

# Revue du Monde Musulman

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4<sup>e</sup> ANNÉE.

JUILLET-AOUT

N<sup>os</sup> 7-8.

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## SOUMISSION DES TRIBUS MUSULMANES DU TURKESTAN PAR LA CHINE 1757-1759

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*Dans la cour du Wen Miao (temple de la Littérature, ou, suivant l'expression plus répandue temple de Confucius) de Tch'eng tou, capitale du Sseu tch'ouan, se trouvent plusieurs stèles, qui peuvent compter parmi les plus belles de Chine. Elles sont en marbre, décorées de beaux chapiteaux représentant l'habituel motif symbolique, les deux dragons célestes se disputant la perle (ou la lune); leurs dimensions sont colossales: elles ont environ 6 mètres de hauteur. Elles reproduisent les édits où les deux grands empereurs de la dynastie actuelle K'ang Hi (1662-1723) et K'ien Long (1736-1796) ont annoncé à leurs peuples leurs conquêtes. Particularité rare, elles donnent simultanément le texte de ces édits en mandchou et en chinois.*

*Ces stèles nous racontent la série des campagnes contre les Eleuths de la Mongolie occidentale, contre les Sifans du Kin tch'ouan (confins tibétains) et contre les Musulmans du Turkestan. C'est l'inscription relative à cette dernière dont nous donnons ici la traduction, avec la reproduction partielle de la stèle de Tch'eng tou: on trouvera plus loin*

un fragment de chacun des deux registres mandchou et chinois qui se partagent par moitié la surface de la pierre. L'ensemble de l'inscription ne peut être reproduit d'une manière satisfaisante, en raison de ses dimensions, 4 m. 60  $\times$  1 m. 76 et de la trop grande réduction qui serait imposée aux caractères.

Le style habituel aux édits ne permettant pas de se faire une idée suffisamment précise des événements, il nous a paru nécessaire de présenter tout d'abord le récit complet de la campagne. L'Histoire officielle n'en est pas publiée, puisqu'elle ne peut l'être qu'à la chute de la Dynastie; mais on en trouve un exposé assez détaillé dans le chapitre III du livre IV du Cheng wou ki, ouvrage fort estimé, dû au lettré Wei Yuan, et dont de nombreux passages ont déjà été traduits par des Européens. Sur les Musulmans notamment, M. Imbault-Huart a publié la traduction des quatre campagnes dirigées contre eux en 1648, 1781, 1783, 1820-1828; mais le chapitre relatif à la campagne de 1757-1759, qui est assurément la plus importante, à laquelle est consacrée la magnifique stèle de Tch'eng tou, et dont le récit est accompagné de renseignements fort intéressants, s'ils sont exacts, sur les débuts de l'Islam chinois, n'a pas encore été traduit, bien que plusieurs ouvrages européens parlent de cette expédition (1). Chose singulière, Dabry de Thiersant ignore absolument ces événements. Il semble difficile de faire accorder le récit qui va suivre — récit authentifié par la stèle de Tch'eng tou — avec les deux chapitres du Mahométisme en Chine donnant l'Historique de l'Islamisme au Kansou et au Turkestan.

Le Cheng wou Ki, composé en 1842 à Kiang tou (préfecture de Yang tcheou, au Kiang Sou), a été l'objet de plu-

(1) Voir notamment : *Histoire générale de la Chine*, par le P. DE MAILLA et GROSIER (livre XI, p. 564 et seq.); *Nouveaux Mélanges asiatiques*, d'ABEL RÉMUSAT (II, pp. 48 et 49); *Recueil de Documents sur l'Asie centrale*, d'IMBAULT HUART (pp. 5-6 et la notice consacrée à la Géographie du Si yu).

sieurs éditions, dont une à Sou tcheou et deux à Yang tcheou en 1842 et 1846, qui présentent des différences assez sensibles. Nous avons suivi dans notre traduction celle de Yang tcheou 1842, réimprimée en 1902, qui nous a paru la plus correcte.

Nous avons puisé beaucoup de renseignements dans le Tong houa lou (chap. XLVII à LXVII) — recueil des édits impériaux et des mémoires au Trône — de la présente dynastie; dans le Siao t'ing tsi lou, mélanges sur les événements intéressants qui se sont passés sous la dynastie actuelle (édition de Changhai 1880); dans le Hoang tchao ou kong ki cheng, ouvrage dû à l'académicien Tchao Yi, ayant le surnom de Yun Song, secrétaire du Conseil privé, qui est le récit des campagnes de la même dynastie; dans le Si yu t'ou tche, Géographie des Pays d'Occident; dans le Hoei k'iang t'ou tche Géographie des Marches Musulmanes et enfin dans le Ta tsing hoei tien.

La plupart des identifications de lieu ont été faites d'après les Textes historiques du P. Wiegner; quant aux assimilations des grades et emplois des fonctionnaires, elles ont été empruntées au Chinese Government de W.-F. Mayers.


La carte jointe à ce travail est la reproduction de la carte chinoise du Turkestan dans l'atlas officiel publié à Changhai en 1889.

#### HISTOIRE DE LA PACIFICATION DES FRONTIÈRES OCCUPÉES PAR LES TRIBUS MUSULMANES PENDANT LA PÉRIODE K' IEN LONG (1736-1796).

En la vingt-deuxième année de la période K'ien Long (1757) le (pays de) I Li (1) venait d'être soumis, mais d'une

(1) Le pays de I Li est le Turkestan chinois actuel. Il est fait allusion, dans cette phrase, à la répression de la révolte du fameux A Mou Eul Sa Na (Amoursana), par le général chinois Tchao Hoei. Amoursana, dans sa lutte

Carte chinoise de la région des "Hoei pou", ou Tribus musulmanes.



manière incomplète, en même temps que les tribus musulmanes se soulevaient de nouveau.

Ce qu'on appelle Hoei Pou (2) est le T'ien Chan nan lou, qui lui-même est le rameau principal du Tsong Ling (3). Le T'ien Chan s'étend sur une longueur de plusieurs milliers de lis jusqu'à Ha Mi (4). A l'est et à l'ouest résident les tribus des Tch'ouen (5) et des Hoei. Ces dernières sont, dans l'histoire des Han, appelées les « trente-six états sédentaires », tandis que la région du Nord (du T'ien Chan) est appelée : « Peuples nomades » (6). Les deux régions se séparent à Ha Mi. On franchit les montagnes en partant soit de Pa Li K'ouen (7), soit de T'ou Lou Fan (8). La grande route conduisant à I Li (9) passe par Ou Lou Mou Tsi (10),

contre l'empire, avait fait appel aux Mahométans du Tarim, et après sa mort ceux-ci continuèrent la lutte, cause de la campagne que nous rapportons ici. Cf. *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, t. I, p. 325 et seq.

(2) On a coutume de traduire : Tribus musulmanes. Mais l'auteur semble distinguer les Hoei peuple, des Hoei musulmans. *Tribus Hoei* semble préférable, car cela n'affirme rien sur leur religion.

(3) Le bassin du Tarim (en chinois Si yu, frontières occidentales, ou encore pays d'occident) est borné au nord par les T'ien Chan ou monts Célestes, au sud par les monts K'ouen Lun. Depuis la conquête qu'en ont faite les Chinois sur les Mahométans, on l'appelle : Sin K'iang (nouvelles frontières). Le T'ien Chan nan lou (route au sud des monts Célestes) est le Turkestan occidental ; le T'ien chan pei lou (route au nord des monts Célestes) est en réalité toute la région nord-est appelée encore Dzoungarie. Le Tsong Ling est le Pamir-Bolor.

(4) Ha Mi, nom chinois de Khamil, sous-préfecture indépendante (ting) du Kansou, construite dans une oasis au milieu du désert de Gobi.

(5) Tch'ouen, abréviation pour Tch'ouen K'o Eul. Transcription phonétique de Dzoungar.

(6) Remarquons cette identification des Hoei ou Musulmans actuels avec les trente-six États existant sous les Han, ce qui indique que, dans la pensée de l'auteur, ce sont toujours les mêmes populations qui occupent la région. C'est donc elles qui se seraient converties à l'Islamisme, et il n'y aurait pas eu d'immigration importante de Musulmans de l'Occident. La suite du texte semble le confirmer.

(7) Appelé encore Hoei Ning.

(8) T'ou lou fan : transcription de Tourfan, sous-préfecture indépendante (ting), de population mi-partie turque mi-partie chinoise, appelée aussi Koang Ngan tch'eng.

(9) I Li, nom chinois de Kouldjà, préfecture ; par extension il désigne ordinairement toute la province.

(10) Ou-lou-mou-tsi, transcription du nom de Ouroumtsi, ancien Bich-Balik. Cette ville porte administrativement le nom chinois de Ti Hoa fou,

tandis que celle qui de Ouche (11) et A K'o Sou (12) franchit le Ping Ling (13) pour aller à I Li est la plus courte. Au nord des montagnes neigeuses, des rivières torrentueuses se précipitent hiver comme été ; plusieurs dizaines (de celles-ci) arrosent de leurs cours sinueux les villes du Nan Lou et se réunissent ensuite dans le P'ou Tch'ang hai (14), appelé aujourd'hui Lo P'ou Tch'ao Eul, d'où sort, par une source souterraine le Fleuve Jaune de Chine (15).

Dans la région se trouvaient quelques dizaines de villes grandes et petites et un millier environ de villages occupés par les Mahométans. Tous les petits royaumes du Si Yue de l'Histoire des Han existaient encore, mais avaient à peine quelques centaines ou près d'un millier de familles ; et leurs belles troupes d'autrefois n'étaient plus constituées que de quelques dizaines ou quelques centaines d'hommes. Durant la période K'ang Hi (1662-1723) un édit impérial signala la conquête et l'occupation par les Tch'ouen K'o Eul-Dzoungars — de plus de mille cités et d'un grand nombre de bourgs fortifiés et villages musulmans (16).

Considérons maintenant ce que cette région fut autrefois. En quittant T'ouen Houang (17), on trouve l'ancien Yu Men et l'ancien Yang Kouan (18) : ces deux passes dépen-

ancienne capitale de la Dzoungarie, elle est aujourd'hui la résidence du gouverneur du Sin K'iang.

(11) Ouch, sous-préfecture indépendante (ting).

(12) A Ko Sou ou Aksou, nom administratif : Wen Siou fou.

(13) Ping Ling, contrefort du T'ien Chan occidental.

(14) P'ou Tch'ang hai, ou Lo P'ou Tch'ao Eul, est le Lob Nor.

(15) Nous avons ici un exemple caractéristique des erreurs géographiques des Chinois ; celle-ci se retrouve dans tous leurs ouvrages et est absolument classique ; or on sait que le Lob Nor a une altitude inférieure au niveau de la mer et, à fortiori, à tout le cours du Fleuve Jaune.

(16) Cet édit, qui raconte la campagne de 1690-1696 dans laquelle l'empereur Cheng Tsou soumit les Tch'ouen K'o Eul ou Dzoungars, est gravé sur une stèle dans le Wen Miao de Tch'eng tou, à côté de la stèle relative aux Musulmans, dont nous donnons plus loin la reproduction.

(17) Touen Houang est le Daxata des anciens ; aujourd'hui sous-préfecture dépendant de Cha tcheou.

(18) Yu Men et Yang Kouan. Ces deux passes ont été à toute époque les deux portes du bassin du Târim.

dent aujourd'hui de la sous-préfecture de T'ouen Houang; il y avait au sud-ouest des ruines, actuellement disparues. Si on va vers l'ouest, on arrive à Ha Mi, ancien I Ou (19); on évite ainsi Pai Long Toei, endroit dangereux du grand Ko Pi (20). On passe par P'i Tchen (21), ancien Chan Chan appelé aussi Leou Lan, et on arrive à Tourfan, ancien Kiu Cheu (22), où furent installées les premières tribus gouvernées par les « kiao yu » (23) des Han, et qui continua à dépendre de la Chine sous le nom de Kiao Ho sous les T'ang, et de Houo tcheou (24) sous les Ming. Après l'abandon de Kiu Cheu, l'administration sous-préfectorale fut transportée dans la localité appelée aujourd'hui Ou Lou Mou Tsi. En continuant vers l'ouest on passe par l'ancien territoire de Wei Siu Yen Ki (25) et on arrive à Kiu Eul Tch'ou Kiun T'ai, le Ou Lei tch'eng des Han (26), qui était sous l'administration du « tou houo » (27); puis on arrive à Pou Kou Eul (28), territoire de Lun T'ai des Han. Vers le sud-ouest on trouve K'ou Tch'e (29), ancien K'oei Tse, dépendant de la préfecture de Ngan Si sous les T'ang. Au nord en passant par les villes de Sai Li Mou et Pai (30),

(19) Cf. note 4.

(20) Le désert de Gobi.

(21) Pays de Pidjan, occupé sous les Han par les tribus des Leou Lan, qui servaient d'espions aux Huns du nord contre les Chinois.

(22) Capitale d'une ancienne colonie militaire des Han qui fut organisée pour la première fois par le général Tcheng Ki, qui conquiert ce pays sur les Leou Lan en 67 avant Jésus-Christ. Voir note 8.

(23) Ce nom désigne les officiers qui, sous les Han antérieurs, dépendaient des *tou yu* ou *commandants*.

(24) Kiao Ho, nom de Kiu Cheu sous les T'ang. Cette ville devint sous les Ming, Houo tcheou que l'on orthographie aussi Ha la ho tchao, transcription de Karakodjo.

(25) Aujourd'hui Karachar.

(26) Localité non loin de Karachar.

(27) Si yu tou houo, préfet des pays d'Occident, était le titre donné au fonctionnaire chinois administrant cette région. Ce titre fut donné en 91 après Jésus-Christ au célèbre général Pan Tch'ao.

(28) Aujourd'hui Boukour, près de Karachar.

(29) Aujourd'hui Koutchar.

(30) Aujourd'hui Sairim et Bai.

on arrive à A K'o Sou (31). La région occidentale de Pai est l'ancien pays de Mo (32) des Han. De A K'o Sou, ancien Wen Siou Kouo des Han, partent trois routes : celle du Nord vers Ouch, le Yu (Wei) T'eou des Han, dont tout le Nord-Ouest est occupé par les P'ou Lou T'e (33). La route du Sud-Ouest conduit à Ye Eul K'iang, le Souo Kiu des Han (34), puis, allant vers le sud, elle franchit le fleuve Wang et arrive à Yu Tien (35). La troisième route, longeant la rive du fleuve Ou Lan, s'écarte vers l'ouest et arrive à Ko Che Ko Eul (36), ancien Chou Lei.

C'est des dynasties Han et T'ang (37) que date l'organisation des pays de l'Occident (de l'empire). En dehors de ceux-ci, les petits pays du Nord-Ouest, tels que Siun Sieou, Kiuen Tou, Pan Touo (38), etc., tous sont d'une manière générale occupés par les diverses tribus des Pou Lou T'e actuels qui entourent le territoire des Mahométans. Mais, ces pays n'ayant pas de chef, on n'en connaît pas le nombre exact. Quant à tous les petits royaumes du Sud, comme Kiue Lei, Tsing Kiue, Jong Lou, Siao Wan (39), etc., cités par l'histoire des Han, ils ont disparu dans les sables sans laisser de trace. L'opinion (généralement admise) est qu'ils ont été ensablés par le Han Hai (40), comme les villes de Ho Lao et de Lao Kia (41). Les grands sables s'étendent sur une longueur de plus de deux mille lis et les

(31) Aujourd'hui Aksou.

(32) Pays de Mo ou de Mei.

(33) Les P'ou lou t'e ou Bouroutes, appelés aussi Kirghiz noirs.

(34) Yarkhend, ancien Souo Kiu.

(35) Khotan.

(36) Kachgar.

(37) La dynastie des Han antérieurs s'étend de 202 avant Jésus-Christ à l'an 8 après Jésus-Christ; celle des Han postérieurs s'étend de 25 à 221 après Jésus-Christ.

La dynastie des T'ang s'étend de 620 à 907.

(38) Anciens noms de territoires qui dépendaient autrefois des Parthes, des Arsacides, etc.

(39) Anciens noms de territoires autrefois dépendants des Sogdiens.

(40) Han Hai est le nom chinois de la partie centrale de la Mongolie.

(41) Ho Lao et Lao Kia sont deux noms de villes que je n'ai pu identifier.



sables mouvants transforment tout, en sorte que la région d'aujourd'hui ne ressemble plus à celle d'autrefois.

Les frontières des Mahométans ont plus de six mille lis de l'est à l'ouest et plus de mille du nord au sud. A l'ouest, au sud et au nord, le pays est borné par de hautes montagnes. Toutes ces régions, qui étaient bouddhistes avant les T'ang (620), furent influencées par le mahométisme; celui-ci naquit et se développa sous les Soei (42) et les T'ang et devint très florissant à la suite des Yuan. Le pays de l'ancêtre des Musulmans était le T'ien Fang (43); à plusieurs milliers de lis à l'ouest du Tsong Ling se trouvaient les deux pays de Mo Te et de Mo K'o (44). Durant les dynasties Soei et T'ang, un prince du pays, Mo Han Mou Te (45), naquit. Doué d'une intelligence remarquable, il subjuga tous les pays des frontières d'Occident et se mit à balayer le Bouddhisme et à fonder sa religion. Il composa un livre de prières en trente chapitres; il vénérât le ciel, lui rendait un culte religieux et pratiquait le jeûne et l'abstinence. Tous les pays à l'ouest du Tsong Ling le vénéraient comme envoyé du ciel, ce qui, en langue des Hoei, se dit : *Pié-nan-pa-eul* ou encore *P'ai-han-pa-eul* (46). Ce titre, à la vingt-sixième génération, fut transmis à Ma Mo T'e (47). Pendant les dernières années des Ming (48), Ma Mo T'e et ses frères se rendirent dans toutes les contrées. C'est de l'époque où, quittant Mo Te, il franchit le Tsong Ling et, progressant vers l'est, s'établit à Ko Che

(42) On sait que tous les ouvrages chinois placent sous la dynastie des Soei (589-620) l'entrée de l'Islamisme en Chine, alors que l'Hégire eut lieu seulement en 622, et que par conséquent les premiers Musulmans n'ont pu arriver dans l'empire du Milieu que sous les T'ang (620-907).

(43) Nom chinois de l'Arabie.

(44) Ces deux noms sont vraisemblablement ceux de Médine et de la Mecque, quoique la transcription plus souvent usitée pour Médine soit Mo Te Na.

(45) Mohammed ou Mahomet.

(46) Transcriptions chinoises du persan Peighember, prophète.


(47) Transcription de Mahmoud.

(48) La chute de la dynastie des Ming eut lieu en 1644.

K'o Eul — Kachgar — que date l'origine de l'installation de chefs Hoei au Sin Kiang. Il fut le trisaïeul de Ho Tsi Tchan et de son frère aîné (49). Les anciens *Khans* des tribus Hoei étaient les descendants de Ha Sa T'ai, second fils de T'ai Tsou (50) de la dynastie des Yuan qui avait été nommé chef à titre héréditaire des tribus Hoei. Lorsque Ma Mo T'e venant des pays d'Occident arriva, les populations de toutes les villes des Hoei le suivirent en foule (51). Ensuite les Ai Lou T'e (52), devenus très puissants, asser-

(49) Ho Tsi Tchan (K'odzidchan) et Pou Na Touen (Boronidou), son frère aîné, sont les chefs des Hoei dans la campagne dont on va lire le récit.

Le *Cheng wou Ki* donne dans le chapitre précédent (livre IV, chap. II, p. 19, v<sup>o</sup>) leur généalogie jusqu'à Mahmoud et leur descendance; nous la reproduisons ci-dessous, parce que plusieurs de leurs ancêtres seront nommés dans le récit.



Le *Si yu t'ou tche* (géographie des pays d'Occident) donne toute l'ascendance jusqu'à Mahomet par Ali; on la trouvera dans les *Documents sur l'Asie centrale*, de M. Imbault-Huart; elle concorde médiocrement avec celle-ci.

(50) Le deuxième fils de l'empereur T'ai Tsou des Yuan (Gengiskhan) est ordinairement appelé Djagatai. Il est probable qu'il s'agit ici du même personnage, dont le nom mongol est transcrit différemment. Peut-être y a-t-il eu inversion de caractères et faudrait-il lire Sa Ha T'ai.

(51) Il semblerait, d'après tout ce passage, que le nom de Hoei était porté par les tribus dès avant leur conversion à l'Islam, ce qui corrobore l'opinion que les Hoei seraient les descendants des anciens Hoei Hou ou Oïgours, qui leur auraient légué ce nom de Hoei, ou même des « Trente-six Etats sédentaires » (Voir note 6).

(52) Les Eleuths, appelés aujourd'hui Kalmouks ou Mongols occidentaux. Après avoir subjugué la région nord des monts Célestes, y compris les territoires du I Li actuel, les khans des Eleuths fondèrent au dix-septième siècle un empire très menaçant pour la Chine. Après des guerres incessantes, il fut enfin détruit, en 1757, par le général Tchao Hoei, qui va être le héros de l'expédition contre les Musulmans que nous racontons. Les Dzoungars, dont

virent les Khans descendants des (empereurs de la dynastie des) Yuan et les transportèrent au Nord des T'ien Chan, où ils demeurèrent. Les tribus Hœi et Ha Sa K'o (53) leur furent soumises. Les Ha Sa K'o nomades fournissaient des chevaux en tribut et les villes Hœi étaient réparties sous l'autorité des *Ngang Ki* (54), qui percevaient les taxes, exigeaient les corvées et envoyaient les chefs suivant la religion des Hœi comme otages au I Li.

A la 35<sup>e</sup> année K'ang Hi (1696), après la défaite de Ko Eul T'an (55), un des chefs Hœi déporté au I Li, nommé A Pou Tou Che T'e (56), vint de la région qui lui avait été assignée comme pâturages faire sa soumission (à la Chine). L'empereur Cheng Tsou (57), en fut très satisfait et le traita bien ; il lui donna une escorte qui dans son retour à Yarkhend devait l'accompagner jusqu'à Ha Mi. Cet homme était le grand-père des frères Ho Tsi Tchan. Son fils Ma Han Mou T'e ayant voulu constituer lui-même une tribu indépendante, Galdan Tch'e Ling fonda sur lui et le fit prisonnier, en même temps qu'il obligeait ses deux fils à rester comme otages et envoyait plusieurs milliers des familles Hœi cultiver les terres et en payer les taxes.

il est fréquemment parlé dans ce récit, étaient une fraction de la confédération des Eleuths.

(53) Les Hassaks (origine des Cosaques), ou Kirgiz, que les Chinois identifient avec les K'ang Kiu de l'antiquité (probablement le Kankar des géographes européens). En 1757 leur Khan fit hommage de vassalité à la Chine. Leur territoire est limité, d'après l'auteur chinois Song Yun, au nord par les possessions russes et au sud-ouest par le territoire des Bourouts. Leurs rois sont appelés *pih*, correspondant aux *begs*. Les chefs sont appelés *othok*.

(54) Les Ngang Ki étaient les chefs particuliers de chacune des hordes des Eleuth ; ils étaient au nombre de vingt et un.

(55) Galdan, Khan des Eleuths, contre lequel l'empereur en personne dirigea deux campagnes de 1690 à 1696. Il mourut en 1696. Ne pas le confondre avec Tch'e Ling Galdan, dont il sera question un peu plus bas. Celui-ci fut khan des Eleuths de 1727 à 1745 ; il détruisit plusieurs armées chinoises.

(56) Abdou Ched, fils de Mahmoud (Voir note 49).

(57) Cheng Tsou, nom de l'empereur de la présente dynastie, dont le nom de règne est K'ang Hi (1662-1723).

L'aîné des fils s'appelait Pou Na Touen ou encore Pou Lo Gni Tou et le second, Ho Tsi Tchan. On les appelait aussi Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné et Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune (58).

Pendant l'été de la vingtième année K'ien Long — 1755 — l'armée impériale conquiert le I Li, délivra Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné et lui donna des troupes qui l'escortèrent durant son retour à Yarkhend où il allait gouverner ses anciennes tribus, tandis que Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune était retenu au I Li, et bien traité, pour que, résidant dans cette région, il fût chargé de l'administration des Hoei. Lors de la révolte du rebelle A (Mou Eull Sa Na), le I Li fut en pleine effervescence. Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, ayant pris le commandement de ses troupes, soutint le rebelle dans sa lutte contre les *t'ai ki* et les *tsai sang* (59) dévoués à l'Empire. Au bout d'une année l'armée impériale avait de nouveau pacifié l'I Li et Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune s'était enfui retournant (dans son pays). Tout d'abord, il ne sut quel parti prendre. Le tsiang kiun (60) commandant nos troupes envoya le che wei (61) Touo Lun T'ai établir des taxes dans le pays ; mais cet officier ne put faire une convention ferme à ce sujet. Alors le tsiang kiun Tchao Hoei dans un nouveau mémoire au Trône demanda

(58) Les auteurs européens appellent ces deux personnages : le Grand et le Petit Kodja. Mais Kodja (théologien) s'applique assez mal à la personnalité des Hotchous Mou, et plus mal encore à la transcription chinoise. M BLOCHET propose soit *Kutchum* « Puissance », titre turk, soit plus probablement Khodjèm « Mon seigneur ». (Voir à l'Appendice.)

(59) Les *t'ai ki*, transcription du mot *Taidji*, étaient des nobles héréditaires prétendant descendre des fondateurs de la domination mongole ou des Khans et princes des diverses tribus.

Les *tsai sang* sont les titres correspondants aux *t'ai ki* chez les Eleuths.

Les *taidji* étaient divisés en quatre classes correspondant aux quatre premiers degrés mandarinaux chinois. Un *taidji* pouvait être commandant d'une bannière, auquel cas il portait le titre de *Dzassak*.

(60) Maréchal tartare. Il s'agit ici de Tchao Hoei.

(61) Les *che wei* sont des officiers de la garde impériale mandchoue ; ils ont quatre degrés correspondants au troisième, quatrième, cinquième et sixième degré mandarinal chinois. A Min T'ou est plus généralement appelé A Min Tao, ainsi qu'on le verra dans la stèle de Tch'eng tou.

l'envoi du fou tou t'ong (62) A Min T'ou, qui serait chargé de gouverner le pays par la douceur. C'était au début du retour de Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune. Les deux frères avaient discuté ensemble leurs projets : l'aîné voulait avec toutes ses tribus exécuter les ordres de la Cour du Fils du Ciel et préconisait le maintien dans le devoir, tandis que le cadet, qui avait auparavant prêté aide et assistance au rebelle A (Mou Eull Sa Na), se méfiait du danger : « Si nous obéissons aux ordres de la Cour, disait-il, elle exigera que l'un de nous reste à la capitale comme otage, ainsi que l'ont fait les Dzoungars. Nos ancêtres ont, des générations durant, reçu les ordres des autres. Aujourd'hui heureusement nos puissants voisins sont déjà anéantis, il n'est rien qui nous puisse empêcher (d'agir à notre guise). Si nous ne profitons pas de ce moment pour fonder un empire, nous serons longtemps encore esclaves des autres. Ne pensez pas que l'Empire du Milieu ayant conquis récemment les tribus Dzoungares soit menaçant pour nous, mais au contraire, cette conquête n'étant pas assurée, son armée ne peut venir (nous attaquer). Si elle venait toutefois, j'occuperais les points importants et l'arrêteraï ; les convois d'approvisionnement en vivres et en argent n'arrivant pas, il ne serait nul besoin de combat pour vaincre l'armée (63) ». Le plan fut aussitôt arrêté. Ayant réuni *po k'o, a houen* (64) et autres, Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune se nomma Pa T'ou Eul Han (65). Il transmit l'ordre à toutes les villes de rassembler des soldats et des chevaux en grand nombre, de cons-

(62) Le fou tou t'ong est le vice-généralissime d'une bannière ; il est du deuxième degré, premier ordre.

(63) Ce discours de Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune rappelle que Tch'e Ling Galdan avait imposé tous les Mahométans et réparti leur pays en territoires qu'il avait distribués à ses vingt et un Ngang Ki ou chefs. Ho Tchouo Mou, fait prisonnier, fut gardé en otage par le roi et tous ses officiers furent donnés comme esclaves aux chefs des Eleuths. *Kang Kien Keng Mou*, K'ien Long (vingt-troisième année).

(64) Begs et akhoun (ou ahong) ; ces derniers sont les desservants des mosquées.

(65) Batour Khan.

tituer des approvisionnements considérables en grains et en armes pour être prêt. Les familles Hœi au nombre de plusieurs centaines de mille suivirent l'exemple donné (par leurs chefs). Mais, dans les trois villes de Koutchar, Paï tch'eng et Aksou, le po k'o a k'i mou (66) Neue Toei et autres, qui tous avaient supporté les rigueurs de Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, intimidés par l'imposante apparence des troupes impériales, s'enfuirent à I Li. Tchao Hœi ordonna alors à Neue Toei de suivre A Min T'ou à la tête de 2.000 soldats Eleuths et d'aller (attaquer les rebelles) sous prétexte de tournée pour percevoir le tribut en grains et en fourrages. Ils étaient en route vers Koutchar quand Neue Toei et autres apprirent que leurs familles (restées dans la région occupée par Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune), avaient été massacrées par lui en représailles; que toutes les villes lui obéissaient et que, de plus, A P'ou Tou, l'homme de confiance de Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, occupait déjà Koutchar avec ses troupes. Neue Toei demanda à retourner en toute hâte pour attendre la grande armée et reprendre ensuite la campagne. A Min T'ou, se séparant de Neue Toei, partit précipitamment, avec 100 soldats mandchous, pour Koutchar et fut massacré, tandis que Neue Toei et ses troupes Eleuths retournaient rapidement en arrière.

L'Empereur apprit ces événements au moment où Tchao Hœi venait de mener à bonne fin la tâche de rechercher et d'anéantir les Eleuths. Il nomma Ya Eul Ha Chan (67), *tsing i tsiang kiun*. A la cinquième lune de la vingt-troisième année (1758), à la tête d'une armée sino-mandchoue de plus de 10.000 hommes, avec Neue Toei comme lieutenant, il partit de T'ou Lou Fan — Tourfan — pour aller attaquer K'ou Tch'e — Koutchar. — A cette nouvelle, les

(66) Beg et akim; ce dernier titre correspond à inspecteur général.

(67) Il reçut le titre de *tsing i tsiang kiun*, c'est-à-dire maréchal pacificateur des Barbares.

frères Ho Tchouo Mou, à la tête de 10.000 hommes de troupes armés de fusils dits *ou ts'iang*, vinrent de Aksou au secours de Koutchar par le Ko Pi (Gobi) qui est le plus court chemin.

A la sixième lune, Ngai Long A (68), ayant le titre de *ling toei ta tch'en*, et autres rencontrèrent l'ennemi à moitié chemin et lui livrèrent bataille. On lui tua d'abord 3.000 hommes du corps d'avant-garde à Ho T'ouo Ting. Le 16 (de cette même lune), on captura ou tua encore 1.600 hommes aux alentours de la ville, au Neue Ken Ho (69) ; on lui ravit ses grands étendards et lui coupa sa ligne de retraite. Les frères Ho Tchouo Mou, réunissant les 800 hommes qui restaient, pénétrèrent à Koutchar pour la défendre. Notre armée fut alors dans la joie de ce que les deux chefs des rebelles se jetaient d'eux-mêmes dans le filet, ce qui permettrait de les prendre et de les exécuter. Neue Toei dit : « Les rebelles n'ont certainement pas de complices (qui puissent venir les secourir) ; aussi, si nous assiégeons la ville, ils seront dans l'obligation de s'enfuir. Or, en cas de fuite, ils peuvent prendre deux routes. La première, partant à l'ouest de la ville, passe le gué peu profond du Wei Tsien ho. La seconde, par le Pei Chan K'euo (70), se dirige vers Aksou et le Gobi. Je vous invite à mettre en embuscade à ces deux passages importants un millier de soldats pour y attendre (les fugitifs) ». Ya Eul Ha Chan ne fit pas de préparatifs. Toute la journée jouant aux échecs, il ne surveilla pas les murs de la ville.

Le 24, vers le soir, il arriva que les troupes de Souo Luen (71) perçurent une rumeur semblable aux cris des

(68) Ngai Long A était *ling toei ta tch'en*, c'est-à-dire grand dignitaire commandant en chef. Il y en eut huit répartis dans les places les plus importantes du Turkestan.

(69) Le fleuve Neue Ken.

(70) Mot à mot la passe des montagnes du Nord.

(71) Souo Luen, c'est-à-dire Solon, ville de la province de Hei Long Kiang (Mandchourie). Les troupes de Souo Luen, c'est-à-dire : les troupes mandchoues.

chameaux sur lesquels on replace les charges et qui s'éloignent (72). En toute hâte ils prévinrent le tsiang kiun, mais celui-ci ne les crut pas. Ce fut cette nuit, précisément, que les deux chefs rebelles et le beg Abdou sortirent hâtivement avec 400 cavaliers par la porte de l'Ouest et s'enfuirent par le Pei Chan K'eou. Et le fou tou t'ong Chouen Te Na qui gardait la porte de l'Ouest, quand cette nouvelle lui parvint au crépuscule, n'envoya pas lui non plus, de troupes. Ce ne fut que le lendemain matin qu'il expédia à leur poursuite une centaine d'hommes qui, arrivés au Neue Ken Ho, trouvèrent le pont coupé. Dans la suite le tsiang kiun accusa Chouen Te Na et rejeta la faute sur lui. En même temps il poussait avec énergie l'attaque de la ville, qui, assise au sommet d'une colline, était munie de remparts faits de terre sablonneuse et de branches de saules dans lesquels les projectiles des canons ne pouvaient pénétrer. Le ti tou (73) Ma Te Cheng chargea les soldats du Lou Ing (74) de creuser le sol pour y pratiquer un chemin souterrain. Nuit et jour, ils travaillaient avec ardeur et sans répit. Ils n'étaient plus qu'à une vingtaine de pieds du rempart, lorsque les rebelles occupant celui-ci, ayant jeté leurs regards de leur côté, aperçurent, sous terre, la lumière des lampes réfléchiée à l'extérieur du fossé. Ils y jetèrent de la paille pour y mettre le feu et nos hommes, au nombre de 600 environ, furent brûlés. Cette fois encore une accusation fut portée contre le ti tou et la faute fut rejetée sur lui. Aucun des officiers incriminés ne sollicita qu'il fut délibéré et statué sur le châtement qu'il méritait.

A la huitième lune, le chef musulman occupant la ville (Abdou) s'enfuit lui aussi pendant la nuit. Tous les défen-

(72) Ou bien : la rumeur décroissante des cris des chameaux dont on replace les charges.

(73) Le grade de ti tou correspond à celui de général de division.

(74) Lou Ing, litt. Troupes de l'étendard vert. Nom donné avant 1903 aux troupes provinciales de Chine.



seurs restant ouvrirent les portes et firent leur soumission.

L'Empereur, voulant montrer sa sévérité et sa colère, fit mettre à mort Ya Eul Ha chan, Chouen Te Na, Ma Te Cheng, afin que la nouvelle, s'en répandant partout, servît d'exemple pour l'avenir. En même temps, il mettait à mort le tsan ts'an Ha Ning A (75). C'est à ce moment que le tsang kiun Tchao Hoei, ayant reçu ordre de venir à la capitale, demanda à rester à l'armée pour terminer les affaires de l'Ouest. L'Empereur le félicita et lui ordonna de conduire son armée au Sud.

C'était l'époque où les deux Ho Tchouo Mou s'étaient enfuis à Aksou. Le beg Ho Ki Seu, qui avait précédemment capturé et livré Ta Wa Tsi (76), ferma les portes et ne les reçut pas; mais, usant de fourberie, il les engagea à se rendre à Ouch qui refusa de les accueillir. Alors Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune s'enfuit à Yarkhend, et Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné à Kachgar. Tchao Hoei envoya Neue Toei occuper Ho Tien — Khotan — et Ho Ki Seu suivit l'armée. Comme la concentration de toutes les troupes n'était pas encore faite, Neue Toei emmena seulement 4.000 hommes de cavalerie et d'infanterie pour commencer les opérations, laissant le fou tsiang kiun Fou Te poursuivre les débris des rebelles, en attendant la concentration de la grande armée pour entrer ensuite en ligne.

Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune avait déjà construit un mur et dévasté les environs (de Yarkhend), il avait coupé les moissons et rassemblé la population dans la ville, afin que l'armée impériale ne trouvât rien à piller. De plus, près de la

(75) Ha Ning A était *ts'an tsan ta tch'en*, c'est-à-dire vice-gouverneur militaire. Il y eut trois fonctionnaires de ce titre, répartis à Ili, Tarbagatai et Yarkhend (Meyers).

(76) Ta Wa Tsi — Davatsi —, petit-fils de Tch'eling Galdan, succéda à son aïeul, grâce à Amoursana. Mais il fut si peu reconnaissant envers son protecteur que celui-ci vint à la Cour, en 1754, demander contre lui le secours d'une armée chinoise. Ta Wa Tsi s'étant enfui fut livré par Ho Ki Seu, le commandant de la place, et conduit prisonnier à Péking.

ville, à cinq lis au nord-est, il creusa un fossé et éleva des retranchements en terre, dans l'espoir de nous retenir longtemps et de nous épuiser. Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné avait (de son côté) occupé K'o Eul — Kachgar —, tous deux formaient comme les deux cornes d'un même animal (77).

Le 6 de la dixième lune, l'armée arrivée à Yarkhend se déploya à l'est de la ville, et les troupes des deux ailes commencèrent par attaquer et prendre les retranchements établis par Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune. Les rebelles lancèrent contre nous plusieurs centaines de cavaliers des plus résolus, qui par les trois portes de l'est, de l'ouest et du nord vinrent faire l'épreuve de nos forces, dans trois attaques qui furent trois défaites, à la suite desquelles les ennemis se réfugièrent dans la ville et s'y établirent solidement pour n'en plus sortir. Cette ville était vaste ; elle avait plus de dix lis (de tour) et était percée de douze portes réparties sur ses quatre faces. Tchao Hœi, par suite du petit nombre de ses soldats, ne pouvant l'attaquer, résolut d'attendre un moment (propice). Par extraordinaire un ancien camp se trouvait là. Situé à l'est de la ville dont le fleuve le séparait, ce camp offrait des ressources en eau et en pâturage. Le camp des Impériaux y fut solidement établi. Le fleuve coulant au nord du Tsong Ling passe à l'extérieur de Kachgar ; celui du sud passe à l'extérieur de Yarkhend. Les habitants de la région dénomment Tche Chœi Ho (78) le fleuve du nord et Hei Chœi Ho (79) celui du sud ; aussi ce camp fut-il appelé Hei Chœi Ing. — Dans la langue des Hœi rouge se dit *ou lan*, noir se dit *ha lan*, rivière se dit *ou sou* (79 bis).

(77) Expression exprimant l'idée de se prêter un mutuel appui comme les deux cornes d'un même animal.

(78) Le fleuve aux eaux rouges.

(79) Le fleuve aux eaux noires, dont le camp portait le nom.

(79 bis) *Oulan*, et *ousou* sont les mots signifiant rouge et rivière en mongol. *Halan*, peut-être *Khara*, bien que ce ne soit pas la transcription ordinaire (Note de M. BLOCHET). On voit qu'on aurait tort de traduire : Dans la langue des Musulmans.

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Tchao Hoei, prélevant 800 hommes de ses troupes, envoya le fou tou tong Ngai Long A occuper Kachgar et sauvegarder les communications. Puis, ayant appris par ses espions que les troupes ennemis paissaient au sud de la ville, au pied du Ing Ki P'an Chan (80), il forma le projet de franchir le fleuve et de s'en emparer, pour assurer la nourriture de ses troupes. Le treizième jour, laissant une garde au camp de Hei Choei, il se dirigea de l'est au sud, à la tête de 1.000 cavaliers : 400 cavaliers avaient à peine passé le fleuve que le pont se rompit soudain. Les rebelles, au nombre de 5.000 cavaliers, sortant de la ville, viennent nous couper la retraite. Les troupes impériales, déployant toute leur énergie, s'efforcent de rompre leurs cohortes, mais une myriade de fantassins ennemis survenant rend l'avantage aux cavaliers, qui nous cernent de leurs deux ailes et attaquent nos derrières. Notre armée séparée par le fleuve ne peut nous secourir ; de plus, les terrains marécageux retardent la marche. Enfin, combattant et reculant, nous retournons au camp en passant le fleuve à la nage. Pendant la marche, plusieurs sections furent arrêtées par les ennemis, et les hommes combattirent isolément jusqu'au soir. Nous tuâmes plus de 1.000 ennemis, et beaucoup de leurs chevaux s'enlizèrent dans les marais. L'armée impériale du sud avait, tant officiers que soldats, plus de 100 morts et plusieurs centaines de blessés. Tchao Hoei se précipitait avec impétuosité de tous côtés, son cheval ; déjà atteint d'un coup de feu, ayant reçu de nouvelles blessures, dut être changé. Ming Joei, lui aussi fut, blessé. Le tsong ping Kao T'ien Hi (81) et d'autres moururent en combattant.

L'ennemi, franchissant le fleuve de nouveau, vint nous attaquer. Cinq jours durant, du matin au soir, nos troupes combattirent en construisant des retranchements. Les

(80) Montagne près de Ing Ki Cha Eul-Yenghi-Hissar.

(81) Le grade de tsong ping correspond à celui de général de brigade.

rebelles, eux aussi, construisaient un grand ouvrage pour nous enfermer. Pendant la nuit du dix-septième jour, Tchao Hoei envoya à Aksou, par des chemins différents, cinq soldats chargés de faire connaître sa détresse. Chou Ho Te donna ordre d'envoyer des secours immédiats.

Les rebelles avaient, en amont du fleuve, pratiqué des ouvertures (dans la berge) pour inonder le camp (impérial), mais nos troupes ayant creusé des rigoles firent écouler les eaux. Le camp était adossé à une forêt dans laquelle les projectiles des canons et des fusils tombaient comme la pluie ; nos hommes abattirent les arbres et en retirèrent plusieurs myriades de balles de plomb qu'ils employèrent dans la lutte. A ce moment les Pou Lou T'e s'emparèrent de Kachgar. Notre armée, donnant libre cours à sa fureur, attaqua et incendia le camp de l'ennemi. Les rebelles soupçonnant qu'il y avait une convention entre notre armée et les Pou Lou T'e, Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné chargea des envoyés de venir négocier une trêve (ou un traité de paix). Mais Tchao Hoei, retenant prisonniers les envoyés, décocha vers l'ennemi une flèche portant une lettre disant qu'il fallait d'abord livrer Ho Tsi Tchan enchaîné et qu'ensuite il consentirait à accepter les articles d'un traité ; puis il creusa des puits pour avoir de l'eau, et les silos pour y trouver des grains (82), de sorte que trois mois durant l'armée ne fut pas sans ressources. Les rebelles effrayés regardaient Tchao Hoei comme un génie (83).

L'Empereur considérant que les deux armées de Tchao Hoei et de Fou To étaient depuis longtemps au dehors exposées au soleil et à la rosée (84) ; que leurs officiers et

(82) Les Chinois ont l'habitude de creuser dans le sol des excavations analogues aux *silos* d'Algérie, dans lesquelles ils conservent, l'hiver, les provisions qui craignent le froid et, l'été, celles qui craignent la chaleur. En cas de troubles, ces cachettes servent à dissimuler quantité d'objets que l'on veut soustraire à la cupidité des pillards.

(83) Cette expression peut aussi se comprendre dans le sens de : furent étonnés de ce qu'ils considéraient comme un prodige.

(84) Cette phrase est une citation de l'ouvrage appelé *Tchan Kouo Tch'e*.

soldats étaient tous exténués de fatigue depuis deux mois, ordonna au tsing i tsiang kiun Na Mou Tcha Eul (85) et au ts'an tsan San Ko (86) d'aller remplacer les deux chefs. Il fit en outre envoyer les troupes de Souo Luen et Tch'a Ha Eul (87) à l'armée d'opération. Il arriva que, Tchao Hoei ayant ordonné par dépêche à Ngai Long A de se mettre à la tête de ses troupes et de retourner à Aksou pour faire presser l'armée de secours, ce général rencontra le tsing i tsiang kiun et autres. Ceux-ci se lancèrent en avant avec 200 cavaliers, mais sans succès, car ils subirent un échec de plus.

Fou To était au Pei Lou lorsqu'il apprit le siège et la situation critique de Hei Choei. Aussitôt il envoya plus de 2.000 hommes des troupes de Souo Luen et de Tch'a Ha Eul arrivées récemment, ainsi que 1.000 hommes des troupes du Pei Lou, qui, bravant la neige, accoururent à la rescousse.

Le 6 de la première lune de la vingt-quatrième année K'ien Long (1759), il arriva à Hou Eul Man où il rencontra 5.000 cavaliers ennemis. Il avança en combattant dans une suite de rencontres, qui durèrent pendant quatre jours du matin au soir. Dans ces immensités sablonneuses, l'eau manquant, on mangeait de la glace pour étancher la soif. Les cavaliers fatigués et la moitié des fantassins arrivèrent le neuvième jour à la rivière de Yarkhend qu'ils franchirent. Ils étaient encore à 300 lis de distance de l'armée de Hei Choei, lorsque les ennemis, très supérieurs en nombre,

« Général, vous avez longtemps été au dehors, exposé au soleil et à la rosée. »  
(85) Namoutchar, qui avait reçu le titre de maréchal pacificateur des rebelles, ou *tsing i tsiang kiun*.

(86) San Ko avait le titre de sous-gouverneur militaire (ts'an tsan).

(87) Solon et Tchakhar. — Le Tchakhar est le territoire mongol à proximité de la grande muraille et le plus proche de la capitale impériale. Depuis sa soumission spontanée aux conquérants mandchous, le gouverneur du Tchakhar est, *ex officio*, contrôleur des routes postales pour le transport des dépêches officielles et l'escorte des fonctionnaires qui s'étendent entre la grande muraille et les monts Altaï, Kouroun, Ouliassoutari, etc. (Meyers). Il s'agit ici des troupes manchoues (Solon) et mongoles (Tchakhar).

les empêchèrent d'avancer. Précisément A Li Houen, grand dignitaire de Pa Li K'ouen, amenait, par ordre de l'empereur, 600 hommes, 2.000 cavaliers et 1.000 bêtes de somme, qui firent leur jonction avec les 1.000 hommes de Ngai Long A. La nuit venue, on apercevait la lueur des feux qui, à 10 lis au loin, indiquaient les emplacements que l'armée impériale et les rebelles occupaient respectivement.

Nos troupes allant attaquer le camp ennemi apprirent en route l'arrivée des secours qui s'avançaient en toute hâte ; elles déployèrent aussitôt leurs ailes en poussant de grands cris, dont les éclats se répandirent au loin jusqu'aux fortifications des ennemis qu'ils inquiétèrent. Nos troupes et celles de Fou To arrivant par trois routes, renforcées de celles de A Li K'ouen, attaquèrent avec ardeur les ennemis, qui, dans l'obscurité, ne sachant combien de myriades d'hommes comprenait l'armée impériale, s'entretuèrent mutuellement et s'enfuirent dans un désarroi complet. Cette armée ensuite, progressa avec hâte. Elle était encore à quelques dizaines de lis du camp de Hei Choei qu'elle battit l'ennemi de nouveau.

Tchao Hoei avait remarqué précédemment que le nombre des rebelles qui l'assiégeaient diminuait de jour en jour. De plus, le bruit des canons et des armes à feu qui s'entendait au loin, se rapprochait, venant de l'est ; le puits creusé dans le camp impérial venait de tarir lorsque parvint la nouvelle que les armées de secours avaient fait leur jonction. Nos soldats, pleins de courage, enveloppèrent les rebelles avec ardeur, tuèrent plus de 1.000 d'entre eux et réduisirent en cendres leurs fortifications. Après cette grande défaite, les rebelles rentrèrent dans la ville. Les deux armées ayant fait leur jonction, on fit cesser le combat et les troupes retournèrent à Aksou (88).

(88) Le *Hoang tch'ao ou kong ki cheng*, au sujet de cette bataille, dit (II, p. 70 verso, col. 13, et suiv.) :

« Fou to, apprenant que Tchao Hoei était assiégé, marcha rapidement.  
« Le 25 il fait sa jonction avec Chou Ho Te à Pa Eull Tcho'u K'o. Le 6 de la première lune de la vingt-troisième année (1758), rencontre à Hou Eul Man

Pendant la quatrième lune d'été de l'année suivante (1759), on envoya d'abord une armée secourir Ho Tien — Khotan — et l'on reprit les deux villes musulmanes tombées au pouvoir des rebelles (89).

A la sixième lune, une armée comprenant vingt mille hommes, trente mille chevaux et dix mille bêtes de somme se réunit à Aksou; en même temps, dans un rapport au trône, on préconisait l'échange de cotonnades contre les grains des Hoei, ce qui économiserait 300.000 onces d'argent en frais de transport. Puis l'armée s'avança par deux routes: Tchao Hoei de Ouch allait occuper Kachgar, et Fou To, parti de Khotan, allait occuper Yarkhend. Chacune des armées comprenait 25.000 hommes.

Les deux Ho Tchouo, considérant que depuis l'hiver dernier l'armée impériale avait livré, avec un nombre restreint de combattants, une série de batailles qui avaient coûté à l'ennemi un grand nombre de morts et que la terreur inspirée par l'Empereur durant ces quelques mois était semblable à celle du tonnerre, abandonnèrent alors la ville et, chassant devant eux hommes et troupeaux, franchirent le Tsong Ling et s'enfuirent vers l'ouest.

Autrefois les deux Ho Tchouo (Mou) étaient restés longtemps au Ili, et ils comptaient sur les milliers de cultivateurs musulmans pour arrêter les troupes en s'aidant entre eux et obliger celles-ci à la retraite. Mais les anciennes

de cinq mille cavaliers ennemis qui offrent le combat. Nos deux ou trois mille hommes avaient peu de chevaux; l'infanterie à coups de feu et à coups de flèches tua un grand nombre d'ennemis.

« A Li Kouen, Ngai Long A attaquaient à gauche; Neue Pou Che à droite.

« Les troupes de secours qui s'étaient réunies rapidement à celles de Fou Te profitèrent de l'occasion pour envelopper à l'improviste et tuer des ennemis, qui commencèrent à s'enfuir en grand nombre. L'ennemi, voyant que les armées venues par les deux routes étaient réunies et que nous avions le succès, n'osa plus nous attaquer. »

— Ce grand succès, il est bon de le remarquer, consista à battre en retraite.

(89) La ville de Khotan commandait à six autres villes, et l'armée reprit deux de ces villes, occupées précédemment par les rebelles.

tribus. au nombre de plusieurs centaines de mille de familles, se souvenant du passé, refusèrent de les reconnaître par crainte des conséquences. Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, persuadé que la tyrannie était nécessaire au gouvernement de la population, avait augmenté les taxes et s'était complu aux châtiments cruels. De plus, les Musulmans de l'Ili qui l'avaient accompagné dans son retour, ainsi que les Pou Lou T'e récemment soumis, constituaient sa garde particulière. C'est pourquoi, devant le mécontentement général, il s'enfuit. Les chefs des anciennes tribus accompagnèrent les deux frères. Ceux-ci désiraient aller au Pa Ta K'o Chan (90), tandis que leurs bandes voulaient se soumettre au Ngao Han (90 bis), où furent expédiés des ambassadeurs qui ne reçurent point de réponse. Alors, ils entrèrent dans le Pa Ta K'o Chan. Ming Joei, à la tête d'un millier de cavaliers d'avant-garde, les poursuivit; il les joignit et leur livra bataille au Houo Se K'ou Ling, où il tua cinq cents rebelles. Ce territoire est une ramification du Tsong Ling. On y trouve le Hei Long Tch'e (91), qui a plusieurs centaines de lis de tour et que, en langue des Hœi, on appelle Ha La Tch'ao Eul; c'est lui que les livres bouddhiques désignent sous le nom de A Neou Ta.

Le 7 de la septième lune, quatre mille cavaliers de l'armée impériale, poursuivant les rebelles arrivèrent au A Eul Tch'ou Chan (92). L'ennemi, emmenant bagages et femmes, s'enfuit, après avoir laissé en embuscade dans les vallées et les gorges six mille hommes résolus pour essayer de faire tomber les nôtres dans le piège. Mais notre armée solidement déployée avait pris ses précautions. Fou To, avec ses bataillons aguerris et courageux, pourvus d'armes

(90) Pa Ta K'o Chan est une des transcriptions du nom de Badakchan, qui est une ville située près des sources de l'Oxus, et dont le nom a été étendu à toute la région avoisinante.

(90 bis) Le Fergana.

(91) Lac du dragon noir. Ha La Tch'ao Eul, pour Karatchar ?).

(92) Montagne de Altchouk.



à feu, occupait le centre ; Ming Joei et A Koei (93) étaient à l'aile gauche ; A Li K'ouen et Pa Lou étaient à l'aile droite. Après avoir séparé les troupes et avoir formé deux fractions, l'une composée de soldats d'élite, l'autre des troupes de secours, et après avoir établi l'arrière-garde aussi solidement qu'un mur, on se mit en marche. Les soldats d'élite s'emparèrent d'abord des deux montagnes de droite et de gauche. En épiant ce qui se passait au-dessous d'eux, ils virent tous les rebelles qui se déployaient pour partir. Nos hommes en profitèrent pour les attaquer de trois côtés, puis ils les poursuivirent pendant plus de vingt lis, leur tuèrent plus de mille hommes et décapitèrent leur brave général Abdou et quelques autres. On captura un nombre incalculable de cuirasses, étendards et armes ; notre armée eut seulement un homme blessé.

Trois jours après on atteignit le I Si Eul Kou Ho (95), qui sert de frontière au Pa Ta K'o Chan. Les deux rives sont couvertes de montagnes appelées Ho Che Tchou K'o Ling. Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné commença par faire occuper par les siens la chaîne située à l'ouest du fleuve, dans le but de l'utiliser comme ligne de retraite. Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune avait envoyé une dizaine de mille hommes occuper les montagnes du Nord ainsi que les sommets de la chaîne orientée vers l'Est, décidé qu'il était à se battre jusqu'à la mort.

Fou To ordonna à A Li K'ouen et autres de se rendre de la rive sud (du fleuve) aux montagnes de l'ouest, tandis que lui-même attaquerait les rebelles des montagnes de l'est. Malgré son désir de combattre, le temps passait sans qu'il eût réussi ; aussi choisit-il quelques dizaines de soldats résolus qui, contournant le versant nord des montagnes, en gagnèrent le faite, d'où ils attaquèrent, tandis

(93) A Koei s'est rendu plus tard célèbre par ses expéditions contre les Sifans du Kin Tch'ouan et contre les Salars.

(95) Fleuve du Issik Koul.

que l'armée de A Li Hoen, des sommets de la rive sud, attaquerait de loin, au moyen de ses armes à feu, les rebelles établis au nord des montagnes. Le pied de celles-ci était couvert de forêts qui enserraient une rivière et parmi lesquelles un voyageur isolé pouvait à peine chevaucher. Les bagages des rebelles, leurs nombreuses familles l'encombraient, interceptant tout passage. Nos troupes partagées en deux corps occupaient les lignes de retraite, de sorte que les rebelles n'avaient plus d'issue pour fuir. Ordre fut donné à Neue Toei et Houo Tsi Seu de planter en terre les étendards musulmans (capturés précédemment), puis à grands cris les hommes exhortèrent l'ennemi à la soumission. Alors ceux qui se soumettaient quittèrent la montagne et descendirent dans un tumulte qui se répandit au loin comme le fracas du tonnerre. Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune en tua beaucoup de sa main, mais ne put les arrêter tous. Le nombre des Musulmans soumis s'éleva à douze mille et l'on captura plus de dix mille animaux.

Les deux Ho Tchouo Mou, emmenant leurs femmes, leurs enfants et leurs vieux serviteurs au nombre de trois à quatre cents personnes, s'enfuirent dans le Pa Ta K'o Chan.

Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune et ceux qui se pressaient autour de lui se dirigèrent tout d'abord vers l'ouest, son projet étant de fondre à l'improviste sur le pays de Pa Ta K'o Chan et de s'en emparer. Arrivé dans cette région, exaspéré de ce que le roi (du pays) ne fût pas venu en personne le recevoir, il mit à mort les envoyés de celui-ci et voulut confédérer les tribus voisines pour le punir. Mais le roi de Pa Ta K'o Chan leva des troupes pour organiser la résistance, attaqua (les rebelles) à A Eul Houen Tch'ou Ling et fit prisonniers les (deux) frères. Le tsiang kiun (Tchao Hoei) ordonna par dépêche de les enchaîner. Ils firent leur soumission dans une lettre adressée au général en chef.

[Cette année Ho Tsi Tchan seul écrivit une lettre pour

faire sa soumission. Quant à Pou Lo Gni Tou, tous ses trésors furent pris. En la vingt-huitième année (1763) (le roi de) Pa Ta K'o Chan envoya à Péking ses richesses ainsi que ses femmes et ses enfants pour les offrir à l'empereur (96)].

Les tribus Hoi étaient pacifiées.

Pendant la huitième lune, au jour de rang cyclique *keng ou*, un mémoire au trône annonça à Péking la nouvelle de la victoire, qui se répandit partout.

Tchao Hoi, qui, au moment de son investissement, avait déjà été honoré du titre de duc du premier degré et du titre de « guerrier aux desseins résolus et courageux », fut, en outre, gratifié à ce moment du rang officiel de « duc de la maison impériale », avec (droit à l'usage de) la bride et la selle (attribuées à ce rang) (97).

Fou Te, lorsqu'il commandait l'armée de secours, avait été honoré du titre de comte parfait et brave; il fut à ce moment promu marquis du premier degré.

Officiers et soldats, ainsi que les chefs musulmans qui s'étaient distingués par leur bravoure (tels que) O Min, Ho Tchouo, Houo Tsi Seu, Neue Toei, furent gratifiés de charges. Une stèle fut érigée dans la Grande École (97 bis), et chaque champ de bataille eut une inscription commémorative.

La deuxième lune de l'année suivante (1760), l'armée impériale, heureuse, rentra à la capitale.

L'empereur, en personne, alla féliciter (le vainqueur) à trois lis au sud de Leang Hiang Tch'eng (98); on construi-

(96) Le passage entre crochets est une réflexion de l'auteur chinois.

(97) Les princes, ducs, marquis, comtes, barons, etc., de l'Empire chinois ont droit à l'emploi d'une selle, d'une bride et d'un harnais de couleur déterminée suivant leur rang. Ces règles sont toujours en vigueur.

(97 bis) Il est sous-entendu : de Péking. C'est la reproduction de cette stèle que nous avons trouvée dans la Grande école de Tch'eng tou et dont nous donnons la traduction.

(98) Sous-préfecture à quelques milles au sud de Péking. La réception de

sit un tertre pour y mettre les étendards. L'empereur alla lui-même remercier le ciel. (A cette cérémonie) le tsiang kiun (Tchao Hoei), avec ses officiers, portant tous le casque et la cuirasse, ainsi que les princes, les ducs et les grands ministres, vinrent à leur tour faire des sacrifices. Une fois les cérémonies terminées, l'empereur se rendit à la tente impériale. Le tsiang kiun et les autres, se pressant en foule et à genoux, regardaient. Les pays à l'ouest du Tsong Ling, le Ngai Ou Han (99), les P'ou Lou T'e, le Ngao Han, les P'ou Louo Eul, le Ngan Tsi Yen (100), et toutes les régions du Pa Ta K'o Chan, avaient envoyé des ambassadeurs à la Cour. On désigna Kachgar comme résidence officielle du sous-gouverneur militaire, chargé de gouverner par la modération les villes de la région au sud (des monts Célestes). Dans chacune des grandes villes on institua un délégué impérial et un résident, chargé de la direction des troupes de garnison ; dans chacune des petites villes, on établit un ou deux hauts dignitaires chargés de la direction des troupes.

Les quatre villes de l'ouest étaient Kachgar, Yarkhend, Yangi hissar et Khotan ; les quatre villes de l'est étaient Ouch, Aksou, Koutchar et Pidjan. Dans la suite, considérant que les trois villes de Hami, Tourfan et Harachar, de la région Est, étaient habitées par des familles des frontières musulmanes, on y établit aussi des Pan cheu ta tch'en et des Ling toei ta tchen. Au total, onze villes. Chacune d'elles avait sous son autorité des villes (purement) musulmanes, soit cinq ou six, soit dix, soit vingt, en nombre indéterminé. Des begs akim (101) furent, pour chacune d'elles, chargés de l'administration des affaires musulmanes. Ils étaient fonctionnaires du troisième au sixième

Tchao Hoei par l'empereur se trouve rapportée en détail dans le *Tong Hoa Lou* et aussi dans l'*Histoire de la Chine* du P. de Mailla.

(99) L'Afghanistan.

(100) Transcription de Andidjan.

(101) Voir la note 66.

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degré, et allaient chaque année, à tour de rôle, faire hommage à la Cour. Ils ne pouvaient de leur propre autorité ni donner la mort, ni accorder la vie (à leurs administrés). Chaque année au printemps, le tsan tsan ta tch'en allait inspecter les frontières de l'ouest, et régler les affaires des Musulmans et des P'ou Lou T'e; en automne, il inspectait les frontières de l'est et réglait les affaires concernant l'agriculture et l'élevage des Musulmans, des T'ou Eul P'ou T'e (102) et des Ho Che T'e (103); il les punissait ou les récompensait suivant les circonstances. Les troupes de garnison des quatre places de l'ouest qui avaient été déplacées, furent remplacées par des troupes venues des régions du nord (des monts Célestes) et de Ngan Si.

On installa une usine à Aksou, pour employer le cuivre rouge de Yarkhend à fondre des sapèques dites « T'ong pao » de l'époque K'ien Long, qui avaient le même cours que les anciennes sapèques des territoires musulmans qu'on appelait « P'ou Eul ». Celles-ci étaient de forme ovale et ne portaient pas de trou carré en leur centre. Suivant les usages des Musulmans, cinquante de ces sapèques valaient un « teng ko » (104).

Le sac de grains contient quatre « tan » et cinq « teou », on l'appelle « p'a t'e ma » (105).

A l'époque (de la domination) des Dzoungars, les marais avaient été desséchés pour y prendre le poisson. La ville

(102) 土爾扈特 transcription du nom des tribus Tourgouts ou Tourbets, qui, selon l'ouvrage de Tchao Yi (Yun Song), sont une des quatre tribus des Dzoungars.

(103) 和碩特 transcription du nom des Kochoït, branche méridionale des Kalmouks dont le siège principal était le voisinage du Koukou Noor, quoiqu'ils eussent une de leurs tribus établie au nord-est de la Chine.

(104) 騰格 Teng Ko est la transcription du mot : tangkar correspondant au 兩 leang chinois, c'est-à-dire une once d'argent (32 grammes français).

(105) 帕特瑪 Le *Tong houa lou*, période K'ien Long, livre XXIV, p. 29, v° et sqq., donne l'énumération des mesures employées par les Musulmans, ainsi qu'une foule de détails intéressants sur l'administration de cette région à l'époque dont nous parlons.

de K'o — Kachgar — était, chaque année, imposée de 4.898 « p'a t'e ma ». Les autres taxes étaient analogues. A Yarkhend on exigeait annuellement des artisans, des employés et des familles des impositions en coton, en safran, en satin, toile, or, cuivre de mine, salpêtre, bœufs, moutons, feutre, filets de pêche, fruits, raisins et pêches de jardin (106). On la taxa en argent à 100.000 « teng ko ». Il en fut de même dans les autres villes. En outre à tout moment on faisait des perquisitions (pour prendre) femmes et enfants, on s'emparait des bestiaux (des habitants). C'est pourquoi les maisons des villages de population musulmane sont rapprochées les unes des autres comme des écailles de poisson ou comme les dents d'un peigne et que de solides murs et des chemins souterrains sinueux forment des réduits dans lesquels on dissimule les objets et on se cache.

Les deux Ho Tchouo Mou revinrent dans leurs anciennes tribus. Malgré la faiblesse des lois, la solde des troupes, les impôts et les corvées gênaient le peuple par leur augmentation. Le moindre retard dans le paiement des contributions était immédiatement suivi de la destruction de la famille. Les deux rebelles disparus, leurs biens servirent à donner du bien-être à la population. Le danger évanoui, tous devinrent sujets des princes (de la Chine), puis on mit fin à la tyrannie et on diminua les taxes dans la proportion de vingt à un. Ce fut pour les tribus Hoei le commencement d'une ère de repos.

Ces marches musulmanes avaient des relations (ou communiquaient) avec les États vassaux extérieurs; K'o — Kachgar — était sur la route du nord (Pei lou) et Yé — Yarkhend — sur la route du sud (Nan lou) : toutes deux étaient les « tou hoei » du Tarim. A l'ouest de Khotan ce

(106) Les jardins des frères Ho Tchouo Mou à Yarkhend étaient célèbres pour leur beauté; il y en avait un grand nombre, dont quelques-uns existent encore aujourd'hui.

n'étaient que chaînes de montagnes. A l'est s'étendaient les grands marais du Gobi proches du Lob nor, sans relation avec les États vassaux extérieurs par suite de l'éloignement, de l'immensité extrême (du désert). Le Gobi produisait du jade et le bruit s'en était répandu dans tout l'empire. Yarkhend tenait la seconde place pour la production et ces deux régions renfermaient du jade dans leurs montagnes et leurs fleuves. Il fut établi un règlement d'après lequel, du printemps à l'automne, on recueillait le jade en trois fois. Autrefois la rivière de Yarkhend ne produisait point de (jade), mais à partir de la soumission de cette région à la Chine, la pierre de jade apparut peu à peu (107).

« Réflexions de (Wei) Yuan (108) :

« Un édit impérial de la vingt-cinquième année de (la période) K'ien Long (1760) dit : Le rebelle Ho Tsi Tchan et son frère aîné, pleins d'ingratitude pour les bienfaits (du Fils du Ciel), ont propagé l'insoumission, ils ont pris et mis à mort des Barbares. Cependant, durant les générations précédentes, les chefs (Musulmans) ne commirent aucune faute. Avant l'occupation par les chefs Dzoungars, hors de la ville de K'o — Kachgar — on conservait depuis longtemps les tombes de Ho Tchouo (Mou) et autres. Nous ordonnons aux tribus Hœi de s'en occuper, de les surveiller comme autrefois ; que l'on n'y coupe pas les arbres pour en faire du bois de chauffage et qu'on ne les souille point. De cette manière nous montrerons l'équité et la compassion de l'État pour le peuple (109). »

(107) Suit une page de texte concernant exclusivement la production et le commerce du jade dans la région et n'ayant qu'un rapport très indirect avec la soumission des Musulmans. J'ai cru bon de la supprimer pour abréger le récit.

(108) Le texte porte les caractères qui indiquent que l'auteur Wei Yuan s'adresse à l'Empereur. Cette note est une sorte de résumé des événements précédents, augmentés de quelques détails nouveaux. C'est un procédé habituel à l'auteur.

(109) Ce fait est rapporté dans un édit impérial de la troisième lune de

Nous avons vu que Ma Mou T'e, le trisaïeul de Ho Tsi Tchan, s'était autrefois transporté à Kachgar. De la fin de la dynastie des Mings au Prophète, son premier ancêtre, il s'était écoulé plus de mille ans. Lorsqu'il vint de l'Arabie, les Hoei le vénérèrent comme un dieu. L'habitation qu'il occupa durant sa vie fut transformée en temple (c'est-à-dire en mosquée); la sépulture, où, mort, il reposa, devint un temple de famille. A cette époque, les villes des marches des Hoei avaient encore des khans, descendants de (l'empereur) T'ai Tsou — Gengis Khan 1206-1229 — et non pas descendants des Hoei. Au début (de la période) Chouen Tcheu (110), Hami avait le khan Pa Pai; Yarkhend avait le khan A Pou Tou, Tourfan avait le khan Sou Lei T'an (111); tous ces khans considéraient celui de Yarkhend comme leur chef, et quand ils adressaient des rapports pour payer le tribut, le khan de Yarkhend les signait de son nom. En la vingt-cinquième année K'ang Hi (1686), ce khan dans le rapport au Trône relatif au tribut se nomma: Votre sujet, descendant du khan Tch'eng Ki Seu (112), héritier du khan Sou Lei Man (113).

A ce moment, les chefs Hoei ne possédaient pas encore la région. Puis les Dzoungars, devenus très puissants, attaquèrent et prirent plus d'un millier de villes des Hoei; après quoi, le tribut cessa d'être payé et les khans n'adressèrent plus de rapport au Trône. En la vingtième année K'ien

l'année 1750. Cf. Tong houa lou, liv. XXXXVII, p. 39, v°, col. 13 et seq. : Chou Ho Te fut chargé d'assurer l'exécution de cet ordre.

(110) Chouen Tcheu est le nom de règne du premier empereur (1644-1662) de la dynastie des Tsing, actuellement régnante.

(111) Sou Lei Tan, pris par l'auteur pour le nom d'un Khan, me semble être plutôt la transcription du mot sultan.

(112) Gengis khan.

(113) Suleyman ou Soliman n'a pas encore été mentionné auparavant. Il semble qu'il n'appartenait pas aux tribus Hoei, d'après la phrase suivante; d'autre part, il ne semble pas non plus qu'il fût Musulman, puisqu'il a été dit qu'il n'y eut pas de chefs Musulmans avant Mahmoud, sous les Mings. Remarquer, dans tout ce passage, comme l'auteur distingue les Hoei, peuple, des Hoei, musulmans.



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Long (1755), une grande armée chinoise partit pacifier les Dzoungars. Un chef de Tourfan, descendant des anciens princes, Mang Sou Eul (114), vint faire sa soumission. A l'exception de celui-ci, il ne restait plus personne de la lignée des Mongols. Les anciens chefs de Tou Lou (Fan) — Tourfan — qui étaient allés s'établir à K'o La Cha Eul — Karachar — avaient perdu leur territoire depuis longtemps. Ainsi les chefs ou khans mongols établis dans les villes des Hoei avaient été, pendant la période K'ang Hi, anéantis par les Dzoungars, et non pas chassés par ceux qui suivaient la religion des Hoei. Lorsque les Barbares Dzoungars eurent vaincu les khans descendants des Yuan, et fait prisonniers les chefs des Hoei, ils retournèrent au Ili, emmenant ces derniers avec eux. C'est alors que l'ancêtre de Ho Tsi Tchan, ne trouvant pas d'appui dans les marches des Hoei, (ne) jouit (que) d'une autorité et d'un bonheur éphémères. De plus, les descendants du Prophète s'étaient répandus dans les divers pays et dans la ville de Kachgar. Ho Tchouo appartenait à une branche particulière dont l'ancêtre n'était pas le descendant d'une des femmes légitimes (115). Les deux frères Ho Tchouo Mou en outre n'ayant témoigné nulle bienveillance à la population Hoei (n'en acquirent aucune reconnaissance).

L'armée impériale les délivra de captivité et les renvoya dans leurs anciennes tribus ; mais ceux qui affamés étaient restés soumis, une fois rassasiés s'enfuirent comme emportés par le vent, rendant la haine pour le bien.

Tou Kin (116), de la dynastie des Han, parlant de Ki Pin (117), dit : Il n'est pas de plus grande vertu que de gagner le cœur du peuple ; il n'est pas de crime plus grand

(114) Transcription de Mansour.

(115) Il faut sans doute sous-entendre : du Prophète.

(116) Auteur chinois du premier siècle avant Jésus-Christ.

(117) 罽賓 est la Cophène, ancien nom du pays de Kaboul. Allusion historique.

que de retenir prisonniers et mettre à mort des ambassadeurs.

La Cour impériale restaura son palais et éleva un tertre sur sa sépulture; elle mit à mort les chefs et soulagea le peuple. Dans (sa sévérité, aussi grande que) le vent et le tonnerre; dans (sa magnanimité aussi douce que) la pluie et la rosée, comment l'Empereur userait-il de partialité ?

Le Pa Ta K'o Chan ayant livré la tête des Ho Tchou Mou, devint maître de leurs enfants, de leurs trésors, et le reste de leurs partisans s'enfuit dans le Wen Tou Se Tan (118) qui, à leur instigation, leva une armée pour faire la guerre. Le Ngai Ou Han — Afghanistan —, un des États voisins, attaqua l'armée du Wen Tou Se Tan et la détruisit (119). Puis les enfants de Ho Tchou Mou l'aîné s'enfuirent dans le Ngao Han — Fergana. — Pendant la période Tao Koang ils s'emparèrent par la force des quatre villes de l'Ouest, puis furent mis à mort, châtement du Ciel (120). Ces faits sont rapportés dans un autre récit (121).

(118) Hindoustan.

(119) Cette partie du récit de l'auteur présente quelques divergences avec les autres ouvrages chinois relatant cette campagne. Le *Si yu t'ou tche* (Géographie des Pays d'Occident), dit que, en la troisième lune de la vingt-quatrième année K'ien Long (1759), les deux rebelles battus sur le lac Yé Tch'eu s'enfuirent dans le Pa Ta K'o Chan, poursuivis par Fou Te, qui, arrivé à la frontière de ce pays, écrivit une lettre à Sou Lei Tan Cha (le sultan-chah), lui enjoignant de livrer les fugitifs. Ceux-ci ayant pénétré dans une région vassale du Pa Ta K'o Chan, le khan de ce pays captura Ho Tchou Mou l'aîné et le jeta en prison; puis, ayant cerné les troupes de son frère cadet sur le mont A Eul Tchou, le khan fit prisonnier Ho Tsi Tchan, qui, blessé et obèse, n'avait pu fuir, et le mit en prison; après quoi il annonça à Fou Te qu'il avait capturé les rebelles et qu'il faisait sa soumission: les troupes du Wen Tou Seu Tan (Hindoustan) arrivèrent pour délivrer les deux frères. Alors le khan du Pa Ta K'o Chan, craignant l'opposition des tribus voisines, s'il livrait les deux Ho Tchou Mou qui, comme lui, étaient descendants du Prophète, écrivit une lettre d'hommage à Fou Te et fit mettre à mort les deux rebelles; mais il put livrer seulement la tête de Ho Tsi Tchan, le cadavre de l'aîné ayant été dérobé (*Si yu t'ou tche*, chap. XXXV).

(120) Révolte de 1820-1828. Djehanguir, descendant de l'aîné des Ho Tchou Mou, fait prisonnier, fut exécuté à Péking en 1828.

(121) Le chapitre suivant du *Cheng Wou Ki* donne en effet sur la fin des Ho Tchou Mou des détails complémentaires intéressants, mais qui nous entraîneraient trop loin. Voir M. Imbault-Huart, *loc. cit.*

Si l'on grave une inscription au sommet du K'ouen Luen, si on frappe les pierres sonores réunies dans le secrétariat de jade ; si l'on étale la viande coupée en tranches à la source du fleuve, les sept bandes de Barbares modéreront la rapidité de leur course et les poutres de cyprès perdront leur poutre faîtière (122). Quel mystère, quel bonheur ! Ce n'est pas un pauvre lettré (comme moi) qui pourrait rapporter (convenablement ces événements).

#### INSCRIPTION BILINGUE DE TCH'ENG TOU

*La stèle, érigée en 1760, se trouve dans un pavillon de la cour du Temple de la Littérature de Tch'eng tou. Sa hauteur totale est de 5 m. 80 (y compris le chapiteau et la base), sur une largeur de 1 m. 76 (y compris la bordure décorative). Elle repose sur une base de 2 m. 46 de largeur, sur 1 m. 60 d'épaisseur et 1 m. 20 de hauteur.*

*Le chapiteau a 0 m. 96 de hauteur.*

*Une bordure, qui a 0 m. 06 de largeur, encadre le texte ; le motif décoratif qu'elle contient cesse des deux côtés à 0 m. 97 de la base ; il est remplacé, à droite, par dix-huit caractères signifiant : « Vos sujets Yue Tchong K'i, Ngo Eul T'ai (123) et autres ont respectueusement érigé (cette stèle) dans le Palais de l'Étude de la préfecture de Tch'eng Tou du Sseu tch'ouan. »*

*Le revers de la stèle porte les noms et titres des fonctionnaires qui ont contribué à l'érection du monument.*


(122) Ce paragraphe est composé d'une série d'allusions littéraires, suivant la coutume des auteurs chinois qui veulent terminer dignement leur récit en faisant montre de leur érudition. Il signifie que la Chine est venue à bout des rebelles Hoei et les a soumis à sa domination, grâce à l'ardeur de ses troupes et au moyen des sages mesures prises par elle.

La dernière phrase, qui exprime la modestie de l'auteur, est, elle aussi, du meilleur goût chinois.

(123) Le général Yue Tchong K'i s'est rendu fameux en conquérant les confins tibétains de la région de Ta tsien lou. Ngo Eul T'ai, vice-roi du Sseu tch'ouan, également célèbre.

Manchu script inscription on a dark background with decorative borders.

Partie supérieure du registre mandchou de l'inscription.



Partie supérieure du registre chinois de l'inscription.

*L'avers porte deux registres ; celui de gauche en mandchou contient trente-trois colonnes très lisibles ; celui de droite en chinois comprend trente-deux colonnes inégales, comprenant 142 caractères au plus, d'une écriture normale, malheureusement peu lisible à certains endroits.*

*Une grande partie de ce texte n'est consacrée qu'à des considérations philosophiques et morales, qui ne nous apprennent rien au sujet des Musulmans ; nous les avons donc supprimées, tout en respectant le récit des événements. C'est ainsi que, immédiatement après le titre qui occupe la première colonne, nous passons à la colonne 6.*

« TEXTE D'UNE INSCRIPTION COMPOSÉE PAR L'EMPEREUR DANS LA GRANDE ÉCOLE (124) POUR ANNONCER AU SAGE LE SUCCÈS DANS LA PACIFICATION DES FRONTIÈRES MUSULMANES. »

Le Ciel, qui a favorisé les armes chinoises lors des affaires avec les Barbares, vient de témoigner une fois encore sa bienveillance en Nous permettant la pacification des tribus Hœi. A Mou Eul Sa Na (Amoursana) s'étant révolté avec l'intention d'employer nos troupes à réaliser ses projets, la foule des révoltés le suivit nombreuse, et les fonctionnaires, craignant les difficultés d'une nouvelle campagne, demandèrent le rappel de nos troupes de Pa Li K'ouen pour les employer comme garnisons-frontière. Mais ce ne fut pas notre avis, car les révoltés, n'étant pas unis, devaient nous revenir bientôt, et si, dès ce moment, Nous envoyions une armée au I Li, les chefs indigènes de ce pays, pris de remords, s'efforceraient de combattre les rebelles pour obtenir de Nous le pardon. Ho Tchouo Mou l'aîné et Ho Tchouo

(124) Temple de la Littérature de Péking. Possédant déjà le texte de l'inscription, estampé à Tch'eng Tou, nous n'avons pas vérifié si la même stèle existe bien à Péking, ainsi que le dit le *Cheng Wou Ki* et que ce titre semble l'indiquer. Une telle stèle n'a jamais été signalée, croyons-nous, mais il est vrai que les recherches de cet ordre en sont encore à leurs débuts.

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Mou le jeune appartenait à une famille renommée parmi les tribus Hoei; les Tch'ouen K'o Eul (Dzoungars) les avaient obligés à rester à A Pa Ha Seu Neue T'ouo. Nos troupes les délivrèrent lors de l'expédition contre le I Li, et accompagnèrent Ho Tchouo l'aîné, Pouo Louo Gni Tou, retournant à Yé Eull Ki Mou (125) comme chef de ses anciennes tribus. Ordre fut donné à Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, Ho Tsi Tchan, de rester au I Li où il gouvernait tous les Hoei de cette région. Mais celui-ci prêta son appui aux révoltés d'Amoursana dans leur lutte contre les chefs indigènes fidèles à la dynastie, de sorte que les rebelles retardèrent leur soumission. C'est alors que Nos armées pénétrèrent encore dans l'I Li, et les rebelles de Amoursana s'enfuirent dans le pays des Ha Sa K'o (126), d'où Ho Tsi Tchan, rassemblant ses forces, retourna dans son pays. C'est le deuxième bienfait du Ciel.

Les événements relatifs aux Barbares Dzoungars ayant été précédemment résumés, Nous ne parlerons ici que des affaires des Hoei.

Notre tsiang kiun Tchao Hoei était encore au I Li quand fut envoyé le fou tou t'ong, A Min Tao, pour discuter les affaires (de contributions en grains) chez les Hoei. Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, usant de subterfuge, arrêta A Min Tao. Nos troupes étant allées à K'ou T'che (Koutchar) pour le punir, Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune, emmenant A Min Tao avec lui, le tua à mi-chemin avec les 100 hommes qui l'accompagnaient, puis, s'avançant avec audace, il ne craignit pas d'attaquer Nos troupes que, bien que vaincu, il combattit avec énergie, et il réussit à pénétrer dans la ville de K'ou tchar. Ya Eul Ha Chan, dénué de tout talent militaire, ne sut pas s'opposer aux mouvements des rebelles de Ho Tchouo Mou le jeune. Alors Nos Mandchous de Souo Lun

(125) Autre transcription de Yarkhend.

(126) Cette transcription de Hassak ou Kazak est différente de celle du *Cheng Wou Ki*.

(Solon), pénétrés de reconnaissance pour les bienfaits de Notre Dynastie, déployèrent une grande bravoure sur le champ de bataille et, malgré leur infériorité, remportèrent la victoire. Les chefs rebelles effrayés s'enfuirent rapidement. Troisième bienfait du Ciel.

Sachant qu'un général a mis en péril les destinées de Notre armée, Nous avons choisi un homme de talent pour le remplacer. A l'époque (des événements précédents), le tsiang kiun Tchao Hoei procédait à la pacification des tribus rebelles des Barbares Dzoungars ; une fois celles des P'ou Lou T'e soumise, Nous ordonnâmes au tsiang kiun de se rendre chez les Hoei dans le même but. Aussitôt arrivé, il prit Koutchar, occupa Cha Ya Eul, pacifia A K'o Sou (Aksou), s'empara de Ou Che (Ouch) ainsi que de Ho Tien (Khotan). A la nouvelle de l'arrivée de l'armée, toutes les tribus se soumettaient. Mais parvenus aux environs de la ville de Yarkhend, hommes et chevaux ayant parcouru plus de 10.000 lis, étaient comme la flèche à la fin de son parcours (127). Les deux chefs rebelles qui occupaient la ville disposaient de plusieurs myriades d'hommes et attendaient tranquillement Nos 3.000 hommes. Ils attaquèrent 400 des Nôtres qui avaient franchi le fleuve ; ceux-ci eurent le courage de tuer un chef (ennemi), ils s'emparèrent d'un drapeau, revinrent et fortifièrent Hei Choei, qu'ils tinrent longtemps. Ce fut le quatrième bienfait du Ciel.

Comment (pourrait-on) à 10.000 lis (de son pays) emporter de l'eau pour éteindre le feu (128) ? L'an dernier, à la sixième lune, Nous avons décidé d'envoyer des troupes et des chevaux remplacer ceux qui étaient à l'armée (en

(127) 如强弩之末 Allusion littéraire signifiant : être épuisé. Cf. *Pei Wen Yun Fou*, XXXVII, § 2, p. 6 v° lettres K'iang Nou.

(128) Allusion littéraire signifiant qu'à une si grande distance de son pays, il est bien difficile d'emporter avec soi tous les approvisionnements nécessaires.



campagne). C'est pourquoi soldats et chevaux étaient partis rapidement et avaient constamment avancé, ne voulant pas rester en arrière, pleins d'ardeur à la lutte. Cinquième bienfait du Ciel.

Le fou tsiang kiun Fou To, le ts'an tsan Chou Ho To furent envoyés au secours (de Tchao Hoei à Hei Choei); ils marchèrent vite dans le K'o Pi (Gobi), de sorte que leurs chevaux furent rapidement épuisés; précisément les tribus Hoei occupaient des positions escarpées où elles attendaient tranquillement. L'armée de secours ne pouvait avancer et les troupes de Hei Choei se trouvaient dans une situation périlleuse, lorsque le ts'an tsan A Li K'ouen, à la tête de la cavalerie d'arrière-garde, arrive et attaque de nuit le camp des Hoei, le prenant entre deux feux. L'ennemi ne sachant pas le nombre des Nôtres, se trouva comme le sang qui coule de la main qui serre un charbon ardent (129), et leurs morts s'entassèrent les uns sur les autres, sans que la fuite leur fût possible. Le blocus de Hei Choei fut levé, les rebelles s'enfuirent rapides comme le cerf, craintifs comme le chamois, jusque dans les gorges des montagnes, pendant que Nos deux armées s'étant réorganisées et ayant compté leurs survivants retournaient à Aksou. Sixième bienfait du Ciel.

Les rebelles présumaient bien que nous allions revenir (les attaquer), et il est bien difficile d'empêcher le T'ai Chan d'écraser (une perle) (130); ils s'enfuirent avant l'arrivée de Nos troupes, emmenant leurs tribus et emportant les objets les plus précieux, le plus loin qu'ils purent. Les Kieou pouo t'e des deux villes de Yarkhend et de Kachgar et autres ouvrirent leurs portes et firent leur soumission. Le ts'an tsan Min Tsan à Houo Seu Kouo Lou K'o barra la route

(129) Allusion littéraire signifiant une complète déconfiture.

(130) 泰山之壓難堂 Allusion littéraire signifiant ici qu'il était bien difficile aux rebelles d'opposer la moindre résistance à l'armée chinoise dont la poussée irrésistible pouvait être comparée à celle du (mont) T'ai Chan.

aux rebelles, tandis que le tsiang kiun Fou Te les battait à A Eul (Altchouk). Les affiliés des deux chefs rebelles, n'étant plus dans les mêmes dispositions d'esprit que leurs chefs, les abandonnèrent, et ceux qui étaient partis en avant revinrent, de telle sorte que les deux chefs, emmenant femmes, enfants et serviteurs, en tout 300 personnes, pénétrèrent sur le territoire de Pan Ta K'o Chan. Septième bienfait Céleste.

C'est une région où ne se voit pas trace d'homme et où l'on ne parle pas la langue du pays (des rebelles). Ils ont fui comme des oiseaux, ou comme des loups qui regardent en arrière. Se soumettront-ils ou non ? on ne peut le dire. A la voix de leurs chefs, pas un de nos hommes n'ose ne pas se précipiter en avant. Les officiers, ayant disposé leurs troupes, s'avancent, ils s'emparent du chef révolté, l'exécutent et placent sa tête dans une cage. Alors les étoffes des pavillons sur lesquels on voit écrite la (nouvelle de la) victoire arrivèrent jusqu'ici (131). Huitième bienfait Céleste.

*[Ici finit le texte relatif à la campagne des Musulmans du Tarim, les seize colonnes suivantes ne contiennent que des développements sur les bienfaits du Ciel et une pièce de poésie en phrases de quatre caractères célébrant la même victoire et les mêmes hauts faits que ci-dessus.]*

Composée et écrite par l'empereur Kao Tsong, en un jour faste de la douzième lune de la vingt-quatrième année K'ien Long (février 1760) (132).

Capitaine LEPAGE,  
(Mission d'Ollone).

(131) 露布 Allusion littéraire. Cf. *Pei Wen Yun Fou*, CXVI, § 1, p. 42, v°.

(132) *Erratum* : Dans l'article intitulé : Biographie du Seyid Edjell Omar Chams Ed-Din (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, mai 1910), p. 26, l. 21, au lieu de : « dans la capitale impériale (Hang tcheou)... », lire : « dans la capitale impériale, alors Pei King (Pékin)... » (LL).

## APPENDICE

### Trois Lettres de l'empereur K'ien-long au Khan du Badakchan.

Par A. VISSIÈRE.

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*Monument élevé à la gloire militaire de la dynastie mantchoue, le Cheng wou ki, ou Relations des guerres impériales, de Wei Yuan n'est pas le seul ouvrage qui nous renseigne sur l'enchaînement des événements qui se déroulèrent dans le Turkestan oriental, lors de sa conquête par les Chinois, au milieu du dix-huitième siècle. Outre le Houang tch'ao wou kong ki cheng, ou Récit des exploits militaires les plus mémorables de la dynastie impériale, composé par Tchao Yi et auquel j'aurai l'occasion de me référer plus loin, nombreux sont les recueils particuliers ou les publications officielles qui permettent au lecteur de faire une étude méthodique de cette phase intéressante de l'histoire de l'Asie centrale. Faut de pouvoir consulter la collection complète de la Gazette de Pékin, dont les exemplaires remontant à un ou deux siècles sont, sans doute, introuvables, la collection, intitulée Tong houa lou, des Copies prises à la porte du palais de Pékin dite Tong houa men (Porte de la floraison orientale), qui a puisé aux mêmes sources que le journal officiel, nous offre une précieuse chronique documentaire, établie presque jour par jour, de tous les faits qui intéressaient la Cour de Chine*

and the assumption of individual responsibility. Japan has indeed been the prime example of a controlled society; but what is too often overlooked is the fact that the rigid system of control has become a necessary evil, as was so tragically demonstrated when it was partially relaxed during the so-called liberal interlude of the 1920's. While the liberal governments and leaders of that era won our affection by a number of achievements, the fact remains that the so-called liberal political parties were absolutely unprepared to use their newly-acquired power and freedom. They succumbed to unprecedented corruption and became the tools of big business and other special interests. This seamy side of Japanese party politics in the 1920's nullified whatever worthy achievements the liberals could claim in this era. If we have shown a partiality for this regime, we were in reality favoring the lesser of two evils: the utterly corrupt and thoroughly incompetent pretense at liberal, party government as opposed to the somewhat less corrupt but ruthless efficient dictatorship of militarists and bureaucrats. Under either regime, the common people of Japan have had no real voice in government.

The record of the so-called Japanese liberals holds little to prove that this element was a political force capable of giving Japan a truly liberal government, or that it was basically committed to policies that would have maintained peace in the Pacific area. The liberals of Japan were after all primarily Japanese nationalists in their thought and behavior. They were the products, or perhaps the victims, of the same traditions and environment which produced the Japanese militarists, and their postwar reinstatement cannot by itself lay the basis for a better Japan.

Before the Japanese can be expected to make a success with liberalism as we have defined it and attempted to practice it ourselves, or before they can ever succeed with any form of political organization beyond their own archaic system of tribal glorification, there will have to be fundamental changes in the political, economic, social and even religious concepts of Japanese life. The grave question which the United Nations will eventually have to face is whether we shall be able to trust a defeated Japan to make these essential changes or whether we shall feel that our own future safety and well-being demand that we make them ourselves.

Washington, D. C.

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## THE NEW SINKIANG—CHINA'S LINK WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

MARTIN R. NORINS

*Ed. Note:—On September 25, 1942, it was reported from Chungking by the United Press that Chinese transportation experts had announced that two substitute supply routes for the lost Burma Road were in "full readiness" to handle the bulk of American goods for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's armies.*

*One route, using the railway systems of Central Asia and the highway from Alma Ata in Russia to Chungking, covers about 4,500 miles. It starts at the Indian port of Karachi and runs through Peshawar to Kabul in Afghanistan and then strikes north through Termez to Samarkand in Russia and east again over the railroad running through Tashkent to the Soviet rail terminus of Alma Ata. From Alma Ata, the route follows the highway through Tihwa (Urumchi), Hami and Lanchow to the Chinese capital.*

*The second route begins at the Iranian port and railhead of Bushive on the Persian Gulf and runs north to the terminus of Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. There the freight is shipped over water to the Russian port of Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Railroads then carry the goods across the central Asiatic plain to Alma Ata and the Sinkiang highway.*

*The experts said two short cuts also were being worked out from India via Kashgar in Southern Sinkiang. But the speedy conversion of these old trails into effective highways is to be doubted.*

*Both routes and both short cuts go through Sinkiang which is the subject of the following article.*

**T**HAT China looks toward development of international communications through South Sinkiang has at last belatedly been indicated. Ever since the Japanese military flood cut across the Burma Road last April, the prospect in regard to continuance of

China's international communications has looked excessively gloomy. In addition to the northwest route through the U.S.S.R., there were always transport routes waiting to be developed from India into the Chinese Republic, and Chinese have known about them. At least one such is to pivot from Sinkiang. For on September 16, 1942, it was announced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had just returned to Chungking from a visit to Northwest China. His return followed by a little over a month a similar trip by the Chinese Minister of Economic Affairs, Wong Wen-hao, who had just completed an extensive tour of Sinkiang and other provinces of the Northwest. Something of what was considered on these journeys is suggested by word coming on September 12 that China had begun negotiations with India for use of an old pack route through Kashmir. This connects with China through Sinkiang and ultimately has access to the Arabian Sea.

When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek paid his running visit to the Northwest Frontier of India on February 13 at the beginning of this year and addressed the Mohammedan mountain tribesmen there, his visit was not without practical purpose. Nor has the opening of modern Chinese diplomatic relations with nearby Afghanistan and Iran since then been unrelated. Such events should be considered in conjunction with the Generalissimo and Minister Wong's tours of investigation, the recent meeting of 600 economic and engineering experts in Kansu Province, and the announcement on July 18, 1942 that the Chinese Moslem leader, Ma Pu-ch'ing, had been appointed Pacification Commissioner of the Tsaidam Marches. For mountain tribesmen to whom Generalissimo Chiang spoke in February apparently still pay token tribute to Chinese suzerainty and are in command of strategic passes along an ancient Eurasian trade route; Afghanistan and Iran are Middle Eastern markets which the route taps; pacification of the Tsaidam Marches in Western Ch'inghai really means linking the course with Chungking at the China end.

An all-Moslem trek, the road passes from Srinagar and the principalities of Gilgit, Nagar, and Hunza in Northwest India, then across the lofty Karakorum Mountains and down to Kashgaria in South Sinkiang. It could enter Kashgaria from Soviet Turkestan. From Kashgaria, it goes through Khotan to the Chinese provinces of Ch'inghai and Kansu. The total distance from

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Srinagar in India to Lanchow, capitol of Kansu, is approximately 2,000 miles.

At difficult points, the new course squeezes through 18,000 foot passes, creeps along the edge of snow-capped crags, and skirts the headwaters of the Indus and Oxus Rivers. Once in the Sinkiang basin, the route follows blistering old desert trails and vast wastelands; too many wonders cannot be expected from it, but the whole is traversible—partly by truck and partly by pack caravan. Should air transport be used over the Karakorum sector, many inherent hazards could be eliminated.

Still far from imminent Axis threat, the course knifes along the edges of British India and Asiatic Russia. It avoids hurting the political feelings of either and can ease considerably the strain on routes which have been busy helping China via Soviet Turkestan further north. Nor, it is to be hoped, should the use of this South Sinkiang trek be basically disturbed by political unrest in lower India.

This is not the place for comment that by choice of this route, the Chinese are providing against the temporary close of a five-century epoch in oceanic transport and are preparing for a possible period of dependence on intra-continental overland trade. The story here concerns instead that little known terrain through which the road mainly passes—Sinkiang, China's modern link with the Middle East.

**A** HOME of primitive desert oases and a myriad of nomadic, little-known peoples, Sinkiang is, at one and the same time, the northwestern-most province of China and a part of Central Asia. The province is for the most part Mohammedan in religion and, due to its geographical location, has been economically more dependent on Soviet Russia than on other parts of China. These and other factors have combined to bring about considerable Soviet influence in Sinkiang and to make it—though formally a part of China—practically a semi-autonomous area.

The name Sinkiang is a corrupted transliteration of *Hsin Chiang*, a Chinese term meaning *The New Dominion*. Today Chinese know it as *Hsin Hsin Chiang*, *The New New Dominion*. Through the province run famous old caravan trails from adjacent Siberia, Russian Turkestan, and the Northwest Frontier Province

of India. The completion of the Turksib railway to Alma Ata on the Soviet side of the Turkestan frontier in 1930 clinched already close Soviet ties which, economically, for the most part did not go far beyond North Sinkiang. The startling political developments in Sinkiang since the 1930's have, however, been on a wider provincial scale. In these developments, General Sheng Shih-tsai has played a leading role.

Sheng Shih-tsai, chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government, has swiftly, sometimes ruthlessly, been modernizing his 550,000 square miles of domain. On coming to power in 1933, he first suppressed dissident factions, next issued declarations of radical administrative policy, then introduced a first, and recently a second, three year plan of provincial reconstruction. True, he has met with some opposition in South Sinkiang, and his efforts at complete modernization of the province have been less noticeable there. But, as a whole, Sinkiang Province boasts of its electric light, telephone, and radio systems, of airplane and automobile transportation, of motion pictures, daily newspapers, and rapidly spreading literacy among its variously estimated one to four million inhabitants.

These radical changes in Sinkiang, so marked under Sheng Shih-tsai's administration, really began with the shooting of Yang Tseng-hsin on July 7, 1928. The killing of Yang, Sinkiang's overlord in both the last days of the Manchu Dynasty and the early years of the new Chinese Republic, ended old-style imperial rule in the province. Chin Shu-jen, Yang's successor, did not retain control long. The province was restive and, not being a military man himself, Chin soon came to depend upon General Sheng.

A Manchurian, Sheng Shih-tsai had studied political economy and military science both in China and Japan. Above all, he had experienced the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. A medium-sized man of stocky build and shaggy dark hair, he was not beyond his thirties when intermediaries gave him his opportunity to assist Chin Shu-jen in Sinkiang border defense. Between 1931 and 1933, there were serious Mohammedan uprisings in Sinkiang, and when they became too hot, Chin fled from the provincial government headquarters at Ti-hua. Sheng, his erstwhile adjutant, restored order in North Sinkiang with Soviet Russian help, then on April 12, 1933, he got himself elected Provisional Border Defense Com-



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mandar (*Lin-shih Pien-fang Tu-pan*) of the province.

Since that date Sheng has in large part dominated Sinkiang affairs. In 1940 he made this position official by receiving appointment as provincial chairman. Sheng's radical administrative program may reflect his ties to Soviet Russia, but, in any case, the unique developments it has brought to the peoples of Sinkiang make it deserve analysis for its own sake.

THE theoretical basis of Sheng Shih-tsai's Sinkiang is outlined in a book by the provincial Chancellor of Education, Tu Chung-yuan. In Tu's study, *Sheng Shih-tsai and the New Sinkiang* (published in the Chinese language in 1939), there is emphasis on an Eight Point Proclamation and a statement of Six Great Policies which Sheng Shih-tsai issued early in his administration.

According to Mr. Tu, the eight points are: (1) establishment of racial equality; (2) guarantee of religious freedom; (3) equitable distribution of agricultural and rural relief; (4) reform of government finance; (5) the cleaning up of government administration; (6) the expansion of education; (7) the promotion of self-government; and (8) the improvement of the judiciary.

The Six Great Policies, Tu says, are: (1) anti-imperialism; (2) kinship to Soviet Russia; (3) racial equality; (4) honesty; (5) peace; and (6) reconstruction.

Though all aspects of this new "charter" are significant, the clue to Sheng's administration lies mainly in the first three points of the Six Great Policies and in his end goal of "Reconstruction."

#### "Racial Equality"

It is not strange that "racial equality" headed the Eight Point Proclamation and actually received Sheng Shih-tsai's early attention. The province is a peculiar melting pot of little known ethnic groups over which a small minority of Chinese have historically attempted to rule; and, as indicated, Sheng even rode into power while settling a Mohammedan uprising.

Tu Chung-yuan names fourteen racial types which he says are popularly recognized in Sinkiang: *Han, Man, Meng, Hui, Wei-wu-erh, Ha-sa-k'o, T'a-chi-k'o, T'a-lan-ch'i, T'a-t'a-erh, Ko-erh-k'o-tzu, Wu-tzu-pieh-k'o, Hsi-po, So-lun, and Kuei-hua*. It is worth while to discuss these various types for a moment as it may

be a mistake to say that they actually are "fourteen races." *Min-tsu*, the Chinese term translated here as "race," literally means "a clan of people," a "tribe," even a "nation." As "clans" or ethnic types the fourteen groups mentioned by Tu certainly deserve distinction, though they may not all represent "races." At any rate, the naming of them is especially valuable as indicative of the kinds of "people" that are locally prominent among the Sinkiang inhabitants themselves.

Tu admits that there is confusion as to the true ethnic situation in Sinkiang, and elsewhere in his study he even identifies the *Man*, *Hsi-po*, and *So-lun* as types of Manchu. The *Hsi-po* (Sibo) and *So-lun* (Solon), more specifically, originally hailed from Manchuria and are of Tungusic stock. The *Wei-wu-erh* perhaps represent the ancient Uighur that abound in Sinkiang and whose Turkestan history goes back to at least the early Middle Ages. But Tu also names the *Hui* (Mohammedans) as one of the "racial" groups and identifies it with the *Wei-wu-erh*, who he says constitute eighty per cent of the provincial population. In one sense this is not improper, for he says the *Wei-wu-erh* are the *Ch'an-t'ou* (Turban Heads or Turban Moslems) who do believe in the Islamic faith. But the *Hui*, or Mohammedans as such, of Sinkiang are more correctly a religious than a racial category, and this brings the Sinkiang method of classification into question so far as its scientific basis is concerned. When he mentions that the *Wei-wu-erh* are eighty per cent of the provincial population, therefore, one is compelled to wonder if he may not actually be naming the great group of Sinkiang inhabitants who adhere to the Mohammedan faith and not the great numbers of a particular "race" such as the ancient Uighurs. By *Han*, in brief, Tu refers to the basic racial type that the Occident has come to know today as "Chinese."<sup>1</sup>

The other groups Tu lists might receive tentative identification as Mongol, Khasak, Tadjik, Taranchi, Tatar, Khalka, Uzbek, and White Russians in the order named. Though the Tatar and Khalka might better be associated with the Mongol group, they do deserve separate mention as distinct Sinkiang types. In accordance

<sup>1</sup>Though the use that he makes here of the term *Han* might be questioned in English, it also has good standing in the Chinese linguistic sense as the "*Han* clan." There is good basis for instance, if there were space to discuss it here, for distinguishing the political history of the "*Chinese Han* clan" from that of other "*Chinese* clans."

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with the custom of many Chinese, Tu also does not mention another racial group, the Khirgiz, who dwell in part in Sinkiang but who are sometimes thought to be related to the Khasak. Nor does he mention either the Habdals or Tulanis (many of which inhabit Afghanistan), Tibetans (though South Sinkiang borders Tibet), or the other few Occidentals (such as the British) who have had access to Sinkiang.

As Tu sees it, however, the main "racial" problem in Sinkiang has not been merely the diversity of the provincial population. It has been, he indicates, that traditionally the ruling Chinese (here he again uses the term *Han*) are only a "ten per cent" minority, and that they have suppressed the remaining ninety per cent of the province.

Formerly, the people were permitted to read only *Han* books . . . and even if they read those they were not permitted to hold office, but could serve only as half-slave translators. As a result, none of the races wanted to do such work. In the Yang-Chin period, force was used to make some do it, but. . . just as soldiers had to be hired in the interior, so only poor persons could be hired to do the reading.

Now things have changed. Since Sheng *Tu-pan* issued his Eight Point Proclamation each race and every educational institution has received help from the government; and, though reading of *Han* books is required, each race can also read its own literature. Since this has happened, readers have multiplied like the spread of mist. Government positions have since been opened to all the educated, and the self-respect of each race has been restored. . .

This new emphasis on racial equality was graphically illustrated during the autumn of 1938, for instance, when 636 delegates, representing the "fourteen" ethnic groups of the province, met as a body at an All-Sinkiang Conference in Ti-hua to express themselves on administrative matters.

More long run evidence which Tu gives of progress toward solution of the racial questions in Sinkiang is to be found in the broader base of education. Tu is authority for the statement that during the administrations of Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen there were not more than sixty educational institutions and less than 3,000 students in the whole province. Yet, he claims, 1,556 educational institutions with over 150,000 students have been established in Sinkiang under Sheng Shih-tsia's government. In this educational development, the cultural contributions of each racial

group in the province have been particularly emphasized, largely through organization of what Sinkiang calls Cultural Progress Societies. Most prominent among these are the societies for the *Wei-wu-erh*, *Ha-sa-k'o*, and *Hui*.

The *Wei-wu-erh* Cultural Progress Society, Tu says, maintains a central office and branches in eight districts, forty-one counties and twenty-three villages. As early as 1936 the society had established 1,980 educational institutions attended by a total of 129,649 students. Activity of the *Ha-sa-k'o* Cultural Progress Society and the *Hui* Cultural Progress Society is on a smaller scale. Besides central headquarters, the *Ha-sa-k'o* Cultural Progress Society maintains five district and eight county offices and has established 207 educational institutions where 10,194 students are in attendance. The *Hui* Cultural Progress Society, besides its central office and branches in three districts and fourteen counties, has thirty-seven educational institutions with a student attendance of over 2,700. Mr. Tu specifically mentions, in addition, that Cultural Progress Societies exist for the *Meng-ko*, *T'a-t'a-erh*, *Kuei-hua*, and *Han*.

#### "Anti-imperialism"

According to the Sinkiang authorities' political analysis, racial difficulties and their political reverberations in the province might not have been so serious in the first place were it not for "imperialism." "Sinkiang," points out Tu Chung-yuan, "has long been the goal of every imperialism. Behind the facade of the racial and cultural complex of Sinkiang, every imperialist force has sought to cause dissension and division. . . . A certain imperialist force, for instance, has increasingly fostered independence for South Sinkiang, and Japanese imperialism has helped the *Ch'an-Hui* [Turban Mohammedans] promote a *Hui-hui Kuo* [Mohammedan State] . . ."

Though Tu is not definite enough in one instance here, other Chinese evidence indicates that the "certain imperialist force" he mentions might be British. Chiang Chun-chang<sup>2</sup> states that "England has one constant aim in regard to Sinkiang. It is to establish on the South Road [i.e., South Sinkiang] around Kashgar an independent government which will be fostered by the English

<sup>2</sup> *Hsin-chiang Ching-ying Lun*, Cheng Chung Book Company, May 1939, p. 75.

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as a buffer between them and the Russians." However, Chiang also does not fear to elaborate on his suspicions in regard to Soviet Russia, Germany, Japan, France, and Turkey as well.

The line of "anti-imperialism" taken by Tu is one which coincides to a great degree with that often espoused by Soviet writers. Though one need not agree with this view, the reasons for it are understandable; and, due to the recent influence of Soviet ideas on Sinkiang, those reasons ought to be briefly mentioned here.

Up to 1917 the trend of Sinkiang foreign trade had decidedly been toward Russian Turkestan. But with the overthrow of Tsarism, Sinkiang commerce with Russia was interrupted. Whereupon, American, British, German, and Japanese businessmen began to develop the abandoned market. Subsequently, Sinkiang imports and exports shifted sharply away from the Russian route via Tarbagatai in the north to that via Kashgar and India in the south. There is confirmation, moreover, that considerable Russian counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet activity did in fact base itself in South Sinkiang.

All this provided a serious problem for the Bolsheviks, especially since they were so much in need of the wool, cotton, furs, skins, cattle, sheep, and horses of Sinkiang and since the Red Army then, as now, was hard pressed militarily. It is in part due to these experiences that the U.S.S.R. has since developed a watchful policy toward its Asiatic frontiers and cultivated "good-neighborly" relations with the peoples on its borders.

At the same time, in view of Japanese aggression, Sinkiang has increasingly felt the need of Soviet friendship. Since 1931, when Chinese troops were defeated in Manchuria and fled through Siberia to Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-tsai has emphasized that the Japanese is the worst form of imperialism. Therefore, especially after signature of the Sino-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression in August 1937, there has been little question in regard to Sinkiang support for the Chinese National Government's resistance to Japan. In October 1938, the All-Sinkiang Congress in Ti-hua pointed out that Japanese machinations in Inner Mongolia had also been unsuccessfully aimed at Sinkiang, and it pledged not only ten airplanes for the Chinese Air Force but also that Sinkiang would oppose "Japanese imperialism" and keep open an overland route for Chinese international communications.

It is not mere chance that the Sinkiang official stand against imperialism resembles Bolshevik views. The Sinkiang of Sheng Shih-tsai openly admits and fosters its "kinship to Soviet Russia." Why? "The Soviet Russia of today is not the same as the old Russian Tsar," Tu Chung-yuan explains. "She does not have aggressive designs. . ."

Chao Lieh, another Chinese writer, echoes this sentiment in a feature article in the Kweilin *Ta Kung Pao*, August 1941, but gives more stress, first, to foreign trade, and second, to Soviet help in Sinkiang reconstruction. He makes the further point that necessarily a certain kinship has been forged between Sinkiang and the Russians due to their contiguous frontiers.

Back in the days of the Tsars, neighboring Turkestan frontiers influenced Sino-Russian relations, but then in the direction of military conflict. It was probably competing international diplomacy in the Middle East and gradual assertion of British interest in South Sinkiang that finally assisted China in checking Tsarist ambitions further north. As a matter of fact, as late as the rules of Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen, Sinkiang leaders played off one power against the other. Sheng *Tu-pan*, however, from the beginning apparently abandoned this attempt at a policy of balance in order to swing toward closer relations with the new Soviet regime. There has, nevertheless, been no public indication yet that British interests have been entirely removed from South Sinkiang.

Sheng turned toward Soviet Russia, Chinese writers explain, because he wanted to "liberate" Sinkiang through provincial reconstruction and thought Soviet help in the form of capital and talent might do the trick. As a matter of fact, Sheng probably had little elsewhere to turn, and he was already indebted to the Soviets for help in suppressing the Mohammedan insurrection of the 1930's. Besides, Sinkiang trade with Soviet Russia had so eclipsed all others that to turn elsewhere might have been contrary to the economic well-being of his province.

But Tu Chung-yuan insists that "kinship to Soviet Russia" has not meant Soviet political control in Sinkiang. If Soviet Russia "controlled" Sinkiang politically, would she tolerate the White Russians that are still there? Are not the Three People's Principles textbooks that are used in Sinkiang identical with those used elsewhere in Nationalist China? Is not the military and

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administrative authority of Sinkiang still in the hands of Chinese? Tu admits that, in Sinkiang, specialists in animal husbandry, doctors in hospitals, pharmacists of the provincial pharmacy, and instructors for the provincial Military Officers Academy and for the provincial air force have come from Soviet Russia. But, he inquires, does that mean that Sinkiang has gone "Red?" Did not Soviet Russia herself, at the beginning of her national reconstruction, get assistance "from thousands upon tens of thousands" of "capitalist" experts? Yet that did not mean that Soviet Russia was "White!"

ON THE basis of his Eight Point Proclamation and his Six Great Policies, Sheng Shih-tsai attempted the reconstruction of Sinkiang. He was not able to realize his aims rapidly, nor is his job nearly completed. But he has had considerable success.

One Chinese authority states that for three years Sheng did not succeed in establishing a unified Sinkiang government. Numerous taxation and currency stabilization problems remained unsolved, and there was still lack of political cohesion. In 1937, however, he instituted a three year plan of reconstruction under Soviet Russian guidance, and by 1941 the second such plan was well under way. Up to the latter date, according to Chao Lieh, a total of 15,000,000 rubles had been borrowed from Soviet Russia. This money has gone mainly for purchase of machinery, for trucks, for curing of furs and hides and—one of the first and basic steps—for currency stabilization. Two institutions, a Foreign Trade Company and a Local Resources Company, transact most of the Sinkiang business and, on a profit-for-the-province basis, deal with and for a network of local cooperatives. All provincial banking is monopolized by a Sinkiang Commercial Bank. Together with a Reconstruction Commission, these organizations are the core of the new provincial economy. An indication of what the arrangement has accomplished, in terms of incomplete and in many cases generalized or proximate data, is shown below.

*Agriculture and animal husbandry.* Only about 30,000 acres of Sinkiang seem traditionally to have been under cultivation, and rainfall has usually been slight. Yet, at times, the province had to depend on its own agriculture and the related field of animal husbandry. Consequently, irrigation projects were given heavy weighting in Sinkiang reconstruction. In the first three year

plan, 1937 to 1940, twenty-two new irrigation conduits were opened and forty-two old ones repaired. Nine river deepening projects, two artificial basins for watering of cattle, and the repair and deepening of the locally famous thirty-five mile Hui-yuan irrigation conduit were also completed. The result, a Chinese writer enthusiastically claims, has been an approximate *tenfold* increase in the amount of land available for cultivation.

To assist the peasantry in the solving of agricultural and animal husbandry problems, field stations have been set up in every county of the province. There are province-wide facilities by which farmers may rent farm machinery otherwise unavailable, there are experimental irrigation stations, veterinary hospitals and schools, special "practice" and breeding stations, forestry offices and weather bureaus—epoch making innovations for this relatively isolated desert area.

*Industry.* Though on a scale microscopic in American eyes, the industrial achievements in Sinkiang have been notable. Primitive wool-washing and leather tanning establishments of older days have been improved and supplemented. Ti-hua, the capital, and T'a-ch'eng and I-li in the northwest of the province, have become industrial centers boasting of leather tanneries, flour mills, and auto repair and small parts shops. Emphasis has, where possible, been put upon the installation of utilities in these and other major cities and electricity, telephone, and telegraph facilities are now well established. In the three years prior to 1941, forty-two factories, including spinning and weaving establishments and plants for making matches, flour, and foods in general, have been erected. By 1939 public printing offices had been opened at such widely separated points as Ti-hua, T'a-ch'eng, K'o-shih, I-li, Aksu, and A-shan, and the printing of the *Sinkiang Daily News* begun in Ti-hua.

*Mineral resources.* Adequate data are not available on the subject as yet, but as a result of recent investigations it has been discovered that Sinkiang is surprisingly rich in mineral resources. The Altai Mountain area of North Sinkiang is proving to be one of the wealthiest gold-bearing regions of Asia, and new oil fields have been discovered: in South Sinkiang near So-ch'e, K'o-shih, and Wen-su counties and in North Sinkiang near Ti-hua, Sui-lai, Wu-su, and T'a-ch'eng. Near Kashgar there are also copper beds. Near Fu-yuan iron is to be found, and coal is abundantly available



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in many places in both the north and south. Students of the province also boast that there are considerable deposits of alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, and salt.

*Communications.* Modern communications have made the province aware of the stirring events in the outside world. The Sino-Soviet commercial air service between Chungking and Alma Ata and touching Hami and Ti-hua, has established regular aviation contacts throughout Eurasia. Fourteen new wireless and eight new radio stations have brought the province within easy communications range of the most distant points on the continent. There were 1,075 kilometers of telegraph wire set up, 2,206 kilometers of old lines repaired, and 2,160 kilometers of telephone lines constructed during the first three year plan. Through these facilities, the Chinese and Russian official news services, *Central News* and *Tass*, have been funneled and bring up to date information to the provincial capitol for public dissemination.

*Road transportation.* But the most significant advances have been those in the field of road transportation. Century old caravan routes between China and Russia through Sinkiang have been readapted to modern truck travel. The only truck highway in Sinkiang before 1933 is said to have run but a short distance from the provincial capital, and there were only some twenty military trucks in the whole area. But Chinese reports stated that by 1938 the following truck roads had been completed and had been put into use in North Sinkiang:

Main Roads	Branch Lines	Termini	Distance [in km.]
Ti-I		Ti-hua and I-li	720
Ti-Hsing		Ti-hua and Hsing-hsing-hsia	750
Ti-T'a		Ti-hua and T'a-ch'eng	690
	Ti-Tu	Ti-hua and Turfan	} 1,840
	Tu-Ch'i	Turfan and Ch'i-chio-ching-tzu	
	T'a-Ch'eng	T'a-ch'eng and Ch'eng-hua	} 4,000 km.
Total			

In addition repairs and reconstruction were undertaken over more than 3,000 kilometers of what is called "dry line" between Ti-hua and Khotan (running via Ti-hua, Yen-ch'i, K'u-ch'e, Aksu, and K'o-shih to Khotan). A transport control office of the pro-

vincial government, which had over 400 trucks of its own in 1938, maintains control and repair stations on every line; by the latter date, the equivalent of well over \$500,000 U. S. currency had been expended on such work. By 1941 it was reported that there were altogether 3,000 trucks engaged in Sinkiang transport, but figures on additional road improvements or construction have not yet been obtained. Truck transport that now connects Ti-hua with Soviet Russia and other parts of China runs principally from T'a-ch'eng (on the Russian border) through Ti-hua to Hsing-hsing-hsia (on the border of Chinese Kansu). But in South Sinkiang there is also important Soviet contact with Kashgar from Andijan and the Terek Pass in Russian Turkestan.

The great remaining need in Sinkiang road transport, however, has been the improvement of truck communications from Khotan in South Sinkiang to Ch'inghai and Kansu. The fact that Khotan was formerly the stronghold of a Tungan army against which Sheng Shih-tsai's forces waged war early in his rise to power may help explain why road construction has not made great progress in that part of the country. But these Tungans, Mohammedans who themselves came to Sinkiang from the adjacent Chinese province of Kansu, may reasonably be expected to cooperate in reconstruction now. Thus, the Mohammedan Ma Pu-ch'ing, famous for his earlier road construction work in Kansu and Shensi Provinces and recently appointed Pacification Commissioner in West Ch'inghai, is himself a Kansu Tungan. He should prove to have been well chosen for political liaison work on the Sinkiang-Ch'inghai borderlands.

**T**HE regime which Sheng Shih-tsai has brought to Sinkiang is entering another phase in which both the National Government of China and South Sinkiang should play more important roles. In developing its new Sinkiang transportation facilities, Chungking will no doubt employ for its own advantage Mohammedan Chinese talent and what it likes of Sheng Shih-tsai's program. China is once more proving her versatile leadership in Asia. In Sinkiang, a new link in United Nations resistance is being forged. For the future, it should lead to new and expanding Chinese relations with the Middle East and, through the Middle East, the outside world.

Washington, D. C., September 1942

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NOTES AND COMMENTS  
JAPAN—PROTECTOR OF ISLAM!

*Ed. Note: This article on Japanese intrigue among Moslems in China and the Near East was written by Mr. Yang Ching-chih, noted Moslem writer, and is translated from the Chungking TA KUNG PAO. It is here followed by extracts from a report on the present day attitude of Chinese Moslems made by the British Ministry of Information, New Delhi, India. This is of special interest in view of the increased attention focused on Northwest China, which is predominantly Moslem.*

I.

**W**E SWEAR to promote faith in Islam and to accomplish our task we shall spare no efforts. May God in Heaven punish us if we fail our mission." That was the text of an oath taken by a group of Japanese leaders at an impressive ceremony held one day in the thirty-third year of the reign of Emperor Meiji in Tokyo. By this oath Japan was sworn into the ambitious role of "protector of Islam" in order to enslave the world's 300,000,000 Moslems.

The bigwigs signatory to this important pact included former Premier Inukai and the super-Ronin and grand old man of political gangsters, Toyama Mitsura. He was the head of Kokuryu (Black Dragon), a leading "patriotic reactionary society" which finances the activities of the Ronin ("Wave Men") one of the two main groups of terrorists in Japan, the other group being the Soshi ("Noble Warriors"). Among other signers of the oath were Uchida Ryohei, Nakayama Yasuzo, Wakano Tsuetaro, Owara, Yamata Kinosuke, Aoyama Katsutoshi, Kawarada and Kawamura.

With the signing of the oath was launched an offensive against the Moslem world which called for a thorough investigation of all possible facts and data about Islam as a preparatory step towards political, economic and military conquest. The first move against the Near Eastern Moslem countries took the form of a delegation to Mecca in 1925 which was headed by Tanaka Yasuhira, a member of the Young Officers' Clique, and included Nakao Hitea, reputed to be an authority on Islamic affairs. In 1933, Tanaka Yasuhira, accompanied by Yamamoto Taro and two other young officers, again went to Mecca to attend the Annual World Haiji Conference. He died of malaria in Arabia on his way back the following year, but Yamamoto Taro remained in Kabul, Afghanistan for seven years investigating conditions of Near Eastern Moslem countries.

6. Verbs ending in *-dya* change into *-didye* :—

<i>kukodya</i> , to meet	changes to <i>kodidye</i> .
<i>kukomadya</i> , to be difficult	„ <i>komadidye</i> .
<i>kukotopadya</i> , to arrange	„ <i>kotopadidye</i> , etc.

A few of the exceptions are given below :—

<i>kuteula</i> , to take off fire	changes to <i>teulile</i> .
<i>kutwala</i> , to take	„ <i>twete</i> .
<i>kuholoka</i> , to come or arrive	„ <i>holeke</i> or <i>heleke</i> .
<i>kuleka</i> , to leave	„ <i>lekile</i> .
<i>kuona</i> , to see, etc.	„ <i>wene</i> or <i>wenite</i> .
<i>kuuka</i> , to come out or forward, etc.	„ <i>ukile</i> or <i>ukite</i> .
<i>kukwela</i> , to climb	„ <i>kwedidye</i> .
<i>kumalila</i> , to finish, etc.	„ <i>malidile</i> .

(To be continued.)

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THE ARAB INVASION OF KASHGAR IN A.D. 715

By H. A. R. GIBB

NOTHING is more disconcerting to the student of early Muslim history than the way in which Ṭabarī and the other historians alternate between detailed and comprehensive narrative and jottings of the most meagre and involved nature, filled out, in some cases, by picturesque but obviously legendary tales. These faults, which are to a large degree inherent in the method of compilation from oral tradition, come out most clearly in the narrative of the brilliant series of campaigns by which the Arab general Qutayba ibn Muslim conquered and annexed the lands eastward from Herāt and the Oxus to the Pamīr, during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph Walīd I (A.D. 705-15). Thus we are given a fairly sufficient account of the long drawn out operations against Bukhārā, but none of the actual conquest and colonization of the city: much of the expeditions against various princes subject to the kingdom of Ṭukhāristān, but practically nothing of the annexation of Ṭukhāristān itself.

Up to the year 712, however, it is possible to follow the actual course of the conquests culminating in the capture and colonization of Samarqand. The story of this decisive campaign is elaborately and clearly told, but the extension of the conquests across the Jaxartes in the next three years is related by Ṭabarī only in brief and confused accounts. It is from the laconic notices of the earlier historian Ya'qūbī, for instance, that the attempted reconquest of Samarqand by the Northern Turks in the following winter has been brilliantly reconstructed by Barthold.<sup>1</sup> But neither Ya'qūbī nor his contemporary Balādhurī add very much more to our knowledge of the events.

The situation of the Jaxartes provinces in the year 713 may be briefly described. The kingdoms of Shāsh (Tashkent) and Farghāna maintained a precarious existence as semi-independent states subject to the Northern Turks, the latest of the ephemeral Turkish empires which flourished in what is now Siberia during periods of weakness in Chinese foreign policy. The Northern Turks, however, engaged in

<sup>1</sup> *Die Alt.-türk. Inschriften u. die Arab Quellen*, p. 11 (St. Petersburg, 1899).

constant warfare with the Türgesh tribes in the Ili valley, were practically powerless to intervene effectively in their affairs. Together with this, the princes of Shāsh and Farghāna, like all the other rulers in Central Asia, regarded themselves as vassals of China in virtue of the Chinese protectorate proclaimed over them in 659, but at the moment the internal weakness of China prevented any enforcement of her claim. Internally, the two kingdoms appear to have been in constant feud, and both suffered from chronic anarchy.

By crossing the Jaxartes, therefore, Qutayba challenged both the Turkish and Chinese pretensions more definitely than he had done hitherto. The accounts given by Ṭabarī are that in the year 713 he divided his forces in two, one of which under his own command defeated the Farghanians and captured their chief cities, Khujanda, Farghāna, and Kāshān, while the other, composed chiefly of the levies raised in Transoxania, was successful in capturing Shāsh. In the following year he undertook a second expedition "into Shāsh", but on hearing of the death of his patron Ḥajjāj he returned to his headquarters at Merv. As the death of Ḥajjāj took place in June (Shawwāl, A.H. 95) it is probable that the expedition was already far advanced. Balādhurī (ed. de Goeje, p. 422) preserves a tradition that Qutayba captured Isbījāb, an important trading centre some 100 miles north of Shāsh. It would seem, then, that, whether or not a second conquest of Shāsh was necessary, Qutayba's plan of campaign was to follow up the very important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz (Aulié-ata) into Shāsh and Samarqand. The economic importance of controlling this trade-route may have been less in his mind, however, than its strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania.

The death of Ḥajjāj deeply affected Qutayba's position although he had received a kindly and appreciative letter from the Caliph confirming his appointment and making him directly subordinate to Damascus. It is unnecessary here to discuss the deep-seated factional tendencies of the Arabs, which showed themselves nowhere in an uglier light than in Khurāsān, on which Qutayba's army was based.<sup>1</sup> The general himself was not supported by any of the powerful parties, and his Arab troops resented his growing partiality for the Persians. All these elements of disaffection had been held in check by Ḥajjāj

<sup>1</sup> See Wellhausen, *Das Arab. Reich* (Berlin, 1902), chap. viii, esp. p. 273.

so completely that Qutayba himself seems to have been largely unaware of his danger.

This summary helps to make clear the circumstances under which the campaign of 715 was projected and opened. The account which Ṭabarī intends to convey is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led an expedition to Kashgar, with complete success. At this stage he received a request from the king of China to send an embassy to the Chinese court. Qutayba selected twelve of the leaders for this mission. The legend naively relates how these ambassadors made such an impression on the king that he sent formal tokens of submission. Beneath the characteristic layer of *fakhr*, however, there is a basis of fact. The Chinese records contain a notice of an Arab embassy which visited the capital in 713 and caused consternation by refusing to kowtow before the Emperor. Nevertheless the ambassadors were favourably received, but no indication is given of the purpose or achievement of their mission. The accuracy of the Chinese date is confirmed by the statement in Ṭabarī himself (ii, 1280, 3) that the ambassadors were sent to the Caliph Walīd on their return, which must therefore have occurred between the death of Ḥajjāj and the end of 714. We may conjecture that the embassy was intended either to dissuade the Chinese from assisting the Turks or to make mutual arrangements with regard to the silk-trade, a matter peculiarly important to Samarqand and Bukhārā.

There is thus *prima facie* evidence that Ṭabarī's account of the expedition of 715 contains a confused and unreliable tradition in at least one respect. It remains now to consider the invasion of Kashgar, which has hitherto been generally accepted as historical. In this case no such easy contradiction is possible, but I hope to show that the whole weight of evidence is decisively against it.

In the first place, of the three earlier historians whose works have come down to us not one mentions this expedition to Kashgar. The silence of Dīnawarī is perhaps hardly remarkable, but both Ya'qūbī and Balādhurī omit all reference to it, though they give fairly full accounts of Qutayba's campaigns. Ya'qūbī quotes only the local tradition of Khurāsān, utilized also by Ṭabarī (see below), that "Qutayba penetrated far into Farghāna", while Balādhurī quotes the summaries of two authorities, Abū 'Ubaida (422, 13f.) and Abū 'Ayyāsh al-Hamadhānī (422, 7f., and 431, 16f.), neither of which include Kashgar in the list of conquests. Nor does Narshakhī, almost contemporary with Ṭabarī, mention such an expedition in connexion with Qutayba,

though he relates his "martyrdom" in Farghāna (ed. Schefer, p. 57). Even when we turn to Ṭabarī himself, in spite of the tarjama (1275, 15) "افتتح قتيبة بن مسلم كاشغر وغزا الصين" (Qutayba captured Kashgar and raided China", we find that the statement is not borne out by the authorities on which it professedly rests.

The first narrative is quoted from Al-Madā'inī (1276, 2 ff.) :

مضى الى فرغانة وارسل الى شعب عصام من يسهل له الطريق

الى كاشغر وهي ادنى مدائن الصين فاتاه موت الوليد وهو بفرغانة

"He marched to Farghāna and sent forward to the pass of 'Iṣām pioneers to clear the way for him to Kashgar, which is the nearest of the cities of China, but the news of Walīd's death reached him while he was at Farghāna." Al-Madā'inī therefore credits Qutayba with the intention of raiding Kashgar, but definitely refrains from saying that the intention was carried out.

The narrative of Abū Mikhnaf is vague and confused (1276, 17 ff.) :

بعث قتيبة كثير بن فلان الى كاشغر فسبى منها سبيا فحتم اعناقهم

مما افاء الله على قتيبة [ثم رجع قتيبة] وجاءهم موت الوليد

"Qutayba sent Kathīr (or Kuthaiyir) ibn Fulān (i.e. son of So-and-so) to Kashgar and he took a number of them captive and placed his seal on their necks, namely of that which God gave as booty to Qutayba. [Then Qutayba returned] and there reached them the news of Walīd's death." It will be seen that though it is claimed that Kashgar was actually raided, the exploit is attributed not to Qutayba with his army but to a small force under an unknown leader. The clause in brackets, besides being in contradiction to the other narratives and clearly out of context, is missing in one MS. and in the redaction of Ibn al-Athīr : it is noteworthy also that Ibn Khaldūn transcribes the whole passage

بعث مقدمه الى كاشغر فغنموا وسبوا وختم اعناق السبي : thus :

"He (i.e. Qutayba) sent his advance guard to Kashgar and they made booty and prisoners, and he sealed the necks of the prisoners."

Ṭabarī quotes finally the local tradition of Khurāsān on a double *isnād*, in almost the same words as are used by Ya'qūbī :



وغل قتيبة حتى قرب من الصين Qutayba penetrated so far into Farghāna as to approach the borders of China." This passage seems to be taken by Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Khaldūn to refer to the main army under Qutayba himself, though the former retains Ṭabarī's tarjama.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Ṭabarī read into his authorities a meaning which they did not support. Wellhausen (op. cit., p. 272) states that the expedition is "auch durch gleichzeitige Lieder vielfach bestätigt". I have been unable to find any of these poems. There are two verses which mention Qutayba in connexion with China. One occurs in a poem of Tirimmāḥ in praise of Yemen,

quoted in Ṭabarī (1302, 18): *قتلوا قتيبة . . . بالمرج مرج الصين*

"They slew Qutayba at the meadow, the meadow of China," and the second in Yāqūt's *Mu'jam al Buldān* (ed. Wüstenfeld, i, 730, 8, s.v. Balanjar), in praise of Bāhila, the tribe to which Qutayba belonged:

*وان لنا قبرين قبر بالمنجر وقبر بصين أستان يالك من قبر*

Two graves are ours, the grave of Balanjar, and a grave in China: alas! what a grave was that." But as both these verses speak of Qutayba's death, which undoubtedly took place in Farghāna, they can hardly be regarded as confirming the tradition.

In the second place, there are grave chronological difficulties. It is well known how, on hearing of the death of the Caliph Walīd, Qutayba, knowing that his successor Sulaymān was his implacable enemy, after some attempted negotiations on both sides, openly revolted. On finding the army disinclined to follow him he completely lost his head and roused a mutiny in which he was killed. The death of Walīd took place at latest in February, 715, and the news must have reached Farghāna by the end of April. Wellhausen (p. 274, n. 2) remarks that it could hardly have reached Farghāna before July, but the statement is not borne out by the Arabic writers. The post covered the distance from Baṣra to Merv, some 400 farsakhs, in twenty days (Ṭab. 1035); from Damascus to 'Irāq, via Ar-Raqqā, was a much shorter distance, and from Merv to Farghāna only 147 farsakhs. It is incredible that Qutayba should not have made arrangements for a rapid system of communications, and two months is ample time to allow for the receipt of the news. The authorities all agree that Qutayba was at Farghāna when it arrived, and he could

not therefore have already set out on his expedition. In any case, the high passes into Kashgar would barely be passable for caravans, let alone an army, before the end of April. The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that followed, but it is evident that some months were spent in an attempt at negotiation, and that in the meantime Qutayba was left with an insubordinate army in an extremely awkward position. It may well be that small forces had already been sent out in various directions and some preparations for the main campaign set on foot, but an arduous expedition with the whole army was out of the question in these circumstances. It is difficult, moreover, to see what, beyond booty, Qutayba stood to gain by such an expedition, in comparison with the risks it involved. Further, it is agreed on all sides that Qutayba was killed in Dhu'l-Hijja, A.H. 96, or the following month, i.e. August or September, by which time only the smallest of raiding parties could have returned from Kashgar to Farghāna, even in the improbable case of meeting no opposition.

This chronological point is of great importance when we come to examine the Chinese records, which, as is well known, do not hesitate to record foreign expeditions into the Tarim basin. It happens that there is an important reference to the Arabs in Farghāna in this year, which has sometimes been taken to substantiate the narrative of Tabarī<sup>1</sup>: "The Tibetans and Arabs, acting in concert, nominated a certain A-leao-ta king [of Farghāna], and sent troops to attack Farghāna. The troops of the [deposed] king having been defeated, he fled to Kucha to ask help. . . . The governor put himself at the head of 10,000 troops from the neighbouring barbarian tribes, marched several thousand li to the west of Kucha, and subdued several hundreds of cities. He made forced marches, and in the same month [according to Chav., p. 291, the eleventh month = December] he attacked A-leao-ta near the United cities [Lien-Ch'ang, now unidentified but apparently in Kashgaria] and after an eight hours' battle took these three cities and killed or captured over a thousand men. A-leao-ta with some horsemen fled into the mountains. . . . Chinese prestige made the western countries tremble. Eight kingdoms, including the Arabs, Samarqand, Shāsh, and Kapisa, sent embassies with their submission."

<sup>1</sup> Translated from Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-Kiue Occidentaux* (St. Petersburg, 1903), p. 148, n. 3.

The one thing quite clear about this strange and obviously boastful narrative is that it has no connexion with anything reported by Ṭabarī. Its general bearing I hope to discuss in a later article on Chinese notices of the Arabs, but for the present purpose it should be noted that while on the one hand Ṭabarī says nothing of Tibetan support or of a battle with the king of Farghāna, so also the Chinese make no reference to an Arab attack on Kashgar. It is not even said that there were Arabs fighting on the side of A-leao-ta. More important, however, is the date of this event. If on the arrival of the deposed king the governor of Kucha immediately collected the available local forces to make a forced march against his rival, and yet with all his haste the battle did not take place until December, it is obvious that the events related in Farghāna did not take place until the late autumn. But by that time Qutayba was dead and his army disbanded. The reconciliation of the two narratives, on the supposition that they deal with one and the same event, seems to me impossible.

The evidence is thus entirely against the authenticity of the tradition that Qutayba invaded Kashgar. But there is no doubt that it was not a pure invention of the historian Ṭabarī; we may take it rather that by his time it had become a floating legend which he attached to his earlier sources and perpetuated by the authority of his name. Its origin may perhaps be traced to more than one source. "Šin," for one thing, was to the Arabs less the name of a definite country than a vague term for "The Far East". How indefinite it was may be seen from the two verses quoted above on the death of Qutayba, or even more surprisingly in an early writer's reference to the battle of Tarāz as having taken place in "Šin".<sup>1</sup> It is in this sense that the saying attributed to Yazīd b. Muḥallab (Balādhurī, 336, 13 f.)

is to be understood : قَبَّحَ اللَّهُ قَتَيْبَةَ تَرَكَ هَاؤُلَاءِ وَهُمْ فِي بَيْضَةِ الْعَرَبِ

“God curse Qutayba: he left these people [the inhabitants of Jurjān] alone though they live in the heart of Arab territory, and sought to invade China,” or according to another account “he invaded China”. In course of time such a statement as “Qutayba invaded Šin” would naturally become defined as “Qutayba captured Kashgar”, that being the nearest and best-known Chinese city in later times.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ibn Ṭaifūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, vi (ed. H. Keller, Leipzig, 1908), p. 8; l. 12.

<sup>2</sup> On the development of traditions to explain poetic allusions see Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.*, i, 183.

Or something of this may perhaps be traced to attributing to Qutayba the legendary exploits of the Tubbas of Yemen, as popularized by Wabb b. Munabbih and other story-tellers. Compare the verse quoted

in Ṭabarī (1304, 15): بهن ابجنا اهل كل مدينة من الشرك حتى

جاوزت مطلع الشمس “With our spears we gained as our booty the people of every city of unbelief, until they overpassed the place of the sun’s rising.”

According to the Chinese records, however, there was a descent on Kashgaria in 717 by the Türgesh in which bands of Tibetans and Arabs joined (Chav., 284, n. 2). It is more than possible that the memory of this raid was preserved and attached to the popular narratives of the exploits of Qutayba. But however the tradition may have arisen, it lost nothing in the course of centuries. To what astounding lengths it was ultimately carried may best be seen in the version given by Vambéry (quoting probably from a late Turkish recension of Ṭabarī) in his *History of Bokhara* :—

“Having conquered Farghāna, Qutayba pressed along the old road through the Terek pass into Eastern Turkestan. Here he encountered the princes of the Uigurs who in default of union amongst themselves were easily conquered one after another. . . . We are told that the Arabs extended their incursions into the province of Kan-su, and it is a source of no little pride to the present inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan that Turfan, on the very first appearance of the Arabs, embraced Islam.”

One can only wonder what the legend might have come to had Qutayba actually invaded China.

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## A BRITISH SCHOOL OF INDIAN STUDIES IN INDIA

(Read at the joint session of the Royal Asiatic Society, Société Asiatique, American Oriental Society and Scuola Orientale, Reale Università di Roma, 5th September, 1919.)

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[*At the Conference of Orientalists held at Simla in July, 1911, under the auspices of the Government of India, a scheme was proposed by Sir Denison Ross for an Oriental Research Institute to be established in Calcutta. The Institute in question was intended to offer facilities for the higher branches of Oriental study to both Indians and Europeans, but owing to the war and other reasons the scheme was never carried into effect. For full particulars the reader is referred to the Government Report on the Conference of Orientalists held at Simla, July, 1911, printed in the same year at the Government Central Branch Press, Simla.*]

THE subject to which I venture to invite your attention is not altogether new to the members of the Royal Asiatic Society. Three years ago, at a meeting of the Society on 14th March, 1916, with Sir Charles Lyall in the chair, when the Campbell Memorial Gold Medal was awarded to Professor Macdonell, of Oxford, the latter in his reply touched upon the desirability of creating, on behalf of British Sanskrit scholars, some opportunity of study and research in India. "The only remedy," Professor Macdonell said,<sup>1</sup> "seems to be the establishment of a school of research for Europeans at some centre of Sanskrit learning, preferably Benares, like the School of Classical Archæology at Athens or the French School at Hanoi in Indo-China. It will be a reproach to this country if we cannot establish something of this kind in India, with all our obligations to advance education and learning in connexion with the ancient civilization and literature of the vast Indian Empire."

I understand that shortly afterwards a committee was appointed, including Sir Charles Lyall, Professor Macdonell, and Dr. Thomas, to consider the question, but that after two or three meetings, as the war was on, the committee did not formulate any definite proposals.

<sup>1</sup> *Journal Royal Asiatic Society* for the year 1916, p. 589.

# *Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities: The First Decade*

By HENRY G. SCHWARZ

WHEN the Chinese Communists spelled out their policy of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, it appeared to many observers that a significant break with the past had been made. Throughout China's modern history, central governments sought to amalgamate the various ethnic minorities with the dominant Han group. Now, in 1949, it seemed as if, for the first time, a central Chinese government was determined to end this process of sinification and to give its non-Chinese subjects a degree of autonomy. This self-rule, as outlined in official documents of the Peking régime, included the administrative, economic, educational and cultural spheres of life.

One of the most interesting features of this policy of regional autonomy lay in the field of languages. Article 53 of the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference guaranteed the development of minority languages and dialects. Sociologists point out that a group's sense of self-identity is greatly enhanced when it possesses its own language. By the same token, it increases this group's ability to resist another group's encroachments upon it. Thus, it would appear profitable to us to see how the Chinese Communists carried out their policy of developing and preserving minority languages. The result of such investigation would give us an additional clue as to the true nature of the larger, more inclusive policy of regional autonomy.

This article will deal with two aspects of this question: the central government's policies and work conducted in Peking, and the implementation of these policies in the minority areas of North-west China and in Inner Mongolia.

The initiative and main activities in this programme were centred in Peking. There were three principal tasks: (1) to create and reform the written languages of several national minorities; (2) scientific research in spoken languages; and (3) the training of language cadres.

The first two programmes were started in 1950 on a rather primitive basis because of the almost total lack of research facilities and of qualified personnel. Only a few of the minority languages could be considered at that time. The Language Research Institute of the Chinese Academy

of Sciences sent out teams to investigate the spoken languages of a number of nationalities. In the early part of 1951, the same institute established evening schools for the training of language cadres. It also opened a special course in Peking University.<sup>1</sup> Regular full-time class work began on July 31, 1951, with thirty-two students enrolled. On October 12 of that year, the committee on cultural and educational affairs of the Government Administration Council established a guidance committee for research in the spoken and written languages of national minorities.<sup>2</sup> This twenty-man body was charged with the task of co-ordinating and guiding research conducted by various organisations over a number of years. Finally, also in 1951, the Central Institute of Nationalities opened eighteen classes for eight languages. The following year, this institute formally set up a department of languages which was to train key language cadres.<sup>3</sup> The guidance committee of the Government Administration Council was abolished in summer 1954, its tasks apparently accomplished. The work then in progress was taken over by the Institute of Linguistic Studies of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.<sup>4</sup>

At the time this organisational change was announced, the policy directives of the central government in Peking in the field of minority languages were announced.<sup>5</sup> Reports were made by Liu Ko-p'ing, vice-chairman of the nationalities affairs commission of the central government, and by Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, secretary-general of the committee for guidance in the research of dialects and languages of nationalities of the committee of cultural and educational affairs in Peking. These men issued two orders: first, in areas where the population had its own dialects but did not possess a written language or no language common to all sections of a given minority nationality, assistance was to be given in the formulation of a phonetic language or in the selection of one of the existing languages. Secondly, regardless whether or not a minority group had its written language, it was "free" to adopt the Chinese or any other language actually used in China.

On November 28, 1954, the Institute of Linguistics and Philology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences started to participate in the reforming and creation of minority languages but at that time it conducted work only on the South-west.<sup>6</sup> In co-operation with the Central Institute of Nationalities, it held its conference on nationalities languages on December 6, 1955, with 160 delegates participating.<sup>7</sup> This was one of

<sup>1</sup> Fu Mou-chi, "Brilliant success scored in nationalities language work," *Min-tzu T'uan-chieh*, July 6, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> New China News Agency (NCNA), October 13, 1951.

<sup>3</sup> Fu Mou-chi, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> NCNA, June 4, 1954.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> NCNA, November 28, 1954.

<sup>7</sup> NCNA, December 6, 1955.

the first in a series of conferences in Peking on the subject. Their number indicated that the work in the relevant organisations in Peking and in the field, such as the North-west and Inner Mongolia, had not been altogether successful. The officially admitted lack of qualified researchers in 1951 was probably never sufficiently overcome by the end of 1955.

The timing of these conferences was also significant because they roughly coincided with the co-operativisation campaigns in the rural areas of the minority regions. During this drive, it was discovered that the higher form of rural organisation, the agricultural producers' co-operative, needed more than merely peasants and machinery. Its relatively more complex organisation made efficient administration absolutely necessary. The greatest single handicap in the field of administration, it was found out, was the lack of minority nationality members who could perform satisfactorily as book-keepers and other clerical workers. The origin of this obstacle was often the low educational attainment of the individual workers. However, just as often the existing language, if indeed it existed at all, was not sophisticated enough to cope with the new terminology required in running agricultural co-operatives.

Thus, in 1955 and 1956, the drive for the creating and reforming of written minority languages, somewhat languishing in the past, received new impetus. On February 3, 1956, the *People's Daily*, in an editorial, urged the speed-up of the creation of languages. It stated as reason that "the existing state retards education and production."<sup>8</sup> It meant specifically that in such areas where there were either no or only inadequate written languages, the old and primitive accounting methods of tying knots, carving wood, and counting straws and beans had to be perpetuated. How extensive these language difficulties were was made clear in the same editorial. Of the roughly forty million members of national minorities, twenty million were affected by them.

Late in February 1956, the Academy of Sciences, the Central Institute of Nationalities, and other organisations of the central government set up special training classes in Peking and Chengtu. These classes, composed probably of a majority of Chinese, were graduated in four to six months. These students were then joined by personnel of the Language Institute, local language organisations, and other relevant units, the total being more than 700 persons. They were grouped into seven language investigation teams, one for each province or region having a large proportion of minorities. Four of these teams were sent to Chinghai, Kansu, Sinkiang, and to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

In a summary report of achievements in language work during the first ten years of the Communist régime, it was claimed that by the end of

<sup>8</sup> *People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao)*, February 3, 1956.



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1956, the creating and reforming of written languages was universally carried out.<sup>9</sup> The commission on nationalities affairs of the central government established a translation bureau which was to bolster the drive for the full utilisation of all minority languages. It is interesting to note that the minority languages into which materials were immediately translated were, with the exception of Yi, used either in the North-west or in Inner Mongolia.<sup>10</sup>

A renewed effort in the creation and reform of minority languages was made in December 1957 when a research class in "Turki" languages was established by the Institute of Minority Languages of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Central Institute of Nationalities in Peking. It was to include "twenty languages."<sup>11</sup> This was a vague, if not incorrect statement. In Sinkiang, the only relevant region in China, all major languages belonged to the family of Turkish languages. They were Uighur, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Tajik. These languages were also used in the respective Soviet republics. However, there were not anywhere near twenty languages of the East Turkish group in Sinkiang. We must, therefore, assume that the Chinese report included certain local variations of these languages.

In a report of August 1958, it was claimed that up to that time, ten written phonetic languages were created and three were reformed, but none of them were native to the North-west or Inner Mongolia.<sup>12</sup> Up to the end of the first ten years, investigations had been conducted into forty-two spoken languages, including Tibetan, Mongolian, Ta-hu-erh, Tung-hsiang, Pao-an, Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar, Uzbek, Salar, T'u, Yü-ku, Sibö, O-wen-k'o, O-lun-ch'un, and Tajik.<sup>13</sup> Significantly, the report failed to mention whether any of these investigations were completed. In the area of training language cadres, the Peking institutes had by October 1959 some fifty-eight classes in regular college courses for twenty minority languages, including Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz. There were also research classes, two special classes for the Mongolian and Turkish languages, and short-term training classes designed exclusively to train journalists, publications and editorial personnel, translators, and teachers. The estimated total of persons engaged in the popularisation of the new and reformed written languages had reached 40,000.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Ma Hsüeh-liang, "Development of written languages for China's minorities during the past few years," *Hsin Chien-she*, April 1957.

<sup>10</sup> *China News Service*, November 16, 1956. These languages were Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh and Korean. The two languages scheduled for later consideration were Chuang and Thai.

<sup>11</sup> *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, December 4, 1957

<sup>12</sup> Reprinted in Fu Mou-chi, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

In 1958, there were the first indications of a change in the Communist policies toward minority languages. The most explicit policy statement concerning the work in minority languages was made at that time. From the end of March until April 16, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the commission on nationalities affairs of the central government held their second forum on minority languages in Peking.<sup>15</sup> The fact that 126 persons participated and that it lasted for twenty days testified to its importance. The conference announced five criteria, some of which were already in operation at that time and which were adhered to for the balance of the first ten years of Communist rule.

First, in places where nationalities lived fairly close together, spoke more or less the same language but had no written language, a written language was to be created. Secondly, when the spoken languages of various nationalities were largely similar, the method of "language alliance" could be adopted, that is, the use of the same written language. Thirdly, when the spoken language differed greatly, care was to be exercised with regard to the written languages. It was held that, generally speaking, the creation of two or three different languages for the same nationality would be disadvantageous. However, if it should prove impossible to use the same language, three alternatives might be used: (a) some might adopt the written language of another nationality; (b) some might establish a written language alliance with a nationality speaking a similar language; and (c) some might create their own written languages independently. Fourthly, in cases where some nationalities had been using the spoken and written languages of Chinese or some other nationality, further work on creating a written language for these nationalities was to be terminated. Fifthly, when the spoken and written languages of some other nationality had been used partially or when these languages were well known and when the minorities concerned "saw no need" for coining their own written languages, any further work in this regard was also to be ended.

The novel features of this directive were the last two criteria and the method of "language alliance." They testified to the non-fulfilment of plans in this field during the years 1951 through 1957 which may have been due to the low quality of the research personnel and lack of co-operation by the national minorities. It also reflected a deliberate de-emphasis of "courting the minorities" on the part of the Peking régime. The outbreak of what was officially called "local nationalism" in 1958 had possibly caused the Communists to have second thoughts on their long-standing policy of special privileges for the non-Chinese peoples. From another point of view, the fourth and fifth clauses suggested that a period of forceful assimilation, at least in the linguistic field, was about to begin.

<sup>15</sup> NCNA, April 18, 1958.

## LANGUAGE POLICIES FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES

The change in Communist policies for minority languages was clearly manifested at the end of the first ten years. In a general survey of work conducted in the field of minority languages between 1949 and 1959, three main policy principles were enunciated.<sup>16</sup> The old principle of helping each minority in creating and reforming its written language was still considered applicable to all minority nationalities. But the survey added that when the investigation of spoken languages started "it was commonly believed that it was for the sake of coining written languages and that the more written languages were coined, the better." This was a typically Communist rationalisation of the change in policy as described above. As a matter of fact, previous official plans called for the creation of languages even for minority groups which no longer possessed any ethnic identity. Thus, there could be no question that this was not a matter of "common belief," but rather Peking policy which was being changed. Now, in 1959, the creation of written languages was said to be for the purpose of developing a "socialist culture" in the minority areas. If a given nationality knew Chinese or the language of another nationality and there was no need to create a written language, it was "free" to choose a written language. The Communists did not go as far as declaring that the programme of developing minority languages should be completely abandoned. These written languages were still considered useful in speeding up the trend toward literacy which, in turn, would help spread Communist Party directives and would give "the masses a more thorough course in Socialist and Communist education."

However, the second principle clearly revealed the true intention of the Peking régime. It warned that the minorities must "grasp the tendency for spoken and written languages to draw closer to the Chinese language. Any plea for the preservation of purity of the existing minority languages must be resolutely attacked." The State Council decided that when a minority language was similar or close to Chinese in pronunciation, it was, as far as possible, to be indicated by letters of the alphabet similar to those used in the Chinese Language Phoneticisation Plan. Also, attempts were to be made to achieve uniformity in spelling and alphabets of the various languages.

Finally, the third principle ordered the minority nationalities to learn the Chinese language. This was important, it was averred, because in many nationalities areas there were no institutes of higher education and no middle schools where instruction was conducted entirely in minority languages. Even in primary schools, only the first and second grades were devoted to the spoken and written minority languages. Starting with the third grade, instruction was mostly in Chinese.

<sup>16</sup> Fu Mou-chi, *op. cit.*

Thus, what was merely a hint in April 1958 had, only fifteen months later, become the clearly stated policy of the Communist régime: first, to force all minority members of all ages to learn Chinese; secondly, where this was not possible, to create and reform minority languages just to the extent that full impact of government propaganda was assured; and thirdly, to create a completely sinicised citizenry in all minority areas by using only the Chinese language in primary and secondary schools.

### THE CASE OF MONGOLIA

In the areas under consideration, the earliest steps taken in implementing the central language policies were in Inner Mongolia. In January 1951, the government of that autonomous region issued a notice to rectify the general indifference toward education in the Mongolian language and called for the promotion of all minority languages.<sup>17</sup> In June 1953, the propaganda department of the Inner Mongolia-Suiyuan sub-bureau of the CCP convened the first known Mongolian language work conference at Kuei-sui.<sup>18</sup> This meeting laid the groundwork for a region-wide popularisation programme.

Three months later, a general directive of the sub-bureau issued seven orders.<sup>19</sup> First, the study of the nationalities policy of the central government was to be co-ordinated with the analysis of problems inherent in language development. Secondly, the study of the Mongolian language was to be developed. This was to be on a voluntary basis for all Chinese cadres but obligatory for those in close contact with Mongols who did not understand Chinese. The third concerned the elimination of illiteracy. All Mongol primary schools were to use Mongolian textbooks, but from the fourth grade on, lessons in Chinese "may be added." Fourthly, documents and directives issued by the Party, government, and mass organisations were to be translated into Mongolian in predominantly Mongol areas. In those areas, Mongolian also was to be the primary language. In meetings with Mongols, interpreters had to be present. Short-term classes were to be established for the teaching of Chinese. Broadcasting stations in Inner Mongolia and Suiyuan had gradually to offer Mongolian programmes. Fifthly, in order to foster Mongol cadres for literacy work, institutes were to be established. Sixthly, a proper research institute was to be set up, to conduct research in the Mongolian language. Finally, the leadership of the Communist Party and government over language work was to be strengthened.

The fifth order had already been complied with before it was formally announced. On July 11, 1953, a Mongolian language school was opened

<sup>17</sup> *Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao (Inner Mongolian Daily)*, Huhehot, October 21, 1954.

<sup>18</sup> NCNA, Kuei-sui, June 16, 1953.

<sup>19</sup> *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, August 28, 1953.

in the regional capital. In the first group of students were eighty-two Mongols who were schooled in courses in philosophy and translation work.<sup>20</sup> At about the same time, the CCP Inner Mongolia sub-bureau warned that in the pastoral areas Chinese cadres still belittled Mongolian and did not use it. In fact, they opposed it on the basis that it expressed the spirit of local nationalism. A full-scale campaign to use the Mongolian language to wipe out illiteracy was ordered.<sup>21</sup>

At that time, the average literacy rate for Mongols in the entire region was 20 per cent.<sup>22</sup> The highest literacy rates were in the pastoral areas of Hu-lun-pei-erh and Ch'a-ha-erh *meng* where half of the Mongol population could read and write.<sup>23</sup> The former *meng* had been under Japanese administration during the days of the Manchukuo régime and thus profited from the Japanese school system. The latter *meng* was one of the most sinicised areas in Inner Mongolia and was located closest to the Communist capital. It is possible that the Mongols of Ch'a-ha-erh were literate in Chinese rather than in Mongolian. In the primary schools, Mongolian textbooks were generally used, while in secondary schools they were used either wholly or only in part.<sup>24</sup>

The Inner Mongolia Institute of Normal Education had been training teachers specialising in Mongolian. During 1952, various government organisations from the regional level down to *ch'i* levels made efforts to organise cadres to study the Mongolian language.<sup>25</sup> A year later, the Mongol cadres in Inner Mongolia had generally reached the level of junior primary school. At a language conference in 1953, a Society for the Study of Mongolian was inaugurated. This society had two committees, one for the standardisation of technical terms, and the other for the study of new language problems. The society was also compiling a Chinese-Mongolian dictionary which was to be published shortly.

In July 1955, a group of sixty linguists left Peking on a tour to investigate the Mongolian language problems in Inner Mongolia.<sup>26</sup> This group was probably instrumental in the adoption of the new written Mongolian language. It was reported from Huhehot a month later that the new language was to be phoneticised and to use the Cyrillic alphabet.<sup>27</sup> According to an order by the regional government council, the adoption of this new written language was to be completed by 1961 and the six

<sup>20</sup> NCNA—English, Kuei-sui, July 12, 1953.

<sup>21</sup> *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, August 28, 1953.

<sup>22</sup> *Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao*, Huhehot, October 21, 1954.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* The English term for *meng* is league, a Mongol administrative unit of the same order as a province in intra-mural China but smaller in size.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> The English term for *ch'i* is banner. This Mongol administrative unit is equivalent to the Chinese *hsien* (county).

<sup>26</sup> NCNA—English, July 2, 1955.

<sup>27</sup> NCNA—English, Huhehot, August 17, 1955.

intervening years were to be divided into two periods.<sup>28</sup> From July 1, 1955, until December 31, 1958, teachers, cadres, and printers were to be trained in the new language and books, journals and magazines were to be published in new Mongolian. Regional newspapers were to have some items in that language. From July 1, 1958, until December 31, 1961, primary school students were to be taught in the new language, with the first grade starting in the second half of 1958. In February 1956, however, this plan was shortened from six to four years, so that by the second half of 1956 new Mongolian would be taught in the first grade of all schools. By 1960, all publications were to be in that language except the classics.<sup>29</sup>

The pressure for shortening the timetable was probably applied by Peking. Shortly after the announcement of the revision by the Inner Mongolia government, a delegation of the preparatory office of the Minority Languages Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was dispatched. This committee held a joint conference with the Inner Mongolia language reform committee on May 22, 1956.<sup>30</sup> From all indications, this was a key conference with regard to the new Mongolian language. Besides the delegation from Peking, there were also Mongol delegates from other provinces, especially Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu. Moreover, Soviet advisers and experts from Outer Mongolia took part. The agenda was probably the finalisation of the new written language and its uniform application in all Mongolian-speaking areas of China.

This new language was identical to the one used in Outer Mongolia. This would explain the presence of Outer Mongolian linguists. The reason for its adoption by the Peking régime may have been to effect closer ties with that country. Some have speculated that with the synchronisation of written languages in both Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Communists intended to win back the "lost" territory of the "Mongolian People's Republic."

The popularisation programme was conducted at full speed immediately after this conference. The Chinese Communists claimed that by the end of November 1956, some 100,000 persons were studying the new written Mongolian language; 7,000 teachers were trained and one million textbooks had been published in that language.<sup>31</sup> The latter figure was deemed sufficient to take care of all the textbooks for all first grade classes in the autonomous region and other Mongolian-speaking areas of China, predominantly the North-west. The training of teachers for this purpose

<sup>28</sup> NCNA, Huhehot, September 5, 1955.

<sup>29</sup> NCNA—English, Huhehot, February 3, 1956.

<sup>30</sup> NCNA, Huhehot, May 23, 1956.

<sup>31</sup> *People's Daily*, November 25, 1956.

at the Inner Mongolia Teachers College was supervised by a Mongolian philologist from Ulan Bator. The teachers included not only Mongols but also members of the Ta-hu-erh minority. In December 1956, however, a draft plan for a written language for the Ta-hu-erh was endorsed at a conference on the Ta-hu-erh language.<sup>32</sup> This plan had been prepared for two years by the Institute of National Minority Languages of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Like the new Mongolian language, it was to use the Cyrillic alphabet. It was based on the Butha dialect and took the Na-wen spoken languages as standard pronunciation. It was planned to conduct a popularisation programme for five years. This unusually long programme for a population of only just over 50,000 was probably necessary because of the very low literacy rate among the Ta-hu-erh.

Despite all these intensive preparations at both the central and regional levels, the negative attitude of Chinese cadres in Inner Mongolia toward minority languages remained essentially unchanged. In October 1956, the official newspaper of the CCP regional sub-bureau complained again that the use of the Mongolian language was still being neglected by party organisations.<sup>33</sup> In the pastoral areas where most Mongols lived, the departments and bureaux of industry, commerce and communications issued nearly all documents in Chinese. This reluctance to become involved with a foreign language was also manifest in the flow of reports from basic-level organisations to the higher levels of government. For example, the regional department of agriculture and animal husbandry received some 128 reports in Mongolian, but only seventy-three were translated, some of them only verbally.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, the directive to use translators at conferences was not followed. Thus, at the meeting of the Food Company of Inner Mongolia in February 1956, all speakers used Chinese. When Mongol delegates demanded interpreters, they were simply told that none were available. Moreover, the Chinese conference chairman reprimanded the delegation from the Hsi-lin-kuo-lo *meng*, the most Mongol area in Inner Mongolia, for reporting in Mongolian and demanded that in the future Mongolian was not to be used or only very sparingly.<sup>35</sup>

This active suppression of all things Mongolian on the part of the Chinese leadership extended to the recruitment of minority cadres. A good example of this was the situation in Wu-lan-ch'a-pu *meng* where, in 1952, there had been more than fifty Mongol cadres in the various government organisations, whereas by 1956 there were only thirty of them left. The popularisation programme, however, was officially continued throughout

<sup>32</sup> NCNA—English, Huhehot, December 27, 1956.

<sup>33</sup> *Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao*, Huhehot, October 23, 1956.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

the first ten years. In May 1959 it was claimed that about 92 per cent. of all Mongols up to "the prime of life" were able to read and write the new Mongolian language. The language was used in all primary and middle schools where the Mongols formed the majority of the student body. Mongolian language classes were also conducted in the colleges and the university of Inner Mongolia.<sup>36</sup> Of course, with the progressive migration of Chinese settlers into all parts of the autonomous region, the share of such predominantly Mongol schools also decreased. It was also claimed that Party and government offices issued most documents and directives in both Chinese and Mongolian. The present writer is inclined, however, to doubt this report which was intended for foreign countries. As we have already demonstrated, the general trend was clearly toward sinification of all minority areas.

#### LANGUAGE WORK IN THE NORTH-WEST

The investigation of spoken languages and dialects was also carried out in the North-west. Although it was reported that already in 1950 such work was being carried out on a small scale, it was not until 1955 that the first systematic attempt in this matter was made. On July 2, 1955, a survey team of forty-two linguists left Peking for Sinkiang to investigate the languages of the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Sibos.<sup>37</sup> This team spent about one year in Urumchi, during which the actual travel plans of the group were worked out. The linguists left Urumchi on August 13, 1956 for the I-li Kazakh autonomous *chou*, K'o-shih, the Lop Nor region, and the Tarim river area. When it returned to the regional capital seven months later, it was reported that it was composed of more than 100 persons.<sup>38</sup> The dispatch did not explain how this increase in personnel came about. But another source revealed that besides the planned itinerary within the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, parts of Chinghai and southern Kansu were visited.<sup>39</sup> Since the latter two areas were predominantly Tibetan, it may be concluded that the additional personnel included specialists in that language, because the original group departing from Peking for Sinkiang had no such personnel. Thus, it seems possible that the additional members of the delegation returning to Urumchi formerly belonged to a team previously dispatched to Chinghai. Four members of the Chinghai team of the minority languages investigation corps of the Chinese Academy of Sciences left Sining on August 8, 1956, for the Hai-nan-Tibetan autonomous *chou* while others of the team went to the Yü-shu and Hai-pei Tibetan autonomous *chou*. The total

<sup>36</sup> NCNA—English, Huhehot, May 26, 1959.

<sup>37</sup> NCNA—English, July 2, 1955.

<sup>38</sup> NCNA, Urumchi, August 13, 1956.

<sup>39</sup> NCNA, Urumchi, April 14, 1957.



strength of the team was twelve, of whom seven were Tibetans and five were Chinese.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, a word about work in the written languages of the North-west minorities. In March 1955, it was claimed that the written language of the Kirghiz in the K'o-tze-lo-su autonomous *chou* was completed.<sup>41</sup> The present writer suspects that it was only a matter of making minor changes in an already existing language. The laconic report stated that the present twenty-seven letters of the alphabet were increased to thirty. In all likelihood, the language used by the Kirghiz up to that time was quite similar to that used by their fellow tribesmen in the Soviet Kirghiz republic and that the "new" language simply made it identical to that language. This view seemed to be supported by the decision reached at a conference in Urumchi in August 1956 at which it was announced that the "new" Kirghiz language was to have the Cyrillic alphabet.<sup>42</sup> The same alphabet was also decreed for the languages of the Uighurs, Kazakhs and Sibos. The Uzbeks and Tatars seemed to have already used the same languages as their counterparts in the Soviet Union and thus no change was contemplated by the Chinese Communist authorities.

It is interesting to note that during the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, the committee for studying the languages of nationalities of the Sinkiang-Uighur autonomous region suddenly decided on new drafts for a language reform movement in the region. It was ordered that the Latin alphabet should replace the Cyrillic alphabet for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Sibos. In addition, the Mongols in Sinkiang, of whom there were an estimated 64,000 scattered throughout the region, were also to receive the Latin alphabet.<sup>43</sup> In view of the present dispute between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, it is permissible to wonder whether this policy change in 1958 was an early indirect result of friction between these two Communist countries. A secondary problem was whether this change separated the Sinkiang Mongols linguistically from the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, where no such change was reported. If the Cyrillic alphabet was retained in the latter region, it might suggest that the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet in Inner Mongolia was designed mainly if not exclusively for the benefit of closer relations with Outer Mongolia. It could not explain away, however, the presence of Mongol delegates from all parts of China at the important linguistic conference in Huhehot in May 1956 described above.

<sup>40</sup> NCNA, Sining, August 8, 1956.

<sup>41</sup> *Hsin-chiang Jih-pao (Sinkiang Daily)*, Urumchi, March 24, 1955.

<sup>42</sup> NCNA—English, Urumchi, August 27, 1956.

<sup>43</sup> NCNA—English, Urumchi, June 21, 1958.

## CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, initial Communist policies pointed toward the full development and use of non-Chinese languages, though the purpose of the policies was, probably, to ensure maximum effectiveness of official propaganda and indoctrination in the minority areas. It is certain that the régime considered the development of minority languages as a major, long-range programme. It consisted of three main areas of activity: creation and reform of written languages, scientific research into spoken languages, and training of language cadres.

At the end of the first ten years of Communist rule, this programme had ceased to function in all but in name. It is difficult to determine exactly when the change took place. Certainly, we noticed that already by 1951 minority nationalities were being encouraged to use the Chinese language, but it appears that it was largely on a voluntary basis. At that time, the Communists still hoped that a "patient" approach would win the minority nationalities over to their cause. The development and full use of minority languages was prominently presented as evidence of a genuine regional autonomy for non-Chinese.

It appears, however, that the real aims of Communist language policies, *i.e.*, to facilitate indoctrination and control, could not be attained by this approach. It is likely that the minorities also perceived at an early date this true nature of Peking's language programme. At any rate, by 1957, the central authorities realised that little or no progress had been made in this field. It is not possible to say whether this was mainly due to minority resistance. The available evidence seems to indicate the blame lies with the Chinese functionaries in minority areas who, by and large, were not willing fully to implement the central policy of developing and using minority languages.

In turn, the widespread increase in resistance by minorities to the Chinese Communist régime from 1957 on made the central government less anxious to carry its language programme to completion. As we have noted, the series of scientific investigations into spoken languages were apparently discontinued. In the end, the Communist programme for minority languages fell victim to the "Great Leap Forward" which marked the beginning of all-out sinification and communisation. With regard to China's minorities, this also meant the beginning of the end to any meaningful policy of regional autonomy. While the training of language cadres and reform of minority languages were still carried on, it was on a very reduced scale and done mostly in Peking for obvious propaganda purposes. By 1959, in the minority areas of the North-west and Inner Mongolia, Chinese was in theory as well as in fact the primary language.

# *The Communist Chinese Attitude Towards Inter-Class Marriage*

By LUCY JEN HUANG

SINCE the change of political régime on the Chinese mainland in 1949, new values and attitudes have been consciously introduced by the Communist Party. The family institution has undergone a rather drastic alteration not only in form but also in composition, structure, roles of its members and especially in values and patterns of mate selection and marital adjustment. According to traditional Chinese social values, one should marry a person of relatively similar social background consistent with the concept of homogamy discussed by Burgess and his associates. The traditional Chinese sentiment often referred to the marriage of two individuals whose family front doors faced each other as a good match, implying that they had matched family backgrounds in residence, social class, occupations, education, economic status and other values held important in pre-Communist China. The strong emphasis laid by the Communist Party on indoctrinating every citizen in the political ideology of socialism and communism in true totalitarian form covers every phase of his life, including that of marriage. In the course of Communist rule, slightly more than a decade, this political emphasis has often come in direct conflict with the traditional value of social homogamy in mate selection and marriage.

This paper is a discussion of the new trend toward political homogamy which often results in the emergence of inter-class marriages. Along with the new freedom in mate selection, there are numerous incidents of romantic love involving individuals of different background and education. Today in Communist China a college girl may fall in love with a chauffeur and marry him. Public opinion may be somewhat discouraging at first, but such a match can be deemed sensible and patriotic by the present régime, as long as both spouses are politically compatible. Data for this paper was drawn primarily from letters to the editors of the magazine, *Women of China*, in 1959 and 1960, a decade after the beginning of the Communist rule. Since the phenomenon of inter-class marriage is a relatively new one, involving fundamental re-education of the general public in terms of values and attitudes, the editors of the magazine found it useful to place such a topic in the "problem discussion" column, and invited the readers to participate in criticism and

languages if they so desire. However, those taking examinations in the specialty of foreign languages shall not be exempted.

Candidates from regions inhabited by national minorities taking examinations for admission to schools of higher education may be exempted from examinations in foreign languages if they so desire (but those taking examinations in the specialty of foreign languages shall not be exempted).

Examination subjects for new students of the schools of fine arts and physical education shall be fixed by appropriate departments and schools themselves. . . .

Prior to accepting new students, schools of higher learning should closely scrutinise the political status, scholastic standing and physical condition of the candidates. Selection should be based on the candidates' order of preference stated in their applications and on the examination results, from high to low marks, taking into account the candidates' political status, scholastic standing and physical fitness.

To ensure unmistakably the quality of new students admitted to schools of higher learning, their political status and physical fitness should be immediately re-examined. If a re-check is unsatisfactory, admission should be rejected. However, in the case of a new student who fails to pass a medical re-check, if the diagnosis of a designated medical unit indicates that he has chances of recovery after a short period of rest and cure—in this way meeting the health requirements for new students stipulated by schools of higher learning—admission of this student within a year will be considered by the school.

Higher normal schools should conduct oral examinations once new students are admitted. Those who stammer to a serious extent, or who are deaf, or who are physically deformed shall not be qualified for admission.

Candidates taking examinations conducted by schools of higher learning shall themselves pay all necessary fees. In regard to travelling expenses for successful candidates who are in-service personnel, army men transferred to other professions, and this year's graduates from intermediate specialised schools, all expenses shall be defrayed by their own units (or schools). Other successful candidates, in principle, shall pay for their travelling expenses. In individual cases, however, if certain successful candidates live comparatively far away from school, or if they cannot afford to pay for their own travelling expenses because their families are really in financial difficulties, they may apply for subsidies from the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional education and administrative departments or from the student enrolment organs in their localities. . . . [NCNA, June 10, 1965. SCMP No. 3492.]

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## China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question\*

By GEORGE MOSELEY

### I

THERE have been enthusiastic reports in the Chinese Press about the collectivisation movement in agriculture and animal husbandry among the forty million people of the national minorities in China. But it now appears that the socialist revolution has not developed successfully in the non-Han frontier regions of the country. Premier Chou En-lai said, in his report to the National People's Congress in December 1964:

"to gain complete liberation, the people of all the minority nationalities in our country must rise in revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. They must conduct and accomplish not only the democratic revolution, but also the socialist revolution, and carry them through to the end."<sup>1</sup>

This exhortation followed the Premier's revelation that the Panchen Lama, who had only recently been named to take over the functions of the Dalai Lama as the head of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, had had to be sacked because of his intrigues with "the reactionary clique of serf-owners."<sup>2</sup> Chou quoted Chairman Mao Tse-tung to the effect that the national minority problem was really a class problem; henceforth, he asserted, class struggle would be the main theme of the CCP's (Chinese Communist Party's) national minority policy.<sup>3</sup>

Premier Chou's statement helps to clarify a number of developments in the CCP's theoretical position on the national minority question

\* The trend of developments since this article was completed in the middle of 1965 indicates an intensification of "struggle" in the national minority regions, and especially in Sinkiang and Tibet. It appears that the Party leadership has become more apprehensive about the security of its frontiers because of the increasingly serious international situation with which it is faced. The "socialist education" drive which has been carried forward throughout the country is another factor contributing to a harder approach to the national minorities.

<sup>1</sup> Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government to the 1st Session of the 3rd National People's Congress" (Summary), *New China News Agency (NCNA)*, December 30, 1964.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Unlike the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama had been educated in China.

<sup>3</sup> The CCP credits Mao with having developed this thesis in 1963, at a reception for a group of African visitors. See *Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily)*, August 9, 1963. But Mao had already raised the issue in September 1962 at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee.

during the past several years. With the progress of China's "socialist construction," the gap between the Han Chinese and the national minorities had, apparently, tended to widen rather than, as had been expected, to become narrower. Finally, a basic readjustment of the CCP's national minority policy had been required, for it had become obvious that the image of China's "great family of nationalities" advancing together on the socialist road was no longer tenable. But the implications of this policy readjustment went far beyond the immediate need to account for the lag in the development of the national minorities. The magnitude of the CCP's shift in policy is revealed in the changed notions of what constitutes a "contradiction" in nationality relations. As late as the end of 1961 a vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission could say that national differences constitute contradictions, whereas by 1963 it was being asserted that there are no contradictions between nationalities but only between classes.<sup>4</sup>

The CCP's new position on the national minority question may provide the basis for a stable relationship between the Han Chinese and China's non-Han peoples. It may also permit this vital area of domestic policy to develop in harmony with China's foreign policy, with the national minority regions assuming their traditional role as an intermediate zone between China proper (the China of the Han Chinese) and the states of Asia contiguous to China. In short, this new theoretical approach may well represent the key to a normalisation of China's position in Asia and the world. While there has been no formal announcement of a new policy, it seems clear that it entered a new phase in 1962 and that the magnitude of this shift was comparable to the great policy reappraisal of 1956-58. In 1956 the national minorities fell from the high estate which they had enjoyed since the "Liberation," and during the ensuing years of collectivisation and Great Leap Forward (1956-1960) they were treated very much like second-class citizens. In the perspective of the policy now in vogue, the 1949-1956 period was a "right" deviation (all unity and no struggle) and the 1956-1961 period a "left" deviation (all struggle and no unity).

In contrast to the Russian revolution, in which peoples other than the Great Russians played a significant role, the revolution in China was a purely Han Chinese affair. To employ a crude but useful distinction, it took place in "inner" China, for "outer" China (Mongolia, Sinkiang

<sup>4</sup> Wang Feng, "To Better Understand the Party's Nationalities Policy," *Min-tsu T'uan-chieh (National Unity)*, 1961, No. 10-11, p. 3. Mao initiated the new line in August 1963; it was fully developed by another Vice-Chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission, Liu Ch'un, in an article in *Hung Ch'i (Red Flag)*, 1964, No. 12, "Class Struggle and the National Question in Our Country at the Present Time," especially p. 25.

and Tibet) had already drifted beyond the reach of the Chinese government by the time the CCP came into being. The fringe areas of "inner" China, too, had become oriented outward, with, for instance, the T'ai regions of Yunnan and Kwangsi tending to fall under the influence of British Burma and French Indochina. Prior to the Long March, the CCP leadership had had no direct contact with the frontier regions where the non-Han people live, which occupy over half the total area of the country; during this period it was content to echo pronouncements on the national question by Stalin (the Georgian whom Lenin had picked to be Chairman of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities of the USSR) and to imitate, in its own programme for China, the federal structure of the Soviet Union. Nor was the CCP's 1936 appeal to the national minorities to unite with the Han Chinese in resisting Japan much more than a slogan, although a number of revolutionary workers from among the national minorities were trained at Yen-an. And when the CCP came to power in 1949 it did so in China proper (including Manchuria), with the outlying national minority regions still to be occupied by the PLA (People's Liberation Army). That Inner Mongolia had fallen under the domination of the PLA early in the civil war was due less to the endeavours of the handful of Sinified Mongols who worked with the CCP than to the fact that Inner Mongolia was required as a military corridor between the northwest and Manchuria.

The national minority policy developed by the CCP during the formative years of the new régime was again an approximation of Soviet orthodoxy.<sup>5</sup> The Party's primary concern until 1956 was the reimposition of unchallengeable Han Chinese mastery of the frontier regions. The policy devised was essentially negative, seeking to undercut any resistance on the part of the minorities to the domination of their homelands by the PLA and the Central People's Government. Regional autonomy for the non-Han peoples was instituted precisely in order to permit the CCP to pursue a differentiated policy in the frontier regions as compared with China proper; it was not the objective of regional autonomy indefinitely to guarantee to the minorities a special status within the CPR (Chinese People's Republic). The establishment of autonomous areas was an essential device in the hands of the United Front Work Department of the CCP in its task of fostering a sense of identification with the new régime in Peking on the part of the national minorities, and especially their traditional leaders.

<sup>5</sup> See G. F. Hudson, "The Nationalities of China," *St. Antony's Papers*, VII (London, 1960), pp. 51-61; and Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Minorities," in "Communist China's First Decade," *The New Leader*, Vol. 42, No. 23 (1959), pp. 17-21. For a superb discussion of the background of the problem, see John DeFrancis, "National and Minority Policies" in "Report on China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 277 (1951), pp. 146-155.

This policy of studied magnanimity was reversed in 1957, when the anti-rightist campaign launched in China proper took the form of an anti-local-nationalist campaign in the frontier regions.<sup>6</sup> With the frontier regions firmly under control, the government then attempted rapidly to carry out among the national minorities the socialist reforms that had been deferred since "liberation." Objections based on national distinctiveness were brushed aside. Han cadres took the place of nationality cadres who were purged in large numbers and a large-scale influx of Han settlers into the frontier regions commenced. Local nationalism, rather than Han chauvinism, was now held to be the principal obstacle to the success of the CCP's national minority policy. Indeed, the policy pursued during these years was really the negation of the national minority policy which had earlier been defined. This trend of Han assertiveness became even more acute with the "great leap forward" and the people's commune movements of 1958-1960. The Tibetan revolt was but the most spectacular expression of the disaffection which ensued. There was an exodus of T'ai peoples across the southern frontier in the course of the commune movement in Yunnan. The massive flight of Kazakhs to the Soviet Union in 1962 also had its roots in the CCP's repression of "local nationalism." Less overt manifestations of resistance to the hard line were evident throughout China's frontier regions.

But the campaign against local nationalism was not merely the negation of the earlier policy, for it did demonstrate the Party's determination that socialist reform would eventually be carried out in the national minority areas, just as, in the earlier period, it had been demonstrated that the frontier regions were irreversibly Chinese. On the other hand, the CCP's tacit admission, which followed upon the waning of the great leap forward, that reforms among the national minorities would be a long-term process, represented a victory for the national minorities. By 1961 a general relaxation in the CCP's approach to the national minority problem could be discerned, and in the following year a fresh policy was formulated.<sup>7</sup>

## II

This new policy rests on several concepts which reflect the experience of more than a decade in dealing with China's national minorities and

<sup>6</sup> In an unpublished master's dissertation (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1959) entitled "Communist Policy in Inner Mongolia, 1947-1957" (p. 153), Thomas A. Metzger has traced the beginnings of this new policy to a nationalities work conference held in Tsingtao during July and August 1957.

<sup>7</sup> The shift in nationalities policy was part of a general policy review undertaken at the time, especially in the economic field. For a perceptive discussion of the period, see A. M. Halpern, "Between Plenums: A Second Look at the 1962 National People's Congress in China," *Asian Survey*, Vol. II, No. 9 (November 1962), pp. 1-10.



which indicate that the CCP has arrived at a mature position with respect to the applicability of Soviet theory in this particular field of policy formulation. First in importance among these concepts is the idea that each of China's national minority peoples must develop into a "modern nationality" on its road to Socialism, Communism, and its ultimate disappearance as a distinct national group. Although this idea had been suggested by Liu Shao-ch'i in his report to the Eighth National Congress of the Party in 1956, it was only with the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, which met in Peking in September 1962, that it became prominent in policy discussions.<sup>8</sup> It is to be compared, on the one hand, with the view consistently advanced by the CCP during the decade 1950-1960: the national minorities must strive to "catch up with" the Han people, thereby wiping out the inequalities among China's nationalities inherited from history and making it possible for all of China's peoples, Han and non-Han, to advance together to socialist society. On the other hand, it is to be set against Stalin's familiar dictum of "national in form, socialist in content" which was intended to indicate the correct way of doing away with a nationality's identity while making it appear that this national identity was actually flourishing.

The difference between the older line of the CCP and the view expressed by Liu is that the latter recognises the fact that the "transformation" of China's national minorities will be a long-term process and suggests, indeed, that they may never "catch up with" the Han people or only in the remote future. In other words, the "special characteristics" of the national minorities are organic to them; they are not residual or affective qualities which can be readily cast off. Quite aside from the question of their willingness to do so, they cannot become good Han Chinese, not even good Han Chinese Communists. Therefore, attempts at Sinification will not hasten their journey along the road towards Socialism but will, on the contrary, retard it. They must be allowed, even encouraged, to take their own road to Socialism, for so deep is their psychological commitment to their specific customs and manners that they cannot function in a positive way if their social environment is hastily or forcibly altered. In essence, then, the CCP has admitted the existence of a contradiction between communisation and Sinification—which is precisely what the "local nationalists" had been urging several years previously.

<sup>8</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP," *Eighth National Congress of the CCP* (Peking, 1956), p. 79. There is nothing of consequence in the Communiqué of the 10th Plenum (NCNA, September 28, 1962); the substance of the CCP's deliberations on nationalities policy at the meeting may be gleaned from an editorial in *Min-tsu T'uan-chieh*, No. 11, 1962: "In National Minority Areas Positively Implement the Spirit of the Party's 10th Plenum. . . ."

The largest of China's national minorities, the Chuang, numbers 7.7 million, or only slightly over 1 per cent. of the Han Chinese population, and there are only a few others, such as the Uighurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Koreans, which number more than one million. Taken together, China's national minorities comprise only about 6 per cent. of the total population of the country. This situation is in marked contrast to that of Russia in 1917, where the Great Russians comprised less than half the population of the whole country. Furthermore, China's non-Han peoples are, by and large, extremely retarded as compared with Russia's nationalities. Then, too, the minorities in China are backward (in terms of Marxism-Leninism's own categories) as compared with the Han, for they are largely pastoralists. Only the Uighurs, with their oasis civilisation, the T'ai, with their Hinayana Buddhism, the Koreans of Manchuria, and a few heavily Sinified groups, such as the Min-chia of Yunnan, even approximate the cultural level of the Han people. It is clear, therefore, that the slogan "national in form, socialist in content" advanced by Stalin was designed for conditions altogether different from those in China. He could envisage the federated peoples of the Soviet Union advancing together towards Socialism, but such a thesis, as the CCP now recognises, is altogether inapplicable to China, where the development of the Han Chinese could not but be something qualitatively different from that of the national minorities.

Lenin, however, made one distinction between the Great Russians and the other peoples of the Soviet Union which the CCP has now seized upon: he referred to the first as a "nation" (*natsiya*) and to the others as "nationalities" (*narodnost*). Early in 1962 a controversy arose among Party cadres engaged in nationalities work over the ambiguous use of the Chinese term "*min-tsu*" (nation, nationality, people) for rendering a variety of Russian and German terms<sup>9</sup>:

	Russian	German	Chinese
People	<i>Narod</i>	<i>Volk</i>	} <i>Min-tsu</i>
Nation	<i>Natsiya</i>	<i>Nation</i>	
Nationality	<i>Narodnost</i>	<i>Nationalität</i>	

The conference at which this problem was discussed concluded that it was entirely proper to employ "*min-tsu*" for all of these terms. But in taking this position the Party's theoreticians looked for support to the German texts of Marx and Engels, where they found evidence for the view that the identification of a community as a nation does not depend first of all upon its stage of development but rather upon its inherent

<sup>9</sup> Chang Lu, "The Situation with Regard to the Use and Translation of the Term 'Min-tsu'," *Min-tsu Tuan-chieh*, No. 7, 1962, pp. 34-39.

cohesion. Regardless of how retarded the development of a community might be, it was correct to refer to it as a nation so long as it was logical to suppose that it was destined to develop as a nation. Specifically, a community could constitute a nation while still being in a pre-capitalist stage of development.<sup>10</sup>

The controversy had arisen over the particular question (presumably advanced by national minority cadres) of whether or not it was correct to refer to the Han people as a nation (*min-tsu*), rather than as a nationality (*pu-tsu*, literally "tribe"), prior to its arrival at a capitalist level of development. Responding to this question in the affirmative, the conference went on to ascribe nation-status to all of China's "national" minorities. It was not denied, however, that the Han people conformed more completely to the idea of a nation than did the national minorities; it was simply more convenient, on the whole, consistently to use the term "*min-tsu*." A parallel was implicitly drawn between the national minorities in China and in Russia when it was noted by the conference that it had not been entirely wrong to translate as "*pu-tsu*" the term "*narodnost*" (nationality) which Stalin and Lenin had applied to peoples other than the Great Russians. The conclusion apparently reached by the conferees, then, was that the "national minorities" are really nationalities, but that they should be called nations nevertheless.<sup>11</sup>

This position is, of course, heretical, for, in more traditional Marxist-Leninist theory, nationality is supposed to be a distinct attribute of the capitalist stage of development of a given people. But like the many other heresies committed by the CCP in applying Marxism-Leninism to China, it is vital. From this position, the CCP was able to advance to a comprehensive prognosis concerning the future evolution of China's multi-national state within the context of a general international movement towards Communism. Ultimately, all nations are destined to disappear, for national identity will be completely superseded when Communism has become world-wide. But some peoples, clearly, will attain Communism before others. As for China, the non-Han peoples will gradually merge with the Han people. At a still later stage, the

<sup>10</sup> Some of the Soviet Union's "national minorities," notably in Siberia and Central Asia, were in a pre-capitalist stage of development at the time of the Revolution. As a result, Lenin had been obliged to distinguish between "nations" and "nationalities," as observed earlier. Apparently, however, the CCP was not satisfied with Lenin's theoretical formulation of the problem. On Stalin's muddled attempt to deal with this very murky problem, see Samad Shaheen, *The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self Determination* (Bandung: Utrecht University Thesis, 1956) p. 51.

<sup>11</sup> In terms of Communist revolutionary practice, nations may form Communist Parties, but nationalities do not. Thus, the somewhat esoteric distinction here between nation and nationality is of considerable moment. The Russian and Chinese Communists shared the problem of how to preserve a multi-national state under the leadership of a single Communist Party; both denied the national minorities the right to form their own parties.

people of China will lose their identity by entering the great sea of the world proletariat. Thus, the fusion of China's nationalities is a phenomenon to be consummated prior to the disappearance of all nationalities.<sup>12</sup>

The long-term nature of the effort to bring about the fusion of China's various peoples is a theme which recurs again and again in the policy discussions of 1962. Thus, we are told that so long as the national minorities retain distinctive languages and cultures, as they inevitably will for a long time to come, China's national question cannot be considered to have been completely resolved. Indeed, the stage of socialist transformation in the evolution of the national minorities defines the period during which their cultures are supposed to flourish, and this stage has only just arrived, signalled by the completion of democratic reform in Tibet, the most retarded area of China. It will not be consummated until the national minorities have been cleansed of the last vestiges of "capitalism." How long will this take? Individuals with an orientation towards capitalism can be expected to exist among the people of the national minorities as long as capitalism remains in the world, which may be "several decades or even longer."<sup>13</sup>

Conforming to this theme, a nationalities work conference held in the spring of 1962 exhorted Party cadres to be patient and understanding in their nationalities work. The principal slogans of the conference were "ceaselessly strengthen nationalities' unity" and "develop the economies of the national minority areas." According to a dispatch in the *People's Daily*,

The conference considered: that for the people of each nationality in our country to proceed in the direction of Socialism is unalterable. But nationalities work must genuinely be done well, adhering to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and truly taking cognisance of and correctly managing the national question in the stage of socialist revolution and the building of Socialism. In this stage, each nationality still has all its national characteristics: it is necessary, therefore, to pay attention to these characteristics, recognising the distinctiveness of nationalities and the long-term nature of these differences; to study and analyse correctly the peculiarities of the area and the economy of each national minority; clearly to recognise, with respect to the national minorities, the relationship between the religious question and the national question; and genuinely to respect the rights of equality and autonomy of the national minorities.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> This point is brought out in an article by Ku Feng in *Min-tsu T'uan-chieh*, No. 10, 1962, pp. 7-11, entitled "The Thorough Resolution of the National Question Is a Long Historical Process."

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* Ulanfu, the leading non-Han personality in the CCP, was perhaps more to the point when he observed in the October 1, 1959, issue of *Red Flag* that the influence of bourgeois ideology "will be stronger in its expression in the nationalities question than anywhere else, because the nationalities question provides it with a very good disguise."

<sup>14</sup> *People's Daily*, June 3, 1962.

In other words, the focus of change would henceforth have to be on the national minorities themselves, and development in their areas keyed more directly to their own interests and desires. This development would have a markedly national flavour, with the minorities, as they matured (in the socialist stage), possibly becoming even more differentiated from the Han. Only in the far-distant future, therefore, could it be anticipated that China's national minorities, having become "modern nationalities" (equivalent to "socialist" nationalities), would have prepared themselves for a loss of identity in the larger entity of the Chinese people. It is not surprising, then, that new prominence has been given to the role of the United Front Work Department in the gradual resolution of the national question in China. Representatives of this department from each province and autonomous region participated in the conference, and one of its principal speakers was the department's head, Li Wei-han.

The Party now looks to economic development in the national minority areas as the prime agent for bringing about the desired evolution in the relationship between the Han and non-Han peoples of China. This principle, too, was stated by Liu Shao-ch'i in his report to the Eighth National Congress of the Party and taken up by the Tenth Plenum:

In order that the national minorities may grow into modern nationalities, the most fundamental thing, the key, besides carrying out social reforms, is to develop modern industries in the areas they inhabit.<sup>15</sup>

That the establishment of modern industry in the comparatively backward national minority areas will in itself be a long-range task is acknowledged, for it must be built on the foundation of more efficient agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry, and raw material production. The national minorities must shoulder this task themselves, developing their own resources with their own labour. Clearly, the Party has been disabused of the notion that improvements in education and health will lead magically to industrialisation.<sup>16</sup>

From these several concepts, (1) the development of each of China's national minorities into a "modern nationality," (2) the identification of China's non-Han peoples as nationalities rather than nations, and (3) the long-range nature of the fusing together of all the national groups in China, the theoretical framework for the new position on the national minority problem can be discerned. Briefly stated, it envisages for each of China's national minorities a unique and gradual process of modernisation which will lead ultimately to its fusion with the Han people. There is nothing in this general theory which contradicts the Party's

<sup>15</sup> Liu, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> *Min-tsu T'uan-chieh* editorial, No. 11, 1962, *op. cit.*

basic thesis on the national minority problem as developed in the early years of the régime, but the emphasis of the new policy is radically different from that of the old.

In recognising the fact that the development of the national minorities, if they are to develop at all, will have to be related to the interests of the people themselves as distinct national groups, the Party has admitted the failure of its attempt to denationalise the national minorities by absorbing their leaders in the United Front. The task of the United Front Work Department with respect to the national minority problem had always been viewed in terms of establishing an alliance with the upper strata of the non-Han peoples, and it rested on the presumption of a natural community of interest between the "labouring masses" of the national minorities, on the one hand, and the alliance of Han Chinese workers and peasants, on the other.<sup>17</sup> Implicit in the new position, on the contrary, is an acceptance of the fact that there is a natural community of interest among the members of a given national minority without reference to class. Of course, the Party is determined that the socialist revolution, meaning class struggle, should be carried forward among the national minorities, but this will now have the character of a true national revolution, something distinct from the Han Chinese revolution. In the CCP's own terms, the changed character of the nationalities' united front derives from the hypothesis that the revolutions of the nationalities have developed from the "democratic" to the "socialist" stage: in the first the united front is based on armed struggle (against imperialism and its lackeys), while in the second it is based on Socialism, *i.e.*, on proletarian unity. In these terms, then, the current problem in nationalities work is that a working class outlook has been insufficiently developed among the masses of the national minorities.

The distinctiveness now attributed to the socialist revolutions among the national minorities is further emphasised by the Party's acknowledgment that it will require many years for them to reach the stage of modern, socialist nationalities, at which point their fusion with the Han Chinese will be practicable. Apparently the national minorities have not, to the extent anticipated, benefited from or participated in the economic development of the country by the Han Chinese, including development of the border regions inhabited by the national minorities. Although this would be difficult if not impossible to verify, one suspects that the development of the border regions by the Chinese Communists has followed, essentially, a colonial pattern, with the national minorities

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, Chang Chih-i (Vice-Chairman of the United Front Work Department), "Several Questions Concerning the People's Democratic United Front," *Hsin Hua Pan-yueh K'an* (New China Semi-monthly) No. 11, 1957, pp. 67-71. As in all discussions of the problem, Chang speaks only of the upper strata of the national minorities as an object of "unity-struggle-unity."

tending to form relatively stagnant pockets, and that it is to remedy such a situation that the Party is now urging the national minorities to push themselves forward economically.

Finally, the identification of the national minorities as "nationalities" rather than "nations" serves to place their revolutions in an intermediate position between the Han Chinese and the independent states of Asia. It must be a matter of deep satisfaction to the Chinese that their relationships with other peoples are once more, after a hundred years of confusion, falling into an ordered pattern. In fact, China's drive to restore and reorder her position in Asia and the world must have been a major motivating force in the CCP's shift in national minority policy. The new policy fits logically into the general pattern of China's policy initiatives during the several years since the rupture in the Sino-Soviet alliance, an event which, for all the inconvenience it caused the CPR, for the first time gave Peking a free hand in the international arena.

### III

In the course of his interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965 Chairman Mao Tse-tung referred to China's national minorities in commenting upon Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. Indonesia, he said, felt that there was not much advantage in remaining in the UN.

As for China, was it not in itself a United Nations? Any one of several of China's minority nationalities was larger in population and territory than some states in the UN whose votes had helped deprive China of her seat there.<sup>18</sup>

The full significance of Mao's statement is only apparent when it is considered in relation to China's recent campaign for the establishment of a "revolutionary" united nations to serve the needs of the underdeveloped countries. A united front of peace-loving peoples comprising a united nations of Afro-Asian-Latin American states supported by China's own united nations (as its "base") is a kind of theoretical construction which has appealed to the Chinese Communist leadership in the past.<sup>19</sup>

Whatever the prospects for its eventual establishment, the projection of a "revolutionary" united nations under the tutelage of the CPR at once reflects a coherent theoretical assessment of the potential applicability of nationalities policy to foreign policy and suggests the influence

<sup>18</sup> Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao," *The New Republic*, February 27, 1965. As Mr. Snow explains, Chairman Mao's answers as published are not direct quotations.

<sup>19</sup> The idea of a revolutionary united nations was advanced by Premier Chou En-lai in a statement made January 25 on the occasion of a visit to Peking of Dr. Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia. See *Le Monde*, January 26, 1965.

which China's aims in the international field must have had on the CCP in arriving at its current position on the national minority question. Whereas China's national revolution had long been held up as an example to other peoples engaged in "wars of national liberation," the revolutionary united front of China's nationalities is now held to be a model for the collective struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against the forces of world imperialism led by the United States and the forces of modern revisionism led by the Soviet Union.<sup>20</sup> As projected by the CCP, the two are structurally the same, with the ties between the underdeveloped country's feudal élite and the American imperialists corresponding to the ties between the national minority's feudal élite and the (pre-"liberation") reactionary ruling clique of the Han Chinese; just as the latter called forth a united front between the Han Chinese workers and peasants and the labouring masses of the national minorities, so the former demands a united front between the Afro-Asian-Latin American labouring masses and the Chinese People's Republic (the personification of 700 million proletarian friends).

In applying this model beyond China's frontiers, priority is given to Asia, where it has maximum relevance. A noteworthy feature of the CCP's approach to the national minority question, which may be traced back at least as far as the Yen-an and Kiangsi periods, is the absence of a precise distinction between non-Han peoples of China and non-Han peoples of Asia. China is in the process of finding a new equilibrium between herself and her neighbours following the breakdown of the old order in Asia caused by the interregnum of European imperialism, during which the boundaries inherited by the CPR were imposed on a weak China. It is no accident that agreements on boundary questions between China and her neighbours—Burma, Nepal and Pakistan—have been accompanied by a new *modus vivendi* between the contracting parties marked by generally warmer relations and, particularly, by steps to establish overland trade.

Except in the north, China is "looking outward" once more, and her frontiers are again assuming a positive role, that of giving access to the outside world.<sup>21</sup> The Sino-Soviet frontier in Sinkiang, where "revisionist" *i.e.*, separatist tendencies among China's national minorities are most marked, has, by way of contrast, an almost wholly negative character. Without wishing to make too glib a comparison between old

<sup>20</sup> This is the clear implication of Liu Ch'un's *Red Flag* article (see note 4, above) in which a summary of the requirements for an international united front introduces a detailed discussion of the success of China's united front of nationalities in overcoming feudalism, etc. For a thorough discussion of the Chinese revolution as a model for the "third world," see Philippe Richer, "Doctrine chinoise pour le Tiers Monde," *Politique étrangère*, 1965, No. 1, pp. 75-97.

<sup>21</sup> Owen Lattimore, *From China, Looking Outward* (inaugural lecture), (Leeds: Leeds Un. Press, 1964).



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and new China, there does seem to be some reason to think that China's leaders today share with their imperial forerunners something of a Great Wall psychology, which manifests itself in a defensive posture in the north and a forward policy elsewhere. The states of Asia which at various times in the past have sent tribute missions to Peking are once more tending to draw closer to China, with the national minority regions again becoming an intermediate zone between the two. They also constitute an intermediate zone in Maoist theoretical terms, for the national minorities are now engaged in socialist transformation, whereas the Han people are already in the more advanced stage of socialist construction and the non-Communist states of Asia are still carrying out the national democratic revolution. And, according to the CCP, what distinguishes the Chinese world (China and the "third world") from the world of capitalism and revisionism, is that it is seriously engaged in class struggle. Chairman Mao's assertion that there are no contradictions between nations but only between classes was made in a statement supporting the struggle of American negroes to achieve equality. It was no mere coincidence that the Party, which could have found just as apt quotations from Lenin, seized upon this statement and made it the cornerstone of its current national minority policy.

To the extent that a new equilibrium has been established among domestic policy, national minority policy (*i.e.*, frontier [the *fan-pu* of the imperial system] policy), and foreign policy, it may be expected that policy towards the national minorities will be more sensitive to developments in the international arena than has been the case heretofore. For instance, if protracted U.S. involvement in South Vietnam leads to a lessening of Sino-Soviet differences and to a tougher Chinese foreign policy, the attitude of the CCP towards the national minorities will tend to harden. There is some evidence that such a chain reaction may already have been set off. On the other hand, the sensitivity of national minority policy to the vagaries of foreign policy is modified by Han colonisation of the frontier regions. Ultimately, the ethnic distinctiveness of China's frontiers will have diminished to the point where national minority policy will be of but marginal concern. However, the rate of Han emigration from China proper is not constant, being itself influenced by Party policy towards the national minorities.

strive for the fulfilment of the sometimes exorbitant assignments of the plan. Failure, for whatever reason, to meet the planned quotas or personal dislike on the part of their superiors may mean not only demotion or dismissal but also criminal prosecution for counter-revolutionary activities. In the United States business executives, newspaper writers, engineers, doctors, and teachers who fall out with their employers have a chance to find another job. The situation is different in the Soviet Union where the state controls all opportunities for work.

No human institution is perfect, a rule to which private enterprise and the capitalist system are no exception. Yet for all their short-

comings they offer the common man a far better opportunity to live his life as he pleases than does Communism of the Russian brand. The facts of the Soviet situation do not support the claims of Russia's over-enthusiastic friends. Some of the faults of the Soviet order may be temporary and may be remedied in time but others, such as the omnipotence of the bureaucracy, are inherent in socialism. The more one learns about the Soviet experiment the better one realizes the advantages of a society that adheres to the principles of political democracy and economic freedom. In the dreary world emerging from the smoke and devastation of the great war America is more than ever the land of opportunity.

*China must restore internal order*

## DYNAMITE IN SINKIANG

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"REVOLT in Sinkiang" reads a headline in *The New York Times*. Sinkiang? The reader pauses for a moment, wonders perhaps where it is, and then tentatively places it within the boundaries of China. He probably assumes, if he does not bother reading any further, that the revolt has some connection with the Communists. If, however, his curiosity is aroused and he investigates the cause of the revolt, he will discover a fascinating chapter of Central Asian history.

Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, is one of the most remote regions under Chinese authority. Because of its position it has long been the center of both British and Russian intrigue. British interest is due to Sinkiang's proximity to India, Afghanistan and Tibet, long a sphere of British influence; Russian interest, to the fact that Sinkiang borders on Russian territory.

Sinkiang has presented quite a problem to the Chinese. Its remote-

ness from the capital at Peiping, combined with primitive methods of transportation, rendered political control difficult. Overland travel in that region is still in an elementary stage since there are few roads and no railroads, the chief means of transportation being camel caravans and ox carts. From Kashgar in Western Sinkiang to Paotow near Peiping, a total distance of 2,500 miles, usually requires 100 or more days. In comparison, Kashgar is only 12 miles from the nearest Soviet railway.

Sinkiang covers an area of 600,000 square miles. It is a land of oases, the arable parts being limited to the rivers and streams and a narrow belt running along the foothills of the mountain ranges. The extent of Sinkiang's natural resources is not exactly known, but there appears to be some oil, as well as gold, coal, iron, copper and jade.

The province has a total population of around 4,360,000. Of these 500,000 are nomads and not more than 10 per cent are Chinese. The subject peoples include many different groups; the most numerous sedentary people are the Chanto (meaning "turbaned") Turki, Sunni Moslems of Central Asian Turkish stock. Their language is Turki. Next in number are the Tungkan, Mussulman Chinese who have much in common with Chinese Mohammedans of Kansu, a neighboring province. They speak Chinese and a little Turki. Their culture is predominantly Chinese; racially, however, there is an ob-

vious Turki strain. A latent antipathy exists between them and the Turki and an ever-present antipathy between them and the Chinese. Besides these two main groups there are many others—the Solons and Sibus, descendants of military colonies planted there by the Manchus; the Sarigolis; the Dulanis; and others too numerous to mention. Among the principal nomadic tribes there are the Mongols and the Kazakhs.

### CHINESE CONTROL

Since the Han Dynasty in 200 B.C. Sinkiang has been under intermittent Chinese control, but for only 450 out of these 2,000 years has the Chinese rule been effective.

In modern times there have been a series of minor revolts, in 1827, 1829, 1846 and 1857. The last major revolt against the Chinese occurred in 1862 when the Tungkan Mohammedans in Kansu rebelled. At the time, Chinese administrators in Kashgar recruited their troops largely from the Tungkanis, who soon united with their confreres in Kansu. The Chinese officials were thus cut off from retreat into China Proper and massacred without mercy.

The ensuing period of internecine strife among the victorious Mohammedans saw the rise of a colorful figure, Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg commanded the army of Burzug Khan, a neighboring ruler, who had extended his power during the rebellion and in 1865 was proclaimed King of Kashgar. Soon thereafter the Russians entered his native kingdom in order to sub-

due it. While Burzug Khan was campaigning against the Russians, Yakub Beg usurped power, assuming full authority in Kashgaria, and then proceeded to bring all southern Chinese Turkestan under his control.

When the Chinese government heard of these events, General Tang was dispatched with a non-descript force from Peiping to recover the lost province. General Tang's goal was over 3,000 miles to the west—quite a problem in logistics for even the most modern army. General Tang, however, was not daunted. As long as he and his troops were in an inhabited section they lived off the country, but once they had reached the uninhabited parts this was no longer possible. General Tang then collected his scattered army, marked out the ground around their camp into plots and had his soldiers plant cereal seeds and vegetables. In due time the crops were harvested and with renewed supplies the army marched forward. The same procedure was repeated the following year and in 1877 Turkestan was again brought under Chinese control. With the fall of Yakub Beg, the Chinese tightened their hold on the country. They saw that the main feature in the rebellion had been the mobility of Yakub Beg's armies, so they denuded the province of horses. The Chinese punished the Chinese Moslems severely. The other inhabitants were treated leniently; rights to property and land were respected and the Chinese return to power was greeted with a feeling of relief.

The Chinese revolution of 1912 caused only a comparatively minor disturbance; the Manchus were massacred, but order was restored by Yang Tseng Hsin, an official of the old administration who was appointed governor. The period of Yang's governorship was the most peaceful, prosperous and most successful period of Chinese rule. Unfortunately he was murdered in 1928 by one of his lieutenants. The murderer was executed by the old governing clique, one of whom emerged as governor.

#### RECURRENT REBELLION

During 1930 rebellion broke out again in Sinkiang and for a period of about two months the Moslems embarked on a campaign of wholesale murder of the Chinese in the province. This revolt died down and the province was relatively peaceful until a new uprising occurred in 1932-33. This time the Moslem Turki captured the capital, Urumchi, and the main towns, Hami, Turfan, Aksu, Kashgar and Khotar. The rebellion had its root in an incident of 1929. During that year the Prince of Hami died. His family had ruled over 3 or 4 oases for 400 years and had collected taxes there. The Chinese would not let the Prince's heir succeed him. They claimed it was contrary to the principles of the Republic, and ordered the taxes to be paid to the national government. They also conducted a new survey of lands for taxation purposes. The Moslems led by Yol Bars Khan revolted, refusing to recognize the Chinese rulers.

Thereupon the Chinese followed their traditional policy—that of pitting one race against another, and ordered the Mongols to go into action against the Moslems. The Mongols refused; their hatred of the Chinese was greater than their dislike of the Moslems. Moreover, Chinese officials had in the past failed to heed Moslem pleas to stop the tide of immigration which was consuming Mongol grazing lands. Upon refusal of the Mongols, the Chinese organized a White Russian mercenary army in the Ili district. This force attacked Hami, recaptured it and forced the rebels under Yol Bars Khan to flee. The Chinese then prepared to consolidate their position.

However, the Mongols' refusal to participate still rankled in the minds of the Chinese officials. Under pretense of discussing an agreement the Chinese invited not their Prince, but the Acting Regent, Khara Shahr Gegen, a lama with the rank of Living Buddha, to a feast at which he was shot. In the meantime Yol Bars Khan had fled to the hills with the remainder of the Turki rebels and the Chinese had brought immigrants from Yarkand, Khotan and Keriya to replace the Turki. The immigrants, contrary to expectations, joined with the rebels. Finally Yol Bars Khan was prevailed upon to discuss peace terms. However he was proving too troublesome, so he too was eliminated according to the time honored pattern—that is, he was invited to a feast at which he was unfortunately shot.

To add to the causes of revolt,

the Chinese military governor, General Chin Hsu-gen, had acquired a virtual trade monopoly which the Moslems sought to destroy. Only he could send gold dust, unborn lamb skins and other products out of the province. General Chin was acting with too much independence and thus incurred the displeasure of the national government. In November, 1933, Foreign Minister Lo Wen-kan, on an inspection tour of Sinkiang, saw the necessity of rectifying the maladministration and denounced General Chin, who was put under arrest. The Foreign Minister said that General Chin had exceeded his powers and revealed that the General had entered into a secret commercial treaty with the Russians. The treaty provisions were said to have included provisions for a barter of goods, and customs and frontier regulations.

The revolt continued and was climaxed in December, 1933, by the capture of Urumchi, the capital, by the 24-year-old Mohammedan General, Ma Hung Ying, son of a former governor of Kansu who had become a bandit leader allegedly because his brother had been murdered by the Chinese. The young general did not have the full support of all factions, but the Nanking government seems to have favored General Ma. It thought that the problem of winning Moslem support might be easier under Moslem leadership. General Ma's position was weakened by an uprising of the local population in Eastern Sinkiang and provincial troops under the new governor,

General Sheng-shih t'sai, finally defeated him.

#### GENERAL SHENG AND RUSSIAN DOMINANCE

The next few months in Sinkiang were marked by extreme confusion and a series of contradictory reports issuing from Sinkiang, London, Moscow and Nanking. A Moscow report claimed that Eastern Sinkiang had declared itself an independent republic; however a Shanghai dispatch a week later revealed that a few tribes including the Tungkan were opposed to the independence movement and were advancing on its headquarters. An even more interesting report came from London in March, 1943, when Dr. Khalid Sheldrake, a London pickle manufacturer and a converted Moslem, announced that a deputation from Sinkiang, believing that the appointment of a king would solve their difficulties, had asked him to accept the crown.

During this period, however, it appears that the governor, General Sheng, was quietly consolidating his position. He was aided in putting down the various uprisings by a force of Manchurian soldiers who fled over the Siberian border at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The Russians had sent them through Siberia to Sinkiang where they greatly aided General Sheng in restoring order.

With the rise of General Sheng began a period of Russian predominance. General Sheng concluded several agreements with the Russians giving them the right to de-

velop the natural resources of the region, and other concessions.

Russian policy, according to Dr. Owen Lattimore, may be partly explained by the Japanese factor. After the Japanese had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo they overran Jehol, opening a corridor to Inner Mongolia where they made several efforts to create a puppet government. Because they feared future Japanese aggression in Central Asia, the Russians were extremely concerned over the fate of Sinkiang. They were faced with three alternatives. The first was to invite the intervention of the central government. This, however, would have meant weakening the provincial government. Moreover, in 1933, troops of the central government were engaged in civil war. The second alternative lay in the absorption of Sinkiang by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Russia, however, was busy industrializing herself and Sinkiang would only have given her greater surpluses of products that she already had in abundance. Moreover, the industrialization of Sinkiang presented quite a problem. The third alternative, the one adopted, was to help the provincial government, to support General Sheng, to develop trade and thus improve the economic condition of the country.

On the whole, the period of General Sheng's "rule" was relatively peaceful and prosperous. The next few years were characterized by some minor uprisings, by virtual Russian monopoly of trade in the province, by the continued rule of General Sheng and by his protesta-

tions of loyalty to the central government.

After hearing of the progress of the German armies in Russia during 1941-42, however, General Sheng became convinced that Russia would be beaten and decided that the future lay not with the Russians but in a united and strong China. In 1943 the Russians withdrew from Sinkiang quietly and without incident.

In the meantime, relations between General Cheng and Generalissimo Chiang seem to have deteriorated. Moreover, the Russians were voicing their dislike of the "reactionary" Kuomintang regime. In an effort to improve Chinese-Russian relations General Sheng was removed in August, 1944, after a complex and face-saving series of arrangements whereby General Sheng left Sinkiang to become Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Shungking cabinet. He was succeeded by General Shao-liang, who did not inherit a peaceful province. Rebel uprisings which had been simmering since July, 1944, flared up once again and violent opposition to Chinese rule was reported towards the end of 1944, in January, 1945, and is still continuing to date.

#### POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

The question of the future status of Sinkiang remains. There appear to be three alternatives. The first would be Russian domination. However, it is not certain whether

Russia would want to add Sinkiang to her Far Eastern republics. Then, too, there were some Moslem uprisings against the Russians even during General Sheng's governorship. Outright incorporation of Sinkiang into the USSR seems improbable in the immediate future.

The second alternative lies in the creation of an independent state. This appears to be the weakest alternative. Due to its geographical location the new state would have little chance of surviving as an autonomous unit. Then too, as has been shown in the past, the different groups do not trust each other sufficiently to form a stable independent state.

The third alternative would be to grant Sinkiang autonomy in local affairs while keeping it within China Proper. The success of this alternative would depend on post-war internal reforms in China. This seems to be the more logical and practical solution. With a reformed Chinese administration which allowed for much local autonomy and with favorable economic conditions the traditional dislike and distrust of the Moslems and other groups towards the Chinese may diminish.

We can only hope that the question will be solved peacefully, for, as Wendell Willkie has said, "There is enough dynamite stored in Sinkiang to start another world war when the present war is finished."

## THE CHINESE CO-OPERATIVE FARM

proprietors to something little better than common labourers, serving masters owing their position to political orthodoxy rather than any special agricultural knowledge or skill, have not hesitated to make known their dissatisfaction at the course events have taken. Sometimes they have even pushed their dissatisfaction to the length of withdrawal from the farms; by no means an easy process in the face of the intense pressures, both political and economic, available to the authorities to induce them to remain. To some certainly the loss of freedom and independence, and the subjection to the new ruling class of local Communist officials and favourites, was compensated for by an increase in income and standard of living, acquired as a result of sharing in the assets and labour power of their more successful neighbours, as well, perhaps, as through technical improvements gained by economies of scale, better capital investment, the use of improved stocks, and strains and similar methods. But to some, absorption in the co-operatives meant, at least for a time, not only a loss of independence but a reduction in standard of living into the bargain. Among such resentment has, not surprisingly, been particularly bitter.

The general discontent arising from this situation may not only exercise an adverse effect on production, but might, in certain circumstances, be politically dangerous to the government. As a result, the authorities have recently been devoting considerable efforts to conciliating the members of the co-operatives. They have tried to bring about some increase in the average standard of living; they have attempted to make the structure of the farms rather less authoritarian than before, and so to give the members at least the appearance of a greater say in the running of their own affairs; and they have tried to do something to mitigate the sacrifices which those who were formerly best off have had to pay in joining the farms. It is too early to say how successful these efforts have been. But the government are likely to devote considerable efforts to ensuring that discontent does not get out of hand. Although in general the Chinese peasant is probably inclined to accept the life ordained for him with a measure of resigned fatalism, very many Chinese revolutions in the past bear witness that, if pressed too far, especially by material need, he can determine the fate of governments. The present régime in China cannot afford to disregard the pressures exerted by the five hundred million peasants on their farms.

## THE NATIONALITIES OF CHINA

By G. F. Hudson

THE TWO GREAT Communist revolutions of our time have both taken place in countries which were already vexed by difficult problems of nationality. Both the Russian and Chinese empires, as they existed at the beginning of the twentieth century, comprised large territories inhabited by non-Russian or non-Chinese peoples. The Russian empire was still intact at the time of the fall of the Tsarist régime in 1917 (except for Russian Poland, which had been overrun by the Germans), but in the period of freedom which followed most of the non-Russian nationalities had set up independent or autonomous states of their own before the Bolsheviks seized power in the former imperial capital. In China, after the fall of the Manchu monarchy in 1911, certain areas of non-Chinese population broke away from the political entity inherited by the Republic and were still independent when the Communists came to power in 1949. In both countries the Communist parties of the metropolitan areas were confronted with the question whether to recognize the secession of peripheral national areas or whether to seek to reconstitute the former imperial unity according to some political formula which could be squared with Marxist doctrine.

The Russian Bolsheviks evolved the theory that national self-determination was a people's right, but that the interests of the working class took precedence over any nationalist movement under bourgeois leadership, so that it was right and proper for the armed forces of Soviet Russia to support Bolshevik elements in non-Russian areas. In the course of the confused civil wars of 1918-20 Russian troops played a decisive part in winning power for local Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia; without their intervention these regions would almost certainly have emerged as a belt of independent states to the south of Russia from the Dniester to the Altai. As it was, all the seceding territories, except for those on the western fringe of the old empire, were brought into the new Soviet Union, which had virtually the same frontiers in Asia as those of the Tsardom. Constitutionally the

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new political entity was a voluntary federation of national states on an equal basis, Russia being only one of the constituent units; in the Soviet constitution of 1923, moreover, each republic had a formal right of secession from the federation. But in practice the central control of Moscow over all the republics became more and more effective, and the "Stalin Constitution" of 1936 did not include any right of secession; indeed, in the great purge trials of the 'thirties the mere alleged advocacy of secession in the past figured as treason. There were during this period widespread nationalist agitations in several of the non-Russian republics, but they were ruthlessly suppressed. Under Stalin "Great Russian chauvinism" and "bourgeois nationalism" were both denounced as opposite deviations from the party line on the national question, but in practice it was the latter rather than the former that incurred penal sanctions. Mass deportations were used to crush the more intractable national movements, particularly that of the Kazakhs, whose territory had already in Tsarist times become an area of Russian settlement; between 1926 and 1939 as a result of famine, massacre and deportation, the total number of Kazakhs declined according to Soviet figures by over one-fifth, so that they became a minority in what remained nominally their republic. Later during the war several small nationalities – the Crimean Tatars, Balkhars, Chechens and Kalmuks – which had shown disaffection against Soviet rule were deported *en masse* and their autonomous political units abolished. Since the war it has been Soviet doctrine that the union of nationalities forming the "Soviet people" is indissoluble, and the principle has been extended to the Baltic States, which were forcibly incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1940 after more than two decades of independence.

Under the system of government established by Stalin it was possible to combine an authoritarian central control with outwardly autonomous elected governments in the various national republics because of the unified and disciplined organization of the All-Union Communist Party which pervaded all the republics and monopolized all political power. The military system of the Soviet Union also ensured that army units were distributed in such a way that there were no locally rooted contingents which might take part in a national insurrection. With all appointments being in fact made by the central authorities of the party it was quite safe to have persons of the local nationality holding the highest government offices in each republic, and there were no longer any Russian governors to affront national sentiment, however

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many Russians there might be in the background holding key positions in the local party apparatus. It was a political order well suited to the claim to have eliminated colonial rule while in fact retaining in Kiev, Tiflis, Samarkand and Alma Ata a control no less effective than that of the Tsars.

The Chinese Communists had this model before them when they in their turn took over a vast territory containing a plurality of peoples and a historic claim to areas which had become independent. Superficially their problem was a much simpler one than that which had faced the Russian Communists, because the non-Chinese elements in China were so much smaller a percentage of the total population than the non-Russian elements in the Soviet Union. Even if the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, as speakers of East Slav languages with a traditional Orthodox Church culture, are counted with the Russians as a single *Staatsvolk*, the other non-Russian nationalities add up to approximately a quarter of the total, whereas in China all the non-Chinese peoples are reckoned to be not more than 7 per cent of the total. On the other hand, they predominate over vast areas of land which is largely mountain and desert to the west and north-west of the zone of Chinese population, so that, if they were to be taken away from China, its territory would be approximately halved. Territorially, therefore, if not in numbers, the non-Chinese peoples are important, and it might have been expected that the Chinese Communists would follow the Soviet example to the extent of recasting the structure of the Chinese state in the form of a federal union. But they have not in fact done so. The "Chinese People's Republic" is a unitary state within which provision is made for local autonomy for "national minorities", but not as constituents of a federation.

The main reason for this difference between Chinese and Soviet practice is to be found in the contrast between the relations of the Chinese and Russian Communist parties to nationalism in their revolutionary periods. Russian Bolshevism during the First World War based itself squarely on Marxist internationalism and denounced the patriotic war effort of Russia supported by other parties; it succeeded in winning power largely by exploitation of the intense war-weariness of the Russian people after three years of costly and fruitless hostilities. The war itself had been classified as imperialist and so in retrospect were the past conquests of the Tsars; initially the Bolsheviks were strongly opposed both to Russian national expansion in the present and to



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glorification of the Russian past. Only by degrees was the cause of Communism merged with that of Russian nationalism so as to produce that peculiar patriotic self-assertion of the Stalin era, the most notorious feature of which was the systematic claiming of Russian priority in nearly every field of the history of scientific discovery. In China, on the other hand, Communism was linked with nationalism from the beginning, for, being a semi-colonial country struggling to liberate itself from imperialism, its national struggle was just and right by Marxist principles; thus instead of Lenin calling for peace with Germany, promoting the disintegration of the Russian army and "turning imperialist war into civil war", we have the Chinese Communists calling for a national united front to oppose Japanese aggression and striving to outbid the Kuomintang as organizers of popular resistance to the invaders. The Russian Communists' recognition of the non-Russian nationalities as constitutionally equal partners with Russia in the Soviet federation corresponded to their initial view of the Tsarist empire as an imperialist régime, whereas the Chinese Communists never had to restrain their patriotic feelings, since it was consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine for them to regard China as the innocent victim of imperialist aggressions and ignore the past extensions of Chinese rule over non-Chinese peoples. It was in accordance with this basic outlook that the new régime they set up in 1949, even though it claimed to inherit all the territories of the former Manchu empire (except Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva), should not have the form of a union of states, but be styled simply the "Chinese People's Republic".

It must also be taken into account that Chung Kuo, the Central Country or "Middle Kingdom", the name regularly used by the Chinese themselves for China, is not essentially an ethnic designation and can theoretically cover various nationalities without being identified with any one of them. The Chinese as an ethnic group, the speakers of the various dialects of the Chinese language, are distinguished as the Han. English usage renders Chung Kuo as "China" — a name derived from that of the Ch'in dynasty and applied to the country from ancient times by the Indians and Arabs — and does not differentiate between the Chinese as Han and the Chinese as inhabitants of Chung Kuo. However, Chung Kuo has always had the connotation of Chinese civilization and institutions; it was the domain of a state power which was centred in ethnically Chinese China even when the imperial authority was held by a dynasty of non-Chinese origin. With the de-

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velopment of modern Chinese nationalism the idea of Chung Kuo became even more closely identified with that of an ethnically Chinese state.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the empire of the Ming dynasty (of ethnically Chinese origin) covered a territory about half as large as present-day China and not very different from the area of predominant Chinese speech. It comprised what later came to be known as "China proper", from the Great Wall southward to Hainan, together with a pale of Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria and a north-westerly extension beyond Kansu as far as Hami. This territory included extensive areas inhabited by non-Chinese peoples in the west and south-west, but it did not include central and northern Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang (except for its eastern corner) or Tibet. With the Manchu conquest of China in the middle of the century the territory of the Ming empire was joined to a kingdom which extended from the borders of Korea to the north of the Amur; before they passed to the south of the Great Wall the Manchus had subdued the Chinese population of the Liao basin and the Mongol tribes to the west, so that each of the Eight Banners (*Pa Ch'i*) comprised Chinese and Mongol as well as purely Manchu contingents, and after their capture of Peking they took over, and adapted themselves to, the political and administrative system of China. The bulk of the original Manchus - who were never numerous - moved into China as army garrisons, and the Manchu homeland was left almost unoccupied. The Manchu emperors, however, tried to preserve the separate identity of their people, forbidding their intermarriage with Chinese and prohibiting Chinese settlement beyond the old pale in Manchuria, but they could not in the long run prevent the absorption of the Manchus by the vastly more numerous and civilized Chinese among whom they were settled, and the policy of keeping the Chinese out of the old Manchu lands in Manchuria eventually had to be reversed in order to forestall Russian colonization of the area - with the result that Manchuria had become overwhelmingly Chinese in population from the Yellow Sea right up to the Amur by the time of the Revolution of 1911.

The Manchu-Chinese dynastic state was normally called the Chinese empire by Europeans in the nineteenth century, but it might well have been called the Manchu empire, for in the extent which it had reached by the beginning of the century it was primarily a Manchu creation. Rough and barbarous as they were in comparison with the Chinese,

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the Manchus provided a military energy and mobility which led through a series of wars to a vast territorial expansion of the realm which had been subject to the Ming. Mongolia, East Turkestan and Tibet were brought under the control of the new dynasty. In Central Asia the Manchus overthrew the last of great Mongol tribal ascendancies, that of the Kalmuks, who held the Ili and Tarim basins and had gained a predominant influence in Tibet through intervention in the latter's internal politics; Manchu-Chinese authority in Tibet, dating from 1720, was incidental to the destruction of the Kalmuk power by the Manchu emperors of China. The territories thus acquired were not, however, included in the regular administrative system of China inherited from the Ming; they were either placed under Manchu military governors or left to native rulers supervised by residents (*amban*) appointed by the central government. It was only in 1884, after the suppression of the revolt of the Moslem Turki people of East Turkestan led by Yakub Beg, that the province of Sinkiang was formed to include East Turkestan (the Tarim basin) and Dzungaria; Mongolia and Tibet continued to remain outside the Chinese provincial system until the fall of the Manchu dynasty.

The outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 was followed by national revolts in Mongolia and Tibet. The Chinese garrisons were driven out and independent states proclaimed. The rebel leaders in both countries declared that they had owed allegiance to the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, but were not subject to the authority of the new Republic of China. The insurrections were partially, but not completely, successful. The Mongols held their own in Outer Mongolia (*Wai meng ku*) to the north of the Gobi Desert, but failed to break away from Chinese rule in Inner Mongolia (*Nei meng ku*) between the Gobi and the Great Wall, where they were closer to Peking and where there were many Chinese settlers. Similarly the Tibetans were able to assert their independence effectively in the central and western parts of their ethnic area, but in their eastern borderland, where their stock was divided politically into a number of principalities under rulers called by the Chinese *T'u Ssu*, the Chinese succeeded in restoring their authority, and the region was reconstituted as a Chinese province under the name of Sikang. Thus both Mongols and Tibetans were split into a section which became independent and a section which remained under Chinese rule. The movements of revolt involved not only the internal but also the international relations of the Chinese empire, for Mongolia and Tibet were

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of interest to Russia and Britain respectively, and both Russia and Britain gave diplomatic support to their respective local autonomies without formally denying the ultimate sovereignty of China.

To emphasize the multi-national character of the new Republic and conciliate the elements inclined to secede, the Chinese revolutionary leaders adopted a flag with five bars representing the five peoples of China, defined as the Chinese (Han), the Manchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Moslems. Of these five the Manchus still retained a lingering prestige but hardly existed any longer as a distinct people; they had almost everywhere by this time been absorbed by the Chinese. The category of Moslems included both the Turki-speaking Moslems of Sinkiang and the Chinese-speaking Moslems of Kansu and other north-western provinces of China, generally known as Tungan, who were linguistically Han, but regarded as a separate community by their non-Moslem neighbours. The fivefold division, however, was not exhaustive, for it made no mention of the Chuong, Tai, Lolo, Miao and other indigenous ethnic groups of the western and south-western provinces of China; these were omitted presumably because, scattered as they were within the Han ethnic area, and lacking any political or cultural unity among themselves, they were regarded as too unimportant to be ranked with the five specified nationalities.

During the civil war which followed the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the Russian protection of Outer Mongolia ceased to be effective, and the country was reconquered by a Chinese military expedition. But the Chinese were driven out again by the Mongols with the aid of a "White" Russian force from Siberia; the latter were in turn defeated and driven out by a Bolshevik army, which promoted the seizure of power in Urga, the capital (now Ulan Bator), by a party of young revolutionaries hostile to the princes and lamas who had hitherto formed the native ruling class in Mongolia. The new régime, backed by the Russian troops, proclaimed the Mongol People's Republic as a new state holding the greater part of the former area of Outer Mongolia. The north-western corner of Outer Mongolia, however, the territory between the Tannu-ola and Sayan mountains on the borders of Siberia, inhabited by a distinct people, the Uriankhai or Tuvinians, was detached by the Russians and made into a separate state under the name of Tannu Tuva. Already before the Revolution there had been an immigration of Russian settlers into the Uriankhai country, where there was much good cultivable land; the Uriankhai, nomadic breeders

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of horses and reindeer, found themselves increasingly dominated by the Russian minority in their territory.

The Soviet government, by the treaty of 1924 which established diplomatic relations with China, still recognized a nominal Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia (including by implication Tannu Tuva), but China had to recognize its internal autonomy, and this was under the armed protection of the Soviet Union, which precluded any further attempt by the Chinese to regain control by force. The Chinese, however, took effective measures to prevent Mongol independence from spreading south of the Gobi. Inner Mongolia was divided among several regularly organized Chinese provinces - Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol - and in each of these Chinese peasant settlement soon produced Chinese population majorities, even though wide areas still remained in the hands of the sparsely distributed Mongol inhabitants. From 1931 onwards Mongol nationalism in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was championed by the Japanese as a lever against China, but this pro-Japanese phase - which, unlike the Soviet-backed nationalism of Outer Mongolia, drew its leadership from the old princely families - came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the Japanese empire in 1945.

In Sinkiang in 1932 a Moslem revolt in which the Turki-speaking majority of the province joined with Tungan insurgents from Kansu nearly succeeded in breaking away the territory from China as Yakum Beg's revolt had done for over a decade during the nineteenth century. The Soviet government, however, moved probably by the fear that Turki Moslem independence in Sinkiang would have dangerous repercussions in Soviet Central Asia, went to the assistance of the Chinese governor with Russian armed forces; the revolt was suppressed and Sinkiang became for several years a Soviet protectorate with its administration in Chinese hands, but effectively detached from the Chinese central government and guided by Russian advisers. This state of affairs came to an end in 1942, when the crisis of the German invasion caused the Soviet government to withdraw its military units from Sinkiang and the Chinese central government re-established its authority there.

Following the Yalta conference of February, 1945, when it was agreed by the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain that the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia should be preserved, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty with China in August of the same year providing for the *de jure* sovereignty of the Mongol People's Republic subject to

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the formality of a plebiscite. Thirty-four years after the original revolt against Chinese rule Outer Mongolia thus gained official Chinese recognition of its independence. At the same time the Soviet Union quietly annexed Tannu Tuva without negotiations of any kind with either China or the Mongol People's Republic. There was not even any formal public proclamation of the incorporation of this territory of about 68,000 square miles in the Soviet Union; the world was informed merely by being told that Tannu Tuva was taking part in elections to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow.

When, therefore, the Chinese Communists set up their Chinese People's Republic in 1949, the territorial inheritance of the Manchu empire had already been reduced by the subtraction, through the exercise of Soviet power, of Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva. But the rest of it, with the exception of Tibet, was under the control of Chinese authorities, whether Communist or Kuomintang. Both the Communists and the Kuomintang affirmed Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, but the latter, preoccupied first with the Japanese invasions of China and later with the civil war against the Communists, had never been able to spare the strength and resources needed for the subjugation of this secluded, mountain-girt land. The Communists undertook the task soon after they came to power, affirming the need to liberate Tibet from "the imperialists". If this was meant to refer to the British it was somewhat out of date, for the withdrawal of British power from India had been completed in 1947, and neither Britain nor any other Western power had access to the frontiers of Tibet. There was no foreign capital investment which might qualify it as "semi-colonial" in Marxist classification. There was indeed no external domination or threat to the independence which the Tibetans had enjoyed since 1912 except that which came from China itself. The Chinese claim was in fact one of inheritance to an empire, and it was pressed all the more vigorously because China under Russian pressure had had to acquiesce in the independence of Outer Mongolia. Unlike the Mongols, the Tibetans no longer had any international protector, and they had failed during the four decades of their *de facto* independence to obtain the international *de jure* recognition which would have qualified them for admission to the United Nations. In the absence of such a recognized status as a national state Tibet was unable to claim the benefit of any juridical rights against foreign aggression, and the Chinese could claim that their military operations against Tibet were a matter of their own

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domestic jurisdiction. The Indian government at the outset protested against the Chinese invasion of Tibet, but this attitude was soon reversed, and the Tibetans, left in political isolation with hopelessly inferior armed forces, capitulated to Chinese demands. The Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951 provided for the continuation of the nominal rule of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, but with the stationing of Chinese troops at strategic points and Chinese advisers in the administration; it was, in other words, to be a political structure in accordance with the traditional method of colonial indirect rule, as imposed so often on native rulers in Asia and Africa by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth century. It might have been made tolerable for the Tibetans but for two things: first, the anti-religious and "socialist" reforms which the conquerors in their Communist zeal could not refrain from impatiently forcing on the country, and second, the massive planting of Chinese colonists on the land in eastern Tibet (Amdo and Kham provinces) against the will of the local Tibetan inhabitants. It was the latter process which was the main cause of the great Kham guerrilla revolt beginning soon after the submission of the Lhasa government to Chinese supremacy.

In the application of Communist policy on national minorities recognition as ethnic units was accorded to a number of peoples other than the four non-Chinese nationalities recognized in the early days of the Republic. In 1954 nine non-Chinese national minorities numbering more than a million were listed as follows:


Chuong	6,000,000	Tibetan	3,000,000
Hui	4,000,000	Mongol	1,500,000
Yi	3,300,000	Puyi	1,100,000
Miao	2,300,000	Korean	1,100,000
Uigur	3,000,000		

In the above list the Chuong are the aboriginal people of Kwangsi, who retain their spoken language (of the Tai family, akin to Shan, Laotian and Siamese), but are largely bilingual and have never had a written language of their own. The Hui are Moslems of Chinese speech; the term was formerly used with an essentially religious connotation but is now restricted to those who used to be called Tungan; the Turki-speaking Moslems of Sinkiang are now separately classified as Uigurs, Kirghiz or Kazakhs. The Yi are the people of Szechwan and Yunnan better known as Lolo; the name Lolo, which is a nickname regarded as derogatory to them, is officially banned. The

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Miao, who live mainly in Kweichow, are another aboriginal people, who, like the Chuong and the Yi, are entirely surrounded by Chinese and, having no traditions of higher civilization, are deeply penetrated by Chinese cultural influence, even though in the past they have maintained a measure of local independence in their mountain strongholds and have given much trouble to Chinese provincial administrations. None of these three peoples, or the Puyi, also of Kweichow, could reasonably be expected to form a fully independent national state in the conditions of the modern world. The prominence recently given to them in Chinese Communist publicity on the question of national minorities may be due partly to a desire to confuse the issue by putting all the non-Chinese ethnic elements on exactly the same footing; it can then be argued that whatever is suitable for Chuong, Yi and Miao must be right also for the less numerous Uigurs, Tibetans and Mongols. However, the latter peoples all have highly developed cultural traditions, Moslem or Buddhist, and large, continuous areas of habitation which would certainly by the standards normally accepted in the contemporary world qualify them as nations entitled to statehood. If political frontiers in the interior of Asia were to be redrawn according to ethnography, Tibet would become a state occupying the whole of the high plateau which is so well marked on a physical map of Asia and has given such a highly specialized character to the Tibetan culture and way of life; the Mongols of Inner Mongolia would be joined to those of Outer Mongolia in an enlarged Mongolian state; and the Uigurs, Kirghiz and Kazakhs of Sinkiang would be joined with their Turkish-speaking kinsmen to the west of them in a federal Turkestan which would extend from the Caspian to Lop Nor. But both Russia and China are concerned to prevent the emergence of such new national states, and although Russia formerly supported the insurgence of a pro-Russian Mongolia against China, both powers have a common interest in the suppression of "Turkism", and in the absence of any Indian support for the independence of Tibet China can continue on the course of denationalizing the Tibetans and swamping them with Chinese colonists. In all this there is nothing that the historian need find remarkable except for the extraordinary performance in semantics whereby Marxist-Leninists justify the forcible maintenance of old empires as part of a struggle against imperialism.





*St. Antony's Papers No. 14. 1963*  
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## THE AKSAI CHIN

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*By G. F. Hudson*

ON OCTOBER 18, 1958, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs addressed an Informal Note to the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi in which it declared:

The attention of the Government of India has recently been drawn to the fact that a motor road has been constructed by the Government of the People's Republic of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as the Yehching-Gartok road or Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September 1957 . . . it is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India. . . . As the Chinese Government are aware, the Government of India are anxious to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer.

The Indian Note added that an Indian military patrol in Ladakh had been missing since the end of August, and asked whether, "since there are now Chinese personnel in this part of Indian territory", the Chinese Government could furnish any information about them. The Chinese Foreign Ministry made no direct reply to the Indian Note, but on November 3 it addressed a Memorandum to the Indian Embassy in Peking which ran as follows:

According to the report of the Chinese local authorities in Sinkiang, Frontier Guards of the Chinese Liberation Army stationed in the south-western part of Sinkiang discovered in succession on September 8 and 12 two groups of Indian armed personnel at Tahungliutan and Kegrekirekan on the Sinkiang-Tibet road on Chinese territory. These personnel had clearly intruded into Chinese territory

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to conduct unlawful surveying activities within Chinese borders. They were therefore detained by the Chinese Frontier Guards. . . . The Chinese Government requests the Government of India to guarantee that no similar incidents will occur in future.

This diplomatic exchange was the beginning of the dispute between India and China over the legal ownership of some 12,000 square miles which the Indian Government had regarded as "indisputably" Indian territory. Two points about it call for comment. The first is the use of the word "recently" in the Indian Note, which leaves indefinite the period of time between the Indian Government's first discovery of the existence of the road and its protest to Peking. The Indian Government had apparently had its "attention" drawn to the fact that the road had been built and complained that it had not been informed about it by the Chinese Government. There was no suggestion that the Indian Government might have been aware of the building of the road through ordinary administrative channels. Yet, according to a subsequent statement by the Chinese Prime Minister, the road had taken eighteen months to construct and had employed 3,000 labourers. It was an obvious inference that, if such an undertaking could be carried out without any Indian official knowledge of it, the territory concerned, even if formally claimed by India, could not be subject to any actual administration.

The second point to be noted is that the Indian Government in reproaching China for building the road across a salient of Indian territory without Indian permission was unaware that India's title to the area was challenged by China. In a subsequent letter of December 14, 1958, to Mr Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr Nehru wrote:

You will remember that when the Sino-Indian Agreement with regard to the Tibet region of China was concluded (in April 1954), various outstanding problems, including some related to our border trade, were considered. . . . No border questions were raised at that time and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries. . . . Subsequently in October 1954 (when Mr Nehru visited China) . . . I briefly mentioned to you that I had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a wrong borderline between the two countries. I presumed that this was by some error and told you at the time that we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. You were good enough to reply to me that these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had not time to revise them.

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In his reply of January 3, 1959, the Chinese Prime Minister tried to turn the tables by declaring that the area through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway had been built had "always been under Chinese jurisdiction", yet "recently" the Indian Government had claimed that it was Indian territory. He went on to say:

It is true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question.

Mr Chou was undoubtedly somewhat disingenuous in pleading that the Chinese Government had not raised the question of the Sino-Indian frontier in 1954 because it had had no time to study the matter. It had had enough time to organize and carry out the invasion and subjugation of Tibet and to negotiate with India a treaty by which the latter had renounced all extra-territorial rights in Tibet previously acquired by the British Raj - a treaty which India might not have been so willing to conclude if she had known that it was to be only the preliminary to claims on 50,000 square miles of what was supposed to be undisputed Indian territory. The Chinese must have been aware of what India claimed to be the alignment of the frontier because it had been clearly shown in Indian official maps; on the other hand, no published Chinese official map before the establishment of the Communist régime had shown the alignment which has now been claimed by China, and Chou En-Lai in 1954, as already mentioned, had explained maps of date subsequent to 1949 - which through the Communist take-over of private publishing firms all acquired an official character - not by declaring that they represented what the Chinese Government held to be the frontier, but by the plea that they reproduced pre-Communist (unofficial) maps which there had been no time to revise. The Indian Government was, therefore, entitled to suppose in 1958 that China did not dispute the frontier in its main lines, though there had already been disputes from 1954 over relatively small areas to the south of passes leading from Tibet into Kumaon and Spiti. The first challenge to the Indian alignment of the frontier in Ladakh was the occupation of Khurnak by Chinese troops in the early summer of 1958. A Note Verbale to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi on July 2 protested that the place was within Indian territory and that the Indian Government "would not like to believe that unilateral action has been

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taken by the People's Republic of China, with whom their relations are of the friendliest, to enforce alleged territorial claims in the region". The Chinese did not deign to make any reply to this protest and continued to occupy Khurnak.

In countering the Indian protest of October 18 of the same year about the construction of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway across an area of what was claimed to be Indian territory, the Chinese did not admit that they had advanced into the area, but maintained that they had "always" held and administered it. In the ensuing controversy it was common ground to both sides that the frontier had never been defined by treaty, but was a traditional and customary one; the difference between them was in their location of the traditional line. Apart from military occupation of the disputed areas, claims could only be supported by appeal to historical evidence showing the exercise of jurisdiction or recognition of the boundary in times past. After exchanges of diplomatic Notes had failed to bring any agreement, and Peking had disclosed that it claimed not only north-eastern Ladakh but also nearly the whole of the territory of the Indian North-east Frontier Agency, the two Governments decided to set up a joint commission of officials to study all available materials relating to the history of the frontier. The officials met and conferred successively in Peking, Delhi and Rangoon during the summer and autumn of 1960; the Report they submitted consisted of two separate reports in which each side presented evidence in support of its case and criticized the evidence adduced by the other. No progress was made towards an agreed solution, and the boundary question remained in a condition of complete deadlock.

With regard to the area through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway had been built, the main evidence produced by India consisted of revenue and assessment records of Kashmir showing that Ladakhis had been taxed for use of the area - which was one of seasonal, not permanent, habitation - for at least three-quarters of a century before 1950. The territory in question is known as the Aksai Chin or Soda Plains and lies at an elevation of 15,000 to 16,000 feet above sea-level; it cannot be used for agriculture, but provides a certain amount of summer pasture for sheep, goats and yaks. It is buttressed to the north by the Kuen Lun mountains whose peaks rise into the zone of perpetual snow and whose northern slopes descend to the lowlands of the Tarim basin. To the west are spurs of the even higher Karakoram range, and to the east and south-east a nameless range with a crest at about 20,000 feet dividing the streams flowing westward into the Amtogor and Sarig Jilganang lakes from those flowing eastward into the Leighten and

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Tsoggar lakes. This north-south range may for convenience be called the Lanak divide; it is claimed by India to be the eastern boundary of Indian territory in this sector, and the part of the Aksai Chin lying within it may be distinguished as the West Aksai Chin from the more easterly part beyond the watershed. The significance of these mountain barriers lies in the fact that the West Aksai Chin is relatively accessible only from the south-west, that is to say, from the permanently inhabited part of Ladakh, whose people can move up their flocks in summer from lower to higher ground without too much difficulty. The Ladakhis thus utilized by *transhumance* the pastures of the Chang Chenmo valley and of Gunto Lumpa and Skydpo Lungpa in the West Aksai Chin; it was dangerous to go too far or stay too long, for, as the *Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladakh* of 1890 explained, "occasionally great loss is caused by an early fall of snow, for the grass which, though nourishing, is at all times scanty, becomes quickly covered up and the animals die of starvation before they can be brought over the Marsenik into milder regions". But these conditions made the West Aksai Chin even more dangerous for herdsmen from the north or east, who had to cross high mountain ranges to enter it, and it was thus in effect reserved by nature for the Ladakhis.

The West Aksai Chin had two other economic uses for human beings; it provided salt from its saline lakes and it was traversed by trade routes which linked Khotan to the north with Ladakh and Tibet to the south. The salt was an objective for the Ladakhis because Ladakh proper, drained by fast-flowing rivers of the Indus basin, had no saline deposits comparable to the inland drainage area of the Aksai Chin; on the other hand, both East Turkestan and Tibet, being wholly or largely inland drainage areas, had no need to go far afield for salt. The trade routes were less closely connected with Ladakh; they might be used by merchants from either north or south. In the eighteenth century and earlier they were used by Central Asian merchants who frequented the trade fairs at Gartok in western Tibet. But in the nineteenth century, at any rate after the Dogra conquest of Ladakh, trade across the Kuen Lun mountains seems to have been almost entirely in the hands of Indian and Kashmiri merchants, who had British backing in their efforts to extend Indian commerce into East Turkestan. In the confusion which followed on the revolt of Yakub Beg against Chinese rule there - the revolt continued from 1864 to 1878 - the trade routes were infested with Kirghiz brigands, and the Kashmir State Government, under British paramountcy from 1846, established police outposts in the northern Aksai Chin to protect merchants against them;

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this protection was finally extended as far as Shahidulla, well to the north of the Kuen Lun range, where a small garrison was maintained for several years.

There is a minority of Turki place-names in the Aksai Chin, and these probably record the old trading connections with the north, going back perhaps to the days of the medieval Uigur Empire, or at any rate to the Chagatai and Uzbek periods in East Turkestan. The Chinese side on the Commission of 1960 tried to use these place-names as evidence for their contention of ethnic occupation of the West Aksai Chin by Sinkiang people – Uigurs and Kirghiz – in recent times, but the argument recoiled on themselves, for the great majority of place-names in the area are unquestionably Ladakhi. The Chinese were unable to produce any evidence to prove that the normal seasonal use of the West Aksai Chin was Turki rather than Ladakhi, and the Indian Report quite justly comments:

The Indian side were surprised to find that the Chinese case contained numerous assertions which were unsupported by documentary evidence. . . . In the Western Sector it was claimed that the Kirghiz and Uighur people of Sinkiang had been going to the Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang areas since the eighteenth century for salt-mining, pasturing and trading and this was said to establish that the area had throughout been part of Sinkiang. But not a single document either from the archives of the Sinkiang administration or from contemporary records and accounts was produced to establish the prevalence of this practice. On the other hand, the Indian side produced both historical evidence, such as accounts of travellers, and official records and local gazetteers to show that it was the people of Ladakh who had been going for salt-mining, hunting and pasturing as of right into these very areas.

The Chang Chenmo valley and West Aksai Chin were for revenue purposes part of the *ilaga* of Tanktse in the Ladakh Tahsil of Kashmir, and the Indian side produced assessment records and maps to show this. Ladakh villagers were assessed for taxation not only for their local land but also in respect of summer pastures which they used. If the Chinese had also sought to levy dues on them for use of these grazing grounds as being within Chinese territory, they would have complained of double taxation, and the question of jurisdiction would necessarily have been raised. But there is no trace of any challenge to Indian-Kashmiri jurisdiction in the region claimed to belong to Ladakh during the period of British rule in India. The Ladakh Tehsil Assessment Report of 1909

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stated that "there have been no boundary disputes on the Lhasa (Tibet) frontier, and the existing boundary seems to be well understood by subjects of both the State and the Lhasa Governments". Nothing here is said about the frontier with Sinkiang, to which the Chinese now claim that the Aksai Chin always belonged, but it certainly would have been mentioned if there had been boundary disputes in that quarter. In fact, there were none, because there was no contact; the broad Kuen Lun range served as a barrier, which was not crossed either way except by infrequent trading parties.

As already mentioned, Chinese control of East Turkestan - dating from the destruction of the Kalmuk Empire by the Manchus in 1759 - was interrupted by a revolt of the inhabitants from 1864 to 1878; after the reconquest the territory was in 1884 constituted a regular Chinese province, which it had not been before, under the name of Sinkiang. Even then, however, it was some years before Chinese administration reached as far south as the Kuen Lun. It was only in 1890 that the Chinese built a fort at Suket, where in 1892 a British traveller, Lord Dunmore, saw a notice declaring that "anyone passing the frontier without reporting himself at the fort will be imprisoned". Later in the same year the Chinese set up a pillar 64 miles south of Suket, which fact was duly reported by Kashmir to the Government of India. There is no evidence that under the Ch'ing dynasty China ever attempted to come further south than this. In other words, they accepted the Kuen Lun range as the frontier, and both Kashmir and the Government of India were equally willing to accept it, because they had no wish to exercise jurisdiction north of the range if the Chinese could assure protection for caravans there, and indeed brigandage appears to have ceased entirely on the Leh-Khotan trade routes after 1890. The fact, however, that Kashmir had for a while controlled an area even north of the Kuen Lun left its traces in cartography; thus Philips' Commercial Atlas of China of 1948 still showed the Kashmir frontier at Shahidulla.

As evidence of their jurisdiction over the Aksai Chin the Chinese referred in the Commission to the case of the explorer Deasy, who in 1898 was forbidden by the Amban of Yutien (Keriya) to travel to Rudok by way of Pulo. This route, however, lay across the East Aksai Chin outside the Indian alignment of the frontier; the Chinese authorities, therefore, had a perfect right to prevent Deasy from using it, but this proved nothing with regard to the territory west of the Lanak watershed which alone is claimed by India.

Indian ownership of the West Aksai Chin was acknowledged in a Chinese map prepared by Hung Ta-chen (previously Minister in St



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Petersburg), which was officially communicated to a British representative in 1893, and also in successive editions of the *Postal Atlas of China* from 1917 to 1933. With regard to Hung's map, the Chinese Commission Report declares that it was

only an imitation of a Tsarist Russian map with names of places in Chinese, which could not be regarded as a Chinese map. After its publication Chinese officials one after another pointed out to the government that it was incorrect and blamed Hung Chun for it. It was for this erroneous map that Hung Chun was dismissed.

The Indian side replied that, if the map was afterwards considered erroneous, the Chinese Government should have so informed the British, but no such communication was ever received. In any case, it should be noted that the mistakes were attributed to copying, not a British, but a Russian map, and in view of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia in the late nineteenth century it is hard to believe that Russian map-makers would have gone out of their way to assign to Britain territory which they knew to be under the jurisdiction of China.

On the *Postal Atlas of China* of 1917 the Chinese declared:

the Chinese Government in its note dated April 3, 1960, already pointed out that this map was drawn arbitrarily by French and British imperialist elements who then controlled China's postal office, without the consent of the Chinese authorities. It did not represent the view of the Chinese people, but only that of the imperialist elements, this is self-evident.

To this the Indian delegation replied:

The Chinese Government could not disown these maps as having been published by "imperialist elements" who were in charge of the postal department. At no time had the Chinese Government lost control of the administration; it had throughout exercised overall sovereign powers, and as it had not withdrawn these maps, repudiated them, or even suggested that the precise alignment shown on them was not binding on them, they should be regarded as authoritative expressions of the governmental viewpoint regarding the alignment. The Indian Government would have promptly protested if the alignment now claimed by the Chinese side had been published and therefore had come to their notice.

China never indeed formally and openly challenged the Indian alignment of the frontier during the period of the British Raj. But

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what of aims and aspirations not for publication? The Chinese delegates on the Commission submitted in evidence two large-scale maps which they held to be authoritative, although they have never been published. One was produced by the Cartographic Bureau of the General Staff of the Chinese Army in 1918, and the other in 1943 by the Bureau of Survey of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence. These certainly showed the West Aksai Chin as within China. The Indian delegation, however, refused to accept them as internationally authoritative on account of their secret character:

The Chinese side admitted after protracted discussion that these maps had never been published, but argued that to set them aside amounted to doubting the *bona fides* of the Chinese side. The Indian side stated that they had no intention of doubting the *bona fides* of the Chinese side, but as secret and unpublished maps had never been exposed to public criticism, or come to the official notice of other governments, they were no proof of the alignment. . . . Governments could show whatever alignments they pleased on unpublished maps.

What these maps do prove, however, is an aspiration in Chinese military quarters from 1918 onwards for effective inclusion of the West Aksai Chin, if possible, within the frontiers of China, and the fact that this aspiration first comes to light in a document of the General Staff indicates that it had a strategic motive. Such a motive is not far to seek. It was one which had not been operative before 1911. Under the Manchu dynasty China had controlled Sinkiang along the line Lanchow-Hami-Urumchi and Tibet along the line Tachienlu-Barang-Lhasa; no need had been felt for lateral communications between the two territories. But in 1911, when the dynasty was overthrown by revolution and China was in disorder, Outer Mongolia and Tibet took the opportunity to drive out the Chinese garrisons and declare themselves independent. The new Chinese Republic regarded itself as the heir to all the conquests made by the Manchus, and its military leaders set about making plans for the reconquest of the seceding countries. For the subjugation of Tibet it was desirable to have more than one line of approach - not only the direct route to Lhasa from Szechwan, but also the route from Khotan into western Tibet which had been followed by Kalmuk invaders at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This latter way went across the West Aksai Chin - the variant by Polu further east being much more difficult - and could only be used either by Indian permission or if the territory were to be internationally

recognized as belonging to China. As a part of India, it formed an awkward salient projecting between Sinkiang and Tibet; to get rid of this salient must be an objective of Chinese policy whenever opportunity might offer.

Although the General Staff map of 1918 was never published, its principles soon began to influence unofficial Chinese maps which had public circulation. One of these was the Peking University Atlas of 1925, of which the Indian Report remarked:

The Chinese side stated that certain maps in the Peking University Atlas of 1925, cited by the Indian side, showed that after 1911 Aksai Chin was a part of China. However, this Atlas clearly showed in the map referred to by the Indian side that China, when at its maximum extent before 1911, under the Ching Empire, had not included the Aksai Chin area. If the area was shown as part of China after 1911, it could only be on the basis of an arbitrary claim with no support in history, for nothing had happened in 1911, or after 1911, to give support to such a claim.

But if nothing had happened in 1911 to support the claim, something, as we have seen, *had* happened to make China desire possession of this inhospitable high plateau. If thirty-two years were to elapse between the General Staff's blue print of 1918 and the crossing of the West Aksai Chin by Chinese troops in 1950, the reason is to be found in the continuing weakness of a China distracted by civil wars and Japanese invasions. The reconquest of Tibet was postponed but not forgotten. At last the conditions for it were fulfilled; by the end of 1949 China was reunited under a strong government resolved to equal and surpass the measure of her past imperial greatness. Meanwhile, two years previously, India had gained independence, but without the unity which had been imposed by the British Raj; the sub-continent was divided between two sovereign states, and nowhere was the heritage so disputed as in Kashmir, where the ruler's accession to India only brought about half the territory of the State under Indian control, the western and north-western areas being seized by Moslem rebels with the support of Pakistan. After more than a year of localized hostilities in Kashmir an armistice was arranged at the beginning of 1949, but many on both sides wanted, or expected, a renewal of the contest. This was the situation in the most northerly borderland of India when the Chinese People's Republic began to threaten the "liberation" of Tibet.

The first Indian reaction to the Chinese invasion of Tibet was one of protest. The Indian Government in a Note to Peking on October 26,

1950, referred to Chinese assurances of intention to settle disputed issues with Tibet by peaceful means and declared the military invasion to be "most surprising and regrettable". The Chinese Reply was sharp and uncompromising; it asserted that Tibet was "entirely a domestic problem of China" and that the Chinese People's Liberation Army "must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China". It also hinted that the new India was not really an independent state by declaring that the Indian protest had been "affected by foreign influence hostile to China". The Indian Government nevertheless addressed another Note to Peking on November 1, expressing the view that "there is no justification whatever" for military measures against the Tibetans; to this Peking replied with the charge that India was trying to "obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government". Indian policy then suddenly went into reverse. Tibet had appealed to the United Nations, but on November 25 the Indian delegate supported the British in opposing the attempt to get the appeal put on to the agenda of the Assembly. Tibet was thus deprived of all international moral and political support and had no choice but to capitulate to superior military force and conclude the Agreement of May 23, 1951, which provided for Chinese military occupation of the whole of Tibet.

The main invasion had been from the east, from Szechwan, but from "the end of 1950", according to the Chinese account, Chinese units also crossed the West Aksai Chin to enter Tibet from Sinkiang. The Chinese Commission Report of 1961, as part of its evidence of continuous occupation and jurisdiction in the West Aksai Chin, stated:

From the end of 1950 to the autumn of 1951 the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari district of Tibet through the Aksai Chin area along the customary route between Sinkiang and Tibet. Since then large numbers of personnel have entered and goods been sent from Sinkiang through this area. . . . From 1954 to 1955 . . . the administrative departments of China's Sinkiang region also set up a special survey team charged with the surveying of the course to be taken by the Sinkiang-Tibet highway. The footsteps of the members of this survey team covered every place in Aksai Chin and Linghithang. After surveying for a period of about two years they put forward for choice more than ten routes among which some are even to the west of the present Sinkiang-Tibet highway. Finally the Chinese Government completed the construction of the present Sinkiang-Tibet highway from March 1956 to October 1957.

The Chinese delegates naturally did not fail to ask the question how it was that, if India had had effective jurisdiction over the area, the Indian Government "had not the slightest knowledge of such important and large-scale activities of the Chinese personnel and that it was not until the last two years that the Indian side suddenly charged China with 'unlawful incursions' ". The answer to this question, implicit in the Indian evidence, though not directly given by the Indian delegation, is that some Indian authorities, though not necessarily the highest, did know all the time. The Indian officials presented in evidence records of military patrols carried out in the area from 1950 to 1958:

In 1951 an expedition went from Leh to Lingzi Tang and Aksai Chin. In 1952 an army reconnaissance party went up to Lanak La *via* Tanktse, Tsogtsalu, Hot Spring and the Kongka Pass. In August 1954 and August 1956 patrol parties repeated this tour to Lanak La. The national flag planted at Lanak La in 1954 was still found there in 1956. In September 1957 a reconnaissance party went up to the Qara Tagh Pass *via* Tanktse, Tsogtsalu, Hot Spring, Shamal Lungpa and Shinglung. In the summer of 1958 a patrol party went *via* Phobrang, Shamal Lungpa and Nischu to the Sarigh Jilganang and the Amtogor lake regions. The party planted the Indian flag at a point  $80^{\circ} 12'$  East,  $35^{\circ} 03'$  North. Another reconnaissance party went at the same time *via* Phobrang, Shamal Lungpa, Shinglung, Qizil Zilga and Palong Karpo to Haji Langar. A third party proceeded to the Qara Tagh Pass *via* Phobrang, Shamal Lungpa, Shamzuling and Qizil Jilga.

The truth about what happened in the Aksai Chin lies latent in these lists of place-names. For seven years Indian military patrols were crossing the tracks of the Chinese in the West Aksai Chin. If they did not actually run into Chinese troops, surveyors or construction gangs, they must have heard all about them from the Ladakhis who traversed the area every year for their grazing and salt-mining. In other words, there was Indian collusion in what the Chinese were doing. On the other hand, it is impossible to read the Indian note of protest of October 18, 1958, with which this study begins, and Mr Nehru's subsequent letter to the Chinese Prime Minister, without being convinced that he was genuinely indignant at what he regarded as a violation of India's frontier only "recently" brought to his attention. The only possible inference is that knowledge of what was going on was kept from Mr Nehru by persons in high position more strongly, or more recklessly, committed than he was to winning the favour of China. Such persons

were to be found among those most directly concerned with the contest with Pakistan in Kashmir, that is to say, in the Kashmir State Government and in the Indian Defence Ministry. For those who anticipated a renewal of hostilities with Pakistan it must have seemed essential to have China, the powerful neighbour of Kashmir to the north, as at least a benevolent neutral, and, if possible, an ally. To bring this about they were ready to go to lengths which Mr Nehru would not have countenanced. Yet he himself gave the impetus to their actions by his abandonment of the cause of Tibet in November 1950. After India had joined in blocking the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations, it was open to a political realist to argue that it would be just as well to go the whole way and win the friendship of the Chinese by giving them positive assistance in their reconquest of Tibet. To turn a blind eye to their military use of the West Aksai Chin would be doing them a real service for which India could hope to be rewarded in future, and the area was so remote that the transaction could be hidden from the eyes of the world. No journalist ever visited these desolate wastes and the British big-game hunters who had once frequented them in quest of wild yaks had long been an extinct species.

What the promoters of this intrigue apparently failed to take into account was the possibility that the Chinese, if permitted the use of the West Aksai Chin, would behave like the cuckoo in the nest and end by claiming the territory as their own. Or, at least, if they recognized the possibility, they must have hoped to avert it by the vigorous military patrolling which was carried on from 1950 to 1958, with such demonstrative acts as the planting of the Indian flag on the Lanak La. If a stranger was allowed to occupy the house, the owner would assert his proprietary right by frequently going in and out. The building of the Chinese motor road, however, transformed the situation. The Chinese could now assemble and supply in the area a much stronger military force than any patrols the Indians could send up along pony tracks from Leh. The patrol which reached the road in September 1958 was taken into custody, and a year later another patrol near the Kongka Pass was attacked by the Chinese and all its members killed or taken prisoner.

When Indian and Chinese representatives met in conference at official level in 1960 to discuss the boundary question, the Chinese had the advantage of the traditional nine points of the law as regards the Aksai Chin, for they were in effective occupation of the territory they claimed. Hence they could afford to disregard the historical evidence presented in support of the Indian case, and the Indian Report complains that "the Chinese side did not really come to grips with this

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conclusive evidence proving the exercise of continuous and comprehensive administration". But the Chinese did have an answer to most of the documents cited by the Indians. The men who compiled these revenue assessments, the authors of these books of travel – were they not British, therefore imperialists, all, therefore, in a conspiracy to deprive China of territory which rightfully belonged to her? In order to plead their case the Indians were constantly driven into the position of defending the actions of the British Raj or suggesting that not all Englishmen were necessarily liars, and the Chinese representatives took full tactical advantage of the Indian embarrassment. Finally, the Indians were goaded into pointing out that the peoples of Sinkiang and Tibet were not Chinese. They were severely rebuked in the following passage of the Chinese report:

The Indian side failed to provide any concrete instance to deny the basic historical fact that British imperialism for many years actively carried out a policy of aggression against China's Sinkiang and Tibet region, a fact which is directly related to the Sino-Indian boundary question. But the Indian side tried by every means to defend British imperialism. . . . What was particularly surprising to the Chinese side was that when the Indian side could no longer deny the facts of British imperialist aggression against Sinkiang cited by the Chinese side, it not only tried hard to defend British imperialism, but put forward the assertion of "Chinese imperialism". It is well known that China has for more than a hundred years suffered greatly from imperialist oppression. How could it be said that Britain, whose aggressive nature is well known, was not imperialist, while China, which the whole world knows has long suffered from aggression, was imperialist.

But such altercations had no bearing on the actual situation. Even while the officials of the two governments argued over photostats of old maps, revenue records and books of travel long out of print, Chinese army lorries rumbled through the rocky wilderness along the shores of Lake Amtogor on their way from Khotan to Tibet. They would continue to do so until India had the power to stop them.

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# TIBET AND LADAKH: A HISTORY

*By Zahiruddin Ahmad*

## I

A GLANCE at the map of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as it was on the 15th of August 1947 will show that, geographically, it was divisible into three main parts. The division into three parts is made by two roughly parallel mountain ranges running north-west to south-east, the Great Himalaya Range in the south, and the Karakoram in the north.

South of the Himalayas and north of its offshoot, the Pir Panjal Range, at an average altitude of 6,000 feet above sea-level, lies the Valley of Kashmir. Before the nineteenth century, the term "Kashmir" meant, exclusively, the Valley of Kashmir.

North of the Himalayas and south of the Karakoram, proceeding from north-west to south-east, lie the three territories of Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh. Both racially and linguistically, the Baltis and Ladakhis are of Tibetan stock. The main difference between the two peoples is that the Baltis are predominantly Muslims, the Ladakhis predominantly Lamaistic Buddhists.

The main geographical feature of the area north of the Himalayas and south of the Karakoram is, of course, the River Indus, as it flows out of Tibet north-westward towards Gilgit, where it turns south to flow to the Arabian Sea, through what is now West Pakistan. On the left bank of the Indus, immediately after it leaves Tibet, lies the territory of Rupshu, with its "capital" at Han-le. The lowest elevation of Rupshu is 13,500 feet above sea-level. Further down, a little to the west of Leh (11,500 feet), the Indus receives a tributary on its left bank, the Zaskar (Zaṅs-dkar) River, which drains the area known as Zaskar. Moving downstream along the left bank of the Indus, we find the Dras River draining into the Indus. Along the valley of the Dras lies the main line of communication between the Valley of Kashmir and Ladakh, across the Zoji La Pass (11,300 feet). The area watered by the Suru River - a right-bank tributary of the Dras - is known as Purig.