



MISMANAGEMENT OF BOOK TRADE IN KAZAKSTAN

Charles Carlson

The Kazak-language literary weekly Qazaq Ādebiyeti<sup>1</sup> recently published an article by Rakhimjan Turisbekov under the rubric "Once More on the Situation of the Book Trade." Turisbekov discusses what he terms "unacceptable manifestations connected with the book trade" in Kazakstan. The main problem, he says, is distribution. The existing network does not ensure that books in Kazak are dispatched to areas with a predominantly Kazak population and Russian volumes to areas with a large Russian population. Advertising by publishers and booksellers is inadequate, so readers are not made aware of new publications. Furthermore, new books have picked over several times before they reach oblast centers and consumers' unions, and, by the time they arrive at the raion level and the sovkhoses, there is nothing left worth buying. Turisbekov also notes that large quantities of books are stacked haphazardly in warehouses, where they gather dust and turn yellow rather than being distributed to the public. He names the towns of Gurev, Dzhezkazgan, and Kzyl-Orda as particularly guilty of such "disparities." Not only do books languish for much too long in warehouses, he goes on to say, but many of those storage facilities are also in urgent need of renovation. The warehouse of the Administration of the Book Trade in Gurev, for example, is in such a state of disrepair that after the spring rains the building becomes flooded, and books "anxiously awaited by readers" are ruined. The damage and disorder are so extreme that "it even becomes difficult to determine in which years the volumes were published."

It is not just in the smaller towns that these problems are encountered, but in the capital as well, Turisbekov observes. (At present, the republic's Kazkniga Association administers 416 bookstores and 216 kiosks in Alma-Ata, which serve a population of over one million.) He goes on to complain that books published by republican publishing houses are sometimes so poorly printed that "even children have trouble reading them." Books of supposedly higher quality published in Kazak and appearing in the Dostiq series also "fade and turn yellow." Another problem is that print runs are frequently too small to meet the demand for particular types of literature. "Some of the multivolumed works of our poets and writers, the volumes of the Kazak Soviet

1. Qazaq Ādebiyeti, December 9, 1983.

Encyclopedia, and some of the works by our young authors can be included in the list of works that are published in insufficient quantity," Turisbekov notes.

Criticism of the book publishing industry in Kazakstan is not a new phenomenon in the Kazak press. In 1981 an open letter to S. N. Tänekeev, chairman of the Board of the Kazak SSR Union of Consumers' Societies, was published in Qazaq Ädebiyeti.<sup>2</sup> The letter was signed by Ghabiyt Müsirepov, who is a Hero of Socialist Labor, and by Ghabiyden Mustafiyn, Abdilda Täjibaev, Muqametjan Qarataev, and Qaliyjan Bekkhojiyn, all of whom are Kazak SSR State Prize laureates. It recalls a meeting held in 1980 by the Kazak SSR Union of Consumers' Societies at which Tänekeev criticized cadres in the union for not giving the requisite attention to the book trade. "A year has passed," the letter continues, "and still the situation in the book trade is not completely satisfying the demands of the majority, and there are many inadequacies in publishing and selling books." This is especially true in rural areas of the republic, the letter notes. In illustrating the situation, the letter mentions that special bookstores were opened in only 758 (32 percent) of the republic's 2,372 kolkhozes and sovkhoses. The supplying of literature to workers living in remote pasture areas is even worse. "Such a situation," the letter points out, "has a negative effect on the ideological education of these workers."

Just as Turisbekov did, the letter notes that books are stacked for long periods in warehouses in certain raions; "in some instances," it says, "large shipments of books have not been opened for years and have consequently deteriorated to the point where they are no longer usable."

Referring to the distribution problem, the letter states that many Kazak-language books published in the republic are dispatched by the various publishing houses in large quantities "without any account being taken of the demographic structure of the local population." Also, it sometimes happens that certain oblasts and raions receive either much larger book orders than they originally requested, or that shipments of books considered important are delivered in too small a quantity to be considered useful or even do not arrive at all. "We believe the time has come to examine such haphazardness in the book trade and the indifference shown towards it" by those responsible, the letter's signatories declare.

The open letter further asserts that there is an insufficiency of specialists in raion consumers' unions and that book trade departments in oblast cooperatives are often directed by persons who are "ignorant of current literary and scientific innovations." It points out that "there is an urgent need to train and prepare specialists who can work directly with the book trade division of the board of the republic's Union of Consumers' Societies and with oblast consumers' unions."

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2. Ibid., March 6, 1981.

The letter identifies several more of the same problems later discussed by Turisbekov. It mentions the inadequate publicizing of books, for example, and it goes into considerable detail about failures to determine the optimum size of print runs. It points out that the Jazuwshī and Jalīn publishing houses, among others, have reduced their print runs in the last few years, particularly with regard to prose works, collections of poetry, and literary criticism by many of the republic's most respected older writers. "There is no doubt," the letter states, "that the print run allotted to many books does not satisfy one tenth of the readers' demands." Typical print runs for such works, it notes, are 3,700 and 2,600. If one takes into consideration that 70 percent of the Kazak people (who number almost 7 million) live in rural areas, the letter adds, it becomes clear that the figures cited above are very small indeed and cannot meet the public demand for books. When the Jalīn Publishing House prints only 4,000 to 6,000 copies of a prose work, the letter continues, that book can reach only a small proportion of the hundreds of thousands of Kazak readers and is not available to many of the nearly 20,000 public libraries in Kazakstan. A further indication that books should be published in larger editions is the fact that "the print run of the republic's newspapers and journals... ranges from 100,000 to 400,000"; this, the letter concludes, "shows how large the number of readers in the republic actually is."

Although both Turisbekov's article and the open letter complain vigorously about the numerous problems besetting the book trade in Kazakstan, they do not suggest any concrete measures to improve the situation. Strong measures are clearly needed, for it is evident that little has changed between early 1981, when these problems were raised in the open letter, and the end of 1983, when Turisbekov found that so many of these "unacceptable manifestations" had persisted. It should be stressed, furthermore, that problems in the book trade are not confined to Kazakstan but are duplicated in other Union republics. In Georgia, for example, the Central Committee of the republican Communist Party adopted two resolutions in the past six years calling for improvements in this field.<sup>3</sup> It would seem that, barring effective steps by the Kazak Communist Party or a radical change in attitude by officials employed in the book trade, the situation in Kazakstan is unlikely to improve in the near future.

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3. See RL 462/83, "Chairman of Georgian State Committee for Publishing Dismissed," December 9, 1983.

RL 39/84

January 30, 1984

YET ANOTHER REWRITE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CAUCASIAN WAR?

The Party has always considered that historians, like writers, are under an obligation to use their talents to promote the Party's current ideological goals. This has involved historians in the extensive rewriting of history. The most notorious example of this rewriting as far as the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR are concerned has been the reevaluations of the nature of the Caucasian War-- that is, the prolonged and desperate resistance of the fiercely independent Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus to Tsarist conquest in the nineteenth century. The war was one of the most memorable and colorful chapters in the annals of Tsarist expansion. The Mountaineers, who fought under the banner of Islam, were led for twenty-five years of their struggle by the legendary Shamil, and their exploits and those of the Tsarist troops were immortalized in the Caucasian tales of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy.

In the early Soviet period the struggle of the Mountaineers to preserve their independence was portrayed in an entirely favorable light. In the latter years of Stalin's rule, however, it was branded as wholly reactionary. In the post-Stalin era, when historians were permitted to modify some of the extreme positions adopted under Stalin, a compromise was reached: the approved view became that the movement headed by Shamil and his predecessors as imam had started out as a popular national-liberation struggle but become reactionary under the influence of Muridism (a form of militant Sufism).

Until recently this interpretation does not seem to have been challenged. Last year, however, the authoritative Moscow historical journal Istoriya SSSR carried an article by a North Ossetian historian that once again rejects the notion the Mountaineers were waging a national liberation struggle and ascribes the Caucasian War to the expansionist nature of their society at that time.<sup>1</sup>

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1. M.M. Bliiev, "Kavkazskaya voina: sotsial'nye istoki, sushchnost'," Istoriya SSSR, No. 2 of 1983, pp. 54-75.

It seems likely that this article is the result of a conscious decision by the authorities to try to deprive the resistance by the Mountaineers to Tsarist conquest of any heroic aura. They are evidently not happy with the fact that some Chechen, at least, are still evaluating their forebears' resistance to Tsarist rule not from the approved social-class standpoint but from a religious-nationalistic point of view and idealizing the role of Islam and the religious leaders.

#### Soviet Historiography of the Caucasian War

Soviet rewriting of the history of the Caucasian War has to be seen, of course, in the general context of the rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR to make it conform to the Party's current requirements in the area of nationalities policy.

In the first decades after the October Revolution the Bolsheviki were concerned above all to denigrate the Tsarist past. Incorporation in the Russian empire was therefore said to have been an "absolute evil" for the non-Russian peoples, and their resistance to Tsarist colonialism was depicted in a heroic light. It was at this time that the Muridist movement headed by Shamil was classed as progressive, the awkward religious element being either ignored or rationalized and Shamil himself presented as an unalloyed hero.

As time passed the Party came to see such glorification of resistance to Russian rule as damaging to the concept of the "friendship of the peoples" of the USSR. Historians were required to produce new histories that, while not necessarily denying the misdeeds of the Tsarist regime, stressed that annexation by Tsarist Russia had been a progressive phenomenon for the non-Russian peoples concerned since it had brought them into direct contact with the advanced Russian people. A corollary of this thesis for a time was that any opposition to Russian conquest was reactionary. Although the new versions of Russian colonial history began to appear from about 1940, it was only in 1950 that the Muridist movement and Shamil were finally declared reactionary. According to the new interpretation, Shamil had enjoyed no popular support. It was even implied that the Muridist movement had been organized by the Turks and the British. As has already been mentioned, in the early post-Stalin era, partly under pressure from historians in Dagestan, the homeland of Shamil,<sup>2</sup> there was a partial rehabilitation of him. The progressive nature of annexation to the Russian empire could

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2. Although the Muridist movement originated in Dagestan, the fiercest resistance to the Tsarist forces was offered by

not be questioned, but after considerable polemics between the pro-Shamil and anti-Shamil forces it was conceded that the movement headed by Shamil and his predecessors as imam had been a popular national-liberation struggle against Tsarist conquest.<sup>3</sup>

The next change in the interpretation of the Caucasian War, which resulted from the continuing elaboration of the myth of the friendship of the Soviet family of peoples in the past as well as in the present, merely modified the nature of the actions of the Tsarist government. Under pressure from the Party to demonstrate that there had never been any enmity between the peoples of the USSR, Soviet historians have over the years discovered that the non-Russian peoples were drawn to the Russians from their earliest contact with them, and in more and more cases it has been claimed that they became Russian subjects voluntarily, either at their own wish or at that of their leaders. In 1979 the Chechen were the last of the peoples of the North Caucasus to be included in the category of those peoples voluntarily incorporated in the Tsarist empire, the view being officially promulgated in that year that the Chechen had become part of Tsarist Russia at their own wish in 1781 and not in 1859 as a result of the Caucasian war.<sup>4</sup> The supposed voluntary incorporation of Chechnya in the Tsarist empire in 1781 meant that the Caucasian War could no longer be regarded as one of Russian conquest.<sup>5</sup> The struggle of

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the Chechen. However, at this time the Chechen had only just been rehabilitated after their wholesale deportation to Central Asia during the Second World War, and there was no Chechen historical establishment to express a Chechen point of view.

3. This paragraph is based mainly on Lowell Tillet's The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1969, which is the standard work on Soviet rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and describes the Shamil controversy at great length.

4. See RL 396/82, "Another Chapter in the Rewrite of History: 'The Voluntary Incorporation of Checheno-Ingushetia'," September 30, 1982.

5. It is interesting to note that some of the standard Soviet reference works have not yet caught up with the new line. Thus the second edition of the Sovetsky entsiklopedichesky slovar', published in 1983, still describes the Caucasian war as the "conquest (zavoevanie) by Russian Tsarism of Chechnya, mountain Dagestan and the northwest Caucasus."

the Mountaineers remained anti-colonial but was said to be directed against the actions of the Tsarist military-administrative apparatus already within the framework of the Russian State.<sup>6</sup>

#### The New Interpretation

It is probably not without significance that the new version of the nature of the Caucasian War has been produced by none other than Marks Maksimovich Bliiev, the North Ossetian historian who in 1970 first advanced the thesis that Checheno-Ingushetia was voluntarily incorporated in Tsarist Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century. This thesis was officially adopted in 1979.

Until very recently Bliiev himself subscribed to the view that the Caucasian War was a liberation struggle against the imposition of Tsarist colonial rule.<sup>7</sup> In his 1970 article he emphasized that the Tsarist regime used "extremely cruel methods" to impose its will on the Mountaineers and that it was this that aroused the resistance of the local population.<sup>8</sup> In order to demonstrate that it was official Tsarist policy to achieve the complete submission of the Mountaineers or their physical extermination, Bliiev cited a letter from Tsar Nicholas I to his viceroy in the Caucasus, Count I.F. Paskevich, on the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. Nicholas wrote: "Having thus completed one glorious enterprise, another, equally glorious in my eyes, and a much more important one in regard to direct advantages, awaits you--the pacification forever of the Mountaineer peoples or the extermination of the unsubmissive."<sup>9</sup> Bliiev then described how various military expeditions were mounted against the Mountaineers. He rejected the "pretense" of the Tsarist administration that these

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6. N.K. Baibulatov, M.M. Bliiev, M.O. Buzurtanov, V.B. Vinogradov, V.G. Gadzhiev, "Vkhodzhenie Checheno-Ingushetii v sostav Rossii," Istoriya SSSR, 1980, No. 7, p. 63.

7. As co-author of Baibulatov, et al.

8. M.M. Bliiev, "K voprosu o vremeni prisoedineniya narodov Severnogo Kavkaza k Rossii," Voprosy istorii, 1970, No. 7, p. 53.

9. Ibid., p. 54. The translation is from Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russian Penetration in the Caucasus," in (ed.) Taras Hunczak, Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, New Brunswick, N.J., 1974, p. 253.

expeditions were prompted by the behavior of the Mountaineer peoples and that they were aimed at putting a stop to the deprivations and plunder in which the local population allegedly engaged.<sup>10</sup>

The new interpretation of the nature of the Caucasian War given by Bliev in his article in Istoriya SSSR, No. 2 of 1983, is radically different. Bliev starts by saying that the traditional view of the "so-called" Caucasian War as a national-liberation, anti-colonial struggle on the part of the Mountaineers suffers from "serious shortcomings" and goes on to question how Russia's policy in the Caucasus could have been one of the root causes of the Caucasian War when the areas where it was mainly localized "had virtually no knowledge of the manifestations of Tsarist colonialism." He then elaborates at length the thesis that the war was the culmination of the "system of expansion" of the "free" societies of Dagestan, the taip (clans) of Chechnya, and the "democratic" tribes of the Northwest Caucasus resulting from the special conditions of their transition from pre-feudal to feudal relations. Bliev argues that the limited production base in the mountain areas gave the poorer and better-off elements in these communities a common interest in organizing raids for booty ("an aggressive form of amassing feudal property"). These raids were directed against Transcaucasia and Georgia in particular in the eighteenth century, which inevitably brought the expansion of the Mountaineers into conflict with the policy of Russia in the Caucasus, and later against the Russian frontier lines and settlements in the plains of the North Caucasus.

Turning to the Caucasian War itself, Bliev implicitly rejects the standard view that it began in 1817 when the Tsarist military command embarked on a deliberate policy of either forcing the Mountaineers to settle in the plains or driving them further and further into the depths of the mountains.<sup>11</sup> He suggests instead that it began in 1828 after Muridism, which provided the ideological underpinning for the growing process of feudalization, turned into an aggressive doctrine calling for a holy war against the infidel and the replacement of adat (customary law) by the shariat (Islamic law), which sanctifies property. He further contends that the war was mainly an internal

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10. Bliev, "K voprosu . . .," p. 55.

11. See entry on the "Caucasian War" in Vol. 11 of the third edition of the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1973.



affair with the imams spending much of their time trying to impose the shariat and extend their power in the mountain areas. True, there were clashes with Russian forces as a result of the Tsarist government's decision to finally consolidate its administration in the North Caucasus and of raids by the Mountaineers on the Russian lines, but Bliev rejects the idea that Russia's role was a "provoking" one, stating that Russia should be regarded rather "as an external force that contained the scope of the war."<sup>12</sup> In other words, any aggression was on the side of the Mountaineers. Bliev concludes by saying that the collapse of the imamate "was conditioned in the first place by internal processes and was only accelerated by the actions of the Russian government."<sup>13</sup>

The question naturally arises: does this radical reinterpretation of the nature of the Caucasian War reflect official thinking? and if so, what lies behind it?

It is impossible to be sure at this stage, but the evidence would seem to point to Bliev's interpretation enjoying official backing:

- (1) The mere fact that Bliev's article was carried by Istoriya SSSR suggests at the least that his views are not unacceptable.
- (2) Bliev's position as head of the chair of the history of the USSR at the North Ossetian State University makes him the obvious choice for putting forward a new interpretation. This is because, in the division of labor among the historians of the North Caucasus that followed the setting up of the North Caucasian Scientific Center of the Higher School in Rostov-on-Don in 1969, the North Ossetian State University was allocated the chief responsibility for the study of Russian-North Caucasian ties.<sup>14</sup> (It was doubtless no accident that this task fell to the North Ossetians as one of the North Caucasian peoples who did not side with the Mountaineers against the Russians.) Bliev was holding the same position in 1970 when he elaborated the thesis of the voluntary incorporation of Chechnya in Tsarist Russia.

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12. Bliev, "Kavkazskaya voina ...", p. 68.

13. Ibid., p. 75.

14. V.V. Chernous, "Organizatsiya istoricheskikh issledovaniy v Severo-Kavkazskom nauchnom tsentre vysshoi shkoly," Voprosy istorii, No. 11 of 1981, p. 123.

The reasons why the authorities might be unhappy over the characterization of the Caucasian as a national-liberation movement are fairly obvious--namely, that it might seem to encourage admiration of resistance to Russian rule and of the role of Islam in this. In an article in the issue of the atheist monthly Nauka i religiya for November, 1983, Khazhbikar Kh. Bokov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, identified this as a problem before it was established that Chechnya and Ingushetia had voluntarily become part of Russia in the eighteenth century rather than as a result of the Caucasian War:

The failure to resolve this problem (of how Chechnya became part of the Russian empire) and its incorrect interpretation in artistic literature aroused unhealthy attitudes that among politically irresponsible individuals went as far as hostility to the Russians and "gratitude" to the religious leaders for the fact that the Chechen had stood out against the Russians with their aid. These ideas were taken up by foreign propaganda which used them to inflame national feelings and to extol religion as the guardian of national dignity.<sup>15</sup>

Admittedly, Bokov sets this problem in the past, but it is difficult to see how it could have been solved merely by asserting that Chechnya had voluntarily become part of the Tsarist empire while still maintaining that the Mountaineers had nonetheless subsequently waged a national-liberation struggle against Russian rule.

A recent article on religious-nationalistic survivals in present-day Muridism in Checheno-Ingushetia confirms that the authorities are concerned about the attitude of some young Chechen and Ingush towards the role of Islam in their history. The author or authors accuse the leaders of Murid communities (said to number 150 belonging to twelve different Sufi brotherhoods)

of trading on the interest of the people, especially the young, in their past, trying to instill in believers and non-believers the idea of the supposedly progressive role of Muridism in the life of the Vaynakhs (Chechen and Ingush)... Under the influence of such propaganda, notions about Islam having played a pro-

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15. Kh. Kh. Bokov, "Ne snyat s povetski dnya," Nauka i religiya, No. 11 of 1983, p. 6.

gressive role in the anti-feudal and anti-colonial struggle of the Mountaineers under the leadership of Shamil are current among some young Chechen and Ingush.<sup>16</sup>

It will be interesting to see whether Bliev's new interpretation of the Caucasian War eventually becomes the official one and, if so, how long it takes. His thesis about the voluntary incorporation of Chechnya only became the accepted version of history some years after he propounded it, but on the information available it is not possible to say whether this was because of opposition to it or because the Party did not sanction it earlier.

Whatever Soviet history books may assert in the future, however, it is safe to say that many Chechen (and doubtless Dagestanis and other North Caucasians) will continue to see Shamil as the leader of their struggle to maintain their independence from Tsarist Russia. From Bokov's article it is quite clear that a certain section of Chechen and Ingush, including members of the intelligentsia, remains extremely jealous of its national traditions and eager to preserve them from any outside contamination.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, Bokov admits that the Party's work in combating nationalistic attitudes among the Chechen and Ingush is still complicated by what he euphemistically calls "certain mistakes and shortcomings in the conduct of nationalities policy and individual infringements of its Leninist norms"<sup>18</sup>--in other words by the wholesale deportation of the Chechen and Ingush in 1944.

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16. "Religiozno-natsionalisticheskie perezhitki v sovremennom myuridizme," in Islam v SSSR, Moscow, 1983, p. 82.

17. Bokov, passim.

18. Bokov, p. 5.

RL 5/84

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**POLITICAL ORGANS CREATED IN THE MVD\***

Peter Kruzhin

Over the past six months, it has been reported on a number of occasions that political organs have been set up within the system of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.<sup>1</sup> To grasp the significance of this move it might be useful to review briefly the history of the political organs in the Soviet Union and the tasks assigned to them in the past and present.

Generally known as "political departments," the political organs are special, if not extraordinary, bodies that have been set up by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the armed forces and in certain other departments where the need has for some reason arisen to strengthen the control of the central authorities, even to the point of adopting emergency measures "to rectify the situation." By way of their own hierarchy, the political organs are directly subordinated to the CPSU Central Committee and can only act on its instructions. This fact is reflected in the entries on the political organs in every Soviet reference work.<sup>2</sup>

Political organs were introduced for the first time in 1918 in the Red Army. At that time, their functions were to nurture "class consciousness" among Red Army soldiers, strengthen discipline, and carry out political work among the population in frontline areas and among the troops of the enemy. As time passed, the range of tasks assigned to the political departments in the army was expanded considerably.<sup>3</sup> In January 1933, political departments began to be set up in "backward sectors"

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\* Translation of RS 243/83.

1. Pravda, July 30, 1983; Komsomol'skaya pravda, November 11, 1983; Pravda Vostoka, November 27, 1983.

2. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed., Vol. 46, 1940, pp. 151-54; 2nd ed., Vol. 33, 1955, pp. 587-88; 3rd ed., Vol. 20, 1975, p. 225.

3. Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 6, 1978, p. 421.

of the Soviet economy, notably in the machine-tractor stations (MTS) and on farms, where their main task was to ensure that the kolkhozes served by the MTS and the sovkhoses fulfilled their food production obligations to the state promptly. They were also assigned the important job of purging the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of "hostile elements,"<sup>4</sup> in other words, of conducting the campaign against "kulaks" among the peasants. In July of the same year, political departments were formed on the railroad system, which, because of the civil war, postwar disruption, and the parlous state of Soviet industry, had become a very backward sector of the economy. The way in which the political departments were to get the transportation system back on its feet was primarily by "purging Party and Komsomol organizations of hostile elements that had wormed their way into the ranks" and by ridding the railway system as a whole of "harmful elements." The political departments were particularly active at the beginning of 1935 when Lazar' Kaganovich was appointed people's commissar of railroads.<sup>5</sup> In April 1934, political departments were created in the water transportation system for a similar purpose.<sup>6</sup>

The political departments in agriculture and transportation were formed and disbanded twice. In the country as a whole, they existed in the MTS in 1933-34 and again from 1941 to 1943; on the sovkhoses, from 1933 to 1940 and from 1941 to 1943. In the western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia, in Moldavia, and in the Baltic republics, they were attached to the MTS in February 1950 and existed until January 1954. The political departments on the railroads existed from 1933 to 1943 and from 1948 to 1956. In the water transportation system, they existed from 1934 to 1943 and from 1948 to 1956.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1956, the political departments have been retained only in the armed forces (including the KGB border troops and the internal forces of the MVD). They are responsible for the morale of troops and for their complete reliability. The highest political organ of the armed forces--the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy--enjoys the rights of a department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Except for the internal troops, there have hitherto been no political organs in the MVD. There existed only the political education departments, as they were known, which catered for the

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4. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, 2nd. ed., Vol. 33, 1955, p. 587.

5. Ibid., 1st. ed., Vol. 46, 1940, p. 153.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 3rd ed., Vol. 20, 1975, p. 225.

ideological indoctrination of personnel. They existed at every level of the MVD from the very top down to city level. In raion departments of the MVD, ideological work was carried out by the deputy heads for political education work.

From this fleeting review of the history of the political organs, it might be concluded that their introduction in the MVD at this juncture indicates that the CPSU Central Committee has come to regard the system as the most "backward sector" of the Soviet state apparatus. Such a conclusion is all the more plausible in view of the revelations that have appeared in the Soviet press over the past ten years of abuses in the MVD, particularly in the police force. With increasing frequency, both republican and central newspapers have cited instances of bribe-taking, arbitrary behavior, rudeness, and the bringing of false charges against innocent citizens, on the one hand, and cases in which police officials have been turning a blind eye to real violations of public order and crime, on the other.<sup>8</sup> All this, it must be assumed, involved some degree of connivance by high-level MVD officials, including Army General Nikolai Shchelokov, the USSR minister of internal affairs. At all events, on December 12, 1982, Shchelokov was deprived of his post<sup>9</sup> and, in the following month, stripped of his seat in the Central Committee for "allowing mistakes in his work."<sup>10</sup> This last sanction and, in particular, the reasons given for it suggest that Shchelokov, apart from turning a blind eye to professional misconduct by members of his staff (which could always have been put down to simple negligence or good nature), may have been guilty of even more grievous sins.

What is the official explanation for the introduction of political organs in the MVD system? The text of the relevant Central Committee decree not being available, the only thing that sheds some light on the question is a recent interview given to a TASS correspondent by Major General of the Internal Service Viktor Ivanovich Gladyshev, who has been appointed head of the Political Administration of the MVD. Asked what had prompted the creation of political organs in the MVD, Gladyshev responded with a lengthy monologue that requires some interpretation. It emerges that the MVD is short of personnel with the ideological conviction, political maturity, discipline, and high professional and moral qualities necessary for its normal functioning as the organ of law enforcement in the country. The paramount task of the political organs is to stiffen the political and moral fiber

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8. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, April 22, 1974, June 30, 1974, July 13, 1974; Izvestia, March 27, 1979, May 18, 1979, July 5, 1979; Krasnaya zvezda, May 14, 1981, June 2, 1981.

9. Radio Moscow, December 17, 1982.

10. Pravda, January 16, 1983.

of MVD personnel. To this end, Gladyshev stated, "in recent years a number of important measures have been taken." Among other things, "on the recommendation of Party and Komsomol organs and workers' collectives, a large contingent of Communists, Komsomol members, and leading workers have been assigned to serve in the MVD."<sup>11</sup>

In this part of his statement, Gladyshev obliquely alludes to the fact that a purge of MVD personnel has been in progress for the past few years. Evidence of such a purge exists even at republican ministerial level. Of the fourteen ministers of internal affairs of the Union republics (there is no ministry of internal affairs of the RSFSR), only two (those in Lithuania and Moldavia) have retained their posts. Two have died natural deaths (in Belorussia and Turkmenia), one died under tragic circumstances (in Azerbaijan), five have retired--one at his own request (in Latvia, Tajikistan, the Ukraine, Estonia, and Georgia), one was released from his ministerial duties "for health reasons at his own request" (in Uzbekistan), one was relieved of his post "in connection with his transfer to other work" (in Armenia), and two were removed from their posts without any reasons being given at all (in Kazakstan and Kirghizia). (See Appendix.)

There can be no doubt that the ministers concerned in Kazakstan and Kirghizia were purged. The same is possible in the case of their colleague in Armenia, since the use of the phrase "in connection with his transfer to other work" is typical in such cases. It also seems likely that the Georgian minister's retirement "at his own request" and the Uzbek minister's expressed wish to relinquish his post "on grounds of health" were also connected with a purge. It is difficult to believe that any Soviet minister would desire to leave his post before his death unless he were under threat of punishment.

In his statement, Gladyshev went on to say that "there are, moreover, still many shortcomings in the activities of the organs of internal affairs. The political organs are called upon firmly and steadfastly to implement the Party's call for an improvement in their work."<sup>12</sup> This remark suggests that the purge has yet to yield the results expected of it by the central authorities and will continue. In addition, strict political control is being established in all departments of the ministry over personnel and the performance of their duties. The newly created political organs have clearly been assigned a very important, if not decisive, role in this. As Gladyshev pointed out, the staff of the political organs in the MVD must possess "a

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11. Komsomol'skaya pravda, November 26, 1983.

12. Ibid.

Leninist style of work" and the ability "to implement firmly and consistently the resolutions of the Party and government."<sup>13</sup>

Although the political organs in the MVD have only been introduced recently, this should not be construed as an initiative of the present, Andropov leadership. The move should rather be seen as a logical development of measures begun while Brezhnev was still in power, even though at that time they were insufficiently consequent and radical.

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13. Ibid.



## APPENDIX

Changes in Leadership of Union-Republic Ministries of Internal Affairs, 1978-83

<u>Republic</u>	<u>Former Minister</u> (Dates of Service)	<u>Present Minister</u> (Date of Appointment)
Azerbaijan	Geidarov A. I. (24.3.70 - 29.6.78) <sup>1</sup>	Veliev D. D. (4.11.78)
Armenia	Patalov E. G. (4.12.74 - 11.83) <sup>6</sup>	Shaginyan A. S. (3.11.83)
Belorussia	Klimovsky A. A. (7.3.67 - 9.10.78) <sup>2</sup>	Zhabitsky G. N. (4.12.78)
Georgia	Ketiladze K. E. (8.72 - 5.79) <sup>4</sup>	Gvetadze G. I. (26.5.79)
Kazakstan	Esubulatov M. (11.73 - 1.80) <sup>7</sup>	Plataev A. G. (18.1.80)
Kirghizia	Gabidulin A. K. (29.7.74 - 7.82) <sup>7</sup>	Akmatov D. (12.7.82)
Latvia	Brolish Ya. V. (13.7.72 - 2.78) <sup>3</sup>	Drozd M. F. (10.2.78)
Lithuania		Mikalauskas Yu. V. (appointed 20.9.68)
Moldavia		Bradulov N. M. (appointed 18.5.61)
Tajikistan	Abulkhakov N. (11.72 - 12.79) <sup>3</sup>	Kurbanov I. K. (25.1.80)
Turkmenistan	Mukhamedov A. M. (14.9.61 - 12.77) <sup>2</sup>	Berdyev R. N. (31.1.78)
Uzbekistan	Ergashev K. (5.7.79 - 6.83) <sup>5</sup>	Ibragimov N. (30.6.83)
Ukraine	Golovchenko I. Kh. (9.4.62 - 6.82) <sup>3</sup>	Gladyshev I. D. (15.6.82)
Estonia	Ani V. F. (6.61 - 3.79) <sup>3</sup>	Tibar M. O. (27.3.79)

RL 8/84

January 2, 1984

MORE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN AZERBAIJAN

Elizabeth Fuller

Several further changes in the composition of the Buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan were announced at a plenum of the Central Committee on December 8.<sup>1</sup> They include the election of two new Central Committee secretaries and the release from membership or candidate membership of the Buro of the former first secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, the military commander of the Baku Garrison, and the former first secretary of the Nakhichevan Oblast Party Committee. As a result of the latest round of personnel changes, only seven of the thirteen full members and four of the six candidate members of the Buro elected at the Thirtieth Congress of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in January, 1981, remain in the posts they occupied at that time. Four full members, including the republican Party first and second secretaries, and one candidate member have been released from membership of the Buro during that period.

The two new secretaries of the Central Committee are Ramiz Enver ogly Mekhtiev and Svetlana Chingiz kyzy Kasumova. They assume responsibility for ideology and construction respectively. Mekhtiev replaces Firuddin Aliev, who died in September.<sup>2</sup> The earliest available information on Mekhtiev's career dates from October, 1978, when he was elected first secretary of the 26 Baku Commissars Raion Party Committee of Baku. He had previously occupied the post of deputy head of the Science and Educational Establishments Department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.<sup>3</sup> In 1981 Mekhtiev returned to the Central Committee as head of the Organizational-Party Work Department.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Bakinsky rabochii, December 9, 1983.
  2. See RL 369/83, "Azerbaijan Central Committee Secretary with Responsibility for Ideology Dies," October 4, 1983.
  3. Bakinsky rabochii, October 28, 1978.
  4. Bakinsky rabochii, January 31, 1981.

Kasumova was one of the secretaries of the Baku City Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol in the early 1960s.<sup>5</sup> In 1971 she was elected a secretary of the Baku City Party Committee.<sup>6</sup> She was identified as Azerbaijan SSR deputy minister of trade in 1977<sup>7</sup> and two years later was appointed minister of trade.<sup>8</sup> Kasumova replaces Fuad Musaev, who was released at the plenum in December from his posts as head of the Construction and Municipal Services Department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and Central Committee secretary with responsibility for construction in connection with his election six weeks previously to the post of first secretary of the Baku City Party Committee.<sup>9</sup> The previous incumbent in that post, Vagif Guseinov, a protégé of Geidar Aliev who seemed at the time of his election as Baku Gorkom first secretary to be a rising star,<sup>10</sup> was released from membership of the Buro at the plenum in December. His new position is not yet known. The reason given in October for Guseinov's dismissal was his "failure to organize leadership in his assigned field of work." In a departure from accepted practice, the proceedings of the plenum of the Baku City Party Committee, including the speech reportedly given by Azerbaijan Party first Secretary Kyamran Bagirov, were not published in the republican press. If the reason for Guseinov's dismissal was shortcomings in his work, it is to be expected that this will be made clear in the course of discussions of failings in the work of the Baku City Party Committee at the forthcoming conference of the city Party organization. It is possible, however, that the implications of Guseinov's dismissal are more serious: a Western correspondent who visited Baku in October reported that rumors were circulating at the time of Guseinov's dismissal that he was involved in some kind of corruption.<sup>11</sup> Whatever the explanation for Guseinov's departure from the scene, it appears that Bagirov still lacks the necessary confidence to indulge in the public enumerations of transgressions by disgraced Party officials that became a hallmark of the speeches of Geidar Aliev.

61 Kamran Nabi ogly. Ragimov was released from candidate membership of the Buro of the Central Committee in connection with his relinquishing the position of first secretary of the Nakhichevan Oblast Party Committee.<sup>12</sup> His successor in that post, Nureddin

5. Kommunist (Armenia), February 4, 1962; Bakinsky rabochii, March 9, 1963.

6. Bakinsky rabochii, February 5, 1971.

7. Pravda, March 8, 1977.

8. Bakinsky rabochii, June 21, 1979.

9. Bakinsky rabochii, October 19, 1983.

10. See RL 39/81, "Personnel Changes in Azerbaijan," January 26, 1981.

11. The Observer, October 30, 1983.

12. Bakinsky rabochii, December 6, 1983.

Elzya ogly Mustafaev, was raised from candidate to full membership of the Central Committee. Ragimov, who was editor of the journal Azerbaijan kommunisti for over a decade<sup>13</sup> before his election as Nakhichevan Obkom first secretary in 1975,<sup>14</sup> has been appointed minister of education.<sup>15</sup> His predecessor in this post, Elmira Kafarova, a former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Kom-somol,<sup>16</sup> is in all likelihood an Aliev protégée; she was identified in 1974 as a secretary of the Baku City Party Committee,<sup>17</sup> a post she held until her appointment as minister of education in 1980.<sup>18</sup> Kafarova has been appointed minister of foreign affairs, succeeding Taira Tairova, who retired last month<sup>19</sup> at the age of seventy.<sup>20</sup>

The third person released from membership of the Buro is Lieutenant General Alexander Kovtunov, commander of the Baku Garrison, who will presumably be transferred to another military district.

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13. See Bakinsky rabochii, January 10, 1964, and July 13, 1973.

14. Bakinsky rabochii, December 28, 1975.

15. Bakinsky rabochii, December 3, 1983.

16. Bakinsky rabochii, March 30, 1966.

17. Bakinsky rabochii, April 26, 1974.

18. Bakinsky rabochii, February 14, 1980.

19. Bakinsky rabochii, November 25, 1983.

20. Bakinsky rabochii, November 7, 1983.

RL 9/84

December 27, 1983

## NEW FIRST SECRETARY IN EAST KAZAKSTAN OBLAST

Bess Brown

According to Kazakhstanskaya pravda, Aleksandr Konstantinovich Protozanov, first secretary of the East Kazakstan Oblast Party Committee since 1969, has retired on pension. His replacement is Anatolii Vasil'evich Milkin, who has been chairman of the People's Control Committee of Kazakstan since 1981.


Very little is known about the earlier career of Milkin. He was born in March, 1930, and before his appointment as chairman of the republican People's Control Committee he served as deputy chairman and chairman of the Department of Heavy Industry of the Kazak Central Committee. In this capacity he was elected a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakstan at the republican Party Congress in 1981. It seems certain from his name that Milkin is a Slav, as was his predecessor. The choice of a Slav as first secretary of the East Kazakstan Oblast may be motivated by the fact that the population of the oblast is approximately three-quarters Slavic by nationality, although this pattern does not hold for all the oblasts of Kazakstan.

The man Milkin replaced, A. K. Protozanov, was born in 1914, so his retirement cannot be considered premature. He was a graduate of the Moscow Institute for Nonferrous Metals and Gold (the same school attended by Kazak First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunaev). This training probably influenced the choice of Protozanov for the job of Party chief in East Kazakstan, where the nonferrous metals industry is of all-Union significance. According to his official biography, Protozanov began his career as an ordinary worker in 1932. In 1939 he was elected secretary of one of the Moscow Raion committees of the Komsomol. He began his Party career in 1941 as second secretary of a raion Party committee, later becoming a department head in the Altai Krai Party Committee. From 1944 until 1948 he was deputy head of a department of the Central Committee in Belorussia, and he then went on to a post as instructor and later sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee. In 1952 he was elected a secretary of the Udmurt Oblast Party Committee, and, after Nikita Khrushchev's reorganization of the Party, Protozanov became first deputy chairman of the Udmurt Economic Council (sovnarkhoz). In 1958 he became

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1. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, December 20, 1983.

secretary of the Tyumen Oblast Party Committee, and he moved up to the posts of chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee and later first secretary of the Oblast Party Committee, the position he held until his election to the job of first secretary in East Kazakhstan.



*radio liberty research*

RL 92/85

March 22, 1985

ANNIVERSARIES OF ARRESTS OF SOVIET  
POLITICAL PRISONERS--APRIL, 1985\*

Georgij Dawydov

- Apr 1 Al'brekht, Vladimir (1983)
- Apr 2 Rytikov, Pavel (1983) (sentence to be completed on  
April 2)
- Apr 3 Palaniichuk, Ivan (1984)  
Yakimchuk, Ivan (1984)
- Apr 5 Oleinik, Vladimir (1968)
- Apr 6 Blokhin, Nikolai (1982) (sentence to be completed on  
April 6)  
Burdyug, Viktor (1982)  
Meged', Vasilii (1982) (sentence to be completed on  
April 6)  
Pavlovsky, Gleb (1982)  
Rozanov, Aleksandr (1982) (sentence to be completed on  
April 6)
- Apr 7 Khodorovich, Sergei (1983)  
Kostava, Merab (first arrest) (1977)
- Apr 8 Chornovil, Vyacheslav (second arrest) (1980)

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\*Including forcible hospitalization as well as the beginning of a term of deprivation of freedom. The terms "second arrest" or "third arrest" apply here only to arrests before the expiration of the current sentence.

- Apr 9 Budarov, Sergei (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 9)
- Apr 10 Bolonkin, Aleksandr (third arrest) (1981)
- Apr 11 Cālītis, Ints (1983)
- Pivovarov, Aleksandr (1983)
- Prikhod'ko, Ivan (1984)
- Sokul's'ky, Ivan (1980)
- Apr 13 Ahonen, Heiki (1983)
- Min'kov, Vyacheslav (1984)
- Pali, Vasilii (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 13)
- Pesti, Arvo (1983)
- Rožkalns, Jānis (1983)
- Apr 14 Kuvakin, Vsevolod (1981)
- Shevchenko, Vitalii (1980)
- Apr 15 Redin, Anatolii (1981)
- Rudenko, Raisa (1981)
- Zakharov, Mikhail (1983) (sentence to be completed on April 15)
- Apr 16 Davud-Zade, Vladimir (1976)
- Apr 17 Enns, Dmitrii (1982)
- Friman, Eval'd (1982)
- Kabysh, Maiya (1982)
- Apr 18 Romanyuk, Yakov (1984)
- Apr 19 Damyan, Iosif (1983)
- Krivoberets, Timofei (1978)



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- Apr 20 Arbuzov, Ivan (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 20)
- Bolonkin, Aleksandr (second arrest) (1978)
- Gajauskas, Balys (1977)
- Nagornyi, Anatolii (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 20)
- Rosenfeld, Raimond (1976)
- Apr 21 Bondar', Lidiya (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 21)
- Fedotov, Ivan (1981)
- Grinev, Viktor (first arrest) (1982)
- Kovalev, Andrei (1982)
- Levin, Aleksandr (1983)
- Murashkin, Vladimir (1981)
- Skublin, Aleksandr (1981)
- Apr 23 Badz'o, Yurii (1979)
- Marynovych, Myroslav (1977)
- Matusevych, Mykola (1977)
- Apr 24 Antsupov, Evgenii (1981)
- Astashova, Galina (1978)
- Babenko, Dzhordzh (1984)
- Razumovsky, Aleksandr (1982) (sentence to be completed on April 24)
- Apr 25 Lavut, Aleksandr (first arrest) (1980)
- Lavut, Aleksandr (second arrest) (1983)
- Apr 26 Barkāns, Jānis (1983)
- Apr 27 Kritsky, Eduard (second arrest) (1983)

Apr 28 Anokhin, Pavel (1979)  
Malyshev, Leonid (1981)  
Apr 29 Niklus, Mart (1980)

Also arrested in April:

Abuladze, Gocha (1984)  
Andryushin, Evgenii (1982)  
Gavrilov (1982)  
Kondrashov, Igor' (1982)  
Konovalikhin, Vadim (1984)  
Kornev, Vladimir (1983)  
Shilkov, Andrei (1982)  
Yankovich, Aleksandr (1983)

**B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS****Religious Propaganda Aimed at Muslims in USSR: "Ideological Subversion"**

'Soviet Uzbekistani' in Uzbek 17 Feb 85

Excerpts from "Ideological battle" article by Prof I. Dzabbarov Ph.D.

"Anti-communism under the mask of Islam":

[Resolution of the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological fight]. In this fight, world imperialism led by the USA resorts to the use of religious ideology, anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as the main instrument.

What is the reason for this? The main reasons are : First, the constantly increasing prestige of countries which have been incorporated into the Soviet Union or have a socialist system with Marxism-Leninism established among the working population; and secondly, the serious social changes in the world, the constant erosion of imperialist rule - especially of the colonialist system - and the constant defeats of bourgeois ideology. That is why the anti-communists, falsifying the achievements of real socialism, use every means, including religion, to restore the present capitalist system and to update and "modernise" it. In the meantime, they seek to bring about the ideological disarmament of the Soviet people by presenting a false picture of reality, which is contrary to objective evidence, through publications, the mass media and other means, and by falsifying Marxist teachings on religion and atheism and the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government in this field.

A wide range of propaganda is being carried out for useless purposes which attempts to mix religion with socialism and compares Christianity with Marxism and Islam with communism, and publicises unscientific ideas called Christian or Islamic socialism.

Another reason for the use of religion in the present ideological fight is that in class societies over the centuries, religious ideology has been an important means of keeping the majority of toilers in spiritual and social slavery and making them obey the interests of the ruling class. But due to the socialist system and scientific and technological progress in the world the trend of turning away from religion is becoming stronger. A review of the present clerical press shows that 8,500,000 people in the world turn away from religion every year, and 18% of the world population do not believe in religion (at the beginning of this century it was 0.2%). . .

Leaders of imperialist states as well as anti-communists of Muslim countries who are in harmony with the bourgeois ideologists fabricate all kinds of slanders.

There has been a considerable increase in the amount of material published by the reactionary press of some Arab countries which are full of slanders and fabrications about Central Asia and Kazakhstan. For example, a series of articles entitled, "Muslims in the Soviet Union", published towards the end of 1981 in the journal 'Al-Umma' of Qatar were taken entirely from American and British journals. An article published in 'Al-Ittihad', journal of the "Association of Muslim Students in the USA and Canada" (1981, No 2) was taken from the book by the fanatic anti-communist Walter Kolarz, entitled "Russia and its Muslims" which was published in London in 1952 and which is full of fabrications and slanders against Leninist national policy. The author of the article presents over-repeated slanders to the readers as the "most-up-to-date" information which "comprehensively throws light upon the issue" concerning "the Russian policy in Central Asia". Like John Dulles, a most fanatical enemy of



*radio liberty research*

RL 31/84

January 18, 1984

FURTHER EFFORTS TO ENROLL UZBEKS IN THE SOVIET  
OFFICER CORPS

Bess Brown

Central Asians can be expected to play an increasingly prominent role in the Soviet armed forces as their relative contribution to the pool of conscripts available for military service grows. This would seem to be causing the Soviet military and political authorities some anxiety, as the Central Asian recruits, especially those from rural backgrounds, often lack the linguistic and technical skills that would enable them to be integrated easily into all branches of the armed forces. Indeed, the preparation of young people for military service has been the subject of two plenums of the Central Committee of the Komsomol organization of Uzbekistan in the space of one year.

The first of these plenums, held on January 26, 1983, adopted a resolution containing prescriptions for preparing young people in Uzbekistan for their military service.<sup>1</sup> The plenum held on December 26, 1983, was intended, according to the report delivered by Uzbek Komsomol First Secretary B. Allamuradov, as a follow-up to the earlier plenum for the purpose of determining the extent to which the recommendations made in the resolution had been carried out.<sup>2</sup>

The plenum in January raised the question of enrolling more young Uzbeks in officers' schools, and even greater emphasis was laid on this theme in Allamuradov's report in December, an indication that an extensive campaign has been launched to make a career as an officer more attractive. According to Allamuradov, the information media directed at young people have provided ideological support for a professional military orientation, and rallies attended by Party officials, military and labor heroes, and heroine-mothers have been staged for youths who have decided to enter officers' schools. In Allamuradov's formulation, "the good parting words of their elders strengthened the young people's certainty that the choice they had made was correct." The Komsomolabad Raion Committee of the Komsomol was particularly praised for its efforts, which included the establishment of a

1. See RL 93/83, "Measures to Integrate Central Asians into the Soviet Armed Forces Discussed in Uzbekistan," February 23, 1983.

2. Komsomolets Uzbekistana, December 27, 1983.

school for future officers and the holding of competitions in military and technical sports. The effectiveness of these measures had been confirmed by the enrollment of sixteen youths from the raion in officers' schools this year. Noting that similar successes have been achieved in raion and city Komsomol organizations elsewhere in Andizhan Oblast, Allamuradov suggested that a zonal seminar be held and that a television film be made about this "interesting experience."

The registration of 841 youths of indigenous nationalities, 641 of them Uzbeks, in officers' schools this year was regarded as a sign of some success. Allamuradov also noted that this year young men from Uzbekistan are distributed over a greater number of officers' schools than has previously been the case, and more of them are entering higher educational institutions of the ground forces and the navy. In 1983, the three officers' schools located in Uzbekistan accepted 153 applicants of indigenous nationality; in the previous year, only 56 had been accepted.

Despite the successes referred to by Allamuradov, there had evidently been a number of problems as well. The Komsomol leader indicated that some youths had retracted their declarations of intent to enter officers' schools; he blamed this on the inadequate ideological and political preparation of certain young people and on the irresponsibility of Komsomol committees that were eager to demonstrate successes at any price.

As an indication of the seriousness with which the campaign for officers' training is being taken, Allamuradov proposed a timetable for the identification, selection, and preparation of potential candidates for officers' schools. Experienced teachers of the subjects required in the entrance examination, including Russian language and physical training, should be provided. It was also suggested that instructors from higher educational institutions and experienced teachers of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and Russian should be sent out from Tashkent to each of the 152 rural raions of Uzbekistan for consultations with those who passed the local recruiting board commission. Such active assistance, said Allamuradov, is especially important for candidates of indigenous nationality who will be taking the entrance examinations in Tashkent.

The stress on making sure that candidates stand by their decisions to attend officers' schools, combined with the planned measures to help them pass the entrance examinations, indicates that the effort to get Uzbeks into the officer corps is being taken very seriously. Komsomol involvement in this process is not to be confined to the selection and preparation of candidates; according to Allamuradov's report, Komsomol committees should maintain correspondence with those who have gone off to officers' schools and should get them to promote their chosen profession in talks to other young people when they are home on leave.

The plenum in January discussed the opening of special boarding schools that would stress military and sports training. Participants in the December plenum were taken to see one such institution where Russian language study is emphasized as well as military and sports disciplines. A two- or three-year course at this institution is supposed to provide students with enough knowledge to enable them to enter officers' schools. There seem to have been problems, however, in getting these boarding schools started: the one in Tashkent is short of staff, textbooks, and equipment, and that in Samarkand has not even opened yet because of what Allamuradov described as organizational muddle. Significantly, eighty-four of the 350 candidates for places at the Tashkent school had to be rejected on medical grounds, presumably because their health was not good enough for them to cope with the physical training program.

The Uzbek Komsomol was also called upon to provide more assistance to military faculties at institutions of higher learning in preparing students to become officers and to acquire military skills. Some students of higher educational institutions are evidently not taking their military obligations seriously: according to Allamuradov, there have been instances of students in Tashkent refusing to respond to their induction notices. The first secretary found such behavior quite unacceptable and hinted that it could lead to expulsion from the Komsomol.

The more general question of preparing all young men for their compulsory service in the armed forces is receiving increasing attention as well. One instrument for teaching young people military-related skills is the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF), which claims to have 3 million Komsomol members in its ranks in Uzbekistan. Assessing the work of DOSAAF in the republic, Allamuradov noted that, despite considerable success in training automobile and tractor drivers, the organization has not been so effective in other areas. Almost half of the schools, vocational-technical schools, and technical colleges in Uzbekistan have no shooting ranges, and two-thirds of all educational institutions have no classes in civil defense. Allamuradov reported to the plenum that 800 shooting ranges are to be built in 1984, and each raion is to have at least one camp specializing in military types of sport; at present, the republic has only twenty-eight such camps. The ultimate objective is that every young person should be able to handle both weapons and technical equipment by the time he starts his military service. At present, however, Komsomol committees are not engaging themselves sufficiently in the measures designed to achieve this goal. Too many Komsomol cadres themselves lack good military and technical qualifications, and some are not even in good physical condition. Allamuradov asked the Turkestan Military District to provide regular shooting sessions for members of the Komsomol aktiv and students at the Tashkent and Andizhan Komsomol schools, presumably on the

principle that the Komsomol officials should practice what they preach.

Allamuradov also touched on the importance of sports, claiming that neglect of mass sports contributes to a higher crime rate and more drinking among young people. Draftees who have not participated in sports are, it is said, often the ones who fall foul of military discipline.

A discussion of this sort in Central Asia could hardly be expected to overlook the subject of competence in the Russian language. Allamuradov predictably observed that "a tremendous role in increasing the readiness of the youth of Uzbekistan for labor and for defense is played by the language of friendship and brotherhood--the Russian language." Apparently the republican Komsomol organization is actively promoting acquisition of Russian language skills by the use of at least some Russian in meetings and for the filling out of Komsomol documents. In addition, the Prize of the Komsomol of Uzbekistan has been awarded for the first time to three young teachers of Russian. Despite all efforts to promote knowledge of Russian, only a disappointing 10 percent of the students in Uzbekistan's schools took part in the Russian language olympiad held in the last school year. Although Allamuradov did not stress the point in his report, other sources have admitted that lack of competence in Russian language skills has been a major problem for Uzbek recruits in the armed forces.<sup>3</sup>

As might be expected, promotion of Russian language capability and measures to improve the social and political qualifications of teachers of Russian in schools where the language of instruction is not Russian were among the recommendations contained in the resolution adopted by the plenum in December. The resolution reflected all the elements of Allamuradov's report, including the need to inculcate respect for service as an officer.

With the publicity that has been giving to getting more members of the indigenous nationalities of Uzbekistan into the Soviet officer corps, it seems probable that Komsomol activities directed to this goal will receive some attention in the press, perhaps making it possible to assess their efficacy. In view of the demographic situation facing the Soviet armed forces, it is understandable that efforts should be made to ensure that Central Asians have the technical and linguistic skills necessary to play an effective role. The drive to enroll Central Asians into the officer corps suggests a desire to integrate them fully at all levels of the armed forces.

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3. See, for example, the proceedings of a conference on Russian language teaching in Kashkadar'ya Oblast reported in Oqituvchilar gazetasi, September 17, 1983.



RL 34/84

January 19, 1984

THE CHAIRMANSHIPS OF THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEES  
OF THE SOVIET MUSLIM REPUBLICS

Timur Kocaoglu

It is no secret that the demographic factor is not a principal determinant in the equal distribution of power in the multinational Soviet state. In spite of the fact that Soviet citizens of Muslim origin have been growing in number faster than any other nationality in the USSR, their share of ruling power in certain spheres within their own Union republics, not to mention in the Soviet Union as a whole, does not reflect the extent of their growth. A look at the nationalities of the chairmen of the State Security Committee (KGB) for the five Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan in the post-Stalin period clearly demonstrates the unequal representation of persons of Muslim origin in the tenure of one of the most powerful positions in the Union republics.

In most of the non-Muslim Soviet republics a member of the titular nationality usually holds the KGB chairmanship,<sup>1</sup> but in the six Soviet Muslim republics the reverse is true. In three of these--Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--not a single Muslim has been promoted to head the KGB since 1955, and in the remaining three--Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Kirghizia--the record has been very spotty. At present, only in Azerbaijan and Kazakstan is the KGB chairman a member of the titular nationality of the republic. In the other Muslim republics this post is currently held by Russians (see Table 1). It is also of interest that, in the six Soviet Muslim republics, all the KGB chairmen not of Muslim origin came to their posts from outside the republic in question, with the exception of Levon Nikolaevich Melkumov (born in 1924), the chairman of the KGB in Uzbekistan between 1978 and 1983. Melkumov, an Armenian from Samarkand, had a long career in the Uzbek KGB before becoming chairman of that organization.

A comparison of the lengths of tenure of KGB chairmen of Muslim origin in Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Kirghizia reveals considerable differences. Kirghizia is in the lead, since, although there has been only one Kirghiz chairman of the republican KGB

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1. It is worth noting that in Moldavia all six KGB chairmen since 1955 have had Slav, not Moldavian, names.



since 1955, he held this post for eleven years; for the other eighteen years non-Kirghiz (of non-Muslim origin) chaired the KGB. In Azerbaijan there have been two Azeri chairmen (including the current one) for a total of five years and seven months, while for twenty-three years and five months non-Azeris chaired the KGB of Azerbaijan. The situation in Kazakstan is similar: since 1955 two Kazaks (including the present KGB chairman) have headed the republican KGB for a total of five years and five months, and non-Kazaks were chairmen for the other twenty-three years and seven months.

There does not appear to be any single factor that serves to explain the discrepancies among the six Muslim republics as far as representation of members of the titular nationality at the head of the KGB is concerned. Neither the size of each Muslim nationality in general nor the relative size of titular nationality in the national composition of the republic seems to be decisive. Uzbeks, for example, who number around fourteen million, are the largest Muslim nationality and the third largest national group after Russians and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. They constitute over two-thirds of the total population of Uzbekistan, whereas Kazaks make up only one third of the population of Kazakstan (see Table 3). Two Kazaks have been appointed chairmen of the KGB in their republic, however, while no Uzbek has even been promoted to that post in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, two Azeris have become KGB chairmen in Azerbaijan, where the titular nationality made up 78.1 percent of the total republican population in 1979.

It is possible that no one of traditionally Muslim nationality has been made chairman of the KGB in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan because these three Soviet Muslim republics border on other Muslim countries. Still, if that factor has been a major consideration in the choice of KGB chiefs, it is hard to explain why Azerbaijan, which borders on Iran, has had two persons of Muslim nationality as chairmen of its KGB. Thus, it would appear that, while geographical considerations may well play a role, they are not the only determining factor in the appointment of KGB chiefs in every Soviet Muslim republic.

It should be pointed out that, although three of the Muslim republics have had as head of the KGB men of Muslim origin, even in those republics this is the exception rather than the rule. The record of such appointments for the six Muslim republics since 1955 suggests that Moscow still has little faith in local Muslim cadres for such a sensitive position.

Table 1

Chairmen of the State Security Committee (KGB)  
of the Six Soviet Muslim Republics, 1955-1984

Azerbaijan SSR

Gus'kov, A. M.	(1955)	to	October 27, 1956
Kopylov, F. I.	October 27, 1956		September 1, 1959
Kardashev, A. V.	September 1, 1959		October 22, 1963
Tsvigun, S. K.	October 22, 1963		June 21, 1967
*Aliev, G. A.	June 21, 1967		July 14, 1969
Krasil'nikov, V. S.	October 1, 1969		June, 1980
*Yusif-zade, Z. M.	June, 1980		(current)

Kazak SSR

Gubin, V. V.	(1955)	to	October 10, 1959
Lunev, K. F.	October 10, 1959		March 9, 1960
*Arstanbekov, A. A.	March 9, 1960		November 27, 1963
Evdokimenko, G. S.	November 27, 1963		November 4, 1975
Shevchenko, V. T.	November 4, 1975		February 15, 1982
*Kamalidenov, Z.	February 15, 1982		(current)

Kirghiz SSR

Tereshchenko, A. V.	(1955)	to	February 20, 1956
Ermolov, N. G.	February 20, 1956		May 22, 1961
Chvertko, P. V.	July 3, 1961		March 2, 1967
*Asankulov, Dzh.	March 2, 1967		April, 1978
Lomov, N. P.	April, 1978		(current)

Tajik SSR

Kochetov, D. D.	(1955)	to	April 18, 1957
Tsvigun, S. K.	April 18, 1957		October 22, 1963
Milyutin, M. M.	October 22, 1963		May 7, 1968
Sazonov, S. G.	May 7, 1968		November 26, 1970
Shevchenko, V. T.	November 26, 1970		October 24, 1975
Perventsev, E. I.	October 24, 1975		(current)

Turkmen SSR

Vas'kin, V. T.	(1955)	to	August 20, 1956
Bannikov, S. G.	August 20, 1956		September 11, 1959
Pishchulin, D. I.	September 11, 1959		February 18, 1965
Korobov, L. I.	February 18, 1965		January 4, 1974
Kiselev, Ya. P.	January 4, 1974		January 4, 1979
Boiko, A. S.	January 4, 1979		(current)

\*designates Muslim chairmen.

Table 1 (continued)

<u>Uzbek SSR</u>		
	(1955)	to February 26, 1960
Byzov, A. P.	February 26, 1960	December 14, 1963
Naimushin, G. F.	December 14, 1963	October 29, 1969
Kiselev, S. I.	November 14, 1969	October 25, 1974
Beshchastnov, A. D.	October 25, 1974	March 9, 1973
Nordman, E. B.	March 9, 1978	August 31, 1983
Melkumov, L. N.	August 31, 1983	(current)
Golovin, V. A.		

Sources: Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, Leaders of the Soviet Republics: 1955-1972, Canberra, 1973; Val Ogareff, Leaders of the Soviet Republics: 1971-1980, Canberra, 1980; Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. III: Union Republics, Washington, D.C., 1979.

Table 2

Nationality of the Chairmen of the KGB in the Soviet Muslim Republics, 1955-1983\*

	<u>Azerbaijan SSR</u>	<u>Kazak SSR</u>	<u>Kirghiz SSR</u>	<u>Tajik SSR</u>	<u>Turkmen SSR</u>	<u>Uzbek SSR</u>
Members of the titular nationality:	2	2	1	0	0	0
Nonmembers of the titular nationality:	5	5	4	6	6	7


\*Based on Table 1.

Table 3

Percentages of the Titular Nationality and of Russians in the Soviet Muslim Republics in 1979

	<u>Azerbaijan SSR</u>	<u>Kazak SSR</u>	<u>Kirghiz SSR</u>	<u>Tajik SSR</u>	<u>Turkmen SSR</u>	<u>Uzbek SSR</u>
Titular nationality:	78.1	36.0	47.9	58.8	68.4	68.7
Russians:	7.9	40.8	25.9	10.4	12.6	12.5

Sources for Table 3: Naselenie SSSR. Po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda, Moscow, 1980;  
"The All-Union Census of 1979 in the USSR,"  
A Collection of Reports Prepared before and  
after the Census by the Staff of RL Re-  
search, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin,  
September, 1980.



RL 98/85

March 26, 1985

CENTRAL ASIANS WARNED TO AVOID MARRIAGE WITH CLOSE RELATIVES

Thomas Skallerup

Natives of Soviet Central Asia were advised of the undesirable medical consequences of marriage between close relatives in a recent article that appeared in Ozbekistan adabiyati va shan'ati. Writing in the weekly Uzbek-language newspaper, Dr. Ataulla Aqilov, chairman of the Scientific Society of Genetic Medicine of the Uzbek SSR, revealed that many Central Asians who contemplate marriage to a near relative are unaware that such matches increase the risk of having sickly or handicapped children or of having no children at all. The grief caused by these problems is also said to lead to depression or alcoholism in many cases.

In discussing the medical troubles that can result from marriage between close relatives, Aqilov seemed to be indirectly criticizing the traditional custom of having marriages arranged by parents, who often prefer their children to marry cousins. The doctor cited the case of a man who, after having married his cousin at the behest of his parents, later became the father of several sickly children. That such situations still occur today was particularly disturbing to Aqilov, who noted that Avicenna, the medieval scientist now widely celebrated in Uzbekistan as a progressive Central Asian figure, wrote about such problems of intermarriage in one of his famous treatises many centuries ago. Aqilov blamed the continuing ignorance of practical genetic knowledge on the local health instruction organizations, which he said do not carry out "medical propaganda among the masses to a sufficient degree."<sup>1</sup>

Aqilov went on to offer a number of practical suggestions for reducing the incidence of medical problems resulting from marriage between close relatives. As well as advocating that Central Asian youth be exposed to information on the principles of genetics, he also recommended that responsible officials, such as deputies of the registry offices and village soviets, more actively enforce Soviet family laws, under which marriage between close blood relatives is interdicted.

Finally, Aqilov proposed the establishment of special medical reviews of prospective couples, which would assist the work of health propagandists, local officials, and conscientious citizens

in discouraging marriages of this type. Whether or not these suggestions are actually implemented, Aqilov's article, appearing in a literary newspaper that seldom publishes information pertaining to health issues, is important in that it implies the existence of a problem that has received little attention in the press until now.

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1. Ataula Aqilov, "Qarindashga qiz berganda..." (When You Marry Your Daughter to a Relative...), Ozbekistan adabiyati va san'ati, October 19, 1984, p. 8.

RL 76/84

February 16, 1984

**FOURTEENTH DEPUTY TO SOVIET PREMIER NAMED****Alexander Rahr**

Besides the personnel changes that were taking place on an unprecedented scale in oblast Party organizations in the USSR at the beginning of the year, a matter of no small importance was decided by the Government of the USSR. This was the appointment of Boris Evdokimovich Shcherbina as the fourteenth deputy to Nikolai A. Tikhonov, the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers--i.e., the Soviet premier.<sup>1</sup> Shcherbina, who is sixty-four years old, has held the post of USSR minister of construction of petroleum and gas industry enterprises for the past ten years.

In all probability, Shcherbina has been favored with a promotion because of his contribution to one of the most important construction projects of the current five-year plan--that is, the Urengoi-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline. It was in connection with his work on this project that he was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labor."<sup>2</sup> In view of his background, it seems likely that he will eventually replace the seventy-three-year-old Veniamin Dymshits as the chairman of the Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers for Dealing with Problems concerning the Development of the West-Siberian Oil and Gas Complex.

The newest of the group of deputy premiers of the USSR (see the Appendix for a list of the fourteen deputies) was born in 1919 in the Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian, Shcherbina graduated from the Kharkov Institute of Railway Transportation Engineers in 1942. He completed the Party School of the Communist Party of the Ukraine following World War II. The early years of his career were spent in the Komsomol and the Kharkov Party organization. In 1951 he was appointed a secretary of the Irkutsk Obkom, and in 1961 he became first secretary of the Tyumen' Oblast Party Committee.

It was during the years of Shcherbina's tenure as Party first secretary of the Tyumen' Oblast that the oil and gas industry there developed in leaps and bounds.<sup>3</sup> In 1973 Shcherbina, then fifty-four years old, was assigned to Moscow as minister of construction of petroleum and gas industry enterprises. His recent promotion suggests that his career as a technocrat in the service of the state is progressing successfully.

## Appendix

Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers

	-----Year of-----	
	Appointment	Birth
<u>Chairman:</u>		
Tikhonov, Nikolai Aleksandrovich	1980	1905
<u>First Deputy Chairmen:</u>		
Aliev, Geidar Alievich (Control of the Economy)	1982	1923
Arhipov, Ivan Vasil'evich (Foreign Trade)	1980	1907
Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich (Foreign Affairs)	1983	1909
<u>Deputy Chairmen:</u>		
Antonov, Aleksei Konstantinovich (Energy, Machine-Building)	1980	1912
Baibakov, Nikolai Konstantinovich (Gosplan)	1965	1911
Bodyul, Ivan Ivanovich (Consumer Services, Trade)	1980	1918
Dymshits, Veniamin Emmanuilovich (Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises)	1962	1910
Kostandov, Leonid Arkad'evich (Chemical Industry)	1980	1915

(continued on next page)



## Appendix (continued)

Marchuk, Gurii Ivanovich (Science and Technology)	1980	1925
Martynov, Nikolai Vasil'evich (Material and Technical Supply)	1976	1910
Nuriev, Ziya Nurievich (Agriculture)	1973	1915
Shcherbina, Boris Evdokimovich (Not yet known)	1984	1919
Smirnov, Leonid Vasil'evich (Military-Industrial Commission)	1963	1916
Talyzin, Nikolai Vladimirovich (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)	1980	1929

RL 73/84

February 13, 1984

**AZERBAIJAN ECONOMY BECOMES SHAKY\***

Allan Kroncher

A first glance at the 1983 figures on plan fulfillment in Azerbaijan shows that, in most cases, this prosperous republic has improved its economic position still further.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the growth rates for national income and industrial production turned out to be considerably higher than the plan targets, while the growth in real income per capita of the population, which also exceeded the plan, was the highest in the current five-year plan. It should, however, be pointed out that this prosperity appears to be rather unsteady and is far from extending to all spheres of economic activity.

In the field of agriculture, for example, it is possible to talk only about a symbolic growth of 0.1 percent; moreover the figures for the first three years of the five-year plan clearly indicate a tendency towards a slowing down in the growth of agricultural production: 7.2 percent, 1 percent, and 0.1 percent respectively.<sup>2</sup> It is possible that the growth in the commissioning of fixed capital assets totalled 5 percent only in comparison with the very poor results of 1982 when this indicator fell by 5 percent compared with 1981. Although labor productivity in industry showed some growth, it was the lowest in three years and this indicator too demonstrates a steady downward tendency. Labor productivity in agriculture fell by 4 percent. Planned growth in retail turnover and services fell significantly short of targets. If one takes the growth indicator not for produced but for utilized national income then the level is the same as that of the all-union indicator, even though Azerbaijan's economic indicators are usually higher than average in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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\* Translation of RS 37/84.

1. Bakinsky rabochii, January 17, 18, 19, 1984, and February 1, 1984.

2. Bakinsky rabochii, January 28, 1982, January 26, 1983, and February 1, 1984.

All these figures show that the ailments that are characteristic of the Soviet economy as a whole, are gaining an ever firmer hold on this island of relative prosperity in the Soviet economy. It is evident that even if in certain cases the Azerbaijan economy demonstrates relatively high growth rates, other indicators show either that growth rates are falling, or that they are remaining static, or else that they have risen only in comparison with the very unprosperous year of 1982.

In connection with the last circumstance it should be noted that in the speeches given by K. Bagirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and A. Mutalibov, chairman of the republican state planning committee, in December 1982, the results for 1982 did not seem to be so bad at all.<sup>3</sup> The figures that they quoted, however, differed to such an extent from the report later issued by the Azerbaijan Central Statistical Administration on the 1982 results,<sup>4</sup> that it is difficult to imagine that it was merely a mistake or an inaccuracy caused by the necessity of working from the preliminary results.

For example, where in the speeches the figure for growth in production of national income was given as 5 percent, in the later Central Statistical Administration report this same figure was given as only 4.3 percent. It was asserted that the growth in industrial production was 5.6 percent, while the report quoted the figure of 4.9 percent. In other cases the discrepancies were even more striking. For example, the growth in real income per capita of the population in 1982 was 0.1 percent and not 3.3 percent as was claimed. In a number of cases the failures of 1982 were disguised by citing the sum totals for the first two years of the five-year plan or by using other, more favorable indicators. Thus, while the growth in retail turnover for the two years taken together was 7.5 percent, the same figure for 1982 alone was 3 percent. It is noteworthy that while the growth in the commissioning of fixed production assets was 4.1 percent, the total growth for the commissioning of all fixed capital assets fell by 5 percent.

It is interesting that in giving his speech Bagirov tried to keep the number of figures to a minimum, and in general quoted the results for the two year taken together, while Mutalibov's speech on the following day was considerably bolder.

There was one case, however, where the picture given of the Azerbaidjan economy in 1982, as presented in the two speeches, is so far removed from the real situation that there are consider-

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3. Bakinsky rabochii, December 10, 11, 1982.

4. Bakinsky rabochiii, January 26, 1983.

able grounds for believing that a deliberate distortion of the results for that year took place. Thus, it appears that this author was justified in suggesting in an earlier article that the government of Azerbaijan was, in all probability, trying to hide something and that the results for 1982 may have been much worse than was shown by the two speeches.<sup>5</sup>

It is also possible that this attempt to hide the real state of affairs did not go entirely unnoticed in Moscow, since the results in Azerbaijan for 1983 were brought out not in December but in January, when not only the preliminary but also the final results for the year were known, making it more difficult to distort the figures. Indeed, on this occasion the figures given by both leaders, tally completely with those given in the report by the Azerbaijan Central Statistical Administration. There was, nevertheless, an attempt on this occasion too to disguise a series of unfavorable indicators when citing the results for the three years taken as a whole. It seems, however, that on both occasions the Azerbaijani leaders were seeking not so much to mislead the Kremlin leadership as to conceal the true state of affairs from the republican population. It is probable, therefore, that no punishment of any kind followed the distortion of data given in the summary speeches for 1982.

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5. See RL 62/83 "Economic Problems in Baku," February 2, 1983.

RL 10/84

January 3, 1984

## THE PORTRAYAL OF "RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS" IN THE SOVIET PRESS\*

Oxana Antic

Articles describing how religious dissidents are exploited by "bourgeois propaganda" to disseminate ideas "hostile to the Socialist order" are constantly being published in the Soviet press. As a rule the targets of these articles are either specific religious groups or individual active believers. By contrast, a pamphlet on "The Social and Ideological Nature of Extremism"<sup>1</sup> by Eduard Filimonov, deputy director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, is directed against all churches, groups, and religious denominations that operate outside the framework of religious legislation and also against active members of the officially recognized churches such as, for example, the Orthodox priests Gleb Yakunin and Dmitrii Dudko.

Obviously the publication of this pamphlet has several purposes. One is to explain how "religious extremism" can exist under developed socialism. A second is to provide an overall picture of the struggle against "the antisocial and illegal activities of religious extremists." The most important, however, to which the author devotes most space in the pamphlet, is to denigrate active believers, in particular the leaders of the Pentecostal movement for emigration from the USSR. Filimonov indiscriminately attributes to them the most negative qualities, referring to them as

people with a dark past, opportunists, who are dissatisfied with the Soviet way of life and Soviet laws, who at times become engaged in protracted conflicts with official Soviet bodies, often concealing their antisocial faces behind a religious mask.

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\* Translation of RS 245/84.

1. Eduard Filimonov, "Sotsial'naya i ideologicheskaya sushchnost' religioznogo ekstremizma," in the series Nauchnyi ateizm, No. 8, 1983, 64 pp.

His negative portrayals of certain believers are so colorful that he might be talking about people he knows personally. Nikolai Kunitsa, a Pentecostal presbyter, he describes, for example, as a "conceited, pathologically vain, and extremely ambitious" man who has "got it into his head that he is an outstanding person." Petr Vashchenko, the father of fourteen children who, together with his wife, three daughters, and two fellow believers, spent five years (from June 1978 to April 1983) in the American Embassy in Moscow, Filimonov dismisses as "a Pentecostal extremist who stirs up the desire to emigrate" and subjected himself to "voluntary confinement" in the embassy while Voice of America and Radio Liberty were reporting that "the authorities persecute Pentecostals in the USSR".<sup>2</sup> The pamphlet names a number of other Pentecostals who "work actively to stir up the desire to emigrate among their fellow believers." The list includes Nikolai Goretoi, Grigorii Vashchenko (Petr's brother), Boris Perchatkin, Stepanov, Patrushev, and Evgenii Bresenden.

Filimonov writes in just as much detail about the adherents of the unofficial Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. About three pages are devoted to Georgii Vins, the former secretary of the Council of Churches who was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1979 with his family. Filimonov is particularly harsh on these Baptists for their involvement with young people:

Acting in open and deliberate violation of Soviet law, the extremist faction in the Baptist Church that calls itself the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists organizes instruction of minors in various circles and schools, allows adolescents of fourteen to sixteen to be baptized, encourages all kinds of "youth communities," and urges young believers to preach the Gospel "with singing and music" in workers' recreation centers, in trains, and on buses. Children are imbued with the idea that they must suffer for Christ.<sup>3</sup>

Filimonov is equally indignant that "extremists from the Council of Churches spread myths about the USSR being an atheist state and about state atheism," and regard the Soviet state as "a state fighting God."

Of the True and Free Adventists and Vladimir Shelkov, their leader from 1949 to 1979, who died at the age of eighty-three in a strict-regime labor colony in northern Siberia, Filimonov writes that "he and his company were apprentices of Western

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2. The Vashchenko family left the USSR in June 1983.

3. Filimonov, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

psychological warfare centers that operate under cover of false concern for believers in the USSR." It is interesting to note that, although Filimonov mentions Shelkov's death, he modestly omits to reveal the age of the Adventist and the fact that he died in confinement.<sup>4</sup>

Filimonov begins his account of "Orthodox religious extremist" activities with the famous letter written by Father Nikolai Eshliman and Father Gleb Yakunin to Patriarch Aleksii in the mid-1960s in which they described the tragic state of the Russian Orthodox Church or, as Filimonov chooses to put it, "expressed their disagreement with existing relations between Church and state in our country and called for disregard of the law on cults."<sup>5</sup> In this connection, Filimonov also cites what he calls "the slanderous letter about persecution for faith in the USSR" that Yakunin and Lev Regelson sent to delegates to the Fifth General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi in 1975.<sup>6</sup> Filimonov sharply criticizes the leaders of the organization for allowing the document to be discussed at the assembly, saying that it was used "to stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Communist feelings." He refers to the declaration of the Moscow Patriarchate that "the leadership of the World Council of Churches has permitted an attempt, as it were, to replace the voice of the Soviet delegation with the opinion of church dissidents."

A great deal of space in the pamphlet is devoted to the activities of Gleb Yakunin, although most of it is a mere repetition of the accusations leveled against him at his trial: that "he prepared, duplicated, and disseminated documents and materials containing slanderous fabrications discrediting the Soviet social and political system"; that he contacted foreign correspondents"; and that his writings were "full of slander of the Soviet Union, of the Socialist state, of the policy of the Communist Party," etc.

Moving on to a critical analysis of Dudko's activities, Filimonov cites one of the most powerful passages from his sermons:

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4. Vladimir Shelkov died on January 27, 1980. He had been sentenced in March 1979 to five years deprivation of freedom under Articles 141-4 and 147-1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code on charges of "disseminating knowingly false fabrications discrediting the Soviet social and political system" and "infringing the person and rights of citizens under the guise of performing religious ceremonies."

5. AS 722.

6. AS 2380.

In our time, one can only be an atheist from lack of understanding....An atheist is always lacking either in mind, or in morals, or in will....Atheism is the split atom of evil. There is moral, familial, and social decay. Not only do they not believe in God, they do not believe one another. In undermining belief in God, atheism has undermined the entire foundations of social life. The ruined churches in our land that are world treasures, immorality, the decay of the family, crime and hooliganism: all these are the fruit of atheism.

As his source, Filimonov cites a pamphlet by Vladimir Kuroedov, the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, The Soviet State and the Church.<sup>7</sup>

Filimonov concludes the pamphlet with advice for countering the ideology and practice of "religious extremism." He draws a distinction between "religious ideology" and "hostile religious propaganda." This propaganda, he says, must be unmasked and, to do this, it is necessary to show believers "the real face of the extremist leaders who have connections with imperialist propaganda centers and services."

In the pamphlet, Filimonov has drawn a vivid picture of individuals and of religious groups in the Soviet Union that are not fully under the control of the state and are struggling for greater freedom in the religious sphere. His explanation for the existence of what he terms "religious extremism" in the Soviet Union remains less than convincing. While maintaining that "in a developed Socialist society there is not and cannot be a social, class basis that could engender and nurture religious extremism," he nevertheless claims that "the ideology and practice of religious extremism is an expression of the crisis of religion in a Socialist society."

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7. Vladimir Kuroedov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i tserkov', Moscow, 1976, pp. 64-65.



# Muslim Life and Culture in the Soviet Union

Dr. Baymirza Hayit

Before dealing with the subject "The Problems of the Defence of Islam under Communist Rule," it is necessary to make some observations concerning the extent of Communist rule in Muslim regions of the present-day Soviet Union in order to first appreciate the point in question.

In February 1917, socialists of all types — Social-democrats, Social-revolutionaries and Communists — joined forces to overthrow the Czar of Russia. Shortly afterwards, the Communists adopted a radical course, overthrew the social-liberal government and seized power in October 1917. With this, Communist rule came into being for the first time in the history of the world.

Before the emergence of Communist power, the Russian Empire had been one of the many large states of the world. The Islamic peoples also formed part of this empire. Of the Crimea, Azerbaijan, North Caucasus, Tartar-Baschkiria and Turkistan also formed part of this empire. Russia's military aggression towards the Islamic people began in the middle of the 16th century and ended at the close of the 19th century with the conquest of Turkistan. Of the Islamic territories of the Russian Empire, the principalities of Bukhara and Khorezm had been its protectorates since the end of the 19th

century enjoying complete independence in internal affairs. Between 1921 and 1924 the Communist government of Russia recognised the sovereign rights of the states of Bukhara and Khorezm after these monarchies had been transformed into People's Republics in 1920.

The Muslims of the former Czarist Empire, whose historical territories covered more than 4.5 million square kilometres, and who numbered more than 30 million, were continually striving to free themselves from Russian domination. Russian defeat in the First World War and subsequent revolutions weakened the power mechanism which Russia had established over the Islamic peoples under its domination. Relations between Russians and Muslims were so strained that a reconciliation between the rulers and the ruled seemed impossible, even after Communist ascendancy. Russia's Communists recognised these conflicts and tried to seek a "solution."

On November 15, 1917, eight days after assuming power, the Communist leadership issued a *Declaration of the Rights of the People of the Russian Empire*, in which it conferred on non-Russian peoples the right of secession from Russia.<sup>1</sup> On December 3, 1917, after Communist rule had been in exis-

tence for twenty-six days, the Bolshevik government of Lenin went further and published a *Proclamation to the Muslims of Russia and the Orient*. In this proclamation, also, it was stressed that Muslims were to be the masters in their own countries.<sup>2</sup>

In 1917-18, following the collapse of central government in Russia and on the basis of the above-mentioned declarations concerning the rights of the peoples, the Muslims of the Russian Empire formed their own national states. The Communist leaders in Moscow now had to contradict their own declarations and promises in order to re-establish the unity of the Russian Empire. Armed conflict between Russians and the Muslims now became inevitable, and soon the Communists started suppressing by force of arms those Muslim national states which had come into being after the Communist revolution. Thus the Russians set themselves to their second conquest of the Muslim countries of Central Asia. In Turkistan, where Muslims lived in closely-knit communities, conflicts between Russians and Muslims assumed particularly large proportions. In February 1918, a struggle against Communist Russia began in Turkistan for the liberation of Islam and the people. These conflicts, conducted by Communist Rus-