[handwritten:] ...ld Politics Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 Oct 1984

MUSLIM CADRES AND SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

Reflections from a Comparative Perspective

By STEVEN L. BURG

CENTRAL Asia confronts the Soviet leadership in Moscow with a number of important policy problems. The difficult issues raised by economic and demographic trends in the region and the potential rise of Muslim nationalism among the masses there have received careful and increasing attention from Western analysts in recent years, as have some of the current and potential responses of the Soviet leadership to them.[1] Far less attention, however, has been directed toward a more directly political problem raised by developments in Central Asia; a problem the resolution of which appears to be of far more pressing urgency, and which has potentially far more profound implications for the future of the Soviet political order itself: the rise of a modern, secular Muslim, communist elite.

The rise of this elite has resulted in extensive "nativization" of Central Asian institutions.[2] This, in turn, raises the possibility that Muslim cadres may soon enter the central party and state hierarchies in Moscow as

[1] The problems posed by regional economic and demographic imbalances have been addressed in a number of recent works. I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude Schroeder, eds., *Economics of Soviet Regions* (New York: Praeger, 1981), contains several important contributions. A useful guide to the earlier literature on regional development is contained in Donna Bahry and Carol Nechemias, "Half Full or Half Empty? The Debate over Soviet Regional Development," *Slavic Review* 40 (No. 3, 1981), 366-83. Demographic trends are summarized in Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1976), 113-54. See also the separate contributions of these authors to U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979). Some of the policy problems posed by these trends are also explored in John F. Besemeres, *Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1980); Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* 28 (No. 1, 1979), 1-13; and Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas," *Population Bulletin* 37 (No. 3, 1982). The potential rise of Muslim nationalism is treated in Alexandre Bennigsen, "Several Nations of One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central Asian Muslims," *Survey* 24 (No. 3, 1979), 51-64, and in Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983).

[2] Grey Hodnett, in his study, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978), displays data that suggest the period from 1955 to 1972 was actually characterized by marginal *decreases* in the number of native cadres occupying positions at the very highest levels of the Central Asian republics (see table 2.11, p. 100). If we examine the broader "social elite" of these republics, however, we find evidence of a dramatic

well. Such a development would be likely to add a new element of complexity to internal debates over domestic social and economic policies, for, to ensure the continued development of the Central Asian economy—development on which the continued upward mobility of native elites in their "home" republics will depend—Muslim cadres will be required to "represent" the interests of their region against competing demands for resources from other regions. Conflict over scarce resources between cadres of differing nationality from regions with objectively contradictory interests may have important consequences for the evolution of central decision-making practices. Indeed, in Yugoslavia it was precisely such conflict that resulted in the dramatic transformation of the political order in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[3]

In this article, I use lessons derived from the evolution of Yugoslav multinational decision-making processes, and especially the role of native Muslim cadres in that evolution, as well as past Soviet experience, to identify some of the political problems posed by the rise of native Central Asian elites, and the alternatives open to the Soviet leadership for dealing with them. I use the Yugoslav case to suggest that the potentially destabilizing or even explosive character of the more obvious short-term solutions may impel the Soviet leadership to adopt a solution they might otherwise have been unwilling even to consider. I argue that although such a solution would inevitably be intended to preserve the essential characteristics of the existing Soviet system, both past Soviet and ongoing Yugoslav experiences provide ample evidence that it would be likely, over time, to give rise to pressures for changes in central decision-making practices that the present leadership appears unwilling to permit. And I conclude that, in this sense, the rise of loyal Muslim cadres committed to maintaining the Soviet political system and increasing the benefits they derive from it, which is the direct result of past Soviet policies, may now be confronting the Russian-dominated Soviet leadership with a genuine political dilemma.

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: "Comparable Cases"?

The Soviet response to the problems posed by the rise of a native political elite in Central Asia will undoubtedly be shaped for the most

expansion in the number and proportion of natives. For these data, see Steven L. Burg, "Russians, Natives and Jews in the Soviet Scientific Elite: Cadre Competition in Central Asia," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique* 20 (No. 1, 1979), 43-59.

[3] See Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

 

part by past Soviet experience. However, the experience of other regimes with analogous Muslim or other minority problems may also affect Soviet decision making in this realm. Soviet scholarship on nationality issues includes a substantial commitment to the study of ethnicity and multinationality in other states and includes some scattered references to the relevance to the U.S.S.R. of experiences elsewhere. Although Soviet scholars working on nationality problems may have less direct influence on the formulation of official policy than has been suggested in the West, it is clear that they do have at least some indirect influence.[4] Of particular interest in this respect are references to the relevance of Yugoslav experience.[5] For, whether or not Soviet policy makers take that experience into consideration in the formulation of policy, from the perspective of a Western analyst Yugoslavia offers the opportunity to explore the potential consequences of the multinational condition for Soviet political development through comparative analysis.[6]

Direct comparisons between the contemporary Yugoslav and Soviet systems are, of course, likely to be useful for only a limited set of issues. However, if we carry out a *diachronic* comparison between the Yugoslav system of the 1950s and early 1960s—that is, before the purge of the central police apparatus in July 1966 and the ensuing rapid transformation of the domestic political order[7]—and the present Soviet system,

[4] For the suggestion of such influence, see Paul A. Goble, "Ideology, Methodology, and Nationality: The USSR Academy of Sciences Council on Nationality Problems," a paper prepared for delivery at the National Convention of the APSA, Washington D.C., August 1980, and Jeremy R. Azrael, "Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR," in Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 363-90, but esp. 365. My own more sanguine estimate of the role of academic expertise in the formulation of Soviet nationality policy is the result of conversations with several of the most prominent Soviet ethnosociologists—some of them members of the scientific council mentioned above—during my recent tenure as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in Moscow, home institution of the council.

[5] Iulian V. Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography and a leading figure in the study of the nationality question in the U.S.S.R., for example, is also a specialist of ethnicity in Yugoslavia and refers to that country as an "analogous" case for the study of the emergence of a common "international" identity among the population of a multinational state in "XXVI s'ezd KPSS i zadachi izucheniia sovremennykh natsional'nykh protsessov" [The XXVI Congress of the CPSU and the task of studying contemporary national processes], in Bromlei, ed., *Razvitie natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR v svete reshneii XXVI s'ezda KPSS* [The development of national relations in the USSR in light of the decisions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU], (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 25. It should be noted, however, that in direct conversation other Soviet researchers from Bromlei's own institute are quite reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of any comparison of the Soviet and Yugoslav cases.

[6] Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are particularly well suited for comparison on the basis of a "comparable cases" or "most similar systems" approach. See Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (No. 2, 1975), 158-77, and Adam Przeworksi and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 32-34.

[7] Pre-1966 Yugoslav politics are analyzed in Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) and Deborah D. Milen-

we will be making comparisons between cases that are very similar in important ways.

Ethnographically, both pre-1966 Yugoslavia and the contemporary Soviet Union are cases of multinational countries comprising both Slavic and non-Slavic peoples. Slavs constitute a large majority, but each country contains a significant traditionally Islamic minority population. Demographically, the populations of both are divided into slow-growth groups that include almost the entire Slavic population and groups experiencing very rapid population growth, comprising mostly the non-Slavic Islamic population. Structurally, both are cases of federations in which internal political-administrative divisions coincide in large part with ethno-national divisions in the population. Economically, both are characterized by regional economic inequalities that each is committed to eliminating. Politically, both are ruled by single communist parties that claim a monopoly on authoritative decision making and, although divided into national-territorial organizations, profess a singularity of interests and purpose that they attempt to enforce. Moreover, in both cases these ethno-national, demographic, structural, economic, and political divisions tend to reinforce one another. Thus, the central political leaderships of both pre-1966 Yugoslavia and the contemporary Soviet Union are confronted by similar conditions that raise similar policy problems.

Most important of all, however, in each case there is a history of domination by the country's largest nationality group that is inconsistent with ideological commitments to political equality among the nationalities. As a result, the creation or expansion of elite cadres among the other nationalities, or any increase in their power or authority, inevitably represents a challenge to Russian power in the Soviet Union or Serbian power in pre-1966 Yugoslavia. This is as true of other Slavic cadres as of non-Slavs. But the most dramatic examples are to be found where Serbs and Russians exercise colonial-like control over ostensibly non-Serbian and non-Russian territories; that is, in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in Central Asia.

The contemporary Soviet Union and pre-1966 Yugoslavia are, of course, not *identical* cases. The scale of economic problems, the characteristics of nationality groups and the nature of relations between them, the distribution of power, and even the simple size of these two cases differ in ways that have important consequences for the resolution of

---

kovitch, *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

the problem with which we are concerned here. However, it is precisely the existence of specific differences in the context of an overall similarity that makes any comparison between cases useful. Where we can identify the consequences of the character of a specific element of the Yugoslav system for the role of minority elite cadres and the later development of multinational decision-making processes, we are able to use this knowledge to suggest with greater confidence the possible consequences of differences in that specific element in the Soviet case. In this way, differences between the cases, combined with knowledge of the later outcome of conditions in one of them, enhance the utility of comparisons between them. Such comparisons allow us to use detailed knowledge of the inner workings of one case to shed light on another about which we know very little.

The Rise of Secular Muslim Elites

Economic development and social modernization of the Muslim territories in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the emergence of native intellectual and political elites. The power of these Muslim political elites, however limited it may be, as well as their status, rests on the communist political order. The secular intellectuals are major beneficiaries of the expansion of educational and cultural institutions that resulted from the developmental commitment of the communist regime. Thus, both can be expected to be quite loyal to the regime. However, loyalty to the communist order does not exclude simultaneous identification with the Muslim community and its interests. Indeed, there is a built-in incentive for the Muslim cultural intelligentsia to emphasize the distinctiveness, the historical importance, and the contemporary significance of the Islamic heritage, for they exercise a virtual monopoly over its development and exploitation. Similarly, there is an important incentive for political elites to emphasize their own "Muslimness" as a means of strengthening mass identification with them and the communist regime they represent.

Efforts by the Muslim cultural intelligentsia to develop the Islamic heritage are facilitated by the existence of a modernist "official" religious hierarchy. It provides important theological and political support for interpretations of the heritage that emphasize the compatibility of Islam and communism even though it may also provide support for the development of interpretations not entirely to the liking of communist authorities.[8] By helping to alter the cultural heritage and by altering the

[8] On the role of the official Islamic hierarchy in adapting the faith to modern circumstances,

definitions of basic religious obligations, such modernist hierarchies enable secular elites to maintain their links to the broader Islamic community as they advance on the ladder of social mobility. Indeed, the full participation of Muslims in political life is encouraged by such a hierarchy's assertions of the compatibility between belief and loyalty. In this way, the existence of a modernist religious hierarchy facilitates the participation of secular elites in the communist system without their concomitant assimilation and contributes to the creation of genuinely *national* leaderships for the Muslim peoples.

In Yugoslavia, the creation of a secular Muslim intelligentsia preceded the establishment of communist rule. That intelligentsia arose among the Slavic Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina and benefited from the dramatic expansion of educational and cultural institutions that followed the establishment of communist power there. Members of this secular Muslim intelligentsia, although by no means unanimous in this respect, soon became outspoken exponents of the distinctiveness of the Islamic heritage of the Slavic Muslims and determined advocates of the official recognition of a Muslim *nationality*. Their advocacy found important support in the revitalization and expansion of the "official" religious hierarchy and a concomitant increase in religious activity among believers that took place during the 1960s. But it also reinforced ethnic, cultural, and even religious divisions between the Slavic Muslims concentrated in Bosnia and the non-Slavic Islamic population, composed primarily of ethnic Albanians and concentrated in Kosovo and bordering territories. Thus, the Islamic population of Yugoslavia became divided into two communities: one "Muslim" and one "Albanian."[9]

The recognition of a distinct Muslim nationality by the Bosnian political leadership had important political consequences for the organi-

---

see Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims," *Central Asian Survey* 1 (No. 1, 1982), 5-42, esp. 21ff, and Rorlich, "Notes on the Dynamics of Religion and National Identity in Central Asia," in David Halle, ed., *Conference on the Study of Central Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1983), 29-38, esp. 31-34.

[9] On the development of a Muslim nationality in Yugoslavia see Muhamed Hadžijahić et al., *Islam i Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina] (Sarajevo: Starješinstvo Islamske Zajednice u SR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1977); Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta: geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana* [From Tradition to Identity: The Genesis of the National Question of the Bosnian Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1974); Salim Ćerić, *Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika* [Muslims of the Serbocroatian language] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1968); Atif Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana* [The National and Political Development of the Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1969); Dennison I. Rusinow, "Yugoslavia's Muslim Nation," *UFSI Report*, No. 8, Europe (DIR-1-82) (1982); and Burg, "The Political Integration of Yugoslavia's Muslims: Determinants of Success and Failure," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 203 (1983).

zation of the Yugoslav political system and the distribution of power within it, as well as for the political system of the Bosnian republic itself. Although it can by no means be seen as a "cause" of the devolution of power and authority that took place in Yugoslavia during this period, the recognition of Muslim nationality did contribute to the development of a genuinely multinational leadership in Bosnia and gave that leadership additional political leverage in discussions then underway within the central leadership concerning the nature of federal political institutions and their relationship to the regions. In this sense, "Muslimness" was as much a tool in the hands of the Bosnian leadership, intent on increasing its own power and advancing the interests of its own region, as it was a social force compelling the leaders to act. Its utility to the leadership, however, depended—and continues to depend—on the ability of the "official" hierarchy to maintain the faith that lies at the core of "Muslimness" while carefully controlling its content and expression. From the perspective of even the Muslim secular political leadership, the latter task can be performed reliably only if the hierarchy is "modernist" and accommodationist, and willing to oppose antiregime forces within the Islamic community, such as fundamentalists or "Islamic revolutionaries."

The creation of secular Muslim cultural and political elites also preceded the establishment of community power in the Soviet Union. However, the relationship between these cadres and the central authorities was an uncertain one, and completely reliable central control in the Islamic communities—as elsewhere in the country—was established only by purging and replacing them. Significant numbers of new indigenous cadres once again began to assume positions among the secular elites of these communities as the result of postwar development, during the 1950s and 1960s.[10] It was during this same period that the "official" Islamic hierarchies in the Soviet Union began the process of adapting the tenets of the faith to the constraints of modern society and Soviet power. Thus, the "modernization" of the Islamic communities in the U.S.S.R. since World War II has occurred on all fronts simultaneously: economic, political, cultural, and religious.

Although under continuing pressure and control, and for a period even renewed assault, the practice of Islam—in its "modernized" variant and infused with pro-Soviet content—has been granted a carefully limited, but nonetheless officially sanctioned, place in Soviet society. In large part this can be explained by the fact that, although the regime can limit the number of official Islamic institutions and clergy available to the

[10] See Burg (fn. 2).

faithful, and in fact has acted assiduously to do so, neither formal institutions nor clergy are necessary for believers to fulfill the basic obligations of the faith. Their destruction, therefore, would be unlikely to destroy widespread adherence to Islam among the masses but would eliminate potentially important instruments for controlling it. The regime has thus sponsored selective rather than wholesale attacks on religion, while the "official" hierarchies have sponsored the abandonment or replacement of "backward" or "reactionary" practices.[11]

The result has been a partial accommodation of the faith to the demands of the Soviet regime and, at the same time, the apparent preservation of widespread adherence to it. Moreover, this arrangement has not prevented, and in some ways has even contributed to, the growing influence of Islamic culture on the national identities of the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. As a result, Muslims have been able to attain elite status in the postwar period without abandoning entirely their "Muslimness."

Muslim Elites and Central Power

The entry of secular Muslim cadres into positions of responsibility in the party and state apparats in the traditionally Islamic territories of the U.S.S.R. will inevitably raise important political issues for the Russian-dominated central leadership, if it has not already done so. It will be increasingly difficult, for example, for that leadership to justify continuation of the long-standing "colonial" pattern of Russian and Slavic political domination of Muslim Central Asia through the staffing of key local positions—such as the party organizational secretaryship and the K.G.B. chairmanship—exclusively with Slavic cadres. As the number of perfectly capable indigenous Muslim cadres with proven records of loyal service to the regime increases, the pressure to turn even these positions over to natives will increase, especially given the fact that they have been staffed by indigenous personnel in other non-Russian areas (for example, the Ukraine) with longer histories of resistance to Russian rule and far more dissident, nationalist and anti-Soviet activity.[12]

It will also become more difficult for the Soviet leadership to justify continuation of the apparent barrier to service by Muslim cadres in the central party and state hierarchies, not only because significant numbers of non-Russian cadres from other territories have served in responsible positions in them, but also because Muslim cadres appear rapidly to be

[11] Rorlich (fn. 8).

[12] Hodnett (fn. 2) classifies the Ukraine as "largely self-administering" in four out of five political-administrative categories (table 2.13, p. 105).

acquiring the Russian language skills necessary for such service, and the Muslim territories from which they come—or at least Central Asia—are becoming economically, demographically, and politically more important to the Soviet regime.[13] The resolution of these issues may have even more important consequences for the distribution of power and influence in the Soviet system than the resolution of similar issues had for Yugoslavia, both at the center and more broadly.

One possible response to pressure for participation from minority elites open to any dominant nationality group—one that might be characterized as "reactionary"—is to reinforce its control over the instruments of power and to strengthen the techniques of domination. Thus, in Yugoslavia, as the process of liberalization began in the early 1960s, the predominantly Serbian conservative faction in the central leadership strengthened its hold over the party and police organizations through which it exercised power. It stepped up its surveillance of minority cadres at all levels of the system, from local institutions to the central party *apparat*, and reinforced their exclusion, and the exclusion of others as well, from all key positions in the power structure under its control. This was reflected in a marked overrepresentation of Serbs in key institutions at the federal center in Belgrade and in certain regional institutions—particularly in the police and security organizations in Kosovo and Croatia. This overrepresentation later became a central complaint of regional leaders—officials and nationalist activists—during the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, rather than forestalling conflict, this "reactionary" response actually exacerbated it in Yugoslavia.[14]

There is some circumstantial evidence that in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev's leadership, despite the presence of a few Muslims in positions of prominence (but apparently not power) in the Politburo, the political predominance of ethnic Russians may have increased. The Brezhnev years saw the gradual elimination of those Ukrainians who had held important positions and had wielded significant power and influence in the central party and state *apparats*, and their replacement by loyal ethnic Russian members of Brezhnev's entourage.[15] It is difficult to determine,

[13] The most recent data available on the number of CPSU members in the Central Asian republics and of Central Asian nationality, reported in "KPSS v tsifrakh [The CPSU in Figures]" *Partinaia zhizn'* 14 (July 1981), 13-26, esp. 14 and 18, suggest that nativization of local institutions continues unabated. See also the comments by Andropov on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the U.S.S.R. concerning the nationalities question, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [henceforth FBIS], *Soviet Union—Daily Report*, December 21, 1982, pp. P4-P5.

[14] See Shoup (fn. 7), 208ff and 254ff.

[15] The Ukrainians identified by Bialer as members of the central leadership in 1974, for

however, whether these changes represent a conscious "reaction" or simply reflect Brezhnev's preference for relying on those cadres with whom he shared long career associations. Indeed, even the elevation of Kazakh first secretary Kunaev to full membership in the Politburo can be seen primarily as part of Brezhnev's efforts to fill the Politburo with his loyal associates, rather than as an attempt to increase the representation of Muslims *per se*. There can be no doubt, however, that the Brezhnev years saw an increasing awareness of, and sensitivity to, the nationality dimensions of the Soviet political agenda on the part of the central leadership,[16] and that by the end of Brezhnev's rule almost every important portfolio in the Politburo and Secretariat was in Russian hands. Moreover, there is no evidence as yet that the co-optation of Kunaev or the later co-optation of Azerbaidzhan first secretary Aliev to candidate membership resulted in any movement by Muslim cadres into positions in the central apparat.

A response at the opposite extreme of the spectrum of potential responses by a dominant group is the complete incorporation and sharing of power with heretofore subordinate minority elites. Although Yugoslavia has moved quite far in this direction, that movement has not been accomplished without conflict, indeed even crisis, within the Party itself. Even at present, the relationships between center and region and between formerly dominant and formerly subordinate national elites are uncertain ones. Moreover, as one might expect, these relationships appear to vary from group to group. Movement toward full incorporation has been far more successful in the case of the Bosnian Muslims than in the case of the Albanian minority. But in both cases increased local autonomy and increased participation in multinational structures at the center of power has been won by nationality and regional elites only in exchange for their careful limitation and, if necessary, repression of those elements in their communities that threaten, or represent potential threats to, the existing political order. The Yugoslav case, therefore, seems to suggest a third type of response, which might be characterized as a limited accommodation.

---

example, have since lost their positions (Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1980], 223). This trend has continued under Andropov, with the ouster of the Byelorussian party secretary and the co-optation to full membership in the Politburo of the premier of the Russian republic. The most important indicator of a contrary trend is, of course, the promotion to full membership of the Azerbaidzhani party secretary, Aliev, and his assignment to important responsibilities in the Council of Ministers, discussed below.

[16] Azrael (fn. 4) points to the activation of the scientific council on nationality problems as evidence of "mounting official concern" (365). See also Goble (fn. 4) for additional discussion. At the very least, this reflected growing interest in the subject on the part of a large number of scholars in a broad range of disciplines.

The Accommodationist Response

The basic feature of the accommodationist response is the attempt to develop an "official" Islamic hierarchy and use it to encourage popular support for the secular political order. The resources of the state are used to subsidize the development of, and thereby at least partly to control, a modernist religious leadership. To the extent the communist leadership is willing to grant "authority" to religious officials at all, it grants that authority only to this "official" hierarchy. In this way, the communist regime attempts to compete with and undermine the potential appeal of conservative religious leaders who might otherwise be able to organize an essentially anticommunist religious movement. At the same time, the regime encourages the development of secular Muslim cultural and political elites. But it does so in a manner that heightens the salience of internal divisions within the Islamic community and preserves the sharp official distinction between religion and nationality so that the affirmation of one need not necessarily entail affirmation of the other.

The Yugoslav case suggests that an accommodationist response may include genuine concessions in the narrowly religious realm: the opening of new mosques, increased religious instruction, and other activities designed to strengthen the bonds between the "official" hierarchy and the Muslim masses. But such concessions are possible only where the communist authorities are confident that such activities will not engender anticommunist sentiments or activities. It is instructive to remember, for example, that the Yugoslav regime appears to be far less willing to make such concessions to the Catholic church because it has been unable either to establish a distinction between Catholicism and Croatian nationalism similar to the distinction between Islam and "Muslimness" or to establish a loyalist Catholic religious hierarchy of its own. Croatian nationalism, it will be remembered, provided the mobilizing force behind early opposition to the establishment of a communist order and a later challenge to the maintenance of communist power. Hence, where a communist regime is constrained from permitting the expansion of religious activity, the strategy must be focused exclusively on the development of loyalist secular elites.

In order to implement an accommodationist strategy, loyalist Muslim political elites must fulfill both a representative and a control function in their respective territories. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, central authorities have insisted that native elites repress all manifestations of local nationalism and any other antiregime activity among their ethnic brethren. Indeed, in Yugoslavia, it appears to be the case that such

repression has been a requisite condition for the transfer of control in key areas—internal security and military or defense matters—to native cadres. Where native cadres have proven reliable, as in Bosnia, these funtions have in the main been transferred from center to region; where native cadres have proven unreliable or simply unable to repress such activity on their own, as in Kosovo, the central authorities have apparently retained control over them. In the Soviet Union, native political leaders of the Muslim republics, like the native leadership of other non-Russian republics, already are expected to, and do, perform the same function; but there is no evidence that its performance has as yet won them any increased local autonomy.

An accommodationist strategy also requires that native cadres control far less violent, and sometimes even subtle, manifestations of nationalism. Where control over cadre policy in almost all areas has passed from center to region, as in Yugoslavia, regional political leaders are charged with the task of preventing discrimination against nonnatives by the upwardly mobile and expanding native elite. But even in the Soviet Union, where cadres policy remains under the close control of the central leadership and the discretionary power of regional leaders is more restricted, the Russian-dominated central leadership periodically cautions native leaders of the non-Russian republics against permitting exclusionary practices aimed against nonnative cadres.[17] This can be a particularly explosive issue where "nonnative" cadres are members of a dominant, or formerly dominant, nationality and assert a legitimate claim to "indigenous" status, as is the case in both Yugoslavia (Serbs in Kosovo) and the Soviet Union (Russians in Central Asia).

For Muslim elites to participate in the communist political order in this way requires a certain degree of acculturation, if not assimilation, to the dominant nationality or culture, if only because of the practical requirements of contact and communication. This has been true even in Yugoslavia, which has gone further in the direction of establishing multilinguistic central political institutions than any other multinational state. But, in order to fulfill their symbolic and genuine representative functions, native political elites are compelled to reserve and even assert the authenticity of the national identity they share with the masses they represent. Yet they cannot do so in any way that calls their loyalty to the existing order into question. For these reasons, the creation of a loyal

[17] The post-Khrushchev leadership began its tenure with a warning against such practices (see *Pravda*, September 5, 1965, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [henceforth *CDSP*] 17, No. 34 [November 15, 1965], p. 4), and Brezhnev ended his rule with a similar warning (see "Brezhnev's report to the Congress—II," *CDSP* 33, No. 9 [April 1, 1981], p. 6).

native political elite and its successful performance in office is unquestionably facilitated by the development of a loyalist native cultural intelligentsia and a modernist religious hierarchy supportive of the adaptation of Muslim identity to the modern communist order.

An accommodationist response is thus characterized by an inherent tension that makes its successful management particularly difficult. To a certain degree, loyalist native leaders may, in fact, *need* the presence of religious or nationalist pressure—or at least the perception of such pressure—in order to demonstrate their own loyalty and improve their positions by controlling or repressing it. Indeed, Yugoslav experience suggests that, under conditions short of open assault against the established political order, the more important the control function they perform, the greater the leverage enjoyed by native leaders for extracting concessions to their autonomous power. Native leaders are constrained from carrying out the repression of nationalist or religious activity too vigorously, however, lest they undermine their own legitimacy in the eyes of their co-nationals and thereby reduce their utility to the center. Yet, failure to carry out such repression would also reduce their usefulness, and almost certainly would result in their replacement. Such failure might even allow the growth of a genuine nationalist or religious threat to the regime—a threat that would be met with forceful repression directed from the center. Indeed, this appears to be precisely what happened in Kosovo, culminating in the nationalist upheaval of spring 1981.[18]

Thus, an accommodationist solution would appear to be an inherently unstable formula for ordering political relations between dominant and subordinate national elites. In Yugoslavia, it has tended either to lead rapidly to full incorporation—with profound consequences for the nature of the political order—or to founder, and to degenerate into more repressive arrangements. Similarly, movement in the Soviet Union toward the establishment of a limited accommodation of Muslim elites during the 1920s gave way to the Stalinist repression of the 1930s. Today, the central Soviet leadership appears once again to have established some of the elements of a limited accommodation with its Muslim political elites, but seems not yet to have adopted an accommodationist strategy. Yugoslav experience suggests that, were such a strategy to be adopted, its success would depend on a number of factors, some of them subject to manipulation and control by the Soviet leadership, and some of them not.

[18] Events in Kosovo are summarized in Pedro Ramet, "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis* 25 (No. 2, 1981), 369-88.

Determinants of Success

The more successful accommodation of the Bosnian Muslims in comparison to the obvious failure in the case of the Albanians in Yugoslavia can be attributed to a number of factors not subject to manipulation in the short run, if at all. None of these, however, are present in the Soviet Union. These include the fact that Bosnian Muslims are ethnically Slav; speak a language shared by the two most numerous national groups, including the formerly dominant one; share a substantial common cultural heritage with these groups; and are geographically dispersed among them in a pattern that makes it difficult to claim exclusive control over an extensive historical territorial "homeland." At the same time, some of the factors that seem to have made the establishment of an accommodation with the Albanian minority such an intractable problem do appear to be present in the U.S.S.R. These include the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness of the native population, and its disproportionately high rate of population growth in comparison to the Slavic majority. In addition, a competition and conflict of interest between native Muslim elites and non-native—primarily Russian—elites, analogous to but certainly not as intense as the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, appears to be emerging in Central Asia.[19] There is also at least the potential for Muslims in Central Asia to become subject to the influence of radical Islamic movements across the border, just as bordering Albania exerts influence over the ethnic Albanians of Yugoslavia. All of this suggests that a genuine accommodation with the Muslims of Central Asia may be difficult for the Soviet leadership to achieve.

Perhaps the most important factor, however, contributing to the apparent failure of the accommodationist strategy in Kosovo is *not*, or at least not yet, present in the Soviet Union—that is, the relative underdevelopment, indeed backwardness of the Kosovo economy in comparison to the economies of the other regions, and especially the progressive widening of the gap between them.[20] Developmental imbalances between

[19] Inter-nationality friction between Russians and native elites was first suggested by the sociological research of Iu. V. Arutiunian ("A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," *The Soviet Review* 14 [No. 2, 1973], 14-15). At the time, Arutiunian's findings, although consistent with a growing literature on the politics of multiethnic states in the West, were unusual for the U.S.S.R. Recently, however, even Andropov acknowledged that "economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied with the growth of their national self-awareness" and that this necessitates "great tact in selecting and posting cadres" (FBIS [fn. 13]).

[20] Per capita national income in Kosovo declined from 53 percent of the Yugoslav level in 1953 to 36 percent in 1961. It was only 48 percent of that in Croatia (29 percent of that in Slovenia) in 1953 and declined to only 30 percent (21 percent of the Slovenian level) in

the Muslim regions and the rest of the Soviet Union are narrower than those between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia. When measured in terms of per capita income, the relationship between the Central Asian republics and the rest of the U.S.S.R. is far closer to the relationship between the more successfully integrated Bosnian republic and the rest of Yugoslavia than it is to that of Kosovo. And there is no evidence of a precipitous decline in the relative developmental level of the Central Asian republics analogous to that experienced by Kosovo. Where declines do seem to have occurred, they have been on the more modest order of that experienced by Bosnia during the period from 1953 to 1961.[21] Indeed, if we use the standard of living as an indicator, conditions in Central Asia may even be better than in other areas of the U.S.S.R.[22]

Although economic development alone does not guarantee that an accommodationist strategy will succeed, it is surely the case that without it such a strategy will fail. Among other things, the most recent round of nationalist demonstrations and violence in Kosovo demonstrates that native occupancy of elite positions, accompanied by extensive concessions in the realm of language, culture, and religion, cannot by themselves forestall the rise of mass discontent prompted by inadequate levels of material achievement.

The demonstrations in Kosovo also suggest that even where the activity of "parallel" Islamic organizations is widespread, the most immediate danger to the established political order is not religious but secular. And secular factors such as economic development policy *are* subject to control by the Soviet leadership. Given the growing numbers of loyalist Muslim cadres, the existence of a supportive Muslim intelligentsia, and the activity of a modernist and adaptive "official" Islamic religious hierarchy, an accommodationist strategy for the ordering of political relations between Moscow and the Muslim communities of

---

1961. Calculations based on data in Savezni Zavod za Statistiku [Federal Institute for Statistics, henceforth SZS], *Statistički Godišnjak Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije 1963* [Statistical Yearbook of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1963, henceforth *SGFNRJ*] (Belgrade: SZS, 1964), 356; and SZS, *Statistički Bilten*, No. 1295 (Belgrade: SZS, May 1982), 8-17.

[21] For data on Bosnia, see sources cited in fn. 20. Comparisons are to data presented in Martin C. Spechler, "Regional Developments in the U.S.S.R., 1958-78" in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (fn. 1), table 3, p. 151; James W. Gillula, "The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics," *ibid.*, table 5, p. 629; and Alistair McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), table 5.1, p. 109.

[22] Inter-regional differences in living standards favoring Central Asia are summarized in Feshbach, "Prospects for Massive Outmigration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (fn. 1), 656ff., esp. 659-60; and Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Regional Living Standards," in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 118-56.

Central Asia might prove successful. Whether the central Soviet leadership will choose to adopt such a strategy, however, will depend on how the Soviet leaders view its implications.

Implications for Soviet Development

The adoption of an accommodationist strategy in Yugoslavia had profound consequences for the nature of the political order. It contributed to the decentralization of political power and helped to alter the relationship between elites and masses in important ways. It stimulated the emergence of latent conflicts between the nationalities and exacerbated existing conflicts between the regions—two sets of conflicts that were mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, it changed the fundamental character of the Party itself. But this need not necessarily be the outcome of a decision by the Soviet leadership to embark on an accommodationist strategy with regard to the Muslim minorities, at least not in the short run. What might be characterized as decentralizing consequences in Yugoslavia were conditioned by several important factors such as the timing, sequence, and sponsoring of a number of discrete, but nonetheless related, decisions. And it is certain that the Soviet leadership will not reproduce this sequence. Indeed, on some important policy issues it is almost certain to make entirely different choices than did the Yugoslav leadership. Thus, it is quite possible that such a strategy might be carried out without necessarily introducing a significant decentralization of political power in the Soviet Union.

In Yugoslavia, for example, the adoption of an accommodationist policy with respect to the nationalities followed, and drew its impetus from, decisions to decentralize the economy. In addition, both economic decentralization and movement toward the accommodation rather than the repression of multinationality were sponsored by a coalition of central political leaders, some of whom were at the same time strongly associated with regional political bases. Thus, both the sponsorship and the timing of accommodation impelled it in the direction of increasing the power of the emerging leaderships of the nationalities.[23] In the Soviet Union, however, the economy remains highly centralized, and those who command decisive political power are all closely associated with the center rather than the regions, and have shown no inclination to permit significant reform in the direction of decentralization. Thus, if this leadership continues to introduce elements of an accommodation with its

[23] Milenkovitch (fn. 7) and Shoup (fn. 7) report extensively on this political debate within the Yugoslav leadership.

Muslim communities, it is almost certain to do so in a manner designed not to call into question the highly centralized character of the Soviet system. But even here Yugoslav experience is instructive.

It is not the "nativization" of social and political institutions in the nationality areas *per se*, or even the genuinely multinational staffing of central party and state organs that appears to have been the decisive factor in the transformation of the Yugoslav political order. Rather, it appears to have been the decision to transfer control over personnel appointments—cadres policies—from central to regional bodies, a decision made possible by the political defeat of conservative, Serb-dominated political forces that opposed economic decentralization and that controlled cadres policies from the center. Although this was by no means the only factor, it is clear that with the transfer of cadre control the retention of elite status came to depend on the approval, not of the center, but of one's own republic, province, or nationality. The central leadership effectively lost the ability to limit the process of accommodation, and native cadres in both the regional leaderships and central political institutions rapidly came to represent their respective—and often mutually contradictory—regional economic and nationality interests. This soon produced political deadlock and, ultimately, the crisis of the early 1970s.[24]

The relative effectiveness of even limited central control over cadres policies was demonstrated during the post-crisis period in Yugoslavia, during which the central leadership reasserted its ability to intervene in regional affairs under certain conditions and thereby restored the balance between the representative and control functions of the native leaderships in the regions. The central Soviet leadership, in contrast, appears not to have relinquished its control over cadres policies even where extensive "nativization" of regional leaderships has already taken place, as in the Ukraine and the republics of the Caucasus. As a result, it has been able to ensure that native cadres in these regions have continued to fulfill their control functions, or it has replaced them.[25] It appears entirely likely, therefore, that it will continue to follow this policy in the Muslim republics of Central Asia as well.

Given the extensive subordination of the Soviet economy to central control, however, it is questionable whether the "nativization" of local leaderships, including even positions heretofore monopolized by Rus-

[24] Burg (fn. 3) reports on these developments.

[25] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone inventories a series of leadership purges in the non-Russian republics in the sixties and seventies in "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 23 (No. 3, 1974), 1-22, esp. 12-13.

sians, will by itself be sufficient to establish an accommodation in Central Asia akin to that already established in the Ukraine and other republics. An important element in the accommodation established in those republics has been the elevation of native cadres to positions of responsibility in the central hierarchies of the Party and the state. Although they have not functioned as "representatives" of their respective regions or nationalities, their presence at the center has helped to legitimize continuing central control over them. Indeed, service in positions of responsibility at the center, providing it does not expose these cadres to racism on the part of the dominant nationality,[26] can be expected to strengthen their loyalty to the established order and thereby make them ideal candidates for later service in their home republics as native "agents" of central power. And, most important from the perspective of the center, their access and potential ability to influence the policy-making process probably serves to forestall demands for the transfer of decision-making power from the center to the regions. "Nativization" of the local leadership in the absence of such mobility, on the other hand, might very well encourage demands for the devolution of political power to the regions.

Thus, despite the evident reluctance of the still Russian-dominated central leadership to do so, it would appear that the structure and organization of Soviet decision-making and personnel policies are well suited for carrying out an accommodationist strategy with respect to the Muslim elites of Central Asia, and that adoption of that strategy might reinforce rather than degrade existing central controls over them. Indeed, there are strong incentives for Muslim elites, once they gain access to and influence in the central hierarchies, to increase their support for preservation of the highly centralized character of the Soviet economy. Yugoslav experience suggests unambiguously that the continued economic advance of "their" regions—and the concomitant continued expansion of opportunities for native elite mobility—will depend heavily on the existence of central institutions powerful enough to compel the inter-regional transfer of capital resources over the objections of the more developed regions. Data on the sources of Yugoslav investment capital in the pre-1966 period suggest that the underdeveloped regions were, as a group, disproportionately more dependent on credits and funds under central control than the most developed republics, which appear to have been more dependent on internally generated capital and amortization funds. The ability of the center to transfer capital permitted

[26] An occurrence alleged by one Yugoslav informant who served in the central apparatus in the sixties.

the underdeveloped regions to maintain rates of investment in the pre-1966 period—expressed as capital invested measured as a proportion of national income produced—substantially higher than those maintained in the developed republics.[27] And the underdeveloped regions became even more heavily dependent on centrally disbursed capital in the post-1966 period.[28]

In the short run, therefore, the participation in central Soviet institutions of Central Asian Muslim cadres who have proved their loyalty to the Soviet order through service in their native territories may actually preserve, if not strengthen, central power in the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the recent elevation of Aliyev to full membership in the Politburo and his promotion to first deputy prime minister has been accompanied by renewed emphasis on discipline and authority in the economy. Thus, while Aliyev's rise must be explained at least in part by his possible K.G.B.-based ties to Andropov, it also suggests that an accommodationist strategy encompassing participation in positions of "real" power at the center cannot be discounted entirely.

Yugoslav experience suggests, however, that there are important costs to such a strategy over the longer run: highly placed members of the Yugoslav leadership and middle-level functionaries alike acknowledge in published memoirs, private conversations, and in official party documents as well, the growing tensions among national cadres in the central party apparatus that arose out of inter-regional conflicts over economic development policy, and that led to the political crisis of the early 1970s. Representatives of the underdeveloped regions, including the Muslim territories of Bosnia and Kosovo, supported the preservation of strong central institutions. The representatives of the more developed regions, in contrast, tried to reduce central power in an effort to retain greater control over a larger share of the capital generated by the economies of their respective regions, and thereby to prevent its transfer elsewhere. Although the Soviet leadership has at its command far greater resources than the Yugoslav, it also faces potentially far greater demands on them, especially from the demographically expanding Muslim territories. Moreover, the poor performance of the Soviet economy promises to make decisions about the allocation of these resources even more difficult. Under these conditions, the entry of Muslim cadres into central power

[27] Data on national income produced, and on invested capital and its sources, for 1955 and 1960 are reported in SZS, *SGFNRJ 1957* (Belgrade: SZS, 1958), 132 and 302; and SZS, *SGFNRJ 1962* (Belgrade: SZS, 1963), 344 and 419-21, respectively. Unfortunately, data for investments in Kosovo are not broken out separately from those for Serbia in these sources.

[28] Sources of expenditures for investment in the regions for the period 1963 to 1971 are shown in Burg (fn. 3), table 2.10, pp. 58-59.

structures might very well provide a catalyst for the emergence of inter-regional economic conflicts analogous to those that characterized Yugoslav politics in the period up to the decisive decentralization of power in 1966.

Fragmentary evidence on Soviet inter-regional capital relationships in the 1960s and early 1970s suggests a fundamental similarity to Yugoslav conditions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The more developed republics of the U.S.S.R. seem to have been subsidizing higher than proportional investment in the less developed republics, especially the Central Asian republics.[29] As in Yugoslavia, these transfers of capital were carried out despite the lower productivity of investment in the less developed regions, and over the objections of at least one of the developed republics affected by this policy, that is, the Ukraine.[30] And, as was also the case in Yugoslavia, these transfers failed to narrow significantly the overall developmental gap between the republics. Moreover, it appears that the character of transfers in the U.S.S.R. changed in the late 1970s, with the Central Asian share in total investment beginning to decline slightly and that of the Russian republic beginning to increase, apparently as the result of a central decision to increase investment in the exploitation of energy and other resources in Siberia.[31]

Capital investment in Central Asia appears to have been directed toward increasing employment opportunities for the growing population there, but in a manner that has reinforced established patterns of specialization in raw-materials extraction and agricultural production, rather than contributing to regional self-sufficiency.[32] Thus, the inter-regional transfer of capital carried out in the sixties and seventies can be said to have perpetuated Central Asian dependency on the developed republics. Its failure to improve the relative level of development of the region suggests that greater, not reduced, levels of investment will be required in the eighties if such an improvement is to take place. Continued redirection of capital away from Central Asia and toward Siberia is, on the other hand, likely to increase the gap between the Central Asian republics and the developed republics of the U.S.S.R. And in the face

[29] Gillula (fn. 21), throughout.

[30] On the lower productivity of investment in the underdeveloped regions, see Spechler (fn. 21), and Gillula (fn. 21), as well as Michael Connock, "Is industry inefficient in Yugoslavia's poor regions?" *South Slav Journal*, 3 (No. 4, 1980), 3-9. On the assertiveness of Ukrainian leadership, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism," in Azrael (fn. 4), 105-43. For a broader treatment of the economic and political position of the Ukraine, see I. S. Koropeckyj, ed., *The Ukraine within the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

[31] James W. Gillula, "The Growth and Structure of Fixed Capital," in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 162-63.

[32] *Ibid.*, 177ff; and Gillula (fn. 21), 649-52.

of the continuing demographic expansion of C[illegible]l Asia, it might even result in an absolute decline in the levels of development there, with important negative consequences for the Central Asian population and their elite representatives.

If Soviet Muslim cadres elevated to the center use their influence to restore or increase capital subsidies to Central Asia, they may prompt a response among Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian cadres similar to the reaction of Slovenian and Croatian leaders in central party and state organs in Yugoslavia in the 1960s. And such responses would constitute far more powerful forces for change in the direction of decentralization than demands advanced by the Muslim cadres themselves. The parallels between the Croatian predicament in the 1960s and the potential Ukrainian predicament in the 1980s are particularly striking in this respect. Both are highly developed republics with substantial industrial and agricultural sectors; both are comparatively productive economies that export capital to other regions of the country; and both are characterized by aging economies in need of capital investment for modernization in order to sustain and expand productivity. Moreover, both are characterized by nationalist activity among the masses and a history of relative outspokenness by representatives in central institutions.

The dramatic devolution of decision-making power in Yugoslavia in the post-1966 period was in large part the product of demands emanating from Croatia for retention of a greater share of the capital generated by the economy of that republic, demands advanced by both a growing nationalist "movement" and increasingly assertive regional party leaders. Even after that movement was suppressed and those leaders purged, however, the devolution of power was sustained. Inter-regional transfers of capital have continued but now are subject to explicit, and highly contentious, bargaining between regional leaderships.[33] Representatives of the developed republics have, over time, used their power to limit the extent of such transfers and to increase the benefits to their respective regions from them. But they have been unable, short of denying representatives of the underdeveloped regions equal participation and power in central decision-making institutions and suppressing mass demands in those territories, to put an end to them. Thus, although an accommodationist strategy might preserve or even reinforce the existing Soviet

[33] Inter-regional bargaining processes are reviewed in Burg (fn. 3), 242ff. The scope of inter-regional capital transfers in the period from 1971 to 1980 is reported in Joseph T. Bombelles, "Transfer of Resources from More to Less Developed Republics and Autonomous Provinces of Yugoslavia 1971-1980," *Occasional Papers* OP-69, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe (1981).

political order in the short run, its adoption might also introduce forces for change that would be difficult to control in the longer run.

The Soviet Dilemma

These potential longer-term consequences of pursuing a strategy of genuine accommodation may explain why the Russians who have controlled cadre policies in the Soviet Union up to now have hesitated to introduce Central Asian Muslim cadres into central decision-making bureaucracies. But Yugoslav experience suggests that continuation of the "nativization" process already evident in the Central Asian republics is very likely to create leaders in Central Asia who are conscious of their own relative powerlessness vis-à-vis the center and who perceive their entry into positions in the center to be blocked by Russians unwilling to share "real" power with them. This would constitute fertile conditions for the rise of resentments that could easily be translated, with the cooperation of the religious hierarchy and cultural intelligentsia, into nationalist discontent. This might even become likely if the Russian-dominated leadership adopted a strategy of investing scarce capital resources in modernization of the advanced economies of the European regions and in exploitation of Siberian natural resources at the expense of investment to meet the needs and demands of the growing population of Central Asia and its economy. The recent decision not to go ahead with the diversion of water to Central Asia seems to portend this scenario.[34] Under such conditions, the central Soviet leadership might choose to deflect mass discontent away from the regime and onto the native leaders of Central Asia by using them as "scapegoats" for failure. It might also turn toward more repressive measures, as the Yugoslav leadership has done—under far more extreme circumstances, to be sure—in Kosovo. But the potential size of such a "Muslim problem" in Central Asia suggests that even simple repression would represent a monumental task. Moreover, it would not "solve" the problem, and it would constitute an admission of failure with potentially historic consequences for Soviet relations with the Third—and especially Muslim—World.

Consequently, the entry of Muslim cadres into central Soviet decision-making bureaucracies would appear imminent, as would the increase in the level of internal conflict in these institutions over the formulation of economic and other domestic policies likely to result from their entry. However, Yugoslav experience suggests that such conflict by itself need not become disintegrative conflict. The Yugoslav leadership of the early

[34] *The New York Times*, December 16, 1983, p. 1.

1960s, like the present Soviet leadership, was able to endure a relatively high level of internal policy conflict. Indeed, for the entire period from 1958 to 1965 the Yugoslav system was characterized by the deep division of the central leadership and the clear emergence of distinct and conflicting regional perspectives on economic issues. Yet there was no dramatic change in the political order. During this entire period regional leaders, and even lower-level cadres far more particularistic in their orientation, remained closely wedded to the preservation of the political status quo. Indeed, one is tempted to suggest that the communist ideology of development shared by both Yugoslav and Soviet elites not only legitimizes but even encourages responsible cadres at all levels of the system to press demands for ever-greater allocations of resources,[35] and that the conflicts that arise out of such demands represent not so much disintegrative pressures as evidence of a strong commitment among such cadres to the existing order.

Yugoslav experience also suggests, however, that such commitment remains strong among regional leaders and other responsible cadres only so long as development of their respective regions continues. In more practical terms, even communist elites remain loyal only as long as they retain a reasonable expectation that their interests will be served. If we postulate a set of elites that are unconcerned about, or unresponsive to, social and economic forces, the only such demands we can talk about sensibly are "careerist" ones. If, however, we postulate even a modicum of concern or responsiveness, then we may begin to talk about local, regional, or even ethno-national demands—even if the ability to advance such demands is constrained by continuing central control of cadre policies. One has only to recall the repeated complaints over the years by the central Soviet leadership against "localism" to realize how far in this direction the Soviet system has already gone. In Yugoslavia, it was the continuing inability of cadres from the underdeveloped regions to increase the resources available to their own regions for development, even after they had won equal participation in central institutions, that led some of them to begin to question the established "rules of the game" for formulating policy and to support the radical decentralization of power that eventually took place.

Thus, the Soviet leadership appears to confront a dilemma. The problems posed by the emergence of a loyal Muslim elite are as much regional development problems as they are a "nationality" problem, and

[35] See the obituary of Uzbek party secretary Rashidov (*Pravda*, November 1, 1983, p. 2.) for official praise of his successful representation of regional interests as manifest in the development of his republic during his tenure as first secretary.

it may be possible to manage them through the combination of an accommodationist strategy toward native elites and further development of Central Asia. But management in this way may require capital resources that the Soviet economy cannot generate on its own as long as it continues to perform poorly, or that are more than members of the leadership from other regions of the U.S.S.R. are willing to allocate. Under these circumstances, accommodationist practices would be likely to fail and to degenerate into a purge of Muslim elites discontented with central policies, and into the repression of potential mass discontent in Central Asia resulting from feelings of "relative deprivation" caused by unfulfilled expectations of continued developmental progress. Yugoslav policies in Kosovo are a case in point. Were the costs of such a failure perceived as too high, the Soviet leadership might undertake those economic reforms necessary to allow it both to pursue a policy of accommodation and to commit sufficient resources to Central Asian development to satisfy at least the minimal demands of the native population. However, the short-term political costs of the reforms that would be required—beginning with the reduction of military spending—might themselves be too high.[36] Moreover, Yugoslav experience suggests that such success would be likely to give rise to pressures to move from accommodation to full incorporation. This would inevitably diminish the power of Russian cadres in central institutions and perhaps even lead to demands for political changes that would alter the very character of the Soviet system; and these are consequences that all Soviet leaders up to now seem to have feared more than the uncertainties of repression.

[36] Joseph Berliner has suggested that precisely such political costs may constitute important constraints on the ability of the Soviet leadership to undertake economic reform ["Managing the USSR Economy: Alternative Models," *Problems of Communism* 32 (No. 1, 1983), 40-56, esp. 54-55]; a similar argument is made by Soviet scholars in the so-called "Novosibirsk memorandum" (excerpted in *The New York Times*, August 5, 1983, p. 4.).