

assembly and parliament elections in 1980 was 62 to 64 percent, when Punjab was

resulted in hundreds of brides being murdered in recent years.

of conduct — and have been locked in a deadly feud for months.

Peking keen on developing Xinjiang region

By Anthony Barker

PEKING, Oct. 2 (R) — China has combined its national day this year with special celebrations to mark the 30th anniversary since Turkic-speaking Xinjiang on the Soviet border was declared a minority autonomous region.

Several Chinese leaders traveled there to attend events such as a mass parade and firework displays that were judged too lavish for the capital yesterday's 36th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

China sees the vast but underdeveloped territory in the far northwest — under and out of Peking's control for 2,000 years — as a great hope for development in the next century.

"Foreign scientists have described Xinjiang as one of the three unconquered frontiers in the world, along with the Amazon basin and the Sahara," Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang said during a visit there in August.


Xinjiang — where Islam is the major religion — has brought China serious internal security problems and clashes with neighbors. In 1969 several dozen Chinese troops were killed in a battle with Soviet forces.

Chinese Communist troops took over Xinjiang in 1949, signaling defeat for those in the area who had struggled for an independent "East Turkestan."

In 1955 Peking declared it an autonomous region for Uighurs, who then formed the majority of Xinjiang's people, but resettled it with troops, political exiles and other Chinese to alter the area's ethnic makeup and consolidate its hold.

Now Uighurs make up only 45 percent of the 13 million population and Chinese about 40 percent, with Kazakhs, Tartars and nine other groups making up the rest.

Despite increases in the numbers of locally-born officials, less than half of the



MUSLIMS: The largest concentration of Chinese Muslims, according to 1982 census, is in Xinjiang. Other areas include Ningsia, Gansu and Henan.

region's 400,000 officials are non-Chinese, according to the New China News Agency (NCNA).

Between 1966 and 1978 China violently persecuted Muslims.

Such policies have resulted in ethnic clashes. In 1962, 60,000 Kazakhs crossed the border into the Soviet Union. The latest serious riots by minorities broke out in the early 1980s.

However, yesterday's celebrations stressed reconciliation and the development of the rich mineral resources of Xinjiang.

The China Daily quoted veteran Communist Party leader Wang Zhen as reading out a message from the party's central

committee which said Xinjiang was now enjoying the best period of unity between its peoples since 1949.

The message added: "Strengthening unity would guarantee economic takeoff in Xinjiang."

NCNA quoted Wang as telling a conference that Xinjiang had to step up development of its mineral resources and strive to become one of China's main suppliers of industrial raw materials.

"The region will also continue to strengthen cooperation with Japan, the Soviet Union, and the Western Asian and Eastern European countries," regional party chief Wang Enmao said.

China students hold anti-Japan rally in Xian

PEKING, Oct. 2 (R) — Thousands of Chinese students staged a protest against Tokyo's policies in the central city of Xian yesterday, the latest sign of simmering anti-Japanese feeling, eyewitnesses said today.

They said between 5,000 and 10,000 students from different colleges gathered for five hours on a city square yesterday.

They made speeches denouncing Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone for visiting a shrine to Japan's war dead, including those who invaded China in the 1930s and 1940s.

Some students demanded that China put restrictions on trade with Japan, to halt what they said was the dumping of inferior Japanese goods on the Chinese market, one witness told Reuters by telephone from Xian.

"Some of the speeches sounded pretty angry, but overall there was a holiday mood," the witness said.

Xian, a former imperial capital of China, is about 1,000 km southwest of Peking.

The Xian protest follows similar demon-

strations in Peking last month when several hundred students paraded on Tienanmen square with banners attacking Nakasone and the "second Japanese invasion" — a reference to the flood of Japanese consumer goods entering China in recent years.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said after the Peking protest that the official visit by Nakasone to Tokyo temple had seriously hurt Chinese feelings.

The ministry's statement appeared to indicate official sympathy for the ideas behind the student protests, although the government had not organized the demonstrations, foreign diplomats said.

Students at Xian's northwest polytechnical university were locked on the campus for several hours yesterday morning by troops refusing to let them join the rally, one witness said.

He said students had told him the authorities only gave way after the protesters threatened to tear down the gates.

He said the protest, on the 36th

anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, had been announced on posters written by National Student Union officials.

In another development, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian have agreed to an exchange of visits, a senior Moscow envoy said here today.

It would be the first such exchange since the giant Communist neighbors began semi-annual consultations three years ago aimed at improving relations, estranged for a quarter-century.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev, who arrived in Peking today for the seventh round of consultations, told reporters at the airport through an interpreter: "In principle, these visits, we are going to have."

Asked when, he replied: "About the exact time, I cannot say anything. They say the solution will be found through diplomatic channels."

CONFRONTATION

Changes in the Chinese leadership over the past two years have done nothing to ease Sino-Soviet tensions along their joint frontier. American high-altitude surveillance has confirmed Chinese reports of military clashes along the 6,500 km border where two concentrations of military power quantitatively greater than anything in Europe still face each other.

The military factor has reasserted itself with the rise to power of Acting Premier Hua, uneasily filling the shoes of Chairman Mao if only on a temporary basis, and the now rehabilitated Teng-Hsiao-ping. With it has come a desire to cast off Mao's blind belief in mass partisan warfare as the supreme deterrent and a decision to modernise China's industrial and military establishments to catch up with the USSR and to ensure protection for Chinese raw materials and industries near the frontier.

Today, nearly fifty per cent of the Central Committee are military men and of the sixteen remaining members of the 1973 Political Bureau, eight are from the armed forces (PLA) and another five connected with the PLA's Political Commissariat.

In the market. With military backing and perspectives, the new Chinese leaders are naturally highly interested in security, a fact which has been reflected in Teng's campaign to modernise industry and the armed forces, even where necessary, by looking for assistance in advanced technology from the West.

Since 1974, Chinese military delegations have shown interest in West German and Swedish anti-tank weapons, French MIRAGE jets and AMX-30 tanks, British Rolls Royce jet engines and HARRIER fighters and the West German advanced BO-105 attack helicopter. Military advice has also been sought from western experts. In September 1977, top West German ex-NATO chiefs Steinhoff, Kielmansegg, Trettner and Poser visited China. Interest in Western defence aid also prompted invitations to ex-US Defence Secretary Schlesinger and Admiral Zumwalt as initial American contacts.

As with China's industries, her military establishment also suffered from the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid and spares available in the 1960s which ensured Chinese inferiority to the USSR and Fortnum's equipment. The Chinese James Ogden, Aristocrat, Canterbury; George Waters, Department Stores, and...

Manchuria, here war is always in the offing

deterrent therefore, has long been largely what Defence Minister Lin Piao once called "the human factor"—an "extensive ocean" of partisan cannon-fodder intended to swallow up any invader.

Men in millions. Preventive strike pressures from Soviet generals who wish to nip China's conventional and nuclear

ture is leading to a more positive build-up on their side.

The two pro-military leaders outlined future policy at an Industrial Conference last May, where the need for industrial and military modernisation to catch up with the USSR was emphasised. Soviet observers immediately interpreted this policy as "war preparations", and said Chinese decisions on the "necessity for an accelerated development of those industrial sectors" as somehow related to a "powerful China" waging war in collaboration with NATO.

The military preparations and build-up on the frontier continue to leave no room for doubt as to each side's real feelings. The USSR maintains one million men east of the Urals, although fewer than 66 divisions (about 620,000 men) can be spared for frontier security, and of these, only 32 divisions (290,000 men) are deployed anywhere near the frontier.

On the Chinese side, however, the minimal demand necessary to cope with Taiwan and India (the USSR also has its massive European commitments) means that China can afford to concentrate more forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier region. If necessary, the 20 divisions of the Sinkiang and Lanchow Military Regions (240,000 men) and the 35 divisions of the Shenyang and Peking Regions (420,000 men) can be rapidly buttressed by another 50 divisions from Wuhan, Tsinan and Nanking, together with 180,000 Frontier Guards and 120,000 frontier-based militiamen.


Grimly funny. Schlesinger, when touring Chinese military units, considered the massive Chinese manpower buildup as yet another mixture of awesome strength and comic opera. The Russians continue to possess and unquestionable superiority in terms of tanks, aircraft and mechanised infantry, and can present China with both firepower and mobility which would make a nonsense of their massed echelons of human beings.

In terms of organisation, the Russians



Hua... high on security.

build-up in the bud before the 1980s now threaten to dilute this deterrent. And all the talk of "a gigantic network for a people's war" (China has an estimated 72 million militiamen should the PLA collapse) the increasing presence of professional military men at the top-level of China's at decision-making political struc-



are clearly prepared to make deep penetration into Chinese territory. By 1965, by which time 5,000 border clashes had already taken place, the buildup had begun in earnest, with a concentration on Mongolia as the potential 'spring board' for such penetration. By 1969 with more serious clashes along the Ussuri and Amur and 2,000 incidents recorded since 1966 the Russians were prompted to create a new Military District ('Central Asia'), which became operational in the autumn of 1970.

With the tripling of Sino-Soviet frontier strength since 1969, the USSR has backed up troop concentration with new barracks, rocket sites, 70 major airfields for medium-range bombers, 25 nuclear warhead depots, radar stations, railway extensions, arms depots, modern land and air equipment and SAM anti-aircraft defences. The lessons of the 1904/5 defeat at the hands of Japan have also taught the Russians to back up manpower with efficient logistics lines and local industrial production geared to an ultimately self-sufficient Far East Army.

Soft spots. Soviet concentrations on the edge of the Gobi desert would also facilitate rapid strikes against China's key

industrial, oil, uranium and nuclear installation sites (see map) and the Mongolian steppes are ideal for mechanised troop movements, armoured attacks and aircraft or missile saturation attacks. It is such Soviet mobility and modernity which the Chinese are currently trying to cancel or at least balance by indulging in a modernisation policy.

Although China's nuclear development suffered followed withdrawal of Soviet assistance in the early 1960s and Soviet attempts to apply non-proliferation and test-ban treaties to China, today, the Chinese have managed to improvise a nuclear capability of just over 100 medium-range missiles, 75 bombers and 5 ICBMs capable of carrying a whole range of tactical and megaton warheads into the USSR.

But apart from the USSR's overwhelming inter-continental attack and defensive capabilities, Soviet tactical nuclear weapons based near the Sino-Soviet frontier (there are an estimated 80, mainly installed on tracked vehicles) offer the Russians an opportunity not merely to support the conventional forces, but also to knock out Chinese nuclear sites barely

3-500 km away at Sinkiang, Lanchou, Paotou, Lop Nor, Yumen and Haiyen. There is therefore a readiness (if not a determination) on both sides to fight a nuclear engagement, which is indicated by both Soviet and Chinese emphasis on manoeuvres in full NBC kit and often after low-yield detonations in desert areas.

Root causes. Sino-Soviet confrontation is thus far from being in a stated disengagement. Apart from rivalry for influence in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indo-China, there are still Sino-Soviet differences based on deep historical roots and survival interests. The Chinese continue to claim that in the past the Russians unfairly annexed parts of China. Geographically big enough, China is not really large in an agricultural sense. A high proportion of unfertile regions create demographic and food imbalances which could lead to a demand for certain territorial revisions.

If recent CIA estimates of the USSR's oil and uranium deficiencies in the 1980s are also taken into account, Chinese oil and uranium resources near the contested frontier must be regarded as interesting targets.

Explaining Regional Autonomy Law

The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities, adopted on May 31 at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, comprises a preface and 67 articles organized under seven chapters. Following are the main points of an explanation of this law by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Chairman of the NPC Nationalities Committee. — Ed.



by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme

Fundamental Political System

China is a unified multi-national country. It has 55 national minorities excluding the Han.

The Communist Party of China has consistently stated that all Chinese nationalities, large or small, are equal. It has been carrying out a policy of equality and unity between Chinese ethnic groups, working for common prosperity for all of them.

The founding of the People's Republic of China marked the end of national oppression and the beginning of a new era of national equality. According to various historical factors, the relationships between nationalities and their distribution, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a policy of regional national autonomy in areas where minority peoples lived in compact communities. This im-

portant state policy was enthusiastically supported by people everywhere, and was formally included in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

China currently has five autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefectures and 80 autonomous counties (or banners). Together they cover 6.1 million square kilometres, 60 per cent of China's territory. The population of these autonomous areas is 120 million, of which 50 million belong to minority peoples.

Great achievements have been made in regional national autonomy during the past three decades despite some setbacks. A socialist relationship between nationalities based on equality, unity and mutual assistance has been established in China.

The system of regional national autonomy has proved correct and well suited to China. By implementing regional national autonomy in a multi-national country like ours, the right of each minority group to administer its own internal affairs and the unity of the minorities and unification and independence of the country are both guaranteed. This system benefits the fight against foreign aggression and subversion.

Basic Principles

The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities will

guarantee the successful implementation of the basic principles and regulations governing regional autonomy stipulated in the Constitution.

The fundamental guideline for the regional autonomy law is to uphold the four cardinal principles — to keep to the socialist road, to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the leadership of the Communist Party and to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

Due attention is paid to the relationship between the national autonomous areas and the state. On the one hand, the autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The unified leadership of the Central People's Government must be guaranteed and its general principles, policies and plans must be implemented. On the other hand, the full power of autonomy of the organizations of self-government of national autonomous areas must be guaranteed and consideration must be given to their special characteristics and needs. In this way, the right of minority people to administer their own affairs will be guaranteed, a relationship based on equality, unity and mutual assistance between different national minorities will be established and common prosperity will be realized.

Autonomous Organizations

The organizations of self-government of national autonomous areas are the people's congresses and people's governments of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. The organizations of self-government practise democratic centralism. Because the people's con-

gresses and people's governments of national autonomous areas are both ordinary local state organizations and organizations of self-government, therefore, according to China's Constitution, the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities makes the following stipulations about their composition.

First, the administrative head of an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall be a citizen of the nationality (or of one of the nationalities) exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned. The chairmanship or vice-chairmanships of the standing committee of the people's congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall include a citizen or citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.

Second, the number and proportion of deputies belonging to the minority which exercises regional autonomy are decided by the standing committee of the regional or provincial people's congress. Due consideration should be given to the national minorities with a smaller population when distributing the number of deputies.

Third, efforts should be made to include minorities in the people's governments of the national autonomous areas.

All these decisions are based on past and present conditions in the minority areas. They not only guarantee that each national minority has its own representatives, but they also help the self-government organizations have closer ties with the local people and better implement the regional national autonomy system.

Based on the relevant regulation, organizations of self-government of national autonomous areas have the power to enact autonomy regulations and specific regulations and to adopt special policies and flexible measures, as long as

they do not contravene the Constitution and the law. The regional autonomy law also stipulates that if decisions, decrees and instructions of the higher-level state departments do not suit the autonomous localities, the organizations of self-government may alter or simply not implement them, provided that they have the approval of the state department concerned. These regulations give the local self-government organizations

The Party and state have always made it their policy to train and assign cadres, specialists and skilled workers from minority peoples. This is the key to the successful practice of regional national autonomy.

great power to implement the state's laws and policies according to their own conditions.

The regional autonomy law also includes specific regulations concerning development in such fields as economics, finance, education and culture.

Under the guidance of state plans, the autonomous self-government organizations may work out their own principles and policies and plan for economic construction in accordance with their local conditions and needs. They may readjust the relations of production and restructure the local economy according to the law and the characteristics of their own economic development. They may decide and arrange local capital construction projects according to their financial and material abilities.

With the approval of the State Council, they may open ports for foreign trade and enjoy a preferential proportion of foreign exchange. They have the right to spend their local revenue. Where

local revenues cannot meet expenditures, subsidies from the higher-level financial departments are provided. Autonomous areas may develop their educational system independently in accordance with the state's educational policy, making their own plans, deciding on the establishment of schools, and the forms of schooling, the curriculum, the language used in teaching and method of enrolling students. The institutions may also develop their national culture in various fields such as literature, the arts, journalism, publishing, broadcasting, cinema and television.

Help From the State

The economy and culture in many minority regions are still rather backward. This de facto inequality is inherited from history. In order to eliminate it, the most important thing is to help the minority people accelerate their economic and cultural development. This is a long-term basic task for China. To meet the task, the regional autonomy law defines a series of regulations on the responsibilities for higher-level state departments.

First, the characteristics and special needs of the autonomous areas must be considered when national economic and social development plans are being worked out. Second, funds for special development should be earmarked for autonomous areas. Third, special concern should be given to commerce, supply and marketing and medicine in autonomous areas. The demands of autonomous areas should be taken into account when distributing means of production and of livelihood. An appropriate number of teachers, doctors, scientists, technicians and managers should be assigned to help minority areas develop their economy, culture and education.

All these regulations illustrate

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the state's special concern for minority peoples. The national policies of the Party and the state are for the benefit of China's national minorities. They are manifestations of the socialist relationships of unity and mutual-aid between different peoples, and are the basic guarantee of the interests of all people in China.

Training Cadres

The Party and state have always made it their policy to train and assign cadres, specialists and skilled workers from minority people. This is also the key to the successful practice of regional national autonomy, and so requires great determination and efforts.

The regional autonomy law stipulates, "The self-government organizations in autonomous localities may, according to the needs of their local socialist construction, adopt measures to train cadres at various levels, specialists in science, technology and administration, and skilled workers from among the local minority peoples." Higher state departments should

do what is necessary to accomplish this work. The law also stipulates that when local state departments and enterprises recruit workers and staff members, they should enrol minority peasants to help form and expand a workers' contingent of minority peoples. This policy will have a big impact in autonomous areas.

Developing Socialist Relations

The spirit of strengthening and developing socialist relations among nationalities is reflected in every chapter of the regional autonomy law. It might even be called the law to maintain and develop socialist relations in China.

The regional autonomy law stipulates that the governing bodies of national autonomous areas and the higher state departments must ensure political equality and unity among various nationalities, and strengthen economic and cultural assistance and co-operation. It calls for the development of economic and cultural exchanges and co-operation between autonomous

areas and other parts of the country, to bring about the common prosperity of all peoples in China. It requires the governments of autonomous areas to educate all the people in patriotism, communism and the state's national policies. It also stresses the need for the cadres and masses of all nationalities to respect, help and learn from each other.

In order to reinforce and develop socialist relations, the regional autonomy law points out in its preface that Han nationality chauvinism and local-nationality chauvinism should both be opposed. These incorrect ideas and tendencies are harmful to the unity of the people of all nationalities.

But they are contradictions among the people, and should be solved through democratic discussion, criticism and self-criticism. Problems of thinking and understanding shouldn't be treated as contradictions between ourselves and the enemies. Of course, activities aimed at betraying and splitting the country are problems of an entirely different nature. □

Minorities Law Will Bring Prosperity for All

by JIAN CHUAN
and WU NAITAO
Our Correspondents

ON June 1, the day after the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress closed, several hundred deputies representing ethnic minorities got together to celebrate the adoption of the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities. Highly elated, many talked about the significance of the law.

"The newly adopted Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities will guide our people

in correctly handling relations between different ethnic groups and promote unity, equality and common prosperity for all nationalities," said Aisin-Gioro Pu Jie, a Manchu deputy and younger brother of Pu Yi, the last Qing Dynasty emperor. "Such a law can only be formulated in New China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party."

After the feudal Qing court was overthrown in 1911, Pu Jie, now 77, was asked to accompany his brother to study in the Forbidden City. In 1931, after the Japanese created the September 18th Inci-

dent and invaded China's north-east, some Manchu aristocrats, including Pu Jie, openly allied themselves with the invaders and set up the puppet regime of Manchukuo. In 1945 Pu Jie was convicted of war crimes and jailed. He was released in 1959 on an amnesty. His own experience has taught him the importance of the national problem.

"During the several thousand years of feudal rule in China, various ethnic groups discriminated against one another, oppressing and killing each other, which led to the different nationalities be-

June 25, 1984



Pu Jie.

coming estranged," he said. "In its latter years, the Qing court was ordered by the emperor to formulate a constitution. The government of the Republic of China (1912-49) also issued 19 tenets after the 1911 Revolution. But since they all proceeded from the interests of the ruling classes and served to oppress other nationalities, they could never solve the national problem."

During the Qing Dynasty, he recalled, the ruling Manchus oppressed other peoples. After 1911 their fortunes went downhill, and in the early years of the Republic of China there was a popular slogan calling upon the people to drive the Manchus out.

To avoid discrimination and oppression, many Manchus changed their names and adopted Han nationality.

"After the founding of New China," he said, "the Chinese Communist Party formulated correct national policies. In 1952, the government adopted the programme for exercising regional national autonomy. The programme was later incorporated into the 1954 Constitution, which ensured equality between different nationalities

and further harmonized their relations."

Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee in 1978, the Party's national policies have been earnestly implemented, helping to dispel the Manchu people's sense of inferiority, Pu Jie said. Efforts are under way to revive Manchu culture. In 1982, *Pearl Lake*, the first dance drama reflecting legendary Manchu life, was staged. Later, the Manchus living in Beijing had their first gathering. According to the third national census in 1982 the Manchu population totalled 4 million. Of these, many had changed their nationality back from Han to Manchu. Currently, preparations are being made to set up autonomous prefectures or counties in northeast China where Manchus live in compact communities.

Pu Jie was elected an NPC deputy on the eve of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1978. At the First Session of the Sixth NPC held last year he was elected Vice-Chairman of the newly founded Nationalities Committee under the NPC Standing Committee. Over the past year, he has devoted himself to working for ethnic minorities and participating in discussions about the law on regional national autonomy.

The law was drafted in 1980 and submitted to the National People's Congress after the opinions of all parties in the minority areas had been solicited and repeated discussions and revisions had been made. Between its founding and now, the NPC Nationalities Committee held 10 meetings to discuss the draft law. The basic principle for formulating this law has been to follow legal procedure to ensure the healthy development of the system of minority national autonomy and the harmony and prosperity of all nationalities.



Gan Huaiyi.

Gan Huaiyi, vice-chairman of the standing committee of the people's congress of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, predicted that the new law will boost Guangxi's economic construction.

Lying on the southern border of China, Guangxi is the home of the Zhuang people, the most populous of China's minority groups. The first autonomous prefecture for Zhuangs was founded in 1952 in western Guangxi, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, one of China's five provincial-level national minority autonomous regions, was founded in 1958. There are 10 minorities in the region, and autonomous counties have been founded in areas where these ethnic groups live in compact communities. More than 13 million people, or one-third of the region's population, are members of minorities.

Gan said that in the early days after liberation Guangxi's industry was underdeveloped, with only a few handicraft workshops and some old factories left over from the Kuomintang government. Hydro-electric generating capacity for the entire region came to only 10,000 kw, with an annual output of less than 100 million kwh. Agriculture was also backward. In

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some places, the minority peoples still used the primitive slash-and-burn method.

After 1958, the regional government was empowered to exercise autonomy within the limits of authority prescribed by the 1952 programme for the exercise of regional national autonomy. The region also received generous help from the state. As a result, the region's economy, culture and education have developed apace over the past 25 years. Gan had a chart marking the changes since 1958:

	1957	1983	Increase
Gross industrial and agricultural output value	2,370 million yuan	18,500 million yuan	7.8 times
Total industrial output value	720 million yuan	9,940 million yuan	13.8 times
Total agricultural output value	1,650 million yuan	8,560 million yuan	5.1 times
Hydro-electric generating capacity	10,000 kw	1.87 million kw	187 times
Electricity output	100 million kwh	6,500 million kwh	65 times
Grain output	3,250 million kg	13,250 million kg	4 times
Institutes of higher learning	3	17	5.7 times
Student enrolment	3,900	27,000	6.9 times

Gan was confident about the region's development, saying, "The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities stipulates that each autonomous area shall be given more power to decide its own financial affairs, handle its own goods and materials and exploit its natural resources. These areas may introduce special policies and flexible measures as long as they do not violate the Constitution. This has provided more favourable conditions for the progress of the autonomous areas."

He listed his autonomous region's strong points:


—The region is located in a sub-tropical area, with conditions favourable to developing farming

and aquaculture. World-famous Guilin also gives it great tourism potential.

—The region has more than 6.66 million hectares of uncultivated land, barren hills and unexploited water surface, giving it a great potential for developing its agriculture, forestry and fishery.

—The region has more than 20 kinds of competitive agricultural staples, and sideline and local products which enjoy a ready market both at home and abroad. It also abounds with hydro-electric capac-

living will be much improved by the turn of the century.



Jipu Pinguocideng.

Jipu Pinguocideng, deputy administrative head of the Tibet Autonomous Region, said that since Tibet's peaceful liberation in 1951 and the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965, profound political and economic changes have taken place there. He said the newly adopted law on regional autonomy has bolstered his confidence about Tibet's future.

He thought highly of the stipulation regarding the promotion and training of minority cadres. He said there are currently many tasks in Tibet to be done. Emphasis is being laid on economic development so that Tibetans can become affluent as soon as possible. To actively train Tibetan cadres, professionals and skilled workers is vital to the region's development. He said that although the local government has made tremendous efforts and achieved some results it still finds it difficult to keep abreast of the times.

According to Jipu, Tibetan cadres come mainly from local schools, institutes for nationalities and other institutes of higher learning elsewhere in China. Today, six of the autonomous region's eight administrative heads are Tibetans; the other two are Hans. Seventy per cent of the cadres at

ity, forest and mineral resources. Its reserves of tin, antimony and zinc rank first in China.

—Guangxi is close to Hongkong and Macao. Sea transportation from the region leads directly to Southeast Asia, and its railway lines, highways and water navigation lines radiate in all directions. Recently, its port city Beihai was designated as one of the 14 coastal cities which will adopt more flexible economic policies.

Gan said these strong points will be given fuller play and the region's economic development in the coming years will be faster than in the previous 25 years. He is quite sure that the standards of

and above the bureau level are Tibetans, and the chief responsible members of the governments at the lower levels are all Tibetans. Since they are familiar with local customs, habits and conditions, these Tibetan cadres have played an important role in the region's construction.

"We are desperate for competent people in all professions, and particularly economists and teachers," he said. The region has only 100 engineers and 300 technicians, a shortage Jipu attributed to the slow development of education in the region. To change this, he said, the local government plans to train 10,000 college and secondary technical school graduates before the end of the 1980s. The law on regional autonomy stipulates that the state shall help minority areas develop education. "This will be a powerful support for us," Jipu said. The local government also plans, beginning this year, to set up grant-aided primary and secondary boarding schools for Tibetan children living in pasture-lands and mountains. Efforts will be made to raise teaching standards in primary and secondary schools.

Jipu also said that preparatory work is being made to build the Tibetan University. The work has been delayed because of a lack of teachers and experience in running a university. But, he said, as the pace of construction quickens throughout Tibet, efforts will be made to overcome this difficulty and things will look up.

North of Tibet is the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, home of the Uygur people. Badai, a deputy from the region, is proud of the culture of his people, who are gifted singers and dancers. Talking about the stipulation that self-governing bodies will work independently for the development of the minority literature, art, publications, broadcasting, films, TV programmes and other cultural un-

dertakings, Badai said this is exactly what they have been doing over the past decades.

There are 13 minorities in Xinjiang. The 6 million Uygurs are the largest ethnic group, and the Tartars, with a population of between 600 and 700, are the smallest. The region has five autonomous prefectures and six auto-



Badai.


nomous counties, where common local spoken languages are employed. The *Xinjiang Daily* is published in three languages, Han, Uygur and Kazakh. The Xinjiang Publishing House publishes books in six languages. All minority languages in Xinjiang have been developed and put to use.

Badai said the local government has attached high importance to collecting and compiling Uygur classical culture, including classical folk music and dances. It has set up a department specialized in studying the traditional *Twelve Mukam* — basic musical forms that serve as the foundation of Xinjiang music. Old folk artists are invited to have their songs recorded, which are later published. Inspired by Xinjiang folk art, local artists have composed many new songs, dances and operas, such as *Ailipu Sainaimu*, a popular opera which has been made into a film.

The local government, with the aid of a state special fund, is organizing teams to compile *Manas*, a lengthy folk epic of the Khalkhas that has been handed down from ancient times. The work actually began before the "cultural revolution" started. But, during those chaotic years, the record was burnt as a symbol of feudal culture. "The law on regional autonomy has a provision about publishing minority classics which has put the work under legal protection," said Badai.

To celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the region plans to publish a dictionary of Turkic and 30 ancient books, including a collection of poems entitled *Wisdom of Fuluo*, which covers historical events, local customs and habits.

Salameiti Alimu, an Uzbek deputy from Xinjiang, as well as deputy head and director of the Xinjiang Song and Dance Ensemble, is encouraged by the regional autonomy law's provision of maintaining and developing minority culture. More than 20 performances created by the ensemble have won gold medals or first prizes at international or national contests. The ensemble, with 200 members from eight minorities, has both old folk artists and young graduates from art colleges or national institutes, who have contributed to the flourishing minority arts by imbuing traditional artistic forms with new content. They also frequently give performances abroad, serving as ambassadors of friendship.



Beijing Review, No. 26

China Strives to Calm Tensions in Key Province

CHINA, From A1

police force refused to execute him and the local Army command threatened to mutiny if the sentence was carried out, Cheng Ming reported. Further trouble was averted when the sentence was commuted.


Another incident occurred in June in Kashi, which is 60 miles from the Soviet border. After weeks of fighting with Chinese, a band of 200 Uighurs tried to storm an Army base outside the city, according to a Chinese source. The attack was repulsed and the Uighur leaders arrested, said the source who lives in Xinjiang.

Trying to restore stability, Peking dispatched Politburo member Wang Zhen to Xinjiang twice in 1980. But Wang, who served as the province's first party secretary until the early 1950s, was unable to contain the violence and political fissures within the provincial party committee, according to diplomats.

The situation deteriorated so badly last month that Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who is China's most powerful political leader, traveled the 1,500 miles from Peking to Xinjiang to help mediate political infighting between Chinese and Uighur members of the provincial ruling committee, according to diplomats.

Although publicly Chinese officials describe Deng's nine-day visit as a "routine general inspection," others say privately he confronted a revolt by Uighur provincial committee members against the Chinese ruling majority.

High-ranking Chinese officials have told diplomats that Deng ordered a reorganization of the provincial committee, which serves as Xin-



By Dave Cook—The Washington Post

jiang's local ruling body. The diplomats were told that Xinjiang's first party secretary, Wang Feng, was recalled to Peking, although that report was later publicly denied.

The second party secretary, however, was replaced within recent months. The new official, Gu Jingsheng, was the deputy political commissar of the Canton military command. His military background is said to reflect Peking's interest in reestablishing order in Xinjiang.

In its September edition, Cheng Ming reported that Deng discovered an "unsteady situation" in Xinjiang. The magazine said that Uighur dissidents had planned a province-wide uprising against Chinese rule, following the slogan "We want self-rule and don't want to be dominated."

Xinjiang, a vast and arid outback in the northwest corner of China, is one of five so-called autonomous provinces with large concentrations of minorities. These regions were set up by the Communist Party as places where China's ethnic groups could enjoy some degree of freedom to practice their religion, maintain their traditions and teach their languages.

Although China has more than 50 different minority strains, they make up only 6 percent of the nation's 1

billion people. China's vast majority are known as Han Chinese, named for the Han Dynasty of 2,000 years ago that laid the foundation of the Chinese empire.

Despite their high-minded minorities policy, communist leaders have long encouraged, and sometimes forced, migrations of Han Chinese settlers to the autonomous regions to dilute ethnic influence and help assure central control along China's troubled borders.

This was especially true in Xinjiang, where Uighurs and other Moslem minorities have longstanding ties with Turkic people in the Soviet Union. Part of the province was ruled by a Soviet-sponsored semi-autonomous regime before the communist takeover in 1949.

Since 1949, 5 million Han Chinese have been brought to Xinjiang from eastern China to help assimilate the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tatars and other minorities who are among the most rebellious in China.

The integration effort began with the founding of the commune in 1958 and greatly intensified during

the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), when the Arabic script was outlawed in favor of the Latin alphabet, mosques were closed, Moslem classics burned and traditional songs replaced by radical leftist dogma.

This clash of cultures resulted in fierce fighting in 1967 when thousands of Red Guards went to Xinjiang and criticized the religious practices of the proud Uighurs as "feudal."

Since the Cultural Revolution, Peking has taken pains to ensure ethnic rights and elevate minority group members to leadership positions. In Xinjiang, a kind of affirmative action program has been started at the provincial university to guarantee that 60 percent of new students are from ethnic backgrounds.

Cadres of Uighur background have been given special priority for enrollment in party schools and training institutes to raise their educational level, and in recent local elections, Uighurs and Kazakhs have won a majority of the seats.

From Washington Post

بۇ خەتتە رەزىمىگە تۇلۇق كېلىپ يە تىگەن بولسا ،
بۇنى ياخشى مولاھىزە قىلىپ بولغۇدە بۇ ماقالە يە زىي
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Ethnic Conflict in Strategic Western Province (*) Alarms Peking

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Foreign Service

PEKING, Sept. 11.—China's sensitive northwest region that borders the Soviet Union has been shaken in recent months by communal fighting and a group demands for greater rule, according to diplomatic and Chinese sources.

The recent trouble in Xinjiang Province constitutes China's most serious minority problem in years and has already prompted emergency inspection tours by Chinese Po-

litburo members and top provincial leadership changes.

Xinjiang's stability is of great concern to Peking because of the province's location contiguous with four unfriendly neighbors—the Soviet Union, India, Mongolia and Afghanistan. It also is home for the Lop Nor nuclear test site and 250,000 Chinese border guards.

The region's strategic sensitivity is sharpened by what the Chinese claim to be constant Soviet radio broadcasts beamed into Xinjiang in

several tongues urging the province's various minorities to resist Chinese domination.

Longstanding ethnic tension recently surfaced as a result of renewed demands for self-rule by the Uighurs (pronounced we-gurs), a Turkic people of Moslem faith who compose the largest minority in Xinjiang.

The Uighurs, who make up almost half of Xinjiang's 12 million people, ask for greater religious freedom and fiscal autonomy from Peking and for

less control by Chinese, who are fewer in number but occupy the top posts in the party, government, military and police force.

Ethnic friction exploded into a series of violent incidents pitting Uighurs against Chinese in at least two Xinjiang cities, according to Chinese sources and reports in the Hong Kong communist magazine, Cheng Ming.

The first incident in April 1980 began after a Uighur man was killed by two Chinese in the eastern Xin-

jiang city of Aksu, according to Cheng Ming. The Uighurs retaliated by beating up several hundred Chinese, smashing Chinese homes and damaging a factory run by Chinese, the magazine said.

A few months later in the southern city of Kashi, a Chinese soldier driving a military truck struck and killed a Uighur pedestrian. When the court dominated by Uighurs convicted the driver and sentenced him to death, the predominantly Chinese

See CHINA, A25, Col. 1

Chinese Move to Protect A Flank

Deep in the Eurasian land mass and far from any ocean lies an area fought over since earliest history by Huns, Persians, Turks, Mongols, Russians and Chinese. Today the land once known as Eastern Turkestan is the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, and the Chinese are planning to develop it as a future base of military might and economic self-sufficiency — if Moscow doesn't interfere. Newsday's Asia Bureau chief recently spent three weeks in the strategic border zone. This is the first of two reports.


By William Sexton
Newsday Asia Bureau

Urumqi, Xinjiang — When Chinese troops invaded Vietnam in 1979, many people, including Chinese officials, expected the Soviet Union to retaliate by attacking China's thinly guarded desert domain along the Soviet underbelly in Central Asia.

In most military analysts' view, the under-equipped, under-trained People's Liberation Army,



New China Pictures Co.



Cavalrymen from a Chinese People's Liberation Army unit, above, patrol the mountainous Soviet border with local militiamen. At left, map details Xinjiang Province.

with its 1960-vintage jets and tanks, would have been no match for the powerful Soviet war machine deployed along the frontier of Xinjiang, China's mineral-rich central Asian territory. Russia's claims to the area go back three centuries, and the brand-new alliance with Hanoi offered the excuse to move. But the Soviets didn't march on Xinjiang. Instead, they invaded neighboring Afghanistan within the year.

Since the Soviet invasion, Peking has taken a fresh look at the Soviet threat in Xinjiang. By 1980 a new army commander had been dispatched, and last year the Communist Party replaced its regional first secretary, the *de facto* governor-general of an area making up one-sixth of China. This summer the central regime is reactivating the special military unit that originally put the sorely underdeveloped territory under Chinese Communist control after 1949.

Precisely because it is underdeveloped — only 13 million persons, or less than 2 per cent of China's total population, live in an area the size of Western Europe — Xinjiang is especially vulnerable to Soviet pressure. An attack on China's other frontier zone to the east would threaten the Manchurian industrial base, where perhaps one-half the country's technological capacity is sited, and might call down a nuclear response from Peking's small but respectable missile arsenal. In Xinjiang, Peking presumably would not invite retaliation against its own cities by playing the nuclear card in the desert. Here its defense strategy is generally conceded to embrace giving ground while mounting guerrilla attacks against an invader's supply lines.

The traveler following Marco Polo's path along the narrow corridor leading into China from the Xinjiang frontier sees no evidence of a Maginot Line. But the mountains flanking the long approach provide an obvious redoubt for massive guerrilla

—Continued on Page 11

Newsday Map/Philip Dionisio

Border Area Long-Coveted

Newsday Asia Bureau

Urumqi, Xinjiang — Afghanistan was not the first target of Russian ambitions in Central Asia's strategic heartland. The czars gave that honor to Xinjiang, the corridor of riches that led Marco Polo into China in the 13th Century.

In Polo's day, the bounty was silk and jade. For Peter the Great, it was gold and territory. Today there is oil, coal, iron, aluminum, copper and tungsten, as well as gold, hydropower and a potential empire of farmland.

Xinjiang sprawls across central Asia like a bloated half moon facing into the Soviet Union, its 640,000 square miles (about the area of Western Europe) accommodating a mere 13 million souls. A single-track railroad links the Chinese *nei lu* (inner land) with the capital of Urumqi in the crescent's northern reach; the trip from Peking is four nights and three days. Khashgar, the ancient caravan terminal at the crescent's western tip, is roughly equidistant from Peking and Moscow and has no railroad.

More than two thousand years have passed since the Han emperor Wu Di dispatched the first expedition to secure the territory in 138 BC. Its Chinese name is as appropriate now as then: Xinjiang means "new frontier." Today the frontier consists of 2,700 miles of tense, often-disputed border with the Soviet Union and its lockstep ally, Outer Mongolia, plus another 75 miles with Afghanistan's northeast corner.

Although the oasis outposts of Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu and Turfan were famous among traders as far back as Roman times, the best-known place on the modern map is probably Lop Nor, the Gobi wasteland where China tests its nuclear bombs. Just to the west in the Gansu corridor, shielded from the

nearby Soviet-Mongol border by desert mountains, is believed to be the principal missile launch complex from which China tested its first ICBM in May, 1980.

The several hundred thousand Soviet troops poised along the Xinjiang frontier since the 1960s — and another 200,000 in adjoining Afghanistan since Dec. 27, 1979 — are only one of Peking's concerns in the region. Another is the apparent restiveness of the narrow majority of Xinjiang residents who are not of Han (ethnic Chinese) descent. Many are Moslems with close ethnic ties to central Asian peoples in the Soviet Union and Mideast, and Islam's stirrings to the west may be causing serious echoes in the reopened mosques along the Old Silk Road. Only recently the Chinese media admitted an apparently serious uprising there in October.

The train from Peking crosses the 2-mile-high Wuchiao continental divide in Gansu Province — on the west the Yellow River flows to the Pacific, on the east Xinjiang's Erix River (Irtysch to the Russians) north across Siberia to the Arctic Ocean. Endless chains of mountains seem to enfold the narrow Gansu corridor, the floor sometimes flat, sometimes rolling but almost always desert. In Xinjiang the Gobi Desert widens out, and at Urumqi a broad pass slices through the *Tian Shan* (heavenly peak) mountains into the Djunggar Basin adjoining Soviet Kazakhstan and Outer Mongolia.

The corridor seems an inviting path for Soviet armor, but the mountains are honeycombed with defense positions, including munitions and food enough to support years of guerrilla operation against an invader. The strategy may sound primitive, but the Chinese are greatly comforted by Moscow's inability to pacify a similar terrain in Afghanistan after 30 months of intense warfare.

—Sexton

China Solidifying Hold on Region

—Continued From Page 4

forces, and the main passenger traffic at small desert railway stations consists of soldiers in uniform. Two hours outside the capital of Urumqi, a heavy artillery battery is visible. The huge gun fires a single round as the train passes.

Foreign journalists aren't permitted anywhere near the Soviet frontier. The bulk of Xinjiang is closed to all foreigners except for a handful of oil exploration technicians, mountain climbers and occasional travel magazine staffers who are shown carefully selected corners of the exotic region.

Chinese travelers describe the border as slicing across almost continuous mountains, the traditional grazing land of nomadic Moslem shepherds who wandered freely back and forth until the border was slammed shut in 1962.

"The Soviets build guard towers here and there," said one Chinese source, "then we build watch towers to observe their watch towers. You can see the Soviets, always with their binoculars. The only barbed wire is around the guard towers. Sometimes they'll suddenly move a tower, so we move ours. And in summer when the herds move out of the valleys, we'll see their patrols reconnoitering the hillsides."

Possibly because neither side wants to alienate the Kazak, Kirgiz and other minority peoples living on both sides of the border, it is a far quieter one than the strife-ridden line between China and Vietnam. The last fatal incident made public took place in July, 1979. China charged that Soviet border guards fired on a livestock farm in Tacheng, killing a Han (ethnic Chinese) woman official and kidnapping a Kirgiz veterinarian who wasn't released until February, 1980. "They tried to make me provide information on the military, topography and streets in Tacheng and the grazing routes on the stock farm," veterinarian Burumbutug was quoted as saying after his release.

Life is hard for the defenders. In mid-May, a convoy of 160 vehicles was marooned by a late blizzard in South Xinjiang on the highway to Western Tibet. "Several hundred people . . . were rescued after four days' and nights' effort by the People's Liberation Army and people of various nationalities [minorities]," the official news agency reported.

A recent Urumqi radio broadcast revealed disension within the army over such hardships. "The fourth company of a certain [air force] unit is stationed on the Tian Shan mountains," the broadcast

Apart from the obvious military preparations, China's main strategy for holding Xinjiang has been to fill it with Han people. A generation ago there were 3 million non-Han residents, mostly Islamic, to only 1 million Han. The 1981 population estimate listed 7.5 million from the minorities, and 5.3 million Han. But the Han influx has exacerbated rather than relieved the strategic situation because of mounting friction between the mostly Moslem indigenous people — 5.8 million of them Uygurs of Turkic background — and the largely nonreligious Han. By law the Uygurs, Kazaks, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongol, Tadz-hik and other "nationalities" are just as Chinese as the Han Chinese.

In the past, China had three sources of Han emigrants — demobilized soldiers, high school graduates for whom no jobs could be found in established cities, and lawbreakers or dissidents ("bad elements") exiled for "re-education through labor." No figures exist on the number sent to Xinjiang as punishment, although an official of the Shihezi state farm complex west of Urumqi admitted that 3,000 "counter-revolutionaries" and "rightists" were included in the population of half a million. The proportion may be considerably greater in less-desirable reclamation colonies deeper in the desert.

Disenchanted "educated youth" have proven almost as great a problem for authorities as the stubbornly independent and religious minorities. Correspondents covering the Boston Symphony Orchestra's visit to Shanghai in 1979 witnessed noisy demonstrations by young people demanding permanent relocation. They had been permitted to visit Shanghai for the Chinese New Year's festival and refused to return to Xinjiang. Apparently the problem still exists. A Shanghai newspaper reported in May that government "organizations in Nanshi County [a suburb] have paid much attention to the work of indoctrinating youth to go back and support the construction in Xinjiang . . . with their earnest efforts many youth . . . have changed their mind and decided to go back."

Involuntary transfers supposedly ended with the Cultural Revolution. Estimates of the total of young people shipped west range up to 1 million and more. Urumqi radio once gave the figure of 200,000 for the years 1968-74. Since the program began about 1960 and was still going on in 1976, the 1 million figure might not be far off.

At Shihezi, Wu Quangyu, 39, and his wife, Cheng Rong, 36, insisted they have no desire to leave their new home to rejoin family in Shanghai.

tral Asia must be a nightmare for Moscow and perhaps one reason for deploying an estimated one-fourth of the Soviet Union's armed forces along the border.

Bahaer, the Uygur spokesman of the Nationalities Commission, denies there is any plan to bring more Han in to Xinjiang. Vice Gov. Amudong Nyazi is more candid. "One day Xinjiang will have a need for additional labor force from Central China," he said. "But there must be education this time about the party's nationality policy. That could take 10 or 20 or 30 years." Given the population pressure back east, it's more likely that emigration will resume as soon as the new military superstructure puts Xinjiang's house in order.

China's main success story in Xinjiang has been the army's "Production and Construction Corps," the *bingtuan*. It had its beginnings as an almost Machiavellian ploy for dispersing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's defeated northwestern armies after the Communist victory of 1949. Instead of repatriating the hundreds of thousands of nationalists back to their homes in eastern and southern China, Communist Commander Wang Zhen merged them into his army and assigned the mixed units to reclamation duty in the desert. In the east, meanwhile, the army recruited thousands of young single women and shipped them off to the northwest, where nature quickly took its course. Now the *bingtuan* is self-perpetuating.

It's a two-sided army: building families, farms and factories on the one hand while providing China's strategic reserve against Soviet expansion on the other. The accomplishments before its dissolution in 1975 were remarkable: 2.5 million acres, or almost the area of Connecticut, converted into farmland by irrigation, 170 mechanized state farms established and manned, and 691 industrial enterprises from power plants to woolen mills set up to supply the region and process its agricultural output for export. Throughout, the *bingtuan* kept its military organization, a factory constituting a battalion, a cluster of state farms a division, and all geared to switch into combat roles on a moment's notice. Some nationalists didn't do badly. After surrendering his artillery battalion in 1949, Col. Shi Yingyu became an army staff officer — then capital investment chief at Shihezi, now at age 70, vice mayor of a prefecture of half a million people.

Such was the *bingtuan*'s clout by the 1960s that Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Red Guards were physically prevented from spreading the Cultural Revolu-

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border region were too great." Air force headquarters in Urumqi sent "a propaganda group into the units to conduct education for the officers and fighters in loving the motherland, Xinjiang, and their units and jobs."

There is also anti-Chinese propaganda from powerful Soviet radio transmitters and, for the central Asian peoples, the strong attraction to join relatives elsewhere. The Turkish embassy in Peking reports continual traffic between Xinjiang's Uygurs and their cousins in Turkey. People's Daily, the central Communist Party organ, revealed July 7 that a "political working group" had to be dispatched "to help a regiment stationed in the Djunggar basin" just across the Soviet border in North Xinjiang. "This education made a great change in the mental attitude of the officers and men," People's Daily said.

"The uncle of Duonati Niyazi, a deputy battalion commander of the Uygur nationality, is manager of a private factory in a foreign country, and he asked Niyazi to go to work with him and inherit his property, but Niyazi decided to stay and do his job for the party."

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schoolteacher, and their bright little row house offers about three times the space a similar family of four would be allotted in Shanghai. Still, their eldest son's given name means "born in Shanghai" (during a vacation), and Wu concedes that life in Shihezi is far better than on more remote state farms where most of the young people end up.

Officials here insist that so-called "educated youth" with family problems are allowed to return to the cities. That's a half-truth at best. One young man sent to Xinjiang in the earlier 1960s was allowed to return to Peking two years ago to attend graduate school. Now the school wants him to join its faculty — but his wife and two children cannot get permits to leave the small town they're assigned to south of the Taklamakan ("no return") Desert.

Fully developed, Xinjiang should be able to support 10 times the present population of 13 million. Once the mountains' heavy snowfall is harnessed to irrigation and hydropower, and the transportation bottleneck solved, it's inevitable that Han emigration will be stepped up again. The prospect of 100 million Chinese living right next door to Soviet Cen-

6
take Shihezi by force on Jan. 28, 1967, they were repelled in a pitched battle that left a reported 100 dead and 500 injured. Tourists are not told that story, however.

Nor do officials in Urumqi offer much information on the suffering of the minority peoples under the Communist Party's policies from 1966 to 1976 — the Gang of Four years — designed to wipe out their religion, language and other historic characteristics. Since the Moslems fought back, the death toll may have been heavy. Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping set about reversing the attitude toward minorities after Mao's death in 1976, but there is some evidence of continuing persecution. At a party conference marking the new year, First Secretary Wang Enmao gave the regime's first task for 1982 as "further consolidate and develop the region's political situation of stability and unity." And the key to that, he went on, "lies in implementing the party's nationality policy and promoting the unity of nationalities." That's the Marxist way of saying it hasn't been done yet.

Next: Xinjiang's Minority Populations

U.S. Set to Extend Grain Pact

Washington (UPI) — President Reagan has reached a tentative decision to extend an agreement to export grain to the Soviet Union for one more year, and will not negotiate a new pact, administration officials said yesterday.

Officials said there were "some discussions" at the White House yesterday on continuing the sale of grain to the Soviet Union, but Reagan did not participate.

The President still must make a final decision on the agreement, but signs point to a one-year extension, the officials said.

Agriculture Secretary John Block and the farm belt states have been clamoring for a longer agreement with the Soviets.

But Reagan has maintained a hard line against the Soviets for their role in the crackdown on the Polish worker movement.

Reagan held a series of meetings over the past several weeks to hear appeals for a five-year agreement, but decided to reject the proposal, officials said.

At the Agriculture Department, John Ochs, spokesman for Block, had no comment on the report, but said a formal announcement will come soon.

Sources on Capitol Hill said a series of options for the course of the agreement when the current pact expires Sept. 30 was presented at a cabinet meeting nine days ago. Two proposals — one

for an extension of the pact at higher minimum purchase levels, and one to allow it to expire and allow the Soviets to buy U.S. grain on what one administration source called a "free market" basis — were rejected at the meeting.


All that remained to be decided after the meeting, officials said, is how much to increase the minimum and maximum purchase levels and the duration of the extension.

The current pact requires the Soviet Union to buy 6 million metric tons of U.S. wheat and corn a year. The Kremlin can buy up to 8 million tons without U.S. permission. The original five-year

pact was extended last year for one year.

This year, the United States offered to sell 23 million tons and the Kremlin has bought nearly 14 million tons.

Most American farmers favor guaranteed minimum sales because their share of the Soviet market was reduced after President Carter embargoed grain in reaction to the December, 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan lifted the embargo in April, 1981, but the historical U.S. share of the Soviet market has fallen from more than 50 per cent to 33 per cent last year. The Soviet market is especially important this year because the Russians are expected to harvest their fourth poor crop in a row.



Newsday Photos / William Sexton
Imam Hadji Abdullah leads prayers in Urumqi mosque in western province of Xianjiang, China. Outside the mosque are village girls Amina, 8, left, and Munir, 5.

China Courting Its Moslems

Second of two articles on Chinese Central Asia, the border area between China and the Soviet Union.

By William Sexton
Newsday Asia Bureau

Urumqi, Xinjiang — His intense, desert-tan eyes sparkling with excitement, the Imam Hadji Abdullah announced to the foreign visitor seated cross-legged with him on a worn carpet in the blue-walled mosque: "There is wonderful news for Islam today."

It had been decided, he said, to reopen local Koran academies here and in Kashgar, China's westernmost city in Central Asia, for the first time since the 1950s. That should assure a new generation of imams to replace the aging spiritual leaders left over from prerevolutionary China.

Ending the prohibition on religious instruction probably represents a profound strategic decision by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic regime. It is probably no coincidence that China sent its Xinjiang song-and-dance ensemble of Central Asian artists — mostly Moslem — on a tour of Tunisia, Jordan and Turkey this summer.

Peking's initiative toward its Moslem minority makes considerable sense since the Soviet invasion of

Moslem Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet Union probably contains more Moslems than any other country, residents of the former Central Asian Khanates gobbled up by the Russian czars a century ago. If Peking can pacify its own significant Moslem minority and forge new ties with the Arab theocracies — a very large "if" — the impact would surely be felt among Soviet Moslems restive over the Afghan invasion.

China has an estimated 13 million believers in Islam, roughly equivalent to the entire population of Iraq. Most live in the northwest provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu and Ningxia that provided Marco Polo his route to Kublai Khan's court in the 13th Century and now form China's longest frontier with the Soviet Union. Many Chinese Moslems are of Hui nationality, which is indistinguishable in physical features from the majority Han (ethnic Chinese). In Xinjiang, however, the bulk are Caucasian-featured Central Asians like the Imam Hadji Abdullah, a member of the Uygur nationality, which is closely related to the Turks.

A charismatic figure who radiates dignity, warmth and inner strength, Abdullah obviously has made his peace with the Chinese who govern the "Uygur autonomous region of Xinjiang," because of all the 1,500 imams who reportedly survived the Cultural Revolution, he is the one to whom foreign journalists are taken for interviews.

The "Hadji" in his name signifies that he has been to Mecca twice — in 1958 and 1962, before Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution of 1966 set out to eliminate religion and ethnic diversity. That year he had to doff the crocheted white skullcap of his office and put on a dunce's cap while being dragged through the streets by Red Guards. Then he was sent into the desert to work as a farmer for two years before re-

turning to virtual house arrest in Urumqi. "I was not worried," he said. "I knew Islam would survive, for it is so written in the Koran."

His mosque was returned to its Uygur congregation two years ago after serving as a warehouse. Abdullah refused to estimate how many believers come to his mosque to pray but said there were 300,000 among the capital's population of 800,000.

Since 1949 the Communists have wrought many changes even among the believers. Child marriage and polygamy are prohibited. Xinjiang's women abandoned the veil, and most have traded the trousers they formerly had to wear under their skirts for heavy, but considerably cooler, stockings. Still, when an attempt was made to photograph three old women selling scarves on the street opposite the mosque, an elderly Uygur patriarch berated one because her knees were showing.

One change the Uygurs resist is China's insistence on setting clocks to the same hour as Peking, even though Urumqi is as far west as is Denver from Washington. Imam Abdullah looks at a timepiece which reads six o'clock, and says it is four o'clock.

In the *Tian Shan* (Heavenly Peak) foothills, Kazaks, the second-largest Islamic majority, extract a spartan livelihood by raising sheep and goats. "It's a terribly hard life," said Adiljan Kasim, a Uygur interpreter. "Sometimes a Kazak gives up and comes to the city, but they always return to the hills."

In 1950, Kazaks along the border staged a full-scale *jihād* (holy war) against the Chinese until the leaders were caught and executed. In 1962, 60,000 of them simply packed up their *yurts* (felt tents) and

—Continued on Page 15



Hadji Abdullah

Chinese, Turkic Minority in Northwest Live in Uneasy Truce

The Washington Post
January 4
1985

By Lena H. Sun
Washington Post Foreign Service

KASHGAR, China—On the dusty, sandy roads in China's westernmost city, the language that is heard most often above the jingle of the bells on the donkeys is not Chinese but Uighur, a mixture of Turkish and Persian. Five times a day, the call of the muezzin pierces the air and the donkey carts are tethered as their drivers, heeding the call to the faithful, head for nearby mosques.

Here in China's strategic northwestern province of Xinjiang, 60 miles from the Soviet border, the presence of the Uighurs (pronounced way-gurs), a Turkic people of Moslem faith, is clearly felt. In fact, the Uighurs, who make up 80 percent of this city's 180,000 population have more in common with their brethren on the other side of the border than with their comrades in Peking, 3,500 miles to the east.

Xinjiang, China's largest province, is home to 40 of China's 55 minority groups that together make up only 6.7 percent of the country's population. In Xinjiang, the Uighurs are the dominant majority, composing almost half of the region's 13 million people.

Relations between the minorities and the Han Chinese, who make up the vast majority of the country's population, have historically been uneasy here. The Han Chinese are named for the Han dynasty that laid the foundation for the Chinese empire more than 2,000 years ago.

For decades the Peking government has been sending Han Chinese to outlying regions like this one to develop the areas economically and assimilate the minorities into Chinese culture. In recent years, however, the government has moved to ease tensions between the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups by guaranteeing the rights of members of minority groups. Today the minorities have equal rights under the law and within the Communist Party.

But despite these efforts, by August 1981 relations between Chinese and Uighurs in Xinjiang had deteriorated so badly that China's most powerful leader, Deng Xiaoping, traveled from Peking to Xinjiang to help mediate the political infighting between Chinese and Uighur members of the provincial ruling committee, diplomats said then.

According to the September 1981 issue of the Hong Kong Communist magazine *Cheng Ming*, Deng discovered an "unsteady situation." The magazine said Uighur dissidents had planned a province-wide uprising against Chinese rule, using the slogan, "We want self-rule and don't want to be dominated." Peking's response to the com-



Han Chinese cobblers are among skilled workers from other parts of China who earn many times their regular wages working in Xinjiang.

was to replace the Communist Party leader with Gen. Wang Enmao in November 1981. Wang had helped bring the region under Communist control after the party came to power in 1949, and his moderate and pragmatic policies reportedly have earned him support among the people.

Now, as Xinjiang prepares to tackle an ambitious modernization plan to transform China's wild west into China's California by the end of the 21st century, much of its success will hinge on its leaders' ability to achieve ethnic unity and political stability.

The easing of tensions on the Sino-Soviet border in recent years and the reopening of two border posts in Xinjiang for the resumption of trade between the two countries has also allowed the region's leaders to devote more energy and time to internal stability.

In a recent interview, Wang, the province's top political and military leader, described relations between the Han Chinese and the minorities as "very good," a marked improvement from 1982, when he noted that there were still "serious problems." Although local residents say there has been no more of the violence that pitted Uighurs against Han Chinese in the past, at

least two Xinjiang cities, there is a feeling of wariness. "Small frictions," caused by misunderstanding over customs and traditions and the inability to communicate, are common, local residents say.

On a recent Sunday, a group of about 20 Han Chinese youths crowded in front of one store, some smoking cigarettes, all listening to western pop music blaring from a large cassette recorder. Not a single non-Chinese went near them. Instead, they steered clear of the group, some even crossing to the other side of the street to do their shopping.

The misunderstanding and prejudices are particularly common among the younger generations of Han Chinese and Uighurs. There have been instances, for example, when young Han Chinese intentionally have stood in front of praying Uighurs to offend them.

"The Chinese youths who do this look down upon the Uighurs. They do this because they like to pretend that the Uighurs are kowtowing to them," one source said. When Uighurs are in a funeral procession, it is considered a sign of respect for approaching cyclists to dismount, but many of the younger Han Chinese either do not

know better or choose not to, the source said.

Accentuating tensions are the frustrations felt by many of the Han Chinese, many of them skilled workers and technicians sent from China's larger coastal cities, such as Shanghai, to help provide the needed personnel for Xinjiang's economy. They have a hard time adapting to the harsher conditions of life here, Chinese sources said. In addition, they often become frustrated professionally because they are cut off from the latest information in their specialty.

In 1980 and 1981, there were clashes caused by unrest among the former residents of Shanghai who had been sent to the region in the 1950s and who were demanding to return to their native homes. When authorities refused, about 10,000 demonstrated in Aksu, 250 miles northeast of Kashgar. Government offices were taken over and officials attacked before order was restored. Although all of China's different national minorities are equal under the law, they usually have a much lower standard of living than the Han Chinese.

"Yes, in reality there are still disparities [between the Han and the minorities] because they are not equal economically," said

secretary Wang. "And where there are disparities [in income], there will be friction."

China has had a history of quelling the central Asian minorities to assert control over its western frontier. Despite the high-minded policy on minorities, Communist leaders have long encouraged and sometimes forced migrations of Han Chinese settlers to the so-called autonomous regions—set up to allow the ethnic groups some degree of freedom and a chance to maintain their traditions—to dilute the ethnic influences and ensure central control over China's troubled borders.

This was especially true in Xinjiang, where the Uighurs and other Moslem minorities have long-standing ties with the Turkic people in the Soviet Union. Part of the province was ruled by a Soviet-sponsored semiautonomous regime before the Communist takeover of China in 1949.

Since 1949, more than 5 million Chinese have been brought to Xinjiang from eastern China to help assimilate the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Mongols. These ethnic groups are considered to be among the most rebellious minorities in China.

The integration effort began in 1958, with the founding of rural communes, curtailment of private plots and attacks on religion, specifically Islam. Discontent among the minorities was reflected in the exodus of more than 60,000 Kazakhs across the border to Soviet Kazakhstan in 1962.

The assimilation effort reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 when the Arabic alphabet was outlawed in favor of the Latin alphabet, mosques were closed and turned into workshops, Moslem classics were burned, restrictions were imposed on the number of sheep minority peasants could raise, and Han officials delivered speeches in Chinese without providing interpreters.

In 1981, ethnic tension flared in Kashgar when a young Uighur peasant who was digging a ditch got into a fight with a Han Chinese. Neither was able to speak the other's language. In a fistfight the Han was beaten by the stronger and bigger Uighur. Angered, the Han went into his store, took out his hunting gun and shot the Uighur.

While the police searched for relatives of the dead peasant, an angry mob took the body and paraded it through the streets. The mob killed two Hans and beat many others, according to a report last year in the Communist Party newspaper *People's Daily*.

Wang said the dead Uighur's father, who was supported by his son, received compensation from the government. The dead Uighur's sister, who was also supported by her brother, was given a job in a school in the city, he said. The funeral costs were paid by the state. The Han and an account-
See UIGHURS, A16, Col. 1.

Minorities, Chinese Live Together Warily

UIGHURS, From A13

... were executed, according to Hong Kong newspapers.

Since 1978, Peking has tried to ensure ethnic rights and religious freedom and elevate minority group members to leadership positions. Now the head of each of the region's 80 counties is a member of an ethnic minority, said Bahar Rahim, an official working on minority affairs. The Arabic alphabet is back in use and there is no longer a limit to the number of sheep a peasant can raise.

In addition, the government has begun allowing people to make the pilgrimage to Mecca required of devout Moslems, and relatives from

the other side of the border have been allowed to visit Xinjiang. Those who have relatives in the Soviet Union also have been allowed to visit there, officials said.

Emphasis has been given to education, with quotas of up to 60 percent set aside for minorities entering the region's colleges. Since 1982, the regional government also has given rewards to those who have contributed to ethnic unity during an "ethnic unity month" each year.


Some of the minorities who now hold party and leadership posts are among those who most insistently deny that any tensions exist.

When told that some minority leaders in the United States resent what they call tokenism, Abdul Ahet Mohammedjan, Kashgar's deputy mayor for trade and finance, replied angrily: "I have power, I have a post and I have responsibility. This is not like the United States."



But here in Kashgar, despite all the talk about ethnic unity, there is no formal program for the Han Chinese to learn minority languages, although there are many programs to teach the Uighurs to speak Chinese.

Pragmatists like Wang acknowledge that there are many problems. As Xinjiang tries to increase its industrial and agricultural output five-fold over 1980 by the end of this century, it will have to rely heavily on skilled workers and technicians from the interior.

To lure them here, Wang said, the region this year began giving material incentives. Those with a college education will automatically



Uighurs kneel for their five-times-a-day prayers at the Id Kah mosque in the center of Kashgar in China's far northwestern province of Xinjiang.



BY BRAD WIT FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

receive a one-step increase in wages when they first arrive. Every three years after that, another increase is guaranteed. The wage incentives are significant because they are a marked departure from the past, when the Han settlers were told that the glorious task of building up the border area was enough compensation for their work.

Ced Wakaz, 67, a Uighur, said he does not have many complaints. A retired shepherd, he spends most of

his free time taking care of the mosque across from the Abakh Hoja mausoleum, the holiest of pilgrim resorts in southwestern Xinjiang.

On a recent Sunday afternoon, his chores completed, he was relaxing in the sun on a straw mat.

"I was born here. I have a wife and two children and two grandchildren," he said. "We all live together. Life is not bad. I have five *mou* [five-sixths of an acre] of land, four sheep and six chickens. I have enough for myself."

BY LENA H. SUN—THE WASHINGTON POST