RL 94/84

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February 28, 1984

PERSONNEL CHANGES IN TAJIKISTAN

Bess Brown

According to a report broadcast by Radio Moscow on February 17, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR has elected Gaibnazar Pallaev chairman of its presidium.[1] Pallaev replaces Makhmadula Kholov, whose retirement, reportedly for reasons of health, was approved at the previous session of the Supreme Soviet on January 14.[2] A second major change in the Tajik leadership was the replacement at a Central Committee plenum on January 30 of the second secretary of the republican Party organization. Yurii Ivanovich Polukarov, who had held the post since 1975, also retired on pension.[3]

The need to summon the Supreme Soviet for another session only a month after its previous meeting--the annual budget session--reinforces the impression that Kholov's decision to retire was made rather suddenly, apparently before a successor had been decided upon. Kholov's request to be released from his post was relayed to the Supreme Soviet by Tajik Party First Secretary Rakhman Nabiev. No mention of Kholov's retirement had been made at the republican Central Committee plenum held the day before the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, although Kholov, as a member of the republican Party Buro, should have been formally removed from the Buro at the plenum since his membership in the Buro was presumably tied to his position as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The position was not made any clearer by Nabiev's statement to the Supreme Soviet that "deputy Kholov has requested the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan to release him from the duties of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in connection with his retirement on account of the state of his health." Kholov's position as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium was a state post rather than a Party one; to address his request to the Party Central Committee seems highly irregular.

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1. Radio Moscow-1, February 17, 1984.
2. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, January 15, 1984.
3. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, January 31, 1984.

Nabiev informed the Supreme Soviet that Kholov had been awarded a Scroll of Honor by the republican Central Committee (although there had been no word of this in the published report of the proceedings of the plenum of the previous day) in recognition of his many years of fruitful activity in his high state post--he had held the position since 1963--and had been granted a pension. In response to Nabiev's request, the Supreme Soviet dutifully passed a resolution freeing Kholov from his duties.

Kholov's retirement is reminiscent of that of Aleksei Kosygin in 1980. It was widely rumored in the Western press at that time that the then chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR would resign from the Politburo at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in October, 1980, that preceded the annual budget session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Instead, Kosygin's retirement was announced by Leonid Brezhnev, with a minimum of fanfare, at the Supreme Soviet session itself. There was some speculation that Kosygin had been reluctant to retire and had only yielded to pressure from his colleagues after the Central Committee plenum had taken place. Doubt was cast on this interpretation when Kosygin died two months after his resignation.

The new chairman of the Presidium of the Tajik Supreme Soviet is, like Kholov, a Tajik. Pallaev, born in 1929, is less than ten years younger than his predecessor. Whereas Kholov's only known higher education was received at the Higher Party School, Pallaev is a graduate of the Tajik Agricultural Institute. Kholov, after serving in the Soviet Army from 1940 to 1947, embarked on a full-time Party career; Pallaev, in contrast, worked for a number of years as an agronomist, an MTS director, and head of an agricultural inspectorate. In 1959 he held the post of secretary of a raion Party committee, but the following year was named a deputy minister of agriculture. From 1961 to 1973, he served as first secretary of the Leninsky Raion Party Committee, leaving that post to become chairman of the "Tadzhiksel'khoztekhnika" association of the Tajik Council of Ministers. In 1977, he was elected first secretary of the Party committee in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, which had been established that same year. He has been a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan since 1961. An indication of his imminent advancement to a higher post was given at the republican Central Committee plenum on January 30, when he was made a member of the Buro.

This plenum was apparently devoted entirely to personnel changes. In addition to the advancement of Pallaev, the plenum released Yurii Ivanovich Polukarov, second secretary of the republican Party organization since 1975, from his post in connection with his retirement. He was replaced by Yurii Pavlovich Belov, who had been head of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee Department of Agriculture and the Food Industry, apparently the sector dealing with Kazakstan. The report of the

plenum noted that Polukarov had been thanked by the Politburo for his conscientious work on behalf of the Party. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that Polukarov is retiring under a cloud. He is only sixty-three or sixty-four (he was born in 1920), and no reference was made to the state of his health as a reason for his retirement. It is puzzling that the plenum at which Polukarov was replaced took place only two weeks after the previous one. It did not remove Kholov from the Buro, so apparently he still retains his membership in that body despite his resignation from the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet.

There has been no indication in the press that the replacement of Kholov, who is the same age as Polukarov, was for any other reason than that officially given. There also seems to be no connection between the retirement of Kholov and that of Polukarov. There is, at least so far, no hint of the sort of scandal that led in 1961 to the removal of a large part of the Tajik Party and government leadership for falsifying economic figures. It seems possible that Tajik Party chief Nabiev, who obtained his present post in April, 1982, may simply have wanted to promote Pallaev, who has figured prominently in the Tajik press since Nabiev became first secretary.

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COMMISSIONER FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS LECTURES LITHUANIAN PRIESTS

Kestutis Girnius

The sixtieth issue of The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church contains a report of a meeting that took place on May 17, 1983, between the commissioner for religious affairs in Lithuania, Petras Anilionis, and the deacons and vice deacons of the Archdiocese of Kaunas and the Diocese of Vilkaviskas. The commissioner and his subordinates seem to have developed a fondness for such meetings with the Catholic clergy or laity (never both groups together), and they make use of them to lecture, cajole, and at times even threaten their audience, all the while pontificating on the purported virtues of Soviet policy towards the Church.[1]

A typical meeting will consist of: a lengthy harangue against the more militant Lithuanian priests, who are invariably referred to as religious extremists; an expression of incredulity that anyone could even entertain the thought that Catholics in the USSR are subject to discrimination; and ominous reminders that the authorities expect their wishes to be obeyed. Yet it is not all theater. The particular matters brought up for discussion by Anilionis are, obviously, not chosen at random and point to aspects of the Church's activity that irritate if not anger the authorities. Occasionally, in an effort to defend some government policy or restriction, Anilionis presents an argument so tortuous and contrived, so patently absurd, that even the Party press is embarrassed to publish it. Only the Chronicle records such specimens of "dialectical" reasoning.

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1. The Chronicle has reported on a number of such meetings during the past two years. For example, Anilionis met with members of the Parish Committees of the Sakiai Raion on April 4, 1983, and one of his assistants lectured the Parish Committees of the Siauliai Raion on March 30, 1983. Anilionis held a meeting with the Church's hierarchs--i.e., the bishops, the administrator of the Archdiocese of Vilnius, and the head of the Kaunas Seminary--on September 7, 1982. He had previously met with with the deacons of the Archdiocese of Kaunas and the Diocese of Vilkaviskis on May 27, 1982.

Anilionis began the meeting in May by expressing annoyance over a number of petitions that Lithuanian priests had sent to Moscow during the summer of 1982.[2] In his view, the fact that the petitions of the various dioceses were similar in content showed that "they were inspired by one center." Anilionis went on to say that Article 50 of the Lithuanian SSR's constitution, which guarantees freedom of conscience, allows the faithful to take part in religious ceremonies but also grants atheists the right to propagate their views. In return for the right to practice their religion, Catholic priests must not, he argued, respond in any way to the atheist propaganda of Party workers, for otherwise they are violating the freedom of conscience of the atheists. The editors of the Chronicle comment that such an interpretation of the constitution permits the government to undermine religion with all the modern means of communication at its disposal, while leaving Catholics only the right to suffer in silence.

Anilionis further voiced displeasure over two specific assertions that had been made by Catholic priests. The first, which was published in issue No. 54 of the Chronicle, stated:

> Lithuania needs bishops who are capable of going together with the nation to prisons, to concentration camps, and even to death, but not those who would only put an end "from above" to the spiritual rebirth that has already begun.[3]

The second assertion, contained in an appeal by priests of the Archdiocese of Vilnius, stated: "Concessions to the atheist regime cause grave injury to the Church." The Chronicle reports that Anilionis branded the appeal "an outburst of insolent hatred."

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2. One of the petitions, signed by an overwhelming majority (almost 80 percent) of Lithuania's priests, listed most of the principal grievances of the Church: government interference in the internal affairs of the Church; restrictions on the right of priests to propagate the faith and visit and comfort the sick and the dying; discrimination against Catholics; and confiscation of churches and shrines. The petition was addressed to the then head of the Party and state Leonid Brezhnev and to the bishops of Lithuania and was published in issue No. 55 of the Chronicle.

3. For a fuller account of the attitude of Lithuanian priests towards the appointment of new bishops, see RL 190/83, "Relations between the Kremlin and the Vatican as Mirrored in Lithuania," May 11, 1983.

By way of answering various complaints by Catholics, the commisioner proceeded to give the standard explanation of the government's position: the state has nationalized all Church property and alone determines the conditions under which the faithful will be allowed to use it for religious services. He stressed that Parish Committees, consisting of twenty laymen, must be organized everywhere without delay and threatened the sixteen parishes that had not yet done so with serious consequences.[4] He reminded the deacons that only parents are allowed to instruct their children in religious matters and that priests may only examine the children to determine whether their knowledge is accurate.

Anilionis devoted more time to answering complaints about interference by the government in the internal affairs of the seminary in Kaunas. Lithuanian priests have frequently protested against the government's practice of not allowing dedicated religious youths to enroll in the seminary. In this instance, too, what Anilionis had to say might be described as a "dialectical" gem. He admitted that 139 parishes do not have a priest but insisted that limits must be placed on the number of young men allowed to enroll in the seminary because all institutions of higher and specialized secondary education have such limits and it would be improper to make an exception in the case of the seminary.[5] He added that the numerus clausus will not be increased until the functioning of the underground seminary is terminated. The editors of the Chronicle point out that Anilionis has put the cart before the horse--if the restrictions on enrollment were abolished, the underground seminary would close down immediately.

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4. "The Regulations on Religious Associations," adopted by the Presidium of the LSSR Supreme Soviet on July 28, 1976, contain many provisions that the Church considers to be incompatible with the canon laws of the Church. Especially odious to the clergy are the provisions for setting up of parish committees that would take the responsibility for most of the religious and financial affairs of the congregation. The Church fears that the implementation of these provisions would reduce the parish priest to a mere figurehead who officiates at religious ceremonies but must defer to the parish committee in other matters. Many priests have bitterly opposed the formation of such committees.

5. It should perhaps be noted that restrictions on enrollments in various faculties at institutions of higher education in the USSR are based on current and projected estimates of the need for specialists. These restrictions are intended to prevent the training of superfluous specialists unlikely to find a job after graduation. They are not imposed when there is a severe shortage of specialists.

The commissioner set forth three reasons why priests cannot visit and bless the homes of parishoners. First, some members of the family being visited might not be believers, and such a visit would thus infringe on their freedom of conscience. Second, he said, the law forbids an individual from going from door to door to solicit contributions, and no one would be able to determine whether a priest violated this statute while visiting his parishoners. Third, during such a visit the priest would perform a religious rite, but the law explicitly states that this kind of activity may only take place in a church or a cemetery or while visiting the sick.

At the meeting, Anilionis also conveyed disapproval of two incidents with political overtones. Apparently, some priests had honored a number of political prisoners recently released from confinement and had even allowed them to address the assembled congregation. The second incident involved the raising of crosses by unknown persons on the graves of Lithuanian partisans who died resisting Soviet rule in the postwar years.

In conclusion, Anilionis is reported by the Chronicle as having noted that the government does not intend to adjust Soviet laws for the sake of making them compatible with the canons of the Church. What is more, he is quoted as having said that the authorities are putting greater emphasis on the strict observance of laws in all areas of life and that, consequently, the regulations concerning religious activities are going to be enforced more stringently.

RFE-RL

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RL 87/83

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TURKISH TRADE DELEGATION VISITS MOSCOW

William Reese

A high-level Turkish trade delegation made up of officials and some seventy private businessmen and headed by Dr. Ekrem Pakdemirli, undersecretary for the treasury and foreign trade, returned from Moscow on January 27 after five days of meetings. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the new export system initiated by Turkish Premier Turgut Ozal. It was hoped that the new system would shore up Turkish exports to the USSR, which had fallen by around 20 percent in the first ten months of the past year.[1]

The Turkish delegation had also hoped to win approval for a revised list of those commodities allowed to be imported into Turkey. These imports would serve to absorb the 60 million dollar credit that Turkey has built up with the USSR.[2] The seventy businessmen who accompanied Pakdemirli were representatives of the sixteen companies now permitted to engage in export business with the East European countries. Ozal's new system has barred small Turkish export companies from these markets, ruling that only companies with foreign sales of 50 million dollars or more a year can export to Eastern Europe.[3]

The agenda for the meetings included too a discussion of the new Turkish banking system, which has reduced restrictions on foreign exchange transactions by increasing the powers of the Central Bank and limiting ministerial interference. Since the first of January, Turkish banks have been buying and selling foreign currencies at prices set by themselves within a range of 3 percent above or below Central Bank rates.[4] Pakdemirli, before leaving Ankara, said he hoped to make it possible for

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1. AP, January 21, 1984.
2. Tercuman, January 28, 1984.
3. AP, January 21, 1984.
4. Saudi Gazette, January 23, 1984.

Turkish banks to have direct dealings with Soviet banks "as the Western banks do." At present, Turkish exporters use American and Swiss banks for their transactions.[5]

Another important topic of discussion for the Turks was Turkey's interest in purchasing natural gas from the USSR through the Romanian and Czechoslovakian pipe-line systems.[6]

According to Turkish press accounts, the major stumbling block in the discussions seems to have been the new import-export system. The USSR was apparently taken by surprise by this development. In a briefing at the Moscow International Hotel, a deputy chief of the Asian Department of the Foreign Trade Ministry, whose name is give as Gurov, told the delegation:

> First you want a foreign exchange free-trade system, and we accepted that. This agreement is still in force....Now you come with a proposal for a new closed transactions system. We thought that these talks were only for consultation. Now the situation is changed. We must wait and think.[7]

The same exasperation was expressed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ivan T. Grishin when he spoke to Turkish journalists on January 27:

> It is not possible for us to just write off the Turkish companies we have been doing business with for some time. We still have functioning agreements with them. We favor continuing trade with them. But we can also do business with the new big companies.[8]

Grishin also told the Turkish reporters that of the 140 countries that the USSR does business with none was trying to initiate a new system like Turkey.

Pakdemirli had got much the same cautious reactions in a two-hour meeting with Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai O. Komarev on January 26. Komarev said that the system was new to him and would have to be given a closer look.

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5. Tercuman, January 25, 1984.

6. Hurriyet, January 25, 1984.

7. Tercuman, January 26, 1984.

8. Cumhuriyet, January 27, 1984; Tercuman, January 28, 1984.

According to the Turkish press, Komarev asked Pakdemirli, "Can you guarantee on behalf of your government, these new companies?"[9]

A scheduled meeting on the problem with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev was postponed because of "the sudden illness of the minister."[10] There is no indication in the Turkish sources that the meeting ever took place.

The discussions on natural gas purchases were also somewhat of a setback for the Turkish delegation. Pakdemirli reported, after his return to Ankara, that it was not possible for Turkey to receive natural gas through the pipe lines to Romania and Czechoslovakia. He told the Turkish press that the USSR was building a new pipe line to Bulgaria but that this would take longer than a year and increase the price of the gas.[11] He added later that the Turks themselves would have to construct a line from the Bulgarian border to Istanbul, a task that could not be completed before 1986.[12]

In his press conference with the Turkish journalists on January 27, Grishin was quoted as saying:

> We are ready to give Turkey natural gas.
> But before we can come to an agreement,
> Turkey must prepare a feasibility study.
> Turkey has told us that such a study will
> be ready in March. We are the biggest
> suppliers of natural gas. But natural
> gas is not like walnuts. You cannot
> just get it anywhere.[13]

An unexpected development in the talks was the announcement on January 27 that the USSR had offered to set up an industrial complex for the construction of the civilian Yak-40 airplane in Turkey. According to the Turkish press, the plane is especially suitable for landing on uneven surfaces and thus is particularly useful on the Anatolian plateau.[14] There has been no mention, to date, whether the proposal has been accepted by the Turkish government.

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9. Cumhuriyet, January 27, 1984.

10. Hurriyet, January 25, 1984.

11. Ibid.

12. Cumhuriyet, January 28, 1984.

13. Cumhuriyet, January 27, 1984.

14. Cumhuriyet, January 28, 1984.

The results of the talks are difficult to assess. No definite agreement was reached on banking, on the new export system, or on the sale of natural gas. On January 27, Pakdemirli and Grishin signed a letter of agreement on the list of Soviet export products to be used in payment of the credit debit.[15] Pakdemirli himself expressed satisfaction with the way the talks went and characterized them as a "start" towards better USSR-Turkish trade relations. He said he believed that "a basis for understanding had been established between the two nations."[16] Not everyone was as optimistic. The Turkish daily Cumhuriyet commented that the Turkish delegation had not accomplished what it had set out to accomplish in the USSR. By way of explanation, it pointed out that it was difficult to do business with any Eastern bloc country on Turkish terms, citing as the main reason the fact the Socialist nations have "planned economies" and are too inflexible to change their methods of doing business on short notice.[17] One of the seventy businessmen who accompanied Pakdemirli to Moscow, Sherif Egeli, said in an interview: "The Soviets are not a nation that likes surprises. For them, this system came as a surprise."[18]

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15. Tercuman, January 28, 1984.

16. Ibid.

17. Cumhuriyet, January 27, 1984.

18. Milliyet, February 2, 1984.

RFE-RL

radio liberty research

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WHO IS IN COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN?*

Peter Kruzhin

The word ogranichennyi or "limited," as defined in Nikolai Ivanovich Ozhegov's Slovar' russkogo yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language), denotes something "small" or "insignificant."[1] Somehow this definition hardly seems appropriate for the force dispatched to Afghanistan in December, 1979, by the USSR--despite the official description of it as "a limited contingent of Soviet troops." So limited it is not. It has ten motorized rifle and two airborne divisions, not to mention special purpose troops and support and reinforcement units. Some estimates place the total force at almost 120,000 troops.

Quite apart from natural curiosity about the identity of the person in command of this enormous force, there is the moral question of who it is that bears the immediate responsibility for the criminal methods of warfare being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet authorities are maintaining complete silence on this subject, doing everything they can to conceal the name of this man. Sooner or later, however, secrets come out. There now appears to be sufficient evidence to at least tentatively identify this military leader.

According to unofficial sources in Afghanistan, the commander of Soviet forces there is a marshal of the Soviet Union. This piece of information does not, however, seem to be entirely accurate. None of the known marshals of the Soviet Union has been out of the public view for any extended period of time except for Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, who is over eighty years old and has made no appearances for the last three years, apparently owing to illness. The same cannot be said of the generals of the army, whose insignia, it should be noted, are difficult to distinguish from those of marshals. It is a general of the army who comes into question here.

At the beginning of December, 1981, Mikhail Ivanovich Sorokin, who had been promoted to general of the army a month earlier, was replaced as commander of the Leningrad Military

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* Translation of RS 38/84.

1. Moscow, 1975.

District by Colonel General Boris Vasil'evich Snetkov.[2] Subsequently, General of the Army Sorokin dropped out of sight. His name did appear three times in military periodicals, though--twice as a signatory on obituaries and once in connection with his receiving the Order of Lenin on May 31, 1982.[3] To judge from the place where his signature appears on the obituaries, Sorokin holds a very important post--at least at the level of a first deputy chief of general staff. His receipt of the Order of Lenin (even though awarded in connection with his sixtieth birthday) shows that Sorokin continues to enjoy the highest confidence of the Soviet leadership. But where is he?

Some light was shed on this question by the Voennyi entsiklopedichesky spravochnik published last year. This official reference states that Sorokin has been in "a leadership assignment in the field" since 1981 (i.e., since his reassignment from the Leningrad Military District).[4] The phraseology can be interpreted as follows: in the military press the expression "leadership assignment" usually designates a command position. The phrase "in the field" can only mean one thing: Sorokin is not serving on the central staff of the military but, rather, is assigned to one of the military districts or groups of Soviet forces stationed abroad. The key command personnel of the military districts and the groups of forces are known, and Sorokin is not among them. Where might he be then? Perhaps in a place where only two Soviet divisions are garrisoned? Commanding only two divisions is no job for a general of the army, though; a lieutenant general can handle that. Because of this, the possibility comes to mind that Sorokin is serving with the so-called limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan--the command staff of which, as already mentioned, has not been made public.

Obviously, any speculation based on information of the kind offered here cannot be conclusive. What the information clearly points to, however, is that General of the Army Sorokin does merit attention at present in considering the question of who may be in command of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It therefore seems worthwhile to mention some of the highlights of Sorokin's military carreer. Now sixty-one years old, Sorokin began World War II as chief of a communications center and finished it as the

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2. Krasnaya zvezda, November 30, 1981; December 12, 1981; Leningradskaya Pravda, November 8, 1981.

3. Krasnaya zvezda, January 23, 1982; March 29, 1982; and June 1, 1982.

4. Voennyi entsiklopedichesky spravochnik, Moscow, 1983, p. 691.

executive officer of a motorized rifle regiment. After the war he graduated from the Frunze Academy and the General Staff Academy, advancing during this period from battalion commander to commander in chief of a military district. Incidentally, he spent more than four years as deputy commander of airborne forces. He has served in the Far East and Hungary; in short, his career has been smooth but successful. He also possesses recognized political authority. In 1981, he was selected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He was also a deputy at the last session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.[5]

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5. Ibid.

radio liberty research

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February 24, 1984

UZBEK SCHOLAR CRITICIZES INDIFFERENCE TOWARDS NATIONAL CULTURE

Timur Kocaoglu

The Uzbek-language newspaper Sovet Ozbekistani recently published an article by H. Polatov, an Honored Scientific Worker of Uzbekistan, that appears to be an attempt to redefine the place of Uzbek nationality and its culture in the process of the "drawing-together" (sblizhenie) of the nationalities in the Soviet Union.[1] The lengthy article, entitled "Historical Consciousness: Its National and International Aspects," may be divided into three parts.

The first part discusses the formation of an Uzbek national identity. According to Polatov, the Uzbeks had not formed a "nation," in the strict sense of the word, until the revolution of 1917, whereafter they became a "Socialist nation." He argues, however, that this does not render the past of the Uzbeks unimportant, since they are one of the most ancient peoples in the world.

He sees no contradiction in this judgment and quotes Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the concepts of "the nation" and "ethnic unity." He says that when Marx and Engels spoke of nations that had lived dispersed and disorganized for thousands of years, they were referring to nations that had existed in some form of ethnic unity until the contemporary nations came into being. He emphasizes the gradual molding of national peculiarities which eventually led to the formation of nations as we know them today. He explains this theory in the case of the Uzbeks as follows:

> Like other peoples, the Uzbek people too has preserved its own history and national environment. This situation has arisen not of its own accord, but as a result of

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1. H. Polatov, "Tarikhiy ong: milliy va internatsional jihatlar," Sovet Ozbekistoni, January 4, 1984, pp. 2-3.

> continuous and conscious struggle. In the course of the struggle, the Uzbek people, like other fraternal peoples in the country, has defended its own national existence and clearly expressed its own national spirit by its labor and its word, and sometimes by taking up arms.

In the second part of the article, Polatov comments on the fate of the Uzbek national culture and identity in the final merging of the nationalities of the USSR. He maintains that Socialist internationalism does not run counter to the national feelings and national pride of Socialist nations. He goes on to say that, although under the present conditions of developed Socialism relations between classes and between nations are linked, the historical fates of classes and nations are different. He believes the merging of nations in the future will not put an end to these national and ethnic differences. These differences cannot be ended in principle, he says, because the merging of nations does not aim to cast aside or ignore "the spiritual wealth of nations."

The third part of the article reveals why Polatov has tried to redefine the concepts of "drawing-together" and "merging" of nationalities in the Soviet Union. He warns that an excessively cautious attitude on the part of some specialists towards national pride is playing a negative role and sometimes even borders on indifference towards national culture. He blames the incorrect ideas put forward in some Soviet books for encouraging this kind of indifference among members of the different nationalities. Here he criticizes V. Ten's book The CPSU's Leadership of the Process of Drawing-Together of Nations under Conditions of Developed Socialism[2] for arguing that the growth of a nation's self-awareness gives rise to some negative phenomena. Polatov is apparently referring to the following passage:

> The rapid growth of national consciousness also gave rise to certain negative phenomena. These manifest themselves as attempts by individual representatives of the intelligentsia to attach themselves like parasites to the natural aspirations of peoples to realize more deeply and more fully their place in the world-wide historical process in the past and in the present.[3]

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2. V. Ten, Rukovodstvo KPSS protsessom sblizheniya natsii v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma (1959-1975 gg.): na materialakh respublik Srednei Azii, Tashkent, 1981.

3. Ibid., p. 186.

Polatov argues that these negative elements only appear in places where the Socialist self-awareness of nations has not fully developed or in areas where there is no active struggle against the relics of the past in the minds of individuals. Indeed, he maintains, the self-awareness of Socialist nations is a part of their culture and is one of the most significant indicators of the success of socialism. According to Polatov, the existence of "self-awareness" is justified:

> There is a need for a deep study of the history of the Uzbek people and the notable great works of our ancestors in every field of life. Thus, since our people has a rich history it should be used to contribute to a strengthening of Socialist self-awareness.[4]

Polatov supports this idea by pointing out the danger of a reaction to tendencies to deemphasize national culture among the Uzbeks. He says that people who introduce themselves as the "learned men" of national culture are false patriots and zealots, who try to show the culture of their own nation to be superior to that of others and emerge where indifference and lack of interest are to be found.

Polatov does not seem to be saying anything new on the processes of "sblizhenie" and "sliyanie." To some extent, he sides with those who argue that national culture and identity will survive even long after the processes of drawing-together and final merging of nationalities in the Soviet Union is completed. What is of interest in Polatov's article, however, is that he seems to be disturbed by the number of Uzbek intellectuals who take no interest in their national culture and identity. It appears that some of these "de-nationalized," or rather, "Sovietized" Uzbek intellectuals even attempt to encourage the rise of indifference towards national culture among the Uzbeks.

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4. Sovet Ozbekistoni, January 4, 1984, p. 3.

RAD Background Report/88
(Eastern Europe)
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RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

EASTERN EUROPE: TOWARD A "RELIGIOUS REVIVAL"?

Contents

* Mr. Girnius is a member of the Radio Liberty staff.

Introduction

A new phenomenon, which is often described as a "religious revival," can be observed in Eastern Europe and in parts of the Soviet Union, especially the Baltic states. The term is perhaps a bit exaggerated; and at present it would be more appropriate to speak only of a religious awakening, which, however, could lead to a true renewal in at least a few countries. There is an increasing number of people in Eastern Europe who are turning toward religion, mostly to Catholicism but also to the Protestant Churches, in the hope that religious teachings will provide them with more reliable guidelines for overcoming the complexities of life than anything offered by the official ideology. Very often they are simply attracted by the climate of religious gatherings: they find there an atmosphere of togetherness, of sincerity and intimacy, in which they can openly discuss even their innermost problems and uncertainties. One should also not underestimate the magnetism of the solemnity of religious services as a spiritual relief in the grayness of daily life.

In any case, since the late 1970s there has been an upswing in religious activities in the area, which has attracted considerable attention, because it follows a long period of communist oppression and of religious stagnation. The upward movement is unfolding despite fresh attempts at reprisals by the communist regimes.

The available but not yet definite evidence indicates that most of the activists on the religious front are young people, students, workers, and intellectuals who do not appear to have any inhibitions about publicly admitting their Church affiliations, religious orientations, or at least their positive interest in some aspects of the Christian spiritual message. They are willing to do this even though it is clear to them that their comportment could endanger their personal security. Their attitude is in stark contrast to that of another category of East European believers, mostly members of the older generation who, for fear of political reprisals, tend to avoid any open contact with their respective Churches. Those are the people who, for instance, prefer to travel to distant places in the country to have their children secretly christened instead of taking the risk of disclosing their religious devotion and loyalty in their immediate neighborhoods. The secretive and conditional practicing of religion had often been considered indicative of the mentality of the whole population, but the new alternative developed by the religious activists has undermined the general validity of such concepts.

The new alternative manifests itself in a great variety of forms, ranging from small, rather inward-looking "basic communities" (Hungary), through Christian "peace activists "involved in spontaneous nationwide movements (GDR), to a sudden rejuvenation

of existing Church organizations or mass attendance at religious services and ceremonies (Poland), to name only a few examples. Likewise, the factors that have elicited and continue to feed the broadening interest in religion also show remarkable diversity. The most outstanding are: the inability of the Marxist-Leninist ideology to give adequate answers to problems of modern life; the growing dissatisfaction, especially among young people, with the hollowness of the communist value system and a craving for more solid and trustworthy guiding principles of life; the search for an all-embracing Christian peace concept, prompted by the hate campaigns of the communist regimes; endeavors to strengthen national identity through a "rehabilitation" of its religious roots; the overall influence of the Western charismatic movements; a determination to escape, even if only for a few hours, from the drab monotony of the socialist way of life and to share with others experiences of a different quality; and, finally, a Polish Pope who, by his origin and identification with Eastern Europe, has lent a powerful impulse to religious life, both Catholic and Protestant (and to some extent also Orthodox) all over the eastern half of the continent.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that many religious activists have come from the dissident movements. As a result, there are interesting contacts among dissident groups and religious renewalists, often leading Church leaders to worry that such ties might create, as indeed they have, additional complications in the Churches' relations with state authorities.

The impact of these factors has been different from country to country. At least two countries, Albania and Bulgaria, have hardly been touched by them or are just entering, with uncertain steps, a new era of growing religious consciousness among certain segments of the population.

It is too early to speculate about the ultimate results of the widening interest in the religious dimensions of human existence. The impression is that in some cases religion and attendance at religious services become a substitute for political protest: people go to church because there is no other way to express their dissatisfaction with the political situation. In many other cases, however, the new currents of religious awakening seem to have reached much deeper levels of the human soul, strengthening the spiritual domain of the Churches.

The communist regimes have been visibly overtaken, if not perplexed, by the sudden resurfacing of religion as a new spiritual factor and even a social force to contend with. It must be especially embarrassing for them that most of the activists involved are members of the younger generation, brought up and educated under their own socialist system. So far, the guardians of the official ideology have not found a uniform and convenient answer to the new challenge. The authorities in some countries try, for instance, to block the progress of religious renewal with fairly militant methods but with little success. Hungary,

on the other hand, takes a more relaxed position, speaks of a long era of unavoidable coexistence between religion and atheism, and even tries to reap some benefits from the situation by contemplating closer cooperation with some religious institutions in order to strengthen public morale and, above all, family life. Whatever their reaction, however, none of the regimes has discarded the ultimate goal of eliminating religion from its society.

This paper analyzes this intricate phenomenon of religious revival in greater detail but without laying claim to completeness. The majority of the contributions deal with Eastern Europe, including Albania and Yugoslavia; but there is also one report on Lithuania, to indicate the trends in the Baltic countries under Soviet domination.

* * *

ALBANIA: THE FIRST ATHEIST STATE BUT WITH DEEP-ROOTED RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

For communist Albania, international communism's "odd man out," religion has always been faced with the problem of survival rather than revival. Since November 1944, when the Communists assumed total control of the country, Albania has undergone a struggle against religion, developed and carried out by the Albanian Workers' Party under the direct guidance of Enver Hoxha.

The postwar antireligious campaign reached a peak in 1967 with the abolition of institutionalized religion, a move triggered by an address of Enver Hoxha entitled "On the Struggle Against Religion and Religious Preconceptions and Customs." Within only a few months, a total of 2,035 churches (including 740 mosques, 608 Orthodox churches and monasteries, and 157 Catholic churches) had been closed down. Only a few churches and mosques of architectural or historical value remained open. The new 1976 constitution specifies that the state does not "recognize any religion but supports and develops atheist propaganda." Today, the Albanian leaders and the country's news media constantly claim that institutionalized religion has been eradicated in Albania but never fail to remind the public that deep-seated religious feelings cannot be eliminated just by closing places of worship.

Nationalism and Religion

The Albanian leadership's antireligious policy in many ways is specifically Albanian in character and is a project that could have been put into practice only in a rigidly ruled country like Albania. Important historical factors have influenced the current campaign against religion. In contrast to many other European countries--for example, Poland, Greece, or Italy--religion and nationalism have not combined as a strong unifying force in Albania. Historically, the country's various religions often reacted differently to foreign invasions or territorial claims on Albania (by the Ottomans, the Slavs, the Greeks, the Italians, and so forth) and actually supported the invading forces. Consequently, at critical political moments the tendency of many of the country's national leaders, past and present, has been to stress the virtue of nationalism over that of religion. During the period of Albania's national awakening (1878 to 1912), for example, the Catholic nationalist leader Vasa Pasha coined the slogan "Albania's religion is Albanianism," a catchword taken over by the Albanian Communists.

Although Albania's Catholic community is relatively small compared with the Moslem and Orthodox communities, Tirana has encountered greater active opposition from the Catholic clergy than from the others; and there have been frequent reports of heavy suppression, including the execution of practicing priests. The Albanian Catholic Church in exile and the Vatican have also been more vocal in reacting to the oppression of religion in Albania. A recent *Zeri i Popullit* editorial complained that

twice within three years the Pope had appeared on the coast of Apulia, directly across the Adriatic from Albania, to curse the "irreligious" Albanians.

Influential Church and rightist circles in Greece have also expressed alarm about the fate of the Orthodox Church in Albania. The Greek aspect of this question is more complex because of Greece's former territorial claims to parts of Albania and the insistence of some Greeks that members of the Orthodox Church in Albania are Greek nationals and that the antireligious efforts in Albania are therefore also inspired by an anti-Greek nationality policy. Strangely enough, the attitude of the Moslem communities abroad to Tirana's official war against religion, which is waged just as rigorously against the country's large Moslem community as against the others, is seldom expressed and is ambivalent. Even more surprising is the development of friendship and solidarity between Albania and Iran, two countries at opposite poles on the question of religion, the former a suppresser and the latter a fanatical supporter of Islam.

Signs of Religious Revival

The abolition of institutionalized religion and the promulgation of antireligous laws does not, of course, mean that religious faith or belief in God have disappeared in Albania. The Albanian leaders themselves have frequently warned that closing mosques and churches did not necessarily settle the question of religion once and for all, and they have admitted that deep-seated religious feelings remain alive. A recent editorial in the theoretical monthly *Rruga a Partise*[2] stated:

> The channel that separates our Marxist-Leninist ideology from religion, dialectic materialism from religious idealism, will again become blocked if one does not constantly work to keep it clear. In practice, the party's demands are sometimes ignored, which leads to an overestimation of the progress and to self-satisfaction, even euphoria, as if everything had been correctly understood, as if everyone behaved like a fully convinced atheist. This explains why some Communists from Kruje, Lezhe, and Shkoder [centers of Catholicism] act as if they did not notice those people who continue holding deep beliefs and [maintaining] religious customs and who even now go to pray in the former "holy" places of Lac.

This is a clear admission of the fact that deep-seated religious feelings cannot be eliminated simply by closing the places of worship. Indeed, it appears that many believers in Albania have overcome the initial shock of the fanatical antireligous campaign of the late 1960s and 1970s, and there are signs of an incipient religious revival in the country.

It should not be left unmentioned that there is a sharp contrast between Yugoslavia and Albania with regard to the official policies toward religion, with Yugoslavia allowing almost

total freedom of religion to its large Albanian minority of 2,000,000. Thousands of Albanian Moslems from Yugoslavia are able to make annual pilgrimages to holy places such as Mecca, and the approximately 60,000 Albanian Roman Catholics living in Yugoslavia, under the leadership of 2 bishops, have built strikingly modernistic churches next to the border with atheist Albania. In Kosovo religion tends to be a deterrent to unity among the various national groups rather than a unifying force. Kosovar officials and the press have complained that the clergy of the Moslems (mainly Albanian nationals) and Christians (Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholics) identify religion with nationality and act as representatives of nationalities, thereby fomenting religious and national hatred. Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church have been accused of inciting feelings against the Albanians by speaking in the name of the Serbian nation and "Serbian Kosovo," while the Moslem, mostly Albanian, clergy has been denounced for being anti-Serbian, anti-Turkish, and anti-Montenegrin.

"Antisocialist Centers"

Recently, a provincial leader in Kosovo spoke of the paradoxical situation in which the share of the general public attending religious services had decreased, while the number of League of Communists members, intellectuals, and officials attending services had been rising.[3] An official in Pristina, Ismail Bajra (a former Yugoslav Minister of Information), said that this was associated with "demagogy" and was "false solidarity" inspired by "religious-nationalist and antisocialist resistance." He also praised Kosovo's religious communites for their proper political behavior, while charging that some churches and mosques had been turned into "antisocialist" and "anticommunist" centers by some "nationalist" clergymen. One should not conclude, however, that the Yugoslav authorities may be inclined to introduce hard-line methods against the Churches in Kosovo, methods similar to those practiced in Albania. In their effort to counter Tirana's ideological offensive, Pristina officials stress the "inhuman" nature of the Albanian atheist model, as Bajra noted:

> In Albania, churches and mosques are being destroyed through political measures; priests and the Moslem clergy have been executed or forced to flee the country. Through such methods, however, religious beliefs, coupled with the material and spiritual backwardness inherited from and deepened through inhuman Stalinism, can only be strengthened.

There is no other case in the communist world where two groups of people of the same nationality, in this case the Albanians, live side by side with one of them living under enforced atheism and the other free to exercise its religious rights.

Louis Zanga

BULGARIA: NEW WAVES

Bulgaria seems to present no exception to the trend toward a renewed interest in Eastern Europe in religion. The country has traditionally been almost totally Orthodox, although some Protestant groups have historically played a role out of proportion to their numbers; and both Protestantism and Orthodoxy appear to be the main beneficiaries of the new currents, which stem from the bankruptcy of official ideology and a corresponding search for something to fill a spiritual void. The authorities have a variety of administrative and propaganda tools at their disposal to combat religion, but these are likely to prove ineffective against so profound a phenomenon with such deep roots.

The Traditional Picture

It may well be said that the history of religion in Bulgaria is the history of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, a situation with parallels in neighboring Greece and Serbia and a point reinforced by the fact that other faiths and Christian denominations generally had one or another foreign association. During the almost five centuries of Turkish rule (1393 or 1396 to 1878) the Church acquired a dual role, an understanding of which may help in appreciating its position today.

On the one hand, the Church served as a surrogate national state, a preserver of Bulgarian culture and national identity, and a tangible link to the medieval past. This was the result of the Ottoman practice of dividing and administering their subjects on a confessional basis. Within each millet, or religious division, the respective Churches acquired administrative functions and in some cases even jurisdictional frontiers that exceeded by far their responsibilities in the medieval Christian states. This institution served as the center of social and cultural as well as administrative life and, when the hierarchy became dominated by Greeks after 1767, and hence alienated from the people, the Church could truly be regarded as the people's Church. Church. In the period from 1860 to 1878, when the Bulgarian national awakening had clearly entered its political phase, the concrete area of struggle was for the re-establishment of a national Church free of Greek control (therefore against the "dual yoke" of Greek and Turkish domination) and for boundaries for the new Bulgarian Exarchate that were really regarded as the frontiers of an eventual Bulgarian state.

The Church, however, came to lose its leading role in Bulgarian society for a number of reasons, one of them being its failure to keep pace with the needs of the times, a phenomenon all too typical of both the Christian and Moslem religious leaders and elite in the Ottoman Empire. This reluctance to innovate meant that the Church could only preserve the link to the past but could not take the lead into the future, although individual priests did play a role in the national renaissance. The real movers of Bulgarian society were the teachers in the secular

schools, who stressed practical and useful knowledge and new ideas from the rest of Europe.

It should thus come as no surprise that once the Bulgarian state actually came into being in 1878, the Church quickly became and remained a subordinate institution. The Orthodox Church was scarcely spared the waves of terror and persecution in the early years of communist rule, although the value of the Church as a national symbol was not lost on the Communists. In 1951 they supported the elevation of the Bulgarian Church to a Patriarchate,[1] and Metropolitan Kiril of Plovdiv was elected Patriarch in 1953 and held that office until 1971, when he was succeeded by Maxim Minkov, the Metropolitan of Lovech. Similar to the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR, during these years the Church itself seems to have caused the party and state authorities few, if any, problems and has been a vocal supporter of all manner of Soviet-inspired "peace" initiatives. It is telling that Church affairs are handled for the government by the committee on the Problems of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and of the Religious Cults within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the committee is headed by a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Church has approximately 6,000,000 adherents out of a total population of almost 9,000,000.[2] It contains 11 bishoprics, plus 2 for the United States, Canada, and Australia, and has 2 parishes each in Hungary and Romania, 1 in Austria, and Vicars in Istanbul and Moscow. There are approximately 1,700 priests, 200 monks, 200 nuns, 2,600 parishes, 3,000-3,700 churches and chapels, 123 monasteries (including St. George's on Mt. Athos), 1 seminary, and 1 theological academy.[3]

If the Bulgarian Orthodox Church seems to present few headaches for the political authorities, the same does not appear to be the case for the country's second largest religious group, the approximately 700,000 practicing Moslems, mainly Turks, Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Moslems), and Gypsies. As was suggested above, the Ottoman tradition of identifying religion and nationality has meant that the non-Orthodox population in Bulgaria was somehow automatically non-Bulgarian; and this is particularly true of the Moslems, whose religion identified them with the Ottoman rulers. Their religion is thus *ipso facto* a barrier to their national assimilation in a country that has not chosen to identify ethnic minorities in a national census since 1956 and whose declared policy since 1975 has been the promotion of "one unified socialist nation," which implies a leveling of both religious and national individuality.

Because of the clear link between the religion and the national identity of these people, a discussion of their situation would go beyond the bounds of a presentation limited to religion. Suffice it to say, however, that the Moslems' increasing alienation from the regime and its national and ideological policies could easily take on a religious form; and, in any event, the party and state authorities appear to have singled out the

Moslems for particular "attention." There seems to be a pattern of mosque and school closings, arrests of religious personnel, destruction of Korans and religious buildings, and the imprisonment of believers in places such as the Belene camp.[4] Bulgarian refugees who have served time in the Danube island camps that constitute the heart of their country's "Gulag" tend to confirm that Moslem prisoners make up a disproportionately large share of the total, up to 50%, according to some reports.

The next largest religious group in Bulgaria is that of the Roman Catholics, whose Western connections have made them a special object of repression. They traditionally played an impressive role in social and cultural life, but the Communists quickly eliminated their educational, health, and welfare institutions, allegedly because their headquarters were outside Bulgaria. The remaining groups are numerically rather small, but, like the Catholics the dynamic Protestant denominations with American links have traditionally played a role in education and culture beyond what mere numbers would justify, partly because they could act as a conduit for the kind of modern and practical Western knowledge that was so important to progressively minded Bulgarians in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Today there are five officially recognized Protestant groups: the Pentecostals (10,000 members, 120 churches, 40 full-time pastors), the Baptists (1,000 members, 20 churches), the Methodists, the Congregationalists, and the Adventists. Their Western ties made them, too, a favorite target for the Communists; the Pentecostals were the victims of "espionage" trials in 1949, and Church membership can still bring restrictions in education or career advancement. Pastors are required to report regularly to the police and take the presence of informers in their congregations for granted.[5]

New Waves

In 1976 and 1977 reports reached the West of a heightened interest in religion, particularly among the youth. Even a sociological survey in 1962 revealed that 35.1% of the population claimed to have religious ties,[6] and religious devotion has always been strong in the countryside.[7] As one source described the current situation:

> From the communist takeover in 1944 until mid-1976 the Churches seemed to be stagnating and void of any signs of the revival that was taking place in some other East European countries. Since early 1977 this situation has altered radically. There are constant reports of a revival in all Churches, including the Orthodox, where some groups are experiencing charismatic renewal.[8]

The developments seem to apply to both the official and unofficial Churches. The latter have attracted particular interest, since it is often felt, understandably, that the former have compromised themselves because of their apparent passivity

before the party and state authorities. The exact extent of these trends is impossible to determine, but their existence appears certain. The underground groups, like all public groups outside the control of the BCP, together with dynamic elements within the official Churches, have attracted the attention of the ideological watchdogs and the security apparatus; the escalation of official pressure is good, indirect evidence of a renewed interest in religion. Harassment and arrests are the standard form, usually under the guise of charges such as illegal possession (that is, stemming from their "foreign" links) of foreign currency or goods. Prominent spiritual figures seem to be singled out, and in 1979 a wave of house searches and arrests led to the trial and sentencing of five Pentecostals to prison terms of three to six years and stiff fines.[9] In addition to these more recent measures one should not overlook the "traditional" forms of administrative obstruction that hinder the training of new pastors, the publication and dissemination of religious literature, the ban on religious instruction, and so forth, as well as militia-sponsored provocations that provide an excuse for limiting attendance at official churches.

The reason for the revival, particularly among urban youth, is most probably disenchantment with the BCP, its ideology, and the kind of spiritually sterile society the past has produced; these reasons, linked to alienation, probably also apply to the renewed popular interest in yoga and various forms of occultism, which have similarly attracted the party's watchful eye.[10] The Orthodox Church, moreover, may have received unintended benefits from the massive official historical and patriotic campaigns in recent years (associated with the name of Ludmila Zhivkova), in which religious art, patriotic clerics, and the Church's role in preserving Bulgarian culture under the Turks have figured prominently. The popularity of underground and charismatic tendencies suggests, however, that the forces at work are more truly religious than cultural or national. Communism has proven spiritually and intellectually bankrupt, and greater popular interest in religion is the consequence.

It is difficult to tell where this may lead, but the authorities will certainly and, probably vainly, try to combat it with repression and their sterile ideology. Keeping track of the continued interest in religion could be difficult from outside the country because of the absence of regular and reliable facts and statistics on religion in Bulgaria, as well as the tendency of religious Bulgarians to regard their belief as an internal spiritual phenomenon and not something to be flaunted or used as an object of social protest. The "ingredients" are nonetheless present, and the trend may continue to enjoy unintentional encouragement from the authorities' stress on Bulgarian history. In short, as is generally the case in following Bulgarian affairs, one should not be surprised if a calm surface is merely concealing deeper, livelier currents underneath.

Patrick Moore

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: AN INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES

Interviewed by an American reporter in 1981, Karel Hruza, who was at that time the Director of the State Secretariat for Church Affairs, said: "In the old days you would only see grandmothers in churches, but now there are young churchgoers too."[1] A number of articles in the official press (some of which will be cited below) and reports communicated unofficially confirm that this is indeed so. Religious beliefs are an important component of the younger generation's existential and political attitudes, and the militantly atheistic regime is acting to change this situation.[2]

The Numbers

Frequently cited official figures admit that 10% of the younger generation are religious.[3] While it would probably be wrong to overestimate the surge of religious attitudes among the young, the official figure is almost certainly too low. Regime sources based on opinion surveys in 1980 estimate the overall share of religious believers in Czechoslovakia at 36% of the total population aged 15 and over, including 30% in the Czech Lands and 51% in Slovakia.[4] Having the fact in mind that all and every polling on sensitive topics must needs produce distorted results in a communist country, the reasonable consensus among Western observers places the figure at a good 50% of all the population, with Slovakia leading over the Czech Lands, possibly by a ratio of 1.5 to 1 or even 2 to 1.

A recent breakdown of the somewhat amorphous concept of "religious belief" into more specific indicators produced the following results:

Specific Value Orientations (Religion) in the 15-19 Age Group
(Czech Lands, 1980)

Attitude	Affirmative Replies
Comprehensive religious outlook	4%
Children should receive religious education	4%
Religion plays a positive role for man under socialism	13%
Respondent says prayers (regularly or infrequently)	10% *
Moral education on religious rather than other principles ought to be preferred	19%
God exists (or his existence is possible)	27%
Respondent believes religion is important for him	38%
Marriages should be concluded with the Church's blessing	40%
Burials should have the form of a Church rite	60%
Religion under socialism should be accepted	78%

* Nearly one-fifth of all respondents prayed "occasionally."

Source: Zdenka Podveska, "On Some Aspects of Value Orientations Among the Younger Generation," *Ateizmus*, no. 1. 1983, pp. 59-62.

There are other signs that religion is not insignificant for many children and young people. In 1981 over 70% of the children in Slovakia were baptized[5]; and despite considerable pressure on parents, legal restrictions, and threat of career blockage, some 15% of children were still being sent to religious classes, with the percentage being far higher in some rural districts.[6] In the Bardejov district, for example, 24.2% of the children frequented religious classes, while 33% attended Mass regularly and 42% occasionally in 1981-1982.[7] Even party members are still religious. A comrade from the Martin district in Slovakia complained recently that "some party members travel to attend Mass in remote districts and let their children and grandchildren be baptized with the parish priests' approval in such a way that their names do not appear in the registers of christening."[8]

As for the form of demonstrating religious attitudes, the spectrum extends from growing attendance at open religious services and pilgrimages to participation in private prayer and meditation sessions and philosophical discussion groups. Not all religious life in the country takes place in the public eye. The regime claims that a "secret" or "underground" Church exists, with privately ordained priests and even bishops, for the purpose of creating an organizational base for future antistate activities. The counterargument from the Catholics is that the Church can only be a single unit. It is not denied, however, that some functions that are impeded by the authorities are being performed without the government's license. There are now some 500 priests without a state permit, but they are, nevertheless, still priests. Moreover, the Church, it is said, must make provisions for the future. What if the virulently atheistic state decides to step up religious oppression still further? The Church must not submit to extinction without resistance; hence the "secret" clerics, many of whom, one is given to understand, are young people.[9]

One final remark on the spread of religion: by all indications, a great many people, including the young, who do not practice religion themselves feel the utmost tolerance and even sympathy toward their religious fellow citizens. Atheism, especially in its militant and combative forms, has remained an artificial creation of the communist regime isolated from the public at large. An official said:

> In between the religious believers and the convinced atheists a sizable mass of the population has emerged who do not claim a confession but do not accept atheistic views either. They often consider atheism and religion to be equal forms of a world view, with each having positive and negative features.[10]

The Institute for Public Opinion Research suggested that next to religion the major impact on public attitudes derived from widespread liberal tendencies, which it described as "abstract humanism, false democracy, and pacifism."[11] We may add that religion can, of course, easily coexist with democratic attitudes and that the road to a confluence of noncommunist ideas is therefore open.

Existential and Ritual Religion

Informed observers, basing their opinions on extensive conversations with and reports from dissident or otherwise unofficial sources, believe that the increase in religious attitudes among Czech and Slovak youth expresses itself in two different, but by no means antagonistic, streams: the traditional ecclesiastically and liturgically oriented form, and the search for a philosophy of life that would be divorced from both the Marxist-Leninist dogma and the cynical consumerism pervading large

sections of a society that has been deprived of rights and liberties. There is nothing new in the bifurcation of a religious idea. God's embodiment in Christ's Church, that is, organized religion, and God as individual man's interlocutor and resort have often both marked religious faith, either in complement or in opposition to each other. Moreover, there is a distinction between Czech and Slovak Catholicism that traditionally leads the former toward rejecting identification of religion or God with the state, while the latter has generally viewed religion and politics as naturally complementary. There is, by the same token, probably more existential searching in the Czech Lands and more conventional ritualism in Slovakia, but one would be ill-advised to counterpose the two manifestations. Communism, the great leveler, is bent on opposing and eradicating both. The true ecumenism of Czechoslovak conditions today lies in the awareness of the followers of both religious manifestations that they have much in common with each other, indeed that the distinction between them is secondary and that they are, each in their own way, resisting a challenge that is dangerous to the ideological fabric that unites them.[12]

. In an opinion poll (of which we have only a fragment) conducted by young people among their peers, a 22-year-old woman replied to a question about whom she looked up to as an example: "The Christians. But only those who take it seriously."[13]

The Motivations

We cannot rely on any individual and specific opinion research in trying to identify the spectrum of motivations of young believers. What made young Slovak Catholics gather signatures to a petition begging Pope John Paul II to visit Czechoslovakia next year?[14] What made young Slovak Catholics carry religious literature from Poland into their homeland?[15] What made a young priest, clandestinely ordained, undertake pastoral work among young Gipsies?[16] What makes young Czechs congregate in private flats to discuss existential problems? What has led the young Catholic philospher Vaclav Benda to become involved in the Charter 77 movement and suffer imprisonment?

The first answer must surely be that in many people there is an inherent drive to oppose religious and moral injustice. If we accept the belief of deists and theists alike that faith is innate to man and that it is linked with the imperative of pursuing virtue and opposing evil, the search for motivation in many instances need not go any further.

Nonetheless, the inner drive is evidently not of the same strength in everyone. Both the profound and the more superficial effects of modern civilization, science, and vulgar materialism have made inroads into the disposition to faith in many people.

Our second motivational explanation would therefore have to do with the inadequacy of answers that young people in Czechoslovakia receive to their existential questions. A regime writer concurs:

> Young people are not being given proper answers to questions of interest to them. No wonder that under the influence of increased religious propaganda interest in religion and a noncritical attitude toward it are being revived among part of the younger generation.[17]

We should add that the crux of the matter does not lie in the immaturity of the young, or their inability to comprehend the official postulations but rather in the inadequacy of these Marxist-Leninist tenets themselves.

The accusation concerning foreign religious propaganda is, of course, one of the usual official exercises in laying the blame at the door of alien agents. Nevertheless, one need not always dismiss such charges as ludicrous. The fact that there is a Polish Pope and that the striving for freedom in Poland in the past five years has so demonstrably been associated with religion could not but have an influence on the Czechoslovak religious scene and, of course, on the regime's suppressive tactics. Some direct contacts between believers and possibly priests in the two countries have been noted. Above all, the stance of the Czech and Slovak Catholic hierarchies has become stronger and tougher since John Paul assumed the pontificate.

Another reason for the enhanced interest in religion may perhaps be sought in the younger generation's natural oppositional attitude. They have been showing disaffection and even disgust at official practices in many different ways. With the exception of political dissent (Charter 77), all the forms of alienation are either negative (in that they reject programs but create no new ones), like the passions for "alternative" or "underground" rock music and a general "opting out" of the socialist rat race, or lead to socially and individually deviant pursuits, such as vandalism and drug abuse. Along with Charter 77, religion offers a positive way for young people to project their anxieties, concerns, and aspirations. It is supremely moral in an environment that the young consider deeply immoral.

There must also be an echo of the Western religious scene, including the link between religion and the peace movement. Charter 77 first postulated the tenet of the indivisibility of peace and human rights; and Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, in accepting it, endowed it with a Christian dimension. While there is no independent peace movement in Czechoslovakia as such, although individual initiatives for peace and against Soviet missiles in the country have been noted, there has emerged a distinct symbiosis between the three concepts of peace, human rights, and religious assertion. This combination must appear attractive to a number of young people.

Finally, one must not underrate the role of tradition, especially in Slovakia, where families have been deeply religious for many generations. Children are still being brought up in many homes on religious precepts. Catalyzed by both adversities and positive challenges, traditional religious values surface to condition and encourage activism in the younger generation.

The thoughtful and critical samizdat writer who has been cited earlier as the author of an essay on the future of Czech Catholicism believes that the "young blood" can be considered as standing ready to take the religious upsurge further. The future, according to him, depends on how they will tackle a dilemma:

> Shall we tread the path of defense of all those who are subjected to unjust persecution, regardless of their world view, or are we going to repeat our old mistake of fighting "only" for the rights of the Church, while taking no interest in the rights of those who are "outside?"

It seems a legitimate question and an important challenge to old and new religious activists, for the communist environment has made religion into a phenomenon of dissent. The Church may not like that role, but it cannot shed or shirk it.

Vladimir V. Kusin

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: IMPACT OF THE PEACE DEBATE

In past years the role and activities of the Churches in the GDR, both Evangelical and Catholic, have been attracting increased interest, not only in the West but, what is more important, in the GDR itself.[1] Although it would perhaps be premature to speak of a religious revival in the GDR in the strict sense--particularly as it is not always clear to what degree increased interest in the Church corresponds to increased interest in religion--it is nonetheless clear that the Churches are currently experiencing a renaissance of sorts. The is particularly so among East German youth, and Church-sponsored activities have been drawing large numbers of young people. This trend actually dates back to the mid-1970s but has become particularly pronounced in recent years as the Churches, above all the Evangelical Church, have become increasingly involved in an array of social and political issues. Despite a continuing decline in overall Church membership, the Churches continue to play a very visible and significant role in East German society.

Several Unique Factors

One should keep in mind several key factors in the situation of the Churches in the GDR in order to comprehend fully their role in society in terms of both their opportunities and limitations. First, the GDR is the only communist country in which the key religious influence in historical terms has been and continues to be overwhelmingly Protestant. In 1950, for example, 80% of the East German population was Protestant and only 11% Roman Catholic. Although official Church membership has fallen considerably under communist rule, the eight regional Evangelical Churches in the GDR continue to have a combined membership of some 47% of the total population, whereas the membership of the Roman Catholic Church has remained fairly stable at around 8%. In the rest of Eastern Europe the Protestant Churches represent significantly smaller minorities.

Secondly, the Churches in the GDR are the sole institutions that are free from direct or indirect communist control. They have resources at their disposal--property, publications, employment possibilities--that give them a unique position in East German society. Their organization and workings offer a stark contrast to Leninist principles of democratic centralism, which dominates all other social institutions. Despite intense periods of harassment by the regime in the 1950s and 1960s and attempts to limit their influence and control their activities, the Churches managed to retain full autonomy in their internal affairs. With the one obvious exception of the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland, the Churches in the GDR probably have more freedom and autonomy than any other Church in the Eastern bloc.

The situation of the Churches in the GDR differs from that of other Churches in Eastern Europe, particularly from the Polish

Catholic Church, in a third, important way. Whereas the Polish Catholic Church, for example, enjoys a very special status as the spiritual and cultural guardian of the Polish national consciousness, based on its key role in Polish history, neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Churches in the GDR can aspire to such a national role.

A "Church Under Socialism"

A fourth factor is the East German Evangelical Church's perception of itself as a "Church Under socialism" set against the background of the partial Church-state rapprochement that evolved in the course of the 1970s. Whereas the Catholic Church in the GDR has traditionally not involved itself with the state authorities and has largely viewed social and political issues as beyond the realm of the Church's direct responsibility, the Evangelical Church has, in sharp contrast, been more inclined to concern itself with social issues and less hesitant to have dealings with the state.

Changes in attitude within the Evangelical Church hierarchy as well as within the party helped bring about the partial rapprochement reached in the 1970s, culminating in the March 1978 meeting between SED Secretary General Erich Honecker and the Chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, Bishop Albert Schoenherr. In 1981 East German State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi termed the attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* between Church and state in the GDR a great "historical experiment." At the same time, he made the SED's political calculations quite clear: "Our real intention is to make the Church feel at home in our republic and gradually to win over its support for the stable development of our republic and for our policy of peace."

For the Evangelical Church, on the other hand, the rapprochement was an attempt to avoid a ghetto existence; a fate that Church officials described as an "ideological Diaspora." Bishop Schoenherr announced the new approach with the famous statement: "We don't want to be a Church against socialism, nor a Church alongside socialism, but a Church in socialism." While recognizing the existing distribution of power and the dominant role of the party in society, Church officials also claimed a right to "critical solidarity," insisting that they would continue to speak out and criticize regime policies when they disagreed with them. The Church also received several important concessions on the building of new churches, on limited access to the state controlled media, state support in organizing large-scale events, and official recognition of its extensive role in the areas of health care and social welfare. The attempt to reach a limited accord between the two institutions could not and has not, of course, eliminated any of the major issues of conflict--education, military training in schools, professional

discrimination against Christians, and so on. Despite recurring problems, both sides have, however, recognized the progress achieved and insist that there is no other alternative.

A More Open Policy in the 1970s

The attempt by the East German Evangelical Church hierarchy to reach some sort of limited accord with the authorities was by no means universally supported within the Church. Indeed, there was initially considerable opposition to the "Schoenherr course," particularly at the lower levels, from priests and Church officials who felt that by openly dealing with the state in this fashion the Church would compromise itself, that such talks would merely lead to cosmetic improvements in official relations, and that the plight of the individual Christian would remain largely unchanged. The dilemma and the risks involved were graphically demonstrated in the mid-1970s when two East German priests committed suicide in protest at state discrimination against Christians at the local level.

Experience has shown, however, that the Church-state rapprochement of the 1970s did not lead to any inhibitions among the Church leadership in speaking out on social and political issues; indeed, one might argue that this was one of the factors that contributed to the growing openness of the Church and its willingness to get involved in controversial political and social issues. On issues both of domestic and foreign policy, the Church has spoken out in recent years with increased candidness, at times to the undisguised irritation of the SED. Whether it be on foreign policy issues such as Poland, Afghanistan, East-West German relations, and questions of peace and disarmament, or on domestic issues such as militarization in schools, alcoholism, crime, and youth problems, the open voice of the Evangelical Church on these and other issues has enhanced its standing in society and led to increased interest in what it has to say. In many cases the outspokenness of the Church has been encouraged by pressure from "base" communities, where priests, administrators, and lay organizations have called upon the regional and national leaderships to provide them with guidance and assistance in dealing with the maze of problems with which they and their parishioners are confronted.

This greater interest in the Church is not solely the result of the increased outspokenness of the Church; it is also attributable to the failure of official policy to satisfy the intellectual, moral, and emotional needs of young East Germans. Consequently, many of them have been turning, to the Church as the only alternative to the highly regimented discipline of official youth organizations. In the Church they discover a different atmosphere, where taboo themes can be openly discussed, where an atmosphere of tolerance exists, and where they can talk about and find sympathy for problems that are ignored or denied in the official press. As a result of the lack of alternative institutions that openly address these social isues and needs, the

Church is becoming a forum for airing issues that the authorities refuse to discuss or only do so in a one-sided fashion.

Limitations and Opportunities

The role that the Evangelical Church has adopted is by no means an easy one. On the one hand, the Church remains open to all those in need or who come into conflict with the state. By getting involved in those issues the Church has been able to enhance its position within society and gain a stronger standing among sectors of East German youth. The fact that demands for Church involvement have often emerged from local communities places the Church hierarachy in a position in which its commitment to its flock can be clearly tested. At the same time, active and open support for such activities involves the risk of confrontation with the authorities and the loss of prerogatives and concessions painfully won over the years. Church officials are also well aware of the limits of their influence and the risks involved for the individual. Moreover, the Church hierarchy must not neglect the needs and interests of its traditional membership. Church officials insist that they are not a political opposition and that they will not allow the Church to be exploited for political purposes or to be a gathering place for all those discontended and alienated from society. The result has been an attempt to strike a precarious balance between the variety of views held within the Church itself, the demands placed upon the Church hierarchy from below, and the prudence dictated by the harsh realities of political life in the GDR.

The fashion in which the Church has attempted to assume the role of a mediator in conflicts, calling for a broadly based open discussion between the regime and critical elements within society, can be illustrated by three examples. The first is the manner in which the Evangelical Church has handled the debate on peace and disarmament in the GDR and the emergence of independent peace groups both within and outside the Church. The emergence of these peace initiatives within local Church communities and the subsequent support provided by the Church leadership have been one of the most significant developments in the GDR in recent years and a clear response to fears and concerns within society at large.[2] The Church's moral support, its intervention in and on behalf of individuals coming into conflict with the state because of their independent peace activism, and, its ability to break the regime's monopoly of information by providing independent sources and studies on such issues have been key factors in the ability of such groups to establish a tentative existence. At the same time, the Church has never questioned the regime's commitment to peace and arms control and continues to call for an open discussion with the regime on those issues.

Another example of how the Church has responded to the interests and concerns of society has been the area of environmental protection. Although environmental problems in the GDR have long since reached the stage where they are more or less common

knowledge, the theme continues to be largely taboo in the official press. In response to the obvious interest and desire among young East Germans to do something in this area, Church communities have organized a variety of small-scale projects and have also set up research centers for environmental studies.

The third example of the Church's increasing involvement in various social issues is its sponsorship of last year's Luther celebrations. A series of 7 regional Church congresses attracted over 200,000 people. Although the focal point of the events was the Luther anniversary, the discussion grops set up during these events covered a range of issues including such social problems as the breakdown of family life, generational conflicts, divorce, suicide, alcoholism, crime, juvenile delinquency, homosexuality, pacifism, and the lack of travel opportunities.

The Future

In many ways the Churches in the GDR continue to present a rather contradictory picture. On the one hand, it is quite clear that for a number of years interest by society in the Church and what it has to say has been rising, above all among young people. On the other hand, traditional indices of Church activity continue to paint a somewhat different picture; although membership in the Catholic Church has remained more or less constant throughout the postwar period, figures for the Evangelical Churches continue to decline (active membership, of course, remains much lower than figures for total membership). Figures on baptisms and confirmations remain very low and in many cases have been declining for years. A shortage of priests has long been a serious problem; and there would also be serious financial problems were it not for the considerable financial help of West German Churches. There are also considerable regional differences as well as those between the cities and the countryside. In some areas the Church remains a thriving institution and a center of social activity, while in other communities it plays a very marginal role.

These declining figures can be reconciled with the growing importance of the Church suggested by other evidence. The Evangelical Church in the GDR has long since ceased to enjoy the historical status of what Germans refer to as a *Volkskirche*, which it traditionally enjoyed in Germany. Yet, in the words of one East German Church official: "Our Churches have become smaller, but I believe that inside they are stronger and their communities livelier." The future challenge for the Church leadership will be the degree to which it can retain the interest of young people that is currently evident and the degree to which such interest can be turned into a long-term commitment to the Church as an institution. This will hinge in large part on the Church's ability to respond to their needs. The motivation that has led increasing numbers of young people to the Church undoubtedly varies from individual to individual. Many young people who are not regular Church-goers or even Christians have nonetheless been

attracted to the Church by the search for answers to their problems and needs. Some come with hopes and expectations that the Church cannot fulfill. Others discover in the Church a refreshing and welcome alternative; and through this experience they develop a new involvement with religion. Still others find that it fills the spiritual vacuum left by a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Although it is difficult to say how widespread such feelings are, a recent article in an official East German journal dealing with problems of everyday life under "real socialism" also openly discussed the lack of any spiritual guidance coming from the party.[3]

There have also recently been signs of further repercussions of the increased interest in the Church. In addition to well-attended Church-sponsored youth activities for the first time in years, the theology departments of both state and Church colleges are reported to have more applicants than available spaces, a trend that, if it continues, could help ease the chronic shortage of priests.[4] In some parts of the GDR there have been reports of a leveling off in the decline in the number of baptisms; some Churches have even reported slight increases. Although it may be too early to speak of a religious revival in the traditional sense, the Churches in the GDR are showing signs of a type of renaissance.

Ronald D. Asmus

HUNGARY AND ITS BASIC COMMUNITIES

The post-Warld War II years marked a turning point for the Churches and religion in Hungary, as the communist party seized total power between 1948 and 1949 and began a series of repressive measures against the Church, which culminated in the life sentence meted out in 1950 to Hungary's Roman Catholic Primate, Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty. By the early 1950s, all Church property had been confiscated and all religious orders disbanded, with some minor exceptions in the field of education. Mindszenty's short freedom during the October 1956 Revolution was followed by almost 15 years of self-imposed refuge in the US Embassy in Budapest and his recall to Rome by Pope Paul VI.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the sharp confrontations between state and Church especially between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, have gradually been supplanted by a *modus vivendi* based on mutual compromises and concessions, with the support and active participation of the Vatican. The Churches' organizational structure has been re-established and various denominations and congregations are again active, albeit under much more restricted conditions than their counterparts in the West. While the state has in principle agreed to a dialogue with the Churches and to a certain amount of cooperation with them in specific spheres, it is not about to abandon its leading role in Hungarian life and society.

The most impressive phenomenon in Hungary today is the resurgence of religiousness, perhaps as a result of years of official persecution. This resurgence affects all segments of the population, including young people, and has been recognized by the Head of the State Office for Church Affairs, State Secretary Imre Miklos on several occasions in the past two years.[1] There are several reasons for this.

The failure of atheistic Marxist-Leninist ideology to make decisive inroads into Hungarian society is perhaps the most important. Even though many people have for years stopped actively practicing their religion, their faith has remained unshaken and in many cases has perhaps been strengthened by trying times. Miklos himself admitted that the Communists were to blame for this attachment to religion, because they had been unable to provide a compelling alternative.

Since the end of the 1970s mounting economic and social problems have endangered the political stability painstakingly achieved by the Kadar regime in the aftermath of Hungary's traumatic national crisis in 1956. Today the party alone can no longer cope with the many aspects of a growing social malaise that could lead to general destabilization. With national unity (on the party's terms, of course) endangered, the authorities had no alternative but to turn to the Churches for support.

The Churches, for their part, have been successfully pressing for a more active social role in society in recent years, and have offered their help in many of the more pressing human problems now confronting the country. Fields of common Church and state concern include the mounting rates of divorce, abortion, suicide, alcoholism, and criminality, a parallel drop in the country's birth rate, and the fragmentation of family life.[2]

As in other periods of history, many believers have for a number of reasons turned away from organized religion to seek deeper, personal faith in what has come to be known as basic or basis communities in Hungary. Thousands of small prayer and meditation groups have sprung up since the 1970s, each usually with a small number of members, many of them young people. Some of these groups have run into doctrinal differences with the Catholic Church hierachy, prompting the Church to suspend one of their leaders, the Piarist Father Gyorgy Bulanyi. Moreover, some basic community members refused to bear arms as conscientious objectors and have come into conflict with communist state laws. The state, in turn, has asked the Catholic Church to police its own members, including some younger, more vocal priests. The end result is a brewing conflict between the Church and some of the basic communities.

Current Church-state relations in Hungary must be viewed in light of the Kadar regime's first priority: maintaining and strengthening "national unity" in very difficult times, even if it means more concessions to religious sentiments. This year's Easter Sunday provided a vivid illustration of this changed official attitude, with Hungarian radio and press for the first time stressing the religious aspect of what used to an important Christian holiday in Hungary, and, at the same time, praising the present "positive" trend in Church-state relations in the country.[3] Even the party daily *Nepszabadsag* devoted an entire page to the place of Easter in the history of religion, mentioning its nonreligious antecendents, Passover, and the Christian meaning of Easter. Of the four major Budapest papers, only the labor union paper *Nepszava* did not write about Easter.

Progress remains to be made in several areas. Religious instruction for children still needs to be freed of some of the restrictions imposed upon it, and some religious orders are still officially forbidden. In the wake of the recent visit to Hungary by the Vatican's special representative, Archbishop Luigi Poggi, however, it was announced that the government had agreed to the establishment of a women's religious order, a long-standing Catholic Church request. In addition, in the future, religious classes can be held in parish halls, wherever existing church buildings prove inadequate. Another problem involves the thinning ranks of the clergy. On the other hand, there is a growing involvement of lay persons who, after studying theology, could teach catechism and perform other tasks.

Church members have been given a new opportunity to fulfill an increasingly important role as social workers. For years, the clergy has aided the old, the sick, and the mentally retarded in homes and health care centers (which are now receiving long-overdue recognition and publicity). The same can be said about Church efforts to combat alcoholism, divorce, abortion, and juvenile delinquency. On a broader plane, the Churches are expanding their efforts to try to prevent a further deterioration in traditional family life. Thus, where the communist ideology and education have failed, the Churches are now being given an opportunity to join the common rescue operation. Since the overall objectives do not always coincide for both sides, many problems of cooperation still remain.

Alfred Reisch

POLAND: ALWAYS A SPECIAL CASE

It is a commonplace that Poles are fervent Catholics, and four decades of communist rule have not changed that fact. Indeed, the years of trial appear to have added even more depth and commitment to popular religious feelings. Despite official attempts to reduce the Church to purely religious functions, its role in society, where it is widely perceived as a leading moral and spiritual force, appears to have been strengthened by recently added responsibilities rather than to have given way to "modern" social and philosophical theories. Even party theoreticians have had to admit recently what they have termed the

> increased importance of the Catholic Church in the life of Polish society, especially with regard to the molding of social awareness, the propagating of a religious world outlook, and the influencing of popular behavior and attitudes.[1]

While attributing that fact, at least in part, to a temporary "weakening" of the party's position in society in general and of the impact of communist ideology in particular, the author of this comment was quick to admit that credit for this increased importance should go in the first place to the Church leaders and their "essentially modified" tactics based on a "realistic assessment" of the Polish situation over recent years.

Popular Interest in Religion

The Church's importance, even before its recent enhancement, was very considerable. It is sufficient to recall the story of Nowa Huta, where the Communists' plans to make it a model "city without God" in the early 1950s led to a popular upheaval 10 years later and forced the regime to revise its intentions. Further telling evidence of the persistence of deeply rooted religious feelings is the nine years of preparation leading up to the 1966 celebration of Poland's Millennium and the nation's solemn dedication to "Mary, Queen of Poland." Still another occasion that raised the temperature of religious fervor was the beatification in 1971 of Father Maksymilian Maria Kolbe, a martyr from the Auschwitz death camp who soon became a symbol of religious heroism. It all goes to show that even before the great religious breakthrough of October 1978, when for the very first time a Pole became Pope, there was hardly any doubt as to the Poles' determination to keep identifiying with Catholicism, and to do so openly and irrespective of all official attempts at intimidation and repression.

Karol Cardinal Wojtyla's ascent to the papacy provided a new, powerful impulse to the revival of faith and confidence among his compatriots. Mass pilgrimages to Rome soon became standard features of Polish religious life, and the first papal homecoming trip in 1979 turned the whole country into one great festival of faith, charity, and hope, sparking off a popular movement to be known later as Solidarity. Another mass

manifestation of popular attachment to the Church and to its leaders was the funeral in May 1981 of Poland's Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski; it was an event that attracted hundreds of thousands of mourners from throughout the country, including high-ranking state officials.

As difficult as an exact sizing up of the Polish religious phenomenon may appear, some of its aspects are clearly measurable in figures. On the exclusively religious side, one need only glance at the recent increase in the number of priests and seminarians over the last decade; between 1970 and 1983 the number of parish priests grew from 18,000 to 21,600 and that of seminarians from 4,300 to nearly 7,800. As a result of "overproduction," as it were, the bishops agreed some years ago that at least 1% of priests were to be "exported" annually to foreign countries where there is a dearth. Owing to strong popular pressure on the authorities, the number of building permits granted by the government for the construction and renovation of religious buildings showed a similar upward trend. During the 1970s some 740 such permits were issued, whereas in 1981 alone more than 330 were obtained; current plans up until 1985 provide for another 1,000 or more churches to be erected or substantially extended (many of them to be built in new housing developments around the big cities). The recent escalation in the number of people wanting to become priests has necessitated the extension of seminaries, and there are plans to add several new ones to the 46 that already exist. All these constructions are financed exclusively from Church funds and private donations, state aid being strictly limited to buildings classified as historic monuments.

Another field that illustrates both the lively, popular interest in religion and the regime's yielding to public pressure is the growth in the number of Catholic publications. According to recent statitics,[2] the Catholic Church in Poland has at its disposal more than 20 publishing ventures printing 89 papers and periodicals with an overall circulation of 1,400,000 copies,[3] in addition to 26 internal Church bulletins. Of particular importance is the recent increase in circulation (from 40,000 to 70,000) of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the prestigious Cracow-based independent Catholic weekly; a second similar publication is to be started in Warsaw soon, reportedly to serve as the primate's semiofficial mouthpiece (planned circulation: 60,000). It should also be noted that, after some initial difficulties, the monthly, Polish edition of *L'Osservatore Romano* keeps coming in by tens of thousands for distribution by Church offices. Moreover, Sunday Masses have been transmitted by Polish radio from Warsaw and Gdansk without interruption, and despite all the vicissitudes of martial law, since September 1980.

New Fields of Pastoral Work

Alongside these religious advances, the Church has assumed a much more widely based and better coordinated social role over the last few years. Its work extends into practically all social

groups and ages, and different specialized pastoral services have been established under the guidance of bishops to meet this increased role.[4] Of particular interest is the Pastoral Service to Workers, established in mid-1980 with the aim of setting up Church-sponsored communities among factory workers and miners. The events in Gdansk and elsewhere during the heady summer of 1980, when open-air Masses were celebrated in the shipyards and on factory sites, spoke eloquently enough of the workers' attachment to the Church. Even more important appears to be the Church's involvement in rural affairs; the new Rural Pastoral Communities, which are springing up all over the country, have become influential peasant self-help organizations, responsible for practically everything, from organizing religious festivals to finding legal counsel for farmers and assisting the families of people persecuted for political reasons. These communities are to be instrumental in the administration of the planned Church-sponsored Western aid foundation to help Polish farmers.

Another relatively new field of pastoral work is the Church's support of intellectuals and artists; this was of particular importance after the imposition of martial law, when many cultural figures lost their jobs or chose to boycott the official cultural institutions. Not only does the Church offer these "internal exiles" various office jobs to earn their livelihood, but it also provides them with new chances to continue creative work by, for example, sponsoring a variety of concerts, art exhibitions, literary contests (with many prizes in cash), and so on. Regular visits by priests (and in some cases even bishops) to prisons, old age homes, and hospitals (not allowed before 1981) are another form of contact with different social groups. Even Gypsies have a special bishop assigned to them to take care of their spiritual needs.

Needless to say, the Church's special attention is focused on the young generation. The Pastoral Service to Students involves thousands of Catholic youth activists in all academic centers; their work includes--besides religious and educational projects--assistance to students who have been expelled from university for their commitment to Solidarity, as well as help to families of political prisoners. High-school students are organized in the so-called Oases, or "Light-Life Movement,"[5] a genuinely Catholic, semi-institutionalized youth movement started 30 years ago by the prominent Catholic educator Father Franciszek Blachnicki. Despite being officially disgraced by the regime, the movement remains active and claims a wide cross section of more than 200,000 young people as members. How seriously the students take their attachment to religious symbols and to the Church in general has been demonstrated again during the recent "war of the crosses."[6]

The youth's growing interest in spiritual matters is a fact of Polish life; that has now been officially recognized. Reporting on the findings of a public opinion poll organized between 1977 and 1980 among some 14,000 high-school students and

graduates, the atheists' weekly journal *Argumenty* disclosed[7] that the number of those professing a religious rather than a materialistic world outlook had grown during that time from 62.3% to 74.8%. Moreover, the number of those declaring themselves as Catholics had increased by 8.6%, and of those regularly practicing by 13.6%. In 1977 only 44.8% of respondents thought that education should be based on religious principles; that figure had grown to 56% three years later. The poll also noted a marked trend toward the mass participation of young people in religious celebrations and festivals. More significant still, the majority of respondents called for a greater "role and significance" for the Church in social and political life, and were appreciative of the Church's activity aimed at the democratization and "humanization" of the socialist system.

Predominance of Catholicism

To reverse this trend, the regime recently devised a comprehensive plan of action for the postmartial law era, taking into account some of the striking and undeniable facts about the Church's position in Poland. These facts are the overwhelming predominance of Catholicism (claiming some 97% of believers of all creeds, while the remaining 3% are distributed among 36 other denominations and religions); the long-standing Polish tradition of linking religion with social and political activity; and the general admiration for and dedication to the "Polish Pope." Forced to recognize these facts, the regime set about counteracting them. The official media launched an information campaign last fall about other religions and sects, with the implied message that the Catholic Church was just one such institution among many other possible ones. To limit Church influence in public life, there are frequent official warnings that the Church should confine itself to purely religious work and abstain from any broader social and political involvement. As far as the Pope is concerned, critical remarks about his person and activities are still extremely rare in the Polish media, but seem now to be surreptitiously encouraged along with occasional reprints of criticism from other communist papers abroad. Even the most inveterate hard-liners, however, must have realized by now that attacking the Pope is a sure way to alienate the Polish public from the regime.

The picture that emerges from this review of the genuine religious renaissance among Poles may appear too optimistic. Indeed, some distinguished members of the Church hierarchy, including the late primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, and his successor Jozsef Cardinal Glemp, have repeatedly warned against any "triumphalism," pointing out that in order to be durable such a powerful surge of religious feeling had to be matched by a simultaneous moral and ethical renewal, which (it must be presumed) they still found lacking. With so much young enthusiasm and such widely based support, however, the Church in Poland may look forward with confidence to its next Millennium.

Ewa Ćelt

ROMANIA: CONFORMISM AND NEW FERMENT

For over a decade now Romania has been experiencing a traumatic economic and moral crisis brought about by the policies of the Ceausescu regime. Material deprivation, social demoralization, and official corruption have reached unprecedented levels. Perhaps nowhere in Eastern Europe has the utopian promise of communism as a substitute for religion proven more unmitigated a failure than in Romania; Poland provides an obvious analogy in this respect. The stage can thus be said to have been set for a reassertion in Romanian society of the perennial religious values that the regime's discredited ideology had sought to displace; historical experience suggests that societies confronted with material or political crises tend to look for spiritual outlets. This process has been slow to develop in Romania and is still in an incipient stage, marked by a steadily rising Church attendance and growing interest in spiritual matters throughout society, but it lacks as yet a mass nature, articulate expression, and structured forms. The reasons for this slow development lie, on the one hand, in the regime's unrelenting enforcement of restrictions on religious life, and, on the other, in the failure of the country's largest religious establishment, the Orthodox Church, to assert itself in its relationship with the state.

The Orthodox Church and the State

The Orthodox Church is by far Romania's single largest denomination, claiming about 16,000,000 members or roughly 70% of the country's population. It operates under severe restrictions introduced in the early years of the regime and continuing unaltered to the present day. The Church has been deprived of its institutional rights and most traditional functions; it has been placed under stringent state control exercised by the Department of Cults, which is notorious for working with the Securitate; and it has been confined to liturgical and ritual functions. Partially purged during the communist takeover and packed with regime nominees, the Church hierarchy was quickly induced to conform to the regime's policies, wholly abandoning its historical tradition of upholding fundamental spiritual values in society and its own institutional automony within the political system.

The hierarchy's quiescent stance provides Eastern Europe's diametric opposite to the stance of the Polish Catholic hierarchy: for example, even as the latter was vigorously taking up the issue of church building permits with the communist authorities, the Orthodox hierarchy in Bucharest remained silent as more church buildings were destroyed (there has been a rash of church demolitions in recent years). Consistently passive in the face of the regime's attacks on the most basic religious values and religious rights, the Orthodox hierarchy in Bucharest insists

against all evidence that it functions under conditions of religious freedom; and it has repeatedly cooperated with the authorities in silencing those clergymen who take issue with the hierarchy's submissive attitude. The hierarchy has also lent a semblance of religious endorsement to the atheist state and its policies, to the extent that it participates in the propaganda activities of the Front for Socialist Democracy and Unity.

While the hierarchy has failed completely to provide the leadership that would be required for a reassertion of religious values in Romanian society, stirrings have been in evidence in recent years among the lower Orthodox clergy. The best known case if that of Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa, who is currently serving a 10-year prison term after having delivered a series of sermons addressed to Romania's young people that attracted unprecedently large audiences in Bucharest. The texts of those sermons continued to circulate in Romania even after their author had been jailed. Father Calciu's message to young people urged them to break through the barriers of atheistic indoctrination and turn to the teachings of Christianity for spiritual guidance. He called upon them to rediscover religious ethics as an alternative to communism's ethical relativism and invoked Christianity's transcendental values as a basis for building up defenses against communist ideology's total claim on man's soul.

The intense response evoked by Father Calciu's sermons illustrates the appeal of Christianity among young Romanians, despite their constant exposure to antireligious propaganda. It also explains the authorities' swift reaction in silencing him, particularly since he had provided spiritual guidance to a group of workers and intellectuals that had attempted to found the "Free Trade Union of Working People in Romania" in 1979.

Father Calciu has been the most eloquent although not the sole representative of a new tendency among members of the Orthodox lower clergy. These clergymen urge the Church to respond more effectively to the spiritual needs of Romanian society and, as a prerequisite of this, to change its practice of "rendering unto Caesar" more than what is Caesar's. From 1980 to 1982 at least 12 cases were reported of priests who were arrested or suspended from their priestly functions (or both) after criticizing the hierarchy for its subservience toward the atheist state and circulating proposals for increased efforts by the Church in sustaining Christian values in Romanian society.

A letter in 1980 to the Patriarch from a priest from the Banat catalogued the restrictions that weigh heavily upon the Church and proposed steps to free the Church from such paralyzing state controls. This remarkable letter appealed for Church autonomy in making ecclesiastical appointments, that is, without interference from the state authorities. It also urged the

Church hierarchy to end its participation in the Front for Socialist Democracy and Unity and other regime propaganda activities. The Metropolitanates and Bishoprics should be staffed only with graduates of theological institutions or monastics, according to the priest, not with "lay" people--a clear allusion to state agents whose role is to keep watch over Church activities from within. He also appealed to the Church to petition the authorities for permission to conduct open-air services, pilgrimages, spiritual ministrations in hospitals and prisons, and religion classes in churches; for more adequate printing facilities for religious literature, the denial of which has resulted in a dramatic shortage of Bibles and other religious books in Romania; and for the observance of the principal Christian holidays, none of which are recognized by the state.

Such requests, which seem radical in the present Romanian context, involve nothing more than the sorts of elementary religious rights already exercised by Churches in most East European countries. That they are not available in Romania shows how little good the Orthodox hierarchy's submissiveness to the regime has done. In fact, it has done nothing more than set a difficult precedent for those churchmen prepared to work to overcome the barriers erected by the regime between the Church and the public.

Other Denominations: Resilience and New Ferments

There are two Catholic denominations in Romania: the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, or Uniate Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. The Uniate Church was forcibly dissolved by the regime in 1948, at which time it numbered 1,700,000 members, nearly all of them ethnic Romanians from Transylvania. Due to the superior caliber of its clergy, the Uniate Church's importance in Romanian history and politics prior to the communist takeover far exceeded its numerical strength. Although officially merged with the Orthodox Church since 1948, some Uniates have informally joined the Roman Catholic Church or at least attend the latter's services, while others continue to practise the Uniate faith in secrecy and even retain an embryonic ecclesiastical organization underground. The latter includes three bishops who seem to function with at least the knowledge of the Vatican. In recent years Romanian Uniates from both Romania and the West have published appeals for the re-establishment of the Uniate Church. In 1981 the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid received a letter from the three underground Uniate bishops resident in Romania who, in addition to demanding the re-establishment of their Church, presented a comprehensive critique of restrictions imposed by the regime on all religious denominations. This tendency to transcend denominational issues and join hands with other Churches has been demonstrated also by the activist Orthodox clergymen, who support the re-establishment of the Uniate Church, This generous ecumenical stance contrasts with the position of the Orthodox hierarchy, which has publicly denounced in vituperative language the initiatives, including those of the Vatican, on behalf of the Uniate Church.

The Roman Catholic Church in Romania has 1,200,000 members, the great majority of whom are ethnic Hungarians and Germans. The Roman Catholic Church has been deprived of its former legal status and rights and so it exists *de facto* but not *de jure*. Despite many vicissitudes, religious observance has remained strong among Roman Catholics in Romania, for most of whom religious affiliation is bound up with ethnic identity. The Roman Catholic communities' morale received a boost in 1983 when two previously two vacant bishops' seats were filled on an interim basis and for the first time a Roman Catholic from Romania was beatified by the Vatican. The beatification ceremonies provided the occasion for the first pilgrimage by Roman Catholics from Romania to Rome since World War II.

As with the Roman Catholics, the Protestants in Romania are almost all of either Hungarian or German ethnicity; there are about a million of them. Their communities are cohesive, culturally insulated, and inward-looking, in this case, too, religious affiliation and ethnic identity are interconnected and mutually reinforcing.

Perhaps the most spectacular development on the Romanian religious scene over the past few years has been the rapid growth of neo-Protestant denominations, which currently number at least 300,000, some 200,000 of which are Baptist, more than in all other East European countries combined. Most have left the Orthodox Church, as observers generally agree, because of its inadequate response to their spiritual needs and religious dedication. Owing to the sense of mission they have brought to the service of their faith and the determination they have displayed in resisting regime pressures, the Baptists' visibility and their impact on the Romanian religious scene has been far greater than their number might suggest. They have been especially active in proselytizing, in disseminating throughout the country Bibles received from abroad, and have engaged in a constant tug of war with the authorities for permission to acquire or build prayer houses and churches. The Baptists have also managed to set up a community-based relief network, which to some extent shields members against the threat of job dismissal.

The authorities, working in some cases through the official Baptist Union, which seeks to mediate between the Baptist communities and the state, have applied a variety of repressive measures, including evictions from churches and prayer houses, attempts to remove elected community leaders, the imposition of heavy fines on congregations, and the arrest and imprisonment of activists. Some of the most outspoken activists have been allowed or forced to emigrate. These tactics have failed to intimidate the Baptists but have almost certainly slowed down their growth. On the other hand, the tactic of allowing the most capable Baptist leaders to emigrate seems to have backfired, as these leaders have been increasingly effective in the USA in mobilizing religious and political support for their brethern in Romania.

Outlook

Religious beliefs and observance have clearly been making a come-back in Romanian society in recent years, and the evidence is multiplying of a growing interest in religious values among broad strata of the population. This development goes hand in hand with a new assertiveness in probing the outer limits of the restrictions imposed by the regime on religious life. The regime has responded with an intense antireligious campaign in the propaganda media and through the party and Communist youth indoctrination apparatus, but there is no indication that this effort is achieving the intended effect. On the contrary, in the course of this very campaign, reluctant admissions have surfaced to the effect that the number of believers and the pull of religious ideas continue to increase.

The symptoms of a religious revival are more visible among minority denominations, particularly among the Baptists, but are discernible among the Orthodox as well. Owing to the country's denominational structure, any development in the direction of a religious revival will remain a marginal phenomenon as long as it does not encompass the Orthodox population. The potential for a religious revival among the Orthodox is there; its development, however, is made difficult by the lack of an effective leadership, and the prospects for such a development materializing depend to a large extent on the abilities and dedication of the lower clergy.

Vladimir Socor

YUGOSLAVIA: A REVIVAL WITH COMPLICATIONS

A plethora of articles in the official Yugoslav press and a number of public meetings and discussions devoted to religious problems and Church activities testify to a nationwide religious revival, a phenomenon that in principle is incompatible with communist doctrine and points to communism's failure to supplant religion with its ideology. Estimates place the number of "believers" (not necessarily active Church members) within Yugoslavia's 3 main religious denominations at about 4,000,000 Moslems, 7,000,000 Roman Catholics, and 9,000,000 Serbian Orthodox believers.[1] There are several factors that have formed the role the Churches and religion play in Yugoslavia. First among them is Yugoslavia's unique position as an East European communist country outside the Soviet bloc, which gives it more elbow room in its domestic affairs, including official tolerance of a certain level of religious sentiment. The very close link between the Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, and Moslem religions and the national history of the peoples of Yugoslavia provides the basis for sustained interest in these religions. That link has remained intact, so that even today there is a strong connection between the Roman Catholic Church and the Slovenes and Croats; the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbs and Macedonians; and between the Moslem faith and the "Moslem nation" in Bosnia. In each case, attachment to a particular denomination is often inextricably bound to nationalistic feelings.

Yugoslavia's separation from the Soviet bloc in 1948 was the decisive step toward a gradual normalization of relations between the communist state and the country's religious groups. In spite of several notorious trials of Catholic and Serbian Orthodox bishops, including the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alosius Cardinal Stepinac, and the prosecution of hundreds of priests in the immediate postwar years, Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948 forced the Yugoslav leadership to seek all the support it could get from domestic social and political forces, Churches and their congregations included.

But the road to more normal and more confident relations between the atheist state and the religious communities was slow and filled with obstacles. While a dialogue with the Serbian Orthodox Church, following the return of the Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo in 1947, was established without great difficulties, as was the case with the Moslem religious community, reconciliation with the Roman Catholic Church was much thornier.

The situation improved in 1960 when Cardinal Stepinac died and Tito allowed his enemy's body to be returned from the place of his confinement to Zagreb for a ceremonial burial. The general atmosphere was less tense, and the Vatican was quick to respond to Yugoslavia's conciliatory move. During the cardinal's memorial Mass at the Vatican, Pope John XXIII officially signaled the start of negotiations with Belgrade, calling for a return of

"civic and religious peace in Yugoslavia." As a result of endeavors on both sides, an agreement between the Holy See and Belgrade was signed in 1966, regulating reciprocal rights and obligations; normalization of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Belgrade was reached in 1970.

The 1966 agreement, usually called "The Protocol," proved to be a great benefit for the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1970s there were 2 Catholic theological faculties in Yugoslavia (in Ljubljana for Slovenes, and in Zagreb for Croats), 5 philosophical and theological schools of higher education, and 15 seminaries with 768 candidates for the priesthood, compared with only 280 in 1949. At the beginning of 1980s about 100 new priests every year joined the Catholic clergy.

The growth of the Catholic press in the 1970s was another sign of the leeway given the Church by the state. Each of the 23 Catholic dioceses and some larger parishes now have their own papers. The most important among them are *Druzina* (The Family), published in Slovenian, and *Glas Koncila* (The Herald of the Council), published in Croatian, with a circulation of 150,000 and 120,000 copies, respectively. Altogether, there are 127 religious papers and bulletins published in the Croatian language. The publishing house of the Catholic Theological Association, The Christian Present, is among the largest of its kind in Europe and publishes history, art, and social science books in addition to religious literature. There is also intensive reconstruction of new churches; for example, in Croatia alone (where about 60% of the country's Catholics live) some 1,250 churches were reconstructed and 273 new ones built (89 more are still under construction) during the postwar period. All this points to a renewed interest among Yugoslav Catholics in their religious affiliation.

In discussing the role of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia one cannot overlook the Church's social and charitable activities. The Church is active in organizing kindergartens and social and teaching programs for young people, caring for disabled and old people, and raising funds for the unemployed and the poor. The Catholic Church is trying to extend its social assistance in those areas where the state is not making any progress.

Although their clergymen are not as well-educated as their Catholic counterparts and do not enjoy the same level of international support afforded to the Roman Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Moslem community have managed to survive the vagaries of a communist state. Each has increased the number of schools for the education of priests and publishes a weekly journal. The Serbian Orthodox *Pravoslavlje* (The Orthodoxy) has a circulation of 50,000 while the Moslem *Preporod* (The Renewal) has 30,000 copies. Perhaps in order to secure their position at home, both groups have cultivated contacts among religious communities abroad. The Serbian Orthodox Church maintains close contacts with the East European Orthodox

Churches and with the Church of England and other Protestant denominations, while the Yugoslav Moslems are seeking close ties to Cairo, Baghdad, and Mecca (over 1,000 hadjis a year make pilgrimages to Mecca).

Yugoslavia's complicated domestic and international situation precludes any radically antireligious policy dogmatic groups within the party leadership might like to inaugurate. It is quite difficult, for instance, to launch a policy hostile to the Serbian Orthodox Church, since the Serbs constitute the largest population group and are the most devoted supporters of the state. As for the Catholic Church, the state is bound by the 1966 Protocol and is conscious of the Vatican's influence on Yugoslav Catholics. Finally, among Yugoslavia's closest friends are several Arab countries--Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Egypt--that would protest any persecution of Moslems.

Recent domestic and international developments have cast new light on Yugoslavia's three main religious groups. The election of a Polish Pope, his spectacular trips to Poland, and his particular interest in Slavs have tremendously encouraged Yugoslavia's Catholic and Orthodox population. The Pope's appeal is so great among Christian believers in Yugoslavia that communist officials have feared a repetition of the Polish events in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the renewal of Islamic fundamentalism in the world has stimulated religious interest among Yugoslov Moslems, particularly in Bosnia. The Yugoslav communist leaders are afraid of an eventual fundamentalist revival, which would inevitably add to the nationality conflicts in those areas where Moslems represent a large portion of the population; the recent trial of 13 Moslems in Sarajevo was the most striking evidence of the state's concern about this.

The Serbian Orthodox Church's revival exhibits strong nationalistic overtones. Events such as the exodus of the Serbian population from Kosovo, the harassment of Orthodox priests and bishops, and the burning (allegedly by 57lbanians) of the old Serbian Orthodox Patriarchat in Decane, Kosovo, have convinced the Serbs that the state is no longer willing or capable to protect their interests and their cultural heritage; looking for support, they are now rallying, as in the past, around their Church.

The communist regime cannot but tolerate this growing interest in religion. Although a religious person in Yugoslavia, as in other communist countries, suffers disadvantages in that he is excluded from all important official positions, the communist leadership has not been able to stem the tide of growing interest in religious groups. There have been further attempts to intimidate Church members, press campaigns against individual bishops and priests, and even incidents of persecution among priests and

believers. The state has accused all Churches of veiling their nationalistic activism with their "religious" role, but, of course, therein lies the basis of their popular support. As a result, several priests and believers of all denominations have been indicted and sentenced to long prison terms. This, however, has failed to reverse the trend. Even the dismissal of a number of believers from the party or from their jobs has done little to discourage religious faith; often it has proved counterproductive by making Church officials and believers even more steadfast.

Zdenko Antic

LITHUANIA: AN EFFECTIVE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Catholics in Lithuania can look back on the last 15 years with a considerable degree of pride and satisfaction in their accomplishments. While even now the Church is in an unenviable position, toward the end of the 1960s its condition bordered on the catastrophic. The number of Catholics in the republic had declined precipitously, the one bishop allowed to carry out his duties was cowed by the authorities, the number of seminarians had been drastically curtailed, and many of the clergy had been intimidated by Stalinist terror and the frequent campaigns of atheist indoctrination fostered by zealous local myrmidons. Moreover, the public tended to disregard the plight of the Church, because many Lithuanians apparently believed in the possibility of greatly improved prospects and substantial changes in the method of party rule. During the 1960s there was relative intellectual freedom, the economy was growing at a steady pace, and measures were being taken to promote prosperity in the countryside, which had been devastated by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the partisan war. It was widely thought that the party's comparatively benign attitude toward further liberalization would be jeopardized by thoughtless and most probably counterproductive demands for more ccomprehensive improvement. These halcyon days of relative contentment with party rule were not to be shattered for some time.

Catholic Counteroffensive

Faced with such a situation, the more militant Catholic priests became convinced that continued silence in the face of repression would inevitably lead to the emasculation, if not the demise, of Catholicism in Lithuania. They launched what proved to be a remarkably effective counteroffensive; although at its inception it was not a defiant challenge to the government by an organization confident of its power and convinced of its future success but rather an act of desperation by people who felt that the situation would soon be beyond redemption.

The Catholic dissident movement began with the writing of mass petitions to various Soviet officials asking that the widespread violation of religious rights and discrimination against Catholics be redressed. When no positive response was forthcoming, publication of the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* and other *samizdat* journals commenced, as another means of calling attention to the plight of Catholics there, while the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers (CCDRB), founded in 1978, became a public and vocal spokesman for many Catholic causes. As Catholics became more assertive, they also became more united and more confident of the justice of their cause. The Church's ability to mobilize support is best shown by the fact that almost 5% of the total population of the republic signed a petition asking that an illegally confiscated church in Klaipeda be restored to its religious purpose.

Moreover, almost three-quarters of the republic's priests signed statements announcing that they would disregard government regulations contrary to canon law.

The struggle between the Church and the government has focused on two main areas: the Church's demand that it be free to regulate its internal affairs, and its desire that it be allowed to carry out its evangelical mission. Catholics have been eminently successful in minimizing the interference of the civil authorities in internal Church matters. They have blocked the appointment of known collaborators or overly pliant individuals as bishops, they have successfully pressured the regime into substantially increasing the number of admissions to the seminary; and they have subverted to some degree the government's attempt to introduce a system of parish committees that would take most religious and financial matters out of the hands of priests. Although Catholics have had little success in the second area of conflict, they still believe that the Church is in the midst of a major spiritual renewal. Even the editors of the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, whose statements are usually pessimistic and suggest a siege metality, have noted that the Church has regenerated itself and improved qualitatively. All available data suggest that the earlier decline of religion has ceased and that almost half of the population retains a sufficiently large residue of religious faith to feel that some of the more important moments of life, such as marriage or the birth of children, should be consecrated by the Church.

Church Strategy

The strategy of the Church has been straightforward. Fearing the appointment as bishops of servile individuals who might compromise the Church from within, the editors of the *Chronicle* and the more militant priests have constantly stressed the absolute priority of ensuring the reinstatement of two bishops whom the Soviets had removed from their duties in 1958 and 1961, a move that would require a substantial concession from the Kremlin. At other times the *Chronicle* has published unfavorable information about priests thought to be likely candidates for promotion as bishops and has even publicly requested the Vatican not to appoint to responsible positions individuals not trusted by the majority of Catholics. The present situation in regard to the Church hierarchy is the most normal to date under Soviet rule, and due to certain decisions taken by the Vatican, most Lithuanian priests are now pleased with their bishops. When government restrictions on the number of entrants to the seminary caused a critical shortage of priests, an underground seminary was founded and its graduates ordained. Since the founding of the underground seminary, the government has allowed the number of seminarians to increase sharply, probably because it is easier to control registered priests than unregistered ones. The *Chronicle* has lifted the veil of silence that shrouded government sponsored repression of and discrimination against Catholics, and the party press occasionally responds with an article denying a

particular charge. Without the *Chronicle* there would be no need for such apologetic articles.

The unknown editors of the *Chronicle*, the founders of the underground seminary, and the members of CCDRB, which had no official sanction from the Church, are in the main responsible for the Catholic renaissance in Lithuania. It is they and not the bishops or other members of the hierarchy that have fueled the protest movement. Yet the militants have no schismatic tendencies and are fully aware of the great strength they draw from the Catholic Church as an institution. Even during the darkest years of Stalinist terror, the Church retained some independence from the dictates of the Kremlin. The Church suffered; its members were persecuted and its rights were transgressed, but it functioned uninterruptedly and was never considered to be illegal. The Church was and remains the only important institution in Lithuania not subject to direct party control and with genuine historical traditions and ties to Lithuania's noncommunist past. Although Catholic militants have tended at times to be excessively critical of their bishops, they have also realized the pressure that can be brought to bear upon their superiors. Thus, some attempts have been made to place intermediaries between them and the authorities. The most important of these are the councils of priests, elected in all six dioceses of Lithuania in 1981, that can take over certain functions as spokesmen for the Catholic Church. The fate of the CCDRB, which seems to have been dispersed in 1983, serves as a reminder that the party can easily dispose of even the most respected priests, when they act in a capacity not covered by the formal organizational structure of the Church.

No Polish Parallels

The Church is far better off now than it was 15 years ago. Yet the predilection of Western journalists to compare the position of the Church in Lithuania to that in Poland is fundamentally misguided. The invocation of a common past may conjure up visions of a similar present, but in reality the Church in Lithuania has far more in common with its harried counterpart in Czechoslovakia. The regime remains an implacable enemy, begrudging every compromise and determined to prevail; and a determined crackdown by the authorities could paralyze the activity of the Church. But the Church is in a better position to withstand even such an onslaught because of a relatively recent and rather unexpected development, namely, a reassessment of the Catholic Church that has led to the almost universal recognition, outside party circles, of its role in fostering Lithuanian national interests. Many Lithuanians, including most dissidents, now believe that the Church plays an exceptional role in fostering the Lithuanian national identity and preserving the national cultural heritage.

Facile comparisons with the situation in Poland obscure the novelty of the development. The Catholic Church has not always

been a unifying factor in Lithuanian life, nor has its role vis-a-vis Lithuanian nationalism been unequivocal. Many priests, in particular most of the Church's hierarchy, were bitterly opposed to the Lithuanian national renaissance of the second half of the nineteenth century, fearing that a separate national identity, based to a large extent upon a conscious opposition to Polish influence in social and cultural life, would lead to a weakening of Catholicism. For many of the older and thoroughly Polonized priests, being a Catholic and having a pro-Polish orientation were virtually one and the same thing, and renunciation of Polish influence was tantamount to apostasy. The liberal wing of the national renaissance movement generally espoused a materialistic philosophy, believing that the nation could flourish only after being freed from "religious superstitution." During the years of Lithuanian independence (1918-1940), the most bitter political struggles concerned the role of the Church in national life. The suspicions and divisiveness thus generated were so great that even during the Nazi occupation resistance organizations were divided along these ideological lines, while communist agents, who infiltrated the postwar partisan movement, tried to weaken it by reviving the old ideological discords.

Guardian of the National Heritage

The reasons for the reassessment of the role of Catholicism in national life are manifold, some of them even being the unintended effect of government repression. It is, however, a matter of the utmost importance that the Church and Lithuanian nationalists, whether they be practicing Catholics or not, have similar views about which aspects of Soviet policy can be construed as constituting a threat to Lithuanian national and cultural identity and how such policies should be resisted. Both Catholics and Lithuanian nationalists are united in opposing linguistic Russification, the destruction of national and historical consciousness, and the weakening of the biological foundations of the nation, although perhaps for different reasons.

The Church's ability to portray itself as the guardian of the national heritage ensures for it the sympathy, if not support, even of many nonbelievers, who are convinced that the Church is the primary public institution fostering national aspirations. In a people as devoted to the nationalist cause as contemporary Lithuanians, such a perception of the Church guarantees it a large pool of potential supporters or converts upon which it can draw in times of trouble. The fostering of such a perception may be the major achievement of the Catholic dissident movement, for it is that factor above all others that may be the most useful in weathering future attacks upon the Church.

Kestutis K. Girnius

Footnotes

Albania

1 1 March 1984.

2 March 1984.

3 *Rilindja*, 14 January 1984.

Bulgaria

1 J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), page 17.

2 *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, no. 3, 1976.

3 Sources for statistics differ somewhat on a number of points but not substantially, which should not be surprising given such a delicate subject as religion in a communist country. See RFE and RL Research Staff, "Religion Under "Real Socialism.'" RAD Background Report/123 (Eastern Europe), *Radio Free Europe Research*, 31 May 1979; *Tsarkvi i Izpovedania v Narodna Republika Bulgariya* [Churches and Religious Denominations in the People's Republic of Bulgaria] (Sofia: Sinodalno Izdatelstvo, 1975); and *The Orthodox Monitor*, July-December 1980.

4 *Digest des Ostens*, no. 3-4, 1977.

5 *Religion in Communist Lands*, Winter, 1980.

6 Wolf Oschlies, "Kirche und Religioeses Leben in Bulgarien," *Berichte des Bundesinstitutes fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien*, no. 15, 1983.

7 *Die Welt*, 5 August 1981.

8 KNS, 25 January 1980.

9 *Ibid.*; *Church Times* (London), 18 May 1979; Mitko Matheeff, *Document of Darkness* (St. Catherines, Canada: Your Neighbor in Need, 1980).

10 G. S., "Ideological Drive Against Paraperception," RAD BR/60 (Bulgaria), *RFER*, 24 March 1983.

Czechoslovakia

1 Hruza's interview with Marvine Howe in *The New York Times*, 4 October 1981.

2 For previous discussions of the problem, with special reference to young people, see Czechoslovak Situation Reports/1 and 6, *Radio Free Europe Research*, 15 January and 26 March 1981, items 2 and 3, respectively; *ibid.*, nos. 5 and 21, 17 March and 26 November 1982, items 3 in each case; *ibid.*, no. 8, 9 May 1983, item 1; and *ibid.*, nos. 3 and 8, 16 February and 4 May 1984, items 4 and 3, respectively.

3 Ales Sekot in *Tribuna*, no. 20, 18 May 1983, pp. 8-9.

4 Ales Sekot in *Sociologia*, no. 1, 1984, pp. 18-19. Sekot is director of the Institute for the Investigation of Social Consciousness and Scientific Atheism attached to the Brno branch of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

5 Karolina Halgasova in *Zivot Strany*, no. 24, 21 November 1983, pp. 25-26.

6 *Tribuna*, no. 1, 1 January 1975, p. 5. No newer data are available but one may assume that the percentage has declined somewhat.

7 Vladimir Osif in *Zivot Strany*, no. 10, 10 May 1982, p. 58. See also *Ateizmus*, no. 3, 1982, p. 342.

8 Maria Slackova in *Zivot Strany*, no. 21, 10 October 1983, pp. 57-58.

9 A samizdat religious writer said: "Catholics can live under socialism, but they cannot accept a planned withering away" (*Informace o Cirkvi*, no, 12, December 1982, p.6).

10 Ivan Hodovsky in *Ateizmus*, no. 5, 1982, pp. 446-465.

11 *Sociologicky Casopis*, no. 3, 1982, pp. 377-378.

12 This and other issues are perspicaciously described in a samizdat essay entitled "The Future of Czech Catholicism." It is unsigned and undated but must have been written sometime in 1980.

13 *Listy* (Rome), no. 6, December 1983, p. 11. The opinion poll's results from 63 respondents are available. Their average age was 21. Of the 63, 15 said they believed in God. A 20-year-old woman said: "I believe in goodness as God, and in God as goodness."

14 Jozef Juracek, Oto Svec, and Jozef Sadovsky were detained and interrogated in early April 1984 in connection with signature gathering (AFP and UPI, 10 April 1984).

15 The case has been described in VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted] Statement No. 354, 19 January 1984.

16 The priest, Gunther Matej Rompf, was sentenced in September 1981 to a prison term of two years. See VONS Statement No. 278, 10 November 1981.

17 Pavol Prusak in *Ucitelske Noviny* (Bratislava), no. 42, 21 October 1982, pp. 1-2. Prusak is attached to the Slovak CP CC apparat.

German Democratic Republic

1 In addition to the Catholic Church in the GDR, which has about 1,200,000 members constituting 8% of the population, there are also 8 regional Evangelical Churches. The eight regional Churches were all founding members of the pan-German EKD founded in 1968. In 1969, however, they left the EKD, following intense pressure from the state authorities, and formed their own separate organization, the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR. In addition, several historical institutions were retained; the five United Churches of Anhalt, Berlin-Brandenburg, Goerlitz, Griefswald, and the Church Province of Saxony, for example, simultaneously constitute the Evangelical Church of the Union in the GDR (EKU). Similarly, the three Lutheran Churches of Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia make up the United Evangelical Lutheran Church (VELK). According to the most recent figures the Federation has 7,700,000 members (47% of the population). The increased interest in the Churches in the GDR has resulted in the publication of several books and numerous articles. For perhaps the best treatment of the Evangelical Churches in the GDR, see Richard Henkys, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* [The Evangelical Churches in the GDR] (Muenchen: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1982).

2 For further details on the origins and development of the independent "peace movement" in the GDR, see Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a "Peace Movement' in the GDR?" *ORBIS*, Summer 1983, pp. 301-341.

3 The East German periodical *Sinn and Form* recently published a discussion with an East German couple from an agricultural cooperative outside Berlin. The couple, presented as loyal citizens and party members, candidly discussed the problems and frustrations of everyday life in the GDR. While commenting on personal relationships and problems with friends, Inge, the wife, said that "No one is concerned about our souls; they are concerned about everthing else, about our physical condition, but what the pastor used to do is missing today. No one is responsible for the spirit anymore." The statement is remarkable in that it amounts to a tacit acknowledgment of both the positive role of the pastor in years past and the inability of the party and its ideology to fill personal needs in this sphere (see Ronald D. Asmus, "East German Journal Discusses Problems Under 'Real Socialism,'" RAD Background Report/59 (German Democratic Republic), *Radio Free Europe Research*, 12 April 1984. The original article, was published in *Sinn und Form*, no. 2. 1984.

4 See *Epd*, 30 January 1984.

Hungary

1 On the growing interest of Hungarian youth in religion and the Churches, see Hungarian Situation Report/2, *Radio Free Europe Research*, 6 February 1984, item 7.

2 See *ibid.*, no. 5, 22 March 1983, item 7.

3 Dr. Tibor Bartha, "Easter Thoughts About Hope," *Magyar Nemzet*, 22 April 1984.

Poland

1 Wieslaw Myslek, "Selected Problems of Ideological Confrontation in Crisis Conditions," *Nove Drogi*, January-February 1982.

2 *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 May 1982.

3 According to the same source, other Churches and religious communities in Poland publish 21 papers with a circulation of 85,000 copies.

4 For extensive information on that subject, see Polish Situation Report/18, *Radio Free Europe Research*, 31 December 1983, item 3.

5 See *ibid.*, no. 13, 24 June 1980, item 4.

6 See *ibid.*, no. 8, 27 April 1984, item 3.

7 20 November and 4 December 1983.

Yugoslavia

1 Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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Note: This is a reissue of RL 39/84 of January 30. The article is being reissued because the author's name was inadvertently left off it the first time it appeared.

YET ANOTHER REWRITE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CAUCASIAN WAR?

Ann Sheehy

The Party has always considered that historians, like writers, are under an obligation to use their talents to promote the Party's current ideological goals. This has involved historians in the extensive rewriting of history. The most notorious example of this rewriting as far as the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR are concerned has been the reevaluations of the nature of the Caucasian War--that is, the prolonged and desperate resistance of the fiercely independent Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus to Tsarist conquest in the nineteenth century. The war was one of the most memorable and colorful chapters in the annals of Tsarist expansion. The Mountaineers, who fought under the banner of Islam, were led for twenty-five years of their struggle by the legendary Shamil, and their exploits and those of the Tsarist troops were immortalized in the Caucasian tales of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy.

In the early Soviet period the struggle of the Mountaineers to preserve their independence was portrayed in an entirely favorable light. In the latter years of Stalin's rule, however, it was branded as wholly reactionary. In the post-Stalin era, when historians were permitted to modify some of the extreme positions adopted under Stalin, a compromise was reached: the approved view became that the movement headed by Shamil and his predecessors as imam had started out as a popular national-liberation struggle but become reactionary under the influence of Muridism (a form of militant Sufism).

Until recently this interpretation does not seem to have been challenged. Last year, however, the authoritative Moscow historical journal Istoriya SSSR carried an article by a North Ossetian historian that once again rejects the notion the Mountaineers were waging a national liberation struggle and ascribes the Caucasian War to the expansionist nature of their society at that time.[1]

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1. M.M. Bliev, "Kavkazskaya voina: sotsial'nye istoki, sushchnost'," Istoriya SSSR, No. 2 of 1983, pp. 54-75.

It seems likely that this article is the result of a conscious decision by the authorities to try to deprive the resistance by the Mountaineers to Tsarist conquest of any heroic aura. They are evidently not happy with the fact that some Chechen, at least, are still evaluating their forebears' resistance to Tsarist rule not from the approved social-class standpoint but from a religious-nationalistic point of view and idealizing the role of Islam and the religious leaders.

Soviet Historiography of the Caucasian War

Soviet rewriting of the history of the Caucasian War has to be seen, of course, in the general context of the rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR to make it conform to the Party's current requirements in the area of nationalities policy.

In the first decades after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks were concerned above all to denigrate the Tsarist past. Incorporation in the Russian empire was therefore said to have been an "absolute evil" for the non-Russian peoples, and their resistance to Tsarist colonialism was depicted in a heroic light. It was at this time that the Muridist movement headed by Shamil was classed as progressive, the awkward religious element being either ignored or rationalized and Shamil himself presented as an unalloyed hero.

As time passed the Party came to see such glorification of resistance to Russian rule as damaging to the concept of the "friendship of the peoples" of the USSR. Historians were required to produce new histories that, while not necessarily denying the misdeeds of the Tsarist regime, stressed that annexation by Tsarist Russia had been a progressive phenomenon for the non-Russian peoples concerned since it had brought them into direct contact with the advanced Russian people. A corollary of this thesis for a time was that any opposition to Russian conquest was reactionary. Although the new versions of Russian colonial history began to appear from about 1940, it was only in 1950 that the Muridist movement and Shamil were finally declared reactionary. According to the new interpretation, Shamil had enjoyed no popular support. It was even implied that the Muridist movement had been organized by the Turks and the British. As has already been mentioned, in the early post-Stalin era, partly under pressure from historians in Dagestan, the homeland of Shamil,[2] there was a partial rehabilitation of him. The progressive nature of annexation to the Russian empire could

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2. Although the Muridist movement originated in Dagestan, the fiercest resistance to the Tsarist forces was offered by

not be questioned, but after considerable polemics between the pro-Shamil and anti-Shamil forces it was conceded that the movement headed by Shamil and his predecessors as imam had been a popular national-liberation struggle against Tsarist conquest.3

The next change in the interpretation of the Caucasian War, which resulted from the continuing elaboration of the myth of the friendship of the Soviet family of peoples in the past as well as in the present, merely modified the nature of the actions of the Tsarist government. Under pressure from the Party to demonstrate that there had never been any emnity between the peoples of the USSR, Soviet historians have over the years discovered that the non-Russian peoples were drawn to the Russians from their earliest contact with them, and in more and more cases it has been claimed that they became Russian subjects voluntarily, either at their own wish or at that of their leaders. In 1979 the Chechen were the last of the peoples of the North Caucasus to be included in the category of those peoples voluntarily incorporated in the Tsarist empire, the view being officially promulgated in that year that the Chechen had become part of Tsarist Russia at their own wish in 1781 and not in 1859 as a result of the Caucasian war.4 The supposed voluntary incorporation of Chechnya in the Tsarist empire in 1781 meant that the Caucasian War could no longer be regarded as one of Russian conquest.5 The struggle of

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the Chechen. However, at this time the Chechen had only just been rehabilitated after their wholesale deportation to Central Asia during the Second World War, and there was no Chechen historical establishment to express a Chechen point of view.

3. This paragraph is based mainly on Lowell Tillett's The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1969, which is the standard work on Soviet rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and describes the Shamil controversy at great length.

4. See RL 396/82, "Another Chapter in the Rewrite of History: "The Voluntary Incorporation of Checheno-Ingushetia"," September 30, 1982.

5. It is interesting to note that some of the standard Soviet reference works have not yet caught up with the new line. Thus the second edition of the Sovetsky entsiklopedichesky slovar', published in 1983, still describes the Caucasian war as the "conquest (zavoevanie) by Russian Tsarism of Chechnya, mountain Dagestan and the northwest Caucasus."

the Mountaineers remained anti-colonial but was said to be directed against the actions of the Tsarist military-administrative apparatus already within the framework of the Russian State.6

The New Interpretation

It is probably not without significance that the new version of the nature of the Caucasian War has been produced by none other than Marks Maksimovich Bliev, the North Ossetian historian who in 1970 first advanced the thesis that Checheno-Ingushetia was voluntarily incorporated in Tsarist Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century. This thesis was officially adopted in 1979.

Until very recently Bliev himself subscribed to the view that the Caucasian War was a liberation struggle against the imposition of Tsarist colonial rule.[7] In his 1970 article he emphasized that the Tsarist regime used "extremely cruel methods" to impose its will on the Mountaineers and that it was this that aroused the resistance of the local population.[8] In order to demonstrate that it was official Tsarist policy to achieve the complete submission of the Mountaineers or their physical extermination, Bliev cited a letter from Tsar Nicholas I to his viceroy in the Caucasus, Count I.F. Paskevich, on the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. Nicholas wrote: "Having thus completed one glorious enterprise, another, equally glorious in my eyes, and a much more important one in regard to direct advantages, awaits you--the pacification forever of the Mountaineer peoples or the extermination of the unsubmissive."[9] Bliev then described how various military expeditions were mounted against the Mountaineers. He rejected the "pretense" of the Tsarist administration that these

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6. N.K. Baibulatov, M.M. Bliev, M.O. Buzurtanov, V.B. Vinogradov, V.G. Gadzhiev, "Vkhozhdenie Checheno-Ingushetii v sostav Rossii," Istoriya SSSR, 1980, No. 7, p. 63.

7. As co-author of Baibulatov, et al.

8. M.M. Bliev, "K voprosu o vremeni prisoedineniya narodov Severnogo Kavkaza k Rossii," Voprosy istorii, 1970, No. 7, p. 53.

9. Ibid., p. 54. The translation is from Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russian Penetration in the Caucasus," in (ed.) Taras Hunczak, Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, New Brunswick, N.J., 1974, p. 253.

expeditions were prompted by the behavior of the Mountaineer peoples and that they were aimed at putting a stop to the depradations and plunder in which the local population allegedly engaged.10

The new interpretation of the nature of the Caucasian War given by Bliev in his article in Istoriya SSSR, No. 2 of 1983, is radically different. Bliev starts by saying that the traditional view of the "so-called" Caucasian War as a national-liberation, anti-colonial struggle on the part of the Mountaineers suffers from "serious shortcomings" and goes on to question how Russia's policy in the Caucasus could have been one of the root causes of the Caucasian War when the areas where it was mainly localized "had virtually no knowledge of the manifestations of Tsarist colonialism." He then elaborates at length the thesis that the war was the culmination of the "system of expansion" of the "free" societies of Dagestan, the taip (clans) of Chechnya, and the "democratic" tribes of the Northwest Caucasus resulting from the special conditions of their transition from pre-feudal to feudal relations. Bliev argues that the limited production base in the mountain areas gave the poorer and better-off elements in these communities a common interest in organizing raids for booty ("an aggressive form of amassing feudal property"). These raids were directed against Transcaucasia and Georgia in particular in the eighteenth century, which inevitably brought the expansion of the Mountaineers into conflict with the policy of Russia in the Caucasus, and later against the Russian frontier lines and settlements in the plains of the North Caucasus.

Turning to the Caucasian War itself, Bliev implicitly rejects the standard view that it began in 1817 when the Tsarist military command embarked on a deliberate policy of either forcing the Mountaineers to settle in the plains or driving them further and further into the depths of the mountains.11 He suggests instead that it began in 1828 after Muridism, which provided the ideological underpinning for the growing process of feudalization, turned into an aggressive doctrine calling for a holy war against the infidel and the replacement of adat (customary law) by the shariat (Islamic law), which sanctifies property. He further contends that the war was mainly an internal

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10. Bliev, "K voprosu ...," p. 55.

11. See entry on the "Caucasian War" in Vol. 11 of the third edition of the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1973.

affair with the imams spending much of their time trying to impose the shariat and extend their power in the mountain areas. True, there were clashes with Russian forces as a result of the Tsarist government's decision to finally consolidate its administration in the North Caucasus and of raids by the Mountaineers on the Russian lines, but Bliev rejects the idea that Russia's role was a "provoking" one, stating that Russia should be regarded rather "as an external force that contained the scope of the war."12 In other words, any aggression was on the side of the Mountaineers. Bliev concludes by saying that the collapse of the imamate "was conditioned in the first place by internal processes and was only accelerated by the actions of the Russian government."13

The question naturally arises: does this radical reinterpretation of the nature of the Caucasian War reflect official thinking? and if so, what lies behind it?

It is impossible to be sure at this stage, but the evidence would seem to point to Bliev's interpretation enjoying official backing:

(1) The mere fact that Bliev's article was carried by Istoriya SSSR suggests at the least that his views are not unacceptable.

(2) Bliev's position as head of the chair of the history of the USSR at the North Ossetian State University makes him the obvious choice for putting forward a new interpretation. This is because, in the division of labor among the historians of the North Caucasus that followed the setting up of the North Caucasian Scientific Center of the Higher School in Rostov-on-Don in 1969, the North Ossetian State University was allocated the chief responsibility for the study of Russian-North Caucasian ties.14 (It was doubtless no accident that this task fell to the North Ossetians as one of the North Caucasian peoples who did not side with the Mountaineers against the Russians.) Bliev was holding the same position in 1970 when he elaborated the thesis of the voluntary incorporation of Chechnya in Tsarist Russia.

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12. Bliev, "Kavkazskaya voina ...", p. 68.

13. Ibid., p. 75.

14. V.V. Chernous, "Organizatsiya istoricheskikh issledovanii v Severo-Kavkazskom nauchnom tsentre vysshei shkoly," Voprosy istorii, No. 11 of 1981, p. 123.

The reasons why the authorities might be unhappy over the characterization of the Caucasian as a national-liberation movement are fairly obvious--namely, that it might seem to encourage admiration of resistance to Russian rule and of the role of Islam in this. In an article in the issue of the atheist monthly Nauka i religiya for November, 1983, Khazhbikar Kh. Bokov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, identified this as a problem before it was established that Chechnya and Ingushetia had voluntarily become part of Russia in the eighteenth century rather than as a result of the Caucasian War:

> The failure to resolve this problem (of how Chechnya became part of the Russian empire) and its incorrect interpretation in artistic literature aroused unhealthy attitudes that among politically irresponsible individuals went as far as hostility to the Russians and "gratitude" to the religious leaders for the fact that the Chechen had stood out against the Russians with their aid. These ideas were taken up by foreign propaganda which used them to inflame national feelings and to extol religion as the guardian of national dignity.[15]

Admittedly, Bokov sets this problem in the past, but it is difficult to see how it could have been solved merely by asserting that Chechnya had voluntarily become part of the Tsarist empire while still maintaining that the Mountaineers had nonetheless subsequently waged a national-liberation struggle against Russian rule.

A recent article on religious-nationalistic survivals in present-day Muridism in Checheno-Ingushetia confirms that the authorities are concerned about the attitude of some young Chechen and Ingush towards the role of Islam in their history. The author or authors accuse the leaders of Murid communities (said to number 150 belonging to twelve different Sufi brotherhoods)

> of trading on the interest of the people, especially the young, in their past, trying to instill in believers and non-believers the idea of the supposedly progressive role of Muridism in the life of the Vaynakhs (Chechen and Ingush)... Under the influence of such propaganda, notions about Islam having played a pro-

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15. Kh. Kh. Bokov, "Ne snyat s povetski dnya," Nauka i religiya, No. 11 of 1983, p. 6.

> gressive role in the anti-feudal and anti-colonial struggle of the Mountaineers under the leadership of Shamil are current among some young Chechen and Ingush.[16]

It will be interesting to see whether Bliev's new interpretation of the Caucasian War eventually becomes the official one and, if so, how long it takes. His thesis about the voluntary incorporation of Chechnya only became the accepted version of history some years after he propounded it, but on the information available it is not possible to say whether this was because of opposition to it or because the Party did not sanction it earlier.

Whatever Soviet history books may assert in the future, however, it is safe to say that many Chechen (and doubtless Dagestanis and other North Caucasians) will continue to see Shamil as the leader of their struggle to maintain their independence from Tsarist Russia. From Bokov's article it is quite clear that a certain section of Chechen and Ingush, including members of the imtelligentsia, remains extremely jealous of its national traditions and eager to preserve them from any outside contamination.[17] Moreover, Bokov admits that the Party's work in combating nationalistic attitudes among the Chechen and Ingush is still complicated by what he euphemistically calls "certain mistakes and shortcomings in the conduct of nationalities policy and individual infringements of its Leninist norms"[18]--in other words by the wholesale deportation of the Chechen and Ingush in 1944.

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16. "Religiozno-natsionalisticheskie perezhitki v sovremennom myuridizme," in Islam v SSSR, Moscow, 1983, p. 82.

17. Bokov, passim.

18. Bokov, p. 5.

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PARTY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN UZBEKISTAN

Bess Brown

The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan held on January 9, 1984, is the first one known to have been held since Inamzhon Usmankhodzhaev took over the post of republican Party chief following the death of Sharaf Rashidov at the end of October, 1983.[1] Usmankhodzhaev's report to the plenum, presumably concentrating on the economic situation in Uzbekistan, has not been published in the daily press, but the changes made in the republican Party leadership have been reported.[2]

In the wake of the election of Akil Salimov, who had been Central Committee secretary responsible for ideological questions, to succeed Usmankhodzhaev as chairman of the Presidium of Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet, a former first secretary of the republican Komsomol organization, Rano Kh. Abdullaeva, was selected for the post vacated by Salimov.[3] Another Central Committee secretaryship was vacant owing to the death in September, 1983, of Asadilla Khodzhaev, who had been responsible for construction. One change that might have been expected in the leadership of the Party organization of Uzbekistan is the removal from candidate membership in the Buro of former republican KGB chief Levon Melkumov, who was reported to have been transferred to other work on September 1, 1983. The published report on the changes made at the plenum makes no reference to Melkumov, however; he presumably retains his post in the Buro and so is apparently still in Uzbekistan, though there has been no published indication of what job he now holds.

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1. There is some mystery about the numbering of the Central Committee plenums. The eleventh, the last presided over by Rashidov, was held in July, 1983. The plenum held on January 9 was numbered thirteen. Either the extraordinary plenum that elected Usmankhodzhaev is considered to have been the twelfth, although it was not so described in the press, or no report of the twelfth plenum was published.

2. Pravda Vostoka, January 10, 1984.

3. Salimov was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet at a special session held on December 20, 1983 (Pravda Vostoka, December 21, 1983).

Akil Umurzakovich Salimov, who as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan retains his seat in the republican Party Buro, has been a secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee since September, 1970, and a member of the Buro since October, 1970, at which time he also became a member of the republican Central Committee.[4] An Uzbek, he was born in Tashkent on December 24, 1928. His educational background was in technical sciences, in which he holds a candidate degree. A graduate of the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute, Salimov went to work in 1954 as a senior teacher at the institute, later rising from the post of docent to deputy dean and then dean of the faculty of mechanics, and finally reaching the rank of prorector of the Polytechnic Institute. Salimov's career as a full-time Party official began in 1965, when he received the post of deputy head of the Uzbek Central Committee's Department of Science and Educational Institutions. The following year he became chief of the department, remaining in that post until 1970, when he was chosen for the job of Central Committee secretary responsible for ideology. In his capacity as chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission on International Affairs, Salimov visited Austria in 1982. The choice of Salimov with his technical background, rather than an agricultural specialist, for the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may be part of an effort to promote people with technological rather than agricultural training to the highest posts in the republic. Usmankhodzhaev, the new Party chief, also has a technological background.

Salimov's replacement as Central Committee secretary responsible for ideology, Rano Khabibovna Abdullaeva, has been a Party official almost all her professional life. She too is an Uzbek. Born in 1935, she began working as a secondary school teacher in 1955, thereafter holding positions in the Komsomol and the Party as first secretary of the Shafirkan Raion Committee of the Komsomol, then as head of a department of the Shafirkan Raion Party Committee.[5] Abdullaeva is a graduate of the Higher Party School in Tashkent and is described in her official biography as holding the degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences. After graduation from the Higher Party School in 1961, Abdullaeva served as secretary and department head of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Uzbekistan, and she was subsequently elected to the post of first secretary of the Samarkand Oblast Committee of the Komsomol. In 1963 she became a secretary of the Samarkand Oblast Party Committee, but she did not remain long in the Party job, as she was elected first secretary of the republican Komsomol organization later the same year. She moved on from the leadership of Uzbekistan's Komsomol to the post of deputy chairman of

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4. The biographical information on Salimov is from Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta Uzbekskoi SSR and the Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia.

5. The biographical information on Abdullaeva is from Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta Uzbekskoi SSR and Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1970.

the republican Council of Ministers in 1971. Her area of responsibility seems to have been culture: she was especially prominent as the chairman of film festivals held in Tashkent in 1972, 1976, and 1980. Her background would seem to make her a more logical choice for the post of ideological secretary than was Salimov.

Little is known about Gairat Khamidullaevich Kadyrov, who has replaced Asadilla Khodzhaev as Central Committee secretary with responsibility for construction. He was identified in Pravda Vostoka in 1976 as the first secretary of the Chirchik City Party Committee. In that year he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in Uzbekistan. In February, 1979, Kadyrov was confirmed as the head of the Uzbek Central Committee department of heavy industry and machine-building; he became a full member of the republican Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party in 1981. Kadyrov's replacement as head of the Central Committee department of heavy industry and machine-building is S. A. Asriyants, who has headed the Central Committee department of agricultural machine-building since at least November, 1980. No replacement was announced for Asriyants, who may be combining his new and old posts. Kadyrov is apparently combining the position of Central Committee secretary responsible for construction with that of chief of the Central Committee's construction department. His predecessor Khodzhaev seemingly did the same thing, as he was referred to as the head of the Uzbek Central Committee's department of construction in the stenographic report of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU at a time when he was known to be a Central Committee secretary.[6]

In addition to the promotions made at the Central Committee plenum in Uzbekistan, there was also a demotion: Lieutenant General Khaidar Khalikovich Yakh'yaev, a former minister of internal affairs, was removed from membership in the republican Central Committee for "mistakes in his work and in his personal conduct." He had been removed shortly before--for the same reasons--from his position as first deputy chairman of the People's Control Committee of Uzbekistan.[7] So far, no more specific information has been forthcoming to explain the disgrace of this high-ranking Uzbek law enforcement official. Yakh'yaev is a graduate of Samarkand State University and started his career as a schoolteacher, but in 1945 he entered the state security service.[8] He headed an unspecified department of the republican KGB and served for a time as chief of the directorate of the KGB for Surkhandarya Oblast. In 1964 he was appointed minister for the preservation of public order of Uzbekistan, becoming minister of internal affairs when the ministry's name was changed in 1968. He

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6. XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Stenograficheskoy otchet, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1981, p. 503.

7. Pravda Vostoka, December 23, 1983.

8. The biographical information on Yakh'yaev is from Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta Uzbekskoi SSR.

became a full member of the republican Central Committee in 1966. In July, 1979, Yakh'yaev was replaced as minister of internal affairs and was given the post of first deputy chairman of the People's Control Committee. At that time he received an honorary scroll from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan in recognition of his "many years of conscientious work in the organs of state security and internal affairs of the republic."

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OLZHAS SULEIMENOV ELECTED FIRST SECRETARY OF WRITERS' UNION OF KAZAKSTAN

Ann Sheehy

A change in the leadership of the Union of Writers of Kazakstan at the end of last year has brought to the head of that organization probably the most outstanding figure on the contemporary Kazak cultural scene. A plenum of the board of the union on December 19, 1983, released Dzhuban Muldagaliev from the duties of first secretary on health grounds. Muldagaliev, a poet born in 1920 who had been first secretary since October, 1979, was thanked for his "conscientious work." In his place the plenum elected as first secretary Olzhas Omarovich Suleimenov.[1] Suleimenov is not only considered the most talented Kazak writer of the present day; a man with a strongly developed Kazak national consciousness, he has in the past shown himself to be independent-minded, and his Az i Ya, which expresses distinctly heretical views on the mediaeval Russian epic The Lay of the Host of Igor (Slovo o polku Igoreve), caused a major scandal when it came out in Alma-Ata in 1975. It is true that Suleimenov appears always to have remained in the good graces of the Party, but it would be difficult to include him in the category of conformist and often second-rate writers from among whom the heads of the all-Union and republican writers' organizations are usually chosen.

Suleimenov is one of a number of Kazak writers who write in Russian. He was born in Alma-Ata on May 18, 1936, graduated from the geological faculty of the Kazak State University in 1959, and then spent two years studying at the Gorky Literary Institute in Moscow. Following in the footsteps of his grandfather Zhayau Musa, who was an akyn (bard), Suleimenov began to write early and emerged as a full-fledged poet at the age of twenty-three when three of his verses were published in Literaturnaya gazeta. His first two books of poetry, the second a long poem marking Yurii Gagarin's space flight, appeared in 1961, and other volumes followed in 1962, 1963, and 1964. These brought him immediate critical acclaim as well as popularity among young people far beyond the bounds of Kazakstan. They also gained him a Komsomol of Kazakstan Prize in 1966 and an All-Union Komsomol Prize in 1967. Further volumes of poetry and awards followed. Suleimenov's

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1. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, December 20, 1983, and Qazaq edebieti, December 23, 1983.

verse was translated into many languages, and Suleimenov himself, whom the Party clearly regarded as an excellent advertisement for the benefits Soviet rule had conferred on Central Asia, traveled abroad extensively. In 1971 he was elected a secretary of the Kazakstan Writers' Union and made chairman of the Kazakstan Committee for Ties with Afro-Asian Writers.

An appreciation of the chief characteristics of Suleimenov's poetry has been given by Ignacy Szenfeld.[2] Szenfeld notes that Suleimenov's first verses appeared in the heyday of the enthusiasm for the poetry of Voznesensky, Evtushenko, and Akhmadulina and had in common with the latter "an alluring manifesto-like quality, strong emotionality, and sophisticated urban attitudes in verse dealing with the author's foreign travels." Szenfeld continues:

> Particularly impressive was the strongly national character of Suleimenov's themes, his way of thought, and the structure of his imagery. The critics rightly noted that whatever Suleimenov wrote about--the campaigns of Genghis Khan, the horrors of the last war, ancient nomadic traditions, medieval folklore, or modern art--he always strove to convey, sometimes with an excess of emotion, the organic interconnection between historical periods. Men gradually came to recognize in Olzhas Suleimenov a humanist artist, opposed to the cruel tendencies of his age, a discoverer of Kazakh antiquity, and a man with a burning interest in the history of his people.

Finally, Szenfeld comments:

> Suleimenov's poetry has always been free of any Party propagandistic appeals..., and in his cycles of verse on foreign themes the world has not been presented purely in terms of black and white....If on occasion he has indulged in sharply controversial, topical publicist writing, he has only touched on the eternally valid problems of duty to one's country and one's people, and of serving the cause of right.

Soviet critics have frequently drawn attention to Suleimenov's bold, innovatory approach, his constant search for new solutions, and his ability not to repeat himself. The majority of his books are said to have given rise to arguments and debates not only on the pages of journals and newspapers but also

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2. See RL 137/76, "Olzhas Suleimenov under Fire from Neo-slavophile Critics," March 15, 1976.

at literary gatherings, in libraries, and in student circles, and this is cited as evidence of his success.[3] According to the novelist and critic Vladislav Vladimirov, both critics and scholars for some time surrounded Suleimenov's Glinyanaya kniga ("Clay Book," Alma-Ata, 1969) with a respectful silence, accustoming themselves warily to the unfamiliar, enigmatic, and therefore, as it seemed to some, "potentially explosive" material.[4] The reviews of his work have generally been very favorable, however, though Suleimenov has sometimes been accused of lapses of taste and--a more serious flaw--of leaving open to misinterpretation exactly where he stands.[5]

Suleimenov has shown on more than one occasion in the past that he is not afraid to speak out. In 1963 he publicly defended Voznesensky after the latter had been sharply criticized by Khrushchev, and at the Eleventh Congress of the Kazakstan Writers' Union in 1971 he censured window dressing in Soviet literature and the opportunism of the majority of Soviet writers.[6] He cannot have endeared himself to the Kazak academic community when he wrote in 1974 that, while there was no shortage of scholars in Kazakstan, there was a shortage of scholarship.[7]

In addition to showing a passionate interest in the history of his people, Suleimenov has been credited with inspiring other writers with this interest. The Kazak literary critic Murat Auezov writes, for example, that Suleimenov's aphorism about the image of the present being "flat without the depth of the past and the height of the future" acquired great popularity among Kazak littérateurs in the 1960s and led to the development of a new historical genre in Kazak literature.[8] Suleimenov's concern with the past clearly arose out of a feeling that the formerly nomadic Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union and their Kipchak and Polovtsian forebears have been presented in an unflattering light in Russian and Soviet history. This feeling is conveyed in the poem "Transformation of Fire," written by Suleimenov in the mid-1960s:

> All the unjust actions of the Kipchaks and Polovtsians...are reflected with pain and

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3. Mukhamedzhan Karataev, "Slavnyi put' literatury Sovetskogo Kazakhstana," Prostor, No. 11, 1977, p. 116.

4. Vladislav Vladimirov, "Poisk opory: improvizatsiya ili znanie?," Prostor, No. 10, 1975, pp. 94-95.

5. See, for example, Aleksei Bragin, "Golosa molodye, sil'nye," Partiinaya zhizn' Kazakhstana, No. 12, 1962, pp. 58-59 (as regards Suleimenov's attitude towards Islam), and Vladislav Vladimirov, "Pravo byt' pervym," Prostor, No. 6, 1980, p. 133.

6. RL 137/76.

7. Komsomol'skaya pravda, April 3, 1974.

8. Murat Auezov, "Utverzhdenie," Prostor, No. 1, 1975, p. 101.

> malice in the pages of Christian chronicles./ Their just warriors remained unnoticed and have not touched the parchment consciousness of the writers whom I know./... Some day... perhaps a Moscow or Kiev historian will make an unprejudiced assessment of the role of the Kipchaks who for centuries served as Old Russia's shield against Mussulman expansion./ For the time being, historians only remember the moments of unjust wars and not the centuries of brotherhood between Rus' and the steppe.[9]

Suleimenov expressed his desire to redress the balance in his statement: "If I succeed in raising my native steppes without lowering anyone else's mountains, I will consider that I have fulfilled my duty before my people."[10]

According to the former Soviet journalist Mark Popovsky, who left the Soviet Union in 1977, Suleimenov's and other young Kazak intellectuals' interest in history is part of what he calls the nationalist movement in literature and the arts that emerged in Kazakstan in the late 1960s. Popovsky, who visited Kazakstan many times and had writer friends in Alma-Ata, interprets this interest as a sublimation of nationalist aspirations that under present circumstances can find no outlet in political or social reformism. Popovsky comments further:

> The most remarkable thing about the wave of Kazakh nationalism is that the dreams of the young intellectuals coincide with the official attitude....The First Secretary of the party's Central Committee in Kazakhstan, a geologist named Din Muhamed Kunayev, is close to Suleymenov by race and mentality. They both understand that there cannot be a frontal attack against the Russians, but that they can be humiliated, exploited, and squeezed out by perfectly legal means and with the help of accepted slogans. Suleymenov and the other young Kazakhs know that they have become a power in the land, and take a dictatorial tone with their Russian mentors.

Popovsky then goes on to cite remarks about Suleimenov made to him by two Russian writers living in Kazakstan. The first said to Popovsky that Suleimenov "never stops reminding me that I and all the other non-Kazakhs who live here are undesirable aliens, invaders, and oppressors of his people," while the second claimed

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9. Quoted by Szenfeld in RL 137/76.

10. Murat Auezov, "'Predki, v boyu podderzhite menya,'" Druzhba narodov, No. 7, 1968, p. 262.

that Suleimenov had told him that all his books should be about Kazakstan and have a Kazak positive hero.[11]

It may be doubted whether Suleimenov is or was such an overt nationalist as Popovsky maintains;[12] Soviet critics have commented with approval on the surprisingly organic fusion of the national and the international in Suleimenov's more recent poetry.[13] What is certain is that his book Az i Ya, published in an edition of 60,000 in Alma-Ata in 1975 and rapidly sold out, greatly offended Russian national sensibilities. Suleimenov had long been interested in the evidence of Turkic influences in The Lay of the Host of Igor, publishing his first article on the topic in 1962. His Az i Ya, however, described by the publishers as "history through the eyes of a poet," makes a frontal assault on generally accepted interpretations of the work. The main theses advanced in the book are that at the time The Lay was written the culture of the Turkic peoples of the south Russian steppe was at a relatively high level and exercised a considerable influence on the Russians; that Russian scholars out of a sense of inferiority generated by the Mongol-Tatar yoke have preferred to shut their eyes to this fact, emphasizing instead the Russians' ties with Europe; and that The Lay was originally not a patriotic call to the Russian princes to unite against the Polovtsians but a tale of excessive ambition on the part of a petty princeling. According to Suleimenov, the patriotic element was added by later copyists. Igor is described in Az i Ya not as an eagle but as a carrion bird. Suleimenov admits in the book that he is broaching tabu topics but strongly defends his right to do so, arguing that the skeptic is the most valuable figure in science.

Az i Ya inevitably provoked a series of very critical reviews in the leading Moscow literary journals,[14] and on February 13, 1976, a joint session of the Buro of the Department of History and the Buro of the Department of Literature and Language of the USSR Academy of Sciences was held to discuss the book. Suleimenov was present at the meeting and had to listen to comments by Academicians B. A. Rybakov and D. S. Likhachev, both of whose views he had criticized in the book. The general opinion of the meeting was that Az i Ya was a very poor work of scholarship that should never have been published. Suleimenov agreed

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11. Mark Popovsky, Manipulated Science, New York, 1979, pp. 130-33.

12. There have, though, been other reports from recent Soviet émigrés of how the Kazaks have been asserting themselves in their republic in recent years.

13. Vladimirov, "Pravo byt'...," p. 132.

14. See, for example, A. Kuz'min's article in Molodaya gvardiya, No. 12, 1975 (which is analyzed in RL 137/76). The book was also subjected to harsh criticism by L. Dmitriev and O. Tvorogov in Russkaya literatura, No. 1, 1976; by Yu. Seleznev in Moskva, No. 3, 1976; by Academician D. Likhachev in Zvezda, No. 6, 1976; and by U. Gural'nik in Voprosy literatury, No. 9, 1976.

that many of the shortcomings noted were present in the book but stressed that he was not a researcher but a poet and that his book should not have been approached as a scientific work.[15] In March, 1977, however, more than eighteen months after Az i Ya had been published, Suleimenov sent a letter to Kazakhstanskaya pravda acknowledging that he had been guilty of the majority of errors with which he was charged, apologizing to those scholars he had offended by his "emotionally unrestrained evaluations," and expressing his regret that a book on which he had spent years of preparation had not turned out well.[16]

What the authorities really objected to in Az i Ya has been brought out most clearly by Mikhail I. Kulichenko, a leading specialist on the national question employed at the Party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. In a book published in 1981 Kulichenko objected to the tone and even more to the import of some of Suleimenov's statements in Az i Ya, describing them as "unprecedented in Soviet literature, particularly that devoted to mutual relations of the fraternal peoples." The three things he found especially unacceptable were: Suleimenov's offensive attitude towards a whole constellation of scholars; his excessive praise of the culture of the Turkic peoples; and his conscious belittling of the achievements of the Slavs of Ancient Rus'. He also found Suleimenov's letter of apology to Kazakhstanskaya pravda inadequate insofar as it did not acknowledge that Az i Ya purveyed harmful views of a nationalist character. On the other hand Kulichenko did concede, as other critics had, that Suleimenov was to a large extent right in claiming that specialists had failed to take sufficient account of the influence of the culture of the Turkic peoples on the language and culture of the ancient Russian people (narodnost').[17] The Leningrad orientalist I. M. D'yakonov had earlier made the point that the appearance of works like Az i Ya was a response to "the unsuccessful treatment of some episodes (momenty) of Russian history and the history of a number of peoples of the USSR. We do not have the right to forget that the Pechenegs and Polovtsians are ancestors of a number of the present-day peoples of the Soviet Union."[18] In other words, Suleimenov seems to have achieved at least one of his aims in writing Az i Ya, since the book clearly succeeded in making the scholarly community more aware of Turkic sensibilities.

In spite of the strong condemnation of Az i Ya, Suleimenov's career does not seem to have suffered in any way.[19] In February,

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15. "V Otdelenii istorii AN SSSR i Nauchnykh sovetakh. Obsuzhdenie knigi Olzhasa Suleimenova," Voprosy istorii, No. 9, 1976, pp. 147-54.

16. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, March 19, 1977.

17. M. I. Kulichenko, Rastsvet i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR, Moscow, 1981, pp. 398-401.

18. "V Otdelenii istorii AN SSSR...," p. 152.

19. Rather curiously, there was no entry for Suleimenov in the appropriate volume of the Kazak-language Kazak Soviet

1976, when the criticism of Az i Ya was at its height, Suleimenov was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Kazakstan Communist Party for the first time (he had joined the Party in 1969). The same year, a 455-page volume of his selected poems entitled Opredelenie berega (Defining the Shore) was published in Alma-Ata in an edition of 100,000. He continued to travel extensively and became an official consultant to UNESCO's program for the study of the civilization of Central Asia. In 1980 he was elected a deputy to the Kazak Supreme Soviet and for a time was a member of its Presidium. In 1981 he was reelected a candidate member of the Kazak Central Committee and was a delegate to the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow. Finally, earlier this month he was elected a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Suleimenov's greater involvement in Party and state affairs has, however, been accompanied by little in the way of new creative achievements. For several years he has published no new volumes of verse. In mid-1981 he stated that he was nearing the end of work on a major new poem entitled "Mig soznaniya" ("Moment of Consciousness"), in which he wanted to express "the perception of the world by our contemporary, the man of the twentieth century," but the poem does not appear to have been published as yet.[20] In the same interview Suleimenov mentioned that he had decided to try his hand once again at writing a film script and had chosen as his subject the heroic stand of the Panfilov regiment (which was recruited in Kazakstan) at Dubosekovo outside Moscow in November, 1941.[21]

Suleimenov worked as a scripwriter and chief editor at the Kazakhfil'm studios for some years after graduating from the Gorky Literary Institute in Moscow in 1961, and some of his scripts received high praise. According to Suleimenov himself, he became a scriptwriter out of a desire to improve the embarrassingly low quality of Kazak films[22]--yet another illustration of his sensitivity to the image of his people in the eyes of others. He soon discovered, though, like others before him, that a good script is likely to get changed out of all recognition in the process of film-making. It was perhaps partly a feeling that only in a top administrative capacity could he effect any real improvement in Kazak cinema that led Suleimenov to take on the first secretaryship of the Union of Cinematographers of Kazakstan

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Encyclopedia published in 1977. This would seem, however, to have been more a sign of excessive caution on the part of the editors than evidence that Suleimenov was in disgrace, since his biography is included in the Russian-language volume of the encyclopedia devoted to the Kazak SSR, which was published in 1981.

20. An extract from the poem, on the Virgin Lands, was published in Pravda on December 11, 1978.

21. Pravda, June 2, 1981.

22. Sovetskaya kul'tura, May 15, 1981.

in 1980 and then the government post of chairman of the republican State Committee for Cinematography in April, 1981, a post he gave up only on his recent election as first secretary of the Kazakstan Writers' Union. At all events, Suleimenov's assumption of the chairmanship of the State Committee for Cinematography seems to have been marked by serious efforts to reinvigorate the work of the Kazak film studios.[23]

It is not too difficult to see why Suleimenov might want to take on the more important post of first secretary of the Writers' Union, though it can obviously be a very frustrating one. A report on one of the first meetings of the Secretariat of the Writers' Union since he took office could indicate that he intends to pursue an activist role here too: a Folklore Council was set up; the reasons for the decline in the size of editions of Kazak-language belles-lettres were discussed; and Suleimenov stated that there was a need to improve the standing of the Kazak language. He commended the work of the newspaper Qazaq edebieti in airing publication and language problems.[24]

The reason why the authorities should propose, or at the very least endorse, the election as first secretary of the Kazakstan Writers' Union of Suleimenov rather than a writer with a more conformist background are less clear. Presumably they are completely satisfied that Suleimenov has proved that he can be trusted to promote the Party's interest and want to take advantage of the authority he enjoys with the public, particularly the younger generation. Or could there be some basis for the claim that Kazakstan Party First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunaev is sympathetic to the aspirations of Suleimenov and other Kazak intellectuals of the poet's generation and younger? At all events, the reported presence of several high-level local Party officials at the plenum of the Kazakstan Writers' Union that elected Suleimenov as first secretary[25] points to the clear endorsement by the Kazakstan Party of his election.

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23. Literaturnaya gazeta, November 3, 1982.

24. Qazaq edebieti, January 20, 1982. This information was provided by Charles Carlson.

25. The officials present included Second Secretary O. S. Miroshkhin, Ideological Secretary K. K. Kazybaev, First Secretary of Alma-Ata Obkom K. M. Aukhadiev, and the head of the Department of Culture of the Kazakstan Central Committee, M. Zh. Chaizhunusov. The report on the election of Suleimenov's predecessor Muldagaliev (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, October 13, 1979) made no reference to the presence of Party functionaries.

TURKESTAN-DAY IN THE U.S.A.

< 13 December >

by Dr.Baymirza Hayit *

The United States in 1959 added an new section to the law about humanism. In July of 1959, the U.S. Congress passed al bill about the Week of Captive Nations. President D.Eisenhower announced this law the 17 July of 1959.Among the Captive Nations is also Turkestan.For the American nation,this law is a moral instrument for the liberation of all countries held captive by Communism. For the Captive Nations,such as Turkestan, this law is moral,political and psychological nourishment on the way to national independence.

Together with the declaration of the law about the Week of Captive Nations, the 13 December everyyear was declared in the United States to be Turkestan-Day.This decision of the Americans has a special importance for Turkestan.For the first time in the history of Mankind did the United States of America express its will, through the Turkestan-Day to fight against the tyranny of Communism and against the imperialistic and colonial suppression of Turkestan by the Soviet-Russia.

Why was the 13 December chosen for Turkestan-Day?There are special reasons for this.In the beginning of November 1917, communistminded Russians serving the Czar and provisional gouvernment of Russia in Tashkent seized power and formed a Soviet (i.e.Council) of Peoples's Commissars. The Soviet consisted of 36 Russians who claimed the right to power in Turkestan.

The national Turkestan leaders called on the gouvernement in Russia and on the self-proclaimed Commissars to hand over the power in Turkestan to the Turkestanians.The Soviet-Russian gouvernement and the Soviet Commissars in Tashkent refused.After this, the Turkestanian national leaders had to withsdraw from Tashkent to the town Kokand in the Fergana valley in order to express from there the will of Turkestan people for national self-determination.

The congress of the Moslems of Turkestan in Kokand on 10 December 1917 declared the National Autonomus Republic of Turkestan. The congress announced the(i.e item)problem of Detaching(breaking off) Turkestan from Russia would be handed over for treatment to the legislative assembly of Turkestan in March 1918.

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The government of the National Autonomous Republic of Turkestan called on the government of Soviet Russia to dissolve the Soviet Commissariat in Tashkent.The Soviet leadership in Moscow reacted according to its own will for power in Turkestan.

Proclaiming Autonomy for Turkestan in December 1917 found special enthusiasm among the population because the people believed they could be free from the Russian rule by that. On the third day after the proclamation of Autonomy for Turkesta over Hundertthousands Moslems of Turkestan orgabized at 13 Decem ber a demonstration in Tashkent to express their joy about the Autonomy.The peaceful demonstration with placard like,"Long live the Autonomy of Turkestan"(Yashasun Türkistan Mukhtariyati and "Long live the legislative assembly"(Yashasun majlis-i muassisani) began after the Morning-Prayer.

The Soviet Commissariat for Turkestan in Tashkent had arreste all Deputies of the Tashkent-City-Council on 10 December for the recognizing the Autonomous Republic of Turkestan.The domontsrato called on the Soviet Commissars to release the political prisone The commander of the Tashkent-Garrison,General Budowich himself thereupon opened the prison gates and released all prisoners. The Chairman of the Soviet Commissars Kolesov and his deputy Uspenski as well as secretary of the Communist Party of Tashkent Tobolin(all of them Russians),appeared on the podium in Front of the demontrators in the town-part of Sheikh-an-Tahur and congratulated Turkestanians to their Autonomy.They promised to release all political prisoners and announsed the government would step by step hand over government power to the Moslems of Turkestan.

The demonstrators were happy and the demonstration passed smoothly; no one suffered any damage.Towards the evening,the demonstrators in large groups moved through the narrow streets of the old part of Tashkent towards their homes.When the first people after the dissolved demonstration reached the only bridge over the river Salar ,Russian Soviet soldiers opened fire on ther from other side of the bridge with guns and machine guns.Numerous Turkestanian(demontrators) were pushed into the river and drowned In the night of the 13.to the 14.December 1917,shooting took place in all streets of Tashkent.Opponents of the Soviet regime were murdered.It has been kept secret until now how many Turkest nians were killed or dangerously injured during that day of

demontration in Tashkent.Soviet archives contaion this informati
The Soviet leaders in Tashkent only announced on 14 December 191
that some seceruty measures were taken the day before.

With the shooting of demonstrators on 13 December 1917 and with the persecution of national-minded Turkestanians,the Soviet Russians ushered in a new tragedy in Turkestan.It became apparer that there were no differences in the methods Russia used to sustain its reign over Turkestan(regardless of wich regime in Russia).But destroying thousands of innocent,unarmed,sometimes dancing and singing, sometimes prayingly marching-Turkestanians proved unequivocally that the Declaration of Soviet -Government of the rights of peoples and of its guarantee for the Moslems's national freedom was nothing but a lie. Through this,the Soviets showed they intended to remain the new tyrants over the soil Turkestan.

It is also important to note that the armed action of the Soviet Russians for the first time in the history of Soviet regi against the freedom of Turkestan took place in Turkestan's heart in the historical town of Tashkent.The sorrow over the 13 Decemb 1917 took on national character in Turkestan.In the following da the tragedy became known in all of Turkestan and the population participated in the funeral ceremonies sincerely,and with feelin of hatred and disgust.

The leader of the Reformation-Movement and Chairman of the Council of Islam of Turkestan, Munevver Kari, who was the actual organizer of the Tashkent demontration,later declared about thes tragic days: "From this day on,the open and bloody fight between Turkestanians and the Russian-Bolshevists has begun".

The 13 December is for Turkestan a day of freedom and simulta ously the beginning of a new tragedy.The Declaration of this day in the United States as Turkestan-Day(e.g.the national flag of Turkestan may be raised next to the American flag in public buil dings; all over the United States rallies in favor of the nation independence of Turkestan can be held) shows the generqus spirit for freedom of the Americans.

All Turkestanians in Turkestan under the regime of Soviet-Russ except for few thousand who believe in the Soviets and have becor privileged servants of Communism- and all Turkestanians in the Emigration can be thankful and proud that their national day of freedom and of tragedy is celebrated in the United States as Turkestan-Day.On this day,Turkestanian can do a lot for securing

of the national identity of Turkestan and can express their opinion.Because only few Turkestanians live in the United States and because many Turkestanians are not concerned with the national affairs of Turkestan,there was no possibility until now to celebrate the Turkestan-Day in the United States according to the dignity of both nations-the free America and captive Turkestan.

We Turkestanians(Uzbeks,Kazakhs,Kirgiz's, Tadjiks,Turkmens, Uighurs,Kara-Kalpaks) are greatly indebted to the United States that they took up our liberation movement.Particularly,on Turkestan-Day we hope,that Americans and Turkestanians together will go the way of realizing national independence for Turkestc May God help in this way America and Turkestan!

T U R K İ S T A N



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RL 175/84

May 2, 1984

TAJIK SCHOOLCHILDREN EXPOSED TO CHEMICAL DEFOLIANTS

Ann Sheehy

A report of a round-table discussion held in Tajikistan last autumn shows that writers from the Western USSR were understandably shocked to find that aircraft dust cotton fields with chemical defoliants while children are actually picking cotton. Their remarks, which appear in the issue of the Russian-language Tajikistan literary journal Pamir for February, 1984,[1] suggest that little has changed in the cotton fields of Central Asia since 1974, when Academician Andrei Sakharov stated that almost all the schoolchildren of Uzbekistan were sick from breathing in herbicides during the months they spend every year in the cotton plantations.[2] It seems clear from the report in Pamir that the safety regulations governing the application of defoliants are being largely disregarded in the face of pressures to fulfill the plan and that the public is ignorant of the possible dangers of being exposed to defoliants.

The round table was organized by the USSR and Tajikistan Unions of Writers, Pamir, and the Moscow literary journal Literaturnoe obozrenie to discuss problems of the present-day village and the tasks of literature in the light of the Food Program. It took place after a tour of Tajikistan by the participants, which included visiting cotton fields where the harvest was in progress.

The Moscow writer I. Raksha is quoted as saying:

> Of course defoliation is necessary and economically profitable, but the aircraft, when spraying the defoliants, fly over fields where children are working. This cannot but affect their health.[3]

Rakhsa's Moscow colleague Yu. Chernichenko went into greater detail. Using the device of describing a writer's visit to the cotton fields as seen through the eyes of a sixth-grade Tajik girl picking cotton, he noted the dreadful smell in the air and

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1. "Proveryaetsya delom...," Pamir, No. 2, 1984, pp. 93-120.
2. AS 1655.
3. "Proveryaetsya delom...," P. 101.

the headache it caused. He told how the brigade leader ("a not unkindly man"), when warned that the aircraft was going to dust the field again, declined to clear the children from the area because he had to fulfill the plan. Chernichenko also cited an elderly Tajik scholar as saying that no one is supposed to approach a field for three days after it has been dusted and adding "but where and when has this rule been observed?" Chernichenko remarked on the fact that some of the defoliant falls on the kishlak (settlement) and also in the irrigation ditches from which the cattle and sheep drink. He noted further that the children are paid four rubles for picking fifty kilograms of cotton--that is, 15,000 bolls "if the bolls are large"--a task that he said would be beyond his own ability.[4]

The two other writers who referred to the problem were E. Budinas of Minsk and I. Bogatko of Moscow. Budinas remarked sarcastically that the state prosecutor is very quick to put a stop to any attempt by farm managers to show independence in the matter of housing construction but "for some reason does not notice what is being scattered on his head from an AN-2 flying at an impermissible altitude."[5] It was Bogatko who made the point about public ignorance of the dangers of crop-dusting. Saying that he thought doctors still had work to do in protecting the health of the rural population, he went on: "The problem of dusting the cotton fields has been either insufficiently studied or concealed from broad public opinion."[6] It is true that one Tajik speaker, M. Narzikulov, an academician of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, did try to deflect the criticism by referring to the development of entomological methods to reduce the use of pesticides in the cotton fields, but he did not really address the question of defoliants.[7]

The fact that Pamir has aired criticism of abuses in the application of defoliants in Tajikistan is obviously to be welcomed, but it would almost certainly be unrealistic to expect a radical improvement in the situation overnight. For years the Soviet press has condemned the extent to which schoolchildren in the Central Asian republics are involved in the cotton harvest to the serious detriment of their education,[8] yet their employment in cotton-picking continues unabated. In view of this, it may be asked whether local Party and government officials will put even the danger of long-term harm to the physical health of the children above the overriding need to meet this year's plan targets.

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4. Ibid, pp. 103-104.

5. Ibid., p. 115.

6. Ibid., p. 117.

7. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

8. See, for example, RL 322/82, "Use and Abuse of Child Labor in the Cotton Fields of Central Asia," August 12, 1982.

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RL 182/84

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AZERI JOURNAL PUBLISHES FABLE SATIRIZING RUSSO-AZERI FRIENDSHIP

Mirza Mikailov

Note: Mamed Orudj's fable "In Harmony," which was published in the Azeri literary journal Azerbaijan,[1] is of considerable interest because the author, in describing the ancient and enduring friendship between foxes and hens, is apparently deriding the claim of Soviet propaganda that there is an "indissoluble friendship" between the Russians and the people of Azerbaijan. Parallels with the history of Russo-Azeri relations can be identified in many episodes of the fable (see Appendix).

In Harmony

(Some notes from a monograph in manuscript)

Author: Wolfov Wolf Wolf Oglu
Scholar-Editor: Jackalov Jackal Jackal Oglu

The friendship between foxes and hens is an ancient one. Chronicler Balam Khetagury, who lived long before our era, points out that foxes and hens used to live together in the same hen-house. The seventh wife of the first emperor of the foxes, Fara (Pullet), was the daughter of the hens' sultan.

But it seems to us that the roots of the kinship between foxes and hens should be dated to still more ancient times, because it is impossible to believe that a close relationship between foxes and hens--their living in harmony--began only sometime before our era.

Keysaria Midi, a sage of Midian who lived in the sixth century B.C., informs us that foxes and hens were living together then. When a hen could not get to her henhouse, she laid her eggs in a fox's den, and hen-loving foxes endured tortures to hatch them, sitting on the eggs for twenty-one days and twenty-one nights. Conversely, sometimes foxes gave birth in the hen-houses, and hens lovingly brought up the baby foxes.

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1. Azerbaijan, No. 5, 1982.

Turkeys and other birds (J.J.--K.M.) were always trying to set the foxes and hens at odds with each other. But though they tried hard, they failed to spoil the friendship.

Everybody knows the immense power of folklore. Let us call to mind one of the greatest stories of hen folklore. The fox's son must endure many challenges before he may wed the daughter of the hen. Finally, after going through torment, he succeeds in winning her.

During the second century A.D., war broke out between the foxes and the mammoths. In this war, hundreds of hen-knights fought on the side of the foxes, and they fought to the last breath. Finally, all the hens came to help, and together they annihilated the mammoths.

History is full of sudden reverses; and the foxes had always been grateful for a favor... After the war between the foxes and the mammoths, the sparrows suddenly attacked the hens. And the foxes' ground forces came to the hens' rescue. Tombstone inscriptions make it clear that, if the foxes had not helped the hens in this war, there would now no longer be any such creature as a hen alive... It seems that the sparrows wanted to wipe out the hens.

Let us turn once again to folklore and recall a hen quatrain:

My darling fox,
How you love me.
As soon as I get wings,
You'll drive me away!

The literature of the foxes had a significant influence on that of the hens, and, indeed, the hens' culture was influenced greatly by that of the foxes.

But twaddling turkeys and other birds (even ostriches) are not willing to acknowledge this truth. They have even invented the outrageous fiction that foxes eat hens! What an obvious lie!

APPENDIX

Several passages in Orudj's fable can be taken as references to episodes in the history of Azerbaijan. The fable states, for example, that

> during the second century A.D., war broke out between the foxes and the mammoths. In this

> war, hundreds of hen-knights fought on the side of the foxes.

A History of Azerbaijan published in Baku in 1960 describes the Russo-Iranian war, as a result of which Northern Azerbaijan was annexed to the Russian Empire, as follows:

> In order to help the Russian troops in Azerbaijan, armed detachments were formed. As was reported in one of the dispatches from the Russian command at the beginning of the war, "the Muslims [Azeris] in all the regions that belonged to us have earnestly requested permission...to form volunteer corps in order to share in the heroic exploits of our courageous forces."...Numerous documents compiled by the Russian military authorities mention the participation of Azeri detachments against Kadjar [Iranian] forces and the rebels [Azeris] who were fighting alongside them.

The fable goes on to state that the hen-knights "fought to the last breath." The History of Azerbaijan notes:

> Full of admiration for the feats of the Muslim cavalry regiments, the Russian writer P. Zubov exclaimed: "One has to see these regiments in action in order to judge what they are really like: they are like lightning, like fire from an angry God descending suddenly from heaven....And to this day I recall with delight the miracles of courage accomplished before my eyes by the Muslim regiments."
>
> (page 47)

The History of Azerbaijan manages to avoid making clear why the Russo-Iranian war was fought: it was a question of taking over foreign territory, including Azerbaijan. The well-known Azeri poet of the Soviet period Nariman Hasanzade describes in his poem "Nariman" the battle for Gandzha (now Kirovabad), a battle between Russian troops and Azeri nationalists, and notes that the hatred felt by the local population for the Russian troops was stronger than death itself.

The next historical event echoed in the fable is a more modern one; it is no longer a matter of relations between the Russian Empire and the Azeris but rather between Soviet Russia and the independent republic of Azerbaijan. Orudj writes that

> the foxes had always been grateful for a favor... [When] the sparrows suddenly

> attacked the hens...the foxes' ground forces came to the hens' rescue.

On May 28, 1918, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia threw off the yoke of the Russian Empire and declared themselves to be independent states. Two years later Lenin sent the Eleventh Red Army to the Caucasus, and this army "saved the people of Azerbaijan"--from the national government of Azerbaijan and from independence. The History of Azerbaijan's elucidation of this matter has, like the fable, a ring of irony:

> The Eleventh Red Army speeded up the preparations for invading Azerbaijan territory in order to bring help to the proletariat of Baku and the peasants of Azerbaijan. On April 27, units of the Red Army crossed the border into Azerbaijan....On April 28, 1920, the working masses of Azerbaijan joyously greeted the Red Army as the liberator from the yoke of capitalism....The Soviet authorities thus realized the most secret aspirations of the people of Azerbaijan for the freedom and independence of their native land.
>
> (pages 226-27 and 234-35)

Orudj may well have had these words in mind when he wrote:

> If the foxes had not helped the hens in this war, there would now no longer be any such creature as a hen alive... It seems that the sparrows wanted to wipe out the hens.

Here another, more recent parallel comes to mind--Afghanistan. In order somehow to justify its occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union came up with the pretext that China and the United States were both committing acts of aggression there, so the Soviet forces intervened to liberate the Afghans. Orudj's account of how the foxes saved the hens from the sparrows applies equally well to the actions of Soviet Russia against Azerbaijan and those of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The clearest reference to Russo-Azeri relations in the fable is the statement:

> The literature of the foxes had a significant influence on that of the hens, and, indeed, the hens' culture was influenced greatly by that of the foxes.

These words correspond with a statement in the History of Azerbaijan:

> The annexation of Azerbaijan to Russia made significantly easier the adoption by the Azerbaijani people of the advanced Russian culture.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Geidar Aliev elaborated on this theme in his speech at the Seventh Congress of Writers of Azerbaijan:

> Russian literature, as the peak of the Russian people's creative genius...has had and continues to have a huge influene on the development of all the national cultures of the fraternal peoples....By tirelessly learning from the skill of authors of classical and contemporary Russian literature, we are helped on our enlightened journey towards perfecting our own national literature.[2]

The references in the fable to cultural influences leave no doubt about whom the author has in mind. Orudj talks only of the influence of the foxes' (Russians') culture and literature on the literature and culture of the hens (Azeris); there is no mention of reciprocity. Soviet propaganda on the subject is just as one-sided.

It is important to note, incidentally, that the basic import of the fable cannot be limited to Russo-Azeri relations alone; the satire applies equally well to relations between the Russians and the Uzbeks, the Kazaks, the Armenians, the Ukrainians--in short, all the other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.

The journal in which this fable appeared--the organ of the Writers' Union of Azerbaijan--published two other works of unusually patriotic, pro-Azeri content shortly before the fable came out. The first, a novel entitled Baku 1501,[3], deals with the life and work of Shah Ismail Khatai, a disseminator of Shi'ite Islam. Khatai is presented as an Azeri patriot who values "a handful of his native soil" and "the smallest word of his own language" more highly than any material treasures. The second work--the novel The Golden Horse and the Land[4]--is also steeped in patriotism and pride in Azerbaijan. In a country where all publications are subject to censorship, the appearance of three such works in an official journal within a twelve-month period is indeed surprising. (One almost begins to wonder whether foxes really do eat hens!)

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2. Azerbaijan, No. 6, 1981.

3. Azerbaijan, Nos. 6 and 7, 1981.

4. Azerbaijan, Nos. 10 and 11, 1981.