


Islam in China

Hui and Uyghurs
Between Modernization and Sinicization

Jean A. Berlie



White Lotus

Jean A. Berlie has done research on China and Southeast Asia at the Center of Asian Studies, Hong Kong University, for more than twelve years (1991-2004). Research in Mainland China, in particular on Chinese Islam started in 1986, and includes a fieldwork based on four-year stay in Yunnan Province. During the period 1987-2003 research was also conducted in Beijing, Gansu, Guandong, Guangxi, Hunan, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shanghai, Sichuan, and Xinjiang.

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Front Cover : Khufiya Sufis at the Sacred Tomb of Ma Laichi (1680-1766), Linxia (January 2003)

Back Cover : Mahometan from Tali.

F. Garnier, *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine* (Official Publication, 1873 and 1885 Edition, Hachette & Cie, Paris).
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Jean A. Berlie



White Lotus Press

For my family, the living and the dead

†

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
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
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
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
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Introduction

“China is the safest and the best region on earth for the traveler.”
Ibn Battuta

The world population includes approximately a billion and a half Muslims, among who are approximately 50 million citizens of the People’s Republic of China (officially 20 million). Islam plays a significant role in the country, even if it concerns only ten of China’s fifty-six official nationalities. There were nearly 400 million Chinese Buddhists at the beginning of the twentieth century, and there are currently 100 million. Catholics and Protestants would, respectively, be 4–5 million, and Taoists 2–5 million.

The Han Chinese control decision-making, but in order to communicate with the Middle East and other Islamic countries, the Hui (called “Ho” in Thailand and “Panthays” in Burma) are useful. Another major group researched here, the Uyghurs, occupy northwestern China, a part of Central Asia. These Muslims are not well known, and it is crucial to understand the role current Chinese modernization plays among them. This study attempts to explain the role of Sinicization or cultural change as a result of direct interethnic contact between the Han and Muslims in China.

According to an analysis furnished by the Islamic Summit of Doha, Qatar, on 12 November 2000, peace and development are the main problems of contemporary Islam. Modernization is necessary to achieve this goal. It seems useful to understand Islam and the Muslims from different viewpoints in order to find peaceful solutions between Islam and the world. The search for a durable peace, in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, concerns not only the government in Beijing but also Muslims in Central Asia.

Based on fieldwork in China between 1986 and 2004, the book details two Muslim groups among different Muslim minorities in China, Northern Thailand, and Burma (Myanmar) and seeks to promote a better understanding and knowledge of

Muslim communities in their host societies. Two in-depth studies of the Hui in Yunnan and the Uyghurs in Xinjiang Autonomous Region explain the history, society, and religion of these minorities. Chapter 5, based on research during 1990–2004, deals with the Hui of northern Thailand locally called “Ho,” Panthays from Yunnan in Mandalay, and Burmese Muslims in Ruili, Kunming, and Jinghong. Its main point is to evaluate the impact of modernization and Sinicization. The lack of influence of Sinicization on the Burmese Muslims in Yunnan is explained.

Modernity is conveyed via the acculturating filter of Sinicization. The Hui and other Muslims in China do not consider themselves as *dhimmi* (in Arabic, a minority) and generally accept their condition as a Chinese minority (*minzu*). Sinicization is a question of acculturation of the “others” by Chinese civilization. It creates an impression of public order for the majority and unites (*tuanjie*) all Chinese citizens.

Beijing’s cardinal principle is safeguarding unity. The law aims to enforce the national basic concept of *Juguo Tuanjie*, national unification or the unity of the whole nation. This principle is valid everywhere in the national territory, in particular in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Similarly, China wants a unity or union (*tuanjie*) of all minorities, and this also concerns two “nationalities,” the Hui and the Uyghurs studied here. This principle of unification is not unique. In May 1754, Benjamin Franklin published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* a cartoon entitled “Join, or Die” preaching unity for the emergent American polity.

Modern China is unique in a globalizing world, and the Muslims of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are no exception. From the eighth century onward, Muslims were authorized to settle and to practice their religion in Chinese territory. Even if turbulent periods in the nineteenth century have shaken the Northwest and Yunnan, Chinese Muslims (Hui) always adjusted to Chinese society. In 1957, Yang, author of *Islam in China*, thought that the goal of the Chinese government was to “destroy all religions.” This was partly true in the past, but Islam in China as well as Taoism (Daoism), Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism are well defined by Document 19 of March 1982 and the new constitution.

Islam in China is not well known. Guangzhou (Canton), “the South Gateway of China,” is an ancient historical point of departure for the study of religions. The missionaries followed the seasonal winds in the Indian Ocean and China Seas. Arab pilots, and later Portuguese navigators, knew how to use the monsoon winds. Marco Polo (1254–1324) and Ibn Battuta (1304–77) described Canton’s religions and Islam, in particular. In 1345, Abu Abdullah Mohammed Ibn Battuta mentioned the practice

of cremation for Chinese and Hindu funeral rites. During that period an important Muslim community resided in western Guangzhou. A distant relative of the Prophet is buried there. It also shows that the Hui-everywhere resident in China-live in cities with close contact in many regions (Canton is linked to central and northern China). Muslims reside on the main axis of communication. Guangzhou lies at the confluence of the Dong and Bei Rivers of the Pearl River system, China's third largest. Canton was also one of the first cities marked by religious syncretism and by global business linked to Macao. In fact, the proliferation of religions existed in Guangzhou well before the establishment of a Portuguese settlement in Macao (c.1555), handed over as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China in December 1999.

One can ask if religion is a well-defined concept in China. The character for "religion" does not exist in Chinese; one should rather speak of "teaching" or "school." Is the personality cult devoted to Mao Zedong also a religion? In Shaoshan, the Great Leader's native city in the southern province of Hunan, I was able to discover the existence of effigies of him, jointly worshipped on domestic altars, with Guanyin, the Goddess of Mercy (*Avalokiteshvara*). For Li Hongzhi, its founder, the Falungong ("The Wheel of the Law") is a religion. Confucianism, not an institutional religion, is indirectly studied here. Confucianism influences Sinicization, which transforms the minorities via Chinese culture. Religion requires reexamination. Religion is a part of Chinese civilization, even if it does not occupy the first place as in India. No other civilization has, during so many centuries, served as a bond for so many people. The place occupied by religion in the society and its acceptance by the State has varied according to period. China does not give autonomy to religions, but freedom of religious belief has been inscribed in the constitution since 1954. Despite this, between 1958 and 1962, and during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, there was intensive repression of all religion.

The People's Republic of China recognizes only five religions. In theory, no other religion is officially accepted aside from Islam, Taoism, Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. A spectacular return of religious belief is noticeable in the post-1980s modernization that drastically transformed China. Sinicization, the cultural contact with the Chinese, continues to produce an acculturation of all the minorities enforced for two millennia. Chinese Muslims, called Hui, did not escape this acculturating process during the last thousand years.

After thirteen years of total suppression, religious practices were re-authorized in December 1978. Churches, mosques, and temples began to reopen the following

year. Atheism does not figure anymore in the constitution. The Marxist-Leninist postulate of religion as “opium of the people” is completely forgotten. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping (*gaige kaifang*) have brought profound changes, thus improving social life. The opening of the country and the multiplication of exchanges with other countries have supported an interest in religion. These have profited from the widening of the governmental religious policy to regain life and develop beyond the provisions of the Party. The development of religious liberty is in a way parallel to economic growth: both depend upon reforms. Without them, Muslims would never have marched in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The position of the Bureau of Religious Affairs has remained rather neutral since the 1980s. In 1989, Muslim pilgrims trained in Beijing since the beginning of June were not prevented from going to Mecca. In recent years, numerous books on religion have appeared and new institutes have done research on the fashionable theme, “culture and religion.” In an attempt to harmonize the relations of Lamaism with the Chinese government at the highest level, the Dalai Lama’s brother was officially invited to the Autonomous Region of Tibet in September 2002.

This work is based on a long study which began in 1986 with the help of many Muslim and Chinese friends in the provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Sichuan, as well as in Beijing. From 1987 to 2003, fieldwork included long interviews with Hui and Uyghurs, conferences on Islam, and the publication of articles on Chinese Islam. In 1992, beginning in Pakistan (Lahore and Gilgit), other provinces and autonomous regions were visited: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Gansu, and Sichuan. The Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia was studied for the first time in 2003. In Beijing, imams were interviewed on their community and on current questions such as terrorism and *jihād*. In January 2003, a long trip brought the author to numerous mosques to meet imams from Beijing to Ningxia, in Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang (Urumchi [*Wulumuqi*], Kashgar, and Aksu), Sichuan, and Yunnan.

This study uses the Chinese *pinyin* transcription system. A glossary of Chinese characters is included. Scholarly transcriptions of Turkic and Arabic languages are not strictly followed, nor does this work always follow a chronological order.

The maps are by Philippe Raggi, who is warmly thanked. This book has greatly benefited from the readings and re-readings of many friends, and I particularly wish to thank James Archer.

Jean A. Berlie
Bangkok, August 2004

Chapter 1

The Setting

Islamization in China: A Brief Introduction

The 1300-year history of Islam in China saw the arrival of the first Muslims at the end of the eighth century. The Yuan (1279–1368) assured a golden period for Chinese Islam. The Ming (1368–1644) integrated the Muslims into the Chinese system, but Sinicization created serious conflicts under the Manchu (1644–1911). From the eighth century Muslim merchants followed the back-and-forth movement of caravans on the Silk Road (a term coined by Ferdinand von Richthofen) and the maritime route of the monsoons. Thanks to the perseverance of these first travelers, and to the resilience of the Bactrian camels, without which the crossing of the great deserts of Central Asia would have been impossible, the long history of Islam in China began.

The First Wave: 8th–14th Century

The first official non-commercial contacts of the Chinese and Islamic world date to the eighth century. A Muslim embassy left Ferghana in 713. In 872, Ibn Wahhab of Basra landed in Canton (Guangzhou) and was received by the Chinese Emperor, Yizong (859–873), whom he charmed with his magnificent collection of images of the prophets. In 1345, Ibn Battuta visited Canton, which became a prosperous Arabic-Muslim port, with a Shaykh (*Shaikh*), Islamic representative, and a Qadi to hand down judgments and to rule the local administration with an indirect power on religion. Muslim merchants took root during the first Islamization of the seventh to the fourteenth centuries and under the Ming (1368–1664). Then, under the latter

dynasty they became land-based, in part because the Portuguese settled in Macao, replaced them in maritime trade.

The Second Wave (Sufi): 17th–18th Century

The second wave of Islamization—principally Sufi—coincided with one of the most brilliant periods of Chinese history, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The nineteenth century would be more dramatic. The uprisings from 1820 to 1876 in northern and southwestern China terminated with the end of an Islamic State in Yunnan and the death of its founder, General Sulaiman Du Wenxiu (1827–73). Du, whom the French officer Francis Garnier (1839–73) met, was, according to him, born Chinese (so his Sinicization is evident) and educated by rich Muslims from Dali. Shaykh Sulaiman had been slightly influenced by Jahariya Sufism. One cannot say that Jahariya mysticism was the key to his doctrine, as it was in Gansu and neighboring Ningxia for the Master Ma Hualong (1820–71), one of the greatest spiritual descendants of the founder of the order, Ma Mingxin (c.1719–81). Some Chinese Muslims continued to call these Sufi members of the “New Islam” (*Xinjiao*). Perfectly valid before the last phase of Islamization, this appellation is no longer correct, if nonetheless common, since the implantation of Wahhabism.

The Third Wave: Late 19th Century–The Present

The third wave of Islamization—*Ikhwan*—often in reaction to Sufism, marked the end of the nineteenth century. The “New Religion” founded by Ma Wanfu (c.1849–1934), was inspired by Wahhabi doctrine. Sometimes considered anti-orthodox, the Muslim Brotherhood was most likely utilized by the Manchu Dynasty to eliminate Islamic anti-Manchu resistance. But this new Muslim expansion did not transform Islam to become, without conquest, the next “principal religion of China,” as the Russian Sinologist Vasilev forecast in 1867. In 1910, Marshall Broomhall and his numerous correspondents in all of the Chinese provinces thought this new religion more liberal than the “Old Religion.” In the present Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia, some Han cadres (Chinese) also expect an increase in numbers of these Muslim Brothers.

Since the Tang Dynasty Islam has successfully overcome several crises, especially those at the end of the nineteenth century and of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). These vicissitudes have strengthened Muslims. The Chinese believe that their society has successfully assimilated the remarkable developments leading to

drastic modernization during the period 1980–2000. Islam naturally expands. The current spiritual void could, in the long run, favor religions; however, it will be very difficult to convert the Han.

Muslim National Minorities and the Hui

There are fifty-six official “nationalities” in the country (including the Han majority), and this number is not open to change. China is an ethnic mosaic officially divided into ten Muslim minorities (*minzu*) separated into three groups.

The most numerous Muslim grouping is composed of the Hui, Chinese Muslims *stricto sensu*, the Uyghurs (called Huihu since the sixth century, then Huihe), to be discussed later, are the second, and there are also the Kazakhs, a majority in neighboring Kazakhstan. Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs were the last Turkish peoples converted to Islam. Kazakh and Kyrgyz are classified in the *kipchak* Turkic linguistic group. Since the 1950s the Chinese have attempted to settle all Muslim nomadic minorities of Xinjiang and, in particular, Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs. Horses have become rare in the Uyghur Autonomous Region, a clear indication of the “sedentariness” of many nationalities formerly nomadic and of their increasing acculturation.

The second group includes: the *Dongxiang*, Mongol Muslims who call themselves Santa, and who form an autonomous district in Gansu, the *Kyrgyzs* residing in Chinese Turkistan, in particular around Aksu facing Kyrgyzstan, at the southern base of the Tianshan Mountains. Kyrgyz probably means “Descendants of Forty Maidens” according to myths of origin. The *Salars*, a group of Turkish origin of the Altaic linguistic branch, also belong in this group.

The third group is composed of the *Baoan* or *Bonan*, the *Tajiks*, the only Shiites (Shia) of China; the *Tatars*, few in number, but who have cousins with powerful international relations, operating from Helsinki to Kazan and in Western countries; and the *Uzbeks*. The Baoan live, as do the Salars, near Jishi Mountain. The ethnonym Tajik could come from “Taj” the Arabic qualifier for Persian speakers or from “taj,” which designates the conic skullcap worn by Sufis. The Uzbeks are principally urban, living in the capital of Xinjiang and in the frontier cities of Kazakhstan, Yining, and Tacheng.

A precise demography of Islam in China is difficult to establish. While one speaks reasonably of 4–5 million Muslims residing in France, it is necessary to mention 50 million in China, even if the Muslim population of China dropped to

only 10 million according to the 1953 census to reach officially less than 20 million in 1990. Xinjiang is the only region where there are representatives of almost all Muslim minorities. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is officially inhabited by almost half of the Muslims in China.

Among these, the Hui are the most numerous. In 1872, 4 million Muslims were counted for a total population of 400 million. Before 1949 they were 50 million. In 1990–92, the official statistics for the ten Muslim minorities mentioned fewer than 20 million representatives. The official number only increased by 2 million over ten years. The 2 million Muslims of Ningxia are the most important regional and provincial Hui population.

Minority status is sometimes considered inconvenient. It may be the case for the Uyghurs, who do not benefit from the economic advantages of the Chinese. The Hui situation, however, requires reflection. Some young Han complain that the Hui have quota for entry in universities. The following example shows a favorable case for the minority people, Cai Jingqing, a Muslim woman from Beijing born in the Hui quarter, and her three brothers, successfully completed graduate studies in the United States. However, it is generally much more difficult for Hui than for Han to have access to higher education. It is now necessary to pay high registration fees to enter a good university, and the Chinese majority is wealthier. However, children of mixed marriages often opt for minority status instead of taking their mother's Han nationality (this is most common case among children of mixed marriages).

Three possible types of relations exist among the ten Muslim minorities in China and the Han majority: (1) Avoidance of the Han practiced by some rural minorities; (2) Resistance and eventual conflicts with the majority; (3) Acceptance of the Chinese minority system and the desire to have good relations with the majority, as in the case of the Hui.

The Hui Minority

Muslims were a religious group more than an “ethnic group” of the Chinese Republic (1911–49) among five nationalities, becoming “minorities” in the 1950s. Current PRC policy excludes the Uyghurs and the other eight Muslim minorities from the Hui. The Hui studied hereafter are one of the current ten Islamized minorities.

Hui, unlike other Muslim minorities, are a highly complex and mixed ethnic group exactly like the Han. That does not mean that Arab and Central Asian ancestors did not play the central role to shape their ethnicity in the beginning. The

ethnonym “Hui” has probably existed since the Liao Dynasty (907–1125), and it is also recorded under the Song in the eleventh century. For some six hundred years the Hui were also called “Huihui” (“Moro” in the Portuguese-Chinese dictionary of Ruggieri and Ricci, compiled in the sixteenth century). The expression “Hui people” (*Huimin*) is preferred to *Huijiao*, a term that qualifies their religion. In the northwest, Gansu and Xinjiang, where they are numerous, they were formerly called Dungan (their current name in Central Asia). Contrary to most minorities, the Hui speak and write Chinese as well as the Han do. These Chinese Muslims often prefer to designate themselves by the term *Muslimin*, but for centuries have been called “Hui” (meaning “Return”, that is, return toward their religion). They are one of China’s minorities (*shaoshu minzu*), and contrary to the great majority of these *minzu*, are not an ethnic group but a cultural minority. *Minzu* is a concept coined by the Soviet Union, but it became a tool to implement an ancient acculturation process, Sinicization.

Three main concepts are considered to define the Muslims of China in this book: *Minzu* (nationality minority), Muslim community, and Sinicization.

Minzu

Stalin’s four nationality-criteria apply to China’s minorities and, in particular, to the Hui and the Uyghurs: a language, cultural life, economic life, and common territory. The economy and the language of the Hui are not significant criteria. The Chinese Muslims do not meet the official ethnic norms, for they inhabit the whole of China and their religion distinguishes them from other minorities.

Arabic is a language of origin of the Hui but is no longer their mother tongue. Mandarin dominates from Beijing to Lanzhou, and from Gansu to Yunnan, for there is only one national written language. However, because of its complexity and of the small number of linguists competent in Arabic and Chinese, the Koran was not fully translated into Chinese until 1932 (in Myanmar this translation into Burmese was completed in 1980). Acknowledging the languages of minorities in some regions and districts does not diminish the national language’s dominance, even in the autonomous regions. In relation to the other Muslim minorities, the Hui are at an advantage because their principal language is Mandarin (Putonghua).

Stevan Harrell calls the Hui (Chinese Muslims) the “strangest” minority in China, because religion, not ethnicity, distinguishes them. Is the official Chinese notion of *minzu* sufficient to define, for instance, both the Hui and the Tibetans?

The Hui, as do the Tibetans, have an identity centered on religion. For the Hui, the roots are their foreign Muslim ancestors, whereas for the Tibetans, Tibet is a central geographical entity—a notable difference of interpretation of religion in relation to two different minorities. Islam is a main component of Chinese Muslim identity, not ethnicity. A Muslim who violates the criteria of Islamic ethic is considered a “bad Hui,” but he/she absolutely cannot become a Han. Religious affiliation as such has no official recognition.

On the other hand, a Han may become Hui, something rare but not impossible. It is the case in the important port of Zaitun (Quanzhou) in Fujian Province—an ancient point of Islamization—where numerous Han succeeded in reconstituting their genealogies in the 1980s and once more became Muslims after centuries of oblivion. It is a complex but remarkable example. The identity of the Chinese Muslims is not constant. Some “new” Hui (a tiny minority) are in reality Han: they eat pork, very rarely enter a mosque, and generally do not meet other Muslims. Their identity card indicates “Huizu” (Chinese Muslim). However, they never speak in public of their rare “Muslim” identity. This also shows the power of Sinicization. In China it is easy to be a Han and sometimes difficult to be member of a minority. If one parent (generally, the father) is Hui, it is easier to behave in Han fashion and posit only the Han identity, even if under state laws the person in question is classified “Hui.”

For a Uyghur, it is different. Nationality is more central than *minzu* status or identity, history playing an important role as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Muslim Community

Their Arab ancestors mark the past (the Hui sometimes say “we are also Arabs”), and their Islamic identity is currently crucial. This identity, woven during the long history of Islam in China is constructed around written traditions such as the Koran but is also composed of simple things such as cooking and feasts that bind the community. Arabic has been forgotten, and only Ahong can read the Koran in the original. A tiny minority among the elite speaks Arabic. Currently the only widespread foreign language and having a reasonable number of readers among the Chinese is English. Many Muslims do not much care about administrative concepts classifying them as an ethnic minority. In general, their religion counts most for them.

Islam is concerned with religion but also integrates the social and religious lives of its believers. The community bases are the family and the mosque. Places

of worship are the center of the Islamic religious life from birth to death, passing through feasts such as Sacrifice Day, *Guerbangjie*, Korban, or *Idul-kebir*. Few authors, Western or Han, mention the central role of the mosque. The orientation of all the mosques in the world, except for one in Medina, is toward Mecca.

The believers are brothers without discrimination. The community is initially the group of those who profess Islam, read the Koran, and observe its laws. According to circumstances, it is the “loose” concept of the *umma* (in Arabic, community) or the national identity *minzu* (nationality) that officially defines the Hui. The socialization of a Hui, his position in the Muslim community, is a function of age and sex. The Islamization in China occurred thanks to the merchants, and it is thus in the cities where many Hui live.

As a result the term “ethno-religious” group for designating the Hui seems the most appropriate, for Islam is central to their identity. The majority are traditionally attached to what they term “The Old Religion” (*Laojiao* or *Gedimu*). So in Yunnan, Hui call themselves “Old Heads.” Almost all Hui are Sunnis of the Hanafite branch. Marxist Chinese scholars speak of three “sects”: the Old, the New (*Yihewani* or Wahhabi), and the “emerging” sects.

Hui have a national identity based on the concept of minority (*minzu*), but as Muslims, the community continues to play a central role. To be Hui is to be Muslim. The term *umma* appears around forty times in the Koran, signifying “people,” “nation,” and also “community.” Almost all human communities, and particularly the Islamic community, are centered on the family. It is around the mother that the family revolves. Take the case of a friend from Kunming who lost his wife in 2000. Her death was terribly painful to him. He had also a passion for books. So, he received the first shock in his life during the Cultural Revolution when, in 1966, Red Guards took away all his books. However, Islam and his family make up the hardcore of his ethic. At present, his daughter perpetuates the central role of the mother; she comes to see him every day in his old age. Family and the mosque are truly two key elements of the Hui Muslim community.

Sinicization

Islam, taught to the Hui through Chinese characters, has a Confucian flavor. Interestingly, there has been a recent tendency of “modern” Muslim leaders such as former President of Indonesia, Wahid, and Dr Sami Angawi, an organizer of the pilgrimage in Mecca, to praise Confucian values. It is enough to note the influence of Chinese

characters among the Hui to have an idea of their strong cultural impregnation (Sinicization). In 1642, for example, Wang Daiyu (c.1584–1670) was the author of one of the first Islamic works in Chinese *Zhengjiao zhenquan* [Correct Religion and True Koranic Annotations]. He draws a parallel between the five pillars of the Koran and the five Confucian virtues. Islam in China is tempered by Sinicization. The point is not really a good knowledge of Chinese characters displayed by Muslim poets such as Ding Henian (1335–1424). What interests me is the acculturation, the penetration of Han culture into the Hui's everyday life.

The most ancient sites of Chinese mosques (displaying a network) are found in Canton, Quanzhou, Hangzhou, and Xian, the largest being in Xian, Lanzhou, Xining in Qinghai (photograph 3), and Kashgar in Xinjiang (photograph 19). Muslims are mainly localized in the northwest (Xinjiang), north and Ningxia ("The Koran Belt"), and the southwest (Yunnan). The Hui mainly live in these regions but are spread throughout the whole country.

Chapter 2

Islam's Ubiquity in China

Under the Tang Dynasty *Dashi*, “Arabs,” were known as early as 638, and their importance became significant in 756 when Calif Al Mansur lent some of his troops to Emperor Suzong (756–762). These Muslims later became Hui, but in Central Asia called themselves Dungan (Tungan). Uyghurs (Huihu until 1911) are the most numerous in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Hui: An Omnipresent Community

Before dealing with modernization and Sinicization, to better define the Hui, this chapter has noted that they live everywhere in China. Hui spread widely. For Émile Littré, ubiquity is a whole, “the state of that is everywhere.” Muslims occupy the whole Chinese space (see map “Muslims in China”) and are as flexible as bamboo in adapting to Chinese civilization despite the Koran’s inflexibility. For more than a thousand years, Muslims have “tranquilly enjoyed their liberty” without attempting “over much” to propagate their religion (Thiersant). Among dominant Chinese, this is a *sine qua non* for Islam’s survival in China.

Their ubiquity is evident. Muslims are numerous in north, northeast, northwest, southwest China, and even in the central provinces such as Sichuan. Two thirds of China’s Muslims, Hui, Uyghurs, and Kazakhs, live in the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Ningxia, in Gansu, and in Qinghai. Henan and Yunnan have each a Hui population of nearly a million.

Merchants in the beginning, they followed the main routes of communication. Hui live along the Yellow River in Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong. The Great Canal, the Blue River, *Changji-*

ang, the road between Beijing and Tianjin, are the main axes of transport and communication with a high density Hui population. Historic ports such as Canton, Quanzhou, Hangzhou, provinces oriented toward Southeast Asia, Yunnan and Guangxi, and railroads have favored Hui networks.

Hui Muslims live in harmony. They actively participate in what Fernand Braudel calls the “exchange.” They like to establish themselves in cities, where they participate in inter-provincial exchanges that are facilitated by their high adaptability. Vissière (1911) found a monastery of 5,000 lamas in Gansu, between Qinghai and Sichuan, at Labrang, Xiahe; the Muslim community consisted of only a thousand Hui survivors, who sometimes married Tibetan women (at that time, the dominant society there was Tibetan). Vissière studied families with one son lama and the other Ahong. In 2003, in Labrang, the Hui prospered and their numbers increased, and they currently comprise half the population.

At the close of the nineteenth century, in Mongolia and Shaanxi, the Muslims numbered only 50,000. They are now officially 400,000, including a Hui population of 200,000 in Inner Mongolia. Hui and Mongols played a historical role, and contributed to the development of business, animal husbandry, and agriculture in this region. The Chinese are currently dominant in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Many Hui were forced to migrate and left Guihua, at the end of the nineteenth century. This capital now called Huhehot, “The Blue City,” is officially divided into three administrative zones: a suburb is Hui, and the two others Han districts are called *Xinqu* (“The New Quarter”) and *Yuquan* (“Jade Circle”). Muslims represent approximately 18% of the total population of half a million inhabitants. William Jankowiak believes that Hui and Chinese of this region share an identical family organization. Sinicization has accelerated this process in Inner Mongolia.

The Autonomous Region of Ningxia has approximately two million Hui residents. In Gansu and Henan, they are respectively two million and one million. Before the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), Luoyang and Kaifeng, historic cities south of the Yellow River, included Hui merchants and craftsmen. Some became farmers despite their lack of inclination for agriculture. Muslims sometimes exiled themselves or were pushed into the countryside by urban Han migration coupled with their more efficient business networks.

At present, the Hui population in Yunnan does not reach yet a million, compared to an official total of 20 million in China. The decrease in population (more than four million Muslims before the Second World War) is partly due to emigration to Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Only in the northwest, on the road to Tibet, does one

find few Hui. In Yunnan, they are numerous in the following cities and districts: Kunming (the capital), Songming, Xundian, Zhaotong (east and northeast); Yuxi, Tonghai, Huaning, Kaiyuan, Gejiu, Mengzi (center); Chuxiong, Xiaguan, Dali, Weishan, Baoshan, Ruili (West); Puer, Simao, Jinghong, Menghai (southwest); and Yanshan and Wenshan (southeast).

Hui social mobility is explained by the following short biography. In Yuanyang, a Muslim restaurant owner, Ma Mang ("Ma the Illiterate") one day told us the story about Wenshan's imam. We were able to meet the imam later in his mosque. He was born 200 kilometers to the west, in Jiānshuǐ District. He arrived in Wenshan in 1945 with his wife and first daughters. In 1949, to avoid problems he took up residence in Mokou, where he taught Chinese in the public school and Arabic at home, in the evening. Like the old imam of Kaiyuan, he was an educator. During the Cultural Revolution, he and his family returned to their native village, near Jiānshuǐ.

The Ahong had spent most of his life in Wenshan, a quiet and small city. In the front line during the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979–80, Wenshan became very busy. A tactical road was quickly built toward Kunming. Imam Xu returned to Wenshan in 1978 and took charge of the new mosque in 1985. The only mosque in the district, located in a Muslim village, was destroyed at the end of the nineteenth century. In the 1990s, the local Islamic Association, received 100,000 *Renminbi* (USD 12,500) from the government and managed to transform a large private residence into a mosque. It can accommodate forty Muslim travelers; some workers benefit from this rare privilege. As a rule, travelers cannot stay overnight in mosques, in particular foreign Muslims must stay in a hotel registered by the Department of Tourism. In 1994, Imam Xu was still active but just before his death a young Ahong, who recently passed his Koranic examination, replaced him. In 2002, Imam Xu Jialu, eighty years old, died quietly.

Xu's four daughters and three sons are all married, and he had eight grandsons and six granddaughters. His sons and daughters, following the example of the eldest daughter, working for the Family Planning of Wenshan, have only two children. This strict application of state policy under the family leadership of the eldest daughter shows that even a rather traditional Muslim family is deeply influenced by Sinicization.

In the Autonomous Region of Tibet, I visited the principal mosque of Lhasa where Muslims of China, India and Nepal meet.

Hui are in fact more numerous in the north, in Qinghai Province. The great mosque of Xining was rebuilt in the 1990s. Except in the cities of Changsha, Shaoyang, and Changde, an acculturation of Islam is apparent in Hunan. Islam regressed in this province. On a hillside of western Hunan, surrounded by Dong minorities, in Xinhuang, on the Wu Shui River, I arrived on the day of the Feast of the Sacrifice, hoping to find the whole Hui village busy. Around the small mosque, there was nobody: the villagers were all in the fields. Two or three years earlier, I had met the family of an Ahong deceased in the 1990s. Recently a son of the deceased imam mentioned that the Islamic Association of Hunan no longer provided the Muslim calendar. The imam was not replaced at his death, and so the villagers did not realize the day on which this feast (*Idul-kebir*) fell. The sheep market, a former source of wealth for the village, had also disappeared. Despite unfavorable conditions, this village is still Hui.

Contrary to this case of de-Islamization, Uyghurs are present in Hunan and practice their religion. Following Xinjiang's Sinicization at the end of the nineteenth century, tens of thousands of them were displaced to Changde, in the north of the province. The construction of the main mosque started in 1933. The presence of Uyghurs also explains the existence of two other mosques in Taoyuan. A hundred kilometers further north, a flood had destroyed Li Xian's mosque (1751); it was reconstructed in the 1920s and restored in 1985. The following observations on mosques will help understand Muslim ubiquity in China.

Mosques

In China as in the Muslim world, mosques are the center of Islamic community life and of Koranic education. Muslim places of worship are often close to important roads, rivers, railways, or maritime communication. They do not benefit from advertising, so it is not easy to find them. We find historic mosques in the south, on the maritime Silk Road, and also along the Yellow River. The most ancient are in Guangzhou and Xian, the largest being those in Xian, Lanzhou, Xining, and Kashgar. At eight o'clock, the number of Uyghurs in the streets for the great Feast of the Sacrifice was already impressive, most of Kashgar's Uyghur people go to Aidkah (Aidikaer) Mosque (there is another mosque sharing the same name in Prome, Burma).

Dabry de Thiersant describes the Chinese mosques (*libaisi*) as follows:

In stone or in brick, they generally consist of a rather large building, covered with a Chinese roof, surrounded by a porch, and situated in the middle of a square courtyard, around which are situated places of lodging. The fountain for ablutions is in the courtyard, generally to the right. The temple consecrated for ceremonies has ordinarily of a square form. The walls are red, a privilege also reserved for Confucian temples (this color totally disappeared in the current new style of mosques common in the modern China of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao). Inside, one finds no paintings, no benches, no chairs, except in the classrooms for Koranic courses. At the entry-facing the east-is an altar on which lies a tablet with an inscription in Chinese wishing long life to the emperor (ten thousand years). [This no longer exists] . . .

Rugs or carpets cover the floor. The whitewashed walls are decorated with verses from the Koran, in Arabic calligraphy. On the western face, is a niche, painted in red and gold pointing towards Mecca.

There are more than 40,000 mosques in the whole country, and nearly thirty in the city of Linxia (Hezhou), called the "Small Mecca," in Gansu Province. In neighboring Burma, Sittwe has a hundred mosques as in Kashgar, Xinjiang. A rather small percentage of Hui go to the mosque every Friday; this is not the case in Linxia, as in most Gansu, Xinjiang, and rural Yunnan, where Muslims are strict. Going to the mosque on Friday and during Muslim feasts is a universal Islamic rite binding the community together. For Jacques Berque, describing it, "the Friday assembly reunites the heads of family, synthesizes that combination of emptiness and fullness, of immovability and movement, of immateriality." In Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, many Muslims in other times were employed in the center, beside the mosque. This is no longer the case. Because of these professional constraints, the place of worship is currently empty on Friday (only ten Hui come regularly to pray), contrary to the adjoining crowded Muslim restaurant serving an important Hui and Han clientèle. Imams regret this situation, and in 1993, one of them, a Yunnanese, left Nanning because Islam was not prospering there. He remained in charge of this mosque for four years and preferred to return to his province. An elderly imam from Tianjin took his place, and, at his death, was replaced by a young Ahong.

Muslim believers travel from mosque to mosque. Ibn Battuta, the great traveler of Tangiers, also used these Islamic structures throughout his long trip in China; a network of influential Muslim friends, qadis and sultans helped him. At present when Hui belong to a state enterprise or travel as tourists (as so many Chinese do

nowadays) they are generally taken in charge by a government travel agency and have no time to visit mosques. This is generally not included in official tours except, perhaps, in Xian and Kashgar (a huge department store recently opened nearby).

Clothing does not distinguish the Hui from other Chinese nationals, but the mosques are landmarks, not only for Muslims in China but also for the universal *umma*. Muslim residents identify themselves by their particular mosque, generally the one nearest to their residence. But sectarianism exists and members of the “New Religion” (*Yihewani*) frequent their own place of worship, sometimes located far from their home. In the same family, some can be *Xinjiao* and others could follow the old Sunni majority current, *Gedimu*. Hui do not often go to a mosque on Friday, though most attend the great Feast of the Sacrifice, the end of Ramadan, and the Prophet’s Birthday in the worshiping place of their community.

During the Cultural Revolution, almost all mosques were closed, except the main mosque of Lanzhou, Gansu. Many were reconstructed in the 1980s. It is the case of the wooden pagoda mosque near Changning, western Yunnan, which is two hundred years old. Red Guards sawed off its magnificent minaret in 1966. In the north (Ningxia), the great square mosque of Tongxin, more than five hundred years old, was reconstructed in 1990. Its green and red *minbar*, where the imam gives his sermons, is a marvel of Ningxia. The Cultural Revolution spared it from being looted. However, in a district having a population including 80% Hui, another marker of Sinicization is indicated by the number of Hui cadres members of the Communist Party (1,500, or 70%, compared with 30% Han).

In China, as in the Muslim world, mosques are the center of community life for the Hui, Uyghurs, and Kazakhs. It is also a Koranic teaching-center. China being a socialist country does not have cultural politics oriented toward the construction of *madrassa*, and young children cannot study the Koran in their parents’ mosque. Thiersant (1878) and Marshall Broomhall (1910) reproduced an inscription from 742, recalling the five Islamic pillars, located in the ancient mosque of Xian (Changan). It was called *Qingjiaosi* (Pure Religion), and in 1335 became a *Qingzhensi*. The name, “Pure and True Pagoda,” which designates the mosques, is often unknown to other Chinese. The Islamic community defines itself by purity and truth (*qingzhen*). This term has been used since the Ming Dynasty and poses a question. Why *Qingzhensi* does not keep the root *masjid* (in Arabic) followed by the Malay speakers (*mesjid*) and the Turks (*mescit*)? Starting in 1998, the historical name *Qingzhensi* is often replaced by *Chaozhendian* (“True Temple”) in Yunnan Province, and this is even stranger.

Xu Xueqiang, who did intensive studies on China's urban system, thinks that the success of the development policies on the period 1978–90 “should not be questioned simply because problems of unbalanced development were encountered.” However, as a consequence of intensive modernization and rapid urbanization, which is expected to accelerate in the future, the ancient Chinese style of mosques is disappearing. Reconstructed mosques are modern buildings in a Middle Eastern style, “politically correct.” Hui are still profoundly attached to their Arab ancestry, and the new religious identity expressed in this modern, but not especially artistic, style certainly reflects what may be an unconscious will. More probably, it is another mark of Sinicization, a new and modern Chinese name.

The main point seems to be a deliberate will toward modernization. One can ask if this new architecture is truly of Hui inspiration. This rather neutral style, trying without success to be universal, eradicates history. In adopting this new “look,” the young generation forget the past. Thus, the ancient and beautiful mosque of Kunming in Zhengyi Street in the town center, instead of being restored, has been razed to make room for a modern monument, but these cultural changes cause the disappearance of the historic “pagoda style.”

Maris Gillette, in her work on Islam in the ancient capital Xian (2000), shows that some older Hui prefer the ancient Chinese style. Others find that “mosques should have a style different from that of the Han.” These new places of worship, sometimes rapidly constructed, do not often have, from an architectural point of view, the beautiful appearance of ancient mosques. When Chinese Muslims return from Mecca they are evidently happy to find a style recalling the pilgrimage. But these new mosques are often, as at Kunming (Zhengyi and Shuncheng Streets) and Chengdu (Renminnanlu), constructed to replace magnificent 500-year old Islamic places of worship, capable of being restored or still in good condition. These ancient places of worship go far back into the history of Chinese Islam, which is thus forever effaced.

The Islamic Association, interested in good economic relations with rich countries, such as Saudi Arabia, often causes these new mosques replacing ancient mosques to be financed by generous international donors, and sometimes these international relations facilitate new commercial networks. Is it a question of a new artistic taste to shape a new Hui identity or an economic orientated program? The new modern style eradicates history and tends to create a new cultural taste.

A Hui from Yunnan, PhD student in Hong Kong, was surprised when I explained this process of acculturation, but after awhile he realized the question of eradication of historical Islamic culture in his province. Hong Kong investors have also

contributed to the recent modern reconstruction of Kunming mosques and may, after gaining economic advantages in a province well-connected with Southeast Asia, have wisely advised sending the best students to Hong Kong. This destruction of historical and cultural Islamic heritage is not unique to China. Chauderlot (2004) reported the disappearance and demolition of Beijing's ancient houses and lanes (*hutong*). The character *chai* ("demolish") inside a white circle means pulling down artistic ancient residences (or mosques) to implement modernization and attract investment to new suburbs in Beijing as well as in Kunming.

Mosques in North and Northwestern China

The village of Changying, on the road to Tianjin, twenty kilometers from Beijing, has five mosques, two of which are exclusively reserved for women. For the Islamic Association of China (*Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui*), gender is an important issue.

Beijing possesses typical mosques such as the seventeenth century one in Oxen Street (*Niujie*), the point of departure for the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca promoted by the Islamic Association. More recent Dongxin Mosque is among the most popular for Muslim foreign diplomats.

Urumchi in Xinjiang Autonomous Region has more than twenty mosques. The largest, Shanxi, was built in 1736. Nanda, a famous mosque built in 1919, was restored in 1987. "The Large Alley" (*Kuanxiang*) dates to 1720. Five were constructed in the nineteenth century: Xida, Cuyuan, Ninggu, Balikun, and Salar Mosque (in principle dedicated to Muslims belonging to this minority).

In Kashgar, in addition to the large mosque Aidkah, built in 1524 and reconstructed in 1798, which symbolizes the greatness of the city, one finds Daxi (Great West).

In Yining, the Hui mosque was built in 1760. That of Turfan, dating to 1778, features an impressive central tower. Shanxi mosque in Hami was constructed in 1881 and restored in 1983 after the Cultural Revolution.

In Inner Mongolia, the magnificent Dasi Mosque at Huhehot was built in 1693. This major city possesses six mosques.

Mosques in Southern China

Until the ninth century, a large part of western Canton (Guangzhou) was Muslim. However, for a long time, Canton had showed a tendency of expanding eastwards,

the Chinese part of the city. In 879, a hundred thousand Hui were massacred during a drastic period of Sinicization, but the Islamic community managed to survive. In 1192, Huaisheng Mosque (*Guangta*) and its minaret were constructed. It was restored in 1351 and 1669. The old Muslim cemetery, not far from the central train station, is a remarkable historic Islamic site of the region. It was restored several times during the centuries—in 1350, 1467, 1695, and 1935. Its small mosque is located near one of the tombs of a great Arab pioneer, Saad Abi (Abu?) Waqqas.

Four thousand Hui currently live in Guangzhou. To develop its economy, the Islamic Association opened a large *halal* restaurant in the 1990s. Guangzhou's other mosque, Xiaodongying (built in 1866), takes its name from ancient military barracks (*ying*).

Zhaoqing (Guangdong) was also an ancient Hui garrison city and has had a mosque from the mid-eighteenth century. It was restored for the Feast of the Sacrifice (*Korban*) in September 1984.

The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region has an important number of Muslims, currently some 30,000. The cities of Guilin, the former provincial capital, Liuzhou, and Nanning have a significant Muslim population. Once again, the Hui are found on the principal routes of transport and communications. Many live along the road linking Guilin and Nanning, the administrative city that holds the largest number of Hui families after Guilin. Between these two cities, the industrial city of Liuzhou possesses a small mosque built in 1673 (reconstructed in 1878 and 1923). I was able to meet the imam, a Yunnanese. He was probably replaced, the Islamic Association being in favor of lowering the age of leading Ahong, a policy also applied in Nanning. Some of the young imams often consult the community on important matters, others let the managers of the mosque (*guanshi*) play their financial and administrative role but tend to use their own politico-religious power to guide the local *umma* despite their youth.

Guilin now counts only a thousand Hui; the Han immigration has been very important since 1949. Going by road to Liuzhou, one comes to the District of Lingui, where the Muslim population consists of 10,000 inhabitants. The small city itself is the fifth Muslim agglomeration in the region after Guilin, Liuzhou, Nanning, and Lingchuan, north of Guilin. Nevertheless, Guilin remains the largest regional Islamic center, Nanning being depopulated of Hui workers who probably moved to Liuzhou or even Guangzhou thanks to their fluency in Cantonese. There are

five mosques in Guilin, one supposedly reserved for women. Gusi (“The Ancient Mosque”) dates from 1664.

Lingui possesses five mosques, and one of these is located in Laocun (the “Old Village”). The two ancient mosques of Yongfu, between Guilin and Liuzhou, bear the names of Suqiu (“Bridge of Suzhou”) and Cheng (“Within the Walls”). Pingle Mosque was built in 1736 near the bank of Gui River, on the road to Guilin.

Baise, in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region controls the entry to Yunnan toward Funing and Kaiyuan. One evening in 1987, in its small one-floor mosque (built in 1906), I was questioned by local authorities who suddenly appeared. It was forbidden to interview Hui without special authorization. I was accompanied to my hotel and compelled to show my bus ticket. A spectacular socio-political change took place in the 1990s concerning research and liberty of travel for foreigners. The next day I entered Yunnan by Funing, a border-town linking Yunnan and Guangxi.

Mosques in Yunnan Province

This province will be studied in detail in Chapter 4. The Hui are settled throughout the whole of Yunnan but shows less dynamic modernization because of the remoteness of many districts. Coming from Funing, after Yanshan one finds Muslims and mosques everywhere—along main roads and key cities

Under the Yuan Dynasty, there were ten mosques in Kunming. Six still remained open in the nineteenth century and survive today. The French consul in Yunnan, Georges Cordier (1927), rightly noted the existence of six mosques in the capital. There are currently almost 5 million inhabitants in Kunming, including 100,000 Muslims residents. Four among the six mosques were reconstructed and “modernized” between 1997 and 2003. So, in 2003, only two mosques were ancient, the others being newly rebuilt *Qingzhensi*. Wu Jianwei, author of a fine monograph in Chinese, curiously mentions only one mosque, Shuncheng, the headquarters of the provincial Islamic Association. This ancient mosque (a Chinese Muslim pagoda) built in 1425 and restored in 1927 and 1988 was demolished and rebuilt in 2003 in a new style. The new designation of this mosque, *Chaozhendian*, symbolizes a Yunnanese deliberate will of modernization coupled with a lack of interest in heritage.

For the last international exhibition of the twentieth century (1999), the city was entirely transformed. Jinbi Street became a large avenue; the ancient mosque of pagoda style was amputated of one side, and most of the century-old plane

trees (*Platanus orientalis*) disappeared. The oldest street in the city, opened in the thirteenth century, lost a third of its ancient houses. The street is nevertheless cleaner, but the Hui marketplace has lost its charm as have many suburbs. This type of urban modernization is not unique in China, but the designation *Chaozhendian* for mosques in Yunnan imposes a type of modernization leading to the almost invisible acculturation process of Sinicization. The cities are transformed and history is eradicated. This does not favor Muslims, and history is consequently rewritten. Elsewhere the modernization process occurs in populated Muslim suburbs, such as in Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, and even Guangzhou, cities completely transformed and modernized. In other provinces, for the Olympic Games of 2008, the Muslims of Beijing and Shanghai have to follow rules of the implacable-but clean and universal-process of modernization drastically transforming many Chinese cities (toward the twenty-first century?).

Yuxi is an important Koranic center where numerous Ahong from Yunnan and the neighboring provinces have trained. The retired imam of Jamia Mosque, the oldest in Hong Kong, studied the Koran there. Yuxi has three mosques, not counting those in the neighboring villages and Eshan. There are nearly 40,000 Hui in this booming district of 4 million inhabitants. Xiying Mosque, in Yuxi, was built in the seventeenth century, and Dongying ("Eastern Barracks") opened in 1875.

The principal mosque of Eshan, Wenming ("Culture") is said to date to the Ming Dynasty (sixteenth century). It was reconstructed in 1895 and after the Cultural Revolution. On the ancient caravan route to the south, this district is currently crossed by a superhighway toward the Red River. Mojiang is the most sacred Sufi mosque in the province. Sipsong Panna (Xishuang Banna) mosque is recent (1980). The Hui population in this district includes more than 20,000.

In Huaning, the ancient mosque Panxibeimen (1856) is located 40 kilometers east of Eshan, not far from Tonghai, and its community includes a thousand Hui. Muche Mosque known from its trees was constructed in 1938, during the Republican period.

Between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, Tonghai in central Yunnan was a wealthy Hui district known for its indigo dyeing tradition, weaving factories, brick industries, and flourishing agriculture. At present, light "carpets" of dried turnips (*luobosi*) are sold as far as Japan for their high nutritive value.

The population counts more than 10,000 Muslims. I found numerous ancient Muslim tombs (*gongbei*) there. The favorite disciple, the adopted "son" of Ma Mingxin, is buried there (the second most sacred Jahariaya shrine in Yunnan after Mojiang). A modern mosque in a Middle Eastern style was built in 1985. The construction of

this large mosque of Najjiaying was financed by a loan of 20 million yuan (USD 2 million) from the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi Trustee Association. Two other mosques include a Yunnanese Jahariya Koranic School. Nearby, Dahuicun (“Great Muslim Village”) possesses a large Jahariya mosque (photo 10) and a Hui population of 3,000 villagers. The majority are disciples of Imam Ma Liesun, who was imprisoned for many years in Gansu. The other farmers follow the Yunnanese Order.

The ancient mosque of Kaiyuan near the train station, on the Chinese Railway linking Kunming to Hanoi via Hekou, built by the Société Lyonnaise, is an excellent Koranic center. The imam, a quite aged schoolmaster, is famous for his methodology for teaching Arabic. This district includes 20–30,000 Hui.

Gejiu District has a long Islamic history; the Muslim community is centered on tin mines and business. These Hui were particularly active during the construction of the railway in 1900. This city now counts more than 12,000 Hui, including Jahariya Sufis. The main mosque, Baifangzi (“White House”), was reconstructed in 1980.

During the Cultural Revolution, this region was the center of a Muslim uprising. More than a thousand Hui died, together with a hundred armed police inspectors. The city of Shadian was practically razed to the ground. The Lianhutatang (“Lotus Pond”) Mosque was reconstructed in 1990 on a large area of a thousand square meters. It has three stories and a minaret. Its style is neither Middle Eastern nor pagoda-like.

Jianshui features a mosque built in 1313, one of the oldest in the province, and often reconstructed.

Mile, on an ancient caravan route, was revived with the construction of the strategic Wenshan-Kunming Road, built in 1980 to accelerate transportation between the capital and the front of the deadly Sino-Vietnamese War (1979–80). Mile has five mosques, the most ancient located in a village named Pengpu. The mosque at Bajiao was constructed in 1940. Two others were rebuilt in the 1980s. More to the east is Niujie (“The Oxen Market”), an ancient Muslim cattle market. Luxi has six mosques for a population that includes nearly 12,000 Hui. All the nearby mosques were built during the twentieth century, except for Taoyuan (“The Peach Garden”) Mosque constructed in 1856.

Muslims were numerous in western Yunnan. Under the Mongols, Dali was a center of Islamization after it was conquered in 1253. Before 1873, there were five mosques in Dali. The oldest mosques were demolished after the fall of Du Wenxiu’s State. His personal mosque was razed after his defeat, and two Muslim centers were later transformed into Chinese pagodas. At least two mosques remain open in the

city, not counting numerous small mosques in the surrounding villages. Xiaguan, an important crossroads with a railway station opened in the year 2000, has two mosques. A population of 70–80,000 Hui lives in this prefecture.

Chuxiong has a small Muslim community, centered on a single mosque; the Han have replaced the Hui on the main crossroad on the highway between Kunming and Dali. Opened in 1999, the expressway has, however, reduced the importance of Chuxiong, which is no longer—as it had been for centuries—an important stopover on the Burma Road. It is still a strategic crossroad toward Sichuan, Mojiang, and south Yunnan, and Muslims continue to reside there. The main center on Burma Road, Xiaguan, retains its importance as an industrial center and has a strategic position on the road to Baoshan, and Ruili at the door to Burma. Ruili displays its modernization and Sinicization by replacing a small Burmese place of worship by a large and modern Chinese mosque.

Weishan (Mengshe) was formerly linked to Dali by a small and muddy road. This explains why Islamization was delayed, four years after that at Dali (1257). The armies of Kublai Khan, including many Muslims, were slowed in their southward progress. One of the reasons for the strategic delay of the Mongol armies was the resistance of Mengshe, a Tai principality, and another includes the difficulty of transport and communication in this isolated, hilly, area of Yunnan. The current Muslim population of Weishan Hui Autonomous District is 4,000. With its twenty-two mosques, this center of the former Nanzhao Kingdom (Nanchao) has been called “The Little Mecca of Yunnan.”

Baoshan features an ancient one-story mosque reconstructed in 1845. Imam Ma Pinde, a passionate reader of Yunnan's history, probably returned to his birthplace, Dali. The Islamic Association replaced him by a young Ahong.

Mosques in Shanghai Municipality and Other Provinces

In the autonomous City of Shanghai the Hui are numerous. There are eight mosques, including a small one reserved for women. Shanghai's Peach Garden (*Taoyuan*) Mosque, constructed in 1917, is the Islamic Association's headquarters. The most ancient place of worship is named Songjiang (1341).

Another ancient mosque (1368) is located in the capital of Jiangsu, Nanjing (Nankin).

In Jiangxi, Nanchang's mosque is small, but that at Lu Shan, built in 1922 (reconstructed 1980) is larger. In Jiujiang, the mosque, built in the fifteenth century

south of the Blue River, controls the entrance to Anhui, a province open to the outside world. More than 300,000 Muslims currently live in Anhui.

Hubei confirms an important point of this study. Muslim communities are centered on crossroads and transportation lines. On Liberation Avenue (*Jiefang Malu*) in Wuhan, numerous *halal* restaurants corroborate the will of the Islamic Association to catch up with Chinese economic growth. Wuhan, a large industrial capital, established its first mosque in 1723 (renovated 1986). It is situated south of the city, near the confluence of the great Blue River, Yangzi, and Han River (*Han Shui*). This Han waterway is an axis of penetration toward the Islamized provinces of Henan, Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Gansu. Upstream are the cities of Xiantao, Xiangfan, and at the limit of Shaanxi, Yunxi. Each town has a mosque, the oldest, built in 1881, is called Xichuan (“Western River”). Three hundred families can meet there to celebrate Muslim feasts. In Hubei’s second city, Shashi, the main mosque was built in 1459 near the Yangzi River, and currently occupies 600 square meters.

Shaoyang in Hunan is famous for its four mosques. The most ancient, Gusi Mosque (built in 1368) contains antique steles, unfortunately no longer very readable.

In Chengdu, Sichuan, China’s ancient capital, the wooden mosque of the Ming Dynasty, nearly five hundred years old, in People’s Street, no longer exists. The largest ancient mosque was also previously demolished and never rebuilt. Modern Renmin Nanlu Mosque, constructed near the famous standing statue of Mao, is impressive but lacking character. Reconstruction of mosques in new styles eradicates the history of Islam, which is elsewhere revived by the re-islamization of tenacious Hui survivors who abandoned Islam during many centuries.

Re-islamization in Fujian Province

A key instigator of Fujian re-islamization was the Hui association of the “Five Families” (*Wuxing Hui*) including the following surnames: Bai, Ding, Guo, Jin, and Ma. The Ding clan is numerous in this province, particularly in Quanzhou, as well as the Ma, the most widespread surname among the Hui. Initiated by the Muslim National Society in 1940 and pursued during the post-1949 period at Chendai, not far from Quanzhou, discussions occurred between the Ding family and the Bureau of Religious Affairs in order to bring them back to the Islamic religion abandoned for centuries. Only in 1978, after the Cultural Revolution, did these negotiations begin to bear fruit, as Gladney (1996) and Wu Jianwei (1995) have explained. In 1991, on an area of 500 square meters, a place of worship was finally reconstructed.

Quanzhou (*Zaitun* in Arabic) is one of the first points of Islamization and a famous port on the maritime Silk Road. The descendants of the Ding, and others clans, were reconverted in the 1980s and became Hui again, (partly) abandoning their Chinese identity in order to recover their Arab-Persian roots (twentieth generation).

After this long administrative procedure, in the 1980s, nearly 50,000 of these former Muslims recovered their ancestral belief after centuries of oblivion. So, in Quanzhou, Hui became Han and are after many centuries again a Muslim minority. Accepting that, the Chinese government has corrected the mistakes made during the Cultural Revolution, and re-islamization acts in a positive way. Imams from other provinces had to come to teach their religion to these religious survivors. The provincial Tourist Bureau took advantage of this process to attract Muslims investors from the Middle East to develop the region.

The ancestral Arabic cemetery, established in the eleventh century on the Lingshan hillside near Quanzhou, was also completely restored. The tombs, attributed to two imams, disciples of the Prophet, Sayyid, and Waqqas, are once again under a Chinese roof. Provincial authorities did not lose time and proclaimed this site a sacred place of universal Islam. These mausoleums, as well as the large Ashab mosque in Quanzhou, are, in fact, a historic Muslim heritage.

In the capital of Fujian, Fuzhou, the mosque in North Street was built in the thirteenth century. In 1541, a fire destroyed it, and it was reconstructed in 1549. As in Quanzhou, there was no brutal cessation of Islam for centuries.

In Xiamen (Amoy), an experienced imam from Gansu left Fujian Province after construction of the new mosque. Following the current trend, he was replaced by a young Ahong in the 1990s.

The mosque at Shaowu, halfway between Fuzhou and Nanchang, has three roofs. The main road and the navigable river between these two provincial capitals again demonstrate the ubiquity of the Hui along the principal axis of transport and communications. Using all modern means of transportation, some Chinese Muslims currently travel far away as in the past, although less than the Han. From the 1990s, each year there are more Muslims from China and Fujian going on the Hajj. Mecca and Medina are part of the compulsory Muslim rites of passage.

The Hui and Uyghurs in Mecca and Islamic Universality

In Mecca and Medina, past and present unite. One of the most famous Chinese Hajj is Admiral Zheng He (1371–1435) of the Ming Dynasty, who made his first

pilgrimage in 1405. The Admiral was more fortunate than Ibn Battuta, who, suffering from a stomach illness, was forced to circumambulate the Kaaba seated on a chair, and later rode a horse given by the Emir to reach Safa and Marwa. But, when he arrived in Mina near Mount Ararat, the great Tangerine traveler recovered well. He remained in the region and revisited the holy places between 1328 and 1330.

Nowadays, each year, thousands of Hui and Uyghurs figure among the 2 million pilgrims from the whole Islamic world. Beijing is generally the official departure point for Chinese pilgrims.

The Hajj, completed once in a lifetime, is one of the five pillars of Islam, but should not cause financial, familial, or physical risks for the pilgrim. Several months in advance, the Islamic Association of China sends official applications for visas to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Beijing and the Saudi Consulate in Hong Kong. Other Chinese nationals may apply individually in Bangkok, Pakistan, or Central Asia. It is a heavy financial burden for the future Haji, whether Hui or Uyghur. It currently costs a minimum of 30,000 yuan (around USD 5,000), an important sum for a Chinese, compared to only USD 700 for an Iraqi pilgrim in 2004 (now free to undertake this religious duty after three decades of restriction).

The Chinese government currently imposes less rigid conditions than in the past to issue a passport. Travels through Thailand, Central Asia, or Pakistan are probably the best alternative routes to Mecca for the Hui of southwestern China and Xinjiang's Uyghurs. Central Asia is cheaper. Our main Uyghur informant in Kashgar offered plane tickets to his both parents to Mecca from Kyrgyzstan for the second time. The capital, Bishkek (formerly Frounze), well connected with Saudi Arabia, is linked to Kashgar by modern buses. Since 1992, life has been much less expensive in Central Asia than in China [Kyrgyzstan and three other Central Asian countries have economic problems linked to the non-convertibility of their currencies. Kyrgyzstan has received hundreds of millions of dollars in credit from the World Bank and the United States. The economy is shaky and inflation higher than in China]. So, for Uyghurs in Kashgar, it is the closest and cheapest country. Security is also better, compared to traveling by bus to Gilgit and Lahore in Pakistan. For the Uyghurs, Beijing, and Hong Kong are far away.

Consequently, in 2003 and 2004, the number of Chinese Haji continued to increase. Linxia (Hezhou) District sends more than 1,500 pilgrims annually. Some, such as the illiterate brother of a Haji cadre from Gansu, went to Mecca via Hong Kong.

Present Organization of the Hajj

Hui and Uyghur pilgrims, aside from those traveling alone via Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Thailand, must follow a course of preparation in Beijing at Oxen Street Mosque. This course gives religious instruction as well as information about the climate, culture, and accommodations in Mecca and Medina, and even advice about changing money. To enter Mecca and Medina, two official guides (*mutawif*) per group are imposed, one for each sacred city.

Before arriving in Mecca, the pilgrims must shave the head and put on a new white cotton cloth (*ihram*) after bathing. For women, the white cloth covers the entire body, and the face is normally hidden. For the 2 million worshippers, despite the intense security, the pilgrimage is not without dangers. Casualties were reported in 2003 and 2004. One must follow all the rites and be prepared, as Abel Turki has noted, for an immersion into a “human sea constantly in motion” around the Kaaba. Since the 1980s this sacred symbol and the Mosque at Mecca have been exhibited in Hui and Uyghur households. These images can be bought in shops neighboring in China's main mosques.

Before leaving Mecca, pilgrims drink water from the sacred well of Zemzem (*Zamzam*). The pilgrims must also run seven times (women walk) between Safa (“Large Rock”) and Mount Marwah (“Hard Silex”). The turning-point of the pilgrimage is the great “station.” The foot of Mount Arafat and its thousands of tents welcome the future Haji arriving on foot, by car, or by bus. Taxis are numerous, and each trip is subject to haggling. In 2003, there were 44,000 shelters of white canvas for the night preceding the Feast of the Sacrifice, each in a well-defined location. That night (10 February 2003 and 1 February 2004) marks the psyche of some pilgrims more than the seven circumambulation of the Kaaba. Then, in Mina, for the feast itself, a sheep must be purchased and sacrificed in memory of Ibrahim (Abraham). This rite is obligatory, as are the circumambulations in Mecca's main mosque. If one is omitted, the pilgrimage is invalid.

There are also a thousand reasons to be lost during the movements from one sacred place to another. At some distance from Arafat, at Mina, there is another “station.” One must gather up forty-nine pebbles as large as chickpeas. These are thrown seven times ($7 \times 7 = 49$) on the “Satanic” pillars. This is a dynamic rite of separation from the devil, another *sine qua non* rite of passage. At present, three steles symbolizing Satan simplify the ritual (continued until 13 February 2003). One day of farewell terminates the first cycle of rites.

The pilgrimage is not finished at this stage, a visit to the holy places of Medina also being required. This oasis plateau, situated at 600 meters, renowned for its date trees, enjoys a more pleasant climate than Mecca situated some 400 kilometers to the south. A popular saying records that “he who patiently endures Medina’s cold and Mecca’s heat merits paradise.” The mosque of Mariya, the Prophet’s Copt wife, mother of Ibrahim, is one of the forty places of religious worship in Medina. It is useful to take three liters of water from Zemzem for the trip to Medina, to drink and for the ritual washing (*wuzu*) before carrying out the salutations near the Prophet’s shrine in the Holy Cemetery (*Al-Bakia*). One must walk barefooted over the whole sacred site. A visit to the Saints’ Cemetery is also an emotional shock for many pilgrims.

Pilgrims from China and Selected Life-Stories

The existence of a community is fully confirmed during the pilgrimage. These different life stories explain the faith of the pilgrims. East of Dali, in a small village a half-hour by foot toward the Lake, Ma, a former butcher, dreams at the community (*umma*) to save his life. In 1998, after fifteen years of hard work, his restaurant and his cattle had sufficiently enriched him to be able to reach Mecca with his wife and father, the village imam. As a Haji, he became a notable, but suddenly his life collapsed. His daughter, mother of a young son, was obliged to divorce. Mrs. Ma accused her husband of incapacity and direct responsibility for the family misfortune. Haji Ma wants to return to Mecca to end his life there but has no more money. Moreover, Haji Ma speaks neither Arabic nor English.

The Jahariya Order would prosper in Yunnan after the year 2001. Among Yunnanese Jahariya Sufis the Master was able to make his third pilgrimage in 2001, and in 2003 again returned to Mecca via Bangkok with four disciples. The pilgrimage is the main door to the Islamic world. This symbolic form of universal Islamic faith also integrates the Sufi community and even the Sunni and Shia ones. It follows the line of Haji Ma Mingxin and Shaykh Ma Tengai who died on 20 July 1991.

In 2001, following the leader of the Jahariya community, two *murid* Jahariya left for Kunming and Mecca, one having been invited to join the official Chinese delegation. Two hundred other Chinese VIPs were also official guests of Saudi Arabia in Mecca’s most magnificent hotel during the Hajj.

Each year Ningxia is the point of departure for hundreds of Haji candidates. Tongxin District has a Muslims population of 400,000, of which 20% are Jahariya. In

2003, fifty became Haji. To celebrate her departure, a lady of this city invited Imam Ismail Li and fifty persons. Later, she left for Beijing on 12 January and for Jeddah on the 15th. A local cadre named Ma was also present. The most extraordinary fruits, confectioneries, almonds, raisins, and other sweetmeats were displayed. Many attendants said: "Help yourself! Help yourself!" but no one dared to taste these sweets. They were all waiting for a signal of the imam to start to eat. Finally, the imam, who had not been to Mecca, spoke, and in his speech explained to the future Hajjah that the pilgrimage stands for an Islamic pillar but God is more important. The experienced imam had preached for nearly fifteen years in the ancient mosque at Xian and was a respected member of the Muslim community. Suddenly, Imam Li decided not to embarrass further the devout Hui lady. He got up without eating anything, thanking every one, and went out followed by all the attendees except the Party cadre and myself. I asked this cadre if the Jahariya mosque was far away, and the lady immediately persuaded him to accompany me. He could not decline. Once in the courtyard of the mosque, Mr. Ma refused to be photographed, made his tires squeal, and finally drove away in his car decorated with two crossed red flags behind the windshield.

The present events in Saudi Arabia (twenty-two killed in Khobar on 29 May 2004) have an indirect impact on the future security of the pilgrimage, on Islam in general, and its relationships with the West, on the world economy, and on China. Saudi Arabia was previously linked to the "jihadic" and Taliban movement against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and now fights Al Qaeda. Wahhabi official discourse, which has been adopted by the Saudi ruling family, influences universal Islamic discourse. But what is the correct Islamic discourse in the mind of the Saudi people and the Hui majority? Al Qaeda? The Wahhabi? Or another discourse? These questions are not discussed here, but they concern China's silent Muslim community.

Community and Ubiquity

Muslims are found everywhere in China. Hui are numerous in the Autonomous Region of Ningxia, and in other provinces, in particular, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan.

Chinese Muslims are above all businessmen. In Yunnan, for centuries (they date their arrival to 1253), and following historical highs and lows, the Hui controlled caravan traffic until 1950. Thanks to Deng's reforms of the 1980s, some Hui began

to be re-engaged in road transportation. In southern China, Muslim ancestral knowledge of the transportation networks is useful. They currently own trucks, and thus ancient commercial links are revived. The Hui are omnipresent in Yunnan, except in the province's northwest corner. Haji Ma from Changning, not far from the Burmese border, in the 1980s established a prosperous family enterprise owning its trucks, buses, and taxis. Other Muslim companies followed this development pattern in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, Xinjiang and the Autonomous Region of Tibet recently became regions of intensive Han migration. Before the 1990s, the Han were a minority in these regions; they are now a demographic majority controlling the whole economy.

The Hui, as well as other Muslim minorities, are not really isolated and receive news from the Islamic world, mainly during the Hajj. Chinese Muslims serve as "middlemen" with the Arabic countries, in Mecca or Beijing, and cooperate with international Islamic commercial networks, controlled in China by the Han majority. But who, in fact, are the Hui?

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19. Aitkah Mosque in Kashgar, one of the four largest in China (Winter 2003)



20. On the road to Aksu, Sanchakou ("Crossroads") renamed by the Chinese



21. Marriage banquet at Ban Ho, Yunnanese Chiang Mai Mosque (27 March 2004)



22. Ma Zhizhong, the bridegroom, the bride, and a relative. Chiang Mai (March 2004)



23. Marriage banquet in Chiang Mai. Donation Box in Thai, Chinese, and English



24. Imam Ma, the Yunnanese Ahong of Ban Ho (Wanghe), Chiang Mai Mosque (2004)



25. Chinese mosque at Chiang Mai surmounted by the flag of Thailand



26. Stele, Shuncheng Mosque, Kunming, replacing the ancient slab destroyed (1966)



27. Tomb of Imam Na, former Yunnanese Ahong of Ban Ho Mosque, Chiang Mai



28. Preparing the tomb of Ma Pinxing at Chiang Mai Cemetery (26 March 2004)



29. Shroud with the head of the deceased in the direction of Mecca, Chiang Mai




30. Yunnanese mosque, Mandalay, Burma (August 2004)





31. Pearl, a Yunnanese H'o at her *halal* restaurant in Chiang Mai (life-story Chapter 5)



32. Preparation of marriage banquet at Chiang Mai Mosque (27 March 2004)





China and Central Asia

1,000 Miles



Chapter 3

Hui Identity and Modernity

Chinese Muslims: Identity and Modernity

Before considering the subject of acculturation and modernity it seems useful to know how the Hui identify themselves. In this twenty-first century, the search for identity is commonplace and touches all ethnic groups including minorities such as the Hui, Chinese Muslims at a crossroads between modernization and Sinicization.

Most of China's Muslims are Sunni. The majority are members of the old school *Laojiao*, also called *Gedimu* (from the Arabic *qadim*, "ancient"). In Yunnan, they call themselves "Old Heads," *Laotou*, a qualifier that only the Muslims of this province understand. The greater part of the Hui belongs to the orthodox Hanafite School; few of them recognize Abu Hanifa (c. 696–c. 767). This jurisprudential school of Iraqi origin goes back to Abdullah Ibn Masud, a companion of the Prophet, and is characterized by the Sunna Muslim tradition, inductive and legal reasoning, and consultation before taking a religious or political decision.

In China, Muslims, particularly the Hui, have Chinese family names (*xing*). These names have an Arabic origin such as Ha, Na, Sai, and Sha. The most widely used by far is Ma ("Horse"). The most common patronymic, Li, also exists but it is less frequent among Hui than among Han.

For Gustav von Grunebaum (1909–72), Islamic cultural identity raises a question about the relationship between Muslims and the Western world: "In accepting Western influence, the Muslim elites aimed not at renewing a heritage but at eliminating marks of inferiority." This question leads to our quest for accultura-

tion and modernization. The transformation of minorities in China, including the Muslims, is being achieved through the acculturating filter of Sinicization. This Sinicization is called “internal colonialism” by authors such as Michael Hechter (*Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*) and in particular Dru Gladney in his recent book *Dislocating China* (2004) on Muslims, minorities, and other “subaltern subjects.”

This study follows the methodology I elaborated for the Dong minority, which did not touch the question of colonialism (Sinisation 1998). The Hui are similarly confronted with Westernization and modernization through Chinese culture and the official education system in particular. The Chinese state, following a type of Durkheimian education system, sticks to state education linked with order and social peace. Acculturation (implemented in particular via the education of the youth) for the Hui is double, Chinese and Islamic. Is it necessary to replace fundamental values coming from family education by the values of the Chinese school? In fact, politics and laws count more than religion. Muslims living in an Islamic country think of the state through the *sharia*; the Hui, a minority, are Chinese citizens who cannot come under the control of Koranic laws.

Ibn Battuta, each time that he encountered a Chinese Muslim, had the impression of encountering his own family or a close friend. Is this still true? Six hundred years after the long voyage of the celebrated traveler from Tangiers, the Hui, having been greatly altered due to Chinese influence, do not necessarily resemble other Muslims. However, one of their principal references remains the Koran, which is a compulsory subject of study for all Muslims. Arabic is “axial,” says Massignon, but it is difficult in China to attain Islamic universality through Arabic, the Koranic language. The Hui majority read the Koran only in Chinese, and Chinese citizenship distinguishes them from the Arabs.

Some Muslims of the Old Religion (*Gedimu*) believe that the reformers of the nineteenth century were not orthodox. In Linxia (Hezhou), for instance, those of the old school consider that the “New Religion,” *Ikhwan Al-Muslimin* (*Yihewani* in Chinese) or the Muslim Brotherhood, has little to recommend it, for it developed in 1936 Salafism (*Salafeiye*) under the patronage of Republican warlords in Gansu and Qinghai, the ancient Kuku Nor. This Brotherhood expressly favors education in Arab, which poses problems in China.

The communal life of the Hui, however, reinforces the existence of the community. The code of Muslim life imposes the five pillars: belief (*kalima*, in Chinese *kalimate*), prayers, fasting, charity (*zakat*), and the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is the unique act of total membership in the *umma*. It is a duty for all Muslims to go

to the mosque on Friday, which is sometimes called *libaidian* or the day of prayer. Chinese people have often found it unusual that Hui and Uyghurs meet together; their devotional prayers are strange for the Chinese.

Dali in Yunnan Province, in majority Muslim, which was ruled by Du Wenxiu from 1856 to 1873, was a Muslim state. It finally collapsed. One cannot say how deeply Islamic culture was rooted in this community, but when assistance was requested from Tibet to fight the Manchu, Muslim identity was stressed.

The *umma* is above all transnational, for Muslims throughout the world belong to a same community. Belonging to this community means going to Mecca at least once. After following a seminar in the mosque on Oxen Street (*Niujie*) in Beijing, the pilgrims accepted by the Islamic Association leave for Mecca; they become an integral part of this community without frontiers. A Yunnanese named Ma, the celebrated Admiral Zheng He (1371–1435), was one of the first Chinese pilgrims to go to Mecca with the Muslim sailors from his fleet accompanying him. In the beginning of the twentieth century, pilgrims used the Yunnan railway from Kunming to Hekou toward Hanoi, because it considerably reduced the length of the trip. Before the Second World War, others embarked at Shanghai, a “Treaty Port.” Since the normal resumption of Chinese pilgrimages in the 1980s, the trip is normally made by plane from Beijing or Shanghai. Kunming is now linked by air to Bangkok, and a visa must be obtained in Thailand based on the rigid limits of the Saudi quota. The more adventurous go in pilgrimage via Pakistan from Xinjiang. The Koran is central in defining official religious acts, in particular during this pilgrimage.

Koranic Teaching

Hui who can read the Koran in Arabic are called *Ahong*, a term of Persian origin; this term is also used to designate imams in China as is the term *yimamu* (imam). The Islamic Association’s practice of lowering the age of the imams is also seen among the rare female *Ahong* who teach the Koran. Since the 1990s one finds a constant practice: the imams fifty to sixty year-old, or the elderly female *Ahong* are replaced by young *Ahong* who are politically more reliable. This lowering of the age of imams is part of Sinicization.

Young imams are happy to find a job. Even ardent believers are concerned with their professional survival. They have not known the stresses of the Cultural Revolution. They closely follow what has been taught to them under the auspicious control of the Islamic Association. They know the limits imposed on religions,

particularly on Islam, but never speak of Sinicization. They cannot even imagine what acculturation means. The search for employment or an administrative post occurs through the building of good family or professional relations (*guanxi*). The most Islamized young Hui elite sometimes seek to study abroad. The guiding organization, the Islamic Association, helps motivated students enter an overseas Islamic university; the family can also play a major role. The most famous Hui scholars have graduated from Al-Azhar, the prestigious Egyptian university. Before the Second World War, dozens of Ahong studied in Egypt, they became the elite of the Chinese Islamic thinkers and researchers. New generations of Chinese imams also try to study in Egypt. Others, after two years at Chiang Mai's Chinese *madrassa*, study at Medina University.

While a good knowledge of the Koran is an essential preliminary, for an imam in China the first criterion—a profound knowledge of Chinese—is crucial. This seems paradoxical, but it must be remembered that in China, Koranic Arabic is learned via Chinese. The Uyghurs, whose language uses an Arabic-Persian alphabet, have an advantage in studying Arabic when they start. However, the Islamic Association in Beijing prefers to train Hui than Uyghurs. However, Uyghurs also join the National University for Minorities in Beijing.

In 1989, there were more than 200,000 imams in China. The older ones have a better knowledge of the Koran and have experienced the religious crises of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution. For them Islam is a community. The Party is linked to the Islamic Association, and most imams are affiliated with it and thus linked to the state. The Association currently prefers young imams who receive only small gifts (*zakat*) from neighboring Muslims. Imams are never rich.

The Muslim belongs to a community. What are the questions a Chinese Muslim can ask in a reformed socialist country? Islam thinks of the other world after death. A belief in metempsychosis also gives to Buddhism a popular platform in the face of Taoism.

One can rightly hold that the Marxist ethic is no longer what it once was, and this is one reason for the increase in Christian belief in China since Deng's reforms. In the 1980s the correct and novel desire to become rich altered radically the Chinese ethic of the period 1949–76. How to live an honest life and have an upright spirit? Islam places responsibility for the person above the collectivity but allows the community to designate the route to follow. Muslim education centers on family values and purity.

Purity

Without considering Muslim ablutions as a ritual preparation for prayers and respecting the obvious necessity of cleanliness, belonging to the Muslim community means also respecting certain dietary rules and clothing habits. The purity of food (*halal* in Arabic, a synonym of “legal”) is from a semantic point of view identical with the concept of “purity and truth” (*qingzhen*) of the mosques. For the French Ollone Mission *qingzhen* was the official name of Islam since the fourteenth century, from which arose the characters *Qing* and *Zhen*, placed above entrances to Muslim place of worship.

The Chinese Islamic community defines itself by purity and truth (*qingzhen*). Dabry de Thiersant mentions that Xian’s main mosque, at first named “The Temple of Pure Religion” (*qingjiaosi*) was renamed *qingzhensi* in 1315, like all other mosques. For the Chinese, *qingzhen* designates, above all, a product manufactured by the Hui minority. But for Chinese Muslims *qingzhen* signifies that which is Islamic. The term *Qingzhensi* (“Temple of Purity”) is not well known by the Han, except by the literati and those living in Muslim areas.

Related to purity is the well-known prohibition on pork as part of Muslim dietary taboos. Butchered cattle and sheep in China as in the Islamic world must have the throat cut according to Koranic ritual. Since the beginnings of Islam in China, this question aroused tensions with the Han because for them pork is a “Great Meat” (*darou*). For Gladney, the consumption of pork marks a “frontier” between Chinese and Hui culture. For Gillette, many Muslims consider the Han as having no dietary ethic. “They eat everything,” Hui say of the Han. It is difficult to find an area of difference more sharply defined between these two “nationalities.”

During the 1970s, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, the Vice-president of the Islamic Association, Mohammed Ali Zhang Jie, overemphasized that the government perfectly respected the Hui. However this high-ranking cadre during a revolutionary and anti-religious period only said that “Hui do not eat pork. That is why special canteens have been installed by the Muslim authorities.” Elsewhere, in December 1982, the publication in Shanghai of an anti-Islamic article in *Youth News* was enough to fire the editor who published “Why Muslims . . . do not eat pork” (Gladney 1996: 188). The prohibition against pork is a strict rule for Hui men married to Han women. University students often admit to having friends for years without knowing that they were Muslims until the day when, dining together,

they realized that their friends were not eating pork and then understood that they were Hui.

Disputes concerning pork are frequent. For example, at the end of 2000, in Shandong Province, a fight occurred between Han and Hui caused by a Han merchant insulting some Muslims in a Han market.

While traveling, Muslims have special food requirements. Except in the north, the northwest, and in the Muslim quarters, it is difficult to obtain pure food, *qingzhen*. This is one of the reasons why in the past, few Muslims have traveled to Western countries.

In the south, in Yunnan, meals eaten in common, such as those in the mosque on feast days (at *Shunchengjie* Mosque in Kunming for example), have not varied very much from those served in Kunming in 1904 (Courtellemont): fish, vegetables, boiled beef, mushrooms, roast or boiled poultry, dried beef (often from Zhaotong in the east), steamed sweetbreads (*huajuan*), vermicelli, pears cut into quarters, slices of watermelon, and tea. Pure food is not only a major preoccupation for Hui and Uyghur residents but also for the Islamic associations, which want to promote the purity of the Muslim minorities of China.

Muslim Associations

Under the Republican regime, a Muslim association was founded in 1912, primarily in reaction against the dominant ethnic group. Cordier (1927) describes the desires of the Chinese government of that time, which favored the creation of associations: "The Muslim population, weakened . . . aspired only to effacement and oblivion. Each group, each family asked only to reconstitute itself, to recover its possessions, and to take up its daily occupations." It is difficult to distinguish Hui from the Han. Muslim associations follow Chinese norms and the political-administrative structures created by the state. The omnipresent Chinese Islamic Association (*Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui*) was founded on this model in 1953. Its links with the Communist Party are not advertised.

Muslims have participated in and still participate in the building of modern China, and Islamic associations play an important role in the modernization process of Muslim minorities. Owen Lattimore notes in a report of 1937 (published only in 1970) that non-Communist Muslims had two regiments in the Red Army, and that they were always considered dependable. The Islamic Association is pro-Han, but numerous Chinese Muslims belong to it; it has always supported a position of

unification. It was only on 20 December 1979 that the principal local committee, the Islamic Association of Beijing, was born. This followed the resumption of pilgrimages to Mecca interrupted between 1964 and 1979. On 19 October 1979, the first large official delegation of the association visited Saudi Arabia, and, in particular, Mecca and Medina.

The purpose of these associations is in accord with the official Chinese political dialectic, as clearly demonstrated by one of its spokesmen, Professor (Haji) Ma Tong, a researcher at the Institute of Minorities in Lanzhou, Gansu. He is a specialist in Sufism and believes that it is necessary to realize “the unity of all Muslims without distinction of sect (Order).” In southern Yunnan, in the Dai Autonomous Prefecture, on the door of the new mosque at Jinghong, the characters *tuanjie* are inscribed so as to remind Muslims that union, the antithesis of Sinicization, must be respected to maintain the established order.

Chinese Islam and Modernity

The history of modern China is a systematic account of the country’s struggle to implement modernization. Rare attempts have been made to understand the incompatibility of the concept of modernization with the existing Chinese social structure. However, modernization as part of China’s social and cultural transformation is omnipresent in the post-Deng era, and this affects all Muslims in the country. Modernization means “to reduce and eventually eliminate the cultural and economic differences among them” (Fei 1981: 86). We will see that this is not always the case.

Modernization was a Great Evil in early twentieth-century China, and so it is even more difficult for the Hui, especially the older generation, to reconcile this concept with religious belief. The Hui are at the crossroads of two cultures, Islam and Confucianism. However, it seems that the Hui cannot deny the Confucian principles of (1) loyalty as being true to one’s own conscience, and (2) a passionate belief in education. The PRC leadership looks at modernization in material terms, with technology as the main index. Chinese Muslim elite use instruments of modernity daily such as portable telephones, CDs, and the Internet.

My purpose here is not to ask primarily if some Chinese Muslims and in particular the youth are “modern.” They are certainly modern, especially in the cities. The problem of modernity of the Hui is not directly linked with these cultural markers of modernity, especially if we speak of religion.

What is modernity?

Mayfair Yang (1994: 37) defined particular points of modernity: (1) the rationalization and mechanization of production and economic exchange; (2) growing urbanization and more efficient transportation; (3) the secularization of social and religious life; (4) vast shifts of population and mass social movement; (5) the increased scope of the mass media; (6) more refined technologies of individual surveillance; and (7) discourse about a “new epoch.”

The Harvard-Stanford Project on Modernization (1974) found that among Chinese students the degree of change from traditional to modern attitudes toward the family was highly uneven. The modernity of minorities, such as Chinese Muslims, is developed through Sinicization, and this degree of change is also probably highly uneven. Modernity did not come to China’s minorities directly from Western countries. Deng Xiaoping played an important role when he launched his reforms called the Four Modernizations (2004 is the 100th anniversary of Deng’s birth). From 1982 onward, Chinese official discourse spoke of this set of modernizations in the following terms: agriculture, defense, economy (industry), and education (science and technology).

Often the Hui are close to the Han on the subject of secular modernity. As concerns marriage, as Maris Gillette has shown in the city of Xi’an, the Hui want to be resolutely “modern.” For a dozen years, the gowns of brides have been white or rose as in Hong Kong. The only difference is that in Hong Kong brides change gowns and color twice a day, probably to display family wealth. Being Muslim means having several days of marriage ceremonies, whereas the Han generally marry on a single day. In China, since the 1990s, both Han and Hui brides must wear makeup.

Sometimes, tradition and modernity are in opposition. Islamic tradition and the Koran are not “modern.” Since the events in New York of September 2001, there has been a certain increase of Islamic traditionalism, and recent events in Iraq do not push the Islamic world toward modernizing Islam. This is also true for the Muslims in China. However this traditionalism allows the use of modern technologies such as mobile phones, satellite television, and other devices currently used in everyday life. The counterpoint of Western modernization may be *jihad*.

Jihad Movement

How do the Hui react to the important issue of *jihad*? Is it a *bellum justum* for Muslims? Majid Khadduri of John Hopkins University distinguishes four ways to

fulfill the duty of *jihad*: by the heart, the tongue, the hand, and the sword. Fighting is intended as a defensive or offensive measure when Islam is in danger, an exceptional means of action when the community is under attack.

The concept of *jihad* is differently interpreted from one place to another. For many, Muslim terrorism is a nightmare and it receives various interpretations depending on the commentator. For the Nepalese Maoist, Baburam Bhattarai, terrorists “are those who do not believe in the people’s power.” So, what reasons are there to act violently or to impose “people’s power” by terrorist actions? Arthur Miller equates the events of 11 September 2001 to a revolutionary action. For Mohammed Siliti, tried in Brussels for orchestrating the assassination of Commander Massoud (9 September 2001), there are two sorts of *jihad*, one “familial, personal” (of honor?), and the other “defensive” when an Islamic state is menaced. The French writer Kepel goes further and speaks of an “offensive” aspect. Truly voluntary or not, it is a sacrifice, an individual or collective effort, the will to die as a hero, “in selling his life to God,” as Massignon says. For Niaz Zikria, the concept of *jihad* is “a religious and social duty because of the confusion of religion and social laws for all believers, who are obliged, in conscience, to do the maximum to insure the defense and the triumph of Islam.”

Other slogans exalt the blood of the “martyrs,” such as the remarks reported by Chipaux in Herat in early 2003: “the Mujahidin is the flower of liberty.” As the United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi recently pointed out in Iraq: “It is a little bit too easy to call everybody a terrorist . . . There are people who are not terrorists but respectable and patriots.” When asked about *jihad*, Hui and Uyghurs in general support Islam, Arafat, Saddam Hussein, and Ossama Ben Laden. They express an opinion that is neither pro-American nor pro-Han.

National Chinese political viewpoints equally play a role in shaping the opinion of Muslims in China. When they go to Mecca, they are also informed of the viewpoint of the Islamic world and spread this information when they return home. Other Hui and Uyghurs, very modern, are aware of events by means of the Internet.

Cultural Traits

In order to affirm its identity and to differentiate “us” from “others,” each organized human group has visible distinctive cultural traits. It is the same for Muslims in China. Very often Chinese traditions do not distinguish Muslims from others. For

example, in the 1900s the Chinese custom of small bound feet for women spread among the Muslim elite.

Fashionable clothing since the 1980s, such as blue jeans or neckties—a New Year's gift—does not constitute a criterion of distinction. The Mao suit, sometimes blue, sometimes green, became almost improper and started to disappear in the 1980s. Some Muslims wear beards in Xinjiang and among the Islamic republics of Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In neighboring Gansu, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia or even in Qinghai, the beard is also a distinctive sign of a Muslims aged forty or older. The headdress retains a symbolic and religious value. A hat is often the insignia of the leader. The white skullcap (*baimao*) is the most prominent and not normally worn outside the mosque except in Muslim villages, in the northwest, Gansu, Henan, and in Yunnan. In Yunnan, the *baimao* is often worn under a cap. The color of the skullcap can vary across ethnic groups or brotherhoods, being white, black, red, or ornamented with calligraphy around the name of Allah. Fashionable turbans are found among young imams. Sufi brotherhoods also distinguish themselves from others by using different headgear.

Sufi faith, of a rather mystical cast, gives access to a non-rational order and attempts to achieve unity with the godhead. Sufis have greatly contributed to the development of Islam in China. The central question of the Sufi's love of the godhead would merit a study itself. Though Chinese Sufism seeks intensity of faith more than success, they nevertheless show an inflexible belief that they will succeed, based on the faith of repeated proofs of divine support.

Sufi brotherhoods persecuted for centuries survived. The Naqshbandiya is probably the strongest Sufi order in Central Asia and in Afghanistan. It is truly an "order" (*ordo* of the Roman type) which the historian Marc Bloch has defined as a "division of temporal society as well as ecclesiastic." But order is also a synonym of "command," and the Shaykh has absolute control over his Sufi disciples. The deprecatory Chinese term *menhuan* is commonly used to designate these brotherhoods and often translated as "sect." In China, the Jahariya Order is sometimes called *Naqshbandi*, a term accepted by the Shaykhs. Except in Xinjiang, there are no disciples of the Bukhari Baha'Uddin Naqshband (1318–89), the founder of the Naqshbandi Order.

Kashgar is the second center of the Order on the *Tianshan Nanlu* (the main road "South of the Tianshan to Urumchi and Hami"). The choice of Kashgar is not surprising, at the crossroads of the two northern and southern roads of the Taklamakan Desert, immense lowland. This oasis is connected to Samarkand and

Bukhara, on the one hand, and to Gilgit and India, on the other. A branch of this route also leads to Afghanistan by way of the Pamir Mountains.

At present, it is easier to construct a network of research on Sufism in the Ningxia, Gansu, eastern Xinjiang, and Yunnan than to try contacting Sufis in Kashgar. This confirms the work of Thierry Zarcone on the preservation of secrecy among Xinjiang brotherhoods, based on a study of Uyghur ethnologists in the 1990s. The Order of the Black Mountain makes one think of a secret symbolic link, not confirmed, with Mojiang (“Black River” City in Yunnan) where the tomb of the son of Ma Mingxin, Ma Shunqing, is found. This tomb, the old sandalwood plantation and Mojiang’s mosque, have a remarkable place in Jahariya tradition in Gansu and Yunnan. In Central Asia as well as in southern China, the Silk Road also played a symbolic and historical role.

Sufism

The term Sufism could come from *suf*, the wool of the clothing of its practitioners, or from *sufa*, *safa*, the purity of beliefs. Sufism is a “non-official” Muslim organization in China. Sufism characterized the second wave of Chinese Islamization in the seventeenth century. It has been shown that the knowledge and the expansion of the mystical orders were not linear. Periods of recruitment followed periods of questioning. The influence of Sufism is strong in Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, northern Tibet, and Yunnan. Sufism is mystical and follows the central current of the Revelation of Islam. Sufism is opposed to radicalism and helps to promote Islam. Roy argued that neo-fundamentalism could be linked to anti-Sufism but did not exclude a shift from Sufism to anti-Sufism (1998: 52).

More than two million Hui are Sufis, and there are four great Sufi schools (*turuq*, *tariqa*) in China: the Jahariya, Khufiya, Qadiriya (Kadiriyya), and Kubrawiya Orders. Gladney (1996: 61) characterizes the first two as “militant” because of their strong dynamism, and the latter two as “dualist.” The first two prospered for centuries thanks to their commercial networks organized around the tombs of Masters called Shaykhs (Shaikhs, *Shahe* in Chinese). Powerful religious, social, and commercial networks are still centered round these tombs. These Masters are often linked by familial or spiritual affiliation with the order’s founder. Disciples have a strong attachment to past and present masters and to the sacred tombs of

the founders, which strongly links them to history. Sometimes initiation reinforces the master's moral dominance. More than 10% of the Hui belong to the Jahariya brotherhood. Deep attachment to the masters is certainly not in agreement with Sinicization, an acculturating discourse.

The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region has nearly 2,000 mosques, more than 500 Jahariya. In this region, there are approximately 400,000 traditional Muslims (*Gedimu*) and hundreds of Qadiriya followers. Fewer than 600 Hui belong to the Khufiya order, and another 600 Hui are Wahhabite (*yihewani*) who often opposed Sufism. Sometimes quarrels occur. The depth of Sufi mysticism arouses fear among orthodox Muslims, generating hostile criticism.

The tombs of masters and saints, *Gongbei*, are major places of worship for the Sufi orders. As Ibn Battuta, sympathetic to Sufism, has remarked that Shaykh's cult is a distinctive mark of each congregation. These cults are criticized by traditionalists. In the past, between the twin cities of Macao and Zhuhai (a new city originating from the dynamism of the Special Economic Zones inspired by Deng Xiaoping) a celebrated Muslim must have been buried, from which the place called Gongbei, which comes from Arabic. Not too far upstream, the tomb of another ancient Arab dignitary, in the cemetery of Guangzhou near the main railway station, constitutes a major landmark pointing out southern China's Islamization.³⁷

Villages play also a role in the Jahariya Order's expansion. Nowadays, this order includes nearly a million faithful of whom nearly 600,000 are resident in Gansu and 300,000 live in Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Yunnan. However, in his study Ma Tong (1983) has fewer members in the Sufi orders (*Sufei Menhuan*). Since the nineteenth century, Jahariya masters have possessed triple power: religious, political, and economic.

The Jahariya Order

The founder of the Jahariya Sufi Order, Ma Mingxin (1719–81), came from Gansu and was initiated in Yemen. He lived in the Arabian Peninsula for more than fifteen years. At Banqio, near Lanzhou, the mausoleum of this master was pillaged several times. His tomb, ruined before the Cultural Revolution, has been reconstructed at Lanzhou in the Nongminhang quarter. Ma Liesun initiated the building of a small Kaaba, a copy of the Black Stone of Mecca, which represents the "official" tomb of Ma Mingxin in the capital of Gansu Province. One might ask the reason for such a universal symbol (Kaaba) of the *umma* in Lanzhou. Luo Changhu a 35-year-old

imam is responsible for this sacred place. Haji Ma Tong (born in 1929, living in Lanzhou), who has written much on Chinese Sufism, so far did not visit this site, which annually draws many Jahariya pilgrims from Gansu, Qinghai and even from Xinjiang.

Ma Hualong (1810–71) was the son of Ma Datian, student of Ma Mingxin. After the founder himself, he was one of the masters who gave the greatest impetus to his *tariqa*. He was killed by troops of General Zuo Zongtang (1812–85), after his voluntary surrender in Ningxia. Ma Tenghai (1921–91) was the last Shayhk recognized by nearly all Jahariya followers; he died in his native city, Wuzhong (Ningxia). His branch is called Banqiao.

In December 2000, Imam Luo Changhu wrote an article for *Yisilan Tongxun* journal entitled “Analysis of the Itinerary of Ma Mingxin during his Pilgrimage.” It is a disguised criticism of Ma Tong’s studies on Ma Mingxin who in his early youth went to Mecca with his uncle, around 1729. Concerning Ma Mingxin’s voyage, Imam Luo believes that these two pilgrims went to the Middle East via Ava (Burma), and Indonesia. Ma Tong, and Jin Yijiu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, on the contrary, believes that the future founder of the Jahariya followed the ancient Silk Road. Later, Ma Mingxin was initiated into Sufism in Yemen. The Order of the Black Mountain (*qarathagliq* in Uyghur, *Heishan* in Chinese) perhaps contributed to his initiation. This order prospered in Central Asia, Yarkand, and in eastern (that is, Chinese) Turkistan during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hezhou (now Linxia) and Kashgar were on the itinerary of Ma Mingxin toward Mecca and Yemen.

Militants are often energetic. Nothing stops Jahariya adepts, not even Khufiya Sufis who waged a pitiless war against Jahariya followers in the nineteenth century. During the fifth generation of the masters, a restructuring of the brotherhood occurred, concentrating religious, political, military, and economic authority in the hands of masters. Ma Hualong’s troops followed their master until the end in Gansu. They were killed by the treachery of the imperial armies.

Despite these events, the Jahariya brotherhood survived and prospered in Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Yunnan. The *tariqa* is hierarchical and secret. It draws its strength from the effective socio-economic management of its human and financial resources. It is divided into four or five branches. Ma Liesun is considered the most powerful in Gansu and Ningxia. Yunnan has its own branch. There is a general analogy among Sufi orders. In his thesis on Sufism in the Sahara, Rahal Boubrik explains the centrality of the master, the genealogy of saints and

charismatic powers (*baraka* in Arabic). Genealogies imply a sense of “biological” descent but equally a spiritual and mystical power. Ties of blood may also exist. Genealogical and mystical manipulations may be noticed, but personal charisma plays a significant role in the transmission of hereditary power.

Sufi orders remain unconditionally faithful to their founders. All members of the community pledge the deepest veneration to the successors of Ma Mingxin and to high-ranking delegates. Disciples, *murid*, are faithful and disciplined. The hierarchy includes assistants and novices. Nowadays there is no formal initiation. Within all secret societies, probation time varies. Secrecy, a firm religious belief, and a thirst for truth characterize the order. These qualities have permitted the survival of Jahariya Sufism despite persecution. Although partially contested in Gansu and Ningxia, the charisma of the Yunnanese master will probably prevail. Along with Ningxia, Yunnan and Gansu are two key provinces for the Jahariya Order.

Following Deng’s reforms, the Chinese government has been relatively tolerant of structured *tariqa* but excludes politico-religious sects such as the Falungong. As might be suspected, the Jahariya Order does not formally belong to the Islamic Association. During the Cultural Revolution, Sufism was under constant surveillance by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. However, in Ningxia, some cadres belong to both Jahariya Order and the Islamic Association, as did the late Ma Tengai.

The Sufi liturgy typically consists of mystical songs, group recitations of the vocal remembrance of Allah, *dhikr* (*dike’er* in Chinese), or litanies of the divine names. Mosques are important, but Sufis do not require a solemn place to pray. This was the case in Kunming during the construction of the new Jahariya mosque during 2003–04. The Order is in some ways ingenious and flexible; a room in a home or at the back of a shop is sufficient. The Prophet liked perfumes and the Sufis use much incense to enter into meditation.

The term Sufi existed before Islam. On the front of the new mosque of Ruili, Yunnan, the characters “Mosque Pure and True” do not appear as they do everywhere else in China but *Chaozhen Dian* (“Temple of Meditation”), a Taoist (Daoist) term, is inscribed. Thus, there is sometimes a temptation among Chinese specialists of religion to mix Taoism and Sufism for purposes of Sinicization. Although no link exists between these two religious currents except for the fact that philosophy and religion can be combined to start a dialogue.

Israeli in a study entitled *Muslims in China* (1978) does not find a particular relation between Islam and Taoism. At Xian, a tombstone (c. 1545), discovered by Madeley and reproduced by Broomhall (1987: 101), mentioned the Prophet

Mohammed, praised God, and asked to pilgrims to circumambulate the tomb. Sufism (as this stele of Shaykh Badruddin) is centered on God, whereas Taoism is centered on the Way (*Dao*). Former Indonesian President Wahid wanted to use Confucianism, not Taoism, to improve links between Islam and the Western world. A Japanese author, Sachiko Murata, goes further in his work on Taoism and Islam. Murata deals with *yin* and *yang* “philosophy” that, unfortunately, does not concern Sufism at all.

The Afghan Sufi Abdallah al’Ansari Al-Harawi (1006–89), made known by Laugier de Beaurecueil’s translation of 1985, gave a structure of journeys toward God which is probably acceptable for many Chinese *tariqa*: “In the beginning is the awakening, a return to God, introspection, how to reform oneself, reflection, meditation, asceticism, and awakening of the hearing . . . These principles are divided into eight main sections: obedience, resolution, will, comportment, certainty, intimacy, *dhikr* (the remembrance of God), and passivity.”

Sufis cultivate the art of secrecy. Meditation (*fikr*) is essential for them. They also know how to isolate themselves to resist oppressors. The Jahariaya Order fought against the Manchu, resulting in the tragic end of the founder. After the execution of Ma Mingxin, the immediate family and the sister of the master were obliged to flee to Yunnan. Only the tombs of his wife and son, Ma Shunqing, remain in Mojiang, Yunnan. Today a small mosque is being reconstructed, and sandalwood trees in Mojiang surround the holy tombs.

To survive, the community led mule caravans to Burma until 1950. Except for the always-crowded bus station, Mojiang, between Kunming and Sipsong Panna (Xishuang Banna) suffered some economic decline when trade was cut with Burma. Hui lost control over this road in 1950, and the Jahariya Order also abated. Trucks and buses have replaced mules and caravans. Few Sufi members are currently involved in this modern transportation business.

The lack of unity among the Jahariya is another problem, but the *tariqa* is still able to enlist numerous disciples. Jahariya followers never belong to any other party than that of God. This did not prevent Shaykh Haji Ma Tengai (1921–91), who was born and died in Wuzhong, Ningxia, from being a diplomat of the Islamic Association of China. He was vice-president of the Autonomous Region of Ningxia for a decade before the Cultural Revolution, and again in 1980. He visited many Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, and Pakistan. His successors were Ma Guoquan and Ma Tengni, but their charisma is eclipsed by Ma Tengai’s. The Banqiao sub-order includes 500,000 practitioners, a figure

some authors contest. East of Kunming is another Banqiao branch, near the Hui Autonomous District of Xundian.

Another master aged sixty, Ma Songli, made two short stays in Yunnan and teaches in the small city of Xiji, in southwestern Ningxia. He is a well-known imam, but enlists his disciples only close to the family of Shaykh Ma Liesun (born in 1925). His disciples claim that Ma Liesun is a descendant of Ma Mingxin. Ma Liesun was arrested in 1993 and will probably be liberated soon. He founded an important Islamic center in Ningxia, and in the 1990s at least a hundred students were learning the Koran and the Jahariya doctrine there. Now, there are barely ten young disciples, plus the older ones, under the direction of Ma Songli.

Another group is called Nanchuan (River of the South).

Numerically the Shagou sub-order is the second Jahariya group; it recognizes Ma Mingxin and Ma Hualong as the most famous masters.

There is another sub-order in Yunnan. Two members made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2001, and five in 2003. A medical doctor, Haji (2001 and 2003), with a family line related to Ma Mingxin's sister, is responsible for the local *tariqa*. The principal places of worship of the order in Yunnan Province are Mojiang, Kunming, Tonghai, Simao, Puer, Shadian, and Qejiu.

Other Sufi Orders

The Khufiya Order (*Hufeiyi*) was founded in China by Ma Laichi (c.1680–1766).

The Qadiriya, probably the most ancient Sufi brotherhood, represents less than 1% of Hui. In the twelfth century, its founder, Abdul Qadir Al-Jilani (or Pir Dastagir) from Persia, lived in Baghdad, where his tomb is to be found. Al-Jilani was Hanbali not only by education, but also by the nature of his work. His literary works are summarized in the Order's history book, *Al-Qadiriya*. Alexander Bennigsen believes that from Baghdad this *tariqa* extended toward Kazan in the twelfth century and later prospered in Herat and Bukhara. In 1672, Khufiya Sufism became known in China at Xining, in Qinghai. (K)hoja Afaq established the main branch in Kashgar. In 1674, an Arabic Shaykh, (K)hoja Abdalla, taught in Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces and was targeted by Ma Zhu who fought Sufism.

Qadiriya doctrine has spread as far as East Java (including Kupang, West Timor) where, according to Clifford Geertz, it is orthodox, for it respects the five pillars of Islam (belief, prayers, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage). However, the Kyrgyz historian Mambetaliev, cited by Bennigsen, described Sufis as a closed

community, “feared and despised” by other Muslims. In the Valley of Ferghana (Tashkent and Bukhara), they practiced chants and dances at night. The Chinese founder of the Qadiriya brotherhood, Qi Jingyi taught the power of personal will and meditation.

Contrary to Jahariya followers, Khufiya did not fight against the Qing Dynasty. The tomb of the founding master, Hua Gongbei, is one of the most venerated in Linxia (Hezhou) and was restored after the Cultural Revolution. In January 2003, contrary to our reception in Urumchi by Khufiya, I was given a good welcome by the imams at the mausoleum. Some were descendants of Ma Laichi. In Linxia, the Qadiriya Holy Tomb of Qi Jingyi (1656–1719) is guarded by an imam and his students; although called Da Gongbei (“The Great Mausoleum”), it has few visitors. Like the Jahariya practitioners at the tomb of Ma Mingxin at Lanzhou, numerous Khufiya disciples pray daily at the site of the Khufiya mausoleum. The tomb of the founder’s father, Ma Laiwan, is found there next to his son’s. The latter is also called Ma Shiwan, to recall the relation with his progenitor, whose name contains the auspicious character *wan* (ten thousand). The recitation of religious hymns is an intimate part of the ritual, and at the tomb of Ma Laichi small pebbles instead of ordinary rosaries are used to count the litanies (Photo 18: third *murid* on the left). Modernization has introduced counters elsewhere (as used by airline personnel to count the number of passengers).

To have an idea of the liturgy, it may be useful to note the Qadiriya ritual proposed by Imam Rabbani, in Kupang, Indonesia: (1) *Istigfar*: five or ten times (2) *Rabithah-Mursyid* (3) *Fatihah* (Prologue of the Koran): seven times (4) *Shalawat-Nabi*: 100 times (5) *Hauqalah*: 500 times (6) *Fatihah*: seven times (7) *Shalawat-Nabi*: 100 times (8) *Doa* (9) A formula from the Koran.

Sufis seek to enter into direct relation with God. *Dhikr* invocation can either be aloud or silent. For Shaykh Mohammed Amin al-Naqshbandi, as cited by Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch, *dhikr* displays a profound unity among different orders. Prayer includes the recitation of the *Fatihah* once (Qadiriya prefer seven recitations) and of *Sura* 112 of the Koran three times. The eyes must be closed, lips tightened, and the tongue placed against the palate. The image of the master is retained in the mind. All senses are directed toward concentration.

In China, no Sufi order is contrary to Sunni dogma, although some traditionalists complain about particularities. As a result, Sufis have few friends. Theologians do not like them much, and Sufis are sometimes considered non-conformists.

The Muslim scholar Ma Zhu had an excellent knowledge of Chinese and Arabic thanks to his mother's education. He wrote his first work at an early age, but his whole life revolved around his *Guide to Purity (Qingzhen Zhinan)*, published in 1683. It is still a classic work of Chinese Muslim orthodoxy. The third part of the eleventh and last chapter on "heterodoxy" is aimed principally at the Sufis in Yunnan. The name of another Sufi order is not mentioned clearly, but the attack in this book caused much harm because it was well written. This Order was only referred to using the Chinese abbreviation *Landai*, from the Persian *Qalandar (Kalandar)*, an ascetic order of the Sufi Dervishes. In reality, by his references to Buddha, Sakyamuni, and to the Confucian Mengzi, Ma Zhu, who traveled extensively in China, simply wanted to become a Lao Zi of Islam. But he failed in his mission to purify Islam in his country. His masterpiece, a bridge between Islamic and Chinese culture, is continuously reprinted. The concept of purity, *Qingzhen* (so prominent in his work), appears on the front of all mosques and on restaurants managed by the Islamic Association of China.

The Kubrawiya is a Sufi order (Sunni) with the fourth largest membership in China. The origin of this *tariqa* is Iranian and the founder's name (eponym) is Najmudin Kubra, a Shia sympathizer (b. 1145–d. c. 1221 in Kohna-Urgentch, east of Khiva). The Shaykh Kubra came from Khiva, south of the Aral Sea. He studied in Tabriz, in Egypt, and in northwestern Persia. The Qaraqalpaqs-associated with the Kubrawiya Order-are also a small Naqshbandi minority in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (*Karakalpaks et Autres Gens*, French Central Asian Institute [IFEAC], 2002: 189).

Kubrawiya doctrine was taught in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Gansu and Qinghai in the seventeenth century. The founder of this order was an Arab named Mohidin (*Muheyiding*), who died in Dawantou, Gansu, in the Dongxiang region, where his tomb is located, enlisting many Dongxiang disciples. The location of this saint's mausoleum raised the prestige of the Dongxiang. They are converted Mongols who call themselves descendants of the Prophet (the name of the Kubrawiya's founder is a close homonym of Mohammed). Dongxiang are, in fact, strongly influenced by Chinese culture.

"The Golden Star," which in 1909 became Xidaotang ("The Western Mosque"), is not a Sufi Order. This essentially Chinese brotherhood seeks synthesis, harmony, and a high level of education in both Chinese and Arabic. Recognized as a legal Muslim institution in 1919, at the crossroads of six provinces, it integrates the modern

notion of nation-state of its founder Ma Qixi (1857–1914), a scholar from Gansu who was originally Sufi. This quite modern order insists on the total compatibility of Chinese and Muslim cultures. Its religious, political, and economic successes, achieved by means of Ma Qixi's communitarian organization, attracted enemies. He was assassinated along with sixteen of his disciples (including one of his sons) by members of his former Sufi brotherhood. This religious group ("New Teaching") counts at present more than 10,000 members, mostly in Gansu Province.

Chinese Sufis generally wear the white skullcap (*baimao*) as other Muslims. Members of the Jahariya Order wear an octagonal white or black bonnet. Islam in China is tolerant, and there are no *burqa*. The headscarf (*hijâb* in Arabic) may be a response to a Muslim code. In the northwest, Muslim women often wear the sewn scarf. The modern veil is tied under the chin and hides the hair. This style seems inspired by a new modernity also in fashion among Islamists.

The color of the veil varies according to the age of the women: young girls wear white, married women often wear green, and older women black. In Qinghai scarves are often black (in other regions they can be white or might not be worn at all). In brief, Hui women rarely wear the headscarf, except in Gansu and Xinjiang or, since the 1990s, for feasts. No Koranic commandment requires that women must veil the face, and this is a question of local tradition. The headscarf is not a big issue in China except perhaps in Xinjiang where many Chinese cadres dislike this distinctive cultural marker.

Chinese Muslim Women

From the beginning, the important role of women in the development of Islam has been ignored. However, women's educative role continues to be fundamental in the Muslim world and among Hui families. Historically, without the wise advice of his wife Khadidja, Mohammed would have had difficulty being acknowledged. She enabled him to emerge successfully from the confusion into which his first revelations had plunged him. Later, it is believed that at least one of the Prophet's wives mastered reading and writing.

Islam is concerned with the bipolarity woman/man, from whom life is born, and the Chinese concept of *yin* and *yang* is replaced by an analogy on masculine and feminine clothing. Traditionally, among the Hui, the woman is a mother, daughter, or wife. Her principal mission in life is to bear children. It is difficult for the Muslims

of South Asia to understand that women work hard in China, Chinese and Muslim alike. No one dares contest an egalitarian juridical statute. Women have the right to divorce and to remarry in China, and it is also unthinkable to stone an adulterous Muslim woman.

However, in the nineteenth century, as reported in the following story, Hui women in China were allowed to marry and remarry only with Muslims. In December 1872, Rocher related the execution in Yuxi (Xinxing) of two women found guilty of complicity in abducting a young Hui widow of eighteen who wanted to marry a Han. The two women were condemned to be buried alive. The Han lover succeeded in fleeing on horseback. The Muslim widow was arrested the day after her hasty departure, near Anning, west of Kunming, more than 50 kilometers from her point of origin. The young widow remained under her brother-in-law's control but was not condemned. She most probably remarried a Hui or remained under her in-law's control. "The victim buried alive" of *Sura* 81:8 alludes to pre-Islamic customs of burying girls alive, which is nevertheless condemned by the Koran.

The Koran praises the father of many daughters, as was the Prophet. In the eighth century, a female ascetic, Rabia al'Adawiya, introduced the Sufi concept of mystical love. One does not find the equivalent in Chinese Muslim history. In China, women contributed to the development of Islamic culture and Koranic teaching. In Baoshan, Yunnan, the mother of Ma Zhu (1640–1711) on her husband's sudden death, a scholar, decided to educate her young son. First, he learned the Chinese characters and then Arabic. Thanks to his mother, he became a recognized scholar at sixteen and obtained a post in the Ming administration under Yongli at an early age. Ma Zhu lost his mother two years later, and in 1661, his protector, the emperor, was executed in Kunming.

Later, in Yunnan and Gansu, women were involved in the renaissance of Islam after the slaughter of their husbands and brothers between 1820 and 1875. This historic period has been recognized in China since 1949 as a model for anti-feudal struggles. Muslims fought against Manchu imperialism rejected by Communism. This model reinforces the current state concept of *minzu*.

Would it be possible to apply to China what Napoleon said to his soldiers before leaving for Egypt: "The people where we are going treat women differently than we do"? Contrary to the documented difficulty for Arabs to find a spouse in China, Ibn Battuta noted that in the fourteenth century it was easy for Muslim merchants to marry in China. However, he did not tell us the initial social status of

these spouses and mentioned that it was easy to acquire female slaves. According to the Jesuit Le Compte, it was no longer easy for a Muslim to marry a Chinese woman after 1680. He reported that the Hui marry among themselves, as is the present case.

In the seventeenth century, as at present, the Hui kept a low profile in society and did not attempt to convert Han or other minorities. Since the period of openness and reforms of the 1980s, there have been no official restrictions on issuing marriage certificates to mixed Hui-Han couples. Acculturation is so common that authorities believe that a Han wife always Sinicizes her Muslim husband. However, despite the evolution of Islamic culture in China, Hui families do not easily marry their daughters to Han.

Gladney, following Charles Keyes, notes that ethnic identity is shaped by “structural ethnic oppositions of interacting ethnic groups, often expressed in marriage exchange.” This explains why it is difficult to have legal unions between Hui and Han. Muslim women are sometimes unjustly characterized as feudal by some young Han, who find that, in a modern society, their skirts are not short enough.

In fact, Muslims cannot look at Muslim women other than in an indirect manner. Students of the two sexes encounter each other in the universities, but that does not break customary taboos; it is extremely rare for a Muslim woman to marry a Han. But it happens that some Hui men marry Han women. Traditionally, a Muslim woman does not marry of her own choice, but today she expresses a preference and can refuse a suitor proposed by her family. Gladney argues that, like Han women, there is a high probability that Hui women will live in their husband’s family or in a patrilocal neighborhood. Hui endogamy and purity are still accepted Islamic norms. Hui women continue to marry Muslims, particularly in rural settings. Muslim women’s qualities are patience and decency. To maintain their ethnic identity, Hui and Uyghurs practice strict ethnic endogamy and thereby protect their ethic of purity.

According to the Portuguese researcher, Maria Silva, author of books on Morocco, the masculine version “of female friend” does not exist for Moroccan women. Without going too far concerning a comparison with Africa, a definite separation exists between the sexes in China. Man-woman contact in public is much more restrained among Muslims than among other Chinese. Even in villages, Hui women are not segregated, but a separation still exists in all Muslim society between the sexes. The case of a woman doctor of Kunming, married to an imam, always reserved but polite with her guests is significant. A devout Pakistani Muslim

guest claimed that she did not keep a proper distance with male guests. She had, however, followed the Islamic etiquette of deference, courtesy, and cordiality. The premier quality of patience found among Moroccan women is also found among Chinese Muslim women.

Although Ningxia had Koranic *madrasa* before 1949, the education of girls in Arabic is still rare. Cherif explains that in the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia, in the isolated village of Weizhou, more than a hundred kilometers from the regional capital, there are two Koranic schools for women, which opened in 1985 and have about 300 students (Cherif 1994: 158–60). The female teachers at these schools studied Arabic in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In that particular region, women are rather well educated in Arabic; however, Chinese, naturally, is always preferred. The government has agreed to promote education among minorities, but the preeminence of the Chinese language cannot be challenged. This preeminence is an imperative for advancing the country toward modernization. From the government's viewpoint, "unity" aggregates minorities with the Han majority. This is part of the management of minorities that unites them in a kind of *melting pot*. There are positive aspects: ten years ago, female illiteracy in Ningxia was nearly 80%, and thus, the private initiative to create two schools for young girls is a large step forward.

The number of Chinese Muslims going to Mecca has increased every year since the end of the 1980s. It is interesting to note that the initiative for going on pilgrimage can also come from women, and that they are undertaking this pilgrimage more often than before. In general, they travel with their husbands. It is not uncommon for children who are successful in business to offer a plane ticket to their mother who wants to go to Mecca. Numerous Hui women in Yunnan are rich enough to become Hajjah.

Muslim women in China are often ignored, even in Hui genealogies. It is perhaps one of the reasons for the scant information about mosques reserved for women. There were few pro-Manchu Muslim militants, members of the "New Religion" (*Xinjiao*) who supported the Qing Dynasty. Without the crucial perseverance of Muslim women, Islam, forgotten after this period of repression, would not have been able to revive as well as it has. Women have been active in reforms, and this fact is unknown. Allès only recorded four women's mosques in the "New Religion" Ikhwan. For Gladney, there are no women's mosques in the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia (I did not observe any in 2003). This may indicate a certain lack of modernity.

Mosques for Women

The Muslim community is centered on the mosque, but this is less true for women. In China, the first mosques reserved for women date to the eighteenth century. The development of education for women led to the creation of a greater number of religious sites for women during the Republican period, particularly between 1911 and 1930, before the Japanese invasion, and during the Second World War. In the mid-1980s, following Deng's reforms, the Bureau of Religious Affairs wanted to assure the social promotion of Muslim women by constructing or reconstructing mosques for women. Elisabeth Allès mentions thirty such mosques in Shandong Province and twenty-nine in Henan in 1997. For less than half, no proof of an earlier existence can be guessed at. In Shanghai, a mosque for women, constructed in 1993, is symbolically situated beside the headquarters of the Islamic Association, Xiaotaoyuan (the Peach Garden). In the northwest, in Harbin, women would like a mosque for themselves, but it seems that they have only a small section in the city's main mosque.

Mosques for women are smaller than other Muslim sites; women have often been forgotten as far in learning the Koran. Because of the separation of the sexes, obtaining an Islamic education for women requires great personal determination, for they rarely receive a structured education in a *madrasa*.

Imams of the Islamic Association dominate the Islamic community. Women are exceptionally Ahong but cannot be imams; they do not preach and cannot celebrate marriages or preside over burials. In Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province, there is only one female Ahong, an imam's granddaughter, and she is responsible for two mosques for women. However, in the state educational system, female citizens have the same rights as men. In numerous areas, for example in foreign languages, educated women dominate. The study of Koranic Arabic is difficult for it occurs the most often through Chinese, which is itself complex. Koranic education is not well organized for women. The building of mosques for women will probably continue to be limited, but a balance currently exists on gender issues, the ideology of the Party, and male religious rigidity. The Islamic Association attempts to promote young female Ahong, but the women frequenting these mosques are often elderly.

The creation of mosques for women is an interesting social phenomenon. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Broomhall does not mention any Muslim feminine congregations or mosques for women. In Yunnan, over fifteen years of

research, I have not seen any mosques for women. The two mosques of Guilin I visited are not reserved for women. Islamic Associations vary by province with respect to the building of mosques for women.

An isolated case, cited by Allès is the Wangjia Mosque at Kaifeng in Henan Province. This mosque was constructed in the nineteenth century for a daughter of a merchant, learned and faithful to the memory of her deceased husband. The two cultures, Chinese and Muslim, praise the conjugal devotion of women.

The Islamic Association of Henan, like that of Shanghai, places importance on women. Islamic purity and the practical knowledge of family medicine are well rooted among Hui women. These women are affected by the problems of birth control in China. Because Islam is traditional, it is necessary to have descendants. The Prophet himself insisted that virtuous women are those who love young children. Hui women raise children until they enter socialist schools, and it is also painful for women not to have children. Chinese birth control policies are applied to Muslims, and, like other villagers, Muslims living in the countryside have two children. In remote villages, family planning is less strict. In the cities, all citizens are limited to one child per couple. Fines are heavy when quotas are not respected, reaching 10,000 yuan (*Renminbi*) per child or more than 1,000 Euro.

Muslim Villages

For various religious, political, military, and economic reasons, Muslims, especially city-dwellers and merchants, have been obliged to take up residence in villages. The Hui are omnipresent in nearly all provinces, especially in the northwest, north, northeast, and southwest. Small and homogeneous rural communities, different in each region, are still the predominant way of life. The Muslim ethos, a system of ideals and values, a sober and prudent Islamic morality is generally more closely followed in villages than cities.

Many Hui villages have been created on the sites of former camps for Muslim troops, such as Changying, near Beijing. Rural Xinjiang supports at present more than 10 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs and slightly less than a million Hui. Islam is the main religion there. Jonathan Lipman describes Muslim villages in the northwest and Gansu as being of variable size. The Han/Hui relationship tends to be harmonious, although Sinicization has caused some social disharmony. Chinese are the majority in the cities. This has caused the Chinese government to displace

populations, Chinese from Hunan and elsewhere toward Xinjiang, and forced migration of Uyghurs from Chinese Turkistan toward Hunan.

Less favored minorities, such as the Dong, were obliged to leave their best lands. These rice-growers who lived in the plains, took refuge in the mountains of three southern provinces, Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangxi. Similarly, in Yunnan, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Qing Dynasty repressed the rebellion, Hui became farmers and settled down.

The marriage strategy of the Hui contributed to the success and strong identity of Muslims in China. The ethnologist Fei Xiaotong has great admiration for the Muslim merchants of Gansu. The Hui have perhaps better resisted Sinicization than Dong from Guizhou and Guangxi, because their commercial networks were powerful. Under the Yuan (1279–1368) and the Ming (1368–1644) Dynasties, the Imperial State took advantage of disciplined Muslim troops.

Twenty kilometers from Beijing, a Muslim village, studied by Gladney (1996: 229–59), Changying (“Large Camp”) has become an autonomous Hui hamlet, with greater administrative autonomy since 1986. Endogamy preserves the Islamic community. In 1980, to maintain Hui purity, around 80% of the daughters among the 5,000 inhabitants of Changying were marrying Muslims from the neighborhood. Twenty percent of the men were taking their spouses from more than 40 kilometers away. Maris Gillette during her interesting study of Muslims in Beijing and Xian found only a single case of intermarriage involving a Hui woman having married a Han residing in Hong Kong. For this Muslim woman, the former British colony was Eldorado. The incompatibility of the Chinese cuisine and Muslim *halal* food creates a barrier to mixed marriages, which are highly praised by the administration and Party cadres. Sunni Hanafite law, founded by Abu Hanafi, the most current in China, stipulates that to be married a woman must consent. Even if families often arrange Hui marriages, this acceptance of the bride is required. Communist China forbids polygyny, which has virtually disappeared among urban and rural Muslims.

Another old Hui village community, which lived through good and bad periods during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) and the Japanese invasion of 1937, has been studied by Elisabeth Allès (2000: 71–89). The region has mosques for women. The village of Sanpo is located on the north bank of the Yellow River, in central Henan Province. Pang Shiqian, a villager from Sanpo, studied in Cairo for nine years before the Second World War and then wrote his memoirs in the 1950s. A population of

nearly 5,000 Hui and only four Han women live there. Religion is a major issue, and Hui endogamy is still strong.

Social change has marked the last twenty years. The village of Sanpo is also a prototype of the success of reforms of the PRC's second Great Leader, Deng Xiaoping. Between 1950 and 1980 this hamlet, under Mao's Marxist commune system, centered on agriculture. At present, the ancient pelt industry has been revived and modernized. Beginning in 1981, the community rapidly became wealthy, and there are now banks in the village. The Muslim *Xueyang* Company ("Sheep of the Snows")-established in 1983-prospered thanks to the production of furs and carpets and already has twenty local branches. Muslim Taiwanese capital possibly boosted local enterprise.

Feasts and Funerals

Feasts are visible cultural traits assuring community cohesion and motivating cooperation. They are part of Muslim rites of passage and currently enter into a modern type of consumerism. During feasts, Hui mosques and neighboring streets are jammed with people. The three great religious festivals are the Feast of the Prophet, the Feast of the Sacrifice (*Guerban*), and the End of Fasting (*kaizhai*). The state instituted a holiday (*fangjia*) for Muslim minorities for these events. The date of the Feast of the Prophet varies from place to place. Thus, in Kunming it was decided in 1988 that 19 October would be the day of celebration; in the rest of Yunnan Province, the celebration falls on a different date. Prayer at mosques occurs in the morning and is generally followed by a meal for all attending.

The lunar New Year that marks the beginning of the Chinese year is also a festive moment for Muslims. Sinicized Hui watch television throughout the night, as do most other Chinese households. It is not possible to resist the lively, popular joyousness. Except perhaps in Xinjiang, Muslims enjoy these traditional Han feasts. Muslim restaurants and merchants also take advantage of the dynamic economic boost created by the lunar New Year celebrations.

For Muslims, the lunar New Year does not have the pomp of the grand Aid banquet, *Idul-kebir*, the Muslim calendar's most important date. I was in Kashgar where, during the preceding days, one saw many sheep being sold in town. Sheep have their throats cut according to Islamic rituals. Apricots are also bought in quantity. Han who question prices during that period are insulted. In Kashgar on that day all Uyghurs go to pray at the crowded main mosque, where it is difficult to find a place.

For the Feast of the End of Fasting, men and women go to the mosque at eight o'clock in the morning. As for other Muslim feasts, the people eat beef and mutton soups, stews of mutton and green beans in the north, hot pepper beef in Sichuan and Yunnan, and cakes (*gaodian*). *Youxiang* (fragrant cakes fried in oil) are a traditional food for the end of Ramadan and for funerals. Muslims introduced these traditional items during the thirteenth century, and they are part of the rites for nearly all feasts. They are offered to family and friends and represent an Arab custom also transmitted during the former Islamization of India under the name *puri*. These cakes are still fried by all castes in the Indian sub-continent, as well as by Muslims in Indonesia. Maris Gillette (2000) noted that the cooking of *youxiang*, which involves much work, had been abandoned in Xian, but I observed that Yunnanese Hui had kept up this tradition. Modernization and Sinicization recently replaced these cakes in Shaanxi Province by Chinese steam-twisted rolls (*huajuan*).

For funerals, more formal gifts are also offered to attendees after prayers in the mosque. The family gives envelopes containing small sums, meant to assure peace for the deceased. Ahong recite passages from the Koran. The body is washed in the morning and placed in a casket. Large mosques possess two coffins. A bowl of mutton soup in the north or a beef soup in the south is served to each attendant by the family of the deceased, accompanied by cakes fried in oil (*youxiang*).

A procession then goes to the cemetery on foot, by bus or in trucks. The deceased, enveloped in a white shroud, is taken from the casket and buried (photos 4, 6, 28 and 29). The body is placed on the back, the head facing north, the feet south, and the face turned toward Mecca. The imam or one of his representatives faces the family and the attendants and recites four *Takbirs* (*Taikebie* in Chinese). The formula "God is Great" (*Allahu Akbar*) is pronounced aloud and prayers follow. The grave is then filled with earth and closed. If a stone has been prepared in time, it is placed at the head of the grave. In the whole Islamic world, Muslims never delay the burial of their deceased. In Albania, the sooner the funeral rites are performed, the sooner the soul reaches heaven.

Socialism and Islam

As is sometimes mentioned, a Muslim cadre in China can be Marxist in his mind and Muslim in his heart (Gladney 1996: 128). A short article by Elira Lamani, published by Peter Clarke in 1998, describes Islam in Albania under the Communist regime. Although the percentage of the Muslim population (60%) is much higher in Albania,

the number of Muslims in China, more than ten times greater than the number in Albania, justifies a comparison between these two countries.

In both Albania and China, Sufi brotherhoods (Qadiriya, Naqshbandi among others) are present and have contributed actively to the development of Islam. The years 1966–67 marked a common official hostile attitude toward religion in both countries. All faiths and religious practices were banned. In 1976, an atheist influence was seen in laws such as Article 37 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania. In 1982, China abolished these restrictions in Document 19. By comparison, in 1993, the Albanian Parliament had not yet established and codified freedom of conscience. However, following reforms, both countries reintegrated a legal religious framework into their societies to fill a vacuum in the people's spiritual life, and they promoted harmony by avoiding discord among faiths.

China reopened its mosques before Albania, which did not authorize religious services in the main mosque of Tirana until January 1991. Just the same, the events of 1989 slightly cooled the relations between the Chinese state and Islam. China, like Albania, uses Islam to reinforce relations with Muslim countries. The Muslims of these two countries are thus useful for understanding the Middle East and Central Asia. After the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, this type of Chinese geopolitical influence is even more important than it was for Mao in the 1960s. Thanks to Edgar Snow, one understands that some Muslim leaders receive special attention from the Communist Party because they are trustworthy.

Umma, a local vision of the Muslim society linked with the universal faith, and the family certainly play a central role in promoting ethics. One also observes the importance of the family; it has played a role in preserving Islam in China and Albania. Religions disrupted by the Cultural Revolution found the family as a unifying factor for the preservation of beliefs. The family bonds to the community and prevents individualism. Muslim feasts reinforce the faith. For youth, without being able to give statistics as precise as Lamani, it is certain that during their student lives many do not want to reveal their religious identity. In 1966, an imam in the main mosque of Xian confided to Jacques Guillermaz that the youth no longer came to pray. Koranic Arabic cannot officially be studied before age sixteen, and this reduces religious zeal.

In a short chapter entitled "God and the Party," Edgar Snow insisted on "rather floating" Muslim orthodoxy. It is certain that in periods of repression, such as that between 1960 and 1976, it was impossible to disclose one's faith in public. From 1950 to the beginning of the 1980s, the *laogai* rehabilitation camps forced numerous believers from all religions to work alongside political prisoners.

China and the Former Soviet Union

According to Vincent Monteil, the four important ordeals that the Muslims in Soviet Union endured were forced settlement, war, deportations, and purges. Deportations, purges, and the Uyghur transmigration to Hunan were the work of Republican China. Hunanese generals in Xinjiang used banishment to solve their political and military problems in that remote province. The Second World War also caused its share of suffering for the Hui. The famines of the “Great Leap Forward” (1958–62), in particular in the heavily populated cities of Sichuan, Shandong, Xinjiang and Gansu Provinces, also affected Muslims. China’s nomadic Muslim peoples were compelled to abandon their traditional ways of living for settled villages. Consequently, a massive emigration of Kazakhs toward Kazakhstan occurred in the 1950s. This completely disrupted their nomadic life. Kyrgyzs, in particular, were forced to settle.

For Marxism, religions are ideologies. Only Communism can eradicate religion and thus create acceptable working conditions and rational relations for man: “Religion is the opium of the people.” In 1936, in the Soviet Union as in China, the constitutions proclaimed freedom of conscience. In fact, original Communism wants to reduce the power of religion, and a certain incompatibility therefore exists with Islam. Islam was the most attacked religion in the Soviet Union and presented as one of the world’s most conservative faiths. Ramadan and women’s headscarves were judged anti-scientific and anti-hygienic. Anti-religious propaganda was abolished in 1982, and religious faith is no longer considered as disloyalty to the Party. In Russia, legislation relating to religious associations underwent profound modification in 1929. Despite the existence of the Islamic Association, reforms in China came late, in 1982, and Islam is tolerated. Religion must not interfere with state-directed social and cultural development for Muslim nationalities. “Patriotic” imams are preferred.

The question of the compatibility between Islam and Communism is fundamental. These two doctrines have a supranational character, and the concept of social justice is comparable in both ideologies. Chou Enlai opened the way to reconciliation with Egypt by saying that cordial relations were possible without the propagation of a Communist ideology. Muslim socialists in Ningxia insist on similarities between Islam and Communism. For Niaz Zikria, the two doctrines cannot be compared. Individual goals must be sacrificed for a common Communism. Islam insists, on

the contrary, on the importance of individual piety and the *umma*, the community. Marxist Communism sacrifices individual freedom, but Islam respects men's individual liberty and human dignity. As often in China, there is an accommodation between politics and religious activities. Gladney argues that "involvement of Party members in religious activities, state support of mosque reconstruction, and recent visits by foreign Muslims and guests to the historic mosque have been interpreted by some Hui as the Party's encouragement of religion." The main question is the policy manipulation of official Islam by the state. It remains to study which entity is winning in the long term-Islam or the state? A return to original Islamic purity is currently being seen in Central Asia and is probably influencing Xinjiang.

In Muslim countries the politico-economic system is often modern but it is always concerned with the Koranic vision of the world. Under Communist political rule, the current Chinese socio-economic system is modern and untroubled by religion except when state security is established. These two ideologies are in principle anti-capitalist. However, after Deng's reforms, a new socialist economy appeared and transformed China drastically. In June 2002, in a remote village of western Yunnan, near Changning, a Haji leader of the Muslim community displayed unashamed joy about his mini-bus, trucks, and prospering enterprise. Elsewhere, near Chenggong, near Kunming, a Hui village was entirely reoriented toward land transportation of goods in the 1990s.

Acculturation of the Hui follows on their modernization. In the framework of Lewis Morgan, Marx and Engels, there is only a slight hope for Muslims for the support of their religion by the socialist state. Han are also "the centrifugal force of unification." As a result, given their level of culture and technology, industrial projects in minority regions must be placed in their hands. Yunnan has drastically modernized in the last twenty years thanks to cross-border trade with Southeast Asia and in particular through close links with Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam. Yunnanese Hui have benefited only indirectly from this modernization.

Chapter 4

Hui in Yunnan

The most important Muslim population of southern China is in Yunnan. By its relations with Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand and Burma, this province maintains close contact with Muslims in bordering countries (see Chapter 5). Since the 1980s, numerous Burmese Muslims have come to live in the west and southwest, in Ruili and Jinghong.

Contrary to Canton, where Islamization occurred during the eight and ninth centuries via the maritime route—thanks to monsoon winds—the ancestors of Yunnanese Muslims entered over the land route as merchants and, in 1253, actively participated in the military conquest of Dali. Despite the presence of Muslim merchants and missionaries prior to the thirteenth century, this province recorded no impact of Islam before this date. The powerful Kingdom of Nanzhao was centered round Dali Lake, Erhai.

The landscape and Islamic presence in Yunnan fascinated Marco Polo, Rocher and Cordier and, for a long time, amazed thinkers and travelers. As Gerald Reitlinger (*South of the Clouds*, the Chinese name for Yunnan) poetically noted: “to follow the courses of the great rivers of the province is to cross the history of humanity.”

Yunnan is composed of a high plateau linked to neighboring Guizhou (*Yungui*), inclined to the less elevated southwest, and divided into numerous fertile valleys surrounded by mountains (*bazi*) that make communications difficult. In addition to the Black River, three of the greatest rivers of Southeast Asia cross Yunnan: the Mekong (*Lancangjiang*), Salween, and Red Rivers. The province’s geographical situation facilitates cultural and economic integration with Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, highways brought modernity and transformation at a rapid pace. In addition to its incomparable beauty and its

Mediterranean climate (except in the tropical south), Yunnan possesses the largest variety of ethnic groups (*minzu*) in China

Alice Wei, who studied the excellent work of Bai Shouyi, in a thesis on Muslim rebellions (1855–73), defended at the University of Chicago (1974), believed that Hui in that province are not a “homogeneous” minority as their co-religionists in northwest China. They are divided into different groups centered at Dali and Weishan, Kunming and Yuxi in the center, Zhaotong in the northeast, Kaiyuan in the south, Yanshan in the southeast, and Simao in the southwest. Despite many years of research and diplomacy in Yunnan, Cordier did not mention the lack of homogeneity among these Muslims and distinguished the Hui from the Chinese with difficulty, especially as they do not wear their skullcap (*baimao*) in the street. Cordier spent a quarter of his life in the region, and Hui scholars such as Sha Dezhen recognized the scientific value of his study *The Muslims of Yunnan* (in French 1927), which was translated into Chinese.

According to Grosvenor, who did research and traveled with Colborne Baber in 1878, Hui in Yunnan are “intelligent, courageous, and generous with foreigners.” Dr Gervais Courtellemont (1904) noted that Muslims in the region were “honest, laborious, and hardy.”

Muslims reached a higher social position under the Yuan Dynasty, since they occupied the second rank among China’s ethnic groups. They were called *Semuren*. The Yuan divided the peoples of China into four categories: Mongols, Semuren, Chinese, and Peoples of the South (*Nanren*). Sun Yatsen and the Republic regrouped all Muslims in China under the name Hui. Only Islam distinguished them from the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans. These ethnic classifications were much simpler than the present *minzu* system of fifty-six nationalities. Numerous Hui and 2–3,000 Uyghurs live in Yunnan.

Hui in Yunnan and their History

Yunnan consists of 380,000 square kilometers and its population is nearly 50 million. Five million Yunnanese people and Sichuanese immigrants live in Kunming, a city founded around 2,000 years ago. Ho Ping-ti has noted the province’s demographic growth (Harvard University, 1959). His study indicated that there were 300,000 inhabitants in the fourteenth century (a contestable figure), 3.5 million in 1787, 5.4 million in 1812, and 7.3 and 14.7 million, respectively, in 1850 and 1953. Kunming (Jaci or Jachi for Marco Polo) was predominantly Muslim at the close

of the thirteenth century. Its ten mosques (six were still standing in 2004) reflected Islam's brilliant past.

After the Second World War, Frank Lebar and Embree estimated the number of Yunnanese Hui at 220,000. The 700,000 Hui officially occupy a preeminent position at present among the twenty-six minorities in Yunnan but receive no publicity. Thus, during the Universal Exposition of 1999 in Kunming, President Jiang Zemin praised Dongba culture without mentioning the Naxi. The Uyghurs who had sent dancers and singers did not play "a starring role" but promoted "unity" (*tuanjie*) for all China's minorities.

Muslim autonomous administrative units are fewer than in northwest China. Since 1956 and 1979, respectively, Yunnan has had two Hui autonomous districts, Weishan in the west, and Xundian in the east. The Hui are numerous along the Yunnan-Guizhou border, a major communication axis. A rather large number are also found in Kunming, Zhaotong, Dali, Shadian, Tonghai (Hexi), Kaiyuan, Mengzi, Wenshan, Cangyuan, Eshan, Lunan, and Nanjian. Without mentioning the Han, everywhere present, the Yi are still the dominant minority in many districts.

In 1876, Anderson mentioned a legend found among Yunnanese Muslims concerning their origin. He argued that the first 3,000 Muslims were not able to return to their country of origin because of their contact with pork-eaters. They could be the ancestors of Yunnanese Hui who courageously contributed to the maintenance of law and order in the province. How did these "Arabs" arrive in southern China? Did they enter via Gansu, Shaanxi or Henan, and Sichuan? The story does not say. However, the studies of Zhang Riming, published in French in 1980 and in Chinese (Ningxia) in 2002, give some details. These Arabic Muslims were integrated into the cavalry of the Tang Dynasty. Their ancestors were descendants of the Arabs (*Dashi* in ancient Chinese) who helped Emperor Xuan Song (712–56) of the Tang Dynasty to push the barbarians from the western provinces. In the mid-eighth century, frequent Muslim diplomatic missions were sent to Changan (Xian) to meet the emperor.

In 758, the port of Canton (Guangzhou) was marked by Arabic-Chinese confrontations. In the nineteenth century, another breakdown of relations between Hui and Han occurred in northwest China and Yunnan. Excluding these two periods, the implantation of the Hui in China was harmonious throughout the centuries.

Annual records by district and annals dealing with these Muslims are rare. In principle, the history of the Hui in Yunnan dates to the eighth century. Unfortunately, the ancient steles of Zhengyi Mosque in Kunming have disappeared. Arabic documents on these origins still existed in Yunnan at the beginning of the last century,

but they are now unlocated. The official thesis, a very restrictive one, states that the first Muslims came with the armies of Kublai Khan and in 1253 participated in the conquest of Dali. During the Yuan Mongol Dynasty, Islamization reached its summit in the province, especially under the impulsion of Governor Ajall Sai Dianchi of Bukhara. He had five sons and nineteen grandsons. He was buried in Songhuaba in 1279, near a large water reservoir, constructed north of Kunming by him and still in use. His tomb, demolished during the Cultural Revolution, was reconstructed in the 1980s.

Ajall's oldest son, a famous general, Nasruddin or Nasr ad-Din, was the commander-in-chief in Yunnan from 1281 to 1291. He was responsible for the Mongol campaigns in Burma, marked by the capture of Pagan in 1287. Marco Polo reported in detail the success of Nasruddin's cavalry (Nescradin) facing Burmese elephants. His brother Husein succeeded to this military post in Kunming, from 1297 to 1305. In the beginning of the fourteenth century, a Persian historian, Rashid al-Din Fadlullah (1247–1318), named Yunnan, Karajan or Carajan. It is better known under its ancient name, the Kingdom of Nanzhao. During 1345–46, Ibn Battuta confirmed Islam's high glory throughout China, but he never reached Yunnan.

In China from 1271 to 1295, Marco Polo mentioned a large number of Hui, without giving their Chinese names. During that period, many authors judged the Yunnanese Hui and Han populations equal in number. Underestimating the dynamic impact of Governor Ajall, many authors reported fewer Muslims.

Admiral Zheng He (c.1370–1435), a celebrated Ming Dynasty Hui from Yunnan (his Muslim name is Haji Ma, and his mother was born Wen), was of Persian and Arab origin. He was the son and grandson of a famous Haji and could be a descendant of Governor Ajall. In addition to maritime Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East (Mecca), and northeastern Africa formed part of his maritime voyage, during his eight state expeditions (1405–33).

Yunnan during the period of splendor of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1795) remained at peace. Muslims were integrated into the Sinicized Manchu system. Many Hui, such as Ma Zhi (c.1600–c.1730) from Nanjing, who traveled to Yunnan, linked Confucianism and Islam. This writer is known for his forceful formulas such as: "Allah, religion, and man (*ren*) are pure and true (*qingzhen*)." Chinese culture indirectly influenced many imams. It is enough to note the importance of Chinese characters among the Hui to understand their cultural impregnation. A Yunnanese Hui, Ma Ruwei became an historian in 1702. His Chinese biographer, Bai Shouyi

(1909–2000), also Hui, classified him as a talented doctor in literature. Like his father, Ma Fu (1642–1715) became vice-president of an administrative tribunal. His works are published in the “Collection of Texts about Yunnan” (*Yunnan congshu*).

Another Hui, Sai Yu (1697–1795) from Shi Ping, at the age of twenty-one, published “Travel Notes in the South” (*Nanyou cao*). In 1752, he became sub-prefect in Hong, in neighboring Sichuan. He died in his native county and remains a celebrated Yunnanese writer. Ma Zhu from Baoshan, already mentioned, was a famous Chinese author and traveler (Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Henan, Hebei, Guangdong, Shandong, and Beijing among other places). Later, Ma Dexin, who had an excellent command of Arabic, Persian, and Chinese, received the title *Baba* (“father” in Farsi, the Persian language). He is distinguished from the previously mentioned authors by his superior knowledge of Arabic and Islam.

Confucianism touched the Manchu as well as the Hui, but for a Muslim could not match orthodox Islam. Sufism (the third wave of Islamization) was perhaps indirectly in conflict with Confucian thought; consequently in the nineteenth century, Sinicization became more evident. When one compares Miao and Dong with Hui, under the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasties, the length of the Muslim uprisings was shorter and limited to the second part of the nineteenth century.

This last century was marked by the internal and external decline of the imperial Manchu Dynasty, punctuated by numerous anti-imperial revolts. The most important, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu (capture of Nankin, 1853), destroyed nearly 600 cities. The Muslim uprising, mainly affecting Yunnan, the north, and northwest has to be analyzed as a consequence of Manchu administrative weaknesses rather than as a *jihad*. Du Wenxiu seized power by using the pride of Dali residents, descendants of the powerful Kingdom of Nanzhao, coupled with a feeling of injustice among Hui.

The past recalled *tusi*, the Yunnanese Muslims’ land rights. Luo Zhongxu and Gong Yin have carefully studied these chieftainships. In the thirteenth century under the Mongols but also during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasties, until nearly 1873, the Hui were hereditary chiefs (*tusi*) in Yunnan in three districts. Muslims thus had good reasons in their fight against the Manchu. Civil war was mainly a consequence of the Qing Dynasty’s administrative weakness, particularly in distant provinces such as Yunnan and Gansu.

The “*tusi* chieftainship” helps to understand the politico-administrative context. Near Dali, halfway to Baoshan, the power of Ma Suofei was confirmed in 1380 in the seventh volume of *A History of the Ming Dynasty*. In Kunming, under Ma Sulama existed also the *tusi* of Chishuipeg. Ma Dan was chief there in 1386. In

Dahe, near Dali, Ma Huiding was *tusi* in 1404; his adherence to Islam cannot be questioned, although it is not noted in *The Annals of Yunnan*. Yongping had another Muslim chieftainship. Hui were particularly sensitive about their prerogatives, and Dali became engaged in a civil war lasting eighteen years.

Troubles

Discrimination and failures of justice were frequent against the Hui. The first confrontations occurred with Han miners in 1819. It is difficult to say which group started the troubles. According to a report of the Viceroy of Yunnan, the dispute concerned the lands of a mosque contested by Han. In the nineteenth century, Thiersant, French Consul and author of *Le Mahométisme en Chine* (1878), confirmed the responsibility of the Qing bureaucracy. Émile Rocher (1879) accused the Mandarin in charge of the mines of Linan (Kaiyuan) of abandoning his post and returning to Yunnanfu (Kunming).

Causes of the Civil War

The most frequently admitted cause of problems was imperial weakness. Conflicts were basically religious, cultural, and socio-economic. The Muslim taboo on pork is often mentioned. Civil wars and the Opium War were linked to each other (Taiping) and fuelled frequent tensions between Han and Hui. Conflicts were badly handled by imperial justice, with regard to mines and properties. The Hui commercial network in the province brought about a certain bureaucratic opposition. When Muslims made a request, competent tribunals refused to hear it.

Chinese secret societies, not Sufi orders, were responsible for the beginning of turmoil in Yunnan. We have no proofs of a Jahariya armed conflict against the Manchu in Tonghai. However a Sufi fortress was razed in 1872. The local aristocracy was no longer able to maintain law and order. Pillage became endemic during 1850–75. Yunnan, like Guangdong and Guangxi, welcomed the partisans of the Ming Dynasty and outlawed the Incense Brothers (*Xiangbahui*). Bai Shouyi believes that they participated in the 1845 events against the Muslims of Baoshan. Corruption of the imperial administration by secret societies existed in South China and Yunnan. Jean Chesneaux (1965) argues that: “Confucian order and social conventions are vigorously opposed by secret societies. . . . They also proposed to construct their own system of rules and political conventions. Thus . . . for centuries, they established a political opposition and participated in religious dissidence.”

Triads such as *Santianhui* were powerful in southern China (He Pin, *Zhongguo Dalu Heishehui* [Secret Societies in China]: 218). This common triad name (used for separate brotherhoods) was later simplified into “The Three Dots Society.” Jade and opium were major exports involved in trade disputes. In Yunnan, these triads fought “Barbarians” (*fan*) as well as Yunnanese Muslims. When tension existed, it was common to blame Muslims; conversely, those who did not embrace Islam were considered unbelievers (*Kafir*, the one who hides the truth). Secret societies often provided a framework for peasant revolts. In Yunnan, they fought against Hui who controlled cross-border trade and caravans. Kunming was far from Baoshan, and at that time, it took twenty days on horseback to reach the capital from that city. Even before 1985, this route required two days travel by bus. No great improvement in transportation occurred prior to 1990.

Disputes between triads and the Hui concerned caravans but also mines. Massacres of Muslims were reported in 1821 at Yunlong, north of Baoshan. These events accelerated in 1826, in Yong Chang, on the Burma Road in the fertile Baoshan Valley, between the Mekong and Salween Rivers. On 2 October 1845, a fight broke out in the marketplace between Muslims and Chinese. Armed militias gave support to secret societies, and many Hui were killed. This massacre lasted most of the night, and the mosque was destroyed. Outlawed triads were hostile to Muslims, and competed with them in the borderlands. For these societies, the control of this commercial route was essential. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Scott O’Connor mentions in Bhamo, Upper Burma, a triad branch called “The Club” by the British.

Following these events, an imam, Baba Yusuf Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu) (c.1794–1874), became a religious leader in Yongping and Dali. He demanded reparations for all Muslim properties destroyed in Baoshan region; the local authorities rejected it. Muslims numbering in the thousands started a revolt, causing Han counterattacks. A series of massacres followed between Muslims and Han. Kunming was besieged. Relative peace obtained in March 1847 in exchange for a Muslim pardon. During 1847–49, a truce was concluded thanks to the celebrated Mandarin Lin Zexu (1758–1850), a former adversary of English opium in Guangdong. In Yunnan and Guizhou (Yungui), this prominent governor calmed social tensions, but in Yunnan a tempest followed. From 1855 to 1873, to demand reparations for previous Chinese attacks, a Muslim rebellion ravaged the province. It was a civil war comparable to the Taiping and Miao-Dong rebellions.

In 1854–55, another clash broke out between Chinese and Hui in the region of Chuxiong, in the silver mines of Banghong, near Nanan. Hundreds of Hui families

drew their livelihood from the mines. The local authorities took no preventive measures against ethnic and religious turmoil. This again degenerated, and a massacre of innocents and pillages were reported. Han miners were jealous of Muslim extraction-techniques and of their commercial networks. Hui were not the only ones targeted; in 1868 and 1875, the British officers Sladen and Brown also came under Chinese pressure because of cross-border competition between Yunnan and Burma.

The business centers on the Burma Road were Dali and Xiaguan (“The Lower Custom”). The city of Dali was known since ancient times for its annual horse fair. Until 1950, this fair attracted many buyers from Burma, Tibet, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Lanzhou.

Pi Luoge from Weishan and his son Ge Luofeng (d. 779) were the monarchs of the Kingdom of Nanzhao, later called Dali, who gave glory to this kingdom, a prestige recognized in Tibet and Sichuan. Between 750 and 1253, this powerful kingdom was able to defeat the Tang armies in 750 and 754. Thus, Du Wenxiu, a Chinese and Arabic scholar, was tempted to establish an independent state in October 1856, probably fascinated by the Nanzhao’s history. This young chief was later called sultan.

The Hui Autonomous Districts of Weishan and Dali are linked to both Dai and Muslim history. In 1257, the Islamization of Weishan came four years after that of Dali. Mengshe (then Menghua) was a former Nanzhao military center, dominated by the Tais. Until the Second World War their descendants, the “Dai,” also liked to have gold teeth. The toponymic root *Meng* or *Muong* is Tai, and there are still seven villages called *Qimeng*⁸⁶ or “the seven *Meng*.” Weishan (Menghua) was later included in the strategy of territorial and the ethnic unity of Du Wenxiu. ADN research in Weishan and the region would confirm the link between Islam and the Dai. When General Du later sent his ambassador to England, he called himself a “humble native of the Country of the Golden Teeth.” It is interesting to note the rhetoric of Du Wenxiu based on the term “Kingdom of the Golden Teeth” by which he designated his state, using an ancient Tai name of Nanzhao.

General Du Wenxiu, Ma Xian, and Ma Dexin

General Du took advantage of the weaknesses of the Qing Dynasty, which was obliged to sign the “unequal treaty” of Tianjin in 1858. To provide logistical support for his armies, nearly 400,000 men, Du Wenxiu regained control of business between

Dali and Burma. Communications were thereafter cut with Kunming, which no longer received products from Mandalay and Bhamo. During that period, the financial situation of the state of Dali was prosperous. Xiaguan and Dali became a single city-state. Du controlled three of the most important Yunnanese salt mines, an imperial monopoly on Yunlong (west of Dali), Yongchang, and Tengyue on Burma's border. The fourth less productive mine, near Lijiang, could not communicate with Kunming without passing through Dali. In times of war there was a substantial exploitation of these mines. The miners, like the peasants, were also enrolled in militia. Trade with Burma and Sichuan was another source of revenue for General Du who controlled commercial activities on Mogok Burmese rubies.

In the beginning, the three main ethnic groups, Hui, Han and Yi (Lolo), were unified by Du Wenxiu who did everything possible to consolidate his program of unity, a key point for the longevity of his state. Du well understood the main causes of Muslim revolts in all of China, that is to say Han and Hui disunion, and tried to bring harmony to their relationship.

General Du Wenxiu argued: "One must not use force, but persuasion. The Han are more numerous than the Muslims. Collaboration is necessary and Han must keep their prominent position in Chinese society." Some nationalities, such as the Yi, viewed this differently. Subversive imperial actions aimed to break the morale of Du's army and Chinese defections were reported. The good understanding between General Du and his Chinese military chiefs unfortunately did not last. The final defeat was linked to a lack of really talented military leaders in Dali. Weaponry of the imperial armies, particularly the artillery, was modernized in the course of encounter with Westerners during the "Opium Wars."

The following short biographies explain the progress of this civil war and describe the main parties. Beginning in 1860, Ma Xian (later Ma Rulong) became *de facto* one of Du Wenxiu's principal opponents. During a particularly difficult year for the Qing Dynasty with the fall of Tianjin and the signature of the Treaty of Beijing, Ma Rulong's treachery was particularly important for the imperial army in Yunnan. Ma Rulong was born to a well-to-do Hui family, and became, at first, an unsuccessful disciple of Ma Dexin but respected his master throughout his life. According to Rocher, the robust and healthy Ma Xian was better at sports and military discipline than at Arabic. He had his first experiences as a leader in silver mines and became foreman in the Chuxiong region. He represented Hui interests in the stocking and sale of minerals. This requires energy, in which he was not lacking. As a man of decision and an opportunist, he seized his chance during

disputes between Han and Hui that caused the death of his brother. He decided to seek revenge, and became a *condottiere*. He left the mines, and, with other Muslims, audaciously attacked Huilong near present-day Kaiyuan. Finally, he decided to retreat and save a large part of his troops. He was later appointed Imperial Military Commander. Ma Xian rapidly found himself at the head of 20,000 men, mainly of Hui and Yi, against the Chinese.

Ma Xian and his troops, making the best use of the terrain to avoid alerting the enemy, attacked Amizhou, near Kaiyuan (Linan). The Yi in the city had been informed by messenger that no harm would come to them; however, contradictory internal information prevented them from believing this. Later, when the city was conquered, the Yi residents were spared and only Han killed. Hui and Yi surrendered and their local chiefs, *tusi*, then collaborated. Ma Xian launched his troops against Mengzi to the south. But the rainy season prevented constructing strong tunnels for sapping the walls. The diversion by the neighboring rich mines of Gejiu unfortunately cost the capture of Mengzi. Later, having replaced his losses, Ma Xian reconstituted his army and audaciously continued toward Kunming. His army no longer encountered opposition during its march northward, and the people cooperated in supplying troops. Kunming was attacked but resisted; however, the provincial economic and social situation continued to deteriorate, and insecurity increased.

The year 1858 proved to be a turning-point. Ma Xian and his troops seized the rich mining city of Chuxiong, between Dali and Kunming, at a crossroads toward Sichuan and Burma. Thanks to the construction of tunnels more helpful than at Mengzi, a large breach was made through the walls and an assault successfully carried out. Many inhabitants were massacred, and pillage followed. The Prefect Song Yanchun escaped with his life disguised as a peasant. His son fell into the hands of Ma Xian, who some years later having changed camp, returned him to his father Song Yanchun, a high ranking administrator. The Muslims who held Dali joined forces with those who took Chuxiong. Du Wenxiu and Ma Xian (later Rulong) initially had the idea to launch an immediate attack toward Kunming. Ma Xian's defection changed all plans. He withdrew at first to Anning to care for his wounds. He knew by experience that after the Battle of Chuxiong many would side with the winner who would rightly expect to have followers.

In 1860, the famous imam Ma Dexin, Ma Xian's master, had just taken Jinning (Kunyang) and Chenggong around Lake Dian, south of Kunming. If other Muslim troops joined their efforts with those involved in conquering Chuxiong, the capital

could have been taken in a vise. In November 1860, the provincial mandarins, understanding the imminent danger, suddenly bestowed the rank of general to Ma Xian and awarded his men handsome gifts. He entered Kunming with his troops in good order, and the frightened citizens were quickly reassured. Trade, however, continued to suffer for thirteen years. General Ma Xian formally became Ma Rulong and was involved in the campaign against his co-religionist Du Wenxiu. Ma Dexin gallantly refused all honors offered to him and did not participate in the anti-Muslim war. He, however, accepted the charge of trying to convince Du to stop fighting against the imperial dynasty.

Du Wenxiu, a man of honor who believed in his fate, was less pragmatic than Ma Rulong. Both were former Koranic students of Imam Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu). The orphan, Ma Dexin (born c. 1793 near Dali) very early showed his intelligence and studied Chinese until the age of 17. He then passed his Koranic examinations and completed his knowledge of Islam in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan Provinces. He was an orthodox *Gedimu*. In 1839, having put aside a little gold, he began his travels on foot to Mecca with caravans, continued by boat, and finally on camelback like the first Muslims. He returned eight years later.

Ma Dexin during his long pilgrimage went to Jingdong, Puer, Simao in south Yunnan, toward the Golden Triangle. He passed Bhamo and Rangoon in Burma where he encountered Burmese Muslims, Hanafites (the majority) and also Shafeites. He boarded a boat and sailed for more than forty days, landing in Ceylon, where he followed the footsteps of Ibn Battuta. Later, he went to Cochin, Malabar, and finally to Yemen. In Jeddah and Mecca, he waited for some days before beginning his pilgrimage. The Kaaba and Medina greatly impressed him. After Mecca, Haji Ma went to Egypt and then visited Turkey, staying in Constantinople (Istanbul) for two years. He went to Palermo, the Dardanelles, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and visited the tomb of the Prophet's aunt. A voyage to Jerusalem allowed him to meditate on the names of all the prophets. He revisited Egypt, went up the Nile, and paid a visit to Sultan Mehemet Ali. In 1847, he probably returned via Alexandria, and finally reached Aceh, Penang, and Singapore and met Malay friends. He returned to China via Canton and Nanning before returning to his province by way of Baise, near the Guangxi-Yunnan border. He then settled at Kaiyuan (Linan), where he taught the Koran and earned a large reputation. In 1857, he became increasingly engaged in the political and military conflict against the Manchu Dynasty.

Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu) recollected his travels in Arabic. His disciple, Ma Anli, translated his memoirs into Chinese and published them in 1862 as *Chaojin Tuji*

[Pilgrimage Logbook]. The dramatic incidents in Yunnan obliged him to discontinue his research. He is the first translator of the Koran into Chinese.

In 1860, massacres took place in Kunming. Rich merchants left the city for Sichuan; those who were not killed were robbed. Some settled in Dali to save their lives. The same year, the Yunnan government took the opportunity to enforce diplomatic and military measures. They permitted the desertion of Hui military chiefs, in particular returned Imam Ma Dexin and General Ma Xian (Ma Rulong). The latter does not figure in the *Chinese Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1996), but Rocher defended General Ma in *The Chinese Province of Yunnan* (in French, 1880). Ma Rulong's betrayal considerably weakened the state of Dali.

Du Wenxiu: Resistance and Defeat

Is it possible to assimilate Du Wenxiu's struggle in the framework of Max Weber's thesis of a conquering Islam? It was probably more a civil war than an attempt at conquest. The military recruitment of soldiers-laborers (*minbing* or militia) was the rule. Sharia law was never imposed in Dali.

In 1865, perhaps inspired by the universal knowledge of Master Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu), General Du's first diplomatic action was directed toward Lhasa. A document written in Arabic evoked the Califs Abu Bakr (c. 570–634) and Ali (c. 599–661) and aimed to provide military and logistical support from Tibet.

Muslim fighters besieged Kunming (1868–69). However, the imperial armies became more powerful by the end of the Opium War. Du Wenxiu saw the difficulties of Dali's position. At the end of 1871 he sent his son Hasan under military protection to Baoshan and Bhamo, and then from Burma to Turkey and England. A relative, a Malay English interpreter, and soldiers accompanied Du's son. Du Wenxiu received no support from the international Muslim community. Burmese Muslims from Tengyue, Mandalay, and Rangoon furnished some help. In London, the principal destination of this long mission (1872–3), the English crown did not respond favorably, and no official aid came from its Burmese protectorate.

Franco-British rivalries appear behind the scenes. An incident occurred in Dali in March 1868. Du possibly believed that Francis Garnier was a spy. The French officer, who carried out topographic surveys in the region, was finally forced to leave Dali and to return to Kunming. Garnier had obtained a letter of recommendation from Du's teacher, Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu). Unfortunately, the imam became unpopular when he supported the imperial troops and especially because he had asked General

Du to surrender. Dali was supported by fifty-three cities, not counting territories in neighboring Sichuan Province.

The end of the Opium Wars reinforced imperial morale and accelerated Du Wenxiu's defeat. In 1872, four army corps commanded by Yang Yuguo besieged Dali. The former strong ethnic union was not so in the end. Furthermore, Du lacked skilled officers and modern weaponry. It is paradoxical that earlier Muslims such as Ala Al-Din (d. 1313) contributed to improving the Chinese artillery that basically caused Du's defeat. One of the main causes for his defeat was the four cannons sent by road through passes and mountains from Kunming. Only three reached their destination, but Dali was never able to purchase modern cannons to defend the city. After the fall of Xiaguan, Dali itself fell in January 1873. Carnage resulted from the imperial cannons' barrages, and extensive pillage ensued.

Ma Hualong tragic death (he was assassinated in southern Ningxia) caused General Du to reflect. Du Wenxiu perfectly understood the imperialist treachery. He was a conscious fatalist, and did not believe in a pardon. He swallowed a bowl of opium, after first having forced his three wives and his daughters to take poison. Kublai Khan had been more merciful in 1253 when he captured Dali, marking a turning-point in the Islamization of Yunnan. General Du head was cut off and exposed, but it was preserved in honey and sent to Peking as proof of pacification, accompanied by 10,000 pairs of Muslim ears ("to kill" in the coded language of the secret societies was to "wash the ears.") In the mid-twentieth century the decapitation of enemies was still practiced, as occurred to Ma Ditai in 1924. Du Wenxiu's body was taken away and finally placed in a tomb, but it did not escape the destruction of the Cultural Revolution. This tomb in the village of Xiadiu, southeast of Dali, was recently reconstructed.

Like King Solomon, Sulaiman Du Wenxiu insured the fortune of his state by a caravan trade protected by fortresses, but its decline was more brutal than his namesake's. In 1873, the victory banquet became an ambush; nearly all Muslims present in Dali were massacred. The same year, when the diplomatic mission to England returned to Rangoon, the son of Du Wenxiu was informed of his father's death and the dramatic capture of Dali.

General Ma Xian (Ma Rulong)-the Hui deserter-finally commanded a part of the imperial troops marching toward Tengyue (Momi), a stronghold in the mountains bordering Burma. In 1874, western Yunnan was reconquered after long Muslim resistance. In Tengyue, the strategy of the imperial armies failed (rerouting the river to drown the besieged Hui). After the battles, five mosques, the walls of the city, and the residential quarter were razed. No mosque stands except that in a

neighboring village. At the end of these events the British established a consulate and customs post there. After the long blockade of Dali, the Burma Road was quickly secured. In August 1877, John Macarthy crossed Yunnan on foot without difficulty, reaching Bhamo.

Initially Ma Dexin secured a compromise with the imperial armies to avoid bloodshed. As we know, he was offered honors and the position of supreme military commander in Yunnan, which he refused. He withdrew and did not participate in the military operations against Du Wenxiu. Ma Dexin was finally killed without a trial, being decapitated on 25 May 1874. Yunnanese authorities took advantage of the departure of Ma Rulong, who remained faithful to his master (despite his morale of dishonesty). Thus has ended the life of a distinguished scholar. After his return from Mecca, he devoted himself to Koranic teaching, and thanks to his energies and efforts, Yunnan is still an important center for the study of Koranic Arabic.

In contrast, after this civil and religious conflict, Ma Rulong's descendants and relatives obtained honors thanks to his opportunism and staunch orthodox Muslim sentiments (*Gedimu*). Famous imams such as Haji Na of Mengzi and Ma Minglun of Zhaotong owed their posts to these circumstances. In northeastern Yunnan, the district of Zhaotong prospered and a hundred years later still had an important Muslim population. This region was not involved in the civil war. General Ma Rulong's family lived in a palace surrounded by three courtyards in Kunming containing "beautiful lacquered furniture, precious coffers, bibelots, and embroidered curtains" (Courtellemont, 1904). H. R. Davies's book on Yunnan (1909) describes these events and condemns General Ma.

Jihad never concerned General Du. The fall of Du Wenxiu was rarely analyzed as a confrontation between the "Old" Orthodox (*Gedimu*) Religion and Wahhabism, the "New Religion." The Manchu Dynasty tried in every way to divide Yunnan's Muslims, in a move to pardon in the beginning and to obtain desertion and betrayal afterwards. Lipman (1998) recognized "Wahabbi" as the "ally of Chinese nationalism" fighting equally Sufis and orthodox Hui. It seems that many writers have underestimated the extent to which the disciples of Ma Wanfu (1849–1934) were sometimes manipulated by the declining dynasty.

Using the four volumes of the Hui researcher Bai Shouyi on Muslim Uprisings, Alice Wei draws a rather clear picture of General Du Wenxiu. However, many sources have been missed. The importance of Sufism during this uprising has not been detailed, but played a less important role than in Gansu. The death of the grandson of Ma Mingxin in Tonghai was one of the rare proofs of the Jahariya participation in the Muslim civil war. Du Wenxiu, a good administrator, was not

really a lesser warlord than Ma Hualong, but he participated personally in the struggles at Dali in 1856 and in the last resistance during 1872–73. He possessed no modern and powerful cannons. On the other hand, the Qing Dynasty inherited Western military technology.

General Du had extraordinary organizational capacities. He succeeded in mobilizing his men despite weak human resources. *Sharia* law did not apply to Muslims in his state, which he called “The Pacific Country of the South” (*Ping-nanguo*). Strict discipline was imposed on the combatants. The artisans and-in particular-arms makers accused of treachery were punished by death. The state of Dali functioned for many years despite the lack of specialists. Money came from taxed cities, cross-border trade, and the exploitation of salt mines. The other key elements of Du Wenxiu’s logistics were military labor, coolies, and the supply of food and arms. In the beginning, a better understanding existed with minorities oppressed by the Qing Dynasty.

The Manchu, to better control far off Yunnan, sent Han immigrants in large numbers. Du Wenxiu knew how to use popular discontent; however, his ethnic program had weaknesses. Yi, Miao, and Lisu, complaining after some years that Hui and Han monopolized too much power, became less zealous. Harmony was partly disrupted at the beginning of 1871 because imperial military pressures had become strong. The Naxi or Moso, close to the neutral Tibetans, did not seem to be concerned despite General Du’s diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, the probable presence of Malay armament specialists was one of the rare examples of international aid from the Islamic community at this time.

Because of the repressions following rebellions, there was a significant decrease in the number of Muslims. This considerably reduced the Muslim community; approximately a fifth of China’s Muslims, from a population of four million, were still there just before the end of the famous rebellion. In addition, it resulted in fratricidal divisions among the Hui, with one section taking the Manchu Dynasty’s side. One can inquire into the influence of Wahhabism and Manchu Dynasty support for this movement.

The Devastations of War

Yunnan was devastated as civil war ravaged the region. Never again did Islam recapture its position as the province’s principal religion, and it took years to recover its commercial, mining, and agricultural prosperity. Rocher mentions a “precarious” situation among functionaries. “Everything reflected the mess; here

and there, however, were still traces of ancient splendor,” as in Ma Rulong’s family. Land registration no longer existed in many districts, and other complaints were reported.

For more than twenty-five years, from 1854 to 1880, Yunnan was in a state of permanent chaos. Outlaw attacks were frequent on its roads. The arms used by caravan leaders, as Rocher noted, consisted of a leather harness holding two sabers or cutlasses, small pairs of knives as well as pistols, or even “primitive” arms such as lances.

Francis Garnier in 1873 and Augustus Margary in 1875 were killed by miscreant Yunnanese elements. In 1868 and 1875, leaving the Irrawaddy and Bhamo, British officers Edward Sladen and Horace Brown, with military and diplomatic protection during two missions and despite all their efforts, never reached Dali. They only succeeded in consolidating economic interests in Tengyue (Momien), which turned out to become a British commercial and diplomatic base. As Victor Purcell (1896–1965) has correctly observed these events had “disastrous” local and regional impacts for Yunnan and the whole of Southeast Asia.

At the beginning of 1871, epidemics and famines were frequent and did not spare Hui in Dali. After the fighting, a new epidemic ravaged Yunnan. Dr Louis Pichon mentions that, in 1893, plague (*yangziwen*) was endemic and spread to Guizhou but was not as dangerous as the Black Death, often fatal. In general, only 5% of the population became infected. At other times, entire districts were decimated. In May and June epidemics prevailed, attaining a peak in September after the monsoon rains. Not even buffaloes, cattle, or goats were spared. The last epidemics in Yunnan were recorded in 1938 and during 1947–50.

Caravans were late to resume their activity. Fewer Muslims were associated with cross-border trade. An Indian Muslim, Shaykh Abdullah was signaled in Jinghong (Xieng Hong) by Lefevre-Pontalis, a member of the Pavie Mission (1879–95). Cultural and economic relations with Burma and Thailand were never broken; however, Islam suffered from this civil war and would certainly have had a more brilliant future if the Dali massacres had not occurred.

Ancient Caravans and Modern Evolution

The first Muslims on the Silk Road were travelers and merchants, and it is not surprising that they long held on to this tradition. The networks of Islamic merchants were frequently developed in cities through a framework of mosques in Kunming, Dali, Simao, and Mengla. Temporary migrations occurred from Yunnan toward

Burma and Thailand. Large networks of associated businesses developed, and one could ask whether the present-day rich Muslims running restaurants in Kunming are the descendants of caravan owners from before the Second World War.

The time of the year to travel was during the dry months—thus avoiding the monsoon. The Muslims went back and forth to Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Tibet, and Guizhou. The Yunnanese mules were prolific and part of Chinese exchange gifts to the kings of Burma. They traveled in daily stages of around 30 kilometers and carried 70–100 kilograms. Vegetation along the roads provided their nourishment. No transport animal in Southeast Asia could be compared for resilience, endurance, and sure-footedness on mountainous terrain. Elephants—as long-distance transport animals—carried smaller burdens over shorter distances, but they require rest periods and also have to carry their own food in order to survive. No other domestic animal is comparable for travel across jungles.

In 1939, in the mountainous regions of Yunnan and Tibet, Pierre Goullart, during his first trip from Dali to Lijiang, poetically explains how the caravans functioned:

We were roused at four in the morning. There was a hasty breakfast, followed by much shouting and sounding of the gong. The loads, securely tied to wooden frames, were spread out in the courtyard. Struggling mules and horses were presently led in, with many unprintable curses. Each load, lifted by two men, was speedily clamped onto the wooden saddle, and the horse was permitted to trot out into the street. My hand baggage was quickly tied to a similar frame, the bedding spread in the form of a cushion, and the whole contraption hoisted onto a horse. I was then lifted bodily on the top and the animal was shooed outside, the man shouting to me to mind my head when passing through the gate. Outside, other contingents of the caravan were pouring out of neighboring houses. To the sounding of the gong, the leading horse, gaily bedecked in red ribbons, pompons, and with small mirrors on its forehead, was led out. The caravan's leading horse moved forward, and, having looked back to see that everything was ready, began walking down the road at a brisk pace. At once, the assistant leader, less gaudily decorated, but likewise full of authority, followed. The whole caravan immediately sprang after them, forming a file as they went along. The caravan men, in vivid blue jackets and wide pants, rushed after the horses.

A hundred years ago, the number of mules and horses, in the hands of “turbaned” Muslims, gave an indication of these commercial movements. Mules, being more resistant, were preferred. The wooden structure on which the loads and sacks

were attached are typical and adapted to fit a small wooden saddle according to the animal's shape. This structure *tuonan* (*bât* in French) is still used in Yunnan. It remains in equilibrium on the mount and rests on four legs when it is not an animal's back. It is adapted for horses, mules, and oxen. According to Dr Louis Pichon who traveled extensively between Hanoi and Yunnan, there were 56,000 pack animals in 1890 and 76,000 a year later, shuttling from Kunming toward the Red River, Hekou (Yunnan), and Laocai (Vietnam). Yunnanese horses have always been highly appreciated in Burma, and, in 1900, a thousand of them were exported annually.

In 1901, the railroad from Kunming to Hanoi, which employed many Hui, shortened mule traffic along the Red River. Once with a Hui in a train going to Kaiyuan, he spoke to me about *Kafir* Chinese (that is, non-Muslims or infidels). Suddenly, a Han policeman told me that it was forbidden for foreigners to take this train. The Muslim disappeared; I found myself alone with this Chinese officer but learned nothing more about the Chinese from a Hui's viewpoint

In 1985–95, there were still many mules in the province owned by Yi farmers. In the twenty-first century, aside from mountain tracks, the growth of highway traffic has made these formerly common and useful animals rare. Even Dai pack-oxen on the Burmese frontier (Mangshi-Ruili) are disappearing. Caravans are part of the Yunnanese past. Modernization and highways entice quite a few Hui to become truck-drivers, and they thus once again take up their traditional profession in long-distance trade.

On his return from Mecca ten years ago, a Haji of Changning, near Baoshan, initiated a transportation business consisting of trucks, mini-buses, and taxis. This enterprise prospered and enriched his large extended family. His social relationships (*guanxi*) made this success possible and secured "special privileges" for opening and managing this type of business. The Haji is also a local cadre. This prosperous Muslim company is not unique.

Some use the new north-south axis, the highway from Jinghong to Kunming, which is nearly terminated. On Tuesday, 18 June 2002 at noon, a truck and its crew, all Hui, passed Yuanjiang. Near Kunming, in Chenggong, a whole Muslim village has converted to road transportation, keeping alive old traditions. This small village, close to the highway, still exists. The new mosque has a small minaret, and its Middle Eastern style does not annoy the powerful Islamic Association of Yunnan, which favors this architecture and the new enterprises. But, in counterpoint to modernization, the mules have disappeared. The same day, in June, our bus encountered only two groups of Yi, one with two mules and the other with eight. They no longer come in large numbers even for the traditional big market (*gankai*

in Yunnanese) held every five days in Tongguan, a pass on the highway. Modern Muslims travel by bus.

Professions, Muslim Culture, and Cultural Evolution

In 1904, Courtellemont mentioned there being 2,000 Muslim families in Kunming. They were found in all professions: honorary and military mandarins, wholesale merchants, jewelers, artisans, veterinarians, butchers, bakers, and pastry-makers, animal dealers or caravan leaders. Today, they are professors, researchers, bureaucrats, teachers, merchants, restaurant owners, or artisans.

A hundred years ago, they wore robes and vests like the Han. Before 1980, they all wore the blue or green costume of Mao Zedong (*Zhongshanzhuang*). Now, they prefer Western suits. One cannot distinguish them from the Chinese. Contrary to Gansu and Xinjiang, where Muslims often wear a full beard as in Pakistan or Afghanistan, Yunnanese Hui resemble the Han (with a beard or discreet mustache). Following the majority, in this way they display their longevity after fifty.

Regarding Hui-Han similarities, education progressed under the impulse of Mao and Deng. State education is now modern and open to all, male and female. Until the Second World War, Muslim girls did not attend school. Sha Dezhen, Director of the French School in Kunming until its closure in 1950, is Muslim, and his daughter was well educated. This contrasts sharply with previous generations of women. However, in addition to Chinese, Mr. Sha speaks English and translates Arabic and Persian. He is the first Yunnanese to have successfully passed his baccalaureate at the Lycée Albert-Sarraut in Hanoi (a year or two after the future General Vo Nguyen Giap). His father, Sha Pingan, spoke fluent French and Arabic and was an interpreter during the construction of the Hanoi-Kunming railway line. Sha Pingan became imam of the Zhengyi Mosque in Kunming and taught the Koran for many years. Among his former students are an excellent Arabic speaker and a translator of the Koran.

The Hui are Chinese citizens as regards their education, culture, and professional life. For Maris Gillette, their modernization is a key element in contemporary China. Many Muslims lived in Kunming in the thirteenth century. Outside the main city, many villages still remain traditional. Hui have become farmers, for instance in Eshan and Tonghai, south of Kunming. Although almost all households own a television set, the Koranic and Arabic language tapes available in Beijing and Xian (Shaanxi) are not sold in Yunnan.

Contrary to certain provinces like Henan in which the women's mosques are numerous, in Yunnan one rarely encounters places of worship reserved for women. At best, there exists a reserved space, and a female Ahong able to read the Koran, who leads prayers.

Over the centuries, many women have contributed to the development of Islam. Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century, the mother of the Muslim scholar, Ma Zhu, author of the famous *Guide to Purity (The Compass) (Qingzhen Zhinan)*, educated her son so that he could be a scholar in Chinese and in classical Arabic. After the rebellion in the nineteenth century, and the slaughter of males, it was women who maintained Islamic traditions in many families that lacked fathers, husbands, and brothers.

Yunnan follows the present line of the Islamic Association that, in relations with the municipality, directs the criteria of cleanliness in the cities. Gillette (2000) also noticed in Xian that housing and mosque reconstruction are subject to official intervention. In itself, the principle corresponds to the Muslim ethic, but this social change and modernization also means Sinicization. The Association's current line of action corresponds very well with Hui notions of modesty and is not generally seen as a symbol of the decline of traditional Islam. In Weizhou, Autonomous Region of Ningxia, one of the most beautiful of China's mosques was demolished during the Cultural Revolution. Ding Hong calls this "existing in China's vast ocean" in his book *Minority Studies and Modernization (Minzuxue yu Xiandaihua, 1994)*.

In Kunming, four out of six mosques were reconstructed: Shunchengjie Mosque, Nancheng ("The South City") Mosque in Zhengyi Street, Yixigong Mosque, and the Jahariya Mosque (*Dongmen* or *Dongsi*). A wall of Yongning Mosque in Jinbi Street disappeared during the widening of the street, and the mosque was partly reconstructed, leaving less space for the Muslim community. As of 2003, Jinniu or Xiaoximen ("The Golden Ox") Mosque, an ancient, tiny mosque, still existed.

In the thirteenth century, Sayyid Ajall marked the history of Islam in Yunnan. Many mosques were constructed. The Muslim governor succeeded in maintaining harmony among the province's various nationalities and religions. In the 1950s, the work on the frontiers (*Yunnan Biandi Wenti*) mentioned a certain lack of harmony with the Muslim community.

Without studying other epochs or situations, in our time, the wall of a mosque was knocked down in Kunming to transform a street into an avenue. The ancient mosque of Zhengyilu has been reconstructed, and its demolition effaces history. The renovation of Kunming's center, begun in the 1990s, caused the destruction

of a third of Shunchengjie Street, followed by the construction of large modern buildings such as Beihuodalou Superstore. Many Hui were forced to move, and had only three weeks in which to do so. In a building across from this superstore, a handicapped Hui unsuccessfully resisted moving, finally being obliged to live far from the city center. The Hui succeeded for some more than 600 years in remaining in Shuncheng Street, with the landmark of the 1950s, a museum in the Stalinist style. Hui and Han restaurant owners, increasingly numerous, who had the chance to remain in this typical street, again prospered, but the future conservation of the historical heritage of this street is jeopardized. However, these important modernization works drew foreign tourists and Chinese travelers to the province. Shuncheng Street still partly retains its traditional Muslim charm, although the quarter has currently become more Chinese. Investors will be tempted to continue modernization in order to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).

Yunnanese Mosques

Yunnan is known for the value of its Koranic teaching. Many imams of the neighboring provinces, Guangxi and Guizhou, were trained in Kunming, Yuxi, or in northwest Yunnan. There are still numerous mosques despite an omnipresent Sinicization and a secular socialization.

Republican work on the question of the Yunnanese borders (*Yunnan Biandi Wenti*) advocates the Islamic community by saying that it “helps to form groups.” Yunnanese mosques are a backbone and the crossroads linking cities, provinces, and Southeast Asia. Before the 1950s there were no paved roads, but Muslims (longtime masters of caravans) traveled continuously, and their places of worship were havens, assuring protection and fraternity on difficult roads.

The long history of Islam in Yunnan is also based on its architecture. Unfortunately, the Chinese do not seem to like old historic mosques. However, there is one at Guangzhou, a place of worship dating to the tenth century, *Guangta* or *Huaisheng* Mosque (The Mosque of Holy Memory). The Ming Dynasty is well represented, in Jiashui, Weishan (Huihuideng), and elsewhere. The fashion is currently for the modern Middle Eastern style, without much artistic value, whereas the variety of the Sino-Arabic combinations of the Chinese pagodas made China a country with a unique Islamic architecture.

Sinicization reconstructs Chinese history. In 1966, the Red Guards destroyed the thirteenth-century tomb of the respected Muslim governor, Ajall. The tomb was reconstructed in the 1990s, but his bones have disappeared. Later, in 1995,

the ancient central Zhengyilu Mosque in Kunming was the issue of long discussions lasting for several months. The local secretary, who defended the Islamic Association, proposed the pure and simple displacement of the mosque after its demolition. He fell seriously ill and was hospitalized, and the discussion resumed when he returned from hospital several months later. Eventually, the 400-year-old mosque was replaced by a modern place of worship in the Middle Eastern style. It is marked with *Chaozhen Dian*, the three characters that in 1998 replaced the ancient name of Chinese mosques in Yunnan: *Qingzhensi*.

This “extreme” Sinicization also marked the end of the year 2002 in Kunming’s oldest street, Shunchengjie. The mosque of an ancient foundation was razed to the ground. The first place of worship constructed on this location dated to 1425. It was renovated in 1856 and 1927, and after the Cultural Revolution. The historical charm of its pagoda style will disappear forever in a quarter grouping together more than 10,000 Muslims. It was claimed that renovation would have been too costly. This was also the main argument for demolishing Chengdu Mosque, a masterwork of wooden construction in People’s Street (*Renminnanlu*), now replaced by a modern place of worship. In January 2003, the new young imam of Shunchengjie declined comment on these matters. During the past fifteen years, his predecessors never refused an interview. The noise of the machines digging in a sacred place does not induce confidence. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that the new Shuncheng Mosque was beautifully reconstructed in less than a year.

Muslim women, and in particular the improvement of their Koranic knowledge, will boost the new mosque’s popularity. Shunchengjie Mosque, conjointly with Kaiyuan and Shadian Mosques, is, in fact, one of the rare places of worship favoring teaching of the Koran to women in Yunnan.

Shunsheng Mosque, being the headquarters of the Islamic Association of Yunnan, deserves to be described. This part of Shunchengjie Street retains a Hui flavor with its Muslim pastry shops. One is owned by a Jahariya Sufi. The old door still exists after reconstruction of the mosque during 2002–03 and leads to a narrow passage with a shop selling Islamic items and religious books. At the end on the right is the entrance to the courtyard. Sometimes Muslims from other regions sell their province’s products in order to be able to continue their travels.

The room for ablutions is situated on the left after entering the courtyard. The boiler is in the next room. To the right on the ground floor in the old courtyard is the new imam’s apartment. Students studying the Koran live upstairs in small rooms. Old Imams keep their accommodations to the left in the courtyard. The mosque’s new stele of the 1980s replaced the old one destroyed by the Red Guard-in the

middle of the courtyard (photo 26). When approaching the new mosque, on the left is a gate leading to a small market; a nearby room is used to clean the deceased. The mosque's two coffins are stored in the back.

The demolished mosque was red like Chinese pagodas. The new mosque is spacious, modern, and elegant, and yellow and gold paint predominate (photos 8 and 9). To the left is the part reserved for women. The huge prayer hall, called *Chaozhendian*, is cleaner than before. The traditional name *Qingzhensi* has disappeared, a distinguishing trait of modernity and Sinicization. Two Chinese jars also stress this point. The *minbar* is also modern as are the inscriptions in Chinese and Arabic.

Western Yunnan

Western Yunnan is a historical region. In 1253, the future Kublai Khan entered into Yunnanese legend in Dali and Xiaguan by seizing the Kingdom of Nanzhao, formerly considered impregnable. Following the Mongol victory, Islam made a strong appearance in the province, because there were Muslims in Kublai Khan's armies. Later Islam dominated the region for eighteen years under Du Wenxiu.

There are now more than ten mosques in Dali Prefecture. The most prominent mosques are: *Zhihua*, constructed in 1906 and restored in 1983; *Shangxingzhuang* dating from 1881 and repaired in 1992 with a budget of 250,000 yuan (around 30,000 Euro); and *Kelizhuang*, the oldest, built in 1856. Muslim villages are numerous near Erhai Lake, and most have their own mosque.

The Koran, under the prompting of Weishan's Koranic center, is taught to hundreds of students each year. Ahong courses last for four years. At five o'clock in the morning, large numbers of students pray (*al-Fajr* prayer).

Dali in particular, and its satellite, Xiaguan, are halfway points between Kunming and the Burmese border, Ruili. Muslims have always been numerous here. Baoshan is said to be the birthplace of Du Wenxiu, and Reitlinger reported a prophecy by a geomancer, saying that Baoshan Mountain is "a king without a throne" and, at Du Wenxiu's death, that Dali was "a throne without a king." Until the end of the Second World War, most merchants in Dali were Hui, now most are Chinese.

Baoshan, on the road to Burma, has a small pagoda-mosque in the old style. It was a staging city for mule caravans, replaced in modern days by cars, trucks, buses, and mini-buses. The recent improvement in traffic is due to construction in 1998 of the Kunming-Dali Highway prolonged toward Ruili at the Burmese border (predicted for 2004). A railroad now links Kunming to Xiaguan, and Lijiang has an airport. Hui always live on the main communications axes.

In Baoshan, Imam Ma Pinde, only fifty years old, was obliged to leave his post to a young and inexperienced imam. The Islamic Association prefers young imams. It is said that they interpret the Koran in a more modern way, but they have also not known the difficult period of the Cultural Revolution.

At other times, the Burma Road passed more to the north toward Tengyue, now rebaptized Tengchong, in the Baoshan District, near the border and Myitkyina more than 1,500 kilometers from Rangoon. Myitkyina on the Irrawaddy River is the northernmost point of the Burmese railway. In March 1942, the railway was cut (between Myitkyina and Mandalay). All the former capitals were constructed along the Irrawaddy River, the main communication axis.

Luxi (Mangshi) and Ruili have a mosque. The access by Ruili to Lashio and Bhamo is less troublesome than the 2,500-meter pass situated on the old road. The small cities of Namkham and Bhamo thus channel the movements of Burmese Muslims. They are jade traders, mainly in Ruili, where a few Chinese Muslims are resident. In 1984, in Dehong, there were 2,000 Hui out of a population of 800,000.

Center and South of the Province

The Jahariya Sufi Order is centered on sacred tombs and mosques. The *Gongbei* cult is essential. The tomb of Ma San, the preferred disciple of Master Ma Mingxin (d. 1781), dominates the Tonghai Valley. His son, Ma Shunqing is buried in Mojiang in a sandalwood forest. According to Bai Shouyi, Ma Mingxin passed through Yunnan via Sichuan, but his itinerary outside Gansu and Xinjiang is not well documented. The grandson of the master-founder, Ma Shilin (1814–71), was also Yunnanese. He was killed near Tonghai. Considering the existence of these former Jahariya masters, this order is very dynamic in Yunnan, particularly in Tonghai. By fidelity to Master Ma Hualong (d. 1871), Ma Yuanchang (1853–1920), son of Shaykh Shunqing, saved his two grandsons, the only descendants of the fifth Shaykh Ma Jinxi, who maintained the Nanchuan sub-order in Gansu.

Ma Yunpeng is better known as Imam Yuanzhang, which recalls his Yunnanese origin. He devoted his life to the Jahariya Order's survival, founding the Shagou spiritual line. He died during an earthquake in 1920. His tomb is in Zhangjiachuan, near Xiji, Ningxia Region. *A Treatise on the Road (Daotonglun)* is attributed to him.

In Yunnan's other cities are the Sufi disciples: in Gejiu, Kunming, Puer, Shadian, Simao, Lancang on the road to Kengtung, and Honghe by the Red River. Most

Jahariya members in Yunnan follow Shaykh Ma. Discipline and *esprit de corps* strengthen community. There was a slow down at the end of the nineteenth century, with the eradication of Islam on the road linking Dali, Tengyue, and Myitkyina. Mojiang's sandalwood forest and its mosque controlled the ancient Muslim route of Dali by Simao-Jinghong-Menghai-Kengtung. The network of disciples is currently very dynamic.

Near Menghai, a thousand non-Sufi Muslims were also part of the ancient caravans to Kengtung (formerly Xieng Tong). This city, called *Jingdong* in Chinese, was cut off from Xishuang Banna in 1949. Two Muslim villages have the privilege of being bicultural, Hui and Dai, and they assisted the former Sufi caravans from Mojiang. This bilingual ability is also common among Hui in Dali Prefecture who speak Bai and Chinese (Yunnanese dialect and/or Putonghua), contrary to the claim made by Michel Gilquin (*Les Musulmans de Thaïlande* 2002: 23). Since the 1950s, most of these Muslim farmers when the Burmese border was closed have settled and become paddy farmers. Menghai is now surrounded by Dai rice-fields; the small city is also known for its tea factory.

On another road, Dahuicun is a Hui village 20 kilometers to the west of Tonghai. There are approximately 3,000 farmers, all Jahariya. The majority recognizes Ma Liesun, but in Yunnan his followers are a minority compared to the Yunnanese subgroup. A tenth of Jahariya members do not wear the hexagonal conic black bonnet but white headgear like the Yunnanese master, a distant descendant of Ma Mingxin. These two groups, however, live in harmony in Dahuicun, share the doctrine of Ma Mingxin, and pray together but are different. For example, a Koranic student from the village, interviewed on 24 January 2003, never goes to the mosque in his own village because he studies in Najiaying's mosque, 30 kilometers distant. This student is faithful to Kunming's master and does not want to encounter Ma Zhiliang, the imam of Dahuicun. The latter, very cordial, proposed to lodge us in the village. On leaving his mosque, however, the imam advised us to avoid ethnological research: "That serves no purpose!" he declared with a preemptively. He wanted to avoid speaking of internal divisions in his Order in Gansu, Yunnan, and the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia.

Orthodox Sunni Muslims prefer a more homogenous Islam and are not educated about Sufism. However, in Yunnan, many orthodox believers follow, without knowing it, Jahariya traditions and practice. They are unaware of the Sufi cult of incense and know little about Sufism.

In the southwest, mosques marked former stages on the southern Silk Road. The Jahariya Order used them to promote its doctrines, which many other Muslims

envy. Before the Second World War, it took more than a month to travel from Kunming to Simao by caravan. During the 1980s, two days and two nights by bus were enough for the journey that now lasts just a day. Since the eighteenth century, the mosques at Mojiang, Puer, and Simao were parts of a network of Muslim caravans traveling between Yunnan and Burma. Simao mosque was rebuilt before the death of Imam Ma Wensi in 1998. An imam from Jingdong replaced him. He has no interest in Sufism but is tolerant. The Simao community is partly orthodox (*Gedimu*) and partly Sufi, and the communities harmoniously share the same mosque. The Islamic Association has built a restaurant in Simao, and the Jahariya Order recently established another. Jinghong in Sipsong Panna (Xishuang Banna) shelters the second community of Burmese Muslims and has a new mosque, the largest in the region.

Eastern Yunnan

Xundian is a Hui autonomous district, the second after Weishan, known for its numerous mosques. It is a region of transit linked by train to Kunming and the neighboring provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou.

Qujing, more to the east, is located near the new highway toward Guiyang and Guizhou. The Shuanghe (“Two Rivers”) Mosque in Qujing was built in 1893. This city has currently a population of 10,000 Hui.

Zhaotong, northeast of Kunming, has produced highly appreciated dried beef from the thirteenth century. This district now houses nearly 15,000 Hui. Daying Mosque at Songming was built in 1851 and restored in 1983, after the Cultural Revolution. This city and its nearby suburbs have five mosques, the oldest, *Baxian* (Eight Immortals) Mosque, dates to 1730. Courtellemont visited the region in the 1900s and encountered an imam, a relative of General Ma Rulong, who went to Mecca, Imam Ma Minglun (1898–1938?).

The pelt trade, tanning, and saddle-making form the traditional Muslim trade in northwest China along the Silk Road and along the Yellow River. Yunnanese Muslims were renowned for pelt-processing. Hui in Henan near Zhengzhou (Sanpo called “Small Mecca” for its religiosity) are also involved in this peltry trade (Allès 2000: 85–91).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in these provinces, this typically Muslim industry prospered, but it was suspended from 1950 to 1980. It has resumed in Henan, perhaps thanks to the economic dynamism of Shanghai and Beijing. In Zhaotong, this is not the case. One no longer finds jackals, civets, and panthers,

as a hundred years ago. There are, of course, sheep and goats, which formed the greater part of Muslim exports, but the Hui in Zhaotong have abandoned tanning and the pelt industry. Even in neighboring provinces, as in western Hunan, north of Xinhuang, Muslims no longer raise sheep but now devote themselves to agriculture and small business. In Mao's province, the pelt industry has declined. In the 1980s, numerous fur traders from Tibet came to Kunming, but they disappeared during the 1990s. The Hui have converted to dried beef small industry. Although Zhaotong is near Sichuan and Guizhou, almost all its products go to Kunming, and the transformation of Shuncheng Street during in the 1990s was a new blow to the Yunnanese Muslim economy.

In Wenshan District, there are nearly 30,000 Hui and more than 10,000 in Yanshan. Since 1985, Wenshan City has boasted a pagoda-style mosque. It occupies an old Chinese dwelling. Matang, in a forested neighboring region, also has a place of worship constructed during the 1980s, Huanglong'ba ("Valley of the Yellow Dragon") Mosque. Hongdian, also in Wenshan District, has two mosques.

In Yanshan, Zhuang Autonomous Prefecture, north of Wenshan, the Hui are cadres and Sinicize the Zhuang. Out of a population of more than four million inhabitants in this prefecture, a fourth belong to the Zhuang minority. The Hui dominate local political life and have built seven mosques. There are seven Ahong for a population of a thousand Hui. The most important is Maodichong Mosque, built in 1980.

From 1974 to 1979, a protest following reprisals against Hui became an armed uprising and was severely repressed in Shadian, north of Menzi in southern Yunnan. Later the destroyed Muslim village, as well as its mosques, was rebuilt.

All of south and southwestern Yunnan's cities currently have links with Southeast Asia, and China has many socio-economic interests in the region. From Indonesia, numerous *Huaren* Chinese returned to China in 1965. These specialists, like the Hui, help China to understand Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Yunnan is a part of continental Southeast Asia and plays an important role in linking China to its neighbors. In exchange, the cities of Ruili and Jinghong, each of which has a new mosque, cordially welcome Burmese Muslims. In Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai, many Yunnanese Muslims, who had left China in the nineteenth century and before 1949, contribute to the revival of Islamic history in this part of Southeast Asia. Yunnanese Hui are still resident in Thailand and Burma.



Yunnan Moslem Family Group.

The father Muh Ta-tie was in Talifu at the time of the Mohammedan rebellion.
Islam In China, a Neglected Problem by Marshall Broomhall, London 1910.

Chapter 5

The Hui in Northern Thailand and Burma (Myanmar). Burmese Muslims in Yunnan

Historic links exist between Yunnan Province and the countries neighboring it. Shared economic and cultural exchanges cause this province and the region, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to prosper. Thailand is very close to Yunnan, the Thai having been influenced by both the Chinese and Khmer civilizations. Numerous authors currently accept the idea of a common origin of the Thai and their kin around Dali Lake; however, the Charles Backus's study of the Nanzhao Kingdom contradicts this thesis.

In South China, there is a long tradition of Muslim presence, and Marco Polo mentions Muslims in Yunnan. They came from Central Asia with Kublai Khan's armies in 1253 and contributed to Yunnan's main wave of Islamization during the thirteenth century.

The Yunnanese Admiral Zheng He and his historiographer, Ma Huan, traveled extensively in Southeast Asia. Ma Huan, from Zhejiang, accompanied the admiral on three expeditions into Southeast Asia and further. They both visited twenty countries described by Ma Huan. The voyages of Zheng He, under the patronage of Emperor Yongle (1402–24), and the writings of Ma Huan contributed to the maritime knowledge of Southeast Asia, Arabia, Yemen, and northwest Africa. Maritime and land routes of cultural and commercial exchanges, afterwards called the "Silk Road," linked Canton and Yunnan with Southeast Asia and Thailand. The Arabs, building their maritime network, established the first encounter of Islamization with south China, and indirectly with Yunnan, a landlocked province. This province is tributary to its land routes and the Mekong River to communicate with Thailand.

Northern Thailand and Hui from Yunnan

Yunnan neighbors four Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. Not easily navigable because of its only recently opened Mekong marked historical links between China (Jinghong) and northern Thailand. The relationship with Yunnan (formerly Nanzhao) over centuries, well before the arrival of the Thai in the Valley of the Second World War, Muslim caravans traveled back and forth between the two countries products during the dry winter season (see map 1).

Yunnanese Muslims began to settle in northern Siam (Thailand). In Thailand, dialect and religion define the “Ho” better than the Chinese symbols, geographical origin, surname, and occupation enable migrants albeit with difficulty. The Hui in Thailand are sometimes called “Muslim” (*khon Islam*) as the Malays of the southern provinces are called *Ho*, also written *Haw* or *Chin-Ho*. This ethnonym means “Muslim” and is loosely given to other Yunnanese people in Thailand. The Thai ethnonym of the Hui. In this study “Ho” means Muslim. In Thailand, “Ho” are not known as Hui, a name probably coined in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). The Liao Dynasty (907–1125). However in Chiang Mai Muslims self-designated as Hui.

“Ho” are esteemed for their honesty and their good knowledge. They use to communicate with minorities such as Hani, Lisu, and Miao. Mandarin and Yunnanese continues to be the most important languages above thirty years. An important issue is Chinese education. In Chiang Mai (and in Mandalay), but in the countryside and small cities, Chinese schools is a matter of serious concern for the parents. Government-financed, and Thai-ification is stronger and stronger. A Thai scholar Tan (2004: 41), found the Chinese “more assimilated because of their good knowledge.”

“Ho” identity depends on the interlocutor. Whether someone in Thailand generally says: “I am Thai Muslim.” To a Westerner, they say “Ho” identity. Thus because of the Ho’s excellent knowledge of the Thai and Chinese (comparable to the Panthays’ proficiency in Burmese), “Ho” identity may be chosen according to the interactive situation.

The installation of Muslim merchants in the region followed the Muslim caravans around the eighth century. In the thirteenth century, Islam came to Yunnan from the north. Under the dynamic Mongol push, the first

began to settle in Chiang Mai. Trading by way of caravans is intimately linked to the history of Islam from its origin onwards. The large number of Muslims in the armies of Kublai Khan permitted the arrival of merchant co-religionists in Yunnan.

As mentioned by Andrew Forbes in his study of Yunnanese “Ho” (1988) these Muslims set up associations of merchant guilds. Muslim traders were numerous and caravans of two hundred animals were not rare. *Mafu* muleteers generally led ten mules and were able to fight to defend themselves and their company against attacks. Before the twentieth century in Yunnan, Thailand, and Ava (Burma), it was common to encounter bands of bandits *en route*. Muslim community and mosques provided assistance and places of rest on the road.

Caravan goods, among other products, included musk and precious metals from China in bar or powder form. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Yunnan exported tea, opium, bars of iron and lead, silver pieces, copper utensils (often coming from Sichuan), salt, and clothing. Sandalwood from Mojiang and fossil-wood were commodities in demand in the region.

Thailand furnished cotton, ivory, vegetable gums, European products, gold and silver dust, areca nuts, and swallows’ nests (the white ones being more costly). Burma also exported these products, particularly precious stones including rubies, jade, and amber. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, South China consumed large quantities of areca nuts and betel leaves. Yunnan’s tropical zone, Sipsong Panna (Xishuang Banna), exported the produce of its ricefields and immense forests. Chinese medicinal products were, and still are, especially prized in Southeast Asia. In 1872, Rocher cited some European products sold in Yunnan in the bazaar at Kaiyuan, Linan: children’s toys (nowadays they are exported from China to Western countries), needles and thread, and matches.

Products coming from the south, from such places as Yuanjiang, Mojiang, and Puer, were stocked in warehouses at Kunyang (now Jinning). Rocher also mentions its numerous storehouses south of Dian Lake near Kunming, where a market took place every five days. This frequency of markets still exists in Tongguan, halfway between Puer and Yuanjiang.

In Mojiang, I interviewed one of the last surviving Muslim muleteers (a Sufi) who died at the age of seventy-five. His life became boring when the border with Burma closed in 1949. Before that the road was fascinating and included dangers, but he became rich enough to educate his daughters (not common at that time) and sons. In January 2003, his youngest daughter married the son of a Jahariya Haji from Simao, the grandson of Imam Ma Wensi.

Continuing their route to Thailand, caravans took more than two months to reach Moulmein by way of Tak and Mae Sot, and three months to return to Bangkok via Uttaradit and Nakhon Sawan. Between Menghai and Chiang Mai, there were seven hundred to a thousand mule trains a year. The caravans were centered round a network of Yunnanese mosques: Kunming, Yuxi, Tonghai (outside the principal caravan route), Mojiang, Puer, Simao, and Menghai. In the Buddhist Dai principality of Jinghong (Cheli), Muslims were not numerous. Caravans disappeared, but links among Muslims were kept up along the route by ancient staging-places and mosques.

During the Second World War, a few thousand “Ho” lived in Thailand. The last important Hui immigration into northern Thailand took place in 1949–50 when the Guomindang (Kuomintang) armies, including many Muslims, left China. After the war, some Hui went to Taiwan. China closed its borders, but solidarity among Yunnanese Hui remained unchanged.

In 1960–70, during the anti-Communist period in Thailand, it was unadvisable to reveal one’s Yunnanese origins, and this was so up until the end of the American War in Vietnam in 1975. Communism was outlawed, as in many countries of Southeast Asia (except obviously in North Vietnam and Laos). Few Muslims succeeded in crossing the border from Yunnan to rejoin their relatives and friends between 1950 and 1990.

After the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the political and diplomatic situation improved between China and Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, the borders eventually reopened, and Thailand restarted its good relations with Yunnan. Around 1995, the Bank of Thailand was the first foreign bank established in Kunming. Thai Airways scheduled flights from Kunming to Chiang Mai and Bangkok. Thai businessmen and tourists from Bangkok entered Yunnan. This did not modify the post-war sedentary habits of the “Ho” of Chiang Mai who were too “Thai-ified.” They did not resume their ancient back and forth travels over the border. However, some Yunnanese imams were able, in small numbers, to enter northern Thailand.

The social dynamism of the “Ho” goes beyond the build-up of the Islamic community. Their knowledge in matters of trade with China makes them indispensable. Thanks to the network of mosques, they are also part of the Muslim world. The mosques create a network of social and economic relations. In Chiang Mai and Moulmein, numerous mosques, sectors of the Yunnanese network, have survived over the centuries and are supported by an important Islamic community. In the early 1980s, according to the national statistics mentioned by Omar Farouk, there

were eleven mosques in Chiang Mai Province. Two are of Chinese origin and the others are Bengali and Indian. In the city of Chiang Mai there are currently four mosques: the main Chinese mosque (Ban Ho or Wanghe), San Pa Koi Mosque and its Koranic school of 150 students (30% female) including Chinese from mainland China, Changkran Mosque, and Chang Phuak (Pké) Mosque. The two last places of worship include Bengalis from Moulmein who speak Thai, Urdu, and a little English.

Haji Ma Hongming is a Thai Muslim of Yunnanese origin born in Chiang Mai, a former student of San Pa Koi, who studied for ten years at Medina University with a scholarship from the government of Saudi Arabia (1993–2003). His Koranic studies are exemplary, and he is fluent in Thai (his mother tongue), Arabic, and Chinese. He completed his secondary education in Arabic, but did not get a university degree. Arabic is a difficult language and to master the Koran is not easy. It is a dream for many “Ho” in Chiang Mai to study the Koran abroad, but only 10% of the students of San Pa Koi, also called Attaqwa Mosque, belong to the Muslim community of Chiang Mai. However, the influence of Thai culture is strong, and as in modern China, the power of money is attractive.

Mae Sai and Chiang Rai were crossed by Guomindang (KMT) troops in 1949. There are Muslim KMT villages that were established west of Chiang Mai around Mae Hong Son. They no longer have links with Bangladesh. Chiang Rai and Tak have two Yunnanese mosques; Lampang, Mae Hong Son, and Nakhon Sawan each have one. The Central Committee of Islamic Affairs of Bangkok is much more concerned about Muslims in the southern Thai provinces (this is even so in 2004). Insurgency or “violence” in the south is one of the main media themes in 2004). The Thai Central Committee of Islamic Affairs does not keep statistics on the small Yunnanese mosques in the villages of northern Thailand.

The Hui of Yunnan (now “Ho”) generally settle in the same suburb in Mae Sai, Chiang Rai, and Chiang Mai. The “Ho” number 40,000 in the northern provinces and Bangkok. Other Thai Chinese, such as the Chaozhou (Teochiu) from Guangdong, are numerous in Chiang Mai. They control the business of medicinal plants coming from Xishuang Banna. Hui expatriates are also among Chinese residents who have developed the economy of Southeast Asia. They still consider themselves Yunnanese, even if the young generations are Thai-ified by the state education system. Yunnanese fraternity is strong. A tradition of mutual help exists, and the mosque, around which all Yunnanese come together, furnishes assistance

and logistics, thereby entering indirectly into the dynamism of exchange. Chiang Mai is the main Hui center of migration into Thailand.

Chiang Mai's Yunnanese Mosque

Chiang Mai, founded in 1296, was the capital of the Lanna Kingdom for nearly three hundred years. Except for periods of trouble, between 1556 and 1775, and during the nineteenth century, the Muslim presence played an important role in the economic and cultural movement linking Yunnan and northern Siam. Chiang Mai has been the administrative center of northern Thailand since 1775.

The architecture (photo 25) and the decoration of Chiang Mai's main mosque (built in 1915), called *Qingzhensi* (Pure and True Mosque) or Wanghe or Ban Ho, clearly display its Yunnanese origins. A rich Yunnanese named Cheng (1871–1964) built this mosque. It seems that an older Muslim place of worship was already there. This donor's fortune enabled him to acquire immense land holdings, later sold to the Chiang Mai administration for the construction of the city's airport. The commercial potential of this rich founder ensured the central position of this mosque near the Night Bazaar. Several *halal* restaurants have been constructed nearby (see "Pearl" life-story hereafter). Mr. Lu also contributed to the prosperity of the Yunnanese Islamic community. This Yunnanese Muslim partly financed the Chiang Mai-Lamphun railway.

Another construction, the *madrassa* at San Pa Koi, already mentioned, is also impressive and indicates the interest of Saudi Arabia in promoting Islam and the teaching of Koran (more than a hundred students in average). China has understood the importance of studying Arabic in the Middle East, but for some reason the Islamic Association of Yunnan was not yet able to take full advantage of this golden geopolitical opportunity to enrich gifted Hui students.

Another prosperous "Ho" village, Ban Yan, exists near Chiang Mai. Its large mosque is located next to the Koranic school (Mote 1967). Imams are not called Ahong, as in Yunnan, but simply "imam."

Muslims from Yunnan

Many social-cultural changes have occurred throughout the years; the "Ho" preference for green tea, however, remains unchanged except for the younger generations.

In Chiang Mai, the presence of Indian Muslims, and the intermarriage of Hui with Thai women converted to Islam, resulted in a certain liking for black tea (Thai, Indian, or Malay) often mixed with milk.

New generations have had a good level of instruction in Thai, and it is not unusual for the most studious to obtain university diplomas. In 2004, many of Muslim lawyers in southern Thailand have come from Chiang Mai. This demonstrates the economic level and the prestige of the Muslim community in northern Thailand. The relations of these “assimilated” Muslims with the Provincial and National Committees of Islamic Affairs are excellent. The young Muslims whose grandparents are from Yunnan cannot be called *Khaaek* (foreigners); but their brothers in the four southern provinces, Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun are classified “non-assimilated” by the Thai administration, for they are still strongly influenced by the Malays of Perlis and Kedah.

Named in 1938, the first “Ho” imam recorded by Wanghe Mosque Chiang Mai or Ban Ho Mosque, is Ma Yuting. Li Renfu replaced him in 1957, himself succeeded by Yang Genhus in 1977. In 1996, during our investigation, late Haji Na Shunxing, promoted imam in 1984, was replaced by a 40-year-old imam from Jingdong, a former Koranic student in Weishan and Mandalay, Ma Qinzheng (photo 24).

The following life histories of these “Ho” show a past mobility. The short biography of Imam Na, born in Tonghai in 1919, illustrates this. Taking advantage from the confusion linked to the events and epidemics of Second World War in Yunnan, he set out with three comrades. They followed the caravan route Puer, Simao, Jinghong, Menghai, Mengban, Kengtung (Burma), and Mae Sai. At the Thai border, a Yunnanese friend took them by truck to the mosque at Chiang Rai, and from there they went to Chiang Mai, where Imam Na resided. His first wife died in Kunming in 1980. He had a son from this marriage who is still in China. His older brother and his family are in Yunnan, in Xiping, and his sister resides in Eshan. In 1983, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and this helped him to gain charge of the mosque in 1984.

Hui often marry local women. In 1955, he married a Thai Muslim from Chiang Mai, who gave him five sons and two daughters. His household, situated in the mosque, resembled that of the Thai. This imam had, in fact, three identities: Muslim, Yunnanese, and Thai. He was mainly a Muslim Thai citizen (*Thai Islam*) but never forgot his Yunnanese origin. He died in 2001 and is buried in Chiang Mai’s Muslim cemetery (photo 27).

The new Yunnanese imam, a bachelor, lived many years in Burma and Thailand. He stresses his Hui identity and does not want to be called “Ho” although he speaks Thai and can preach in this language.

These former Hui people of Yunnan like to find themselves among their Chinese compatriots, and the elders like to speak their provincial dialect (*Yunnan hua*). Their children and grandchildren of the second third generation are educated in Thai public schools, but learn to read the Koran in the mosque. “Ho” people above the age of thirty still speak Chinese.

On 13 October 1996, five days after the funeral service for a rich merchant, Yuan Xinchang (1917–96), Imam Na was in charge of the funeral commemoration. Two widows and the grandchildren of the deceased are Thai Islam, but his friends remain Yunnanese and speak Chinese with a southern accent. Their roots are in Yunnan.

The following short biography of a woman also demonstrates the intimate family relations between the Chinese province and northern Thailand. One of the individuals responsible for the *halal* restaurants, near the Yunnanese mosque at Ban Ho, called “Pearl,” a borrowed name derived from her Chinese name (photo 31). In 1928, just before the economic crisis, her parents migrated to Thailand and left Yuxi, with their first two daughters. For more than seven hundred years, Muslims have settled in this city, south of Kunming, known for its ancient mosques and its large tobacco factory established before 1949.

“Pearl” was born in 1929 in Chiang Mai, like her younger two sisters, and life must not have been easy for this family of five children. In 1948, at the age of 19, she married a 43-year-old Muslim from Kunming, who had left his parents and sister and went alone to Thailand. He was a good husband and gave her ten children. His death in 1982 produced a shock, and twenty days later “Pearl” lost an older sister. In 1990, another sister (a nurse) also died, adding to her distress. In 1996, the feeling of a family-community was still strong. “Pearl,” her two sisters, her younger son aged 38 (the ninth in the family), her youngest daughter and her granddaughters work in her restaurant near the mosque. She will be succeeded by a daughter (acting as second now). The eldest son plays also a role of protector—he lives at the site (Thai education weakens the Yunnanese language and identity but provides work). Another son works in a bank in Lampang. A daughter-in-law, also Muslim, is a teacher. Thai-ification obliges. The oldest grandson, aged 21, enlisted in the Thai Army.

Pearl’s 28-year-old-niece in Virginia. She married an American resident, Mr. Ma, who studied in the US. From Yunnan and Chiang Mai, Pearl’s family returned

to the place of origin of the tobacco from Yuxi, Virginia, but not to Yuxi itself. In time, family links are cut. “Pearl” never forgets her Hui origin; her dream in 1997 was once again to see her cousin, Chen Zhongyi in Yuxi. Between 1950 and 1998, she had no news of her family in Yunnan. Finally, in 1999, she went to Kunming where one of her granddaughters stayed for a while, but she did not even travel to Yuxi, the family birthplace, and in 2000 she visited her family in Virginia. She is faithful to Islam but has no intention of going to Mecca; she is too busy with the restaurant and her family. In 2004, at age 74, she feels a little bit tired but every day around eleven o’clock she goes to the restaurant to take care of the finances. “Ho” and Hui are Chinese, and business is important.

Chiang Mai’s Muslims are faithful to their Islamic community but retain a Chinese entrepreneurial spirit. The solidarity of the Chinese in Thailand, including Muslims and Akhas (Hani in China) is strong. “Ho” are distinguished from other Muslims by their Yunnanese dialect, a distinctive cultural trait. Religion and ethnic origin contribute to construct their strong identity in Chiang Mai. Numerous *qingzhen* (*halal* in Arabic) restaurants around the principal mosque are also part of their culture. Sometimes, Yunnan is more important, but their Islamic faith is their most distinctive trait. They also have common concerns with the Chinese such the pre-eminence of the ancestors. Some are descendants of those who fled Yunnan at the end of the nineteenth century following the rebellions. Marriage also plays a role; contrary to the Akha, Hui do not give their daughters in marriage to Han. Hui, Chinese, or Akha origin counts less in northern Thailand than in Bangkok. “Ho” Muslims benefit from their good relations with omnipresent Buddhism in Thailand. Concerning Islam, northern Thailand is under the influence of Yunnan and Burma, whereas the south is culturally attached to the Malay language.

For hundreds of years the “Ho” of northern Thailand succeeded in keeping the tradition, *sunna*, their culture and, in particular, their Yunnanese dialect among the elder generation. The closure of the Chinese border between 1950 and 1990 separated the Hui in China from the “Ho.” These relations are normalized, even if there are no longer any *mafu* and caravans. For Islam in Chiang Mai, it is no longer the Yunnanese link that is most important in the twenty-first century but the dynamic network of Thai and “Indian” mosques linked to Bangladesh, Burma, and Mecca.

It is very convenient for Yunnanese to go on pilgrimage to Mecca via Chiang Mai and Bangkok, but many continue to travel via Beijing. They were twenty in the 1920s, twenty-three in 1923. Between 1950 and 1980, no Yunnanese Hui went

on pilgrimage. However, more than 2,000 went on pilgrimage in 1987; at present, there are more than 6,000 Yunnanese pilgrims each year. It is now easy to obtain a passport valid for some months and a visa and to take a plane for Bangkok to Saudi Arabia for 20,000 RMB (3000 Euros). Yunnan has once again become an important departure point for pilgrimages as it was before 1940.

Contrary to their elders, the younger “Ho” generation, under pressure from the Indian world and Thai official teaching, are relatively more influenced by the Islamic world than by Yunnan, the land of their ancestors, a dynamic but landlocked province. The *halal* restaurants in Chiang Mai are not so Yunnanese but rather Thai Islam, although the Chinese policy of economic opening has reinforced the Yunnanese identity of the “Ho” in Mae Sai and Chiang Mai. It is no longer the “Ho” who play a significant economic role in northern Thailand but the Chaozhou (Teochiu) of Guangdong, resident in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. The former Muslim prosperity is in decline in northern Thailand. Tourism by air from Yunnan is in the hands of Han businessmen who eventually advertise their flights in Shuncheng Mosque at Kunming.

Through Mandalay and Dehong, Burmese Muslims of Indian origin benefit also from the development of border relations between Southeast Asia and Yunnan. They came in large numbers to settle in Ruili (Shuili in Burmese) and in Jinghong, in Xishuang Banna.

Burmese Muslims in Yunnan

Islam has been recorded in Burma (Ava) since the ninth century. Islamization occurred by sea. It was linked to maritime commerce, which initially, before the Portuguese establishment in Macao, was controlled by the Arabs. As in China, the mosques synthesized the Asiatic and Muslim style, but Arabic is a dead language for the region’s Muslims, both Burmese and Hui. As in Yunnan, the Muslim elite speaking Arabic is negligible in Southeast Asia.

In 1287, the capture of Pagan by Mongol armies, commanded by and consisting partly of Muslims among other groups, opened the way to pacification and harmonious relations with Yunnan.

Yunnanese Hui in Burma (often called “Panthay” or “Panthe”) managed ancient mule caravans. The name Panthay has an obscure origin and occupies an entire page of *Hobson-Jobson* and three pages of *The Islamic Encyclopedia*. For Anderson,

citing Phayre, it derived from Persian (*Phaarsi* in Hindi). Others, like Sladen, believe that it probably refers to a Burmese etymology. The term *Pathi* designates in Burmese rich Indian Muslims. All these etymologies are not scientific enough. However, the Muslim rebellion of Du Wenxiu against the Manchu was called “Panthay Uprising.” The name “Panthay” was adopted by Westerners and almost disappeared except in ethnological literature, although it has come into fashion among Hui resident in Burma. However they continue to identify themselves as Hui. China influences Southeast Asia and being Chinese is in fact prestigious in the region.

Muslims and Yunnanese were welcomed by the Burmese, and their descendants are numerous in Mandalay. Chinese are not “foreigners” in Myanmar. “Panthays” live also in the Shan States, Bhamo, Lashio, Taunggyi, Kengtung, and near the ruby mines of Mogok (west of Lashio). The Salween and Irrawaddy Rivers were their main penetration routes. Many left Yunnan in 1873–74 for Burma and in 1949–50 for Thailand. The “Panthay” population is currently approaching 50,000. Contrary to Muslims of Indian origin in Burma, they have no Muslim association to support them (in Mandalay the Cultural Association in a space offered by the government of Myanmar is above all Han Chinese). The border with China was closed for more than thirty years, and “Panthays” were dependent on their mosques, *madrasa*, and Chinese-type associations. Since their mothers are Burmese, it is more difficult for second and third generation “Ho” to be fluent in Chinese. Burmese schools do not teach Chinese. All the Chinese schools are private but numerous (in Lashio, Mandalay, Mogok and near the Chinese border). Only educated “Panthays” migrate to work in Ruili in large Burmese enterprises. Burmese Muslims in Yunnan are not fluent in Burmese or Chinese.

The Chinese community is important in Burma and comprises more than a million or 3% of the total population. They mainly come from three provinces: Fujian, Guangdong, Yunnan, and, without mentioning Mandarin, some speak four Chinese regional languages: Hokkien, Cantonese, Chaozhou, and Yunnanese. Except for the rare student who attends a Chinese university, their Burmese citizenship and the closing of Chinese schools in 1966 caused the “Burmanization” of the younger generation, which is less fluent in *Putonghua* and regional Chinese languages.

Muslims from Yunnan (Panthays) do not participate in Burmese politics, but are fully considered citizens of Burma, contrary to their Arakanese “brothers.” In 1993, 17,000 of these Rohingya returned to Arakan. This region is bordered by the Bay of Bengal and by Chittagong District (north) and has mountains difficult

to cross, the Yoma Arakan to the east. After the Second World War, Arakan was divided into two parts for the first time: the north is predominantly Muslim, and the south Buddhist. Many of these Arakanese Muslims fled to India, to East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). The State Council for the Restoration of Law and Order (SLORC), renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, is accepted by a large part of the Burmese Buddhist monks. The Burmese generals retain solid links of friendship with their powerful neighbor, China. These relations have taken on a more formal aspect since the end of the twentieth century. As a result, there is a significant migration of Burmese citizens toward China, along the route Mandalay-Bhamo-Ruili-Baoshan-Dali-Kunming.

The Hui, who once traveled between Yunnan and Burma, are replaced nowadays by Burmese Muslim traders in Ruili, Jinghong, and Kunming. They move in small groups from place to place in Yunnan. Their common language for communication is Burmese. Many speak Urdu. They wear Burmese clothing, learn a smattering of Chinese, and their principal business is jade. The majority population is of Indian origin and some are Arakanese (called Rohingya or Rohinga). These Muslims practice their religion in China without constraint. Since the 1980s, they settled by the hundreds in Ruili in Dai Jingpo Dehong Prefecture. Immigration formalities became more complicated in the 1990s. Arakanese, such as Mohammed Husein Qadiriaya d'Akyab, do not experience discriminatory measures in Yunnan as sometimes occurred in their own country. The Rohingya have no Burmese citizenship, contrary to Muslims of Indian origin. The principal activity of the Burmese Muslims is the retail sale of jade, but they can also be restaurant owners, like a Haji who prospered for ten years in Ruili thanks to his *halal* establishment. Others are spice merchants, such as an Indo-Burmese Muslim from Lashio.

Among Yunnanese who migrated to Burma, Purcell notes that the education of children of mixed couples Chinese-Burmese, was in Chinese for boys and in Burmese for girls. In Mandalay Panthay boys and girls now study Chinese after their classes in government schools. Chinese culture and education is also very strong in Lashio where a Yunnanese mosque constitutes a landmark on the road linking Ruili to Mandalay. Burmization is strong but Chinese culture is resistant compared to Indian cultural influence, except in Rangoon where Burmese of Indian and Pakistani origin are numerous. In the past ten years Hindi and Urdu have increasingly been replaced by Burmese language. There is no school teaching Hindi or Urdu in Myanmar, private teachers in these languages are rare and cannot find students willing to have an Indian education. However, all Muslim children study the Koran, even if the Burmese mother is not devout. There is no limitation

before the age of sixteen as in China for Muslim education. There are hundreds of madrasa in Myanmar's capital.

John Anderson mentions that in the nineteenth century Chinese merchants in Burma were generally Muslims, except for a few dealers in ham. Dali was formerly reached after a month's travel from Rangoon. From 1855 to 1873, during the years of Muslims resistance, border traffic was often disrupted except between Dali and Tengyue, which was controlled by Du Wenxiu. The Chinese of Lower Burma complained because for many years they could not buy products from Canton (Guangdong) and the black market was hazardous.

At the end of the civil war, despite the attempts of the Viceroy of Yunnan, cross-border trade did not resume before the 1880s. The Governor of Yunnan sent a message to the King of Burma announcing the end of hostilities and asking to resume cross-border traffic. At the end of the century, the British, installed in the Shan States and Tengyue, made every effort to allow a recovery of the economy. In the twenty years between 1855 and 1875, Yunnan lost half of its population during the civil war and the subsequent plague, and this explains why the recovery of the province's economy was so slow. In the years following 1873, the elimination of Muslims was the principal cause of the stagnation of border traffic, which they had controlled for centuries. Chinese, assisted by Yi (Lolo) and Lisu muleteers, replaced them. Hui who remained faithful to the imperial regime, in Kunming and in northeastern Yunnan, were untouched by this draconian social change. Thus the trans-provincial economy between Yunnan and Guizhou was not heavily disrupted. In 1900, the construction of the railroad between Hanoi and Kunming, which employed many Hui, completely changed cross-border trade and commerce.

Few Muslims took part in the exploitation and transportation of rubies, and in 1926 the mines at Mogok became less important. Generally, Hui were not involved in jade exports to China from Myitkyina and Bhamo. Today, the most beautiful pieces of jade are sent to Shanghai and Hong Kong. Ruili is the only city in Yunnan with small jade manufacturing plants. Jinghong, has a secondary retailing role. The jade business is the principal activity of Burmese Muslims in Yunnan. Their population approaches roughly 1,000 in Ruili, 500 in Jinghong and in Kunming, and 100 in Lancang ranging on a new east-west road toward Simao.

At the end of the nineteenth century, a few thousand Yunnanese, including Muslims, were resident in Bhamo and Mandalay. Vincent Scott O'Connor and Purcell believed that between 1890 and 1930 border exchanges resumed between Yunnan and Bhamo.

In 1931, out of a total population of 14 million in Burma, there were 193,500 Chinese expatriates. Approximately 90,000 were born in China (and many in Yunnan), others in Mandalay, the Shan States, and Rangoon.

The road from Dali to Bhamo was closed (by the Japanese) in 1942. Shortly before its closure, a small number of Yunnanese returned to their country. With the view of attacking China and preparing for the eventual capture of Yunnan (which failed), the Japanese built the first road from Namkham to the Chinese border, Ruili. This new route accelerated the traffic and became the modern Burma Road.

At present, the Lashio slip road is a main route to enter Yunnan. During the Second World War, the Dali-Baoshan section was considerably improved. In Yunnan, the Burma Road was upgraded and lined with trucks for the first time during 1943–45. In 2002–05 this strategic road became a highway.

The influence of Yunnanese Islam, based on cross-border historic relations with continental Southeast Asia, deteriorated after the Second World War. Burma became independent on 4 January 1948. On 1 October 1949, the Communist Party seized power in China. Numerous Muslims, particularly those who had served in the armies of the Kuomintang, crossed from Yunnan to Thailand and Taiwan. The actual “Ho” population in Thailand is close to 40,000. In 1988, Omar Farouk stated that their number varied between 20,000 and 100,000 according to the sources of information available. Beginning from 1980–85, the opening of Yunnan and the establishment of a socialist market economy (*shehuizhuyi shichang*) brought many Muslims from Burma to Yunnan. They settled mainly in Ruili and Jinghong.

A Burmese Imam in Yunnan

The mosque at Ruili was constructed in 1987 by a 40-year-old imam, Wali Ali, whose family was originally from Rangpur in India. He had already more than ten years of experience as an imam in Toungoo, where he replaced his father in a mosque halfway between Rangoon and Mandalay. When he was in Ruili, the Islamic Association of Yunnan attempted several times to replace him by a Chinese Ahong in charge of the mosque at Ruili. These frequently attempts failed because of the Burmese imam’s diplomacy and his profound knowledge of the Koran; numerous Hui candidates blundered and thus assured his continuance in his post. Around 1991 to 1992, the main aged imam of Dali was obliged to leave the mosque. Neither Hui nor Burmese Muslims accepted his controversial character and his lack of Koranic knowledge. In 1992, a second imam came to take charge of the mosque and, unlike Imam Ali, he received a salary from the Islamic Association of Yunnan. The second

Ahong was later dismissed because of dishonesty. A third Chinese imam arrived in 1996; Ali took advantage of this new event to travel to India and Pakistan with the Islamic Association of Burma. The latest Hui imam now permanently resides in the new mosque, on the front of which is not inscribed with the character *Qingzhen*, as on all the mosques of China, but *Chaozhendian* (Temple of Meditation) as on some Taoist temples. This is a strange case of Sinicization for a place of worship initially constructed by an imam from Burma.

At age fifty-five, Imam Ali is now in Jinghong, where he has very good relations with his Chinese colleague in charge of the mosque. As in Ruili, the mosque at Jinghong is newly reconstructed. Two or three of the nine children of Imam Ali are married. His oldest son, a trader, resides in Ruili. Jinghong is far from Namkham where his spouse lives with the younger children. To go to Namkham, it takes three days and three nights from Jinghong by Kunming; ten years ago it would have taken eight days. Since the 1980s the road along the Burmese border has been good and it takes only four days, but it is necessary to change buses quite often.

In Ruili, a Haji of Indian origin replaced Ali (as new religious head of the Burmese community). Another Arabic scholar is a merchant from Lashio who surprisingly chose Chinese education for his children. In Ruili, only two Burmese families educate their children in Chinese.

The small Burmese Muslim community of Jinghong is mainly composed of jade dealers. Far from the extraction sites around Mandalay, these businessmen are less prosperous than their compatriots in Ruili. In order to survive, a supply of artificial jade coming from Southeast Asia is also sold. These Burmese Muslims are most often of Indian origin, but a number of them are Arakanese.

There are immigration problems for these residents; it is no longer possible to have long-term resident visa as in 1980, and all Burmese residents are required to report to the Immigration Department frequently. However they come from far away to open a shop in Yunnan, even Burmese-Indian Muslims from Rangoon are present in Ruili and Jinghong.

Let us now turn to cross-border relations. Four years ago and accompanied by ten faithful followers, Sha Jiyun went to Burma. This young imam in charge of Jinghong's mosque visited the Muslims of Kengtung. Imam Sha is distinguished by his intellectual curiosity and good knowledge of Burmese Islam. However, it was neither the ancient Sufi networks of Mojiang nor the Yunnanese mosque at Kengtung that interested him but the setting up of cooperation with orthodox Burmese Muslims

linked to the official Islamic Bureau. These relations finally became a mere formality. China prefers to open a sole customs entry per country in Southeast Asia. Yunnan favors Ruili as the Burmese commercial gateway. Jinghong, linked to Thailand by air, cannot consequently increase its economic and cultural relations with Kengtung. These Yunnanese Hui were, nevertheless, the first to go from Jinghong in a mixed delegation of men and women to Kengtung to visit their Muslim “brothers.” In 2000, the Burmese Muslims and the local Islamic Association of Kengtung, linked to the General Council of the Islamic Associations of Burma, sent fifty Muslims to Jinghong. Consideration of exchange permitted the Islamic Association of Xishuang Banna to prove that constructing a new mosque can improve relations between the Yunnanese Muslim Association and Southeast Asia and have a certain cultural impact as well. The Burmese Muslims of Kengtung, on the other hand, went in large number to Jinghong, paving the way for migration to Yunnan, a prosperous province. Dai friends of Menghai, in Xishuang Banna, also dream of going to Burma to participate in holy Buddhist pilgrimage; they seem to have no other motivation.

Among the Burmese cities, Mandalay has only Rangoon as a competitor. Kengtung, despite its remote geographical situation, is another land access from Yunnan to Taunggyi and Rangoon. Hui (Panthay), still in large numbers in Burma, have founded mosques to construct a network for Muslim caravans that have been a feature of life since the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Yunnanese mosques still exist in Kengtung, Mandalay (also *madrassa*, but the majority of the students are not Chinese), Mogok (also *madrassa*), Rangoon, and in many cities close to the Yunnanese border. †

Mandalay and Kengtung: Yunnanese Muslims in Burma

Like their co-religionists on the Silk Road in Central Asia, Yunnan’s Muslims have always traveled. For mule caravans, one month was necessary from Dali-Xiaguan to the Burmese border. The road passed through remarkable points. Before arriving in Yongping, it was necessary to go over two suspended bridges, and that took about eight days. Two days later, one crossed the Mekong River. A day later, the main stage before reaching Burma was the Yongchang Prefecture (now Baoshan). Three days later, the Salween River was crossed. The region was called “Death Valley” because of its deadly environment. It took another five days to reach the custom city of Tengyue (Momein for the Burmese), now Tengchong. After having passed the market of Guyong and one of the highest passes of the whole trip, at more than 2,500 meters, one arrived in the small border village of Ganbatian after five days.

From there, in two days, the Irrawaddy, a navigable river down to Rangoon, and the railway linked the capital from Myitkyina, on the Old Burma Road.

Nowadays, the modern road passes by Luxi and Ruili, the principal border-trading center. Ruili has the most important Burmese Muslim population in Yunnan. From this Sino-Dai city, the road goes to the Shan States, Namkham, Lashio, and Mandalay. Since 1902, Lashio, some 500 kilometers from Dali, has been connected by rail to Mandalay, about 300 kilometers away (linked in six hours by bus).

The last royal city of Burma, a former British colonial capital, links Burma to Yunnan. In a rich plain surrounded by favorable hills. Mandalay, on the bank of the Irrawaddy, became a royal city in 1856 by the decision of King Mindon, who transferred his capital from Amarapura, the “City of the Immortals.” After consulting with astrologers, the construction of Mandalay, the city of the Mandala, took more than two years and was finished before the monsoon season of 1859. The complete transfer of capital took another two years.

The citadel, a magic square of two kilometers on each side, had twelve gates, three on each side, and was protected by a mote. By the southeast “Door of the Dead,” processions left for the Buddhist cremation site. Thanks to Lord Curzon, Governor of India (1899–1905), this royal city was protected until the end of the Second World War when it was targeted by intense bombings.

The modern part of the city and bazaars lie west of the ancient citadel. A Muslim community, centered on several mosques (sixty in 2004) still exists. The new University, an important Buddhist center, indirectly contributes to protecting the regime and, like the Buddhist University of Rangoon, was constructed by Burmese generals. Mandalay’s numerous skilled artisans in silk, wood, and, above all, stones and precious metals long ago drew Chinese and Hui to Mandalay.

It took nearly twenty days by boat to come up from Rangoon, but only some twenty hours to go back down. Travel (except for expensive tourism and local navigation) by boat between Mandalay and Rangoon no longer exists in 2004. The Irrawaddy is the main navigable river of the country. For Scott O’Connor, its beauty, length, and volume made it the most beautiful river in Southeast Asia. Muslims and other Burmese currently travel by bus or by train between these two main cities.

In 1903, Du Wenxiu’s nephew lived in the region and carried on religious and economic links with Dali. An imam from Dali who practiced asceticism, visited this Yunnanese town, and this partly confirms long economic, cultural, and religious ties between Dali and Burma. Haji Nur-ud-Din (Ko-Shwetin), a ruby merchant who had

voyaged in the South Seas and in the Middle East, lived close to the mosque. The later resided in Mogok, north of Mandalay, near the center of ruby production. There is currently a Yunnanese mosque on the same spot. Since his pilgrimage, religion has taken up most of the Haji's time, though he was not an ascetic like the *mullah* at Dali.

China has greatly changed, and now Mandalay looks toward Yunnan. Panthays maintain economic and religious links with the neighboring Chinese province, and perpetuate old historical links with Yunnan. They are also Burmese Chinese, as Tan (2004) has pointed out, who do not want to stress "overseas" Chinese-ness. Their assimilation into Burmese society is very harmonious, and they are well accepted, unlike the Rakhine Muslims (named Rohingya) who may have a longer ancestry but are not citizens of their own country.

Around 300 Panthay families live near the Yunnanese mosque of Mandalay (built in 1868). At present it is the second oldest mosque of the city after Jong Mosque (built in 1862 but reconstructed) and is a major link in the Burmese network of Yunnanese mosques: Kengtung, Myitkina, Bhamo, Mogok, Mandalay, Meiktila, Rangoon, and Moulmein.

Chinese is more resistant than Indian and Pakistani languages Hindi and Urdu. The present linguistic decline of these Indian languages has been significant over the past twenty years. The good level of Chinese of many Panthays in Burma has been achieved thanks to an ethic of hard work, the high level of knowledge of Chinese, and the endeavors of school directors who teach written characters and Putonghua, such as Master Xu Yaotang in Mandalay. He was born in Myikyina, on the Old Burmese Road.

Many Muslims have left Yunnan. In large cities such as Chiang Mai, Kengtung and Mandalay Hui have successfully migrated in the past. Their family links were cut with relatives in Kunming, Dali, Yuxi, and Simao between 1950 and 1980. Rare are the "Ho" and "Panthays" who returned to Yunnan and were able successfully to rebuild new cross-border trade and religious links.

In Yunnan, Burmese Muslims—who are very rarely Panthays—live in Ruili, Jinghong, and Kunming. From there they sometimes travel to Shanghai and Beijing. Their migration route goes through Ruili, Namkham, Lashio, and Mandalay. Bhamo is linked to Mandalay and Rangoon via the Irrawaddy. Myitkyina ("Near the Great River") was a main crossroad before the Second World War. Even though linked by rail with Mandalay and Rangoon, it has now lost its supremacy to Ruili, Lashio, and Mandalay in the Yunnan-Burma connection.

After the end of the nineteenth century, and especially since the end of the Second World War, Yunnanese Muslim merchant networks have been revived by China's current economic boom. However, the closure of the Sino-Burmese border from 1950 to 1988 halted historical cross-border trade with Yunnan. The sealed border contributed to the development two Hui villages near Menghai with their own mosques (Mansaihui and Manluanhui). These Hui (also called Paxidai) speak Tai languages but no longer go to Kengtung.

Educated Hui in Yunnan have changed professions; they are now professors, doctors, or professionals. This has not yet completely changed their habits; some Hui merchants still live in Kunming, Xiaguan, Baoshan, Yuxi, and Simao, but few have resumed business links with Southeast Asia. Han are moving across all continents with great success. The Yunnanese Muslims are certainly modern but have lost their entrepreneurial spirit to trade with Thailand and Burma.

In the 1980s with Deng's reforms, the Muslims and Han of Yunnan adapted to China's extraordinary economic development. This has had a considerable impact on Southeast Asia and, indirectly, on Islam in the region. Thanks to their diligent work, Chinese Muslims have succeeded in urban as well as rural areas, for instance in the region of Tonghai. The Hui are modern, though as other minority people living in the countryside, they do not receive the education and development aid they deserve. Since 1949, and particularly between 1980 and 2000, social change was rapid among the Hui and Uyghur, but religion, traditions, and the family, as always, linked the community at a micro-level.

At present, the grip of a globalization is visible in Yunnan, Southeast Asia, and Xinjiang. Following the attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, wars have rocked the Islamic world and have affected Muslim public opinion in China. The Hui remain silent on internal affairs and are even more muted in their judgment when foreign policy is at issue. But like most students of the Koran, the Hui took sides with their Iraqi "brothers," especially during the first two weeks of the Iraq War when the *Blitzkrieg* scenario was deferred and no weapons of mass destruction discovered. The Hui, like the Uyghurs, were, by an overwhelming majority, opposed to the Iraq War. During three weeks, this conflict was the main program on the Chinese CTV 4 chain, broadcast throughout the world by satellite. Despite Saddam Hussein's defeat, it showed the force of the Muslim community from Beijing to Baghdad and influenced Uyghurs in their autonomous region, Xinjiang.

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Chapter 6

Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Modernization, Sinicization, or Separatism?

Uyghur Territory and the History of Xinjiang

In Chinese Turkistan, history, ethnicity, and Islam must be studied together. The Uygurs currently occupy the Tarim Basin and the perimeter of the immense Taklamakan Desert (see map “China and Central Asia”). Dating from the sixth century, their ancient Chinese names were *Huihu* and *Huihe*. “*Uy*” (oey) meaning “Union” in their Turkic language is the root of the name Uyghur. This ethnonym, more or less abandoned after the Islamization of Turkistan in the twelfth century, was brought back into vogue by Soviet Union and the PRC, which included Uyghurs among its fifty-five minorities. Ancient names such as Sartes or Tarantchis have disappeared (Roy 1997: 182). In 1926, the term Sarte went out of fashion in Soviet Central Asia, but Kazakh authors, such as Ishakov of the Institute for Oriental Studies of Almaty, has used it to designate the Uyghur diaspora.

Since 1 October 1955, Xinjiang has been the Uyghur Autonomous Region. It occupies a sixth of China’s territory, comprising more than a million and a half square kilometers, of which only a small part is cultivated. The landscapes of the Tianshan, Altai, and Pamir Mountains as well as deserts and oases shape this rich and unique region.

Uyghurs distinguish themselves from other Muslim minorities and from the Hui mosaic minority, which is not an ethnic group. They are called “Chinese Muslims” here. As a result of localization (cultural adjustment to a particular geographical environment) at the periphery minorities in Xinjiang can always construct and reconstruct their identity and resist Chinese acculturation. Films from Turkey have an impact in Xinjiang and bring another type of modernization than modern

Sinicization. This chapter will demonstrate that Sinicization is less acculturative among Uyghurs than in Hui society.

Mustapha Kemal Attaturk in 1933 foresaw the possible fragmentation of the Soviet Union, and pointed out the importance of history and language, a sort of framework for the cultural influence of Turkey in Central Asia and Xinjiang (Balci 2003: 65–66). The vernacular Uyghur is a Turkic language, classified with Uzbek in the *chagatay* linguistic group. Following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1981, this main language of Xinjiang is now written in Arabic-Persian script. No formal education is given in this language even though it is the language of the autonomous region. As for the Hui, they speak Chinese with different pronunciations and know Chinese characters; they are modern and ready to take jobs in a country where unemployment is common.

The Uyghurs (*Weiwu'erzu* in modern Chinese) are descendants of the ancient Ugurs, who gave their name and a few religious traditions. They were one of the first peoples speaking a Turkic language in Central Asia, and their Chinese ethnonym *Huihu* continued to be used from the sixth century until the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, their ancestors began their march from Mongolia toward the west. They abandoned their Buddhist and Nestorian faiths, and many cultural traits to become Muslim. Access to a new religion, Islam, thus created historic rupture with the past as the ancient Tais of Weishan, Mengshe, who do not know their district history before its Islamization. This Nanzhao principality, initially *Mengshe*, became Muslim as did the Uyghurs. The ancestors of the Uyghurs were pacifists, but it is generally accepted that the Xiong-nu (Huns) were Turks. However, they spontaneously cooperated with Genghis Khan. Later, Kyrgyz (Qara Kyrgyz) were defeated in 1207. The Uyghurs love justice and hate injustice even more. They are not fanatics but fatalists and artists.

Uyghurs were the major population of the northwestern borderlands of China, which, before Islamization, participated in the long-distance caravan trade. According to the Arabs, their main cultural trait is not political but linguistic (“those who speak Turkic languages”) (Frye 1945: 308–10). They settled down, devoted themselves to agriculture, and also became merchants and skilled artisans. Intellectuals are essential to safeguard this Central Asian culture. Historical novels in Uyghur are one of the rare cultural media shaping modern nationalism. An increasing number of Han, the majority group in the cities, occupy a central position in the administration, industry, and commerce of the Uyghur Autonomous

Region. This urban Chinese transmigration creates resentment among Uyghurs. Thus the villages and their social organization became main cultural safeguards against Sinicization.

The neighborhood forms a major social organization and the Chinese and Uyghur cadres certainly understand its cultural strength. As with the Uzbeks, village endogamy is the rule. People also marry within the same city neighborhood (Petric 2002: 93–94). These marriages are still for the most part arranged by parents and the family. Contrary to the Han, for traditional banquets, men and women are in the same room but at different tables. For religious marriages men and women are clearly separated.

Even though the status of women in the Turkish civilization is high, Olivier Roy (2002) has noticed a regression in Central Asia, following the “indigenization” of the new Islamic republics. In the present Chinese system, and among Uyghurs, women have a high status.

As in all countries, Uyghur children like to play. In winter on the ice and on a hard surface, boys enjoy playing with tops. Girls play with dolls. Before the age of sixteen, all now attend Koranic schools. This is not possible in other regions and provinces of China where this age restriction is respected.

Music, a key element in Uyghur culture, must be learned from an early age. Art and music play an important cultural role in Central Asia and Xinjiang. The masters are esteemed. In Kashgar, parents often make sacrifices for the musical education of their sons. The makers of musical instruments profit from this sociological trend. The *dutar* is a distinctive Uyghur string instrument (1.45 m long) (photo 11). The best *rawap* have resonating drums covered with serpent skins. Other smaller instruments (*kechik dutar*) are also suited for children. *Dutar* and *rawap* are popular (the approximate price in Kashgar is 300 RMB); they contribute to the creation of Uyghur identity. In Xinjiang, Islam and music are intimately linked.

Since the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin era, religion has recovered its traditional place, in particular since 1982. Amidst their agricultural or professional activities, even more than the Hui, the Uyghurs pray five times a day. Because their subsistence economy has been improving since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, a small number of rich merchants and privileged persons of both sexes are able to make the pilgrimage to Mecca once in their lives. That was only a dream in the generation of their grandparents. China never tried to impose non-rogatory local pilgrimages to replace the Islamic pillar as in the Soviet Union.

History

It is striking to observe the absence of an historic past in the collective memory of Central Asia and particularly among Uyghurs (Roy 1997: 243). Kashgar was established more than 2,000 years ago. Two historical facts marked their history: Islamization and the establishment of the PRC in 1949. There is no model of nationalism based on history. Rewriting history in Xinjiang will probably incorporate the values instituted by China, the only ones taught in the public schools. The current vision of history in the state schools favors the Uyghurs more than other minorities, but the final goal remains Sinicization, the propagation of Chinese culture, an acculturation process continuing for 2,000 years.

Sixty years before the present era, under Emperor Xuan Di (73 BCE to 49 BCE), the Chinese sent troops to consolidate the Silk Road. A governor supervised thirty-six principalities north and south of the Tianshan Mountains. In 327 BCE, the Prefecture of Gaochang (*Qocho* in Uyghur) was established in Turfan and under the Tang (618–907), Anxi included Yutian (Khotan) and the Taklamakan.

The Uyghur kingdom, centered in Turfan, was prosperous from the ninth to the seventeenth century. Tolerant Sufism constructed masters's tombs (*Shaik* in Arabic) in sacred Buddhist places. This was the case of *Yiti Qalandar* (Seven Qalandar), buried around Turfan, near the ancient Uyghur Buddhist capitöl Qocho (Khotcho). In other regions of Xinjiang, Sufism was from time to time well accepted. The *Qalandar*, and especially the Qadiriya Order, have played an important role in Islamization. Korla is the site of the mausoleum of Shah Qalandar. These "*Gong-bei*" are sacred places of worship. This Arabic word for "tomb" indicates Muslim mausoleums like that north of Macao where only the toponym survived.

As we can imagine, from the tenth century, Thierry Zarcone thinks that, in Samarkand, Bukhara, and Xinjiang, Sufism had a religious and political role (Popovic 1996: 268). Many princes were themselves Sufi. This type of faith is called "total" Islamization, a strong term also given to African Sufism. Among the Muslim missionaries in Central Asia, a Kubrawiya Shaykh, Burhan ud-din Bukhari, preached in northwest China before traveling in the southern provinces. Sufi masters converted local sovereigns such as Sutuk Kara (Qara) Khan (d. 955). His other name Bughra Khan reminds the Shamanic and totemic origin of his people (*bughra* means camel). This mystic warrior established his capital in Kashgar, a rich oasis at the crossroads of Central Asia, Hindustan, and China. His sacred mausoleum still exists near Kashgar, one of the most traditional of Xinjiang's Uyghur cities. This

Qarakhanides Sultan (also member of the Qarathagliq Order) was the pioneer of Uyghur Islamization under the Naqshbandi banner.

In the fourteenth century, the Qadiriya Order was powerful, and Kashgar became an important center of Islamization. In the sixteenth century, Islam was a unifying factor in East Turkistan. Makdum Azam founded the Naqshbandi branch, and (K)hoja Afaq (d.1694) was a Qadiriya descendant of this line. This sovereign also established the Aqthagliq Party (“White Mountaineers of Kashgar”; in Chinese *Baishanpai*). This Sufi order also powerful in Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai was also called Baimaopai (“White Skullcap Order”). Aksu’s name, “White Water,” suggests an ancient membership in this order. The Aqthagliq were opposed to Qarathagliq (“Black Mountaineers” or “Order of The Black Mountain”), known throughout Central Asia for more than a century. During repressions imposed by the Chinese, these two religious orders took refuge in Ferghana, in the region of Kokand. The masters of these orders were called *tora* and retained a strong Kashgari identity. In 1830, according to Hegel Ishakov (from Almaty), these Uyghur Sufis were more than ten thousand. Russian annexation of this khanate halted Kashgari migration.

During the eighteenth century, the Chinese consolidated their power in East Turkistan. For the Russian authors Melikhov and Miasnikov (1985: 32), the strategy in East Turkistan and Kashgaria of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was an act of “aggression westward-from the Amur across Mongolia, Dzungaria (northern Xinjiang), and Kashgaria to the foothills of the Himalayas.” This statement reflects Chinese and Russian competition in Central Asia. The Khanate of Dzungar was destroyed and Khalka was Sinicized and annexed. In 1716, Chinese armies began to take Turfan. One of the successors of Goldan Tsereng resisted for more than fifteen years until his death in 1745; Amursona, a chief aided by China, seized power there. In 1754, profiting from the troubles, the Qing Dynasty sent troops into the region. Five years later, China annexed the western borderlands. Kashgar was then six months by foot from Peking. More recently, in 1935, Eric Teichman took a month by truck to cover this distance. So, one understands the difficulties for the Chinese to impose their law in this far-off region then called *Xiyu* or “Western Territories.”

Pacification of the southwestern part continued without interruption during 1758–59. The (K)hoja Burhan ed-Din left Kashgar, besieged by imperial troops, and took refuge with a neighboring khan, who decapitated him and sent his head to the Manchu. Khoja Burhan’s brother called the “Small Khoja,” suffered the same fate. The whole of East Turkistan was annexed. Under Qian Long (1736–95), this “Great Accomplishment of the Qing Dynasty” figures among nine other victories. After

the Han and Tang Dynasties, the Manchu, following the same policy, occupied the far-distant western borderlands and assimilated new nationalities. In 1768, the name Xinjiang, “New Territory,” replaced the former name of “Chinese Turkistan.”

Chinese colonization did not prevent the construction of mosques such as that at Turfan (dating to 1778). Its large circular tower of more than 40 meters is remarkable and figures in several books on Islam in China. However, the British explorer Francis Younghusband, during his journeys of 1886–87, found that this “curious” assemblage of earthen bricks resembled a factory chimney and preferred its magnificent door.

For the historian Immanuel Hsu, the Muslim anti-Chinese rebellions of Xinjiang of the eighteenth century were the consequence of the corruption of the local imperial administration. In 1825–28, profiting from the revolts in the provinces of Shanxi and Gansu, Yakub Beg (1820–77), from Kokand in Uzbekistan, replaced Buzurg Khan by force of arms. In 1865, he ordered the construction of Kashgar’s fortifications, a mandatory point of passage toward the Khyber Pass and Lahore at the border of the dominant Sunni world and of a Shiite enclave (Tajik).

Yakub established the “Seven Khanates” and imposed *sharia* law on the whole of Turkistan. In 1869, for a period, China did not control Xinjiang. The English, the Russians, who concluded a treaty with Yakub in 1872, and the Ottomans tried to submit Central Asia to their hegemony and wanted to benefit from independent Kashgaria. The Kashgaria state was recognized by Turkey. The Turks were aided by the nephew of Yakub, Yakub Khan Tore, Ambassador of Kashgar to Istanbul. The Russians also took part of Xinjiang during this period. In 1873, the British were prepared to block Russia, always powerful in Central Asia, and thus, from 1866 to 1878, Kashgaria was a sovereign state, a fact that has contributed to the pride and strong ethnic identity of the Uyghurs in southwestern Xinjiang. Yakub Khan died in 1877; his nephew took refuge in India to pursue his Sufi studies. The Chinese counter-offensive in 1877 brought repression. Kashgari left their country by the hundreds of thousands at the fall of their independent kingdom. Following these events, Islam in Xinjiang became a secular religion without political power.

General Zuo Zongtang, former Governor of Zhejiang and Fujian, was responsible for anti-Muslim repression in Gansu (1851–78) and the re-conquest of Xinjiang. Russia profited from this until 1882. General Zuo, who hated the Jahariya Order, was responsible for the killing of Shaykh Ma Hualong, who had freely surrendered. The Hunanese origin of Zuo forced transmigration of Uyghurs to southern Hunan.

This general is also accountable for the massive importation of Hunanese tea, which continues today in Qinghai and Xinjiang.

In two millenia, the Chinese lost East Turkistan four times and conquered it five times. Continued Uyghur resistance during the period demonstrates their independent spirit. However, under the rule of Emperor Guang Xu (1875–1908) the grip on Xinjiang increased, and the transformation of East Turkistan into a Chinese province opened the path for Sinicization.

In 1911, following the example of the other Chinese provinces, the fall of the Manchu Dynasty brought warlords to Xinjiang. In the 1920s, Governor Yang Wengxin was considered a separatist. Another, a Muslim governor in Kashgar, Ma Ditai, instituted terror and established his harem of fifty women. The explorer George Roerich clearly explained how in February 1924 Ma Shaowu in an official mission set out for Kashgar with a small army of 5,000 men to overthrow Ma Ditai. The son of Ditai was killed on 1 June. The Governor of Kashgar, after having been wounded by bullets in the right arm, was crucified on one of the city gates. After having been shot, his head was cut off and displayed. His conqueror, General Ma Shaowu, standing between the dismissed governor and the firing squad, almost lost his life. After hearing the first pistol shot fired by Ma Shaowu himself, the soldiers seized with panic, opened fire without orders.

The region became almost independent once again in 1933, under the command of a charismatic Hui warlord nicknamed the “Great Ma,” General Ma Chongyin. (K)oja Niyaz Hajj, a Uyghur, was associated with this movement. However, the Russians betrayed them. In January 1933, Stalin, following a confidential agreement with the Chinese military governor Sheng Shicai, sent an army to stop the separatists in Urumchi. Ma had already twice unsuccessfully attempted to invade Xinjiang’s capital, and his dream of creating an Islamic sultanate in Central Asia was destroyed in great secrecy, under snow and ice, by Soviet armored vehicles and airforce. The four years of war caused more than 10,000 deaths. Muslim troops came under the command of General Ma’s half-brother. Some soldiers escaped massacre and became bandits in order to survive. One day, not far from Kashgar, perhaps helped by the Japanese, the Great Ma crossed the border and disappeared into Soviet Union. He probably ended his life “liquidated” in Moscow. Xinjiang remained Chinese.

In 1944, a Guomindang (Kuomintang) Republic of East Turkistan of short duration was proclaimed under the umbrella of the Soviet Union and survived for

a time in Ili. It was reunited with the PRC in 1949. In the 1950s, numerous Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled to Soviet Kazakhstan. Many regional chiefs never returned to their country of origin.

In 1951, purges by the Chinese administration intensified. The elimination of the former cadres and the creation of a new government were on the agenda. Passive Uyghurs resistance was frequent. Robberies and armed attacks were common. During the same period, Yang (1957) mentions revolts in neighboring Gansu, causing the death of nine people. Cases of armed resistance were also reported in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs also resisted, and many fled.

In Hami (Kumul), bands of a thousand fighters were rapidly overcome. In April 1951, a leader, Wo Siman, and his partisans were captured and executed after organizing a meeting that mobilized a hundred thousand. In May, the Xinhua News Agency transferred its headquarters from Yiwu (Araturuk) to Hami, a secure city. During the same month, near Pingliang, Yang Qiyun and Ma Guoyan forced the provincial authorities to send troops to assist local militias. Their lives being in danger, they pulled back to the mountains. These two leaders were later arrested, condemned, and imprisoned for seven years. In December 1951, 37 people were killed, including 19 who were poisoned.

In 1952 and 1953, under Wang Chen, campaigns of repression were organized. In 1953, the *Xinjiang Ribao* mentioned the progress of Sinicization in Ili, among Kazakhs. Elections were held in April, and thousands of new political cadres were formed, mainly Uyghurs and Kazakhs, but they did not have much power. In 1955, Xinjiang was proclaimed the Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 1957, the Party Plenum (Central Committee) proposed the creation of a “Uyghur Republic,” causing a passionate outbreak of popular reactions, followed by new repression.

The two principal Uyghur opposition parties, the *Sarki Turkistan Halk Partisi* (People’s Party of East Turkistan) and the *Sarki Turkistan Islam Partisi* (Islamic Party of East Turkistan) were responsible for the main uprisings in 1962–69. Unfortunately, not much is known about other opposition groups. The Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 was a difficult period; the frontier was sealed off for 30 kilometers with the Soviet Union. Muslims were oppressed, and mosques were closed. Imam Ismail Li, interviewed in January 2003 in Tongxin, had bad memories of the religious repression along the Soviet border and in particular in Ili.

The People’s Party of Xinjiang was implanted in eight districts and nineteen cities. In 1979, China declared this party anti-Han and anti-Communist; according to its Uyghur leaders, it nevertheless organized guerrillas despite police campaigns.

Clandestine presses continue to print the Constitution of Independent East Turkistan and an Appeal to the United Nations.

In 1980, after criticism against the Gang of Four, Han cadres were also criticized for their lack of understanding of Uyghur traditions, but this political orientation did not last. The Uyghur nationalist writer Ablimit Mesud was lynched. Uprisings were reported in Aksu in 1980, in Kashgar in 1981, and in Kargalik the following year. To calm the situation, Deng Xiaoping made a one-week trip to Turfan and Urumchi in August 1981. Reorganization of the Party in Xinjiang was proposed. However Han-centrism in the administration provoked uprisings. In autumn 1981, in Kashgar, members of the Islamic Party attacked police posts; they were arrested and suspected of being armed. The result was an intensive recruitment of “patriotic” Uyghur cadres to consolidate national unity in Xinjiang. The percentage of minority cadres increased but did not satisfy the expectations of the Uyghur majority. The lack of political and economic autonomy of the Uyghurs persisted. Acculturation and Han demographic pressure increased.

Around 1985, for the first time, young Han cadres who were sent to Xinjiang asked to return to their provinces of origin. In many universities, Uyghur students formed democratic associations such as the Cultural Association *Tanridagh* and the Youth Association of East Turkistan. On 15 June 1988, it organized a successful march in Urumchi. In 1989, in this same city, the Islamic University demonstrated against the publication of *Ways and Sexual Customs of the Muslims*. Large scale anti-Uyghur repression followed.

In 1991, the Soviet Republics of Central Asia became independent states. This independence, too easy and sometimes not desired, did not spur Uyghur separatism. Sinicization, the encouragement of the Uyghurs toward modern goals of economic development, industrialization (mainly Han), secularization, and intensive Chinese immigration continued. It is estimated that 90% of unemployed workers in Xinjiang are Uyghurs.

Many pro-separatists Uyghur fighters returned to Xinjiang after training in Afghanistan. Thus, in the 1990s, village revolts in Baren near Kashgar took a more serious character. Abdul Kasim’s Islamic group was incriminated in these actions. A resistance movement followed in northwestern Kashgar. In Artush, four days of fighting ended with a Chinese helicopter attack that, according to official reports, caused twenty deaths among 2,000 farmers. The whole of Xinjiang then revolted. Hundreds of bomb attacks occurred during the period. In 1993, twenty bombings were reported in Kashgar, and, a year later, several in Aksu. In 1995, nineteen Uyghur activists were publicly executed.

In 1996, repression increased, the armed police and PLA organizing a large campaign of arrests in Xinjiang. Several thousand Uyghurs were detained, following the diffusion of internal documents by the Chinese Communist Party that scheduled purges. In 1997, new Uyghur bomb attacks occurred in Xinjiang and even in Beijing. Riots and assassinations were also reported, and numerous prisoners were executed. This caused an attack by Uyghur partisans against Chinese soldiers in the Taklamakan Desert. A pro-Chinese imam of Kashgar was threatened.

Politics was not on the agenda. However, many villages began to organize discussions (*meshrep*), and the Chinese authorities became alarmed. Arrests followed. In August 1997, after Deng Xiaoping's funeral, Uyghur revolts were reported in Urumchi and Kashgar. The following September Chinese soldiers died in action, Uyghur separatists were also killed in Hejing and Heshou. A cycle of violence continued during 1998–2002. In October 1999, the first National Uyghur Congress was held in Germany. In 2001, more than a hundred Uyghurs were arrested in Urumchi. There are negotiations going on between Beijing and the East Turkistan Information Center claiming to work for a peaceful resolution of conflicts within the China's borders, however, the Uyghur autonomous vision is supported neither by Washington nor Beijing.

In 2001, when the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were powerful, Central Asia was ready to give assistance to the Uyghur. Now, it seems rather, that after the capture of Baghdad by the American forces on 8 April 2003, the United States, present in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, wants at times to favor Beijing's position while at other times seems to favor that of the Uyghur. In August 2004, Beijing expected Uyghur detainees in Guantanamo to return to China. The US government did not transfer them.

Globalization does not prevent the Hui and Uyghur Muslims from having their proper characteristics. I will not speak of the political cadres, nor even of the "Sinicized" imams in Xinjiang who follow closely government instructions (through the Islamic Association). Islam in Xinjiang is caught between Sinicization and separatism. Are the Uyghurs as a whole convinced that separatism is possible? Disorder is not desirable. To live under Chinese control is not, however, easy for the Uyghurs of Kashgar, but does a logical alternative acceptable to the majority exist? The Chinese played the nationalist card, but Uyghur separatism may gain ground. Sinicization begins by the education of the Hui and Uyghur and the acquisition of Chinese culture. Legally, Arabic and the Koran cannot be taught to students younger than sixteen. Chinese schools and television reinforce Sinicization and

avoid the apprenticeship in a culture other than that of the Han, form citizens, and teach “patriotism” (*aiguojia zhuyi*). In return, Uyghur nationalism and Islam insist on solidarity between the rich and the poor. Considering these “internal problems” in Xinjiang, how can the Muslim countries respond in order to maintain a regional social order?

The Uyghurs and Friendly Countries

Traditional Uyghurs like to call their sons Mehemet Ali after a nationalist hero, a resister against Napoleon in 1798, an anti-Wahhabite, and Ottoman Viceroy in Egypt from 1805 to 1849. He founded a dynasty that lasted until 1952. An indirect cultural influence from Turkey is certain—for example, the remarkable development of Turkic languages since the independence of the Central Asian republics. Since the 1980s, following the Turkish secularist model, some Uyghur leaders have opposed the Chinese market economy.

In the 1990s, Turkey was active in constructing *madrassa* and schools teaching Turkish Islam in Xinjiang. However, there is a certain fear of Turkish influence (which proved too ambitious in the 1990s). Uzbekistan closed a dozen high-class Fethullaci secondary schools in 1999 under the control of a talented Muslim educator and preacher, Fetullah Gülen (b. 1938). China never accepted the establishment of these schools teaching English and computer science in Kashgar and feared a relationship with Jamaat-i-Islami. Since 1999, in Chinese Turkistan and the neighboring republics, as a result of political and financial instability in Ankara and an attempt to draw closer to Europe and also perhaps to Russia, Turkey’s role in Xinjiang has become more cultural and religious than political and economic. The Islamic Association of Xinjiang largely dominates religious life, but Turkish cultural influence remains significant. On the other hand, the Islamic Institute of China in Beijing also trains Uyghurs who support the Chinese Communist Party. If Turkey joins the European Union, its role in Central Asia could be boosted.

Did Uyghurs receive Turkish support? One could say that Turkey was interested in Uyghur opposition forces from 1950 until 1990, with Aysa Beg, a warlord resident in Istanbul. He was later replaced in Almaty by Moukhlissi, who was active until 1996. In the mid-1990s, cultural associations and Uyghur businessmen in Almaty and Bishkek were politicized and could have been used as intermediaries between the Uyghurs in Turkey and in Xinjiang. Newspapers such as *Zaman* (“Times”) and publishers such as Sözlər and Sürat Yayinlari play a significant role in Central Asia (Balci 2003: 13, 255–56). These are all part of Turkey’s cultural network in

the region. Jamaat-i-Islami, a form of radical Islam like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, partly influenced by Wahhabism, found a relatively favorable audience among Uyghurs. At present, associations such as the Committee of East Turkistan may benefit from internet links with Turkey.

In October 2002, an announcement by Richard Armitage, US Assistant Secretary of State, placed many organizations on a "terrorist" list. This was an immense success for Chinese diplomacy, which, anticipating this action, had invited the brother of the Dalai Lama to Tibet and Xinjiang in summer 2002. Following this trip, this diplomat was unexpectedly full of praise about Xinjiang's positive economic development. His press conference in Hong Kong before returning to India was variously interpreted. It is unclear if he wanted to be polite or was truly impressed by Xinjiang's economic development.

Recent uprisings and demographic changes in Tibet have their parallel in Xinjiang. In the Autonomous Region of Tibet, massive Han immigration has drastically transformed the human mosaic over the last thirty years. Similarly, in Xinjiang in 1950–60 80% of the population was Muslim, but in 2004 this was no longer the case (going down possibly to 50%). Recent immigration had increased the percentage of Chinese to 50%, a *de facto* Han majority in the Uyghur Autonomous Region. In Xinjiang, Chinese demographic and political pressures provoked Kazakh and Uyghur emigration in the 1950s, with hundred of thousands fleeing toward Kazakhstan; this is no longer the case. In comparison to Central Asia, Chinese socio-economic rule improved Uyghur's living standard.

The Uyghurs are still badly represented in their autonomous region. In Xinjiang, high-level cadres are puppets of the Chinese, and Uyghur cadres are generally less influential than many Tibetan Communist Party members. Xinjiang's major industries and economic production are Han-controlled. Under the Communist regime, the people have no access to political structures and decision-making power. However, if police pressure is increased too much, Uyghur violent counter-reactions could occur and create an aggressive explosion of national pride already fuelled by news from the Middle East.

In 2003, however, an apparent calm reigned in Xinjiang. The cities are modernizing. Nonetheless, Uyghurs retain an attachment to their cultural values, especially to Islam. As the Afghans, they are true Muslim believers. Kashgar was a cultural model, a mosaic of all of Central Asia's and Pakistan's ethnic groups. The vision of Younghusband, who spent a winter in this key city of Xinjiang at the end of the nineteenth century, proves that nothing has changed. The power of the former

Chinese Daotai-responsible of this far-off region-resembles the present-day rule of the highest administrative and military Han authorities.

The Uyghurs closely followed the Iraq War. A Kashgari friend who told me dogmatically that the Americans were going to begin the war on 27 January 2003, was mistaken only by a month or two. This proves that Uyghurs-although sympathizers of Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein-are tempted by United States aid in Uzbekistan, and expect much from the recent American geopolitical presence in Central Asia. Finally, the political, military and even religious situation of the Uyghur Autonomous Region is not changing very much at the moment.

The behind-the-scenes history opens on a double polarization of the present Uyghur social life, Islamic community identity, and acculturation. To succeed in society, Uyghurs must learn Chinese and accept official norms. This acculturation counterbalances Uyghur nationalist dreams. Stalin's concept of nationalities, developed in Europe before the end of the nineteenth century, entered China and Xinjiang through the Soviet Union; however, the independence of the republics of Central Asia brought new hopes, if of short duration, to the Uyghurs. The *minzu* system and Sinicization are underlying forces in society.

The Sinicization of Chinese Turkistan

At the beginning of the Christian era, Sinicization of the region began with the Han Dynasty and its conquests along the Silk Road. Later, in 939, "The History of Five Dynasties," *Jiuwudaishi*, presented Sinicization's positive effects by using the patronizing expression *fenghua* ("receiving civilization"). Previously fast-riding horsemen, the Uyghurs became a Sinicized and sedentary people. By political conviction and because they saw the strategic and economic importance of the region, a certain number attempted to resist Sinicization and to develop a local nationalist spirit.

Michael Hechter (1999) explains how integration (Sinicization) in the case of Xinjiang operates:

Political integration of minority ethnic groups will be facilitated to the extent that systematic structural differences between such groups are progressively effaced. . . Contexts which are culturally dominant but economically disadvantaged (such as Uyghur economy compared to the dominant Han network system) are typified by the strongest extent of class political orientations. . . . Solidarity represents high political consciousness on the part of groups seeking to alter the cultural division of labor.

Education is a key issue in Sinicization. In 1910, Broomhall reported that in the region of Kashgar the Chinese government promoted modernization with Turkish assistance: (1) the improvement of Turkish schools in which instructors from Constantinople (present-day Istanbul) were invited, (2) the setting up in Chinese Turkistan of a printing press publishing books in the regional Uyghur language, and (3) publication of newspapers encouraging Uyghur education.

It is true that there are schools at present, but priority is given to Chinese. At the beginning of the twentieth century, China was too poor to be able to put in place a structured educational program. At present, books and newspapers in Uyghur are published, but the Chinese government censors them and this has increased bad feeling among the local population.

New reforms and the modernization of the education system favor markets. Education is no longer part of the state plan and autonomous regions such as Xinjiang are controlled by a market economy controlled by the Han majority and not favorable to the Uyghur. Fourteen Chinese universities were opened in Xinjiang, and state education progressed in cities. However, many Uyghurs live in villages where competent teachers refuse to teach.

Uyghur youth from Xinjiang today find themselves excluded from power and good jobs more than their elders. They have nonetheless responded favorably to modernization transmitted through Chinese culture. Structural discrimination increases their ethnic solidarity and could ultimately create a confrontation with Chinese authorities with “patriotic” Uyghur cadres backing the majority. It is not at all clear that young Uyghurs are sufficiently motivated toward social change. To reach this level of motivation, they must resist Sinicization and become “anti-patriotic.” The frustration of younger generations is well known in other Asiatic countries such as East Timor, independent since 2002. Chinese Muslim students used the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie, a rather anti-islamic English writer of Indian origin, to promote their political ideas with some success. In 1989, *The Satanic Verses* were confiscated, and its publisher closed down.

Although this sort of movement does not give Xinjiang’s people a real political voice, autonomy, on the other hand, does not mean much in China. In 1982, other incidents have shown the effectiveness of Chinese Muslims, reacting against an anti-Islamic article published in the review *News of Youth* in Shanghai. The Chinese Communist Party has, however, understood from experience the importance of the younger generation. The rapid promotion of young imams does not exist in Xinjiang, but elsewhere in China this is a current policy to favor gifted Koranic students.

Han-centrism exists in contemporary Chinese literature and culture. Latent Han-centrism exists in tandem with the cross-cultural communication between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities (Shi 2003: 215–16). “The Uyghurs will be like the Manchus, assimilated by the Chinese, because the Chinese culture is much stronger” explained an army general in Urumchi to Geoffrey York, *The Globe* correspondent in Beijing. Thus, there is widespread resentment of Han dominance. Discrimination exists against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, their autonomous region. It is perhaps more in their professional life that Uyghurs are disadvantaged in comparison with the Han who control the economy.

The political orientation of Uyghur teachers, contrary to their Han colleagues, is strictly controlled. There are instances of demarcation between the majority and the Uyghurs in large cities such as Urumchi, Turfan, Hami, Aksu, which are dominated by the Han. Professional and commercial competition does not favor minorities. The law forbids discrimination, but in practice the majority rules. China publicly promotes a concept of union of all nationalities (*tuanjie*), but is not always faithful to its noble legal and political intentions (*hanhua he tuanjie*). The majority has discretionary power toward the Uyghurs, and local interpretation of laws can vary to their disadvantage. Education in Xinjiang is centered in cities, but Uyghurs live mainly in rural areas. On the other hand, local laws and patron-client relations still exist. The clan chiefs manipulate situations in their own interests, and Han use Uyghur cadres to impose their point of view.

Does the policy of clans, “localism,” and the proliferation of patron-client relations defined by Ahmed Rashid for the Soviet Tajiks currently exist in Xinjiang? There are certainly similarities. Xinjiang is politically more stable than Tajikistan. However, the Uyghurs of Xinjiang are rather close to the Tajiks of the former Soviet Union. At the local level, Tajik ex-cadres, as “patriotic” Uyghurs, benefit from administrative posts. One can say that there equally exists a certain analogy between the Chinese system of *guanxi*, personal relations as described by Mayfair Yang (*Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China*) and the Uzbek social network studied by Petric. Social relationships are created and developed in the family, among former schoolmates, friends, and professional colleagues. Uyghurs, Tajiks, and Uzbeks are Muslim, and almost all Chinese citizens are attached to the family, friends, and their neighborhood.

The creation of a modern identity is a crucial need. Except for television and mobile telephones, Uyghur cadres adapt badly to new ideas but follow Chinese

culture. Minorities in China, the Uyghurs in particular, have lost a sense of their history. Chinese holidays are completely unrelated to Uyghur culture. In Xinjiang, Khotan for example, Sinicization has been seen in clothing since the tenth century. Uyghur administrative vocabulary is also based on Chinese terminology, and the Chinese transform Uyghur names. Between Kashgar and Aksu, lies the small town of Sanchakou (Three Branches) (photo 20). This toponym is also used 50 kilometers west of Kunming.

New Urumchi with its modern buildings points to progress. Xinjiang's living standard is higher than in the independent Central Asian republics. However, Chinese domination remains absolute and shows no sign of weakening. The Chinese government is attentive and attempts to act harmoniously, as required by Confucian ethics, but increasingly Chinese and Uyghurs have little to do with each other though residing in the same region. On 17 January 2003, a high-level Han cadre from Aksu, although diplomatic and cordial with Uyghur colleagues, clearly explained to a Chinese businessman from Beijing that, despite appearances, the Han dominate. Among members of the Party, even more than in the Autonomous Region of Tibet, the Uyghurs have never had real supremacy in their region. They are integrated into the Chinese system.

Demography alone explains Xinjiang's intense Sinicization. Before the Second World War, Chinese civil servants and merchants were not numerous. In the early 1940s, there were about 4 million minority people in this province, and 200,000 Han. The Chinese increased from 6% in 1949 to 40% in 1962. In 1982, they were 5 million to 6 million Uyghurs and 1 million other Turkic minorities. In 1988, the Uyghur still dominated numerically, but this is no longer the case. The Chinese are thus peacefully invading Central Asia, and Uyghurs are now a minority in their own cities. In 2002, the population of Xinjiang officially reached 17 million, including 42% Han. This percentage does not reflect current demographic Han pre-eminence, and it will be difficult to promote Uyghur nationalism in a region dominated numerically, economically, politically, and militarily by the Han.

Yet, the Uyghur, according to Marxist terminology, are a "nationality." The Uyghur mother tongue still plays an important role, but Chinese language dominates in Xinjiang. Since 1991, numerous Turkic peoples have acquired independence in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, 75% Uzbek, supports the supremacy of languages in constructing an identity and wants to be modern. Uzbek is currently romanized. Clothing is also a symbol of ethnic identity, but modernity also Sinicizes the Uyghurs. In Xinjiang, the religious criterion in the constitution of Uyghur identity is more pertinent. Islam has weight in Xinjiang. In Burma, it seems that the majority of the Buddhist "clergy" is

pro-government, as in Xinjiang. An improbable change of regime in both countries will most probably benefit neither Burmese bonzes nor Uyghur imams.

For Zangwill (d. 1926), the collective sentiment of nationality attains its full intensity in cases of danger. This is no longer true in China. According to Roy's theory of groups, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, and Uyghurs are ethnic groups more by a political process than natural evolution. The question is whether a group can be powerful without possessing the conditions for political unity. Even if the Chinese give certain privileges to the Uyghurs, the creation of a Soviet-type autonomous region has had the result of suppressing real autonomy. The formation of the new republics of Central Asia was unexpected, and various ethnic identities finally emerged. This is not the case of the Uyghurs. Their identity is centered on an imaginary national minority membership, on a history shaped by a Chinese vision taught in state schools, and on myths based on historical novels in Uyghur.

Chinese/Uyghur relationships are "mixed" in term of cordiality. In 1992, in Kashgar, Uyghurs were aggressive toward Chinese residents, the harassment of Chinese in the marketplaces being particularly evident during Ramadan and Muslim feast days. Now Uyghur civil servants or police often harass Uyghurs more than other groups.

The image of the conquering Muslim warrior developed by Max Weber does not apply to modern China. Since September 2001, one might have expected a "*jihadic*" revival but this did not occur. Nearly all cities in Xinjiang have Han majorities: 90% of the population of Urumchi is Chinese, and in Aksu the percentage is close to 80%. Measures to control local populations are severe, and the Chinese no longer fear Uyghurs except in the countryside and that rarely. A bazaar located in the center of Kashgar (Kundervazta Street and its side streets) behind the old mosque, the most typical part of this city, might be demolished as part of a plan to renovate the city. How can the Kashgari oppose the eradication of their historic bazaar? It was finally demolished in 2003 to make room for Chinese shopping malls. Modernization and health issues are the key reasons given for urban transformation, being the same in Xinjiang, Kunming, and Oxen Street in Beijing for the upcoming Olympic Games. The consequence is the eradication of history. The Uyghurs offer a certain passive resistance called the "national liberation movement." The Chinese call nationalism "terrorism."

Unlike the Hui, Uyghur religion is more homogeneous. Imams in Xinjiang are officially appointed; however, Xinjiang is the only region of China where Muslim extremism could exist. The Taliban were able to recruit Uyghur fighters, some of

whom were detained at Guantanamo Bay. American authorities classify 30% as “terrorists.” In August 2004, the American government announced that the twenty-two Uyghurs listed in Cuba will not be sent to China.

Sufism in Xinjiang?

We know the historical link of Sufi Order Aqthagliq and Qarathagliq (“White and Black Mountaineers”) along the Silk Road. Kashgar was linked to Gansu and Hezhou (Linxia), a city nearly 3,000 years old, where I twice visited the tomb of the Qadiriya Shaykh Qi Jingyi (1665–1719) who is buried in a large mausoleum (*Dagongbei*). Secrecy among Xinjiang’s brotherhoods does not allow knowledge about Uyghur *tariqa*. It is strange to observe that in Kashgar, one of the principal centers of Uyghur Sufi Islamic culture, in a little less than a week of persistent questioning, I was unable to interview a single Sufi imam. Torres confirms the difficulties of having direct interviews with them. Elsewhere, in Ningxia, Gansu, and Yunnan, no fewer than ten Jahariya imams were questioned at length in their mosques about their *tariqa* Order. Some are masters, such as Suo Chenzhong in Tongxin and Ma Songli in Xiji; others are less known, such as Luo Changhu of Lanzhou. Qadiriya and Khufiya imams of Linxia were also interviewed in 2003. In this old city, there are even possible descendants of the Shaykh founder of the Khufiya Order, Ma Laichi (d. 1766).

One cannot deny the existence of Sufism in the region and its crucial role in Xinjiang’s Islamization and nationalism. Between 1992 and 2004, a Sufi renaissance has been occurring in neighboring Uzbekistan. Following the independence of the Central Asian republics, the borders have opened, and culture and music revived. The Koran has played an important role in this revival. A solid Sufi structure exists in Xinjiang but silence is the rule. After being welcomed in Lanzhou by the guardians of Ma Mingxin’s mausoleum (1719–81), I experienced difficulties in visiting a small Khufiya mosque at Urumchi. Its members accepted only disciples of their order, and especially not a stranger favorable to the Jahariya Order, their enemy in the past.

First of all, in China, no Muslim, even Sufi, likes to attract attention. Sufis are thus only minimally visible, except perhaps in Linxia. Few Chinese have a clear idea about Sufism, its numeric importance, and politico-religious influence. Sufism is also sometimes wrongly classified a “New Religion.” An intelligent Koranic student from Tonghai in Yunnan, even though living nearly three years close to a

Jahariya mosque, knew nothing about the Jahariya Order and even thought that its teaching was *Yihewani* or related to Ikhwan reformers. Koranic students from Xinjiang, immersed in the same context of the Islamic Association, are not interested in the history of Islam in China.

Regional identities are pertinent. There is rather strong fidelity of Uyghur imams toward the Chinese government. In Xinjiang, as in the Autonomous Region of Tibet, one encounters numerous cadres, including imams, who, for personal, familial, or financial reasons, are more attached to the *status quo* than some of their Chinese colleagues. The Uyghur police is often “more royalist than the king.” However, Uyghurs do not feel a great love for the hammer and sickle, as at other times was the case in the rest of Central Asia. Contrary to Urumchi, few posters are displayed in Kashgar and Aksu. These show Chairmen Mao, Deng, and Jiang Zemin together. It would be interesting to know if portraits of President Hu Jintao have recently been displayed in Xinjiang. In contrast, on the spot of a demolished mosque, in the middle of modern Chengdu, Sichuan, a large poster shows a huge modern red sickle instead of Communist leaders.

If the police and military increase pressure on Uyghurs, they may become the only Muslims in China capable of promoting *jihād*. Economic factors also play a large role in developing radicalism. The economy of the Autonomous Region is in good shape; however, news from Iraq is sometimes alarming. In January 2003, the new resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan was said to be linked to the Iraq War, and the United States characterized Uyghur nationalists as “terrorists.”

For Rashid, Sufism places no confidence in political parties. The Jahariya Order, with its million members the strongest in China, is in reality a giant with clay feet weakened by internal struggles. Since 1949, the two Jahariya sub-groups of Ma Liesun and Ma Tengai (d. 1991)-also present in Xinjiang-are reported to be close to the Party. Thus, the Islamic Association of China may develop or restrain Jahariya Sufism.

In Tongxin, in the center of the Autonomous Region of Ningxia, an 85 year-old imam, Suo Chengzhong, has an impressive knowledge of Jahariya Sufism. He survived thirteen years in labor camps from 1958 to 1971. He is linked to the 77-year-old Sufi master, Ma Liesun, a former high-ranking cadre educated in the Soviet Union also in re-education in recent years.

Islam, Imams, and Saints

Islam in Xinjiang is general, though most imams are politically pro-government. With the massive arrival of Chinese in this region at the end of the twentieth

century, the observation of Onesime Reclus is no longer accurate. In 1913, all or nearly all inhabitants were Muslim. In 1953, Beijing created a powerful association to control the Uyghurs: the Islamic Association of Xinjiang, headed by a faithful friend, Burhan Shahidi. He has the same name as the president of Kuomintang in Xinjiang who turned Communist in 1949. Unlike the rest of China, where many are ignorant about Islam, most Han in Xinjiang know particular terms such as *qingzhensi* (mosques). There are approximately 40,000 mosques in all of China; nearly half are found in Xinjiang, but after prayers they are often locked. More than a hundred still exist in Kashgar.

Religious practice has been reactivated, and Islam occupies a central position in constructing and perpetuating Uyghur identity. However, it appears that the acculturation process (Sinicization) already studied, more than in the 1990s, counteracts strong Uyghur Islamic faith. The Uyghurs are part of Central Asia; their books, traditions (*hadith*), Koranic schools, and mausoleums largely perpetuate this identity. Like the Hui, they are in majority Hanafite Sunni.

The Uyghurs in general read Koranic Arabic better than the Hui. After the Cultural Revolution, the Arabic-Persian alphabet replaced the Roman alphabet that Mao Zedong's linguists had used to transcribe Uyghur. A translation of the Koran into Uyghur was printed by the government, as a sign of good-will toward this minority and their religion. An Islamic Institute linked to the Islamic Association of China exists in Urumchi.

There is a larger number of Hui and Han than Uyghurs educated in prestigious Arab universities. With the improvement of education, a young generation in Xinjiang is completely bilingual in Chinese and in Uyghur. Concerning their faith, there are some differences between the Uyghurs and the Hui. For the Uyghurs it is unthinkable not to have a religion, and they often ask fellow Muslims "Are you a good Muslim?" This question does not come to the mind of the Sinicized Hui.

Imams and Rites of Passage

Young imams in charge of large mosques are numerous in other provinces; this is almost impossible in Xinjiang. With some exceptions, imams are poorly lodged and badly paid in China, one of the reasons why a young imam from Oxen Street in Beijing left his post. Now married, he no longer exercises his ministry.

The daughter of the elderly imam of the large Uyghur mosque at Urumchi, Shagou, did not want her father to be disturbed. As in Turkey and Central Asia,

Uyghur women enjoyed more freedom than their Chinese “sisters” prior to 1949. She knows that her father’s apartment is large and unique. She imposed her tall stature to impress and bar entrance to the family residence in the mosque and acted with great authority. In Uyghur society, women are important; however, in a mosque, such an attitude is uncommon. This imam in Urumchi lost no time after prayer. His age (he is seventy) does not prevent him from leading most of the five prayers. Sometimes his disciples must help him to get up at the end of the *salat* because his knees pain him. After prayer, he joins his family and leaves by a side door near the *mihrab* marking the direction of Mecca. A private entry connects with his magnificent apartment. His daughter will probably not find such an apartment again, under any regime, in the center of the city, two steps from a great hotel, The Hongfu, the preferred residence of high-ranking cadres on visits in Urumchi. Is there a certain analogy between this important Uyghur imam and the Tajiks of yesteryear? Rashid noted that their “localism” serves “personal interests.” Like the Tajiks in the 1980s, Uyghurs currently accuse their imams of being Communists in private but no criticism of the government can be heard.

Imam Khorum (K)hoja of Aidkah Mosque in Kashgar, President of the Islamic Association of Xinjiang, was victim of an assassination attempt in May 1996; however, his accusers did not boycott the mosque. Most Uyghurs are true believers and go to the mosque frequently. Many do not care about politics and do not judge their imams.

The Uyghur community, as do all Muslims, has its “rites of initiation.” The principal Uyghur rites (which fall into the ethnological category of “crises rites”) are birth, circumcision, marriage, the Feast of the Sacrifice (Korban or *Idul-kebir* in Arabic), the end of fasting, and funeral ceremonies.

At Aidkah, in Kashgar on 14 January 2003, one day after the death of an old Uyghur, in the courtyard the body lay in a coffin belonging to the mosque in which it was later transported to the cemetery. Following the afternoon prayer, *Asr*, an imam recited the service for the dead. Many attendants offered condolences to the family. The Great Imam after praying left quickly. The family and friends, accompanied by the officiating cleric, went to the cemetery. The body was wrapped in a simple shroud and placed in the grave, and the coffin was returned to the mosque as usual. This funeral displayed no great differences between Uyghur and Hui rituals.

As in the Islamic world from Pakistan to Indonesia, to China, Muslims keep a record of those who give them gifts. This enables hosts to avoid a blunder in their

return gifts. Pilaf, as in Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, is a convivial ritual dish, whereas *nan* (a flat bread like that of India) is everyday food.

In Xinjiang, as in Central Asia, worshiping saints forms part of the cultural traditions. Cults may center round the tombs of imams, Shaykhs, Sufi saints, or “perfect” men. For example, northeast of Kashgar, the mausoleum of Abakh (K)hoja, dating from the seventeenth century, is still a place of pilgrimage.

Islam is segmented in Central Asia, but official Islam is rather strong. In Xinjiang, religion is more monolithic. Sufi brotherhoods exist in Chinese Turkistan. The dominant Islam of the Islamic Association of Xinjiang probably helps the Chinese government in its fight against separatism.

Uyghurs in Central Asia’s New Geopolitical Context

The Uyghurs are distinct from the Han in Xinjiang, but the state always occupies a central position as it did in Soviet Turkistan. In Uzbekistan, most Uyghur separatist movements currently legitimize Chinese state policy. In Xinjiang, most Uyghur imams are pro-Chinese. Thus, in 2004, how could Xinjiang be “ready to separate” as a Haji Uyghur stated in Kashgar in January 2003? Unlike the Hui, the mother tongue of the Uyghurs is not Chinese. Whether they are good citizens or not, “loving their country,” the Uyghurs have a different culture and are geopolitically distinct.

Cybercafes, numerous in Sichuan, do not exist in Xinjiang. Internet connections are closely watched everywhere in China. All of the new Central Asian republics, except part of Tajikistan, speak a Turkic language. Films, television, and compact discs enter in massive quantities from Turkey, directly and indirectly. Pan-Turkism is rather strong, but its political influence is weak as Istanbul is far away.

The vogue for English in the region existed before the implantation of American oil companies. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have received military and aid investments amounting to millions of US dollars. Without speaking of the Chinese, the main forces present are Islamists and Russian, and the Uyghurs thus find themselves isolated. Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia have no intention of meddling in China’s internal affairs. Beijing controls the Central Asian republics politically and economically. In November 2002, the Chinese, for the first time, participated in military maneuvers in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, new treaties linking Russia and China have a rather similar approach to Islam.

The Chinese economic model attracts. In 1995, China allowed Kazakhstan to use the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. Russian influence, especially during

the 1990s, suffered a decline in the region, whereas the Chinese play an increasing role in Central Asia. Several million Han are in Siberia. Hundreds of thousands now live in the key economic region of Kazakhstan. These factors are all a brake on the idea of greater autonomy for Xinjiang.

The Uyghurs cannot count on their diaspora in Kazakhstan of nearly 200,000 East of Almaty and along the Syr Daria River. In Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, they number 40,000. In parallel with Yughur nationalism, the independence of the Central Asian republics was “too rapid and too easy” according to a young Uzbek Sufi cited by Rashid. Roy qualifies this liberation in Central Asia as “sudden and non-desired” (1997: 8). Even if people such as the Uzbeks are favorable to Uyghurs in China, they understand and speak the Turkic languages of Xinjiang. Uyghur is understandable to educated Turkic peoples. The military and religious logistics were probably furnished in part by Pakistan. Uyghur separatism has apparently no leaders in Xinjiang.

Urumchi, Kashgar, Aksu, and Korla are industrial cities. Turfan is a large oil center. The promising zones of Aksu and Kashgar display Xinjiang’s increasing development. Oil reserves in the region are enormous, and pipelines are under construction. After the oil industry, light industries, the textiles, and the agro-dietary sector have a major place in the economy. Heavy industry has a more modest position. All these enterprises, 80% state-owned, are principally tributaries for Han labor, qualified human resources in unlimited numbers, and this accentuates politico-religious troubles. Uyghurs facing this impressive development in their own region do not benefit from it. The region’s internationalization slows political tensions, and Central Asian governments collaborate with China, the second world power.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Chinese have established the Shanghai Forum, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. A meeting took place in July 2000. In 2001, Uzbekistan became a full member. This treaty freezes Uyghur separatism and could be dissuasive for its diaspora, hundreds of thousands of “brothers” in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. This diaspora includes around half a million people, assimilated for the most part into the Uzbek community in Ferghana but also by the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan.

Under Chinese political dominance in Central Asia, fewer Uyghur newspapers are being published. The Institute of Uyghur Studies at Almaty has been closed,

merging with the Institute of Oriental Studies, which is too large to promote Uyghur culture. Uyghur art, literature, and Islamic culture have, however, received a certain dynamism in Kazakhstan.

In 2003, Uyghurs all the same remained optimistic and expected some support from the United Nations and the United States. According to an international poll of city-dwellers, taken by the BBC in February 2004, China is the only country in the world liking American policy and economic development. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan for their economic interests, also sided with the USA during the Iraq War. However, the entire region, including Xinjiang, suffers a post-war syndrome that is unfavorable to the Uyghurs. For Bates Gill, Director of Chinese Department of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies, the improving relations of China with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) also penalizes the Uyghur separatist movement.

Central Asia

There is an undeniable international interest in Central Asia. The Iraq War reinforced the still strong Taliban, and a Taliban recruitment campaign was launched at the beginning of 2003. Their alliance with former Prime Minister Gulbudin Hekmatyar was not excluded from this mix. On 3 February 2003, eighty Taliban fought against American forces at Spin Boldak.

Oil reserves in Xinjiang could incite Uyghurs to demand greater autonomy. Who dares support them? Are American companies already present in Central Asia, such as Chevron and Unocal, interested in Xinjiang?

Stable equilibrium in the region, particularly in Afghanistan, is not guaranteed, even if a gas pipeline is planned. The designated Iraqi President of the Choura, Mohammed R. Shahir has said that "the law of the gun dominates." If Iraq remains unstable, Central Asia and, indirectly, Xinjiang will suffer. In July 2004, Iraqis took back control of Iraq, but stability is not yet in sight.

A certain number of Muslim separatists in the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang still contest the central authority of Beijing. According to trustworthy sources, the Uyghur conflict caused significant loss of life and human rights violations. Should we believe that various separatist groups are increasing their coordination? Economics is a major issue. The risks of a *jihad* will certainly diminish if China succeeds in maintaining a good standard of living for everyone in Xinjiang, superior to that of neighboring countries. Beijing knows that separatism could become an important menace in the

long-term issue affecting China's political stability. Separatism in Xinjiang supports the independence movement in Tibet and ethnic agitation in Inner Mongolia.

Common ethnic and religious problems in Xinjiang and Tibet are confirmed by the official voyage of the Dalai Lama's brother in 2002, which centered on the Autonomous Regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. In 2003, in a private interview, the Assistant Head of the Police for Foreigners (*Waiban*) at Aksu declared: "Our country has enemies. We must always act as if we have enemies in Xinjiang."

For Rashid (1994), there is no model of "central-Asian" nationalism based on history and culture. It is thus difficult for the Uyghurs to progress toward separatism, not only because of the region's oil reserves but also out of "principle" will attempt by all means to ensure that a Uyghur model, which might be suitable for other minorities, never sees the light of day. It is certain that *minzu* conceptualization, close to the Soviet model, unifies all of China's minorities. This concept does not take into account ethnic and cultural differences, such as Uyghur traditions. There is thus no space for social and ethnic diversity. A Kashgar company director said: "I believed in *minzu zhuyi* (the power of national minorities), but it is not valid. So I became a true Muslim."

Olivier Roy's thesis about the separation between Islam and culture is arguable. There is an intimate relation between religion and music in Uyghur culture. However, as noticed in Central Asia (Roy 1997: 9–11), there is a certain Uyghur criticism of the concept of nationality (*natsionalnost* in Russian or *minzu* in Chinese) and concerning the Chinese multi-ethnic concept applied to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:

Break up the large linguistic and cultural groupings founded on language (a Turkic language) or religion (Islam). To accomplish this, Stalin (as did Mao) placed nationality in the forefront . . . a multi-ethnic empire, a way of management merging different populations into one and the same matrix . . . capitals where the population was always in the minority . . . economic dependency on the center . . . the foundations of a nation-state are thus imposed against a strict political identity . . . the identity becomes univocal: censuses require that each person declares his nationality from a list imposed by the state . . . the imported nation-state model was only an element inside a project, much more vast and radical, of social engineering, which would make it obsolete by integration in the (Chinese) mold . . . The Communist Party has, of course, a political monopoly.

In this analysis of Central Asia, it is striking to see the analogies with the Chinese *minzu* system. All the ethnic groups, including the Uyghur, are fused

into the same mold. All the cities of Xinjiang, not just the capital as in the former Soviet republics, have majority Han populations. Since 1997, relations between the Han and Uyghurs have not always been good. Uyghurs control neither their social space nor their administration. The small number of Uyghurs who have joined the Communist Party is insufficient to eliminate the indifference of the Han toward Xinjiang's minorities. For Gordon Chang, a Taiwanese, the Uyghurs are more "diluted" in their territory than before. This polemic author believes that the Falungong is no more than a "light comedy" and that the Uyghur question is a "tragedy." Many Uyghurs would like more autonomy. It is no longer the case. As in the Autonomous Region of Tibet, by means of Sinicization, the Chinese cadres want to accelerate modernization, which does not fit well with developing minorities. Chinese modernization combines Western ideas under the umbrella of structured and unstructured "Sino-centric" organizations. Thus, Chinese nationalism weighs heavily on modernization and future of the minorities-the Uyghurs, in particular (Gladney 1996: 90). Despite Xinjiang's rich natural resources, the Uyghurs are not supported and their religion is not a government priority. It thus seems necessary to look toward the borders to better understand the Uyghurs.

International Problems

Chinese Muslims are affected by current problems besetting Islam. However, the Hui are not directly involved in Muslim "fundamentalism." For Maris Gillette, there is no danger of a Hui separatist movement "as some of the uprisings that occurred in Xinjiang during the Deng era."

In the eighteenth century, the Qing Dynasty removed influential Uyghur chiefs and their families to Peking. In the nineteenth century, Yakub Beg (1820–77), in conflict with China between 1862 and 1877, fortified Kashgar, at a crossroads near the Khyber Pass, Lahore, and South Asia. Kashgaria was recognized by Turkey. The British were ready to side with them in order to block Russia, always interested in Central Asia. Kashgar was an independent state from 1866 to 1878, even now instilling Uyghur nationalism in the region. Following Turkistan's annexation by the Chinese many Uyghurs were deported. Not until 1884 was Turkistan conquered, becoming Xinjiang ("The New Frontier").

In Xinjiang, the Uyghurs consider themselves to be in their own country. The repression of students and the Han population by partly Uyghur troops was paradoxical but logical. A large majority of the students were also Han. Dreaming

of a Western-style democracy, too theoretical and sometimes inapplicable in Asia, these university students were overly confident after their long protest in Tiananmen Square and their short talk with Mikhail Gorbachov, who did not restrain them.

In Beijing, Uyghur students do not publicize their ethnic origin. The presence of an activist and key student leader Wu'er Kaixi (Uerkesh, "The Torrent" in Uyghur) in Tiananmen Square in May–June 1989 is well known, but his ethnic origin was undisclosed. He himself did not want to lay claim to his Uyghur origins for, as he said, "I would not have been credible." The psychological difficulty of being a Uyghur outside Xinjiang is clearly apparent in such a statement. Wu'er Kaixi, a highly educated and "Sinicized" Uyghur, speaks Mandarin fluently and behaves like a Han, thus preferring to conceal his nationality. In a BBC interview on 3 June 2004, he was proud to mention that he had been able to interrupt the Prime Minister Li Peng during a meeting with students in 1989.

Lu Xun said after the events in 1926 that this was not a conclusion but a new beginning. A student of the period now living in the United States recognized, in another BBC interview, that human rights had improved as a consequence of the Tiananmen events. Wu'er Kaixi, on the other hand, acknowledged the lack of current interest in the past student demonstration. In another meeting in Taipei with a reporter of *Le Figaro* published on 4 June 2004, he refused to acknowledge the failure of June 1989 and also mentioned his desire to return to Beijing without conditions.

Mosques and religious schools in Chinese Turkistan are too often considered centers of hostility to the regime. Xinjiang's places of worship have periodically been closed, and religious militants arrested and harassed. The Uyghurs, very sensitive to injustice, are sometimes able to launch a *jihad* movement not existent elsewhere in China, but there are other solutions. Sayed Abdullah (Saidov) Nuri (b. 1947), one of the founders of the Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan, believes that fundamentalism does not promote Islam. However, the present Western focus on "terrorism" has perverse effects. The Chinese government has sometimes persecuted Xinjiang's Muslims and that caused a massive emigration of Kazakhs to Kazakhstan in the 1950s. In a region with a strong regional identity, in April 1992, in Baren, not far from Kashgar, twenty persons were killed, and fifty wounded, during an uprising. Chinese authorities accused a man trained in Afghanistan, Abdul Kasim, to have fomented it. This affair was considered seriously, and China quickly closed the Karakorum (Qaraqorum) access toward Pakistan.

Since then, reports of bomb attacks and assassinations committed in Xinjiang's cities have followed one upon another. Three distinct bomb attacks in Beijing in spring 1997 have been attributed to Muslim separatists and marked the extension of violence. These actions, directed against Chinese soldiers, civil servants, and pro-Beijing Muslim sympathizers have been carried out in Xinjiang over the years. Generalized street fighting and massive arrests of presumed separatists have been reported. The Bureau of Public Security (*Gonganju*) has always retained considerable power in criminal procedures: arrest, investigation, and judgment are sometimes carried without charges being laid.

The Uyghurs, a majority in Xinjiang, have been targeted in the last ten years by Chinese authorities and have no international backers, such as those of Wang Juntao and his inflexible spouse, Hou Xiaotian. The events of 11 September 2001 marked a turning-point, and the Uyghur nationalist movement and freedom fighters were systematically labeled "terrorist," allowing intensive police action against the Muslim majority. The United States now considers the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan a terrorist movement. Although Uyghurs are not always angels—the wearing of a dagger was a masculine ethnic trait—"terrorism" symbolizes another kind of threat. Some Western human rights NGOs accused China in the war on terrorism in a manner similar to Jakarta categorizing the Aceh separatists as Al-Qaeda terrorists. James Millward (Washington 2004) notes "the notion of an imminent terrorist threat in Xinjiang or from Uyghur groups is exaggerated." For him, violent activity has declined since the late 1990s.

The Uyghur nationalist movement, a part of emergent national identities, was based in Kazakhstan. Hundreds of Uyghurs have been trained in the camps of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Forty were taken prisoner during the war in Afghanistan, and twenty detainees at Guantanamo Bay are classified as "terrorists" by American authorities. The situation improved in 2004, but little is known about the future of these detainees. Uyghur nationalists form the Liberation Front of Uyghurstan. This movement claims a membership of 5,000 militants in Central Asia. Amnesty International notes an exceptionally high proportion of executions, in response to regional separatist activities. These executions have fomented acts of violence, for they are not always preceded by a formal judgment (www.mondes-rebelles.fr).

Distant Chinese Turkistan has long been economically neglected. Deng Xiaoping, however, promised to the autonomous regions of the minorities more autonomy within the framework of national unity. China is working to develop a modern road network, and a new Urumchi-Kashgar railway was built in 1996.

Civil aviation has also progressed in the region. Central Asia has opened its oil wells to Chinese investors, and Chinese culture is spreading. The Central Asian economy did not recover consequently many new republics in the region are listed among the rare Muslim countries unable to send their annual quota of pilgrims to Mecca. The economic level of Central Asia is low compared to Xinjiang, which, in its own right, has the greatest oil reserves in China (Tarim and Dzungaria), lithium, and mica. Its coal reserves are the third largest in the country, and its water reserves are immense. In first place, Xinjiang's oil creates an exceptional potential for economic development, but it needs peace and security to be harmoniously developed.

The second type of trans-border community, Islam, was proposed for regrouping the peoples of Central Asia. China has a long history of peaceful diplomatic relations with Islam, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Contrary to the British, French, Dutch, and Japanese, the Chinese were never imperialistic in Southeast Asia. With the exception of the troubled period of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government attempted to present an ideal image of Islam in China to the Muslim world, in particular in the Middle East, a geopolitical center. Though political Islam could spread rapidly in Central Asia, following years of religious repression, it is not the case. Several reasons explain that Pan-Islamism also could not rally support from a large part of the population. The large number of Sunni groups and Sufi brotherhoods do not offer favorable terrain for a planned organization of religions. An Islamic revival has not yet occurred in Central Asia. Islamic models offered by Iran's Shia and the Taliban do not respond to the expectations of moderate Sunni branches, a majority in the region. Finally, political authorities have left little room for the development of a militant Islam.

However, the Islamic world, often divided, has difficulty in resolving its internal conflicts and was unable to reach a consensus before the declaration of war on Iraq in 2003. Must one believe that Ahmed Rashid in *Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* (1994) was very optimistic for the hopes of peace in Central Asia, thus creating better conditions in the "sensitive" region of Xinjiang? It is necessary to know if a thinker like Ajem Chaudary d'al-Muhajiroun is right when he believes that, according to the Koran, there are two kinds of *jihad*: that which responds to terrorism by terrorism would be justified in his opinion. Is this thesis acceptable since China qualifies the Revolutionary National Front of East Turkistan as terrorist? For Rashid, the true crisis in this part of the world is the state, and disturbances in public order do not favor Islam.

The People's Republic of China thus possesses several trump cards for increasing its role in Central Asia. However, the economic integration of China with its Central Asian neighbors is not obstacle-free and Xinjiang is not yet stable. Russia has decided to maintain its traditional role in the region. Finally, the opening of the borders has created a series of new trans-border liaisons. According to the BBC, in August 2002 Chinese security forces attacked a village where Uyghur nationalists, labeled "terrorists," had taken refuge. The Chinese government puts forward a figure of a thousand Uyghurs trained in the camps of Osama Bin Laden to justify systematic police intervention in Xinjiang. Since September 2001, Amnesty International has noted an intensification of torture. However, there are no camps of the Guantanamo Bay type in China. Although surrounded by Islamic republics, the movement for the independence of Xinjiang remains currently too divided to present a serious menace for Beijing. Uyghur separatism supports the Tibetan independence movement; this was perhaps the reason for an invitation of the official representative of the Dalai Lama, Luli, in the Autonomous Regions of Tibet and of Xinjiang, in September 2002. The same year, in Xinjiang, many political prisoners did not have the luck of Ngawang Sangdrol, liberated in Lhasa after eleven years of imprisonment. She was amazed by the Chinese economic boom. The Chinese government wants to find new solutions to protect its revenues in both autonomous regions, however, as for Sangdrol, religion not politics still occupies an important place for Uyghurs and Tibetans. Ismail Tiliwaldi, the highest ranking Uyghur cadre in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, recently announced in an official meeting that in 2003 no bombings and no assassinations were reported in the region. At present there is apparently a lack of popular cohesion, and history seems forgotten.

At the beginning of June 2004, *The Economist* was right: in the whole of China, including Xinjiang, fifteen years after the Tiananmen Square events, organized dissent does not exist. The People's Republic does not recognize the principle of territory. There is still a law on regional autonomy formulated in 1984, but in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region internal competition between oases is the real political issue.

Chapter 7

By Way of a Conclusion: Perspectives on Islam's Future in China

The term “ethno-religious” group accurately characterizes the Hui minority that embraces Islam. Community is a collective ideal, an invisible universal solidarity, an *esprit de corps* (*asabiya*). It is composed of relatives, a notion that also fits well with their “Sinicity.” The Koran and the omni-directional symbol of Mecca, the place of pilgrimage, are essential. The resumption of pilgrimages to Mecca in the 1980s marked an important stage of cultural reassertion.

In 1997, the state vainly attempted to reduce the number of pilgrims when economic difficulties in the countries of Central Asia did not allow them to reach their annual Hajj quota. In sharp contrast, the Chinese economy functions well and benefits the country's Muslim minorities, making the pilgrimage possible again. Thus, numerous Hui and Uyghurs have become Haji since the opening up of China that brought modernization and improved international relations. These two minorities, however, must accept local restrictions. In China, state and religion are not linked together as idealized in Muslim countries. Islam is a minority factor. The Koran nevertheless guides Hui traditional life distinct from the ethic of the Han majority and far from Western modernity. Hui Muslims are well integrated in Chinese society thanks to their Confucian spirit and their fluency in Chinese, their mother tongue.

Arabic has long been a dead language in China, although there a slight revival has occurred in Beijing's diplomatic circles. Yet, since the 1980s, a certain number of imams are once again learning the language in order to join the Islamic world order and to communicate with their Arab “brothers.”

Language and education are important components of identity; however, minorities such as the Uyghurs want more than the right to attend government Chinese

schools and wish to speak their own language in the Uyghur Autonomous Region. According to many in Xinjiang, the judicial and political rights of the Uyghurs are not truly respected. Violent reactions by the younger generation against the Han are sometimes reported in the region. *Jihad* does not exist among the Hui in China but is said to have existed in the past in Xinjiang. Given Chinese society's secular orientation, conflicts can still arise with its Muslim population.

Geopolitics and Sinicization

In converting to Islam around the ninth century, Uyghurs broke with their past. The other important change occurred in 1884, with the transformation of East Turkistan into a province of China. In 1991, a third key date, the Soviet republics of Central Asia became independent states in which Islam plays an essential role. This independence, too easy and sometimes undesired, gave impetus to Uyghur separatism. There is a growing Sinicization linked to intense Han immigration. This wave of the Chinese population recently brought the percentage of Han to more than 50% in the region for the first time. Han migrants are rarely mentioned by local authorities (Gladney 2004), but the Uyghurs are no longer the majority in their Autonomous Region. If a referendum were to take place, a self-governing platform would not be assured of victory.

Philippe Massonnet (2000: 194–96) describes “potentially violent national questions . . . particularly at the far reaches of the empire, in the so-called ‘minority regions’ of Xinjiang and Tibet. . . . Prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic, Chinese Communists planned that these regions would be independent members of a federation of republics. But when the Communists came to power, Mao vigorously opposed the separation of Han Chinese from the fifty or so ‘national minorities’ . . . Segregation between Han and non-Han exists in all cities in the Xinjiang region. . . . Urumchi is becoming increasingly Chinese. Minarets are disappearing behind office buildings, shopping centers, and karaoke bars, all covered with ideograms”. Chinese Muslims are immersed in the acculturation process of Sinicization, but Uyghurs often resist it.

In parallel to Han migration, since 1996, China and its friendly countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan make up the “Shanghai Five” that tightly control Muslim activism. However, three years after its creation in the year 2000, Bishkek, their counter-terrorism center near Kashgar, which was intended to coordinate intelligence and military force, did not yet seem to function in the framework of the renamed

Shanghai Cooperation Organization. According to Jiang Zemin, former President of the Military Commission (*Junwei*), national security cannot damage the fundamental interests of other countries. In this system of Chinese security, nationalities, Uyghurs must follow the sacred principle of “unity” complementary to a Sinicization that goes unmentioned. China's new leadership did not introduce policy changes in this field.

At the gate of Xinjiang there are still sources of ethnic or fundamentalist instability. In matters of institutional religion, the psychological adaptation of Muslims to China is collective (possibly Confucianist); in matters of belief it is individual. Society and private convictions are distinct.

In 1993, bombs exploded in Kashgar as an expression of discontent. In Xinjiang, since the Islamist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, Sinicization has been reinforced. In the wake of the American “war on terrorism,” China hopes to obtain support for its repressive actions by sanctioning US policy. The principles of unity, law, and order are primordial in determining government policy in the autonomous regions. The fight against Uyghur *jihadic* terrorism is an American priority, and China thus finds itself faced with a dilemma. Should it follow the policy of the most powerful country in the world, the United States, or take a less anti-Islamic position? China uses the concept of the “war on terrorism” to its advantage, without taking into account the Uyghur point of view in Xinjiang. To believe that *jihad* could one day develop is unthinkable and intolerable for the Han. Chinese society and, particularly its Han majority, is wholly opposed to *sharia* law but have never received a formal Islamic *fatwa*. Ahmed Rashid, notes optimistically that “Central Asia is almost certain to become the new global battleground.” Dissident unity is growing in strength, and their motives are converging; morale among national troops in the region is variable.

With respect to borders and for all Muslim minorities, the Chinese government is proud of its success, in particular sustained economic development since 1980. But, from a religious point of view, even if many imams are “patriotic,” to satisfy the state as in Xinjiang and in Yunnan, that is not enough. The global irrational world and China devote a disproportionate importance to vital economic questions and do not always look at standards of living and social well-being. On the other hand, many Muslims remain attached to other values. The conflict of interest between development and religion in Xinjiang is an ongoing disagreement.

Religion and language are important cultural traits, but the determination of the Uyghurs also counts. The Chinese nation Sinicizes and transcends citizenship,

but Kashgari pride, forged by history and the landscapes of desert and oasis, goes unrecognized. The Han are always the “big brothers,” but only part of Xinjiang’s population accepts this fact. Chinese law forbids ethnocentrism, but political relations in favor of the majority are always evident. China places the unity of all nationalities (*tuanjie*) in the forefront but does not always apply its good legal and political intentions. One can speak of Han discretionary power, but local practices can deviate from the central line. Sinicization is thus “hierarchizing” and not truly egalitarian and democratic. Western countries, themselves often ethnocentric, would like to apply everywhere a “globalized” type of democracy and egalitarianism to the whole of Asia without jeopardizing their economies.

Almost thirty years have passed since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the reforms that brought an extraordinary modernity to China. After Mao Zedong’s death on 9 September 1976, the Deng Xiaoping era brought rapid changes. The oldest civilization in the world is now gripped by the idea of unity and acculturation in a modern framework of sustained economic development, but Chinese nationalism brings less hope for a dialogue with the minorities at the periphery such as the Uyghurs. The world is tending to become more uniform through globalization, but China is modernizing in its own way and keeping its identity through the Sinicization process. This has been an unchanging program over centuries. Sinicization and its complement, the unity of all the minorities (*tuanjie*), remain national priorities. The “Great Union” has once again become fashionable. Forming an integral part of the just and constant (*zhongyong*) Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, the concept of national unity is again associated with Confucianism. In particular, the principle of national integration remains unchangeable. The creation of a harmonious society is also a criterion of good governance. A “comfortable society” (*xiaokang shehui*) is the current recipe for uniting all Chinese citizens, including Muslims.

Is there a cultural imbalance between the majority and minorities? The Uyghurs are ethnically different. Their mother tongue, contrary to the Hui, is not Chinese. However, religion, controlled by the Islamic Association of Xinjiang, is generally faithful to the regime, because the majority of imams are pro-China. To compare different Asian countries, China and Burma have roughly the same policy toward Islam but use different approaches to deal with the question of religion and society. Burma’s leaders use Buddhism as a tool to control society. China, without mentioning it, manipulates Sinicization and tightly controls the media. China is much more

liberal. In Myanmar, it is difficult to find more than two similar newspapers, local daily papers alike and a weekly review in Burmese and English. In Xijiang, Uyghur television and radio programs exist. However, Turkish films and, more recently, programs broadcast in the Turkic languages of Central Asia that form a cultural reference point. Official programs are judged to be too "governmental." Many Hui share the PRC's standard of modernization, but it is not clear that the Uyghur majority accepts Han material indices of modernization. It is true that Uyghur music succeeds in transmitting Uyghur culture. Uyghur cadres implement Sinicization and modernization. However, the clothing and the Uyghur cap, veils and beards (prohibited for the civil servants and teachers) keep tradition on track. This is not enough in the face of Chinese language, which shapes the society. It is also difficult to find suitable employment in Xinjiang if the language of the majority is not mastered.

Confucianism, often placed in the forefront for the Hui, has little power over the Uyghurs even if the young, bilingual generation, educated in universities, is Sinicized. It is certain that, to allow a minority to preserve its ethnic identity, the principle of autonomy satisfies the national spirit, but an integration policy can constrain minority nationalities. For the Uyghurs, autonomy is theoretical, and a large number would like a practical and serious study of this question.

Uyghurs and Kazakhs are ethnically more homogeneous than the Hui. However, at the level of society, the concepts of minority (*shaoshu minzu*) and Sinicization structure daily life of all Muslim minorities in China. It is a legal, rigid, and complex system, and Hui and Uyghur minority cadres who implement Sinicization rarely partake of real political power. Thus one understands that districts such as Kashgar, which has a long history of Uyghur sovereignty, are regions where an eventual separatism could be revived.

As long as Muslim activism and "separatism" are equated, activism "will be regarded as going against not only China's national destiny but also history itself" (Gladney 2004). A serious effort is becoming apparent at the local and national levels for the formation of Uyghur cadres, but is insufficient. In the contemporary world, there is a duality between nationalism and ethnicity. The improvement of the relationship majority/minority is an ongoing process, although discrimination against the Uyghurs can be observed in their own autonomous region, not in terms of education (in Chinese), but in their professional life. Numerous Hui in the cities have more advantages than the Uyghurs.

The Hui must adapt and are tied to the Chinese nation. The Uyghur question is more complex and cannot be resolved by a pithy formula. In Islamic countries, state

and religion are one, even in secular Turkey which sharply distinguishes between religion and politics. The Hui, and especially the Uyghurs, are forced to separate these two concepts. Koranic Law is part of the Koran but not of daily Chinese life. The *umma* exists in Mecca but is not well delineated among the Hui even if their quarter or village is a well-defined space. One cannot speak of "territory" for these Chinese Muslims; they are everywhere and nowhere because they live very close to the Han without having a sentiment of ownership of "motherland China." This, despite the fact that many Muslims (closely associated) with the Han defended China against all types of aggression for more than a thousand years.

Among the Hui, Sinicization has not altered strong Muslim orthodoxy. Chinese culture and Islam are juxtaposed. For Sinicization, Confucianism is important. The notion of a God or the existence of an invisible superior power, and the mortuary shroud, are equally important for Confucianism and Islam. Its psalmodies are common. The ethic of Islamic life and the belief in the afterlife are parallel to the Chinese notion of social relationships and to the ethic of *guanxi-renqing*. Reciprocal and mutual aid ties family, friends, and classmates, sometimes combined with a feeling of Islamic fraternity, which is strong among the Hui. Must one believe the writer Mario Vargas Llosa, who thinks that ancient nations create a common denominator, a protective and isolating "us," and that, despite this, centrifugal forces once again place the socio-political balance in question? "Us" (the Han majority) cannot be fully equated to "the Others" (the minorities) and that may create tensions if Chinese nationalism and "Hanism" are too strong.

A first step to try to solve Xinjiang ethnic problems is to improve the mutual respect of the Han and the Uyghurs. To recall the five criteria ("variables") in relationship to peripherality presented by Hechter (1999): "(1) the degree of administrative integration; (2) the extensiveness of citizenship in the periphery; (3) the prestige of the peripheral culture; (4) the existence of geographical contiguity; and (5) the length of the association between the periphery and the core," we may conclude that the Han majority gets three positive points, namely an efficient integrating administrative system, a political and military link with Central Asian Muslim countries through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and a long territorial association with the Uyghurs.

Uyghurs are certainly disadvantaged with respect to many rights, but they can rely on their own cultural prestige. Nationalism, particularly Han nationalism, shows no sign of abating, and Xinjiang ethnic problems promise to continue. However, equal access for the Uyghurs to new social roles within Xinjiang's society could certainly create dynamic ethnic change leading to a stable autonomous region.

Thus many forces favor reconciliation, and other constraints cause discord. For the Uyghurs as well as for the Hui an improvement in education is a major point. The Chinese state tends to give more power to the provinces and autonomous regions that have other priorities. More globally, if the Shanghai Cooperation Organization uses some of its power to build a new harmony in Xinjiang society instead of trying to find Uyghur terrorism everywhere, chances for peace in the Uyghur Autonomous Region as well as in the whole of Central Asia will increase. Such reforms will eventually modernize the whole region.

Modernization

Modernization is undoubtedly a long-range social, political, and economic process adapted differently according to country and religious tradition. China is truly modern but at the same time retains its identity, with its own way of seeing modernization. The doctrine of Deng Xiaoping praises wealth, banished from 1949 to 1978.

Chinese official discourse is concerned with modernization and development. On the other hand, there is a basic incompatibility between modernity and Islam. Even if Muslims are modern in their daily life, it is difficult to “adapt” Islam and modernity in China. One must avoid falling into the trap described by Maxime Rodinson (1915–2004): “Conservatism pushes the traditionalists to draw back from anything that seems to him, in the domain of ideas as well as in that of practice, to be linked to destabilization” (Rodinson 1989: 133). Western philosophy of modern discourse does not favor a linkage between Koranic Law and society, even less so when one finds Islamic and Western principles not well suited to one another. The West is recognized for its technical superiority, but Islam gave rise to the first liberal ideas, even if, afterwards, diverse currents have rejected this original liberalism.

Thus, China's Muslims have suffered two shocks. One social process, Sinicization, is a light once because it has lasted for centuries already. The other is sometimes distressing because Western modernization with its technological applications can be seen as the sister of colonialism. Ejaz Akram links modernity and globalization (Akram 2004: 271): “modernity seeks to destroy the power of religion.” For him the true followers of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism will not give up religion for an ephemeral ideology.

Having lasted so many centuries in China, Islam has known how to present an image of “cohesion and peaceful participation,” which proves its flexibility and an

exemplary adaptation to an enduring civilization of nearly five thousand years. For Xu Jilin (1996), the history of modernization begins with an “explosion of participation” (*canyu baozha*). It is certainly true for the new China of Deng Xiaoping, who opted with good sense and clear-sightedness for opening up and for reform. These giant steps of Chinese society, sustained by a galloping economy, concern the Hui indirectly. The Uyghurs are excluded, but their standard of living is superior to that of other peoples in Central Asia. In “secular” exchanges they are also “modern.”

To be “modern” has become a slogan since Deng’s reforms got underway, but this irreversible process does not apply to the religion of the Hui. Confucianism is not considered a religion, or an official philosophy, even if present in the written language (characters), daily life, and the philosophy of the economic boom. Léon Vandermeersch called this social and economic revolution a “modern transformation (‘mutation’)” of the Sinicized countries, and the peoples involved are *Tongwen* (“cultural brothers”) (Vandermeersch 1986: 9, 152). The adaptation to modernity compels the Hui to be modern in their secular marriage ceremonies but leaves Islamic rituals unchanged. The Hui are neither “aboriginals” like the Miao, nor true immigrants like the Russians; contrary to many other *shaoshu minzu*, they are *Tongwen*, a fact that sets them completely apart.

However, the scenario of the modernization of Chinese Islam is another question. The modernization of Chinese Muslims is not concerned exclusively with religious matters. As Maris Gillette has shown, the mosque does not seem to play the same role according to sex among the young generation. Girls, more concerned perhaps with the materialistic side of modernity, lack the same motivations as boys. They were mobilized by the events of 2003. The mosque is a more masculine central space. The more educated in cities can be tempted to marry modern Han women. This is the case of a Burmese Muslim, residing in Ruili, who wants to succeed economically in Yunnan Province. He married a Han maiden, a rather rare secular union for she did not convert to Islam.

Gender issues are a field where modernization could have an impact. The modernization of relationships between women and men has been recorded in the Constitution of China since 1949. Muslim women are very active and have equal status. Only the state administration is authorized to issue marriage certificates (*jiehun zhengshu*); this causes a marginalization of imams common when Islam is in a minority position. Islam is part of the private domain for China’s Muslims.

Numerous young Muslims are modern in their own way. Muslim women, more reserved than female Han, are unjustly considered as too traditional by young Han.

Education, except for the study of the Koran, traditionally taught to men, is in essence egalitarian. Hui and Uyghur women can drive, be elected to assemblies, and enter the professions as teachers, doctors, and journalists. But mosques for women are rare; mosques and especially prayer-halls are a male social space.

Concerning modernization, one can raise the question of the indirect destruction of history and of the works of art like old mosques. What accounts for the recent fashion for constructing new places of worship and destroying old ones rather “Confucian” in style but belonging to the historic Muslim heritage of China? This new sociological phenomenon is part of modernization, which also has positive elements. Without the investments of Saudi Arabia in Lanzhou and perhaps in Tonghai, there would be no new mosques. In a word, for a Chinese Islam caught between “tradition” and “Sinicization,” it is more difficult than in the Middle East to find “modern” solutions acceptable to everyone.

One must also separate consumption, technology, and religion. The unavoidable question of clothing and technical innovations interested Ibn Khaldun 600 years ago. The relations between objects, markets, people, and the state has greatly changed in China. Muslims want to choose modernity for themselves without really knowing that it comes through Sinicization. To consume in a modern way is not forbidden in the limit imposed by the dietary ethic of *halal* (purity). Its antonym is *haram* (forbidden or impure). It is difficult to modernize the Islam and certainly cannot occur by using Western concepts, but the adoption of modern technologies does not pose a problem for Chinese Muslims. Islam is not opposed to technological innovation, to individual engagement, and to the search for progress and comfort.

This concerns the dress of Chinese Muslims, their participation in the telecommunications boom, and in the transformation of family furniture. The accumulation of modern electrical household appliances such as large television sets, a fashionable gift for wedding ceremonies, continues apace. China borrows modern technology from the Western but keeps its own values (a hardworking ethic among other qualities). Chris Patten pointed out the Confucian values of family, order, hierarchy, self-discipline, and obedience (Patten 1999: 161). In parallel, technological progress in China has brought changes in daily life at a rapid pace; no country has known such a development in less than twenty years. The Chinese know-sometimes better than many Westerners-how to dominate modern technologies, but take less advantage of them.

That is, however, only the tip of the iceberg. The modernization of Islam poses a huge challenge. The Second Iraq War caused cultural reconciliation to recede in

2003, and, like Mao's Great Leap Forward (*Dayuejin*) of 1958, has resolved nothing. The idea of modernizing Islam is for a Hui a psychological dilemma: Islam or Chinese society? To be a Chinese citizen and at the same time a Muslim requires an adaptation to the acculturative process of Sinicization. Can one cut these beliefs in half? That would cause distress to the Hui, like the division into two parts of a gift by a Kyrgyz returning to his country (Shahrani 2002). He was returning from Kabul by the Wakhan corridor, and the religious head of the region, a Shaykh, was informed of his arrival. He asked the traveler to give him the magnificent and invaluable blanket he had brought back. The Kyrgyz cut it in two and gave half to the Shaykh, sending him a message that he regretted receiving the request too late. He also informed him that he would be very grateful if this modest gift suited the imam; the other half had already been given to his own brother. Modernization has its limits but the power of a Shaykh for those who believe does not call for compromises. However, the typically Hui way of resolving problems between Islam and daily life's constraints is a constant adaptation between religion and Sinicization.

Any modification of the Chinese Islamic tradition toward modernity is a part of a Western dream. The Hui are truly "torn" between Sinicization and modernity. Their Chinese citizenship is rooted in Chinese Confucian culture. They always unconsciously try to adapt the Koran to their Chinese culture. This perhaps is the reason for the constant popularity of Ma Zhu's *Guide to Purity* (*Qingzhen Zhinan*), published in 1683 and still reprinted. The first translator of the Koran, Ma Fuchu, was also strongly influenced by Confucianism.

Modernity privileges the human, universal, and rational spirit, but harmonizes with difficulty with the Islamic scholastic order. The preservation of old mosques would be a rather modern idea that has no weight in China, given the transformation of the Muslim quarters in Beijing for the Olympic Games of 2008 and in Kunming. Modernity in Western countries and in Asia is not exactly the same. China is modern, but one does not see when the Hui, contrary to many Turks, will modernize their religion. This is perhaps the consequence of an omnipresent Sinicization, a force modernizing the minorities, imposing on them constant adaptation and destroying many traditions. To exist, the Hui have to harmonize their two cultures, Islamic and Chinese, but, in order to follow the tradition, *sunna*, there is no compromise.

In 1966, a modern reformer like Sayyid Qotb died in prison in Egypt. It does not seem that in China the thought of moderate Muslims like Fazlur Rahman (*Islam and Modernity*) can, in the coming years, transform the Islamic community.

Muslim China lives in peace, but the “new” Wahhabism and “the ancient religion” (*Laojiao*) are not yet in harmony. Reforms on the line of religion would be easier in an Islamic country, but remain inapplicable for the Hui sandwiched between religion and Sinicization.

For Tan (2004) religion is able to resist acculturation, but the challenge of modernity, also present in the media, could, through Sinicization, touch a large number of Muslims in China. Modernization can also reach a large Hui and Uyghur public through the press and Chinese media, above all by the intermediary of television. One sees on television paradigmatic representations of the ongoing tension between the traditional claims of Islam and the demands of China's government.

This balancing act between old religious customs and modern Chinese ideology takes many forms. One is the reluctance of foreign observers to identify these imbalances. Another form is the state's will to build mosques for women in order to appease concerns about gender issues. However, “rethinking Islam,” to use the word of Mohammed Arkoun, Professor at the Sorbonne, or really changing religion or the understanding of Islam is not for tomorrow in China.

Can one then speak of reforms toward an Islamic modernity? The adaptation of the Koran to modernity, fundamentally a Western idea, is confronted with the absence of basic texts. There is no clear work explaining how to modernize Islam. The Koran, a unique book, dominates the horizon from Mecca to Beijing. Some seek to create bridges to attempt to resolve this conflict of modern times. Is it possible in China? The Islamic revival has to take into account the social realities of an immense country needing social order. Economic growth linked to modernization has transformed the living standards of all Chinese citizens. Many Muslims practice their religion and enjoy undreamed of personal freedoms compared with the period 1966–76. Can the present modernity have a real impact on Chinese Islam? It is the Muslims themselves, the Hui and the Uyghurs, who will be able to respond to this question in a few years.

Islam in Contemporary China: Expansion, Threat, or Steady State?

The history of Islam in China is a long sequence of some 1300 years. The Tang saw the arrival of the first Muslims at the end of the eighth century. The Yuan (1279–1368) assured a golden period for Chinese Islam. The Ming (1368–1644) for the first time integrated Muslims into the Chinese system, and in the nineteenth century Sinicization under the Manchu created serious conflicts.

Following periods of exchange with the outside world, Gladney, after Joseph Fletcher, confirms the Islamization of China into three historical phases (“tides”). It spread by regional areas: northwest, Xinjiang and the north of China, the coast of China in Canton and Zaitun (Quanzhou), along the Yellow River, and in Yunnan. The first wave, orthodox Sunnite, which the Hui themselves name the “Old Religion” (*Laojiao*), began around the ninth century under the Tang Dynasty by land and sea, by the two Silk Roads. Around the eighteenth century and, particularly between 1744 and 1781, a second wave developed under the influence of Sufi saints such as Jahariya Master Ma Mingxin. The expansion of the Islamic Brothers (Wahhabi) occurred at the end of the Qing Dynasty. They are also called *Yihewani* and favor an education directly in Arabic, which is difficult to apply in China.

The traditional *Gedimu* religion dominates but masks a fact: many Muslims do not know to which branch of Chinese Islam they belong and do not understand Sufism. Nonetheless, Sunni doctrine dominates among nine of the ten Muslim minorities and modernity is also present at another cultural level.

The abrupt judgment of the non-renaissance of Islam by Baber and Grosvenor in 1878, after the civil war in Yunnan, must be considered in historical context. Islam was for long the province’s main religion. After the revolts, the nineteenth century ended in massacres, and Islam did not recover its central position. There were several million Hui in the middle of the nineteenth century in Gansu, but the present Autonomous Region of Ningxia currently has less than two million Muslims. In Ningxia, the *Yihewani* reformers are, however, powerful and rich, but apolitical like the imam responsible for the important Nandasi Mosque in Yinchuan or the “patriotic” imams in Xinjiang. Similarly, the recent statement of Geoffrey York in Beijing pointing out a decline—“Islam is visibly in retreat”—does not reflect realities in Xinjiang and elsewhere. China is a country where nothing is direct. You have to look at the back streets of the mosques. The demolition of many typical Muslim quarters to promote modernization does not deter Uyghurs and Hui or diminish the faith of Muslims in Urumchi and Kunming.

Similarly, the Islamic faith of many Yunnanese in Thailand and Burma is high. Yunnanese Hui became Panthays in Burma and Ho in Thailand. It followed the nineteenth-century events and post-Second World War migration. During thirty long years they had no contact with Yunnan Province. Between 1949 and 1980, a period of international seclusion, Muslims did not really have the right to believe except in their hearts. In the twenty-first century, it is no longer illegal to believe. The freedom of enterprise and growth equally favor the Hui. I cannot however cor-

roborate the existence of a fourth wave of expansion of Chinese Islam predicted by other authors in the new patriotic and nationalist China. Life being currently more easy, one can foresee a development of modernization jointly with Sinicization. This secularizing process has positive effects and others less positive ones for the five recognized religions and for Islam in particular.

“The Great Leap Forward” (1958–62) created a demographic “hole,” and Islam was unable to progress during the period. The ideological persecutions in the years 1966–70 slowed it, but much less so than the civil and religious wars of the nineteenth century and the Second World War. There has been a revival of all religions after the Cultural Revolution. All Chinese citizens have the right to believe, much more than during the Mao period (1949–76) during which many citizens placed their faith in Marxism. However an Islamic apostolate is not really predictable. The Han theoretically cannot convert to Islam, but the higher birthrate of Muslims creates Hui and Uyghur natural demographic expansion. In the Chinese countryside, the Muslim ethic tends to ignore the official limit of two children. In cities, family planning imposes a son or a daughter on a conjugal family. The Muslims must pay fines when their family size infringes these administrative norms, for instance in Kunming or Beijing. Significant demographic growth, like that of the European Muslims, is excluded in China.

The Uyghurs have seemed to follow Islam more strongly in the last ten years. Despite more secular, Kazakhstan the republics of Central Asia are giving much importance to Islam and this is an incitement. If this Islamization is confirmed, it would make the Uyghurs more “foreign” in the eyes of the Chinese, and their integration into the society of modern Xinjiang would become more difficult.

The Hui are among the most Sinicized of China's minorities. Hui are mainly conciliatory in tendency and for thirteen hundred years have accepted control and leadership by the Chinese state. Even more than the Dong minority in Guangxi, Guizhou, and Hunan, one wonders if these Muslims are not simply Chinese citizens but Han like the others. They are rather close to the central power. The Hui are ethnically and culturally distinct from the Uyghurs. To be Chinese and Muslim does not pose an identity problem. The Hui like their own country, China, even if they complain privately about a lack of religious liberty, adjusting themselves to Chinese “Communist capitalism.” Must one finally pay for this Sinicization by silence and accept the control by the Chinese market economy? It is so for the Uyghur nationality, no longer a majority in its autonomous region. There is an

impossibility of developing a constructive critical spirit for Muslim minorities in Xinjiang and for the Han; the Uyghurs must accept this socio-economic situation. China respects differences in the framework of national unity (*tuanjie*). Inversely, under coercion the government cannot ask religious concessions from the Uyghurs, who already unhappy about the growing number of “patriotic” imams.

For Maurice Freedman (1979), the Chinese state has completely succeeded in eliminating “religious authority,” but Chinese society is changing. What are the consequences of the present drastic social changes at the level of belief? Official discourse of the twenty-first century has changed somewhat; it is less rigid and has a tendency to assimilate culture and religion. There is no longer a perceived incompatibility between socialism and Islam. However, China, though up-to-date in its modernization and globalization, has not yet truly modernized its relations with Islam.

Islam in China cannot be compared to that practiced in the independent republics of Central Asia or to that in the Middle East. To sum up, among the Chinese Sunni and Hanafite majority, Islam is rather traditional and relatively static. But as in Indonesia, one sees a revival of Sufism. Chinese Islam counts 5% of Sufi; they are very active in the northwestern provinces and Yunnan. Some orders like the Jahariya are dynamic; their impact on the youth is sometimes astonishing. As in the Middle East, it is not rare that jobless youth, sometimes rather poor, take refuge in intensive study of the Koran and join a Naqshbandi Order.

To form a community it is almost impossible to avoid government associations. In the 1920s, the first modern Islamic associations appeared, already combining the primordial affinity of nationality with religion. The Islamic Association of China, very secretive, more political and economic than religious, controls the nomination of imams and is the central structure of complex official Chinese Islam linked to the Party. It continues to be the only organized Muslim institution inside the country. It is also a superior state organization dealing with Muslim countries the world over and has many experts in Arabic.

China has witnessed a revival of Koranic studies and a concomitant intensification of Sinicization that draws youth away from mosques. The common educative curriculum for all Chinese citizens until the age of sixteen prevents an early sustained study of Islam, and consequently a generation gap exists among Hui and Uyghurs. Those who have known the Cultural Revolution did not enjoy the same opportunities of university (and even secondary) education as their children.

Elsewhere there is a re-Islamization of tenacious Hui survivors who abandoned Islam during many centuries in Fujian. A large number of Chinese have been able to prove their Muslim origin and have taken up the faith of their ancestors. The advantages given to minorities after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping have also facilitated the revival of religion.

Immense China is still far away and continues to be a mysterious country for most Muslims, even though sometimes closer as a result of irreversible globalization. Muslims want to know more about their Chinese "brothers," but in order to communicate must use English or Mandarin, which few foreigners know. The dynamism of Chinese Islam is due in large part to its relations with the outside world, thanks to indirect factors such as oil and business, or direct ones such as academic and Koranic relations and pilgrimages. Since the 1980s, the Hui have often communicated with foreign Muslims through the intermediary of Chinese diplomacy, except when they go to Mecca on an individual basis. However, if they do not know Arabic or English they cannot communicate. For Western countries, Chinese Islam represents more of an unknown domain than a menace. The Hui often benefit from a friendly attitude. On the other hand, somewhat like the Kosovars in Europe, Uyghurs can rouse either a profound attraction or indifference on the part of Western media.

There are few ways to communicate with the outside world, with the exception of electronic communication, known only to the elite. Hui, Uyghurs and, to a lesser extent, China's eight other Muslim minorities are sometimes in contact with the international Islamic community through the neighboring countries of Central and Southeast Asia, especially during the annual Hajj. They silently took sides with their Afghan and Iraqi "brothers" during the wars that followed the attacks on the United States in September 2001.

In 1998 religion had a promising future in China (Berlie 1998: 132–34), as the political, economical, social and cultural sectors displayed improvement. However, few changes have occurred at the beginning of a new century, and silent proselytism is the only religious attitude tolerated. In a country where economic pressures are great and the population gigantic, humans seek reassurance when solving their problems. Islam, by its simplicity, can appear to resolve them. The future of Islam in China is certain, if it is able to adjust itself to the modern socio-political context merging religion and culture.

Glossary of Chinese Characters

Ahong 阿訇	Imam; anyone advanced in Koranic studies
Baimao 白帽	White skullcap
Baoan 保安	A Muslim minority in China
Chaozhen dian 朝真殿	Mosque (a new term, formerly Taoist temple)
Darou 大肉	“Big meat,” a Chinese name for pork
Dashi 大食	“Arab”
Dayuejin 大跃进	Great Leap Forward
Dike'er 迪克尔	Dhikr; Sufi remembrance
Dongxiang 东乡	Muslim minority of China
Fangjia 放假	Holiday
Gaodian 糕点	Cakes
Gedimu 格底目	Orthodox Sunni
Gonganju 公安局	Police office
Gongbei 拱北	Tomb of saint
Guangta 光塔	Oldest mosque at Guangzhou
Guanxi-renqing 关系 人情	Family or professional relation and its ethic
Guerbangjie 古尔邦节	<i>Korban</i> ; The Feast of the Sacrifice
Gusi 古寺	Ancient mosque
Hanhua he tuanjie 汉化和团结	Sinicization and unity
Huasheng 怀圣	The Mosque of Holy Memory (Canton)
Huajuan 花卷	Steamed sugar buns
Hufeiye 虎非耶	Khufiya, Sufi Order
Huihe 回纥	Ancient ethnonym for the Uyghurs
Huihu 回鹘	Another ethnonym for the Uyghurs
Huijiao 回教	Old name for Islam in China
Huizu zizhixian 回族自治区	Hui Autonomous District
Jiehun zhengshu 结婚证书	Marriage certificate
Kaizhai 开斋	To break the fast; end of fasting
Kuanxiang 宽巷	Name of a mosque, Urumchi

Laojiao 老教	Old religion (Gedimu)
Laotou 老头	Muslim (in Yunnanese dialect)
Libaisi 礼拜寺	Mosque
Libaitian 礼拜天	Day of prayer: Friday
Mafu 马夫	Muleteer
Menhuan 门宦	Order, saintly descent group
Minzu zhuyi 民族主义	Minority power
Musilin 穆斯林	Muslim
Nandasi 南大寺	Name of a mosque, Yinchuan
Putonghua 普通话	Chinese language; Mandarin
Qingjiaosi 清教寺	Mosque
Qingzhen Zhinan 清真指南	Muslim guidebook
Qingzhensi 清真寺	Mosque (Pure and True Temple)
Renminbi 人民币	Yuan monetary unit; Chinese currency
Shahe 沙赫	<i>Shaykh</i> (master)
Shaoshu minzu 少数民族	National minorities of China
Shehuizhuyi shichang 社会主义市场	Chinese socialist market economy
Shunchengjie 顺成街	Ancient street and mosque in Kunming
Sufei 苏菲	Sufi
Weiwu'erzu 维吾尔族	Uyghur (in Chinese)
Wenming 文明	Civilized; refined
Wuxing Hui 无姓会	Hui Association of "The Five Families"
Xiaodongying 小东营	Mosque at Guangzhou
Xiaokang shehui 小康社会	"Comfortable Society" (a slogan)
Xinhua 新华	Chinese News Agency
Xinjiao 新教	"New Religion," Yihewani
Xinqu 新区	A suburb of Huhhot
Xinjiang, Xiyu 新疆 西域	Chinese Tukestan, Xinjiang
Xinjiang Ribao 新疆日报	A Xinjiang newspaper
Yihewani 伊赫瓦尼	Chinese Wahhabism
Yimamu 伊玛目	Imam
Youxiang 油香	Muslim fried cake (<i>puri</i> in India)
Yunnan hua 云南话	Yunnanese dialect
Yuquan 玉圈	"Jade Circle" in Huhhot
Zhehelinye 哲赫林耶	Jahariya Sufi Order

Zhengjiao zhenquan 正教真詮	True Koranic annotations
Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui 中国伊斯兰教协会	Islamic Association of China
Zhongyong 中庸	Confucian Doctrine of the Mean

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
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Islam in China defines the Muslims of China, in particular the Hui (Chinese Muslims) and the Uyghurs. Concepts of nationality (*minzu*) and *umma* (Islamic community), and the penetration of Chinese culture or Sinicization, enable the reader to understand the particularities of Islam in China. Mosques, Sufism, feasts, and family shape the Muslim society and its ethos.

After the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, modernization plays an important role, and appears in the daily life of these Muslims through the impressive development of China which also influences indirectly Islam in this part of the world. China's modernization constitutes a model for Southeast Asia and helps the Yunnanese Hui in Thailand and Burma to be proud of their country of origin. One chapter deals with these two countries and explains these unknown Overseas Chinese in particular in Chiang Mai and Mandalay.



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