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
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“The bounds of its investigation will be the geographical limits of Asia: and within these limits its inquiries will be extended to whatever is performed by man or produced by nature.”—SIR WILLIAM JONES.

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PART I.—HISTORY, LITERATURE, &c.

Extra No.—1897.

CONTENTS.

The History of the Khōjas of Eastern-Turkistān summarised from the Tazkira-i-Khwājagān of Muhammad Šādiq Kāshgharī.—By the late ROBERT BARKLEY SHAW, author of a Sketch of the Turkī Language, the Ghalcha Languages, etc., edited with Introduction and Notes by N. ELIAS.

INTRODUCTORY NOTICES.

I.—THE KHĀNS AND THE KHŌJAS.

It so happens that the only history we have of the Moghuls of Central Asia, closes at a date almost coeval with the break up of the Moghul kingdom. The last of the Moghul line who ruled over the whole of the six cities of Eastern Turkistān (the kingdom of "Altishahr") as well as over a portion, at least, of the country north of the Tiānshān, then known as Moghulistān, was Ābdu-r-Rashīd Khān, otherwise Rashīd Sultān, the early years of whose reign are recorded in the closing chapters of Part I of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*. The kingdom that Ābdu-r-Rashīd had inherited in 1533 was being pressed upon from the north-west by the Usbegs, from the north by the Kirghiz, and from the north-east by the Qalmāqs. As far as the history of his reign can be traced in the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, it would appear that Ābdu-r-Rashīd was able to repel his enemies and keep his dominions together, up to about the year 1546; but after that date nothing is known of what occurred, until the end of his life—and indeed for a considerable time after. He died in 1565-66, but it is not possible to say definitely that he maintained his country intact till that time. All that can be gleaned is that some thirty years after his death, it was almost certainly divided into two, if not split up into several different chiefships. He left thirteen sons to dispute over the inheritance, one of whom, Muḥammad Khān or Sultān Muḥammad, can be traced as having reigned at Kāshghar to within the 17th century, for his death is mentioned in 1609. Another, named Ābdu-l-Karīm, is spoken of as being in power (probably at Yārqand) within the same interval, viz., in 1593—though one authority, it seems, alludes to his death in that year. In 1602 we hear of a third, called Ābdu-r-Raḥīm, as chief in Yārqand, but the remainder are scarcely more than mentioned by name.

These are the only Khāns of this generation of the Moghul dynasty for whose lives even odds and ends of dates are forthcoming, and as they are culled from various sources, which give no information regarding the country or its affairs, it is only by inference that we can conclude that the dominions of Ābdu-r-Rashīd had been split up so soon after his death. Nor do any of these sources except one—and that but vaguely—give any indication of how far the foreign enemies of the Moghul Khāns were concerned in dismembering the kingdom; so that it is impossible to judge

whether, if the power were really divided at the time in question, the division was brought about by external foes or by internal dissension.

What the sources of information on these points are, it will not occupy many lines to explain, for they are the merest fragments. In the first place there is the short passage in the *Haft Iqlīm* of Amin Ahmad Rāzī,¹ where a list of the thirteen sons of Ābdu-r-Rashīd is given, with some scanty indications of what had become of them down to the year when Ahmad Rāzī wrote—viz., 1593. Secondly, there is the remnant of the narrative of the Portuguese missionary, Benedict Goez,² who passed through Eastern Turkistān on his way from Lahore to China, *viā* Badakhshān and Wakhān, and only a portion of whose journal was rescued, after his death at Suchau, in Western China, in 1607. His sojourn in the country fell in the years 1603 to 1605, and though he mentions only the name of one Khān—Muhammad—whose seat was at Kāshghar, he points incidentally to others possessing some sort of power in other provinces, but does not name them. Thirdly, Dr. Bellew mentions, on the authority of a book called the *Tārīkh-i-Khānān Caghataīa*,³ that this Muhammad Khān and Ābdu-l-Karīm “succeeded to a divided Government in turn;” while during the reign of the former, and about the year 1572, the Kirghiz invaded the country. It is then added that this invasion led to the dismemberment of the kingdom by rival representatives of the Moghul family; but, as remarked above, it is not clear whether this was effected by the Kirghiz, or whether it was due to dissensions between the Khāns. Fourthly, Dr. Bellew cites some passages from another book—the *Taḡkira-i-Hidāyat* of Mīr Khālu-d-Dīn, Yārquandī⁴ which he was, apparently, able to examine at Kāshghar in 1873-74. But the extracts he furnishes afford no dates bearing on the generation of Khāns immediately succeeding Ābdu-r-Rashīd, though it is somewhat more explicit in information concerning the next two generations, as will be seen below. Fifthly, among Mr. Shaw’s fragmentary papers, are to be found some notes of certain *Yarlyghs*⁵ or title-deeds (sanads) which he procured at Kāshghar or Yārquand, and which afford unmistakable proof of certain Khāns being in power at certain periods. These documents consist of grants of land, titles or privileges, and most of them bear the date of issue. From them are obtained glimpses of Muhammad Khān reigning in 996-H. (or 1587)

¹ See Quatremère *Notices et Extraits*, XIV, pp. 474, *seq.* Ahmad Rāzī calls Ābdu-l-Karīm the brother of Rashīd, but it is obvious, from the context, that “son” is meant.

² See Yule’s *Cathay and the way thither*, volume II.

³ *Report of Sir D. Forsyth’s Mission to Yarquand, etc.*, page 174. He notes, however, that he had not himself seen the book.

⁴ *Report of Mission to Yarkand, etc.*, pages 175 to 178. This book would appear to be history or biography of the Khōja Ḥazrat Āfāq, whose name was Hidāyatu-llāh.

⁵ يارليغ *Yarlygh* ou يارليق *Yarlyq*, ordre royal, chiffre qui le surmonte. (Pavet de Courteille.) [Ed.]

and dying in 1018-H. (1609); of Ābdu-l-Karīm in the year 1000-H. (1592); of Ābdu-r-Raḥīm at Yārqaṇd in 1011-H. (1602-3) and at Kuchār in 1017-H. (or 1608).¹

To these five sources, fragmentary and imperfect as they are, it would have been gratifying to be able to add the history of Khōjas as an authority, but it is not possible. A few of the names of the Khāns are mentioned, but not a date is vouchsafed throughout the book; while for about half a century following on the death of Ābdu-r-Rashīd, no events are recorded that can be set up as landmarks from which to infer them even approximately.

During the whole of this period nothing is heard of the Khōjas in any other capacity than that of priests and workers of miracles. They appear to have been content to exercise over the Khāns or Chiefs, to whose service they nominally attached themselves, the great powers they possessed as "Khalīfas," or spiritual guides. This, indeed, is what they had already been doing for more than a century past, among the various rulers in Central Asia who entertained them: for it had long been the custom for every Khān, Chief or Amīr of standing, to attach one or more of them to his court, where the "holy man" became, usually, the object of much superstitious reverence. But as the power of the Moghul Khāns declined, that of the Khōjas no doubt increased. What must have been wanting, previously, to enable them to obtain control, not only over the minds of the Khāns but over the affairs of the country, was that the dynasty should be divided against itself; and this opportunity was afforded them, to some extent, during the generation that followed Ābdu-r-Rashīd. Still more was this the case during the two succeeding and final generations of Moghul Chiefs, for it was then that the Khōjas began to raise themselves to temporal power, and brought their country's independence to an end.

Of grandsons of Ābdu-r-Rashīd, I can only find mention of two names. One of these, a certain Shujā'u-d-Dīn Aḥmad, son of Muḥammad Khān, occurs merely in some deeds seen and noted by Mr. Shaw, in Kāshghar or Yārqaṇd, and there is nothing to show whether he ever ruled over even a province of the country, or, if he did, which one it was. The other, called Ābdu-llāh, a son of Ābdu-r-Raḥīm, appears to have been a man of some mark and his name often occurs in the History of the Khōjas, as well as in Mr. Shaw's list of "Sanads." He had his seat of Government at Yārqaṇd, but no mention is to be found of which provinces acknowledged his sway. Nor can the length of the reign of either of these cousins be indicated more nearly than by a few odd dates, during which

¹ See the Genealogical Table attached.

they seem to have been exercising power. Thus Mr. Shaw found documents of *Shujā'u-d-Dīn Ahmad* dated in 1611 and 1615, and of *Abdu-llāh* in various years between 1637 and 1643 inclusive.¹

Abdu-llāh Khān's sons, alone, constitute the next and last generation of the reigning *Khāns*. How many there were of his children is not apparent, but four sons and one daughter are to be found named by one or another of the above mentioned authorities, or by our author, and those of them who governed the various provinces, had to keep up an almost constant struggle with the *Khōjas*. Their period may be placed, in the absence of more accurate information, at between 1650 and about the end of the century. The one who seems to have played the most noticeable part was called *Isma'il*. He succeeded, for a time, as will be seen in the history, in ridding his country of the most powerful of the *Khōjas* and continued his career till 1678, when the *Qalmāqs*, intervening in favour of the *Khōjas*, made the whole of Eastern Turkistān a tributary of their own, and carried *Isma'il* a prisoner to *Ilī*. After this date one of his brothers, called *Akbash*, is incidentally mentioned as a vassal of the *Qalmāqs* struggling against *Khōja* fanaticism in the year 1694, and he completes the tale.

As the author himself tells the history of the *Khōjas*, there is no need to encumber this Introduction with more than a few remarks on them, gathered from Dr. Bellew's notice of the *Tazkira-i-Hidāyat*, and to add a genealogical table which may help to make the narrative of the *Epitome* clear. There are, as is well known, many Persian and Turkī books in existence,² which deal with the lines of saints [*Auliyā*] and *Khōjas* who have flourished at one period or another, in various parts of Central Asia; but probably very few indeed of these concern themselves with Eastern Turkistān, or with the *Khōjas* who governed there between the *Moghul* and the Chinese periods. Except those of our author, and of *Khālu-d-Dīn*, I can find no reference to any. Several of the *Musalmān* general histories contain notices of saints and miracle-workers, more or less celebrated, who appear to have been mostly *Khōjas*, and some of whom belonged to particular countries, while others seem to have wandered from one place to another. None of these, however, so far as I am aware, ever attained to temporal power in any country, as they did in Eastern Turkistān, though many must have exercised considerable influence in the dominions of the *Khāns* or *Sultāns* to whom they attached themselves. A number of such characters will be found alluded to in the *Tārīkh-i-*

¹ These are the dates contained in the list of "Sanads," but there is elsewhere a note of Mr. Shaw's giving 1617 to 1642 as the dates traceable for *Abdu-llāh Khān*. He does not mention his authority.

² Such as the *Silsila-i-Khwājagān*, the *Tazkira-i-Auliyā*, etc., etc.

Rashīdī as having flourished in various regions of Central Asia, including Eastern Turkistān, during nearly two centuries before their rise to power as described in Muḥammad Ṣādiq's history. Yet, strangely enough, not one of the names given by this author, in the pedigree at the beginning of the book (see below), can be identified with certainty, with any Khōja mentioned in the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*.¹ It is possible that one cause for this may be that these professing saints went by several different names—or rather titles; and these titles seem to have been assumed, or given to them by their followers, at different times and perhaps in different places. However this may be, it can only be regretted that none of the later ones mentioned in Muḥammad Ṣādiq's pedigree are to be found in the history of Mirzā Haidar, for he furnishes dates so abundantly, that had it been otherwise, the descent of the Khōjas we have to do with in the Epitome, might have been fixed in point of time, and other events would have fallen into their right places.

The extracts published by Dr. Bellew, from Khālu-d-Dīn's *Tazkira-i-Hidāyat* are brief and consist chiefly of anecdotes which have no particular interest. Such indications as it contains regarding the Moghul Khāns and the course of affairs in Eastern Turkistān during the 17th century, are so confused and so greatly at variance with all that can be gathered from other authorities, that I have been unable to make use of them. No useful purpose would be served by discussing the irreconcilable discrepancies here, but a few examples may be mentioned to show their nature. Thus in one place a certain Khān—named Akbash—is spoken of as the brother of one of the Khōjas, which is impossible, seeing that he was a "Khān." In another place Khānam Pādshāh, the widow of Khōja Afāsh is described as the daughter of Abdu-r-Rashīd: yet, as is well known, Abdu-r-Rashīd died in 1565-66, while Khānam Pādshāh was not left a widow by Āfāq till 1693, when she was still an active woman taking part in the intrigues and dissensions of the times. Further, the death of a great-grandson of Rashīd, named Muḥammad Amīn, is recorded for 1633-34, after years of fighting and intriguing, while his elder brothers are known to have been alive at near the end of the 17th century. Again the invasions of

¹ It seems just possible that the Ḥazrat Makhdūm-i-Āzam of our present author may be identical with the Ḥazrat Makhdūm-i-Nūra so often spoken of in the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* under various styles, such as Ḥazrat Khwāja Khāvand Maḥmūd Shihābu-d-Dīn (which was his real name) and several other combinations of the same words. The last we hear of Makhdūm-i-Nūra is his escape from the Punjab to Māwarāu-n-Nahr in the year 1540, while Mr. Vambéry records the death of Makhdūm-i-Āzam as having taken place in that country in 1542. In the Epitome, below, it will be seen that his proper name is given as Aḥmad Khwāja; this is evidently taken from Mr. Shaw's "other book," for it is not mentioned by Muḥammad Ṣādiq. (See *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, page 399, and Vambéry's *History of Bukhārā*, page 299.)

the Qalmāqs and their acquisition of suzerainty over the Khōjas—the leading features of the history of the period—are not even mentioned.

Dr. Bellew's extract does not purport to be a translation, but I am assuming it to be a correct summary, and if this is the case, the book must be regarded as unreliable for historical purposes. It furnishes, however, some particulars respecting the Khōjas that are not contained in the narrative of Muḥammad Ṣādiq. We may gather from it, for instance, that the Khōjas themselves had split up into two opposing factions quite early in the 17th century, and that they were known, even then, as the Ak-taghlyq and Kara-taghlyq, or White and Black mountaineers, respectively, while these designations are never used by Muḥammad Ṣādiq. It appears (if the writer is to be trusted) that in 1622, in the course of the struggle for ascendancy between these two parties, one Mullā Fāzil of Artush, the leader of the White faction, called for help from some powerful Khōja of Khōkand, and by means of the forces this ally brought him, succeeded in capturing Kāshghar. Neither this event, nor the name of Mullā Fāzil is mentioned by our author, and it can only be conjectured that Fāzil must be another name for one of the descendants of Ishān Kalān whose line eventually became the White party. Only very shortly after this incident we find Khōja Hidāyat-llāh, known as Ḥazrat Āfāq, mentioned as the leader of the White mountaineers, but it can hardly be to him that the style of Mullā Fāzil is applied, for he is so well known a personage that all his names and titles must have been handed down.

Āfāq was, without doubt, the most famous of all the Khōjas descended from Makhdūm-i-A'zam, and he attained to a greater degree of power than any other, of either party. He is described by Dr. Bellew's author as having held entire dominion, spiritual and temporal, over the six cities of Eastern Turkistān, as well as over Turfān and the eastern districts known, at an earlier date, as Uighuristān; while he had large numbers of disciples in foreign countries, from whom he received tithes. "Amongst the people of Kāshghar," writes Dr. Bellew, "he was held as a prophet only second to Muḥammad, and, in his miraculous powers of healing the sick and restoring the dead, he was reckoned the equal of Ḥazrat 'Isā (or 'the Lord Jesus'). His bearing exercised a marvellous effect on the people, and his appearance amongst them produced the most extraordinary manifestations of fascination. Some wept with joy, some sang with delight, others danced and leaped and whirled around, and others again fell senseless to the ground, whilst all were irresistibly attracted to him by an ecstatic devotion of spiritual love. His miracles are said to be countless; yet in his early career scoffers and unbelievers were not wanting." He is said to have converted nearly a hundred thousand people to Islām, and appears to have lived to a great age. The date of his birth is not to be found, but if his biographer, Khālu-d-Din, is to be

relied upon, his active career must have begun some time previous to the year 1622, while his death is recorded in the year of the Hijra 1105, or 1693-94 A. D.—dates which would point to a life of almost incredible length, considering the country and times in which it was passed. Among the appendices to the present volume will be found an interesting account of a visit paid by Mr. Shaw to Ḥazrat Āfāq's tomb at Kāshghar in 1874, but it is remarkable that no mention is made of the duration of his life.

So scanty and fragmentary are the notices of the Khōjas of Eastern Turkistān in known or available works, that it is necessary to fall back on such brief statements as our author, Muḥammad Ṣādiq, vouchsafes to his readers, in order to trace their identity and origin. He very naturally omits any explanation of what constitutes a Khōja (or *khwāja*, as it is more properly written), for it must have been a household word among his associates and countrymen, and in every-day use with them. Still it may not, at first sight, be quite easy to determine whether any difference existed between a Khōja, as understood in some countries, and the members of other families supposed to owe their origin to the Prophet Muḥammad. The learned orientalist, M. Schefer, has defined them¹ as those who claim descent from the Khalīfs Abū-Bakr and 'Umar, by other women than the daughters of the Prophet; and that they were divided into two categories:—the Khōjas Sayyid-atā, who possessed deeds proving their descent, and the Khōjas Jūibārī, whose deeds were lost and who could only appeal to tradition and repute. They differed from the Sayyids in that the latter claimed to originate from the Khalīfs 'Uṣmān and 'Alī, through the daughters of the Prophet; and they had precedence of the Khōjas. But this definition, though no doubt correct for some regions, seems scarcely to apply to the usage in Eastern Turkistān. Mr. Shaw, in his "Turkī Vocabulary" defines the word *khwāja* as "a title applied to the offspring of a Sayyid by a woman of any other family: also to their descendants." In other words the Khōjas were Sayyids²: for the offspring of Sayyids, by whatever woman, are always Sayyids; and it may be remarked that Mr. Shaw must have obtained his description from the mouths of people who were living among the posterity of those very Khōjas with whom our history is concerned. Thus, whether strictly accurate or not, it would seem that in Eastern Turkistān (and probably other neighbouring countries also) the name of "Khōja" had become synonymous with Sayyid.³

¹ See Howorth, II, page 870.

² It may be remarked here that the Khōjas belonged to the order of Darwīshes known as "Naqshbandī", but this does not affect the question of their being Sayyids.

³ Compare Richardson's *Persian Dictionary* and Redhouse's *Turkī Dictionary* under the words *Sayyid* and *Khwāja*.

But however this may be, our author, Muḥammad Ṣādiq, records the lineage of the Khōjas in a way which shows that they themselves could not have laid claim to the origin indicated by M. Schefer, for, in the pedigree which he gives, the names of the Khalīfs Abū-Bakr and 'Umar do not occur. He traces them directly from Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of 'Alī, and thus classes them, in fact, with Sayyids. His account of their descent is contained in the first chapter of his book, but as Mr. Shaw has not reproduced it in his Epitome, it may be worth while to cite the passage here; for, although the pedigree may have no historical authority, the extract may, in some respects, be of interest. He writes: "Be it known to you that lineage [*nisbat*] is of two kinds, *viz.*, spiritual and apparent. Apparent lineage means that so and so is the son of such an one, and so forth; and the succession comes to him. True [or spiritual] succession is allowed to those who carry out the working of the Prophet (may God bless and save him). This kind of lineage is of three sorts: firstly apparent knowledge; secondly visible acts; thirdly internal acts. But apparent knowledge is of no use without internal grace. The knowledge of the Prophet (on whom be peace) was of two kinds: one of prophecy, which concerns the perpetual knowledge of holy law: another of saintliness [*Vilāyat*], which concerns the perpetual knowledge of internal conditions. First¹ we will describe apparent lineage [of the Khōjas]. The offspring of the Prophet (may God bless and save him) was the blessed Fāṭimah;

her son was Imām Ḥusain;

his son was Imām Zainu-l-Ābidīn;

- " " " Ḥazrat Imām Muḥammad Bākir;
- " " " Ḥazrat Imām Jafar Ṣādiq;
- " " " Ḥazrat Muḥammad Mūsā-i-Kāzim;
- " " " Ḥazrat 'Alī Mūsā;²
- " " " Ḥazrat Sayyid Ṭālib;³
- " " " 'Abdu-llāh-i-Āraj;
- " " " Ḥazrat 'Abdu-llāh-i-Afzal;
- " " " Ḥazrat 'Ubaidu-llāh;
- " " " Sayyid Aḥmad;
- " " " Sayyid Muḥammad;
- " " " Ḥazrat Shāh Ḥusain;
- " " " Ḥazrat Shāh Ḥasan;
- " " " Ḥazrat Sayyid Jalāu-d-Dīn;
- " " " Ḥazrat Sayyid Kamālu-d-Dīn;

¹ The author omits to describe "Spiritual" lineage.

² Imām 'Alī Mūsā Rizā whose shrine is at Mashhad.

³ The Shi'as do not acknowledge Ṭālib as a son of 'Alī Mūsā.

his son was Ḥaẓrat Sayyid Burhānu-d-Dīn ;
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Sayyid Jalālu-d-Dīn ;
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Makhdūm-i-A'ẓam ; ¹
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Iṣḥāq Walī ;
 " " " Khwāja Shādī ;
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Khwāja 'Abdu-llāh ; ²
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Khwāja Dānyāl ;
 " " " Ḥaẓrat Ya'qūb (called Khwāja Jahān)."

This pedigree, then, whatever it may be worth in point of authenticity, shows that the Khōjas of Eastern Turkistān were accounted Sayyids, and it is to that fraternity that we may regard them as belonging.

Muḥammad Ṣādiq's history may be said to open with the life of the Khōja known as Ḥaẓrat Makhdūm-i-A'ẓam who was of the twentieth generation in descent from the Prophet. Nothing more interesting, however, is recorded of him than some disjointed tales of miracles that he performed and some brief notices of his wives and children. These have mostly been omitted in the Epitome, but it may be remarked here that some of them have a certain bearing on the history, for they show how it was that at the death of Makhdūm-i-A'ẓam, a division took place among the Khōjas, which resulted in one party becoming followers of the Makhdūm's elder son, called Ishān-i-Kalān, and another attaching themselves to his younger son, Iṣḥāq Wālī. The party of the Ishān seem to have acquired the name of *Ak-taghlyq*, or White mountaineers, and that of Iṣḥāq, *Kara-taghlyq*, or Black mountaineers, but these names had no reference to the localities where their adherents lived. All were inhabitants of the lowlands and cities of Eastern Turkistān, but each section made allies among the Kirghiz of the neighbouring mountains, and apparently subsidised them to fight their party battles. The Kirghiz tribes of the Western Tien Shan ranges, lying to the north of Kāshghar, were known as the "White mountaineers," and those of the Pāmīr as the "Black mountaineers" so that the Khōjas came to assume the designations of their Kirghiz allies. Though these terms never occur in Muḥammad Ṣādiq's book ³ they were, apparently, in pretty general use, for they are found, according to Dr. Bellew, in the *Tazkira-i-Hidāyat* and are employed throughout the narrative of Captain Valikhanoff, who tells us, moreover, that they were current at the time when he wrote.

¹ For some remarks on this saint, see immediately below; and for the remainder compare the genealogical table, attached.

² This name should be 'Ubaidu-llāh.

³ He uses, sometimes, Iṣḥāqī for the party of Iṣḥāq Walī, but has no general name for the party of Ishān-i-Kalān.

II.—THE QALMĀQS.

The story of the Qalmāqs as a race is so variously told by ethnographers and historians that it is impossible to follow any one authority exclusively. The sources from which different writers have derived their information have been so scattered, and the points of view from which they have approached the subject so wide apart, that exact agreement could hardly be otherwise than surprising. One has compiled his account from the traditions of the tribes in Northern Mongolia, another from those located, in the last century, on the banks of the Volga, a third from the annals of the Chinese, while a fourth has culled such fragments as exist from the works of Musulman historians. A critical comparison of all original writers by such scholars as Howorth and Bretschneider, however, enables us now-a-days to get a clear view of who the people were who now go by the name of 'Qalmāq' and how they came to occupy the position described by our historian of the Khōjas.

In the first place it may be remarked that the name of Qalmāq (Calmuck, Kalimāk, etc.) is of comparatively recent origin and is not a native one among the nation so called. Its meaning is uncertain,¹ but it appears to have originated with Turkī-speaking tribes who at some time were neighbours of the people they applied it to. Professor Grigorieff tells us that the word is not to be found in the works of Musulman authors previous to the 15th century,² and it is highly probable that it only came into use about that period. But it has since become universally applied to them by the Turkī- and Persian-speaking nations of Central Asia and by Europeans, and has doubtless, in later times, been partially adopted even by the people themselves. On the other hand, the Chinese have never employed the word Qalmāq or any variant of it.

The Qalmāqs' own name for themselves is *Oirā*, though more often seen and used in its plural form of *Oirātā* or more fully as *Durben Oirāt*, that is "Four Oirās"; and it is this word, in various phonetic forms, that the Chinese have always made use of in their writings. Thus we find *Wā-lā*, *Wā-lā-tē*, *Ö-lö-tē*, *Wei-lā-tē*, etc., which European translators from the Chinese have rendered Olot, Ölot, Eleuth, etc., according to differences of ear.³

¹ If it is a real Turkī word, it would mean "to remain, to stay behind." See Shaw's *Turkī vocabulary*, p. 146. But Sir H. Howorth gives reasons for considering it to be synonymous with "unbeliever." (Volume I, pp. 497-498.)

² See Schuyler's *Turkistān*, I, p. 369.

³ Translators from the Mongol seem to read *Oghlod*, or *Ogehled* (See Howorth, I, pp. 676-677.)

The four tribes, or divisions, of the Oirāt have been variously stated and the subject has given rise to some discussion, which there is no need to enter into here. Briefly put, the Qalmāq, or Oirā, people may be regarded as merely the western branch of the Mongol race, while this branch has been divided always into four sections (whence the name *Durben-Oirāt*), which were again more or less subdivided.

As in the case of most, if not all, Mongol tribes, the western, or Oirā, nation originally consisted of two wings, called the "Right-hand" or *Boronghar* and the "Left-hand" or *Zunghar*.¹ The former of these seems almost completely to have disappeared previous to the conquests of Cingiz Khān, at the beginning of the 13th century; though in reality a remnant was left as will appear lower down. Still the sections of the left wing alone have latterly formed the Four Oirāt. Their names are:—

- (1) The Choros (or Cholos—the Cho-lo-sze of the Chinese).
- (2) The Durbet (or Turbatē Tu-rh-po-tē).
- (3) The Turgut (or Turghud—Tu-rh-hu-tē).
- (4) The Khoshot (Ho-Shē-tē).

Thus, when we read of the *Zunghar* tribe (the *Chongkar* of the Chinese), it should mean, properly speaking, the whole of these four tribes, or all that exist of the Left-hand wing of the original Oirāt. The vanity of a chief, however, caused at one period a modification of this simple rule—a matter that has been briefly explained by a Chinese author cited by Dr. Bretschneider.² We are told that on his accession the chief of the Choros tribe, known as Galdan Khān (about 1671) took the title of "Zunghar Khān", and from this circumstance his tribe and country, especially, became known (for a time it would appear) by the name of *Zunghar*. In this way the whole of the *Zunghar* seem to have been regarded merely as the Choros under another name, while the latter name had (and has since) almost fallen out of ordinary use. On the other hand, however, the Choros having become the predominant tribe, and being known as *Zunghar*, this last name became subsequently a synonym with Oirāt, or Eleuth—as indeed it more correctly should be. It may happen, therefore, that writings are to be met with where the term *Zunghar* is made to denote the Choros tribe alone, but if so it is incorrect. Our history of the Khōjas is concerned almost entirely with the Choros tribe and its chiefs, so that when throughout the Turkī author's text³ we read of the "Jungar",

¹ The Right-hand is always the Western, and the Left-hand the Eastern, Wing.

² *Mediæval Researches*, II, page 171.

³ This will hardly appear in the Epitome, however.

it is, in fact, to the Choros section of the Zunghar, or Left-hand Qalmāqs that he alludes, though in applying the term to the whole of these Qalmāqs or Oirāts he is strictly accurate.

But in addition to the four sections of Choros, Durbet, Turgut and Khoshot, mention is often found of the tribe of *Khoit* (the Chinese Hucitē) and, with some writers, this has been the cause of much confusion.¹ Mr. V. M. Uspenski, however, has, I think, shown, in an elaborate paper on the Koko-Nor region, that, according to certain Chinese and Mongol authors, the Khoit have never been included among the Four Oirāt, or the Zunghar proper, but that they are a tribe of the *Boronghar*, or Right-hand Qalmāqs. If so, they are probably the only remnant that now exists of that ancient branch of the nation.² But just as these Khoit would, in their own language, call themselves Oirāt, so they are also classed—and rightly so—by their Turki-speaking neighbours under the general term “Qalmāq.” The Turks, though, are not right when they apply this name, as they do in Eastern Turkistān, at the present day, to all the Mongolian tribes.

The habitat of the Oirāt tribes has varied a good deal in the course of the last five centuries, though it has been, in the main, about the same as at present, that is, the region between the southern frontiers of Siberia on the north, and the chain of the Tien Shan on the south; or, in other words, the territory pretty generally known now-a-days as “Zungharia.” In addition to this tract, certain sections of some of the tribes have also occupied parts of the Koko-Nor region, while others again are located on the north slope of the Altai. During the period covered by the history of the Khōjas, the Choros (known as *Zunghar*) was the tribe that held supremacy over the others. They inhabited chiefly the Ili valley, but seem to have been distributed, to some extent, over nearly the whole of the region that might be called Qalmāq territory. Still the centre, or homeland, of each tribe can be fairly well made out, and may be roughly stated as follows:—

The Choros in the Ili valley and North-western Tien Shan.

The Durbet on the Upper Irtish.

¹ Among the appendices will be found a note by Mr. Shaw on “Tribe Nomenclature” of the Qalmāqs. It was found among his papers and seems to have been intended as an appendix to his version of the *History of the Khōjas*. The particulars it contains were evidently gathered by him at Kāshghar or Yārqand, and though not entirely correct, are interesting as coming direct from the people themselves.

² Mr. Uspenski (in translation at least) is not very clear but I take his “Barin tribe” to be the Boronghar wing. [See *Memoirs of Russian Geographical Society* (Ethnographic Div.) No VI.]

The Turgut¹ on the Imil river and about Tarbagatai.

The Khoshot in the eastern ranges of the Tien Shan.

The Koko-Nor region seems to have been chiefly the home of the Khoit, though the Khoshot were also largely represented there, and to a certain extent some of the other tribes.

All were, and are still, Buddhists and ardent followers of the Grand Lama of Lhasa. They have also been much bound up with Tibet, and Tibetan affairs, since the middle of the 17th century, and it will be seen further on, how they sometimes made themselves masters of Lhasa.

For the purpose of tracing the story of the Khōjas of Eastern Turkistān, there is no necessity to go further back into the history of the Zunghars than about the year 1676, when the chief then in power over them—the notorious Galdan—first began to extend his influence eastward and to the south of the Tien Shan. The Emperor Kang-Hi, the second of the Manchu dynasty, was then reigning in China, while in Eastern Turkistān, the last representatives of the Moghuls were still nominally exercising the functions of Khāns over the disintegrated provinces of that country, though the actual power lay already with the Khōjas.

This Galdan (or Galdan Bushētu Khān) as his title afterwards became,² was born in 1645, his father, known as the Erdeni Baatur (or Bahādur) having been a warlike chief, who had developed considerable power and had been able to treat, on something like equal terms, with Russia, China and Tibet.³ Galdan was not his eldest son and did not succeed to the chiefship, but was sent to Lhasa to study for the priesthood, whence, after a few years, he returned to his own country as a Lama. Here he soon contrived to make away with his brothers and to set himself up (about 1671) as the tribal chief, with the title of Taishi,⁴ or Kung-Taishi. His turbulent disposition was not long in showing itself, for he

¹ The Turgut are perhaps best known to English readers from DeQuincey's *Flight of a Tartar tribe*. They were compelled by tribal enemies gradually to migrate westward in the 17th century, and finally (in 1703) all settled between the lower Volga and the Ural river. During the reign of Peter the Great they lived there in peace, but unable to endure the rule of Catherine II, and learning that their ancient enemies, the Choros, had been practically exterminated by the Manchus, they returned to Zungharia in 1771—2, and became Chinese subjects.

² The word Galdan is itself only a title, and means, I believe, King. The chief's personal name does not appear to be known.

³ He is also reported to have made a successful raid on the cities of Eastern Turkistān in the year 1634, or about the time when temporal power there, first fell to the Khōjas. (Howork, I, p. 617.)

⁴ The *Tāji* of our Turkī author.

began, very shortly (about 1673), to quarrel with his relations, and his first campaigns—not always successful—were against sections of his own, or closely connected, Qalmāq tribes. Thus in 1677, he conquered the Koko-Nor country, with the result that large numbers of the Qalmāq and Tibetan tribesmen inhabiting the region fled eastward into China and placed themselves under the protection of the Manchu Emperor, who took up their cause, and thereby sowed the first seeds of the long series of wars that he had afterwards to wage against the Zunghars.¹

It was just at this time, also, that an opportunity was afforded to Galdan of extending his influence over the cities of Eastern Turkistān, where, as we have seen above, the Khōjas were already divided into two rival factions, according to their family extraction, though a descendant of the former Moghul Khāns was still the nominal King of at least the western part of the country. This Isma'il Khān, whose capital was at Yārqand was an adherent of the Black Mountain Khōjas, while the leader of the opposing faction was Khwāja Hidāyat-llāh, more usually known by his title of "Ḥazrat Āfāq." The White party being worsted in the struggle, Āfāq fled to Kashmir and thence, it is said (though perhaps doubtfully, as we shall see), made his way to the Grand Lama, at Lhasa, to whom he appealed for aid against his enemies. The Lama, we are told, gave him a letter to Galdan, requesting the latter to render Āfāq the assistance he required for re-establishing his authority in Kāshghar and Yārqand. Galdan seized the occasion, subdued the western cities of Eastern Turkistān in 1678, set up Āfāq as a feudatory, and exacted a yearly sum from him as tribute. At the same time he took Isma'il Khān prisoner and, carrying him off to Ilī, settled him in the town of Kulja.² He also conquered the eastern districts of Turfān and Hāmi immediately afterwards, and proceeded to lend his assistance to certain tribes of Western Mongolia who were then disputing with some of their neighbours. This was in 1679, and the complications into which his intervention in Mongolia led him, together with certain family feuds, kept him actively employed for many years, during which time the Qalmāqs seem scarcely to have interfered with Eastern Turkistān or the Khōjas.

¹ See Howorth, I, p., 623.

² It will be seen in the Epitome, that these good offices of Galdan's were repaid shortly afterwards, by the treacherous Khōja allying himself, with a younger brother of Isma'il, named Muḥammad-Amīn and marching an expedition into Ilī. The date of this expedition is nowhere given, but it seems to have been shortly before the death of Āfāq which occurred in 1105 H. (1693-4 A. D.), and was therefore probably at a time when Galdan was engaged in war with the Mongols or the Chinese. The expedition was successful however, and a large number of Qalmāqs were carried back as prisoners to Kāshghar.

Eventually, about 1688, Galdan's operations against the Khalka Mongols caused the Emperor Kang-Hi to fear that the Qalmāq chief was becoming too strong, and was advancing too near to the limits of Chinese territory. It was known, moreover, that he had intrigued with the Russians on the Siberian frontier, and had promised that, if provided by them with a force of Cossacks and some guns, he would ravage all the borders of China outside the Great Wall.¹ The Emperor was unwilling to go to war with an enemy who was practically master of the desert, and whose mobility his Manchu and Chinese soldiers could not hope to equal. He was, however, forced to take arms in defence of the frontiers of his country as well as of the Mongol Bannermen who inhabited the border region, and who remained true to the throne. He collected a numerous army and despatched it to the north of the Gobi, where it was beaten by the Qalmāqs and their allies, who then advanced to within 80 leagues of Peking. Here a second huge force had been got together, but the battle that ensued can only be described as a drawn one. Matters were patched up by a truce, and Galdan was free to turn his attention to further hostilities and intrigues with various sections of the Mongols and Qalmāqs, at a distance from the empire. Kang-Hi, however, saw that his enemy was by no means disposed of, and employed himself in organising, on a great scale, three new armies. Each of these was reported to number some 36,000 men and they were attended by an incredible host of retainers and camp-followers. One army he headed himself, while the two others were under the command of his most experienced Manchu generals. Early in 1696 this force began to move northward and westward across the Gobi and, after many slow manœuvres and tiresome delays, at length brought Galdan to battle at a spot called Chao-modo,² and defeated him.

This was the end of Galdan's power. Though not entirely crushed, he had, afterwards, to confine himself to the more westerly regions, but even there he was pursued by a force under the Manchu commander, Feyanku; while his family and tribal enemies took advantage of his fall to embarrass him in various ways. His nephew, Tse-Wang-Rabtan, the eldest son of Senghe or Tsenka (the elder brother who had been murdered soon after the Erdini Baatur's death) had long previously quarrelled with Galdan, and, though he had never joined the Manchus against his kinsmen, had lost no opportunity of trying to oust him from the chiefship. Galdan's own son, moreover, had fallen into the hands of the Emperor a few months after the battle of Chao-modo, and was never likely to be released

¹ Howorth, I, p. 628.

² Probably at a short distance to the south-east of the modern Urga.

from Peking. Against these conditions he struggled till June 1697, when he died suddenly and his followers dispersed—the bulk of them going over to Tse-Wang-Rabtan, though some surrendered themselves to Feyanku.

The Emperor at first thought that his troubles with the Qalmāqs were at an end, and withdrew the army under Feyanku, which was then probably in the western part of Kansu, and beyond the Great Wall. Tse-Wang-Rabtan became the successor to his uncle, almost without opposition, and the Emperor offered generous terms of peace, though he required the new chief to give up the mother and daughter of Galdan, together with the dead chief's ashes. This demand was at first resisted and led to a long correspondence and exchanges of envoys; but eventually Kang-Hi had his way and behaved with magnanimity to the prisoners.¹ For a time all went smoothly with China, but Tse-Wang-Rabtan proved to be nearly as restless and ambitious a spirit as his uncle. He was thirty-two years of age on his accession, and from his earliest days had been engaged in the inter-tribal wars, in the campaigns with the Mongols and latterly in operations of his own against Galdan. It seems probable, indeed, that during the last few years of Galdan's life he had been supplanted by his nephew in Western Zungharia (the Ilī region), and even to some degree in the eastern districts of Eastern Turkistān, for Sir H. Howorth points out that in 1696 he had his own garrison of five hundred men at Turfān. Immediately on his succession to the chiefship, moreover, he had to undertake a war with his western neighbours, the Kirghiz-Kazāks,—a war which he had, in fact, inherited from his uncle, and which he brought to a successful conclusion by subduing a large section of the middle horde of that people. He also humbled the Kara Kirghiz (the *Purut* of the Chinese), a tribe that lived in the regions about Lake Isigh-kul, and who supplied the Qalmāqs with a contingent of 3,000 fighting men. A little later again—in 1704—he was equally successful in suppressing the Turgut Chief Sandship,² to whom he was related by marriage, and who had attacked him without any apparent cause. The Turgut, however, suffered for his boldness by the loss of the whole of his followers, for these went over to the Zunghars and proved a considerable increase of strength to them. Even the Russians, the Zunghar Chief was able to beat back from the northern part of his dominions, and Peter the Great was fain to submit to more

¹ Howorth, I, pp. 639 and 642.

² Sandship was the third son of Ayuka, the chief of the Turgut, then settled in the steppes between the rivers Volga and Ural. He had broken with his father and had returned with a large part of his tribe, to endeavour to wrest his native country from Tse-Wang-Rabtan. (See Howorth, I, p. 567.)

than one defeat, having eventually to relinquish his design of marching a force southward, into Eastern Turkistān.

But these wars, while they augmented Tse-Wang-Rabtan's power and enlarged his influence, had no far-reaching effects, and failed to embroil him with the Manchu Court. The one which was to follow, however, roused the Emperor once more, and brought on a series of campaigns with China which out-lasting the life of the chief, and terminated only with the loss of the Zunghar kingdom, together with its dependencies in Eastern Turkistān. The events which led to the invasion of Tibet and the details of that expedition, need not be gone into here, as they have no bearing on the history of the Khōjas. It need only be mentioned, briefly, that the Tipa, or minister of the Grand Lama of Lhassa, who had been a protégé of Galdan's and a Zunghar partisan, had been attacked and driven out of Tibet by one Latsan Khān, the Chief of the Khoshots of the Koko-Nor, while this personage is described as a friend, and little more than a tool, of the Manchus. Tse-Wang-Rabtan determined to support the Zunghar influence, and sent an army into Tibet under his brother Chiring Danduk,¹ who captured Lhassa, put Latsan Khān to death and ravaged the country.² This was in 1709 or 1710, and it would seem that the Tibetans appealed to the Emperor for succour; for, some three years later, a combined army of Chinese and Mongols was sent quietly westward and appeared in the neighbourhood of Turfān. The Qalmāq, though taken somewhat by surprise, prepared an ambush, cut the invaders in pieces and marched upon Hāmi, which town they captured and destroyed. A war with China was thus begun, and Kang-Hi found himself compelled to continue it. In 1717 he sent forth an avenging force to the same quarter, but it met with a similar fate to the first one, and only at a short distance further west. In 1719 he sought to retrieve these disasters by means of a third army, and this time made Northern Zungharia and the vicinity of the Zaisan Lake the objective of his attack. This region was the home-land of Qalmāq tribes and was inhabited almost exclusively by them, while on the previous occasions, by invading Turfān and Karashahr, the Emperor was striking only at dependencies inhabited by an alien people. Though better fortune was met with on this northern expedition, the result was far from a conclusive victory: indeed from this year forward until the date of Kang-Hi's death (1722), a campaign against the Zunghars, more or less desultory, was carried on almost without intermission.³

¹ Probably the Ta Chiring (or Great Chiring) of the Chinese writers; for there were many of the name of Chiring—or perhaps more properly *Tsiring*. *Danduk*, it may be mentioned, might perhaps be better written *Tenduk*.

² Howorth, I, p. 643.

³ See Amiot, in *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, I, p. 333.

These campaigns, though a heavy burden on the Manchus, both in men and money, seem scarcely to have affected the power or influence of the Zunghar Chief, for, during the time they lasted, we find him not only holding his own against the Russians, but also retaining his suzerainty over the Khōja rulers of Eastern Turkistān and intervening effectively in their affairs. Since the death of Galdan these factious priests appear, as will be seen in the course of our author's narrative, to have seldom been in want of a cause for quarrel among themselves; yet, as far as their external relations were concerned, we only hear of two occasions when they came into conflict with Tse-Wang-Rabtan. The first of these is not mentioned in any account based on Chinese chronicles, as far as I am aware, nor does our Turkī author refer to it, but Sir H. Howorth cites a German authority¹ on Russian history, who states that on Tse-Wang-Rabtan's accession, the Khōjas attempted to withhold their tribute, with the result that he led an expedition against Yārqaṅd, and carried off the Khān together with other chiefs to the valley of the Ili.² The second occasion was about the year 1713 when the Qalmāqs were seized with a desire to revenge themselves on the Khōjas for the perfidy of Ḥaḏrat Āfāq in attacking his benefactor, Galdan, some twenty and odd years previously. The invasion of Kāshghar and Yārqaṅd which followed was brought to a favourable conclusion: the reigning Khōja, Dānyāl, and several other members of the Black Khōja family were led captive to Ili, while all Qalmāq prisoners found in their hands were released and restored to their homes. Some seven years later, however, or about 1720, an opportunity was taken to re-instate Dānyāl as Governor over four of the cities of Turkistān, for which favour a tribute was levied from him of the same amount as that originally fixed by Galdan to be paid by Āfāq, viz., one *tanga*³ a head of the population.

The Emperor Yung Ching, who succeeded to the Chinese throne in 1722, being of a more pacific disposition than Kang-Hi, began his reign by reversing his father's policy in the matter of the Qalmāq wars. He saw no advantage in attempting to subdue the Qalmāqs or in protecting the Mongols from them. The tribes of the steppes were to be allowed to settle their own differences, and as long as the Empire was not disturbed, Yung Ching believed that he would have peace. For a time this was the case, and during the five following years, which comprised the remainder of Tse-Wang-Rabtan's life, the western war was practically in abeyance. His death occurred in 1727, as we know from Chinese sources, while our Turkī author tells us that it was caused by poison administered by his wife—

¹ Viz., Dr. Müller who (it seems possible) may be following Uskowski, the Russian Envoy at Tse-Wang-Rabtan's head quarters (p. 645).

² Whether the "other chiefs" were Khōjas or not, is not mentioned.

³ A *tanga* is a small silver coin, worth, usually, about one-sixth part of a rupee.

probably the daughter of the Turgut Chief, Ayuka.¹ Tse-Wang-Rabtan was no doubt the most powerful chief of the Zunghar dynasty, and he is said to have been able to put from 40,000 to 60,000 men in the field.²

Tse-Wang-Rabtan's successor was a son named Galdan Chiring, the child of a Durbet wife. On assuming the chiefship, his first act was to put his step-mother to death together with all her children. He seems then to have taken up the hereditary war of his people against the Mongols under Chinese protection, and to have attained some success; but in 1734, the strife was terminated by the intervention of the Grand Lama.³ At the accession of Kien Lung to the Chinese throne in 1735,⁴ Galdan Chiring sent envoys to Peking to offer tribute and make submission, and for the rest of his life (*i.e.*, till 1745) lived in peace with the Empire. "Charmed with my benevolence," writes Kien Lung, "Galdan was faithful to his promises. But Āchān, his son, the perfidious Āchān, did not follow in his footsteps. He advanced with giant strides on a career of crime . . . and was regarded by the chiefs of the different hordes as a monster of whom it was necessary to purge the earth."⁵ This estimate of the character of Galdan Chiring's successor is borne out by the view of our Turkī author, as will be seen below; but there is little to record of him, for his relations soon began to conspire against him, and finally capturing him, they put out his eyes and threw him into prison.

The sovereignty over the Zunghars now fell to the chief of the conspirators against Āchān, *viz.*, to his half-brother, the son of a concubine of Galdan Chiring's. He was a Lama and his name is usually given as Dardsha, though the Emperor Kien Lung, in his memoir, invariably calls him "the Lama Torgui." Whatever Torgui (or perhaps Torgī) may have signified, it seems likely that it was the name by which this chief was usually known, for it is also the one—in the form of "Lama Tāji"—by which he is spoken of in Muḥammad Ṣādiq's text. In consequence of his illegitimate birth, Dardsha's accession was only partially acquiesced in by his people, or by the princes of his father's house, and it was not long before a

¹ Howorth, I, p. 649.

² *Ib.*, p. 646.

³ *Ib.*, p. 649.

⁴ The reigns of the three Manchu Emperors of China with whom we are concerned here, were:—

Kang Hi	from 1661 to 1722
Yung Ching (son)	from 1722 to 1735
Kien Lung (son)	from 1735 to 1795

Those of Kang Hi and Kien Lung are regarded, by the Chinese, as the most glorious of modern times, resulting, as they did, in a great extension of the Empire.

⁵ Amiot, p. 339.

party had arisen, whose object it was to depose him in favour of the grandson of Chiring Donduk—the brother and chief general of Tso-Wang-Rabtan—whose name has been mentioned in connection with the invasion of Tibet.

This Prince, called Ta-wa-tze by the Chinese, and Dābāji by our author, was considered the legitimate heir, and his claim was actively supported by one Amursana who was not a Zunghar, but belonged to the tribe of Khoit, though he inhabited the same district as Ta-wa-tze, viz., Tarbagatai. After sundry adventures, these two, aided by some Kirghiz tribesmen, fell upon Dardsha, defeated his followers and killed him,¹ when Ta-wa-tze was established as Chief of the Zunghar.² This, however, was not the result that Amursana had intended, and the allies, becoming rivals, soon came to blows with each other, the upshot being that Amursana was worsted and fled to China to seek aid for his cause from the Emperor. On arriving at Peking in 1754, Kien Lung received him with honour, found an excuse for condemning Ta-wa-tze and accorded the fugitive the help he had come to seek, in the shape of a mixed force under a Mandarin named Panti, who was Governor of the provinces of Canton and Kwangsi.³ Within the year following, this army had reached the Ili Valley, Ta-wa-tze was attacked, and put to flight after scarcely any resistance. He crossed the Tien Shan and took refuge in the Khōja town of Ush Turfān, but was made prisoner by the Hākim Beg of the place, one Khōja Si Beg (the Hokis of the Chinese writers), and delivered over to the Manchu general who despatched him to Peking.

The Emperor treated him with consideration, and appears to have entertained the idea of making use of him against Amursana, whom he evidently mistrusted, but both the prisoner and his son, who had been sent with him into exile, died before events had developed themselves, and with them ended the legitimate line of Zunghar chiefs.

On Ta-wa-tze's removal, his rival Amursana was set up as Khān of the Zunghars, but was kept in leading strings by the Chinese generals and closely guarded by the army which he had been the means of bringing into the country. This consisted now of only a detachment of 500 men, under Panti and one Ngo-yung-ngan, the bulk of the force having been

¹ See Howorth, I, p. 651, also chapter XIV of Muḥammad Ṣādiq's text, where, however, they are both (erroneously) styled nephews of Galdan Chiring.

² A Chinese author of the last century says Amursana surprised, and killed Lama Dardsha in his tent, then went and offered the crown to Ta-wa-tze, knowing himself to be of too low extraction to wear it. (See Gueluy, *Chine occidentale* in *Le muséeon*, 1887, p. 103.)

³ According to Gueluy's author this force consisted of Manchus, Chinese, Solons (a tribe of Manchuria) and Chakars (a Mongol people), *Ib.*, p. 104.

withdrawn to China. Thus, as puppet chief, it is not surprising that he should have had little power or influence over the Zunghars; indeed many of the tribal headmen, we are told, declined to recognise him, but continued to profess allegiance to the exiled Ta-wa-tze.¹ Yet, notwithstanding his enforced subjection to the Chinese, he attempted, as our text shows, to recover possession of the towns of Eastern Turkistān from the Khōjas, who had, in the meantime, revolted and set up a divided government of their own. This he was, in a manner, able to accomplish by utilising the services of two brothers—Burhānu-d-Dīn and Khān-Khōja²—descendants of the White Mountain Khōja Ahmad, who had lived long in Ilī as an exile. In other words, Amursana succeeded in setting one section of the Khōjas against the other. The first named of these brothers was sent forward with a mixed force of Chinese and Qalmāqs, while the other was, at first, retained as a hostage in Ilī. Treachery and dissension arose in the Khōja camp, so that the most important of the cities were captured without difficulty, and the leading Khōjas and Begs were either put to death or made good their escape, and Amursana, as a Chinese vassal, became the over-lord of the country.

It is at this point (about the end of the year 1755 or the beginning of 1756) that our author's history comes to an end, but we may briefly follow the fortunes of the Qalmāqs and the Khōjas for some four years more when they finally disappear.

Amursana's success was short lived, for elated by the advantage he had gained in Turkistān, and unable to endure the restraints put upon him by the Chinese, he determined to shake them off. With the help of those of the Qalmāqs who supported him, and some other allies, he turned upon the force appointed to control him, destroyed it and executed the commanders. He then marched eastward, gaining some successes over other small garrisons of Chinese troops on the northern Tien Shan line of settlements, till he reached Barkul (the "Palikun" of the Chinese) where, apparently, he was shortly afterwards beaten by troops pushed forward by the Peking Government. The Emperor, against the advice of most of his ministers, was now determined to break down the last remnant of Qalmāq power, and despatched some of his best generals and troops to the Zunghar country. Amursana retreated westward and took refuge with the Kirghiz-Kazāks in the steppes to the north of Farghana. The Manchus, in small bodies, pursued him, but after a year of fruitless marching and negotiating, attended by some reverses, Amursana eluded them. He escaped into Western Siberia, where he found a refuge with the Russians at Tobolsk.

¹ Roworth, I, pp. 654-656.

² The *Bouraton* and *Hokitchen* of Gucluy's Chinese authors.

Here, in 1757, almost immediately after his arrival, he died of smallpox, and, on the Emperor demanding the corpse of "the rebel," it was carried to the frontier and delivered over to his envoys.¹

Throughout 1757 Kien Lung had been pressing forward large bodies of troops to the Ilī region. The power of the Zunghars, as well as that of other Qalmāq tribes, had been broken, but this was not satisfaction enough for the Emperor in the humour that then controlled him. "The blood of my slaughtered soldiers," he said, "cries for vengeance," and his vengeance took the form of a massacre of all Qalmāqs—men, women and children, says a Chinese author²—that failed to make good their escape. The land was practically depopulated, and the Zunghar tribe almost blotted from existence. Their country now became Chinese territory, and was, shortly afterwards, to be re-peopled by aliens from Manchuria or the extreme east of Mongolia, and by Musalmans from Eastern Turkistān.

In the meantime Khān Khōja having escaped from Ilī, and joined his brother Burhānu-d-Dīn, these two had become the rulers of nearly the whole of Eastern Turkistān, and were regarded, now, by the Chinese, as their direct dependents. There was, however, no Chinese Governor, but the Commander of the army in Ilī, Chao Huei by name, appears to have acted as the Emperor's representative and, following his master's orders, interfered as little as possible with the affairs of the vassal State.

For nearly a year this state of things seems to have continued, but in 1758 the two Khōjas, thinking themselves secure at a distance from the Manchu garrisons of Ilī, revolted and endeavoured to set up an independent Musalman Government. They declared themselves first at Kuchrā, but, after a long siege, had to fall back on Kāshghar and Yārqand. They were followed, however, by Chao Huei and his Lieutenant Fouté, and many months were spent in intrigues and in a desultory kind of fighting, until at length the Musalman inhabitants would seem to have become weary of the continued disorder and the weakness of Khōja rule.³ At both places, in the summer of 1759, they opened their gates to the invaders, and Eastern Turkistān, from that time forward, became like the Zunghar country, a Chinese possession. The two Khōjas, who had taken their last stand in Yārqand, escaped, together with a number of either

¹ Mr. Schuyler writes:—"At that time the Chinese Emperor was so strong and the Russians were so weak in Asia—their attention at the same moment being taken up in Europe by the Turkish wars—that in order to buy peace, they conveyed the dead body of Amursana to Kiakhta and gave it up to the Chinese."—(*Turkistān*, II, p. 168.)

² Guéluy, p. 107.

³ Guéluy, pp. 108-114.

relations and followers, to the Pamirs,¹ while several others of the Khōja family—descendants of Afāq—fell into the hands of Chao Huei and were sent to Peking.

The intention of Burhānu-d-Dīn and his brother was to find an asylum in Badakhshān, or perhaps Bālkh, but they were closely pursued by a party under Fouté, whose despatch to the Emperor, giving an account of his proceedings, is cited, in translation, by Amiot.² It is no doubt sufficiently exaggerated, and is certainly vague in its geographical details; but it has a curious interest. It may be summarised thus:—"I came up with the rebels near Alichur and beat them. On the 1st September 1759, they had arrived at Poulo Kol [Bulun Kul] where I obtained some information from a Pourouth [a Kirghiz] regarding their whereabouts. He told me they had already crossed the mountain (pass) but had still another very high pass to cross before reaching Badakhshān. 'This mountain,' said he, 'is between two lakes. The one on this side is called Bulun Kul, and that on the other side, Isil-Kol [Yeshil Kul] From the top of this mountain you will be able to see Badakhshān and perhaps, also, the army of your enemy, for he cannot be very far off.' On this information I set out, and about the middle of the day, after having passed round the shore of the lake, I received information that the enemy was at the top of the pass, where it would not be easy to attack him. In the evening we met with the rebels who fired upon us: we burst upon them, and, though night set in, we continued the fight, until at last the Khōjas, fearing that they might fall into our hands, fled in the direction of Badakhshān with all who were able to follow them. I did not count the dead, but was assured that the Great Khōja [Burhānu-d-Dīn]³ was of the number. As soon as I saw that the rebels no longer defended themselves, I put an end to the carnage. Their soldiers had, almost all, either been killed fighting or had followed their Chiefs, while we captured all that remained. The number of prisoners is over 12,000, and we found on the field of battle cannons, muskets, sabres, arrows, etc., to the number of 10,000, as well as over 10,000 oxen, asses and other animals, not counting the horses which were few, seeing that the fugitives had mounted the rest in order to hasten their flight."

¹ Gueluy's authors (p. 114) speak of a retreat to Khōtan, whence, after a final defeat, they are said to have fled westward, but this is not in accordance with other accounts, and would, moreover, be improbable.

² See pp. 393-394.

³ Burhānu-d-Dīn was, I believe, not the Khōja known to the Musulmans as "Great Khōja," or *Khōja kalān*. "Great," here, probably means the "elder" of the two who were being pursued.

From this version of the affair have been derived all modern accounts of the final fall of the Khōjas. Seeing, however, that it is based on the despatch of a Chinese general to his Government, it is scarcely likely to be worthy of credit, except in its main outline. The incident is well known, by tradition, even at the present day in the Pamir region, and is in the mouth of almost every Kirghiz, Shighnī and Badakhshī to be met with; but they tell the story without any mention of the sanguinary engagement near Yeshil-Kul, and divide the Chinese figures by about ten. In reality it would appear, the Khōjas had a following of some hundreds of Musulmāns and Qalmāqs of whom many were women, children and slaves. The Chinese party sent in pursuit followed them as far as the lake, but finding that the fugitives had crossed the pass into Shighnān, they cut some characters on a rock¹ and returned to Kāshghar. There was no battle, the Khōjas and their party passed unmolested into Badakhshān, and had reached Argu, below Faizābād, when they were attacked by Sultān Shāh, then Mīr of the country, and taken prisoners. Sultān Shāh plundered the whole party, beheaded the two Khōjas and kept the Qalmāqs as slaves.

On considering the part played by the Qalmāqs in these regions of Central Asia, during the last century, we see how it came about that the remnant of the Moghuls gave place to the Khōjas in Eastern Turkistān, and the latter to the Manchu Emperors of China. Had the Khōjas been independent of the Qalmāqs, it may perhaps be a question whether China would have been drawn so far westward as to interfere in the territory misgoverned by these factious saints. It is possible that one party might have gained so decisive a predominance over the other that a fairly strong and permanent government would have been the outcome. But even had this been the case the Khōjas would not have been long left to themselves.

In 1714 the Russian Governor of Siberia, Prince Gagarin, became possessed of information that Eastern Turkistān, and especially the district of Yārquand was a country whose rivers abounded in gold. In all probability it was Khōtan that he had heard of, for the rivers there contain gold in fair quantities, while in those of Yārquand it is scarcely known; but this matters little. He reported his discovery to Peter the Great and

¹ This was the stone seen by Captain F. E. Younghusband in 1890. It has since been carried off by the Russians. The imaginary fighting on the Pamir, it may be mentioned, is handed down to posterity in two spirited prints in M. Pauthier's *Chine* (Volume I, 1843) representing not one, but two separate engagements of the most approved theatrical pattern. Knights in armour mounted on prancing Arabs charge each other, with lance and battle axe, among the forest trees of the Pamir; while lines of camels, with field pieces pivoted above their humps, teach the reader what the artillery of the day was like.

proposed as the readiest method of mining the gold, the annexation of the country. It belonged, he pointed out, to the Zunghar Chief, then Tse-Wang-Rabtan, and his plan was to advance southward from the Irtysh, by means of a route which he would protect by a line of forts. He sent specimens of the gold-dust which had been brought to him, and so greatly interested the Tsar in the scheme, that the latter despatched a force of some 3,000 men, including artillery, artisans and others, under an officer named Ivan-Buchholz, to commence operations by building a fort near Lake Yamish, and thence to push southward. In 1715 the establishment of this post was begun, but its position being beyond Russian limits, as then recognised, Tse-Wang-Rabtan treated the proceedings of Buchholz as an invasion of his territory. He and his brother Chiring Donduk, therefore, lost no time in collecting their men and laying siege to the half-finished fortress. For several months the communications with Russia were cut off, and the garrison was so nearly starved that sickness broke out and Buchholz determined to retire. The fort accordingly was destroyed, and the troops, reduced by losses and disease to 700 men, retreated northwards to the confluence of the Om with the Irtysh, (the site of the present town of Omsk) whence the commander was recalled to Russia.

A fresh force was pushed forward in 1716, and again another, in the following year, under an officer named Stupin, while Gagarin was urged by Peter not to abandon his efforts to reach Yārquand. Stupin advanced up to Irtysh for 228 versts above Lake Yamish, and there began, in 1718, the erection of a fort which has since become known as Semipalatinsk. At the same time an officer was sent to treat with Tse-Wang-Rabtan, who was then camped in the Ili valley, but the result was unsatisfactory to the Russians, for nothing was elicited but threats of what the Chief would do if the new post were not at once dismantled. The Tsar, becoming impatient, appointed, early in the next year, a General Likhareff to superintend the proceedings, and sent with him a number of other officers. This party arrived at Semipalatinsk in 1720 and, with a force of 440 men, made their way up the Irtysh, in boats, to Lake Zaisan. The Qalmāq Chief was as good as his word. On the 1st August he attacked the Russians with numerous bodies of tribesmen and after an indecisive battle, which continued for three days, a parley was arranged, when it was agreed that the Russians should abandon their scheme and retire down the Irtysh. They retreated, accordingly, to within 181 versts of Semipalatinsk and there put up a new fort which has since developed into the town of Ust-Kamenogorsk.¹

¹ See Howorth, I, pp. 646-648.

After these events the Russian vision of an Eldorado in Yārqand appears to have been dispelled, for no further attempt was made to reach Eastern Turkistān. Indeed the limits they were compelled to confine themselves to in 1720, have not been greatly overstepped even to the present day ; so that the historical rôle of the Qalmāqs, during their short period of power, was not alone to draw the Chinese forward into Zungharia, but to keep the Russians back within the boundaries of Siberia.

EPITOME

OF THE

MEMOIRS OF THE KHŪJAS.

Makhdūm-i-Azam, a very holy man, spread religion from Mecca to China. His great grand-father, Sayyid Kamālu-d-Dīn Majnūn (a descendant in the seventeenth generation from the Prophet) lived at Medina and emigrated to Uz (or Uzkand) in Farghāna. At that time Sultān Iliq Māzi, one of seven kings, was ruler of Utrār, Kāsān, Farghāna, Uzkand and Ush¹. In consequence of a dream the Sultān married his daughter to Sayyid Kamālu-d-Dīn. He returned with his wife to Medina, where after his death, a son named Sayyid Burhānu-d-Dīn Kilic was born to him, who returning, succeeded his maternal grand-father, Ilik Māzi, on the throne of Uz. After a short time he gave up his government and became a devotee, retiring for the purpose to Khōjand. With whomsoever he was angry that person was sure to die. A certain other holy man once came to ask him the reason for this. On approaching the Sayyid, he fell into a trance and saw, hanging from the roof, a naked sword. Flies were constantly striking against its edge and being cut in two. When he returned to his senses, the Sayyid said to him: "Friend, whose fault is it: the sword's or the flies?"

¹ Mr. Shaw notes here that Ilik Māzi was a grandson or descendant of Sultān Sātuk Bughrā. Dr. Bellew in his remarks on the *Tazkira-i-Bughrā Khān* infers him to be identical with Sātuk Bughrā, but this is probably incorrect. Dr. Bretschneider, on the authority of the *Kāmilu-t-tawārīkh* of Ibnu-l-Aṣīr, makes one Ilik, or Ilak, the successor of Sātuk, but does not mention the relationship; and it is uncertain whether he refers to the same person as Ilik Māzi. Ibnu-l-Aṣīr speaks of him as subduing the Sāmānī dynasty in Transoxiana in 1008 A. D., while Sātuk Bughrā is recorded, in the *Tazkira*, to have died only in 429 H.—or 1037—8 A. D. Thus it is quite uncertain to whom the text refers. The dynasty of the Bughrā Khāns was one of original Turks, or Uigurs, who had their capitals at Fālāsāghun and Kāshghar, and flourished chiefly in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries. They are known sometimes as the "Kara Khāns", but more usually as the "Ilak Khāns"—a circumstance which would point to the word *Ilak* being something more than the name of a single individual, and to the probability of its having been some general name or title. Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole says, "the history of these Khāns is very meagrely recorded." And it is certain that what little information we have, is obscure and contradictory. It may be added, with reference to what follows in the text, that no such name as Burhānu-d-Dīn is to be found in any of the lists of Ilak Khāns (See Shaw's *Turkī Grammar* p. 334; Bellew in *Yārquand Report* pp. 125-6; Bretschneider's *Mediæval Researches*, I, pp. 252-8; and Lane-Poole's *Muḥammadan Dynasties* p. 134).

Hence Burhān-ud-Dīn obtained the name of Kilic (sword). His son was Jalālu-d-Dīn, whose son was Ahmad Khwāja, called Makhdūm-i-Āzam; then followed Ishāq Walī, then Khwāja Shādī, then Khwāja Ubaidu-llāh, then Dānyāl, then Yāqūb Khwāja (called Khwāja Jahān).²

Burhān-ud-Dīn's son and his grandson, Makhdūm-i-Āzam, were lights and pillars of religion.

Makhdūm was married to a certain Bibica Kāshgharī, a descendant of Sātuk Bughrā Khān. From them was born Ishāq Walī.³ While she was *eniente* Makhdūm used always to rise with reverence when his wife approached, but he informed her that this homage was not meant for her but for her child yet unborn. His father, however, did not confer on him the succession as head of their religious house, but he was consecrated (as it were) by another holy man⁴. When he was grown to a certain age he went to Bālkh, whence some of his father's followers [*murīd*] came out to meet him. A certain Khalīfa Khurdak, who was one of them, did not pay him this mark of respect. At that time Muḥammad Khān

² The whole of this paragraph seems to have been taken by Mr. Shaw from his "other book." It is not in the original text of Muḥammad Ṣādiq.

³ Muḥammad Ṣādiq recounts the family history thus:—

"Makhdūm-i-Āzam had four wives. The first was called Kārsān Sayyid, who had four sons and one daughter. The first son was Ishān-i-Kalān, the second was Khwāja Dōst, the third Khwāja Bahāu-d-Dīn and fourth Khwāja Abdu-l-Khāliq. But Khwāja Dōst was made chief of the Khalīfa; and his august father gave Bahān-d-Dīn permission to follow his guidance. He also gave similar sanction to Abdu-l-Khāliq and his brother Ishān-i-Kalān. Another wife was the daughter of the Pādshāh of Kārsān, and was called Malika-i-Kārsānī. She had two sons and two daughters: one of them was Khwāja Muḥammad and another Sultān Ibrāhīm. He (Makhdūm) had another wife named Bibica-i-Kāshgharī, who was a descendant of Sultān Sātuk Bughrā Khān Ghāzī. That illustrious child, Ishāq Walī, was born of her." (Kārsān is said now-a-days to be a village some ten *farsakhs* from Bukhārā on the road to Karshī.)

⁴ This is explained by Muḥammad Ṣādiq thus:—"Be it known that while Ishāq Walī had not received clear permission and direction from Makhdūm-i-Āzam, his father (to exercise religious functions), Maulānā Luṭfu-llāh, who was Makhdūm-i-Āzam's nephew, had attained to this permission and direction from the Makhdūm. The latter had conferred them at the time of his death, when Ishāq Walī was studying at Bukhārā The grace which had been confided to him, in trust, at the prompting of the Holy Prophet, he delivered over to Ishāq Walī, saying to his friends: 'whatsoever was left to me by my teacher, Makhdūm-i-Āzam, that I have given to Khwāja Ishāq Walī; now do you demand (instruction) from him.' But the faithful disciples of Ishān-i-Kalān place their trust on this that the succession passed from Makhdūm-i-Āzam to Muḥammad Islām, and from him to Muḥammad Amīr and from him to Ishān-i-Kalān." Referring to this portion of the original text Mr. Shaw notes:—

"This passage is written in view of the rivalry which afterwards sprang up between the descendants and successors of these two brothers, as will be seen. An attempt is

was ruler of Bālkh.⁶ At the latter's request, Ishāq went to visit the Khalifa, but the latter was found dead as a consequence of his want of respect to the saint. Ishāq raised from the dead a child of Sultān Muḥammad Khān. From Bālkh he went to Ḥiṣār and Bukhārā.

Abdu-l-Karīm Khān of Kāshghar, invited him to Kāshghar. After some time the Khān became offended with him. He then retired to the land of the Kazāks and converted many of them, destroying several idol temples. Abdu-l-Karīm then again sent for him. The Khān's son-in-law was named Muḥammad Sultān, who was much devoted to Ishāq Walī, and the latter prophesied that he would shortly become King. The Khān set out with an army for Kanjāfur⁶ against the advice of the saint. This army took panic and fled. The saint then advised Muḥammad Sultān to go, promising him victory. The prophecy was fulfilled but excited the wrath of the Khān. Ishāq Walī prayed for deliverance, and three days afterwards Abdu-l-Karīm died when Muḥammad Sultān became Khān⁷.

here made to show that Ishān-i-Kalān's commission was less directly derived from their father, Makhdūm-i-Azam, than Ishāq Walī's." It is, in short, the origin of two Khōja parties as explained in the Introduction p. 9 above. In another place Mr. Shaw remarks that:—"An Ishān is also a religious teacher, but not of so exalted a spiritual rank as a Khwāja."

⁶ I cannot trace this Sultān Muḥammad Khān. The date referred to would appear to be within the last quarter of the 16th century: if so, it would be a period when Bālkh generally formed part of the Uzbek dominions of the successors of Shaibānī. But it is possible that Muḥammad was not an independent King: he may have been only a governor under the Uzbek Sultān of the day (at that time probably Abdu-llāh Khān II) who had his capital at Bukhārā.

⁶ Kanjāfur is, no doubt, intended for Kanchou-fu, the capital of the province of Kansu in the extreme west of China. It might easily be confused with Kenjanfu, the Mongol corruption of King-chou-fu, an old name for Si-Ngan-fu, the present chief town of Shensi. This Mongol form had indeed survived till the middle of the 16th century; but for several reasons Si-Ngan cannot be the place here spoken of. Whether Kan-chou was ever invaded by a Khān of Yārqand, I can find nothing to testify, but it is known that by the date in question (which must have been towards the end of 16th century) Chinese power under the Ming dynasty, had fallen very low on the western frontiers. The border province of Kansu was often invaded from the neighbouring Musulmān States of Hami (or Kumul) and Turfān, and it is just possible that the western cities of Eastern Turkistān may have sometimes lent their assistance. On this occasion, according to Muḥammad Sādiq's text:—"Muḥammad Khān rode forth with 500 horsemen. He found the King of that country unprepared and captured the city."

⁷ There are apparent discrepancies here but they may be accounted for. Mr. Shaw notes that a Farlygh, or title deed is still in existence, granted by "Muḥammad Khān, son of Abdu-r-Rashīd," which is dated at Kāshghar in A.H. 996 or 1587 A.D. Yet he also notes that according to "the other book" Abdu-l-Karīm's

Ishāq Wali remained twelve years in Yārqaṅd, Kāshghari Khutān and Aksu, teaching and making disciples, and then went to Samarqand, leaving a disciple named Ushtur Khalifa in his place. The Khān and people of Kāshghar became cool in their devotion and transferred it to a shrine at Turfān. Ushtur went with them thither and sitting a straddle on the grave [stone], kicked it with his heels. A dragon came out to eat him; but the saint who was in Samarqand, becoming miraculously aware of this, offered, in spirit, his son, who was at Aksu in order to save his vicegerent Ushtur. This son, Shāhbāz by name, died at the same instant and Ushtur was delivered.

Abdu-llāh Khān, king of Bukhārā, sent his younger brother Rustam Sultān⁸ with an army of 50,000 men to attack Muḥammad (Sultān) Khān of Kāshghar, who was saved by the prayers of Ishāq Wali. The King of Bukhārā died of anger. After these events the Khān of Kāshghar became much devoted to this saint, who shortly afterwards died and was buried at Isfudik (in Khōkand) and not at Dahbid, near Samarqand,⁹ where Makhdūm-i-Āzam was buried; for his father had said that whoever, hereafter, should be buried in the space between his own and his son's grave, should be a partaker of Paradise.

Ishāq Wali left two sons: (1) Quṭbu-d-Din, whose descendants are in charge of the shrine of Ishāq Wali; and (2) Khwāja Shādi, who was appointed his father's viceregent at Yārqaṅd.

Now Makhdūm-i-Āzam had another son called Ishān-i-Kalān who left a son named Khwāja Yūsuf, whose son was Khwāja Āfāq. These came over to Kāshghar and were received with veneration by the people.

death is placed at A. H. 1,000 which fell in 1591-2. But from an extract from the *Haft Iqlīm*, translated by Quatremère, it appears that Muḥammad Khān or Muḥammad Sultān, was Governor of Kāshghar under his brother, Abdu-l-Karīm, as Khān of the country. Thus Muḥammad Sultān must have succeeded to the Khanate about 1592, and it is he who is spoken of by Benedict Goes as the King in 1604. When, in the text above, Muḥammad is spoken of as the brother-in-law of Karīm, the author must have made a mistake. They were both sons of Abdu-r-Rashīd. (See Quatremère in *Notices et Extraits XIV*, pp. 487-8 and Goes in Yule's *Cathay*, p. 565.)

⁸ The 'Abdu-llāh Khān mentioned here is the second of that name in the line of the Shaibān Uzbegs otherwise known as the "Abdu-l-Khair." Though he only actually reigned from 1583 to the date of his death in 1597-8, he was in power long before the former date. Detailed accounts of his life exist, but in none of them, accessible to me here, is such a person mentioned as a brother named Rustam. Indeed he seems to have had no brother: nor is there any record of an Uzbek invasion of Kāshghar during his reign. It may be noted, however, that the words "younger brother" do not occur in Muḥammad Šādiq's original manuscript; they must have come from Mr. Shaw's "other book."

⁹ It appears that both these villages must be near Samarqand. Dahbid is said to be just beyond the suburbs of the city; and Muḥammad Šādiq speaks of them

By this time Muḥammad Khān (the king) had died,¹⁰ and ʿAbdu-llāh Khān was reigning. He had three sons: (1) Yulbars, Governor of Kāshghar; (2) Nūr-ud-Dīn, Governor of Aksu; and (3) Ismāʿil Khān, who stayed with his father¹¹.

Yulbars was disobedient to his father, but he revered the holy men Yūsuf and Āfāq, as did also the people of Kāshghar. Khwāja Shādī died at Yārquand leaving two sons: (1) ʿAbdu-llāh; and (2) ʿUbaidu-llāh. Yūsuf Khwāja came to Yārquand to pray over Shādī's grave, when the king and many of the people turned their devotions to him abandoning the sons of Shādī. The adherents of the latter became angry and reproached the king, who said he would give an answer the next day. During the night he dreamed that he saw a large male camel [*bughrā*] which was seized by a small camel [*kiwa*] that came out from the Altun Mazār¹² where the grave of Shādī was. In the morning Yūsuf departed without taking leave of the king. He fell ill at one day's march from Yārquand and died at Topluk. Ḥazrat Āfāq came and fetched his body and buried it at Yāghdu¹³.

At Yārquand the sons of Shādī advanced in religious influence. The king (ʿAbdu-llāh) went away on pilgrimage to Mecca, leaving his son Ismāʿil to rule in his stead, who expelled Khwāja Āfāq from Kāshghar and placed his own son Bābak Sultān, as Governor there.¹⁴ This régime flourished exceedingly; never had there been such prosperity even in the days of the Khāns. For twelve years the people knew not whether there were soldiers in the land or not.

Khwāja ʿAbdu-llāh (son of Shādī) died, and ʿUbaidu-llāh became the sole religious chief; but he died before reaching the age of forty, and left two sons—(1) Khwāja Shuʿāib, and (2) Khwāja Dānyāl. All obeyed them in religious matters.

Āfāq, on being expelled from Kāshghar, went towards Kashmir. He arrived at an idol temple of the Prophet Māni at Ju. He performed

as being separated by a canal, so that Isfudik should be close by. I do not know why Mr. Shaw has inserted the words "in Khökand" in parenthesis. He spells *Isfiduk*, instead of *Isfudik*, as it stands in the text.

¹⁰ Mr. Shaw notes here the year of Muḥammad Khān's death as 1018 A. H. or 1609 A. D.

¹¹ Further on in his book, Muḥammad Šādiq mentions other brothers of Ismāʿil, whose names I have inserted in the genealogical table as sons of ʿAbdu-llāh, though it is possible that the word "brother" may not be used in a strictly literal sense.

¹² The so called *Golden cemetery*. It still exists at Yārquand, and is much revered.

¹³ The present shrine of Ḥazrat Āfāq. (See appendix B.)

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¹⁴ The original text adds that Ismāʿil himself "ascended the throne at Yārquand."

miracles and asked for help to take the country of Yārqaṇd. When the difficulties of the road were objected to, he asked for an introduction to the Qalmāqs who were of the same faith. Accordingly, a letter was written to the Tura (chief) of the Qalmāqs of Ila, saying:—"Oh, Shibur Khān! Āfāq is a great personage whom Ismāil has expelled from Kāshghar. You should send an army to restore him." He went and received aid.¹⁵

When the news of his approach at the head of a Qalmāq army was heard, Bābak Sultān led a force against him, but was killed in an encounter. The victorious Qalmāqs then took Kāshghar and marched towards

¹⁵ As this is one of the most interesting episodes recounted in the book, it may be worth while to transcribe literally the author's complete version of it. He writes:—"Ismāil Khān expelled Khwāja Āfāq from Kāshghar. The Ḥaẓrat went on from city to city until he had passed Kashmir. There is a place named Chu in the country of Chin. There the infidels had a Brahman priest (*Shaiḫh*) who performed miracles, and, by his teaching, had established his own religion. Ḥaẓrat Āfāq arrived there and, by degrees, displayed virtuous habits and miracles, which surprised the infidels. The infidels turned their faces to worship. Ḥaẓrat Āfāq, who was determined to protect his faith, also betook himself to devotion, and, by manifesting miracles and revelations, overcame the infidels, who acknowledged his power and asked who he was and where he had come from. The Ḥaẓrat replied: 'I belong to the sect of Musulmāns, and am their Khwāja. I had disciples in Yārqaṇd and Kāshghar; now a man has come and seized those towns and turned me out. I beg you to give me people to recover my country and restore it to me.' The Brahman priest replied:—"It is very difficult to send people from here to that place.' But he gave him the following letter to the Tura of the Qalmāqs at Ila:—"Oh, Shibur Khān. Khwāja Āfāq is a very great personage whose country (Yurt) is Yārqaṇd and Kāshghar. In that country he is the Khwāja of the Musulmāns. Ismāil Khān has seized his country and expelled him. You should send an army, recover his country and restore it to him' Ḥaẓrat Āfāq took this letter to Ila and saw the Tura of the Qalmāqs there. Shibur Khān treated him with great consideration. He acted on the instructions contained in the letter, collected a large army and set out for Kāshghar."

In the first place, it would be interesting to identify the *Chu* or *Ju* of the text. Captain Valikhanoff does not mention the name in any form, but says that Āfāq "retired to Kashmir, whence he proceeded into Tibet, where he so ingratiated himself with the Dalai Lama, that the latter despatched him with a letter to Galdan of Zungharia, requesting the latter to re-establish the authority of Āfāq at Kāshghar and Yārqaṇd. Galdan seizing this opportunity conquered Little Fūkhārā (i. e., Eastern Turkistān) in 1678" What the writer's authority is for assuming *Chu* to be Tibet, I do not know, nor is there anything to show the source of the date 1678. Still both are possible and even likely; Howorth, Bellew and others have relied upon the Russian author. If the statement, that Āfāq had passed Kashmir when he arrived at *Chu*, is to be taken literally, it would be necessary to look for the latter place somewhere about the confines of Northern India. But it is possible that Ladak may have been regarded loosely, as part of Kashmir, and thus the fugitive Khōja may have passed through Ladak into Tibet, which would be a more or less direct route. There is not, however, and never

Yārqand. The Yārqand General, Iwaz Beg, was killed, and by Ismā'il Khān's advice, the people of Yārqand treated with the enemy, conditioning for the exercise of their faith under their two Makhdūm-zādas. This was agreed to. Āfāq was put on the throne and his son Yahyā was given the government of Kūshghar. The Qalmāqs carried away Ismā'il and all his family to Ila. Āfāq agreed to an annual tribute of 100,000 tangas payable to the Qalmāqs.¹⁶ Thus the evil custom, which continues to this day was established by Khwāja Āfāq.

But the reign of Āfāq, as King, did not last long, as he found it inconsistent with his religious duties. He put a younger brother of Isma'il's named Muḥammad Amīn,¹⁷ on the throne and married their sister Khānam Pādshāh. War was made on the Qalmāqs and several of their Chiefs were taken. The disciples of Āfāq then became very turbulent, the Khān, Muḥammad Amīn, had to fly from Yārqand, but was killed by his own servants and Khwāja Āfāq again seated himself on the throne.

has been, any name like *Chu* or *Ju* for Tibet, or for any particular province or town in that country, as far as I am aware; though *Chin* is very frequently used as a name for Tibet proper, in Turkistān as well as in the hill regions north of the Panjab. Probably, therefore, as he is said to have gone to *Chin*, Āfāq did retire to Tibet, and it is just possible that *Ju* may stand for *Ju-wo*, which Mr. W. W. Rockhill tells us is the name of the chief temple at Lhassa. If this is the case, the "Brahman Shaikh" would seem to have been the Grand, or Dalai Lama, and his influence over the Qalmāq chiefs would have been, at that time, very great. It has been mentioned, indeed, (in the Introduction above) that Galdan had been a Lamaist pupil at Lhassa.

As regards the authenticity of the date furnished by Captain Valikhanoff, I can offer no suggestion except that 1678 falls within that period of Galdan's life, when such an event as the invasion of Eastern Turkistān might be looked for. Ismā'il had succeeded Ābdu-llāh in the Khānate, but all we know is that the latter was reigning up to 1643 (and possibly for some years beyond that date), we know also that more than twelve years of Ismā'il's reign had passed before he expelled Āfāq; while Āfāq's mission to Lhassa (if Lhassa it was), his journey thence to Galdan's seat at Ilī, and the Qalmāq invasion must have occupied some years. Thus the year 1678 may have been reached.

The third puzzle in this passage is the name of Shibur Khān. Captain Valikhanoff assumes it to represent Galdan, and most likely he is right, for not only does the probable date bear him out, but, as explained in the Introduction the real name of the chief known as "Galdan" has never come down to us. Galdan seems to mean "King," but in addressing him, the Dalai Lama of Lhassa would probably use some personal or familiar title.

(See Valikhanoff, *Russians in Central Asia*, p. 169. Howorth, I., p. 623. Bellew, *Yārqand Report*, pp. 175 and 178. Rockhill, *J. R. A. S.*, 1891, pp. 259 and 263.)

¹⁶ Muḥammad Šādiq's text has "4,000 tangas a month." Valikhanoff makes it 400,000 tangas a month! (*Loc. cit.* p. 170.)

¹⁷ The text has:—"They brought Isma'il's younger brother, Muḥammad Amīn, from Turfān and placed him on the throne." One date can be fixed during Muḥammad Amīn's reign by a reference to the *Tazkira-i-Muqīm Khānī* of Yūsuf Munshī, as

To get rid of the rivalry of the other faction—the adherents of the Makhdūm-zādas—Āfāq sent for their disciples, and having ascertained that the spiritual Chiefs held land, viz., at Faizābād near Kāshghar, Tokuzkent¹⁸ near Yārquand, Ak-Sarāi near Khutan, and Ak-yār near Aksu—he caused a part of the rent of these lands to be applied to the service of the Altun Mazār at Yārquand (the shrine of Khwāja Shādi) and gave the rest of it to the disciples to send to their masters, in exile in Kashmir, with an invitation to them to return. They did return, but their hearts were heavy. When they reached the Tiznāf river, Shu'aib said to his brother:—"Every step I take, my feet turn back. Let not our line be cut short; do thou return and I will go on." Dānyāl returned towards Kashmir, but a party of fanatical devotees of Ḥazrat Āfāq came out, without orders, slew Shu'aib and, putting his body into a bag, threw it into the river Tiznāf.

The news of this deed did not reach Ḥazrat Āfāq for some time, when one of the disciples of the Makhdūm-zādas came and reproached the saint with it. Āfāq struck his hand on his knee with anger and said:—"Oh ye butchers of disciples of mine. Ye have done this deed against my soul as well as against your own. This reproach will lie against us till the day of judgment." He then went himself and recovered the body, brought it back and buried it in the shrine of Altun. But Ḥazrat Dānyāl retired, in safety, to Dahbid near Samarquand, where the tomb of Makhdūm-i-A'zam was. After a dream in which his ancestor foretold the future greatness of his line and consoled him saying:—"Every grief lies between two joys," he went to Khōjand. Here he married, and a son, Ya'qūb, was born to him. His religious instructor gave him the title of "Khwāja Jahān," saying: "He will become a Jahāngir [conqueror] and raise again to dignity the line of the Khwāja."¹⁹

translated by Professor Senkowski. Among other ambassadors who arrived at the court of Subhān Quly, Khān of Bukhārā, in the year 1102 H. or 1693, was one "sent by Muhammad Amīn, Khān of Kāshghar. His mission was to represent to the Khān that the infidel Kirghiz, having taken possession of the country, Muhammad Amīn had placed himself under the protection of Subhān Quly, had said the Khutba and struck the coin in his name and implored his assistance." The result of the mission is not recorded. (*Supplément à l'Histoire des Turks, etc.*, 1824, p. 57.)

¹⁸ *Toquz kent* means "nine villages." Mr. Shaw names them as follows:—Pialma, Guma, Zangoya, Chodar, Sanju, Boria, Dawa, Koshtak and Ui-Tughrak. They all lie to the south and south-east of Yārquand.

¹⁹ Here Mr. Shaw notes:—"Another account says that Āfāq inveigled the young Makhdūm-Zādas away from Kashmir and slew one of them—Ai-Khwāja (i.e., Shu'aib)—at Sanju and murdered many hundreds of their adherents. Afterwards he himself went and increased the pile of fuel in hell, while his wife, surnamed the "Butcher Queen" (Jallād Khānam), carried on his bloody policy. The devotees (Dīwāna) became

To Āfāq were born two sons: Mahdī Khwāja and Ḥasan Khwāja. He repented of having taken the country by the help of the infidel Qalmāqs, but said that he could now hold up his head again on account of the virtues of this Mahdī Khwāja.²⁰ Āfāq presently died and was buried in the shrine called by his name.²¹ His widow Khānam Pādshāh remained at Yārqand with her son, who was then five years old; while Yaḥyā governed at Kāshghar.

The Queen shortly afterwards went to pray at the shrine of her late husband. Yaḥyā's councillors represented to him that a woman was unable to hold the reins of government; the Kirghiz on one side, and the Qalmāqs on the other, were formidable enemies: he should unite Yārqand to his own government and become Khān. He objected that he would be accused of injuring his father's widow, out of ambition; but one of the councillors said:—"Modesty is out of place in affairs of state; by means of modesty the country may be ruined." The wife of a councillor reported this matter to the Queen, on which a quarrel took place.

The Queen returned to Yārqand and made her son Mahdī King there. After six months, this son's adherents murdered Yaḥyā Khān. He left three sons, two of whom were killed; while the third, Khwāja Aḥmad, was hidden away in a cave in the mountains. The Governor of Kāshghar was Zaid Beg, and he also was killed; but some time afterwards Khwāja Aḥmad was put on the throne. Much bloodshed ensued from which the Queen earned the name of "Jallād Khānam"—the executioner, or butcher, Queen. She herself was also murdered six months after the death of Yaḥyā.

After this Akbash Khān, the brother of Muḥammad Amin, came to Yārqand and slew a thousand fanatics (*dīwāna*). He put his son, Sultān Aḥmadī Khān, on the throne of Kāshghar²² and married the widow of

unrestrained in their wildness, and finally Akbash Khān came and took Yārqand and restored order. He seized a thousand *Dīwānas* and, at the Kaba-Ghatku gate, (the Aksu gate) cut their throats and made a will go with their blood."

²⁰ Mahdī was son of Āfāq by his wife Khānam Pādshāh, the younger sister of Ismā'il. But Ḥasan, according to Muḥammad Ṣādiq was grandson of Āfāq—not son. He was son of Mahdī, as marked in the genealogical table.

²¹ This was in 1105 H. or 1693 A. D.

²² Muḥammad Ṣādiq's statement on this point is quite different. He writes:—"the people of Kāshghar brought Khwāja Aḥmad from the cave in the hills and made him their Khān." This Aḥmad, as we have seen, was son of Yaḥyā and was a Khōja. The name of Sultān Aḥmadī does not occur in Muḥammad Ṣādiq's text. If he were a son of Akbash, he would have been of the line of Moghul Khāns and not a Khōja; and there is no mention in the text of any son of Akbash. My impression is that the Epitome is in error on this point, and that Khwāja Aḥmad should be the reading, without mention of any relationship to Akbash.

Yahyā. Akbash Khān then retired with the remainder of Āfāk's family to India,²³ having first sent for Dānyāl Khwāja from Khōjand, stating that his ancestors had always been disciples of Dānyāl's ancestors. Dānyāl set out and was well received by the Kirghiz. The Kāshghar people, however, held out for their own religious leaders; so the Kirghiz took him on to Yārqand, where he was accepted as spiritual Chief.

At Kāshghar, Khwāja Ahmad was the nominal Khān, but the real rulers were some Kirghiz Chiefs who carried on a series of raids against the inhabitants of Yārqand. Not having any King of their own, the Yārqand people brought in a Kazāk Khān, called Hāshim Sultān, to reign over and defend them. In one of their raids, the Kirghiz approached the town. Hāshim, though taken unawares, sallied forth, slew one of the leaders and dispersed the rest. Next day the Kirghiz began to treat for the surrender of their chief, thinking he was still alive, but a prisoner; and they promised to give up three hundred Yārqand prisoners in exchange for him. The Yārqandis, in order to secure this advantage, dressed up the dead man and set him on a horse, tied to a plank. The Kirghiz saw him from a distance and said to one another:—"He hangs down his head: he is ashamed at having fallen into the hands of the Sarts."²⁴ The deceit was successful, for the Yārqandī prisoners had been given up, and the dead body of their chief was all that the Kirghiz got. After this lesson they ceased their attacks on Yārqand.

In consequence of the intrigues of the devotees of Dānyāl Hāshim, the Kazāk Chief retired from the government of Yārqand and returned to his own country, on which Dānyāl became ruler of Yārqand for several years.

Whereas the Qalmāqs of Ila had been attacked by Hazrat Āfāq and Muḥammad Amin, the king of Yārqand, they had preserved a desire for revenge, but were prevented from taking it by troubles of their own. Now, at last, they found an opportunity, in the confusion reigning among the Musulmāns, and with a large army they marched to Kāshghar and thence, without stopping, to Yārqand. Khwāja Dānyāl finding himself too weak to resist, accepted the rule of the infidels; and they,

²³ Here again there is a discrepancy. The author's text makes Khwāja Mahdī, and not Akbash Khān, retire to India. Both in this case and that of the note above Mr. Shaw seems to have followed "the other book." Akbash was obviously at Yārqand throughout these events, and Muḥammad Šādiq makes Mahdī take leave of him before setting out for India.

²⁴ The Sarts are the cultivators and townsmen of the lowlands, as distinguished from the Nomads of the hill regions; the word has no ethnographic meaning.

taking him with them, now attacked Kāshghar which, after a short resistance, surrendered. Dānyāl advised the Qalmāqs not to offend the religious feelings of the country by slaying any of the Khōjas. They approved of this counsel and merely imprisoned Aḥmad Khwāja (son of Yahyā), Ruler of Kāshghar, and put on a well-wisher of their own in his place; but they afterwards carried both Aḥmad and Khwāja Dānyāl to Ila. Here the Chiefs treated Dānyāl with great respect, but sent Aḥmad to one of their frontier stations, called Irān Kaburgha²⁵.

When Muḥammad Amin had plundered Ila, he had captured thirty thousand people of the country, and from among them had bestowed a Chief's daughter on Dānyāl, who had converted her to Islām and married her. On the Qalmāqs taking Yārqand and Kāshghar, they had released their compatriots, and Dānyāl's wife, then *enceinte*, was given to a Qalmāq Chief, who, however, had no intercourse with her, until her child by Dānyāl was born. The child was a son, whom his mother swaddled in fine clothes and devoted herself to. He was brought up, till the age of seven, in all the learning of the Qalmāqs, without its being known, publicly, that he was the child of a Musulmān.

The mother, at last, found an opportunity to inform Khwāja Dānyāl of the fact, by means of a letter sent through a Musulmān merchant. He appealed to the chief of the Qalmāqs, who sent a man of his own and a disciple of the Khōjas to enquire into the matter. The woman stood to her declaration, but her new husband denied it and would not show the child, telling him that the Musulmāns would eat him. Finally all the parties were brought to the court of the chief of the Qalmāqs. The husband fell at the feet of the *Kongtāji*²⁶ (the chief) who was a relative of his, appealing to him not to deprive him of his only child, for the sake of the Musulmāns.

²⁵ Muḥammad Ṣādiq adds that Khwāja Aḥmad remained at Irān Kaburgha, on the frontier of Ila, for seven years. The Irān Kaburgha district is in the range of hills forming the northern shed of the valley of the river Kāsh — a tributary of the Ilī. The date of these events can be traced, through Chinese accounts of the Qalmāqs, to about the year 1713, if our author's indication of "seven years" is to be accepted. See the next note below.

²⁶ Perhaps a better spelling would be *Kung Taishi*. It was the title of the highest rank among the Qalmāqs and stood for "Sultān" or King. Sir H. Howorth, quoting Pallas, says the meaning of the words is "Swan-like Prince" (I, p. 617-n). The *Kung Taishi* in the present instance was the famous Tse Wang Raktan, and the date about 1720, for the author tells us, lower down, that the restoration of Dānyāl to the government of Eastern Turkistān took place seven years previous to Tse Wang Raktan's death, an event which is known, from Chinese sources, to have happened in 1727 (see also p. 20 of the introduction, above).

The *Kongtāji* appointed a day when the Musulmāns attended, dressed in their turbans, etc., and the principal Qalmāqs in their own costume. The suppositious father had warned his child against the "turbaned race," telling him not to go near them, lest they should eat him, and instructing him to come and sit on his (the Qalmāq's) lap. When the two parties were drawn up and the child set in their midst, the *Kongtāji* said:—"Oh child! Which of these two dost thou recognise as thy father?" The boy turned his face towards his Qalmāq father, but when he got close to him, he uttered a sudden cry and ran and fell unconscious into the arms of his real father Dānyāl. The whole assembly was affected at the sight, and the *Kongtāji*, weeping, said:—"Oh *Khwāja*! The child is yours of right. I give you also the rule over four cities." Thus saying, he dismissed him to his government. Dānyāl gave thanks to God, and leaving his elder son *Khwāja Jahān* (*Ya'qūb*) at the court of the *Kongtāji*, set out for Yārqand. He clothed his newly found child as a Musulmān and gave a feast with much rejoicing, bestowing on the child the name of Yūsuf *Khwāja*.

On arriving at Yārqand, Dānyāl was accepted, with joy, as ruler of that city and province and also of *Kāshghar*, *Aksu* and *Khutan*, as had been ordered by the *Kongtāji* of the Qalmāqs. The yearly sum of 100,000 *tangas* ²⁷ agreed upon by *Ḥazrat Afāq*, as tribute to the Qalmāqs, continued to be paid by Dānyāl, and thus seven years elapsed.

The *Kongtāji* had a daughter whom he was about to marry to the son of the Chief of the Turgut tribe of Qalmāqs. All the Governors of the seven cities (of Eastern Turkistān) with *Khwāja Dānyāl* at their head, were bidden to the wedding, and went. He demanded from them, as a wedding contribution, Indian valuables, such as pearls, jewels, etc.; but they had none suitable. The *Kongtāji* became angry and threatened them with death. They all fell at the feet of *Khwāja Dānyāl* and implored his assistance; they also held a solemn night of prayer, in the course of which news was brought that the *Kongtāji* was dead, and that his son *Galdan Jirin* ²⁸ had become the chief. On enquiring, they found that one of the old *Kongtāji's* wives, for the sake of raising her own son to the throne, had poisoned her husband. The people sought to take *Galdan Jirin's* life, but he heard of the plot, and taking counsel with other chiefs, slew his step-mother and her son. God turned his infidel heart, so that he allowed all the captive Musulmāns to return to their homes. Dānyāl was also sent home and was confirmed in the government of the four cities. He had to

²⁷ Muḥammad Ṣādiq speaks of this sum as one tanga per head of the population.

²⁸ That is *Galdan Chiring*. He succeeded in 1727.

content himself with the income from his ancestral lands and to give all the other revenues of the country to the Qalmāqs.

At last Dānyāl fell ill, and when about to die, made his will. After entrusting to his eldest son, Khwāja Jahān, the affairs of the faith, he told him that he himself was dying without having been able to attain the wish of his heart, which was independence of the infidels, but that perhaps God might grant the accomplishment of the desire to him. Then he expired and was buried in the Altun Mazār.

Dānyāl left several wives and five sons, viz., 1, Khwāja Jahān (named Yaṣqūb); 2, Khwāja Yūsuf; 3, Khwāja Ayyūb; 4, Khwāja Nizāmu-d-Dīn (called Khāmōsh Khwāja); and 5, Khwāja Ābdu-llāh. By order of the Chief of the Qalmāqs, Yārqand was allotted to Jahān; ²⁹ Kāshghar to Yūsuf; Aksu to Khāmōsh ³⁰ and Khuṭan to Ābdu-llāh. They all regarded Khwāja Jahān in the light of their father.

Now the line of Khwāja Jahān was as follows—

Kamālu-d-Dīn (a descendant of Imām Husain in the 15th generation).

Burhānu-d-Dīn Kilic.

Jalālu-d-Dīn.

Makhdūm-i-Āzam.

Ishāq Walī.

Khwāja Shādi.

Khwāja Ubaidu-llāh.

Khwāja Dānyāl.

Khwāja Jahān (Yaṣqūb).

His apostolic succession (or the descent in the spiritual grace of saintship) was manifested by many miracles.

He was one day complaining of the mutual rivalries and enmities of the holy men of his times, and enquired whether the same was the case in former days, when the following story was told him:—

“In the time of Ābdu-llāh, there were two holy men, between whom no cloud had ever arisen. The Khān, to try them, took them out hunting with him. Taking an opportunity when he was alone with one of them, he asked him :—‘ How is it that your horse is so lively and that of your friend is so slow?’ The saint replied :—‘ Because my friend is such a great saint, that his horse, out of reverence and respect, moves gently and sedately ; whereas my horse, knowing what a sinner he bears on his back,

²⁹ Mr. Shaw notes :— “ On the title deeds of a Mazār, he is found to be reigning in 1148 A. D. ” (1735-36 A. D.)

³⁰ In Muḥammad Ṣāliq’s MS., *Ayyūb* is said to have been appointed to Aksu.

dances about and tries to shake him off.' Presently the Khān asked the same question, privately, of the other, who replied: 'My horse is oppressed by the load of sins which he carries in my person, whereas my friend's sanctity is so great that his horse, desiring to fly to the heavens with him, continues to spring up from the earth in his endeavour to do so.' "

Yūsuf's youngest brother was Ābdu-llāh who had four sons:—

1, Shamsu-d-Dīn; 2, Yaḥyā; 3, Aḥmad; 4, Ābid.

Ābdu-llāh lived at Aksu and when his brother, Khamōsh, died there, he gave over his own government of Khutan to his son Shamsu-d-Dīn. He himself also died at Aksu; after which Shamsu-d-Dīn and Yaḥyā obtained Khutan.

Yūsuf went to Ila.³¹ He found the Qalmāqs in trouble among themselves and concluded that the longed for opportunity to strike for independence was come. He took counsel with Khush Kipak Beg, the Governor of Kāshghar, who was also at Ila and sent him back to Kāshghar to fortify the city and prepare for war, telling the Qalmāqs that this was done as a precaution against irruptions. But he sent a letter to Umar Mīrzā, the Chief of the Kirghiz-Kipchāks, living in the Ila district, and planned an insurrection in concert with them. He could not obtain leave from his Qalmāq masters to return to Kāshghar; so he resorted to artifice. He sent off a servant with orders to go a few days' march and then come back in haste bearing a prepared letter, which reported that the Kirghiz had attacked Kāshghar, and that Yūsuf's presence was required. The Qalmāqs at first decided to send an army, but being themselves in difficulties, they were finally compelled to give up this idea and to depute Yūsuf. He pretended unreadiness and offered to send his sons instead, saying that if they failed, he would go himself. In this way he hoped to release his sons.³² His proposal was agreed to, but, according to a pre-arranged plan, the sons sent back word that the task was beyond them,

³¹ In Muḥammad Ṣādiq's text it is said that Yūsuf used frequently to pay visits to Ila, his chief object being— "to obtain an insight into the affairs of the infidels. He was waiting for a disturbance to take place among them that he might seize the opportunity to use the remorseless sword of Islām On one occasion he found that the Tura (Chief) of the Qalmāqs had been changed, and that dissension and disturbance prevailed among them." Galdan Chiring's death occurred in 1745, and gave rise to several years of disturbances among the Qalmāqs, as has been mentioned in the Introduction. The occasion of Yūsuf's visit, here alluded to in the Epitome, was apparently at the time when Ta-wa-tze had just become Chief, (*viz.*, 1754) or shortly previous to it, perhaps about 1753.

³² The text of Muḥammad Ṣādiq mentions only one son in connection with this incident, and names him— Khwāja Ābdu-llāh.

and that their father's presence was necessary. This device succeeded, and Yūsuf also started for Kāshghar. He had made one march on this (south) side of the Muzart Pass, when he was met by the Governor of Uch, ³³ named Khwāja Si Beg, who congratulated him, saying that now he was come, Islām would gain ground. Yūsuf put off this interpretation of his proceedings, but advised the Governor not to go on to Ila. This confirmed the latter in his suspicions of Yūsuf's intentions, and he continued on his way to Ila. Yūsuf fearing treachery from this circumstance hastened on to Aksu and Kāshghar.

The Governor of Uch, on his side, pushed on to Ila, and warned the Qalmāq Chief, Dābāji, that Yūsuf's object was rebellion. They sent three hundred men in pursuit of Yūsuf, but they were too late. Finding this to be the case, they despatched a messenger to him, saying,—“The Turas of the Qalmāqs summon you to their assistance. Amursana is advancing against them with a large army.” Yūsuf, on the arrival of this messenger, professed illness as an excuse for not complying. Khudā Yār was Ishkāgha ³⁴ of Kāshghar and held by the Qalmāqs; while another adherent of theirs fortified himself at Artush, and sent to urge Khudā Yār to revolt against Yūsuf. He forged a letter from the Qalmāqs in which they were made to say that a large expedition was advancing against them from China; it also contained an order to the Ishkāgha and his adherents to seize and kill Yūsuf, saying that if their own dominion continued, this would be considered good service; and if the Chinese prevailed, they would certainly reward it. The other Beks, however, would not join the Ishkāgha in this conspiracy, and the messengers took the letter at night to Yūsuf, who armed all his people and remained on his guard. The Ishkāgha perceived that the conspiracy was discovered and shut himself up in his house. Yūsuf then appointed ten Kipchāks and commanded them thus:—“When I say, twice over, *Tamāku sal* (fill up the tobacco), seize and imprison Khudā Yār.” The latter, however, kept away for some days, but had at last to attend the Chief's Court. Yūsuf began reproaching him and then gave the signal. A certain Kipchāk seized Khudā Yār with one hand, and, lifting him up like an apple, forced him, crying out for mercy, down the steps. Yūsuf re-assured the other Beks, telling them that they and even Khudā Yār's children, had nothing to fear. He then ordered a certain man to enquire how Khudā Yār was imprisoned. This man, whether he was a partner in the conspiracy and feared detection, or whether he did not hear the order

³³ Also written *Ush*. The place intended is Ush Turfān.

³⁴ Literally *Lord of the gate*. A kind of mayor or town-Magistrate.

distinctly, conveyed to the Kipchāks an order to slay Khudā Yār immediately, which they did.³⁵

A force was sent against the rebels at Artūsh, who, after firing a few shots, fled to Aksu, by way of Kalta Yailāk and Kalpin. At Aksu they consulted with Ābdū-l-Wahhāb, the Governor, and wrote to inform the Qalmāq Chiefs of the events that had occurred, saying that unless troops were despatched at once, they must wash their hands of Kāshghar, Yārqand and Khutan. The children of the slain Ishkāgha also appealed for vengeance. The Qalmāqs consulted about sending an army, but refrained on account of Amursana being known to have gone to the Court of Khākān (the Emperor of China) and because an attack from that side might be expected. They determined, however, on despatching an Embassy.

Some time before this, the Kipchāk-Kirghiz, who were passing the summer on the Ila pastures, being instructed by Yūsuf, came down to Kuchār and thence went on to Khutan. The Qalmāq envoy, therefore, was sent under the pretext of bringing back this tribe. Now the Qalmāq Government was in a state of disorder—ruler succeeding ruler, as each obtained the power. The envoy, Mudarjī, was nominally deputed to Yūsuf, but he had letters to the Chiefs of Kāshghar and other places, appealing to them to sieze Yūsuf and send him to Ila. He set out with three hundred horsemen in armour, and took the road *viā* Aksu and Ush Turfān. Yūsuf sent a man to find out their intentions and received a report that they were adverse. He made warlike preparations, so that when the Qalmāqs arrived they found everything ready for war, and armoured men everywhere on guard. The attendants were detained at the doors and only five chief men were allowed to penetrate into the presence of Yūsuf. He treated them well and dismissed them to their quarters, telling his people that, although they were Kāfirs, still they must be considered in the light of guests.

When they reached their quarters, they sent for Khush Kipāk, Governor of Kāshghar, and showed him their letters with the red (royal) seal. He repelled their attempts to corrupt his loyalty. He also dissuaded them from their mission, warning them that they would fail. The Governors of Besh Karam and Faizābad were, however, won over; they told the Qalmāqs that without them their country would fall a prey to the Kirghiz. They said it was easy to seize the Khōja of Yārqand, who was a simple Musulmān, but Yūsuf was a sagacious chief whom it was not easy to

³⁵ Mr. Shaw notes here :— “ Another account says he showed Khudā Yār his own letter, and asked him what punishment he was worthy of, who thus conspired against his own Khōja. The criminal replied : ‘ death,’ upon which Yusuf gave orders for his execution.”

beguile. Accordingly, they planned to bring him over to their own quarters on the plea of an interview, there to slay him and show his body to the people. This plot became known to Yūsuf, who, when invited according to previous arrangement, went accompanied by a sufficient guard. Seeing this, the schemers gave up their intention against his life, as impracticable. Finding all their plots unavailing, they took leave and went to Yārqand.

Yūsuf, however, sent to warn Khwāja Jahān of Yārqand against them, and to bid him remain day and night on his guard. The envoys saw that all the Khōja brothers were on the alert, so they contented themselves with inviting Jahān to go to Ila and visit their chief. He excused himself. After a time, with the assistance of Ghāzi Beg, Governor of Yārqand, they succeeded in inveigling him to their dwelling, under the pretence that the chief envoy was dangerously ill and desirous of speaking to him. When he came in, they seized him and closed their doors. Some of his officers, who were outside, gave the alarm, and the palace was made safe and guarded. Some of the Khōjas fled towards Khutan, while a messenger was despatched to Kāshghar to inform Yūsuf. The Qalmāqs and their adherents went in pursuit of Khwāja Ṣādiq as far as the river Zarafshān,³⁶ but he escaped and got to Khutan. He seized Ghāzi Beg's³⁷ house and family at Khutan, sending off only one of the servants to tell Ghāzi Beg that he was coming, that the Beg should prepare for war, but that if he hurt a hair of Khwāja Jahān's head, he (Ṣādiq) would destroy all his family to the seventieth generation. He then raised a force of some 6,000 or 7,000 men from among the Kipchāks who had established themselves at Khutan, and from the inhabitants of the country.

Yūsuf, on being made aware of what had happened, shut up the messengers and made it publicly known that an army of Kirghiz was coming to attack the town. By this means he induced the people to raise a considerable force, and, at the same time, sent to warn Ghāzi Beg, under a threat of retaliation, not to injure Khwāja Jahān. The messengers bearing this letter presented themselves before Ghāzi Beg and the Qalmāqs. A report spread that Yūsuf was coming with a force of 10,000 men, and was assembling the Kirghiz tribes under his standard.

Letters of reproach also came from other Musulmāns to Ghāzi Beg. He began to repent of his conduct and made an attempt to restore himself to favour, in case of accidents, by causing his own men to dress as Qalmāqs, and feign an attempt on the life of Khwāja Jahān, their prisoner, when he himself came in and pretended to save him at the peril of his own

³⁶ The Yārqand river.

³⁷ Ghāzi Beg was the Governor of the town of Yārkaṇd and had treacherously helped the Qalmāqs to seize the Khōja. Muhammad Ṣādiq says of him "God had made Ghāzi Beg a scoundrel from the day of his birth."

life. His sons, the same night, sent in two swords to their father, so that he might defend his own room until succour should reach him, if an assault were made on the house.

Yūsuf despatched 500 men to Bārcuk to intercept the Qalmāqs, should they attempt to make off to Ila with their prisoner. The Kirghiz also assembled at the call of Yūsuf.

Ghāzī Beg, becoming alarmed at these threatened attacks, released the imprisoned Khwāja Jahān and, obtaining his pardon, prevailed on him to send off members of his family to stop the armies of Khūtān and Kāshghar. The latter force returned, but Khwāja Šādiq, who was met on the way from Khūtān, refused to believe the messengers and pressed on to Yārqand where he found Jahān released and sitting on the throne. He rewarded his soldiers and allowed them to go back to Khūtān. Yūsuf, however, formed the idea of attacking Ila and solicited help from Andijān and the Kirghiz.

A wife of Yūsuf had remained at Aksu. Ābdu-l-Wahhāb Beg, a Chief of Aksu, who had not submitted to Yūsuf, showed enmity to this wife, but she was released and sent to Kāshghar by an Ishkāgha.

Yūsuf, falling ill, took leave of his family and started for Yārqand, by way of Yapurghā. The people of Yārqand came out to meet him with a horse litter [*takht-i-rawān*], but he refused to sit in it, and entered the city on horseback. Here he remained for three months, holding intercourse with all the principal people.

At this time Dābājī (Ta-wa-tze) was ruler of the Qalmāqs at Ila, but their country was much disturbed. Amursana was a claimant of the chiefship, but being unable to obtain it by his own strength, he went to the Emperor of China (*Khāqān*), begged for an army and agreed to pay tribute. Assistance was granted him. Dābājī fled with a small following, and finally, finding no other refuge, betook himself to Ush (Turfān), while Amursana ruled at Ila. The Governor of Ush, who was not subject to the Khōja of Kāshghar, invited him into the town, but seized him as soon as he entered, and sent him to Ila, whence he was conveyed a prisoner to China.³⁸ There, however, he was treated with honour and his

³⁸ This passage, which is one of the most interesting in the book, from a historical point of view, is given by Muḥammad Šādiq in greater detail, and may be transcribed here. He writes:—"The cause of the disturbance in Ila was this:—Ghāldan Jirin [Galdan Chiring] was dead and his son Achan succeeded him when only twelve years of age. Being so young, he was not heeded by the infidels. He occupied himself only in amusements with dogs, in hawking and cock-fighting. He carried off Qalmāq women and often committed [other] sins. The affairs of his country fell into disorder.

descendants dwell in China to this day ³⁹.

Amursana, having firmly established his authority by the help of the Chinese at Ila, planned the conquest of the three cities of Kāshghar, Yārquand and Khutan. But the Qalmāqs were in a depressed state, and the Chinese army, having come from afar, was weary, so that the despatch of a sufficient force was thought difficult. ʿAbdu-l-Wahhāb, the Governor of Aksu and a partisan of the Qalmāqs, advised the following plan. There happened to be two members of the Khōja family at Ila. Let one of

“ Achan had a sister, called Ghulām Biā, who conspired with a Qalmāq named Tamgu Jarghāl, to imprison Achan and for Tamgu Jarghāl to be made Tura. Achan was made aware of the plot, whereupon he seized his sister and her accomplice, put out their eyes, and threw them into prison. Galdan Chirin had a concubine by whom he had a son named Lāma Tājī. Having heard the news of Ghulām Biā’s capture, Lāma Tājī came with a large force. On hearing of this, Achan, out of fear, took to flight, but Lāma Tājī pursued him, seized him, and established himself as Tura. He then put out Achan’s eyes and drove him into the streets where he died.

“ A short time after this, Amursana and Dābājī, who were nephews of Galdan Chirin and belonged to the Tura’s family, heard of Achan’s death and claimed their right to succeed as Tura. They collected an army and moved forward. Lāma Tājī was unaware of their schemes, and when he heard that they were coming, shut himself up and was unable to move out from fright. Amursana’s soldiers entered his tent (*Akoi*) and killed him. They took many captives and plundered the country, while Dābājī established himself as Tura, but Amursana claimed the Turaship for himself and disputed it with Dābājī. He failed, however, in his object and went with 500 Qalmāqs towards Khatā (China) and thence arrived at Bājin (Pekin). He asked the Khān (of Khatā) for an army. The Khān entertained him with kindness and gave him a thousand troops under the command of a Jang Jung [Chiang Chün]. This force accompanied him on his [return] march. Dābājī was not free from the fear of Amursana. For this reason the Qalmāqs were unable to send troops to prevent Kāshghar being plundered”

Further on in the book the author continues on the same subject thus :— “ When Dābājī had become established as Tura, Amursana went before the Khāqān Emperor of China and asked for a large army. He made a promise to take and deliver over Yārquand and Kāshghar. From of old the infidels of China had a quarrel with the Qalmāqs, but no favourable opportunity had presented itself (for action). When Dābājī heard of Amursana’s approach with an immense army his limbs trembled, because there was much confusion and dissension in the country. Not being strong enough to oppose the Chinese he was compelled to take flight and went forth with 300 brave horsemen of his own kindred, but finding no means of escape in any (other) direction he travelled on till he came to the pass of Uch” Thence he went on to the town of Uch, (*i.e.* Ush Turfāu) where, for a time, he made himself secure, but the author continues :— “ Now, since Dābājī had fled from Ila, the throne of sovereignty had remained vacant, so Amursana came and occupied it. Khwāja Si Beg (Governor of Uch) took Dābājī prisoner and gave him up to Amursana. The latter was greatly pleased and sent Dābājī under escort of an army, to the Khāqān of China.”

³⁹ Dābājī, or Ta-wa-tze, had only one son, named Lob-Tsang, who died at Pekin

them, he said, be deputed together with an envoy, to Kāshghar, and let it be proclaimed that he has been appointed ruler of the province by the Emperor of China.

Now Khwāja Yaḥyā (son of Khwāja Āfāq) had left a son named Khwāja Aḥmad, who had two sons: 1, Burhānu-d-Dīn, and 2, Khān Khōja. Burhān was sent with an embassy, accompanied by a force of Chinese, Qalmāqs and hillmen. He was received with joy by the people of Aksu, and took possession of Ush. But the inhabitants of Ush advised an arrangement by which Yūsuf should be left in possession of Kāshghar, as it was reported that all the Kirghiz, as well as the people of Khutan and Yārqaṇd, were assembled for the defence of Kāshghar.

When Yūsuf heard the news from Ila, he was lying ill at Yārqaṇd. He took counsel with his advisers, and it was recommended that he should not wait to be attacked in Kāshghar, but should carry the war into the enemy's country, Ush and Aksu. But Yūsuf did not approve of thus inviting an attack on himself, in case his army should be defeated, and the Kirghiz allies were not to be trusted. However, the general opinion was too strong for him, and a force was despatched from Yārkaṇd, without Yūsuf's knowledge or consent, under command of his brother Khwāja Yaḥyā. The Kirghiz joined the army at Yangī Ḥiṣār, and the Governor of that place, who was suspected of complicity with the Qalmāqs, was made prisoner, and taken on to Kāshghar; whence the force proceeded, by way of Artush to Ush. Khwāja Yūsuf died two days after his army had left Yārqaṇd.

Khwāja Jahān, who succeeded Yūsuf, did not approve of this expedition and wanted to recall it. But his Chiefs represented that, having started, it was best that it should go on, lest the enemy should perceive dissensions among them. By his order Khwāja Ābdu-llāh, son of Yūsuf, was made ruler of Kāshghar. He collected a contingent of troops from his province and sent it after Yaḥyā, whom it overtook at Besh Karam. The united forces then marched by Akshai and Kakshal, to Ush. The invading Khwāja Burhān was amusing himself when news of the approach of this expedition reached him. He was taken by surprise, but ordered his troops to be called together.

Yaḥyā sent an embassy to Ush. On being introduced to the presence of Khwāja Burhān, they were scandalised at his dress and manners, which resembled those of the Qalmāqs and Chinese. With him were the Governors of Aksu, Ush, Kuchār, Sairām, Dolan and a Kirghiz Chief. There were also 400 Chinese troops under Turumtai Darin, and 1,000 Qalmāqs

immediately after his father, and while still a child. This would have been some twelve or thirteen years previous to the date of Muḥammad Ṣādiq's book, and consequently, it might be thought, within his recollection.

under Dān Jin-Jing.⁴⁰ After reading the letter from the Chiefs of the Kāshghar army, exhorting him to join the side of Islām, he began to mock the feeble intelligence of the Ishāqī Khōjas. He then recounted the deeds and power of his supporters, Amursana and the Khāqān, who had appointed him Ruler of the country, and he recommended the Kāshghar Khōjas to sue for pardon. His words and threats won over the emissaries, who reflected that Yūsuf was now dead. Two of them stayed at Ush and the other two returned to their own army, after making a promise to take the side of the invaders.

On reaching the camp of Yaḥyā, they spoke in exaggerated terms of the strength of the enemy. Yaḥyā professed his readiness to die in defence of the faith, and said:—"We looked upon Khwāja Burhān as our brother, and were anxious to deliver him from the hands of the infidels, but now that he has joined them to attack us, we will resist him to the death."

The troops prepared for war, but without much hope of success. They had before experienced the power of the Qalmāqs, and now the power of the Chinese was added to it.⁴¹ When the fighting began, one portion after another of the Musulmān army went over to the enemy. The remainder, finding their case hopeless, fled.

On their return to Yārqand, Khwāja Jahān was advised to seize the remainder of the Mungī tribe of Kirghiz, who had been the first to go over to the enemy. An attempt was made to take them prisoners, but half of them escaped and fell to plundering the country. Those who had been captured, moreover, succeeded by fair speeches in obtaining their release and joined their brethren in pillaging Yārqand territory.

The invaders then consulted and decided to go at once to Kāshghar, as the Kirghiz were friendly and the defending army broken up. On arriving at the city some of their local supporters worked upon the Kipchāk-Kirghiz guard at one of the gates, so that they agreed to let the rival Khōjas fight out the matter between themselves, without assisting either side. These were a body of Kipchāks who had fled in the days of Khwāja Dānyāl from Ila to Kḥutan. A certain Abdul Majid, a supporter of the invading Chiefs, stood on the bank of the Tumān river and cried out with a loud voice:—"Oh, my Princes! There is no use now in delay. The master of this land has come, now go ye forth!"

⁴⁰ These are intended for Chinese names and titles. *Turumtai* I can make nothing of. *Dārin* should read *Ta-jen*, the ordinary title of any high official. *Dan* would probably be the surname *Tan* or *Tang*; while the office *Jin-Jing* is doubtless meant for *chiang-chün*, or "general".

⁴¹ It is at this point that the MS. of Muḥammad Ṣādiq and Mr. Shaw's printed text come to an end.

After vain counsels, Khawāja Abdu-llāh retired with his followers to Yārqand, and Khān Khōja entered Kāshghar. He immediately prepared to follow up his success by advancing against Yārqand. He was accompanied by a numberless force of Kāshghar, Aksu and Ush men and of Kirghiz under Kubat Bi, to whom the government of Kāshghar had been promised as a reward for success.

Khawāja Jahān, at Yārqand, pitched his tents outside the city and called an assembly of chief men of the place, to whom, after a feast, he made a speech recounting the time he had spent among them as their ruler, and entreating their pardon for any offence that he might have given by word or deed. "Now," he added, "we hear that a descendant of Hazrat Āfāq has taken Kāshghar with the help of the Chinese, and it is probable that he will also seek to become master of Yārqand. As it is not fitting that I and my family should submit to the rule of the infidels, we will carry out our long-formed desire of visiting the holy cities." The chief men of Yārqand tried to dissuade him, saying that if he insisted on going, let him take them with him. Let him not throw them aside in this manner. They would not consent to accept the rule of the descendants of Āfāq, but would fight them if they would not remain content with Kāshghar.

Khawāja Jahān was persuaded to stay, and entrusted the defence of the town to Ghāzī Beg, who had formerly betrayed him. A force of 3,000 men went out from Yārqand, with orders not to attack their brother Musulmāns of Kāshghar, unless the latter should strike the first blow. But when the cavalry of the two armies began to skirmish the Kāshgharīs came on with cries of "kait, kait" (turn back, turn back). Khawāja Jahān was pleased when he heard the news of this, saying:—"As they do not make 'Allāh' their war-cry, we may fight them with a clear conscience. It had long been on my mind that it would not be lawful to attack troops who met us with cries of 'Allāh,' " and he gave orders for the advance.

The Yārqandīs fought so vigorously that the Kāshgharī force retreated a *tāsh*⁴² distance, and made their "salāms" in the direction of Yārqand. A second time the Yārqand troops came out to the attack, and again proved victorious. They were in possession of two European rifles (*Frang Miltak*) which could strike a mark at the distance of a *tāsh*: they had been the property of Khawāja Yūsuf. Khawāja Burhānu-d-Dīn, the Āfāqī, was standing on the Bai-Dubba (or Tippa), a mound about half a mile from the Maskhara Darwāza (gate) on the east side of the city. A shot from the European gun, fired from the gate, struck his standard-

⁴² The *tāsh* is a measure of distance, equal to about four miles. It is the Persian *sang* or *farsakh*.

bearer, who fell with the yak's tail standard (*Tugh*). After further fighting the Kāshghar force retired again, and the Yārqand officers returned triumphant.

Now when the Kāshghar troops first set out, a deputation of Yārqandis had represented to Khwāja Jahān as follows:—" Khwāja Burhānu-d-Dīn, with the help of the Chinese and Qalmāqs, has taken the whole country except Yārqand and Khutan; but Yārqand is, of all, the chief city of Mughalīstān,⁴³ and its inhabitants, as long as they have one mind, are capable of encountering those of the whole of the other cities put together. But we are doubtful of two men—Ghāzī Beg and Niāz Beg—who would not scruple to barter their faith for the things of this world. They should be imprisoned till these troubles are over, and should have no share in our arrangements. Afterwards they might be restored to their present dignities." But Khwāja Jahān could, with difficulty, be induced to agree even to such precautions as preventing them going out into the field, or sitting in the court (*Urda*) to give their orders.

To return: the invaders finding force of no avail, sent four envoys, two Chinese and two Qalmāqs—and they were allowed to come into the presence of Khwāja Jahān, who sat on a high throne surrounded by his chiefs. They presented a letter which ran in the name, first of the Khāqān, and secondly of Amursana, and in which the Yārqandī leaders were reproached with their folly in withholding the tribute paid by their forefathers for many generations. Their error was ascribed to Dābāji, the expelled Tura of Ila. All the countries formerly in possession of the Qalmāqs had now fallen to the Chinese crown, of right. The Khān had sent this embassy to invite them to obedience. If they happened to be victorious over it, he threatened that troops upon troops would come from China and slay down to the very four-footed beasts; and he concluded by exhorting them to lay down their arms, promising good terms and throwing the responsibility of rejecting this offer on Khwāja Jahān.⁴⁴

The Khwāja tore up the letter and burned it. He then replied, saying:—" Khwāja Burhān is eating dirt. If he knows himself to be a

⁴³ It is curious to see this name applied to Eastern Turkistān. At an earlier date the regions to the north of the Tien Shan alone were known as Mughalīstān, because they were those inhabited by the Mughals, or Mongols. Early in the 16th century, when a Mughal Khān conquered Eastern Turkistān and made Kāshghar his capital, the name of Mughalīstān seems to have extended over the whole of his dominions; while our author, two centuries later, applies it to Eastern Turkistān only. Probably it was not a commonly used name even in his time: now-a-days it is never heard for Eastern Turkistān.

⁴⁴ This expedition to Yārqand is not mentioned in the memoir of Kienlung on the conquest of the "Eleuths" (as translated by Amiot), but the letter, although it is not expressly said to have come from the Emperor, has the real Kienlung tone about it.

man, let him learn that others are lions. Our minds have no other desire than to wage a religious war." With this answer the envoys returned.

Afterwards, however, a council was held in Yārqand, when an envoy was despatched to Burhānu-d-Dīn, on the part of Khwāja Jahān, charged with an attempt to win him over to the side of Islām and offering, for the sake of religious peace, to give up the city to him and to go on pilgrimage. Otherwise even if the city walls were of paper, the weapons of defence needles, and the defenders women, still he would not be able to take it. In reply Burhānu-d-Dīn said that a theological disquisition of this kind would not accomplish the work of soldiering: that the Khāqān and Amursana, who had sent him, would not accept such a sermon in lieu of obedience. "I am backed up," he continued, "by these two great mountains and shall not fail to take Yārqand—if not to-day, then to-morrow. Where will it go to escape us?" With these words he dismissed the envoy.

With this envoy had come a follower of Ghāzī Beg, who entered into negotiations with the enemy, on behalf of his master, to betray the city, on condition of obtaining its government. He also opened communications with Niāz Beg. The latter possessed a garden close to the wall of the town, from which he began mining under the wall and throwing the earth into an empty ice-house. It was winter, so no one visited the garden. He had progressed 8 fathoms, making in such a direction as to come out on the face of a bank below the wall on the outside. But among his servants there was one loyal man, and he at last informed Khwāja Jahān, who sent and found the mine as the man had said. Niāz was put into confinement, but his property was not seized, nor was his family injured.

There was another man named Ashur Kozi, a Qalmāq by birth, but much trusted by Khwāja Jahān. He entered into communication with the invaders on behalf of himself and Niāz, advising them to push forward, on a certain night, some 3,000 men; while he would arrange to set fifty men at work, with picks, to make a breach in the city wall. All was in readiness, but a son of Ashur Kozi reproached his father for his treachery, saying that it was better to die righteously than to enjoy the empire of the world. Passing from words to blows, the father wounded him with his sword, and he fled and informed Khwāja Jahān, who at first refused to believe him. But, at his suggestion, the messenger of his father was seized and he confessed. Then Ashur was arrested, his house was searched, and the letter bearing the seal of Khwāja Burhān was found.

Next day Ashur was brought out before the people and his crime declared. He made a public confession and acknowledged that death

was the penalty he had incurred. Khawāja ʿAbdu-llāh interceded for him, saying that if he were killed, no son would, in future, reveal his father's conspiracies. Khawāja Jahān then proclaimed to the people that the son had begged for the father's life from him, and he (the Khawāja) now begged it from the people. The assembly, however, replied that unless somebody's life was taken, the city would not be safe, so the messenger was executed.

The enemy were greatly dejected, because these two schemes had failed; and they were defeated daily in the open field.

Now Ghāzi Beg's station in the defence was from the Khānaka gate to the Maskhara gate. It was reported to the Khawāja that Ghāzi's spies were constantly coming and going, and a petition was handed in that he might be imprisoned. The Khawāja replied:—"It is of no use. Our destruction is decreed: it is only delayed, not averted." Ghāzi Beg then planned to procure a defeat of the Yārqand army. The Khawāja consented to an attack being made and the whole male population of Yārqand, from twelve years of age to seventy, was sent out. Some people said that they numbered as many as 40,000 as they sallied forth.

Burhānu-d-Dīn's army retired before this mass. The Kirghiz, Kubat Bi, the accursed one, stood looking on. But Ghāzi Beg was marshalling the Yārqand troops, when a small force rode at him. He fled with his standard, and the Yārqand men being taken with fright at this defection, fled, and pressed on one another up to the gate. Khawāja ʿAbdu-llāh tried to get out of the city to stop the rout, but could not make his way through the crowd of fugitives. Ropes were then thrown over the wall and as many as possible were taken into the town; the rest were all slain by the enemy.

After a few days of despair, the Khōjas and the chief people of Yārqand sallied forth with the intention of taking refuge in the mountains. Some on horses, some on camels, some riding two together on one horse, they set out and reached the Zarafshān (the Yārqand river); but it was frozen so insufficiently as to be impassable on the ice, moreover night had set in. They turned aside to a place, above, called Kara-Yun-tagh, and there began to cross. Then the Kirghiz in the enemy's army discovered their movements and went after them.

Ghāzi Beg finding the people had left the town, beat the drum of rejoicing and sent out to Khawāja Burhān who pushed forward 500 men to stop the flight. This party, together with the Kirghiz, overtook the fugitives. Some of the latter were trembling with cold and wet, some were burdened with children in their arms; but none were capable of showing fight, although there were about a thousand of them. One of

Khwāja Jahān's wives gave birth to a child during the night and could not follow.

Khwāja Ābdu-llāh managed to collect a few men to check the pursuit, but it continued nevertheless till the afternoon of the next day. At the upper crossing of the river, the Kirghiz seized the passage and opened fire with their muskets. Ābdu-llāh alone showed courage, but what was one against so many? The fugitives crowded into the river, so as to dam up the water, but again it broke through them sweeping many away with it. Ābdu-llāh saw the dead body of Yūsuf Khwāja's son being borne past, but he could not even cast a second glance at it in the confusion. After a long struggle they reached the other bank and stopped to recover themselves. Looking round they counted up their losses: one had lost his wife, another his father, and a third his child; cries of grief went up to heaven.

The Kirghiz now offered them quarter if they would surrender. With the exception of Ābdu-llāh, all the princes agreed to do so, provided the chiefs of the Kirghiz would bind themselves to good faith by an oath. But Ābdu-llāh's pride would not consent to a surrender on any terms. Khwāja Jahān exhorted him to submit and not to fly from death, for life was only a prison to the faithful, though a paradise to unbelievers. Ābdu-llāh replied:—"Oh my king, suffer me and a few others to make a fight for liberty. If we all fall into the hands of these infidels, none of our line will escape. I say not this as desiring to avoid death. In our present circumstances death is our best refuge. But firstly our lineage will be destroyed by our being taken, and secondly I would rather die in fight than after falling into the hands of these men."

While they were discussing thus, the Kirghiz crossed the river and coming up, with respect, to the old Khwāja, suggested that if he did not believe their word, he should send his son Yaḥyā with them to the camp of Burhānu-d-Dīn, to obtain assurances from him in person. So Yaḥyā was sent off with them.

The Musulmāns were wet, hungry and cold, and night was coming on. Some of them killed their horses, and lighting fires, cooked the flesh and ate it. Ābdu-llāh then begged the Khwāja's permission to try and escape with his two children, lest the line of the Khwājas should be cut short, and God threw dust into the eyes of the Kirghiz so that he got away safely, with one child before him and the other behind him, on the same horse.

In the morning the Kirghiz approached and said:—"Oh Khwāja, let us come away into the presence of Khwāja Burhān and see what city he will appoint to you as your Government." But the princes said to themselves:—"It is a question of what death they are going to inflict, not

what city they are going to give." Afterwards the Kirghiz asked:—
"What need have you now for your fire arms and accoutrements?" and
so took them from them.

With many indignities and sufferings, they were brought in by the
Kirghiz, who, cruelly and for sport, slew many of the children and carried
their bodies on their spears. In this way, they passed one night at the
village of Ak-tam and another at Urda-Ustang, where there were but four
bare walls to sleep between. At this place they were separated from one
another to be led into the city, and they never saw one another more.

What happened after this, there is no strength to relate nor to listen to.

APPENDIX A.

HIERARCHY OF THE MUSULMĀN RELIGIOUS ORDERS OR GUILDS.

The technical terms in the text require a little explanation. Among the Musulmāns of Eastern Turkistān, who follow chiefly the rule of the *Naqshbandī* order, the head of the hierarchy is the *murshid* or *pir*, generally a descendant of the Prophet. The spiritual succession "*nisbat-i-mānā*" is handed down usually in the family of the Founder or Missionary Apostle, but sometimes is vested in one or more of his chief disciples, especially at what may be called "out-stations." He has a congregation or body of disciples (*murīd*), consisting of the lay chief and population descended from those who were originally converted or recruited by his ancestor's preaching. These are considered hereditarily subject (in religious matters) to the *murshid's* descendants or representatives. He has also a special band of more closely united disciples or apostles called "*khalīfa*," i.e., vicegerents (vicars) who may be considered the clergy of this church, although their speciality merely extends to preaching and expounding and not to any priestly ministrations, for Islām recognises no priesthood. These form a sort of court around the spiritual superior and his family; and from them are chosen his representatives and successors when his own progeny fail.

The *waqf*, or church lands, given by devout laymen, are vested in this hierarchy. When such a church or order is formed, whether out of the general body of Musulmāns or by the conversion of tribes of a different religion, the initiatory process is called "*inābat*," i.e., conversion or religious submission, or "*irādat*," i.e., devotion. The commission, or ordination, by which the *Khalīfas* are inducted into this office, is called "*rukhsat*" (permission) or "*irshād*" (direction). Hence "*murshid*" a spiritual director. These churches or orders or guilds do not, I believe, differ doctrinally from one another among the orthodox Musulmāns. They even belong to the same one out of the four so-called sects of the Sunnis. But they profess a particular method of exciting devotion among their members. This is called their "*tariq*" (road or path). Some of them, especially the *Naqshbandī* (to which the *Khōjas* of *Kāshgharia* belonged), have particular signs by which they can recognise their brethren in the faith among strange Musulmāns. There may be many such churches or congregations belonging to the same order or guild, but tracing their spiritual descent through a different line. The members are sometimes scattered in different countries. In such cases the superior will often send a *Khalīfa* or will travel himself into the places inhabited by them, to confirm them in the faith and to raise contributions. Thus *Ghafūr Shāh Naqshbandī*, belonging to a family originally of *Tāshkand*, but now established in *Kashmir*, several times visited his flocks in *Turkistān*, and often wrote to the chief members. In return these people and other *Turkistānis* when they visit *Kashmir* are outertained by his sons (he is now dead) in quarters,

especially devoted to this purpose at the ziārat or shrine of which he is guardian. So also Aghā Khān of Bombay (a Shī' sectary) has many adherents in the valleys of the Hindu Kush. Of course in some cases such an organisation is used for political purposes.

APPENDIX B.

A VISIT TO THE SHRINE OF HAZRAT AFAQ.

The following account of a visit paid by myself and an English companion to the shrine of Hazrat Afāq, in December 1874, may be interesting as illustrating the text.

After crossing the Tumān River by a wooden bridge, just below the south-eastern angle of the wall of Kāshghar city, we rode for nearly a couple of miles chiefly through a large cemetery—a perfect city of the dead—where numerous begging dervishes, single, and even in families, had established their dwellings in the niches and under the domes of the tombs, and came out at the approach of our cavalcade to ask for alms with loud invocations and deep reverences. Presently the road became a walled lane, overhung by the branches of tall trees growing in a large park-like domain, which extended on either side and in front. This lane ended at a gateway where we all dismounted, and left our horses under the charge of a number of boys and young men, who were hanging about there for the purpose of holding the horses of visitors and pilgrims. The hereditary guardian of the shrine, a Hājī, accompanied by his retinue, met us at the gate and conducted us into the interior. We passed numerous collegiate buildings, the quarters of students who come to study theology here, and other buildings indicating the existence of quite a little religious colony. In summer it must be charming under the shade of the venerable trees, an air of religious and scholastic repose pervading the whole. After a short walk we reached the shrine, a square building with a barred gateway enclosing a small courtyard in which were more than seventy tombs of the members of the Afāqide branch of the Khōja family. Among them is a tomb marked only with the initials K. Sh. (*Kāf, Shīn*). This is the *nom de plume* under which is known the writer of certain poems and semi-poetical biographies of Hazrat Afāq and his ancestors, which are in my possession.

The shrine is marked by four tall masts decorated with yak tails (*tuḡh*) and flags inscribed with Arabic texts, and by numerous huge horns of the Ovis Poli (or rather Ovis Karilini) found in the neighbouring mountains. These are ranged along the top of the walls surrounding the shrine, and the finest are formed into two heaps, in front of a little pavilion where pious worshippers sit and meditate on the virtues of the saint. These fluttering yak tails and heaped-up horns are strange features for a Musulmān holy place, although commonly found associated with grave-yards in Turkistān. They remind one of the cairns and built-up pillars or monuments, similarly adorned, which are found in all notable spots throughout the mountainous region between India and Eastern Turkistān,¹ and which are variously called *Dēvīs* (the haunts, that is, of female deities) in the Hindu region, *Shāto* (*i.e.* demon-dwellings) in the Buddhist region (where they are not considered

¹ And even in Mongolia. See Perjevalski, *Mongolia*, volume I, pages 76, 283. Volume II, page 257. They are there called "obo."—B. B. S.

to be connected with orthodox religion)² and *Pir* or *Masār*, respectively, in the Kāshmirī and Turki Musulmān regions, where they are explained to be the tombs of holy men. As, however, they occupy precisely corresponding positions in all these regions (positions where it is generally eminently improbable that they could be graves, or which indicate some other associations, e.g., summits of passes, peaks of rock barely accessible, turns of a valley where one first comes in sight of a tall precipitous cliff or of a remarkable three-pointed mountain) it is, I think, more probable that they all owe their existence to some common origin (e.g., a primitive local demon worship) than that in the Musulmān region alone they should be due to some cause which could not have operated in the other regions. Stray traces of a local demon worship underlie the existing religions all along the Himalaya and far as into Burma, where "nat" worship is interwoven with the orthodox Buddhism.

Now if the above hypothesis be true, we have an explanation of these curiously un-Musulmān features, viz., the fluttering tails and rags and heaps of horns. They merely carry on the local pre-Musulmān mode of showing reverence for traditionally hallowed spots, which has been extended to more modern holy rites such as graves; and, on the other hand, the designation of graves has been carried back to explain the reverence exhibited for the older sites, which Islām refuses to honour as the abode of local demons or deities.

Thus the Shrine of Ḥaẓrat Āfāq would be but a magnified and glorified adaptation of the rough cairns and pillars so often found in Tibet and in the Indian mountains; a survival of the customs of a primitive local demon-worship, in fact.

We were led round outside this shrine, in a circuit, keeping it on our left side (i. e., moving against the course of the sun) which seems to be the usual way of showing respect to it. Afterwards we were conducted over a newly erected mosque with wings, enclosing a square flagged court-yard, sufficiently large to contain several hundred worshippers. The Ḥāji pointed out, with pride, that the building could boast of nineteen low domes, and was all built of burnt bricks. It had been constructed within the last four months, for the festival, or 'Id, which closes the Ramazān or month of fasting, and hence was called an 'Id-gāh, or "place for celebrating the 'Id."

We were then conducted into a raised and carpeted platform under some trees on the bank of a large tank or reservoir. Here an open marquee had been erected

² In the Buddhist countries—Western Tibet, China, etc.—these cairns on the tops of hills and cliffs are usually put up in connexion with the supposed functions of good and bad spirits, or benign and evil principles. In some places the hills, or other natural features, are believed to favour the passage and operations of beneficent spirits or influences, in others to obstruct them or to attract evil ones. The cairns are placed so as to divert the malicious currents and to facilitate those regarded as propitious. In short, they are devices of the spiritualism prevailing among the inhabitants of the regions in question—their ancient superstition that existed long before Buddhism was introduced, and which underlies the Buddhism of the Lamas to this day. The spiritualistic "teachers," or mediums (who are usually Lamas in Tibetan countries) ascertain the proper positions for the marks, or cairns, by mystic methods known only to themselves, and are employed to erect them by the people of the villages for grazing grounds, who regard them as a measure of protection. The Mongolian *obo*, alluded to in Mr. Shaw's footnote, is not quite the same thing.—N. E.

for us, and we were treated to a repast, beginning as usual with fruit and bread, and ending with 'pilāo' and soup. Our host was not able to join us in the meal, as it was fast time; but he presented himself again afterwards, and seated himself with humility on the furthest edge of the carpet, nearer than which nothing could induce him to approach. I discovered that he also was related to the saintly family, to some member of which, the charge of the Shrine and of the College and of the landed estates attached to the Shrine, is always confided. He complained that the place had been sacked repeatedly by the Chinese and Kirghiz within the last decade, and even its library of old books destroyed.

Opposite to where we were sitting was an old mosque with carved wooden ceiling and pillars, and open, as usual, in front and at one side. When the hour of afternoon prayer arrived, the Hāji, our host, ran off to stop the mu'azzin who was going to call to prayers. When asked why he did this, he answered: "Because I fear the English gentlemen may be offended by the sound." On being assured of the contrary, he permitted the prayers to begin, but he could not be induced to go and join in them himself until I assured him that I should be pleased if he did. He then went up the steps of the mosque with my own Musulmān attendants, but between every prostration he would look round to see whether we were showing no signs of displeasure, and would make signals to his pages to keep pouring us out more tea.

On rising to go away I gave him a little gold compass, or "Qibla-numā," with which he was much pleased, saying that it would enable him to be more exact in fixing the direction of Mecca for the new mosques which he was about to build. He accompanied us to the outer gate where he parted from us with many salutations.

This reception by the Chief or Guardian of the most celebrated Shrine in Eastern Turkistān, which one might suppose to be a refuge for the conservative and religious sentiment of the country, rather belies the usual idea of Musulmān fanaticism and intolerance in Central Asia, and is of a piece with all my experience of Eastern Turkistān.

APPENDIX C.

COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS IN EASTERN TURKISTĀN.

Colleges and schools are very numerous in Eastern Turkistān, though they are devoted to religious education, and only teach reading and writing as incidental to that purpose.

Every founder of a college must provide a building and an endowment in land, after which he executes a title-deed which is countersigned by the authorities, and makes it over to the Principal or *Ākhund* nominated by himself.

The following is the usual establishment: 1st, the *Ākhund* or Principal; 2nd *Mudarris* or Master; 3rd, a *Mutawallī*, i.e., Steward or Manager, 4th, a number of *Jārūh-Kash*, literally "sweepers" who are hereditary servants or slaves attached to the foundation and who perform the menial service of it.

The *Mutawallī* collects the revenues of the endowment lands annually, and hands them to the *Ākhund*, who divides them into ten shares, which are distributed somewhat in the following manner, viz., to the *Ākhund* and *Mudarris* four shares; to the *Mutawallī* one share; for repairs, etc., one share; to the sustenance of the *Jārūh-Kash*, and sometimes of the students, four shares. Total ten shares.

In the city of Yārqand there are over sixty-two collegiate buildings, of which twenty-nine are kept up in good order, while the others are abandoned. I have a list of the twenty-nine with particulars of each. The earliest of them was founded in A. H. 903 (A. D. 1497). The *Ak-madrassa*, mentioned in the text, is put down in my list as situated in the *Altun Mazār*, and as having been founded in 1172 (A. D. 1661-2) by *Khān Khōja*; also as being endowed with fifty *Patmans* of land in the townships of *Poskgām*, *Karghalik* and *Yārqand*. It is stated that no public education is carried on in it now, but that its *Qāzī* (*Ākhund*) takes private pupils. Neither the date nor the name of the founder agree with the text, so it is probable that *Khānōsh Khōja's* bequest must have been used merely to enlarge an existing college and to increase its endowment (which is perhaps indicated in the text by the expression "widened the endowment lands").

The total endowment of these twenty-nine colleges amounts, according to my list, to 3,670 *Patmans* of land (each *Patman* being as much as it takes about 1,000 lbs. of grain to sow), and 198 houses or shops, whose rents form part of the revenues. Judging by some whose income is known, the total revenues of the Yārqand colleges must be about 400 *yambus*¹ of silver, or about £6,800 per annum. These particulars are gathered from the college title-deeds. There only appear to be a little over four hundred students educated at these colleges, a good number of them carrying on no education, but merely affording snug retreats for the learned, such as they are.

¹ The Chinese *Yuan Pao* or shoe of sycee silver.—N. E.

As for primary education there are *maktab khānas* or schools in every ward or sub-division of the cities and attached to most of the mosques. Here the children, both male and female, may be heard repeating their lessons in the usual sing-song style, while they rock their bodies to and fro. In the bitter winter weather they have a curious way of providing for the warmth of these little bodies. Along one or more sides of the school-room runs a long sort of earthen trough, or manger, with a broad lip. This trough is filled with straw and the children squat in this, putting their books before them on the rim. They learn to read and to repeat their religious exercises. The girls do not often go further than this. Some of the boys learn to write and read as far as four books in Persian or Turkī, and those that have a liking for knowledge continue their education at the colleges. Some of the elder girls learn the Qur'ān at home.

APPENDIX D.

TRIBE NOMENCLATURE OF THE QALMAQS.

The following note on the modern tribe nomenclature of the Qalmāqs, as given by themselves, may be interesting as throwing some light on this difficult question.

There are two grand divisions called by the Turks, respectively, the *Sarygh* (or yellow) Qalmāqs, and the *Kara* (or black) Qalmāqs. The latter seem to be the Eastern Mongols of European writers; the former the Western Mongols or Qalmāqs.

The following tribes of *Sarygh* Qalmāqs are in and about the Ila region, north of the Tien Shan mountains, but they state that they originally came from *Bē-tu-dāze*¹ (or Mongolia) :—

1. *Chungur* (which seems to be the tribe known to western nations as *Sunghar* or *Zunghar*).
2. *Turghut* who live in the south of Ila and have only recently (*circ.* 1870-72) been driven out of the Yulduz pastures by the incursions of the Tunganis or Dungsans. The Turghut tribe is said to include (i) the *Khosot*, (ii) the *Barluq*, who inhabit Tarbagatai, (iii) the *Khoiti*, who migrated to Russia and back again in the last century.
3. *Turbet* (? *Derbet*).
4. *Chalus* (? *Choros*).

Then there are two other tribes of more Eastern origin :—

1. *Solan* which includes the sub-tribes *Dāghur* and *Un-gar* (? right and left hand). They are said to have immigrated from *Saghlan-Ula*.
2. The *Shiba* or *Shibar* who also are said to have come from the East (from the mountains of *Liu-dung* or *Liuchung*,² they say) more recently than the rest and who now occupy the north of Ila.

The *Solan* and the *Shibar* are said to have been located here by the Chinese in the 15th year of the Emperor Ja-Ching,³ for the purpose of overawing the other Qalmāqs. They are reported to have enjoyed certain privileges. They call themselves Manchus and the Turks call them *Manchu Qalmāqs*.

The tribes about the Koko-Nor and Sining are also called Qalmāqs by their Turki neighbours. All the abovenamed Qalmāqs are Buddhists and revere the Dalai Lama of Lhassa.

¹ This is, I believe, a Chinese compound, *viz.*, *Bē*=north, *tu*=land, *dāze*, (or *tha-tse*) is the name commonly applied to the Mongols. (See Howorth, I, pages 701-2, where *tha-tse* is put forth as a probable origin of *Tartar*.)—R. B. S.

² Liuo-tung.—N. E.

³ Kia King or Chia Ching—The fifteenth year of whose reign would be 1810.—N. E.

The tribes denominated *Kara* (black) *Qalmāqs* by the Turks live further East. They include the *Kalkas*. They are said to call themselves *Ald* or *Angul*.

This account was given to me by a *Shibar* *Qalmāq*. Another account makes the fourfold division of the *Sarygh* *Qalmāqs* as follows :—

1. Chalus.
2. Durbet.
3. Khoshot.
4. Turghut.

THE MUSLIM MINORITY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA

RAPHAEL ISRAELI

I want you to know that we possess complete domination over your bodies, but not over your hearts. Behave properly outwardly, and that will spare you and us the trouble of your inner concerns. Show us good deeds, and if you indulge in evil Allah is helpful.

(‘Utbah Ibn Sufyān)¹

Chinese Islam in traditional China was peculiar in that it did not fall within the framework of a majority-minority situation as we understand it in the modern sense. For we are not merely talking about the distinction between Chinese and Muslim in religio-cultural terms but, more significantly, of the confrontation in China of two enormously self-confident cultures.

The Muslim community in China, whose history can be traced back to the eighth century, prospered and multiplied so that under the last Imperial dynasty (the Ch’ing—1644–1911) it amounted to the impressive figure of at least 10–15 million.² This achievement is particularly striking in comparison with the poor showing of both Christianity and Judaism, which both entered China at about the same time as Islam.

The relationship between the Chinese majority and the Muslim minority in China must be conceived of in terms of interaction between two different groups, each with its own fears, suspicions, stereotypes and way of life. Chinese Muslims, by following their dietary laws, praying in their mosques, holding

1. ‘Utbah Ibn Sufyān was Governor of Egypt during Mu‘āwiya’s reign. Upon taking over the governorship, he gathered the Copt leaders and lectured to them in much the same terms Ziyād Ibn Abīhi was warning the Iraqis at the same time, and as al-Hajjāj was to threaten them in ‘Abd al-Malik’s period. See Abū Ḥayān al-Tawḥīdī, *al-Baṣā’ir wa-dhakhā’ir* (Insights and treasures), 2 vol., Damascus, vol. 2, pp. 210–11.
2. Estimates vary between 10 and 80 million. Since no reliable figures are available, we have chosen a conservative estimate.

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on to their own calendar and living in their closely knit communities, *eo ipso* set themselves apart from the Chinese. The Chinese, ignorant of the underlying religio-cultural necessity for this self-imposed isolation, could not help but despise and ridicule those who lived in the heart of Civilization but were unwilling to partake of its benefits. Ancestor worship, for example, the very pivot of Chinese culture and tradition, was not practised by Muslims. On what common grounds then could Muslim and Chinese meet?

Nevertheless, Islam did achieve a strong foothold in China, and Chinese Islam showed a great deal of adaptability to the Chinese environment. An ostensibly peaceful coexistence between the two cultures was worked out, which averted a head-on collision. It is the purpose of this article to show the mechanics of this coexistence which, when disturbed, could erupt into bitter confrontation as in the nineteenth century when Muslims rose up in arms in an attempt to disengage from the Chinese system of oppression.

As a general rule, in cultural contact material objects are taken over by the recipient culture before ideas. Tools and clothing, for example, are adopted earlier than non-material characteristics and forms of social organization. Thus Chinese Muslims, under the stress of the assimilatory factor, were responsive mainly to the Chinese material culture, but stopped short of spiritual and ideological acculturation. Their mosques borrowed the outside appearance of Chinese temples; their clothing, speech and manners became Chinese. But the core of Muslim doctrine and practice seems to have remained largely intact, at least as far as the mainstream of Chinese Islam was concerned. If Muslim scholars in China attempted to present Islam to the Chinese as a close relative of Confucianism, it would appear from their writings that they did so apologetically, not as a genuine expression of their own ideas and beliefs, but rather to ease the outside pressure by throwing a rhetorical bridge over the substantial gap that separated them from the Chinese.

In this setting, where cultural contact resulted in an almost unidirectional diffusion from the dominant to the recipient culture, and social interaction generated strong internal pressures among the Muslims for self-identity, a peculiar pattern of behaviour was adopted by the minority group. Outwardly, the Muslims behaved like Chinese, spoke Chinese, called each other by Chinese names and wore Chinese clothing; inwardly they were Muslims, they put on special items of clothing for prayer, greeted each other in Arabic, called each other by their Arabic names, turned to Mecca for prayer, and maintained a high degree of social cohesion. In short, their behaviour had an adaptive significance in that they attempted to be Chinese outdoors and Muslim indoors.

As long as the balance between the internal and external pressures could be maintained, coexistence between Chinese and Muslim was possible. From the Muslim viewpoint, as long as outside pressures did not directly interfere with their Muslim-ness, the situation was deemed bearable and they could live with it. From the Chinese viewpoint, so long as the Muslim community seemed to fit within the Chinese pattern, it could be tolerated and permitted to follow its own course. In other words, the Chinese were concerned not about Islamic ideologies, which anyway they did not understand, but about practical manifestations of these ideologies which might undermine the Confucian system. It is the purpose of this article to examine to what extent Chinese Islam could fit into Chinese frames of reference, and thus be deemed congruent or incongruent with the Chinese system. To this end, we shall examine Chinese Islam in the light of, and in comparison with, three forms of traditional social organizations in China:

1. *Institutional religions* — Islam will be compared to Chinese Buddhism and Taoism and some forms of communal religion;
2. *Heterodox groups* — was Islam in China comparable to Chinese secret societies and other sectarian groupings?
3. *National minority groups* — in what ways did Chinese Islam differ from minority groups in China, such as the Mongols and the aboriginal tribes?

Islam as an institutional religion

In Chinese society the role of religion has been determined by the dominance of diffused religion and the relative weakness of institutional religion.³ Diffused religion has its theology, cult and personnel so intimately diffused into secular social institutions that they become a part of the latter, thus having no significant independent existence. Institutional religion is a system of religious life, having an independent theology of cosmic interpretation of the universe and human events; an independent form of worship consisting of symbols and rituals; and an independent organization of personnel to facilitate the interpretation of theological views and to pursue cultic worship'.⁴ In short, it is a social institution separate from the secular system.

In China, institutional religion was represented by major universal religions

3. C. K. Yang, *Religion in Chinese society*, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1967, ch. 12. Part of the following discussion is based on this chapter.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-5.

such as Buddhism and Taoism, while diffused religion was all-pervasive in such forms as the family (ancestor worship), or the patron gods of guilds and communities. But there was an interdependence between the two insofar as diffused religion relied upon the institutional for the development of mythical or theological concepts, for the supply of gods, spirits and rituals, and for the services of the priesthood (e.g. priests could be used in ancestor worship). On the other hand, institutional religion was dependent for its existence upon rendering these services. The diffusion of religion into secular social institutions and community life contributed to the stability of social institutions, because of Chinese popular awe of institutionalized practices and respect for the past. Institutional religion, on the other hand, required a break with the past and participation in a new way of life (e.g. life in a monastery or temple and abandonment of the family and social ties). Thus, diffused religion was dependent upon the effective functioning of secular institutions, since its existence rested on their continued vitality. In time of social disorder, when the secular institutions collapsed, diffused religion lost the devotion of the people. By contrast, the great religions, being separate institutions of religious life, had a lasting quality. In other words, the weakness of institutional religion was its strength: being only functionally attached to the establishment, it could detach itself when the structure crumbled, while diffused religion, being inexorably intertwined with the structure of the state, faltered with it.

Islam, an institutional religion with its own theology, worship and priesthood, could, like Buddhism and Taoism, exist independently of the state and survive after the collapse of the polity. The Muslim community in China could therefore lead its life separately from the Chinese establishment. But unlike the Chinese, who in time of stability could, and usually did, practise diffused religion while using the services of institutional religion, Muslims were bound exclusively to one religion — Islam. Thus, for Chinese Muslims, Islam had to fill the role of both institutional and diffused religion. This may explain why Islam was a strong institutional religion in China as opposed to the relative weakness of Chinese institutional religion.

Islam, then, manifested both the structural independence of institutional religion and the functional stamina of diffused religion. But unlike the diffused religion in China, which rested upon existing Chinese institutions (the family, the clan, the community, and the local and central political order), Chinese Islam rested wholly and exclusively on the Muslim congregation. For the Chinese, the kinship group constituted the congregation which performed the ritual of ancestor worship. Trade guilds had their gods, and the worship of these

gods was part and parcel of the organization's operation. In agricultural communities, the patron-gods symbolized the collective existence of the community, and the local leaders officiated as priests. In the rituals of the state, such as those relating to Heaven and Earth, the performance of the cult was part of the administrative routine of the Emperor and his officials, while the entire public acted as the congregation. For Muslims, the community — the *umma* — was everything, insofar as Muslims are bound to live according to the Word of God (Qur'ān) as transmitted to mankind by the Prophet of Allah (Muhammad).

Since its inception by the Prophet, the *umma* has been dual in character. On the one hand, it was a political organization, a new social organism which Muhammad had substituted for the traditional tribe. Yet at the same time, the *umma* had a basically religious meaning. Political and religious objectives were never really distinct in Muhammad's mind or in the minds of his contemporaries.⁵ The Prophet had learned that religion related to social life. He realized that religious doctrines had to find ritual and social expressions in order to have any impact on the community. Hence he instituted the *umma* as the embodiment of a way of life. The Five Pillars of the religion, repeatedly practised day after day, validated the membership of the individual in this *umma*. From the Muslim's point of view, the *umma* was the operative group which set him apart from all non-believers and protected him against them.

The Muslim in China, therefore, did not practise ancestor worship in the family; his rituals were performed within the *umma*. He could not worship the god-patron of the guild or of the village, but had to set up his own guilds and his own villages as part of the *umma*. He did not partake in the state cult, and did not recognize the authority of those who administered it; so he had to rely totally on the priesthood of the *umma* — the *imām* and the *ahung*.

Because of its added quality as a diffused religion, Islam in China did not suffer from the weaknesses which affected Chinese institutional religions. It displayed vitality where they were weak. For example, in most of the Buddhist and Taoist religious establishments (temples and monasteries) there were no priests; religious activities, even those centered on the temples, were conducted by the people themselves without priests in a guiding role. This, of course, attests to the weakness of the priesthood in organized institutional religion.⁶ As for Muslims, although they could pray in private, no mosque could exist without an *imām*. While the Buddhist priest, where he existed at all, had a limited responsibility in the area of ritual and none beyond that, the

5. B. Lewis, *The Arabs in history*, Hutchinson's Univ. Library, London, 1950, pp. 44-5.

6. Yang, pp. 309-10.

imām acted like a Christian minister or a rabbi who possesses wide authority by virtue of the charisma attached to his learning. Thus, the *imām* could give advice, interpret the *sharī'a* for the daily needs of the congregation, or settle differences between members of the community. In short, Chinese Muslims, unable to take part in many of the Chinese community's activities, and accustomed to doing without the guidance and authority of the local Chinese leadership (gentry), had in consequence to look to the *imām*, and to him only, for many of their needs.

Financially, the clergy of Chinese institutional religions had inadequate support and controlled few, if any, sources of income except for temples and convents which had their own estate endowments.⁷ Mosques could muster the financial resources of all members of the community, and organized taxation in the form of *zakāt* (alms)⁸ or voluntary donations by well-to-do members in order to support varied activities in fields such as worship, education, publishing or welfare. A Buddhist or Taoist priest's livelihood depended on occasional small donations or remunerations for religious services for individuals. The *imām* was employed by the congregation and owed his position and his economic security to the effectiveness with which he discharged his functions. This institutionalized relationship between the *imām* and the community made for stronger commitment on the part of both, and for a higher standard of performance by the *imām* because others could usually be hired in his stead⁹ (although in some cases the position was hereditary).¹⁰

A remarkable feature of Chinese institutional religion was the absence of a broad organized laity, except for some societies of devotees who were attached either to Buddhism or to Taoism. The secular population at large lacked a formally organized relationship with the priests and the temples. There was no membership requirement for worshipping in a temple, and the worshippers had no binding tie with the house of prayer or the officiating priest, when there was one. This was, in part, generated by the Chinese tradition of worship in temples of different faiths on different occasions. This made for the organizational fragmentation of the religious community, for there was no organic

7. Ibid., pp. 315-6.

8. One-fortieth of every Muslim's income was supposed to be donated to the community treasury (See M. Broomhall, *Islam in China: a neglected problem*, Morgan and Scott, London, 1910, p. 250).

9. D'Ollone, *Mission d'Ollone (1906-9): recherches sur les musulmans chinois*, Leroux, Paris, 1911, p. 439.

10. Lo Ch'en-p'en, 'K'ai-feng Hui-chiao' (Islam in K'ai-feng), *Yu-kung* (Chinese Historical and Geographical Magazine), vol. 7, 1937, p. 159.

group collectively and continuously committed to a specific temple or priest. In the Chinese setting, this lack of permanent organization may also have been caused by the prevailing political outlook, which interpreted a following of organized laity as a group potentially dangerous to the political order.

In Chinese Islam, organized laity was the congregation, and every Muslim was, by definition, its member. In places where more than one mosque was available, Muslims could choose to go to either, but in general they were permanently attached to one or the other.

In Chinese religions the priests had low social status. Ordination to priesthood was an improvement of status for the poor, to be sure, but for the middle and upper class it was a degradation. If a learned priest ranked with the scholars as a member of the elite, it was because of his Confucian learning, not his priestly status.¹¹ An *imām*, by contrast, enjoyed the highest prestige in the Muslim community. Even Muslims who attained scholarly ranks in the Chinese system and high positions in the imperial government, were likely to preserve respect and awe towards the Muslim spiritual leader.¹²

Buddhism and Taoism of the post-Sung era showed a lack of participation in education and charitable work in the community. This was partly due to the fact that education and charity were regular functions of the local magistrates in co-operation with local notables. Education was conducted within Confucian patterns and tradition, and since most priests were ignorant of the Confucian classics, they were thus disqualified as teachers. Education in Confucian tradition was indoctrination on the part of the political order, and since institutional religions were detached from this order, they had no business in it even if they were qualified to teach it. Charity was organized by local officials who induced wealthy merchants and gentry to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of institutions for the destitute and disabled. In times of famine, relief was extended to the poor on the same basis. Organized religion was in no position, financially or otherwise, to take up that role, thus further weakening its position in society.

Muslim communities, even those located in the smallest villages, had an education system designed to train children in the Holy Scriptures.¹³ The interior of Chinese mosques was divided into a prayer hall, a lecture hall, a dormitory, conference rooms, the offices of the community leaders, and the

11. Yang, p. 327.

12. Even today, one cannot help notice the honour paid to his *imām* by the lay leader of the Muslim community in Taiwan.

13. A. F. Easton, 'Visits to Kansu', *China's Millions*, no. 58, 1880, p. 45.

'dead man's room' for washing the deceased.¹⁴ This meant that they had facilities to accommodate members of the community in all stages of their life (and death): prayers, religious festivals, education, weddings, and funerals. There were few or no beggars among Muslims, and very rarely did a Muslim girl become a prostitute. If 'a Muslim female should fall into bad company, the local community would buy her freedom right away and remarry her'.¹⁵

It is paradoxical that those factors whose absence made for the weakness of Chinese institutional religions and whose presence made for the strength of Chinese Islam, brought about the same result: structural decentralization. In Buddhism and Taoism, the inherent weakness of the organizations as manifested in the shortage of clergy, the scarcity of funds, the absence of a broad laity, and non-participation in educational and charitable systems provide adequate explanation. In Chinese Islam, on the other hand, we see elements of strength and communal cohesion that should have led to centralization.

In reality, Chinese Islam was totally fragmented. Local congregations were completely independent of one another and recognized no outside authority either in the country, the province or the Empire. The Sharif of Mecca was sometimes considered a most venerated priest of the religion, but no definite authority was attached to his special status.¹⁶ Occasionally renowned scholars such as Ma Te-hsin in Yunnan won recognition beyond their locality, but the deep respect stemming from scholarly authority did not necessarily imply practical power of any sort.

We can turn the question around and ask why so decentralized and institutional religion as Islam was so strong, while an equally decentralized Buddhism was so weak. As we have seen, the explanation lies in, firstly, the vitality of Islam as a diffused religion; and, secondly, that like Buddhism and other institutional religions, it had the authoritarianism of a communal religion, although, it was also voluntary in form.¹⁷

In Chinese communal religion the worship of Heaven and sacrifices to the ancestors and deities were conducted by officials and civic leaders for the well-being of all the community. Every member of the community was considered a believer by virtue of membership of his clan or village. Regardless of his views, he benefited from the religious rites, and was forced by group pressure

14. Dawood Ting, 'Islamic Culture in China', in K. Morgan (ed.), *Islam the straight path*, New York, 1958, p. 361.

15. *Ibid.*

16. See *Mission d'Ollone*, p. 439.

17. Part of this passage is based on Yang, pp. 110-12.

to take part in ancestor worship. There was no choice in religious beliefs, but neither did it occur to the common man to make any other choice. Religious values were embedded in the traditional moral order, and religion was an integral part of communal existence, inseparable from the individual's existence. The rise of institutional religions in China, Buddhism and Taoism, brought an element of voluntarism. Membership in the religion was no longer inherited but acquired by conversion, the voluntary choice of the individual.

In Islam, the element of *īmān* (faith) is essential. Islam is a revealed religion in which both the message of Allah and the Prophet who carried it to mankind are an integral part of the Faith. The creed links these two fundamental verities: 'I testify that there is no god but Allah and Muḥammad is the Prophet of Allah'. This is the statement of faith that is required of converts to Islam and of Muslims, who thereby validate daily their membership of the community. This statement is 'voluntary', as is the behaviour of Muslims reflected in the daily implementation of the Five Pillars of Islam. Both emanate from the quest for the right life that is the supreme motive of Islamic conduct; and, since the right life is prescribed in the *sunna*, then the authoritarianism of the religion overrides its voluntarism. Doctrines and duties can be accepted as binding only when they are imposed by, or derived from, a source beyond human questioning.¹⁸ Directly or indirectly, any regulation should go back to Allah, either in what He transmitted in the Qur'ān, His Word, through the Prophet, or in what He caused Muḥammad to do or say as His Messenger.

A Muslim in China was born into his community, was given a Muslim name, taught Arabic¹⁹, brought up as a Muslim and educated to hold the *īmān* in respect. Almost regardless of his individual will, he benefited from the protection of the congregation and submitted to communal pressure, psychological if not tangible, to participate in its activities. A Muslim also had practically no choice in religious beliefs, because religious values were embedded in the moral order and were an inseparable and integral part of the community's existence.

Just as a Chinese believed in the supremacy of Heaven and its associated deities, and their ability to bring about a united and peaceful Empire, so the Muslims were permeated by a sense of the primacy of Allah, the One, the All-Powerful. However, while for the Chinese there was a direct relation between the deeds and moral conduct of the Emperor and his subjects on earth and the

18. For this discussion, see G. von Grunebaum, 'Islam in a humanistic education', in J. Stewart-Robinson (ed). *The traditional Near East*, Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 36-68.

19. According to Rashīd Riḍā, basing himself on Shāfi'i, it is the duty of every Muslim to know Arabic. See *al-Manār*, vol. 17, 1914, pp. 589-92.

rewards and punishments of Heaven, Allah for the Muslim is not bound by any moral law, and is in no way obliged to give man the right guidance or to reward and punish him in accordance with his obedience or disobedience. For 'Allah leads astray whomever He wills and sets on the right path whomever He wills'.²⁰

The Chinese conceived the political order as part of the cosmic order, and the worthy Emperor could maintain the harmony between them by his rightful conduct and due sacrifices. The Muslim denies laws of nature and any eternal cosmic order, because Allah's majesty is unrestrained and not bound to abide by any existing order. The apparent regularity of cosmic events is due to no irrevocable law of nature, but to Allah's habitual procedure. It is precisely Allah's unpredictability that makes Him so awesome in the eyes of believers, and makes Islam so authoritarian.

Islam, like Chinese communal religion, is traditionalist, which makes for stability and continuity. Institutional religions in China were 'revolutionary' in that they introduced the notion of extra-establishment worship, which was potentially detrimental to the ethico-political order. Diffused religion, on the other hand, had the effect of stabilizing and strengthening social institutions by its feeling of awe towards established ways. It became a source of support for the values and traditions of the established institutions. Idealization of the past was a characteristic of diffused religion, while institutional religion often required a break with the past, and participation in a radically new way of life.²¹

Thus, Muslim values and patterns of behaviour could have been regarded by the Chinese as characteristic traits of Chinese institutional or communal religions. However, traditional China contained other social groupings which will be examined now.

Islam as a sectarian group

In China, the frequent association of heterodox religious movements with potential rebellions caused general suspicion, if not open hostility, towards these groupings: they were regarded as politically dangerous. Even if a sectarian group had no political aspirations, the government still persecuted it

20. Qur'ān, 6:39.

21. The Buddhist tonsure and the Taoist hairdo, the priestly robe, the vegetarian diet, the assumption of life on a temple or a monastery, the foreswearing of the family—all these severed ties with the past and the established ways of society. See Yang, pp. 298-9.

because of the age-old fear that a politically ambitious and talented leadership, particularly in times of unrest, could easily foment rebellion. Thus the government considered the socio-political order to be constantly threatened by heterodox movements with dissenting social and political orientations, and banned their operation. Only those institutional religions, such as Buddhism, that had won recognition were permitted to function, and then only under government control. The heterodox movements were confined to secrecy and organized to offer resistance to suppression, if necessary, in order to protect their own forms of religious life. Secrecy and readiness to resist government were particularly necessary, as C. K. Yang has remarked²², for the doctrines of religious sects which aimed at universal salvation and usually claimed their deities possessed superior powers over the world order. This dogma was obviously offensive to the authoritarian temporal power, which would tolerate none claiming superiority over the accepted orthodoxy.

Islam steered a middle course between an institutional, recognized religion and a sectarian movement. Like other sects, it was certainly heterodox, for it claimed the superiority of Allah over the world order, was ready to resist the government in order to protect its way of life, and pursued universal salvation. The inextricability we have observed in Islam of the socio-political life from religious theory made Chinese Muslims anticipate, or at least hope for the *Ta-shih* (The 'Great Enterprise'), when they would establish on earth what they had been longing for: a new relationship between governor and governed based on the *sharī'a*, a place for 'ulamā' and *quḍāt* in the system, all aimed at the preservation of the heritage of the *umma*.

Islam in China shared some of the characteristics of sectarian ideology, and also some of their functions. For example, a Muslim, like a member of a sect, could circulate throughout China and everywhere find lodging, help and protection among his co-religionists. Some Muslims used 'secret' dialects and words to communicate among themselves, in writing by using Arabic letters to spell Chinese words²³, or by using many Persian words when they spoke in front of undesired Chinese witnesses.²⁴

Like secret societies, Muslims in China represented a sub-system, a counter-state in the society, Islamic religion playing the role of ethnocentrism in secret

22. Yang, pp. 222-3.

23. Ting, pp. 357-8.

24. Badr al-Dīn al-Sīnī, *al-'Alāqāt bayn al-'Arab wa'l-Sīn* (Relations between the Arabs and China), Cairo, 1950, p. 303.

society ideology.²⁵ A new member of the secret society was ritually reborn by joining the brotherhood. Chinese Muslims considered Japhet the father of the Chinese and Shem as their own,²⁶ although ethnically both belong to the Han race. They explained that by changing their religion (i.e. converted to Islam) they also changed their father.²⁷ This emphasis on substituting spiritual for biological descent and family relationship was certainly a characteristic of Chinese brotherhoods. It might also have served the purpose of lending historical depth to the Hui ('Muslim people' — in Chinese parlance), thus glorifying themselves in the eyes of their hosts, who were conscious of their past and proud of their gallery of illustrious mythological figures. Legendary stories about the origins of secret societies also abounded, and the History of the Sect was one of the beliefs shared by members of each sect.²⁸

A traveller in Yunnan at the turn of the century presented this picture of the Muslim community:

Muslims may be organized like secret societies, as is the general custom here. The majority of *ma-fu* (cart-drivers) belong to this religion. In their travels to-and-fro in the land, they act as ready-made agents of liaison, without raising suspicion because of their occupational cover.²⁹

This vision of an all-pervading Muslim *confrerie* may be exaggerated, but it certainly reflects the intensification of clandestine Muslim activity at a time when secret societies were active in China. This is yet another common factor of Chinese Islam and secret societies. Both intensified their seditious operations in times of dynastic crisis. For when the administration became corrupt and inefficient; when irrigation canals fell into decay; when droughts and floods, famine and despair plagued the countryside — the time was ripe for the antistate to step into the vacuum and take over the management of the people's affairs.

Unlike the Chinese sectarian organizations such as Maytreyan Buddhism, however, which were essentially chiliastic, striving for antinomian order, Sunni Islam (embracing the majority of Chinese Muslims) is not a messianic religion. The Prophet of God has already come to earth, and since he was the Seal of

25. F. Wakeman, *Strangers at the gate*, University of California Press, 1967, p. 120.

26. Japhet is not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but commentaries and popular legend within Islam deal with the three sons of Noah: Shem, Ham and Japhet. See *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, pp. 637-8.

27. *Mission d'Ollone*, p. 210.

28. See the case of the Triads in South China, in Wakeman, pp. 118-9.

29. *Mission D'Ollone*, p. 5.

the Prophets, no other can be expected. The Word of Allah has already descended to mankind; its finality and all-embracing quality allows no other to appear and be visible. True, wicked rulers may depart from the *sharī'a* and ill-informed peoples may distort the contents of the Holy Qur'ān with their own claims to possession of holy scriptures. But Islam should not bend to these anomalies, and the devout Muslim should live up to his faith and the teachings of the *sharī'a* as worked out in the Qur'ān, the *sunna* (Tradition) and the *ijmā'* (consensus of the community).

However, Islam too has known chiliastic experience, especially in times of instability, centered on the symbol of the *mahdī*. At the end of the Umayyad period (661–750 C.E.), the coming of a divinely guided leader who would overthrow tyranny and fill the world with justice, was no vague dream, but a firm and specific promise due for immediate fulfilment. Bernard Lewis has shown that the titles of the first four 'Abbāsīd Caliphs (al-Saffāh, al-Manṣūr, al-Mahdī and al-Hādī) all have messianic connotations.³⁰ Their appeal was to deep-rooted anxieties and passions, and to the popular beliefs and prophecies about the imminent coming of the rightful leader who would end tyranny and inaugurate a new era of justice and plenty. Four times, with the accession of the first four 'Abbāsīd Caliphs, the millennium was deferred to the next reign, until the new dynasty was firmly in control.

Even before the 'Abbāsīds, messianic claims had begun in Umayyad times with Mukhtār,³¹ followed by a long line of messianic aspirants, and culminating in the Middle Ages with the establishment of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. The tragic death of Ḥusayn had provided his supporters with a martyr and, inconsistently with orthodox Islam, a mediator between man and Allah. 'Alī and his descendants became divinely guided and infallible *imāms*, charged by God with expounding the True Faith. Mukhtār hailed Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥanafīyya as the *mahdī* who would usher in the millennium and, after his death, he was widely believed to have been hidden by Allah and to be preparing to return in the last days.

This was the origin of the Hidden Imām in the Shī'a. The peculiar position of the *imām* in Shī'ite Islam has far-reaching implications. Since Allah spoke through the *imām*, the latter tended to replace the Qur'ān, the *sunna* and the *ijmā'* as the source of truth and be elevated to a virtually divine status. It is

30. B. Lewis, *Regnal titles of the first 'Abbāsīd Caliphs*, Berkeley, University of California Library, n.d. (mimeographed), pp. 13–19.

31. This discussion is based on J. Saunders, *A History of medieval Islam*, London, 1965, pp. 126–7.

on these grounds that the *imām* concept in the Shī'a and the Maytreya Buddhism of the Chinese sectarian movements can be compared. Just as Chinese sectarianism flourished in times of distress, so it may be contended that Chinese Muslim sectarianism (New Sect)³² was generated by the same social disorder. In both cases there was an underlying sense of imminent change, of something happening that is going to revolutionize the world. In both cases new prophets appeared who claimed superpowers and possessed the necessary charisma to solve the discrepancies of the time. In both, the bad was the sign that good was just around the corner. Evil, such as wars, massacres, siege and famine, was the inevitable transitional stage. In both, the faith, of which the charismatic leader was an essential part, was emphasized as the key to survival through the period of trouble.

Thus, Chinese Islam's similarities to the Chinese underworld possessed the characteristics of both secret societies and sectarian movements. In time of peace, the Muslims (like the Triads) thrived within the established system and participated in its maintenance and growth, primarily by handling sizable portions of Chinese trade. Being on the margins of Chinese society, both needed an alternative social organization to give them a sense of belonging, whether in their locality or their frequent travels. In this situation, the organization was emphasized, with all its reinforcing rituals, welfare programmes, clandestine relationships and extraordinary sense of cohesion. But in the time of trouble Chinese Islam produced sectarianism which, not unlike the White Lotus, became a movement, chiliastic and religious in essence, which threatened to turn the latent antistate into an overt, new political reality.

Such a movement destroyed local organization and became a province-level or multi-province affair, with the masses relinquishing local loyalties and rallying round the charismatic leader. This, of course, contrasts with the relative strength of local organization in time of peace, when both Islam and secret societies were strong on the community or lodge level, but loosely confederated nationally.

Although, as we have observed, some of Islam's activities smacked of secret societies' operational self-effacement, we must remember that while sectarian movements were totally clandestine, Islam usually operated overtly, however low its profile. More important, there were some crucial differences between Chinese Islam and sectarian movements in China. In the latter, the blood brotherhood was an analogy to the Chinese family system. As any Chinese

32. The New Sect was an apparently Shī'ite-prone splinter of Chinese Islam, which initiated and led the widespread Muslim rebellions in north-western and south-western China in the mid-19th century.

could hardly survive as an individual, let alone attain the higher echelons of society without his socio-economic interdependence with his kin, so the *confreries*, despite their anti-establishment character, were 'so impregnated with the idea of familism, that the very organization of revolt sedulously copied kinship and guaranteed these artificial ties with elaborate rites of passage.'³³ For Muslims the metaphor of brotherhood was not familistic but historical. It was the common father, whose name and heritage were deeply rooted in the Muslim tradition, who created the brotherly link between Muslims.

Sectarian movements could lump together all sorts of marginal, discontented or *declassé* elements in Chinese society: peasants, criminals, merchants, army deserters and even gentry. The greater the decay in state administration, the more the ranks of the secret societies were likely to swell. The constituency of these organizations was fluid and uncertain in times of stability, and likely to dissolve when order was restored. Islam, on the other hand, including Islamic sectarianism, regularly recruited its membership exclusively within the Muslim community. In time of peace, the whole community operated as a quasi-secret society; in time of trouble, some members of the same communities, or entire congregations, foreswore their parochial independence and united behind a charismatic leader who led a revolutionary movement.

While dissenting groups in China were not tolerated, and those who pursued a heterodox ideology — be they Taipings, Triads or Communists — were persecuted and loosely termed *fei* (bandits), Chinese Muslims did not automatically come under this definition. A clear distinction was drawn between *liang-hui* (good Muslims) and *Hui-fei* (Muslim bandits). *Fei* were people who were beyond the pale of society because they did not abide by conventional social norms. Since they were not part of the society and threatened to disrupt peace and order, they should be eliminated.

Thus, as long as Muslims were *liang-hui*, they were recognized as a people (*min*) and permitted to operate as such. Consequently, while almost all Chinese dynasties cracked down on sectarian movements and secret societies, no particular official governmental persecution against the Muslims, as distinguished from local-individual prejudice and discrimination, was recorded until the advent of the Ch'ing. The intensification of anti-sectarian assaults under the Ch'ing, whose motives are the subject of a separate study, also left its mark on Chinese Islam. In addition to putting the Muslim rebels with other *fei*, the Chinese attached the dog radical to the character *Hui* in documents,

33. Wakeman, p. 120.

thereby designating not only the Muslim bandits but the Hui in general.³⁴ The 18th century Chinese Muslim scholar Ching Pei-kao pointed out the impropriety of this sacrilege, claiming that the combination of the dog radical with the character *hui* has no foundation, and thus no justification, in authoritative Chinese literature.³⁵

Chinese sectarian movements were either restorationist or revolutionary, in both cases committed to toppling the existing government, but equally determined to preserve their own Chinese-ness. Restorationists, such as the Triads in the 19th century, were anti-Manchu because they wanted to rid themselves of Ch'ing oppression and restore the monarchical paradigm of the Ming. Therefore, they mounted an intricate propaganda campaign against the Manchus, which went on continuously and lent visibility to the movement in the periods between their sporadic rebellions.³⁶ Similarly, the Ch'ensheng and Wu-kuang rebellion during the Ch'in (209 B.C.) aimed at overthrowing the 'unprincipled government and ruthless laws of the Ch'in'. The rebels strove to gain power without altering the social structures or the institutional system of the time.³⁷ The Yellow Turbans, similarly, remained essentially Chinese in their Taoist ideology.

Revolutionaries, such as the Taipings and the Communists, also aimed at toppling the system, but they also clung to essential Chinese values. Granted their claims against the existing order were not that the regime had lost the Mandate of Heaven, as restorationist secret societies would have it, and that Taiping and Communist ideologies drew on sources alien to Confucianism and designed to supersede it. But it is equally true that the Taipings retained traditional forms and vocabulary, and used Confucian rhetoric to refute Confucianism.³⁸ The Communists, likewise, in Levenson's words,

'permit iconoclasm, while sheltering an impulse to restore a tie with the past. But it is a source of strength for Chinese Communism that this im-

34. Numerous examples of this can be seen in the collection of Chinese documents *Hui-min Ch'i-i* (The rightful uprising of the Muslim People), dealing with the Muslim rebellions of the 19th century in north-western and south-western China. One of these rebellions, led by Tu Wen-hsiu in Yunnan, even succeeded in establishing a rebel Muslim state (1855-73).
35. Cited by A. Vissière, *Etudes Sino-Mahometanes*, Paris, 1910, p. 120.
36. Boris Novikov, 'La propagande anti-mandchoue de la Triade en Chine pendant la 1ère moitié du XIX siècle', in J. Chesnaux et al. (eds.), *Mouvements populaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine aux XIXe et XX siècles*, Maspéro, Paris, 1970, pp. 133-50.
37. V. Shih, *The Taiping ideology*, Univ. of Washington Press, Seattle, 1970 pp. 329-85.
38. J. Levenson, *Confucian China and its modern fate, a trilogy*, University of California Press, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 102-15.

pulse is not an embarrassment to it, something either to be smothered or uneasily tolerated, with a nagging sense of inconsistency. As Chou En-lai has indicated, Communist theory does not merely suffer the restoration of such a tie, it demands it'.³⁹

In the context of Confucian China, Chinese Muslims had neither restorationist nor revolutionary aspirations. Their frame of reference was Islamic and not Confucian, so they had no interest in toppling one Confucian government and substituting another. Being more Muslim than Chinese, the changes they envisaged might be thought revolutionary, but being Muslims among the Chinese, they could have entertained no expectation of changing the entire system. They were outside the Chinese order, and therefore they could not rebel against it. As long as the level of oppression was bearable, as it seems to have been prior to the Ch'ing, they coexisted with the system but were not part of it. When the pressure became overwhelming, their only remedy was to part ways with the system, to secede from it.

We have observed the remarkable phenomenon that Islam, despite its affinities with heterodox groupings, was not conceived as such by the Chinese authorities and therefore was not systematically persecuted prior to the Ch'ing. Even during the Ch'ing the distinction between 'good' and 'bandit' Muslims was drawn, implying that a Muslim who behaved passively and accepted the Chinese order had no reason to feel unsafe. We have also noticed that Islam operated as an institutional religion in China, although it was not officially recognized as such. Particular favours had been accorded to Muslim communities in the past,⁴⁰ but they had amounted to taking cognizance of the existence of the Hui people in China, with their peculiar religion. This was not an express acknowledgement of the foothold that a foreign religion had secured in the Middle Kingdom.

The Muslims as a 'national' minority group

We have thus far approached the Islamic question in China in relation to, and in comparison with, institutional religions and heterodox groups, and we

39. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 138.

40. Wang T'ai-yu, a Muslim writer of the 17th century, mentions the favours accorded to his ancestors, who came from Arabia to the Ming court. See Vissière, p. 107. See also V. P. Vasilev, *Islam in China*, translated and edited by R. Lowenthal, published in *Central Asia Collectanea*, no. 3, Washington D. C., 1960, pp. 29-30, in which favours accorded by T'ang monarchs to Muslims are recounted.

have observed that Islam was neither. Rather it stood midway between the two, having some affinities with each but also clearly distinguished from them. Let us now analyze Islam in terms of a 'national' minority group, of a people (*min-tsu*), like the many nationalities and minorities that had always been part of the Middle Kingdom.

Like the Soviet Union, China was, and still remains, a multi-national state with the Han majority prevailing and some fifty minority groups⁴¹ existing mainly on the fringes of the Empire. In Yunnan alone there are, according to a recent survey⁴², more than seventeen different nationalities and minority groups.⁴³ But unlike the Soviet constitution, which regards the state as a federation of supposedly independent republics, today the Communist China Constitution⁴⁴ conceives of the state as traditional China has always done — as unitary. Under the Communist regime, democratic centralism has replaced bureaucratic and monarchic centralism, but the concept of a state within a state was and remains incompatible with Chinese political thought. From the Chinese point of view, therefore, the distinction between the Han majority and the minority 'nationalities' was grounded on an ethno-cultural, ethno-linguistic or religio-cultural basis, not a 'national' one in the modern sense. This was, of course, generated by the culturalist concept which regarded China as a culture rather than a nation. Anybody who lived a way of life different from the Han Chinese seems to have been regarded an alien, regardless of any language or anthropological features which may have been Han, as in the case of the Han Muslims.

In traditional China all minorities, whether ethnic, religious or linguistic, had to submit, as far as possible, to Chinese cultural values, and acculturation of minorities was regarded as one of the duties of the ruler of the Empire.⁴⁵ It was this basic unwillingness to let people of different habits live as they pleased within the boundaries of China proper that led to the paradoxical situation in which, under the Republic, the four major minorities (including

41. Ho Ping-ti, 'Salient aspects in China's heritage', in Ho and Tsou (eds.), *China in crisis*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968, vol. 1, p. 5. Stanley Gosh gives the figure of 36 minorities: *Embers of Cathay*, Doubleday, New York, 1961, p. 18.

42. *Chung-kuo te min-tsu* (China's nationalities), pictorial album, Hong-Kong, 1970; see the table of distribution on p. 1.

43. The groups in order of size are: Hui, Yi, Miao, Chuang, Tai, Pai, Li-su, Na-si, Wa, Laku, Ching-po, Nu, Tu-lung, Ha-ni, Pu-mi, Ku-tsung, Sa-ni. Although the survey is recent, it is probable that the same minorities have been there since the distant past.

44. See Article 2 of the Constitution of the People's Republic.

45. Herbert Franke, 'Comments on Ho Ping-ti's paper', in Ho and Tsou, vol. 1, p. 42.

the Hui)⁴⁶ were recognized as distinct components of the Chinese people,⁴⁷ yet their Sinicization was sought as an ideal.

This paradox persists under the Communists who, despite their insistence on the unitary state, have established a series of 'autonomous regions', including the Ning-hsia Hui Autonomous Region, in order 'to increase socialist enthusiasm and initiative of the Hui, making the Hui, the Han and other nationalities draw even closer together to help each other build up this autonomous region and to make our motherland a powerful socialist state'.⁴⁸

These ambivalent policies toward minority groups reflect the inconsistency of Chinese attitudes toward this problem and the flexibility with which the Chinese have approached its solution throughout history. On the one hand, a folk-anthropological distinction prevailed in China, defining the Chinese on behavioural grounds as Han and thus different from the minorities. On the other hand, historical and cultural reality did not necessarily go along with this definition. Some minority populations, such as the Chuang, are indistinguishable from a non-Chinese perspective, from the Han Chinese majority. Yet, no Chinese would think of identifying them as Han.⁴⁹ Conversely, the cultural gap between Han Chinese and the minority groups is often no greater than that between Han Chinese of different regions in China. There is, as George Moseley has pointed out,

'an almost continuous ethno-cultural spectrum extending from the Northern, wheat-eating, Mandarin-speaking Chinese at one end, to, at the other, the dark-skinned K'awa in the South, who are food gatherers and speakers of a language of the Mon-Khmer family. In between are the more than 100 million "Han" Chinese of south-coastal China who speak dialects other than Mandarin and who refer to themselves as *T'ang-jen* rather than *Han-jen*, and more than 10 million of the "national minorities" in South China, who have been, to varying extents, acculturated to Chinese ways, to the point that, in some cases, they had no awareness of being a minority until

46. The others are: Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans.

47. The flag of the Republic had five stripes representing the Han and each of the four major minority groups.

48. See *Ning-hsia Hui-tsu Tzu-chih Ch'ü* (The Ning-hsia Hui Autonomous Region), Peking, n.d., p. 6.

49. M. Fried, 'China, an anthropological overview', in J. Meskill (ed.), *An Introduction to Chinese civilization*, Heath & Co, 1973, p. 343.

they were informed of the fact by the Chinese Academy of Science after 1949'.⁵⁰

In other words, in any given minority location in China, there is a wide range of relative Chinese-ness among the inhabitants, blunting the dichotomy of Han and national minority. But the distinction between these two groups does reflect a traditional Chinese attitude towards China's frontier peoples, the occupants of the zone between the Han Chinese and the outer barbarians. The distinction largely rested on the fact that frontier people did not use the Chinese system of writing (who can blame them?), a major ingredient of Chinese culture and the roof under which all Chinese were held together, despite mutually unintelligible dialects.⁵¹

Just as the differentiation between Han and the minorities rested on the historical interaction between China and the frontier people, so the treatment of minorities in China rested on the traditional ideas of pacification of the border areas during the Imperial era. This treatment was conditioned, to use Lattimore's terminology, by the distinction between 'non-Chinese' (i.e. barbarians) and 'un-Chinese', namely people who stood in between, not yet Chinese but a new kind of barbarians, some of whom did eventually become Chinese, while others tended to shift from the vague category of being un-Chinese into a strongly non-Chinese category.⁵² As far as the barbarians were concerned, since remote antiquity the Chinese indulged in comparing them with all sorts of animals,⁵³ and in stereotyping them as 'having nothing of affection or friendship and being full of greed'.⁵⁴ Names of barbarian tribes were often written with animal radicals. For example, the Ti (northern barbarians) were named with the dog radical⁵⁵ and the Man (southern barbarians) with the worm radical.⁵⁶ The rationale was that in the ancient world, the outermost areas were reserved for barbarians, ferocious animals, and evil spirits.

50. G. Moseley, *The Party and the national question in China*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 8-9.

51. Moseley, pp. 12-14.

52. O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, p. 276.

53. For example, the *Tso-chuan* compared the Ti and the Jung to 'wolves to whom no indulgence should be given' and to 'beasts and birds'. Both quotations are from Yang Lien-shen, 'Historical notes on the Chinese world order', in J. Fairbank, (ed.), *The Chinese world order*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, pp. 20-34.

54. *Tso-chuan*, cited by L. S. Yang, p. 27.

55. Radical 94.

56. Radical 142.

The Chinese believed that barbarians were greedy and warlike, and therefore closer to animals in character; and their belief was reinforced by the fact that many barbarians had physical features different from those of the Chinese.⁵⁷ The *Tso-chuan* said: 'If he is not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind'.⁵⁸ Different meant inferior; thus, a different race meant an inferior mind.

These ancient associations persisted for many centuries and extended the stereotypes of the non-Chinese to the un-Chinese peoples on China's frontiers. Since the Hui were non-Chinese by extraction, they remained associated with the same stereotypes (greedy and warlike) and were treated with the same contempt (dog radical and popular gibes) as the non-Chinese, although they had become merely un-Chinese through their material acculturation.

The traditional official policy towards barbarians was flexible and ranged from military oppression to pacification. This policy used the parable of 'bone and stick', which was in line with the metaphor of the 'wild dog'. Its flexibility lay in the relative size of the bone and stick, and the degree to which each was to be used, depending on the ferocity or the docility of the dog and other circumstances. Chang Chü-cheng, the famous Ming statesman, wrote:

'Just like dogs, if they wag their tails, bones will be thrown to them; if they bark badly, they will be beaten with sticks; after the beating, if they submit again, bones will be thrown to them again; after the bones, if they bark again, then more beating. How can one argue with them about being crooked or straight or about the observation of law?'.⁵⁹

Concurrently with the bone-and-stick policy, Confucians since Han times held that using virtue to control barbarians, allowing them to participate in the ceremonies performed at the Ancestral Shrine of the Imperial Court, would inspire in them civility and etiquette. Confucius remarked in the *Analects*: 'If distant people are not obedient, they should be won over by cultivating their own refinement and virtue'.⁶⁰ According to this policy of propagating Chinese culture, the moral teaching of filial piety ought to be spread among the barbarians. Thus, the father-son relationship was invoked in the intercourse between the T'ang Dynasty and the Turks and Uighurs; under the Sung, the relations with the Liao and Chin were grounded on an uncle-nephew relationship.⁶¹

57. L. S. Yang, p. 27.

58. Ibid.

59. Cited by L. S. Yang, p. 31.

60. *Analects*, 16:1.

61. Chusei Suzuki, 'China's relations with Inner Asia, the Hsiungnu, and Tibet', in J. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese world order*, pp. 180-5.

The energetic policy of Sinicization of minorities began in the 1720's under the Ch'ing. It was directed against the un-Chinese ethnic groups who constituted a majority of the population in a number of mountainous enclaves in Southwest China and in Hunan and Hupei.⁶² The core of the policy was to replace the native tribal system with Chinese local administration, and to promote an educational system which would encourage a gradual cultural assimilation of these groups. Some aborigines were picked out and sent to the capital for indoctrination; they then returned to their native areas as local officials to carry forward the work of acculturation, being themselves converted to the Chinese feeling of superiority of what they had learned over their former tribal ways. For instance, they substituted Confucian and state-approved Buddhist festivals for native observances, so that the aborigines would be drawn into the orbit of Chinese symbolism.⁶³ In this period, limitations were imposed on the Muslim's freedom of worship: in 1731 for example, the ritual slaughtering of animals was forbidden, and under the Ch'ien-lung Emperor the construction of new mosques and the pilgrimage to Mecca were prohibited.⁶⁴

This emphasis on acculturation was even more pronounced with sizable minorities which were attached to particular territories, such as the Mongols and the Tibetans. For example, in Inner Mongolia the Manchus threw open large tracts of land to cultivation, thus violating Mongol traditions that the earth is holy and the ancient tribal laws which forbade the plowing for two years in succession of more than the minimum necessary amount of land. A number of tribes have completely forgotten their Mongol speech and, except for differences in their dress, have become almost indistinguishable from the Chinese.⁶⁵

As regards the national minority problem, then, the Muslims could be said to have been classed with the non-Chinese and, by extension, with the un-Chinese minority groups. They were victims of the same derogatory stereotypes and the same assimilatory policy on the part of the authorities. On a closer look, however, some major differences distinguish the Hui people from the others.

First, although more concentrated in marginal areas of the Empire, there were Muslims in virtually every province, and in every sizable agglomeration throughout the country, and their presence was not merely statistical. They

62. Ho Ping-ti, pp. 4-5.

63. A. Wright, 'Comments on Ho Ping-ti's Paper', in Ho and Tsou, vol. 1, p. 38.

64. J. Keim, 'Les musulmans chinois', in *France-Asie*, vol. 10, 1954, p. 605.

65. O. Lattimore, 'The Chinese as a dominant race', *Asia*, vol. 28, 1928, p. 450.

had large communities in the capitals (Peking and Nanking), they were traders in many centres, and made their impact everywhere (though more as individuals than as a group). This may explain the ubiquitous nature of the hatred, jealousy and contempt in which they were held by most Chinese. Conversely, from the authorities' point of view, no crash program in a single territory could force all the Hui to acculturate. For this reason, while the other major minorities were handled under the Ch'ing by the Li Fan Yuan⁶⁶, which controlled them by controlling their territories, the Hui were free from such domination.

Second, since the Muslims could not accept the principle of filial piety and participate in the ceremonies of the ancestral shrines at the Court through which the Chinese attempted to 'civilize' non-Chinese barbarians, they sought to remain outside the pale of the sought-for 'refinement and virtue'. Nor could the stratagem that the Ch'ing used with un-Chinese aborigines work with the Muslims. The Hui had their own sense of superiority, their own festivals and religious symbolism, their own learning and culture, and needed no 'uplifting' to the heights of Chinese civilization. In short, they did not yield to the *mission civilisatrice* of their Chinese hosts.

Conclusions

Religious heterogeneity has always been disruptive to political stability, because when conflicting beliefs about ultimate values enter the political arena, they exacerbate dissensions by preventing compromises between various cultural groups which may otherwise be possible. In conflicts of this sort, it is the minority religion that tends to push polarization, because it is the group that stands to lose to the existing majority order. The dominant group, comfortable in its dominance, tends to brush off the import of the religious factor and look at the problem 'merely' through social majority-minority glasses. For these reasons, 'solutions' that are generally suggested by the majority stop short of true compromise, since from the majority's viewpoint no compromise about ultimate values is either possible or desirable. Some pluralistic societies in modern times, it is true, have been able to reduce, though not eliminate, their inter-religious tensions by secularization (i.e., weakening religious values in general); by compartmentalization (the separa-

66. This office controlled Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan. A Uighur-Muslim was present in Turkestan, Han Muslims in China Proper.

tion of religions from other areas of life); and by homogenization (the convergence of different beliefs toward a vaguely defined consensus).⁶⁷

Were these solutions applicable and applied in pre-modern China, and could Chinese Muslims be receptive to them? Since Chinese Muslims were both a self-confident socio-cultural minority *and* a vigorous, viable religious group, none of the three accommodations suggested above was applicable to them, even had the Chinese been willing to come forward with such a plan. Secularization, which is the weakening of religious values in general, was not realistic in a society so deeply imbued with religious belief as the Chinese, a state in which the Imperial cult had strong religious overtones, and the culture was sure of its superiority and therefore intolerant of any other. Had the Chinese been amenable to such a concession, the plight of the Muslim would have worsened, because it would have exposed them as irreconcilable fanatics in a society that had no particular regard for any religion. (Consider, for example, the Muslims in Communist China.)

Compartmentalization, that is the separation of religion from other areas of life, was even more unacceptable to both parties, religion being paramount in all aspects of their socio-political existence. Finally, homogenization — the convergence of different beliefs on a vaguely defined consensus — was totally unthinkable because, as L. Coser put it:

'If conflict centers around goals, values and interests that do not contradict basic assumptions upon which society is founded, then... adjustments are possible. But if the participants do not share the basic assumptions, social structures are threatened'.⁶⁸

This grim picture does not leave much room for accommodation, understanding and compromise between the Chinese hosts and their Muslim permanent-guests. Yet Chinese Islam knew periods of coexistence, uneasy as they may have been, with their Chinese neighbours. I should like to suggest that the viability of Chinese-Muslim coexistence in the era prior to the Ch'ing, could only be sustained by the fact that China,

'although it looked homogeneous to the lay observer from a distance, was a mosaic of differentiated local cultures. Thus, what is amazing about China,

67. This terminology is taken from R. Alford, 'Religion and politics', in Schneider (ed.), *Religion, culture and society*, Wiley, 1964, p. 367.

68. L. Coser, *The functions of social conflict*, Free Press, New York, 1956, pp. 151-2.

is not that it has frequently been divided, but that it has so often and so long achieved a high degree of unification'.⁶⁹

As Morton Fried has pointed out,⁷⁰ although the most general and common designation for China, *Chung-kuo*, has existed for a long time, neither it nor its derivative *Chung-kuo jen* (Chinese person) has been particularly common until modern times. Even today many Chinese prefer to designate themselves in narrower terms, sometimes referring to regional, linguistic or cultural identity, such as *min* (people). In this setting, Chinese Muslims, in times of peace, could take their place in the multicoloured and multifarious mosaic without causing much dissonance with their environment. But the mosaic had a dominating pattern, whose disturbance could not go unnoticed. The pattern was conditioned by the wide diversity of institutional religious, diffused religions, covert secret societies, latent sectarian movements, a multitude of minorities, 'nationalities' and aborigines and, above all, by the particularistic identity of the Chinese in general. These components were not differentiated in a clear-cut fashion; rather, they shaded off into each other, forming a continuum of basically diverse elements. So, as long as the Muslims could be seen, depending on one's vantage point, as one of these components (and they had characteristics of each and all of them), the pattern remained discernible, if somewhat blurred.

In time of unrest, however, when the mosaic fragmented, and each of its components rallied to form a separate pattern of its own, the differences between the hitherto linked elements became more pronounced, and social polarization occurred. Muslim rebels, like other discontented sections of the population, raised their banner of identity, making Chinese society irrelevant to them. From the Chinese government's viewpoint, they turned from a *min*, a part of the harmonious mosaic, into *fei* (bandits) who, like the other *fei* coming into the open, were detrimental to the pattern and had to be eliminated.

The viability of the Chinese-Muslim coexistence, then, did not hinge on the potentialities implicit in Chinese Islam as an ideologically undermining and disruptive heresy, but on its actual behaviour. The Chinese authorities were apparently not even aware of the potential threat that this foreign religion posed to their order, for they were ignorant of the doctrines of Islam and of the Islamic insistence on assumption of political power, as the will of God has to be worked on earth by a political system. The literary inquisition

69. Fried, p. 352.

70. Ibid., p. 345.

under the Chi'en-lung Emperor, which was directed precisely against deviationist doctrines of this sort, was helpless in the case of Chinese Islam, because the books which taught these 'heresies' were in Arabic and Persian and thus inaccessible to the inquisitors. Chinese Muslim books written in Chinese were not harmful to the establishment because of the conciliatory stance they took towards Confucianism.

Thus, Chinese Muslim *behaviour*, not its intentions or doctrines, was the factor determining the Chinese government's attitude towards them. As long as they have behaved properly, that is passively, and showed signs of acculturation, the Chinese, having no control of their hearts and minds, remained unmindful of their 'heresy'. But when the cultural confrontation escalated into a confrontation of strength, and the rebellious intentions of the Muslims became evident, they were treated (or mistreated, one might say) accordingly. The multifarious facets of Chinese Islam were certainly instrumental in its survival. For when the Muslims were eliminated as a heterodox sect, they survived as a minority culture; when they were persecuted as a secret society, they went on existing as an institutional or communal religion of sorts; when they were reprimanded for both, they still could be seen as *min*, a minority people, one of many in the Chinese mosaic.

These shifting faces, it should be emphasized, had more of an impressionistic quality than one of essential change. From the Muslim point of view, they were chameleon-like adaptations to a changing but constantly hostile environment. In other words, the change of colour was an adaptive response to outside stimulation, in line with the low-profile stance that the Muslims had adopted since the Ming, in order to camouflage their portion of the social pattern when it attracted too much unwarranted attention from the Chinese. This shift was objectively perceptible, and it reflected the ups and downs in the fortunes of Chinese Islam. From the Chinese viewpoint, Islam appeared to them as a kinetic picture looks to viewers of modern art. The pattern shifts subjectively in the eyes of the onlooker, depending on his standpoint, while the picture itself remains unchanged. Thus Islam could appear in different guises to different segments of Chinese society and Chinese government at different times and different places. Not that the Chinese were fascinated by this artistic parable, but an element that evades clear-cut identity, despite the preponderantly negative stereotypes attached to it, can also evade persistent and determined persecution. This is precisely what Chinese Muslims achieved in their relations with Chinese society in pre-modern China until the advent of the Ch'ing.

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THE PREMIERSHIPS OF MIRZĀ HOSEIN KHĀN AND HIS REFORMS IN IRAN, 1872-1873¹

AZRIEL KARNY

Background

The subject of this paper is a unique attempt to transform the structure of Iran's central administration by one of the most remarkable, though neglected, Iranian statesmen of the Qājār period (1796-1925).

The process of reform in Iran prior to the rise of Reza Shah to power in the 1920's was erratic and inconsistent, and lagged far behind reform activity both in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt (which at that time was formally under Ottoman sovereignty). At best one may point to some scattered and sporadic attempts at reform undertaken in the nineteenth century by a handful of outstanding individual Iranian statesmen. The reasons for this are not hard to find. For centuries Iran was practically isolated from the West by the vast expanses of the Ottoman Empire. In the first third of the nineteenth century, Iran's experience of the military impact of the West, was far less profound than that of other countries in the Middle East: compared with the Ottoman Empire the impact was relatively short (the Russo-Iranian wars which ended in 1813 and 1828 were practically the only major wars between Iran and a Western power in modern times); and as opposed to Egypt, where Napoleon's army occupied the heart of the country, including Cairo, the Russian military might and Iran's consequent territorial losses was felt in border areas. As a result the Iranian ruling classes did not feel the urgency of their Ottoman and Egyptian counterparts to reform their governments and countries in face of the overwhelming might of the West.

When Iran first felt the brunt of Russian military might, it was also drawn into

1. This paper is a modified version of several chapters in the author's dissertation *Mirzā Hosein Khān Moshir od-Dawlé and his attempts at reform in Iran, 1871-1873* (UCLA, 1973). The system of transcription used in this article follows persian phonetics and not systems used in the transliteration of Arabic. Exceptions are Arabic words, such as names of months.

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