu* and 燕<sup>17</sup> were destroyed and lost. China was indeed in a truly pitiable condition.

When the *Sung* house rose *T'ai-tsu* and *T'ai-tsung* cut down the usurpers thus laying the foundations of the universal peace. At the time the Kitans [merely] sent letters asking for peace, whereas the people of 夏州 *Hsia-chou* murdered and used violence in order to serve the causes [of their own] kingdom. [In spite of this the delegates from regions] like the land of the *Ju-chens*, *Kao-li* [*Koryu*], *Po-hai* in the East, *Chiao-chih*, *Chan-ch'êng* [*Champa*], *Po-ni* [*Borneo*] *Chên-la*, *P'u-kan* and 三佛齊 *San-fu-ch'i* in the South, *T'ien-chu* [*India*], *Yü-tien* [*Khotan*], the land of the *Hui-hus* [*Uigurs*] and the *Ta-shihs* [*Arabs*], *Kao-ch'ang* [*Turfan*], *Sha-chou* and *Chiu-tz'ü* [*Kucha*] in the West although some of these were separated from the empire by the sea and others by the desert, nevertheless they all wandered through the lands and seas without fear and came to the court touching ground with their foreheads and offered their hoarded treasures, the treasury was not empty for one month. The *Tang-hsiangs* and the tribes of *Ku-szü-lo*, *Tung-chan* and *Hsia-chêng* from *T'u-fan* were conflicting to the people from *Hsia-chou* but neither their revolt nor their surrender was permanent. And those who finally showed repentance were supported [by the empire] from time to time. When they happened to arrive they were entertained at bankets and given presents, ranks and decrees in order to be taken into imperial grace. When they happened to revolt, punitive expeditions were conducted against them, but in case of surrender they were left there in peace and troops were not [stationed there] permanently. The method of the ancient kings was to treat distant peoples leniently: what else could have been added to this by the *Sung* [rulers]?

With the passing of several generations the warriors and horsemen [of the *Sung* empire] were slayed by the Tangutans, its money taken by the Kitans

<sup>15</sup> Reference to the 50—52, and 66—69, passages of the chapter entitled 夷 貢 *Yü lung* from the *Shu ching*. See J. Legge, op. cit. pp. 115, and 121.

<sup>16</sup> Since the author fails to mention first names I have been unable to identify the person of the excellent historiographer in question. The conservative spirit of the text and the strongly orthodox (i.e. anti-barbarian) interpretation of the cited, seemingly heterodox statement seems to point to the historical conception of *Ou-yang Hsiu*.

<sup>17</sup> The region of Peking and its wider surroundings. This territory was conquered by the Kitans in the first half of the 10th Century. Cf. K. A. Wittfogel, op. cit. pp. 575—576.

and its territories seized by the *Ju-chens*, and then the Mongols continuing this rose and destroyed the *Sung* empire. An unmeasurable change followed. What a confusion there arose! A great disaster befell upon China because they resisted the Great Policy and nothing happened as it used to under *T'ai-tsu* and *T'ai-tsung*.

There is no need to talk about the Mongols. The behaviour of the Kitans and *Ju-chens* was similar to that of the Tangutans, how could they be ranged with the *Sung* dynasty in the compilation of the historical works! According to *Li [-chi]* the greatest rank among the Barbarians is a mere *J-tzu*<sup>18</sup> this, to be sure is an expression of contempt. According to the *Ch'un-ch'iu* inside [the frontiers] there is China and outside there are the Barbarians and our territories are established accordingly. Now, if we respect the rule of the *Sung* dynasty, *Liao* and *Chin* should be considered abroad and discussed similarly to the Tangutans. There is no need of further explaining the meaning of this.<sup>19</sup>

The conception and construction of the two texts are parallel, both beginning with a historical retrospection, continuing with a more detailed description of the Chinese-Barbarian relations in the *Sung* period and ending with historiographical and methodological observations. These frames, however, are filled with different contents.

The *Sung shih hsien-pien* begins the historical retrospection with remarks of an entirely general nature on the relation of the Chinese and Barbarians and traces the problem back to ancient times. Immediately here in the first few sentences he finds opportunity to make allusions to the undisputable authority of one of the canonical books (he quotes the *Shu ching*, cf. Note 13). He hastens to state that the corruption or difficulties of the relations have their cause in the «inherent characteristics of the Barbarians». It is only now that he expounds the actual antecedents from the historical traditions regarded by him as being of decisive importance. He indicates with two data referring to the period of the *Hsia* dynasty and the *Chou* era that the Barbarians surrendered to China as early as that. (Cf. Notes 14. and 15.)

The *Sung shih* allows very little time for discussing the preceding events as opposed to the previously mentioned text and begins *in medias res* although he is in no hurry to evaluate the events. He begins his description with remarks on the *T'ang* period and he asserts that the relations of the *T'ang* empire and the distant peoples were free from special problems or greater troubles.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Reference to the II/9. passage of the chapter entitled 曲禮 *Ch'ü li* from the *Li ch'i*. See. S. Couvreur, *Mémoires sur les bienséances et les cérémonies*. Paris 1950. I. p. 90.

<sup>19</sup> It may not be incidental that this text otherwise failing to pay much attention to investigating the ancestors and predecessors (i. e. the historical continuity) goes straight back to a dynasty of barbarian origin the *Yüan Wei* (*T'o-pa*) house at the brief enumeration of the predecessors of the *T'ang* dynasty.

In the following both authors investigate the dissolution and confusion at the time of the Five Dynasties. The sentences about the decline of the «virtue» of the dynasty refer after all to internal troubles, this among others is regarded by them as the very cause of the more and more passive foreign relations of China. Thus the succession of the *Sung* dynasty is similarly justified in both cases. Their views on the activity of the neighbouring peoples under the Five Dynasties, however, do not conform to each other. «There was nobody to show them the way of virtue» the writer of the *Sung shih* asserts closely in the words of tradition but still somewhat ambiguously, whereas the writer of the *Sung shih hsin-pien* definitely condemns the Barbarians for their invasions and robberies, moreover, reporting the destruction of *Yu* and *Yen* he expressly blames the Kitans. (Cf. Note 17.)

The two writers thus agree in the *Sung* dynasty put on the throne by heavenly mandate. They also agree in taking partly historical partly geographical aspects into consideration in their further discussions.

The *Sung shih* enumerates the names of the countries having contracts with China, roughly in geographical order. The names of eastern (actually north-eastern), western (among them we find both legendary distant and, from actual allies and fights, well-known smaller and bigger nearer regions) and southern countries, with allusions even to the pacified southern territories are crowded together. The foreign policy of the *Sung* empire is represented as reasonably tolerant, that is, not basically feeble, but attractive from the Barbarians' point of view. In the short introduction of the role of the *Liao* and *Chin* states (according to his conception they are not real Barbarian countries, several official historical works appeared emphasizing their greatness) he carefully avoids the analysis of the actual conflict. E.g. we do not learn the reasons why the *Sung* dynasty moved southward.<sup>20</sup> Mentioning the downfall of the dynasty on the other hand he calls attention to the *Sung* rulers' responsibility.

The historical events of the *Sung shih hsin-pien* are assessed and grouped in another way. First he mentions the problems belonging to the initial period of the reign of the *Sung* dynasty. At the beginning the difficulties were caused by the independent policy of *Liao* and *Hsi-hsia* (the people of *Hsia-chou* in his work) and by their striving for independence. The following analysis of the other countries (both eastern and distant southern and western ones) and some trouble-making tribes is in its main features roughly corresponding to the

<sup>20</sup> Further examples: The contrast between *Sung* and *Liao* is not mentioned in the text (we are led to infer it only from the allusions of the earlier geographical enumeration); the clash of *Chin* and *Liao* i. d. the destruction of *Liao* is indicated only indirectly (cf. Note 10.). Finally the antagonism of *Sung* and *Chin* that was not mentioned at the description of the dynasty's move to the South serves here as an evidence for the humiliation of the *Sung* rulers as if the Mongols had not played an active part in the events at the end of the *Sung* period.

parallel parts of the *Sung shih*. We regard the discussion of the differences between the two geographical enumerations as being outside our present task. The essence of the foreign policy of the *Sung* dynasty is summed up similarly to the former text and similar emphasis is laid on its tolerant and reasonable character. While in this respect he agrees with his predecessor (here the two texts literally coincide in some places) in the following he deviates from him all the more. The Kitans, Tangutans, *Ju-chens* and Mongols are considered as Barbarians, foreigners and intruding conquerors alike. Their destructive activities are described and he regards them as one of the fundamental reasons of the downfall of the *Sung* dynasty and the destruction and immeasurable changes that followed it in China.

The conclusions of both prefaces make fragmentary but still remarkable observations on the historiographical methods of the above discussed views. The task which the authors set themselves is defined above all as being of an editorial nature.

The compilers of the *Sung shih* selected material from the works of the ancient historiographers for several historical works of equal rank and referring to one and the same period.<sup>21</sup>

*K'o Wei-ch'i* on the other hand makes it clear and documents it with canonical quotations that a historiographer may record *one* period and only in *one* official historical work since only *one single* legitimate dynasty can exist at a given time. Since in the *Sung* period, outside the China of the *Sung* dynasty everybody else is a Barbarian, the description of the various other countries and their histories can be accomplished only within the frames of the longer or

<sup>21</sup> The *Yüan shih* fixes the date of the accomplishment of the *Chin shih* a year prior to that of the *Sung shih* (1344. and 1345). The *Liao shih*, not mentioned in the text, must have been accomplished in the same year as the *Chin shih*. Cf. *Yüan shih* 41. *chüan* 7.a. — 7.b. and *Hsin Yüan shih* 24. *chüan* 4. b and 5. a. A significant observation is cited by Fan Wen-lan from a for me unknown edition of the *Yüan shih* (op. cit. p. 214.), on the development of the plans for the three *cheng shih*s and on the order of their preparation: (According to the biography of *T'o-k'o-t'o*.) «When the chronological scope [of the single works] has not been determined, yet some wanted to have a chronological history of the *Sung* period made (冊記 *tsai chi*), and miscellaneous notes on the *Liao* and *Chin* dynasties (冊記 *tsai chi*); others on the other hand demanded — since the *Liao* empire had been founded earlier than the *Sung* empire — that the history of the *Liao* and *Chin* empires should present the history of the Northern Dynasties (北史 *Pei shih*), from the *Sung* era it should be the period from Emperor *T'ai-tsu* [960—975] to the *Ching-k'ang* era [1126] that is to be discussed in the history of the *Sung* dynasty (*Sung shih*) and from the events subsequent to the *Chien-yen* period [1127—1130] the history of the Southern *Sung* dynasty should be prepared (*Nan Sung shih*). They were all arguing for a long time without taking any decision. Finally under *Shun-ti* [1333—1367] imperial orders were given to record the histories of both *Sung*, *Liao* and *Chin* dynasties alike in separate works.» For interpretation of the terms *she chi* and *tsai chi* see Morohashi Tetsuji, *Dai kan-wa jiten*, Tokyo 1960. I. p. 269. and X. p. 1016.

shorter chapters of the *Sung shih*. He reselected and rearranged the material, this is actually determined to be one of the main purposes of his ten years' efforts in his discussion so severely condemning the views of the *T'o-t'os*.

Although neither of the above discussed texts contains actual historical material, thus both are without any value as sources, still, despite their abstract characters, they reveal much about the nature of the selection and arrangement of the material and some elements of the historical conception of the authors and about their views concerning the *Sung* period and their claims as historiographers.

Each author is an excellent scholar, this being shown not only by their courtly positions, high degrees but also by the careful composition, logical construction, inner order and rich material of both texts. Their historical world view is based upon traditional Confucian ideas. In the description of the *Sung shih* e.g. the dynasty rules by heavenly mandate, the decline of its virtues leads to the break-down of the order of the world and conversely, even distant peoples long for the supreme authority of the dynasty, the center of the events is always the imperial court etc. A considerable part of the statements criticized by *K'o Wei-ch'i* who quotes the holy books fits into this Confucian chain of thought. E.g. when *T'o-t'o* blamed the declining *Sung* dynasty in order to justify the rise of the Mongols, he acted entirely in accord with the orthodox tradition: he explained to the reader according to the old recipe of the victorious conqueror or rebel founding a new dynasty that the heavenly mandate was won by the new ruling house.

At the same time the conception of *T'o-t'o* is considerably motivated by the fact that he appreciates all those who served as examples or predecessors for the Mongols. This is the reason why the first place is given to the *Liao* and *Chin* dynasties.<sup>22</sup> On the evidence of what we have said so far it is clear however, that these features do not in the least alter the case that the authors (compilers) of the *Sung shih* were the historiographers of the lawfully ruling *Yüan* dynasty that approached the history of China and the neighbouring peoples no longer from the Barbarian's point of view but examined and presented the events from the «center».

*K'o Wei-ch'i* tried to devastate this conception built on the tradition by the authority of the tradition (that of the canonical books). In his own way he disputed the significance, role and justification of a world outside the supremacy of the lawful dynasty. Supported by arguments taken from the canons he deprived the privileged Barbarians of their privileged positions, he refused them their right for an independent policy presenting their subordinate situa-

<sup>22</sup> He is probably influenced by his attempts to express and justify the inner order of the empire. This can be detected in the text where he regards the Tangutans as the first Barbarians.



tion ever since ancient times and he even disputed their very ability of striving for good from them, because according to his idea only bad Barbarians can exist.<sup>23</sup> In his conception he tried to follow the earlier variations of the historical works as faithfully as possible in accordance with his original purpose, (where he had no objections against the text of the *Sung shih* he used it literally) but he made efforts to deprive it from step to step of its original content and special elements. In his work he attempted at the «debarbarisation» of Chinese history. The result of this effort that was certainly not unique and served directly the interests of the dynasties and suited the taste of the court under the *Ming* emperors reminds us essentially of those of the other trend but the differences are perhaps enough to call attention to the importance of a careful examination of the value of the sources.

<sup>23</sup> It is by all means closely related with this conception and historiographical attitude that the scholars of the *Ch'ing* period had not the best opinion of the work of *K'o Wei-ch'i*; it was considered a work of secondary quality in the *Szü-k'u ch'üan shu tsung-mu t'i-yao* (II. p. 1110.).

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