

SOVIET EXPANSION IN EASTERN TURKESTAN

1944-49.



Roostam SADRI


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SINKIANG


- To be completed in 1959-60
- International boundary, demarcated
- - - International boundary, undemarcated
- - - International boundary, indefinite
- - - Internal administrative boundary
- ▨ Rebel area, 1944 to 1949



DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITIES WITHIN SINKIANG


MAJORITY POPULATION

	Mongols		Kazakhs
	Uighurs-Thickly Inhabited		Uighurs-Sparsely Inhabited
	Sarikolis		Kirghiz
	Chinese		



PASTORAL AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY IN SINKIANG

	Pastoral Economy
	Agriculture, Mainly Oasis Agriculture



ABBREVIATIONS.

1. E. T. R. - Eastern Turkestan Republic
2. K. M. T. - Kuo Min Tang, The Chinese Nationalist Party.
3. T. A. S. S. The Soviet Information Agency.

Preface.

This thesis ~~aims to~~ to cover an unknown but important aspect of post-World War II Soviet expansion - namely the Soviet Union's attempted absorption of Eastern Turkestan between 1944-49. To this day the Soviet sponsored "Revolution of Three Regions" of Eastern Turkestan remains ^{out of} one of the least studied upheavals in Central Asian ^{although to a} great extent it determined the future of Sino-Soviet relations in the following decades? The story that will be told is not just one of confrontation and collusion between the U.S.S.R. and China for the ^{presentation of this} frontier colony. It is also a story of a ^{remarkable} but ^{but} futile struggle of a proud people for independence from these two imperialist powers.

This project is primarily an oral history, however, the large number of testimonies taken from eyewitnesses to the events has been supplemented by both printed and unpublished source material only some of which is available in Australia. Reluctance of informants and suppliers of written testimonies to give permission for their names to appear in this work constitutes one of the main handicaps of the research.

The new socialist books and articles that deal with this topic tend to solve only one-sided and often an incomplete picture. A very pictorial account of the struggle of the people of Eastern Turkestan for independence and freedom is given in Z. P. Taipov's memories entitled, V borbu za svobodu (Struggling for Freedom, 1974).

However, its value as an eyewitness account suffers considerably because of the author's necessity to comply with the official Soviet line in interpreting those events in Eastern Turkestan, thus leading to distortion of some facts, such as the Soviet military aid to the insurrectionists.

A. Kurahonja's book Dagi Turkestan - Chin Mustamlakasi (Eastern Turkestan - A Chinese Colony, The) provides good insight into the tragic history of the people of Eastern Turkestan. His account reflects the viewpoint of Turkish emigres from Eastern Turkestan who fled abroad after the Communist take-over in 1949. Owen Lattimore's Pivot of Asia is a classic work concentrating on the historical background, the people, geography and political developments in Sinkiang prior to the Communist take-over. It provides good insights into subsequent events that toppled the Chinese Nationalist regime* in the "New Territory". Among other books relevant to the topic of this thesis, Lars-Eric Nyman's published doctoral dissertation entitled,

*Hereafter K.M.T.

Great Britain and China, 1911-1949 (1977), represents another example of a thorough and well-documented monograph. A.S. Whiting's Sinclair: Power or Prowl (1973) contains substantial valuable information, but the part containing General Chiang Kai-shek's apology should be completely discarded as a source of information for its bias and distortion of facts.

Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940) by Owen Lattimore, Gateway to Asia by H.R. Horns (1944), China and Russia by O.E. Clubb (1971) and China and Inner Asia by M. Rossabi (1979) are relevant to the subject of this work as is The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia by M. Boleff (1947).

While attempting to reconstruct the events that took place in Eastern Turkestan, in the period of 1944-49, this thesis initially analyzes the historical background of the Soviet expansion in Eastern Turkestan, then it studies the political and socio-economic situation there prior to the uprising in 1944. The position of the ruling Han* group within the overall social structure of the thirteen ethnic groups inhabiting Eastern Turkestan is also studied in order to evaluate what grievances of the native population caused the anti-Chinese revolt supported by all other ethnic groups inhabiting the area.

Regardless whether the Soviets instigated the revolt

* Han: Ethnic Chinese.

merely to contribute to the struggle for the liberation of the peoples of Eastern
Toward China, and to the struggle for the liberation of Eastern
Turkestan, or whether it was a case of aiding national
liberation movement of an oppressed people, they proved
to be instrumental in restoring the Chinese rule in the
area after 1949, as "Eastern Turkestan Republic" was
abolished after the Communist victory on mainland China.

Why did the original plan of the Soviets to create a
friendly satellite state of Mongolian type change, necessitating
a fake airplane crash that liquidated the leadership of
"Eastern Turkestan Republic"? All these questions will be
approached as a study of a limited area, for a fixed
period, with Russia and China playing the major roles.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF EASTERN TURKESTAN

The term "Eastern Turkestan" is of comparatively
recent origin, and has been inspired by the growing Turkic
nationalism of the people inhabiting the area in contrast
to "Western Turkestan", the Usurist name for the Middle Asian
republics of the Soviet Union. The banner of "Eastern
Turkestan Republic" was raised twice - the first time in
1933 in Kashgar by Hoja Niaz*, and the second time in 1944
in Kuldja by Alimhan Tur. Its Chinese name Sinkiang,
translated as "New Territory", "New Dominion" or "New
Frontier" was imposed in 1882, when the invading army of a

* See Lars-Erik Nyman. Chapter 5.2.3.

Chinese general, Pan Fusheng, declared it a Chinese province for the first time.⁴ In Western publications the name "Chinese Turkestan" is also often encountered.

The land mass of Eastern Turkestan, or Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as it is labelled now, exceeds 1710 thousand square km, which comprises one sixth of the present territory of China.⁵ Its common border with the Soviet Union exceeds 3000 km, bordering Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics in the north and the north-west. It also borders with the Mongolian People's Republic in the north-east, Afghanistan in the south-west, Tibet and Kashmir in the south.⁶ Chinghai and Gansu provinces in the east connect it with China proper. Tien Shan mountain range extending across Eastern Turkestan from west to east cuts it into two, with the smaller part to the north called Tangria, and the larger to the south called Kashgaria. The Fergana Basin occupies a central position there. A string of oases extending westwards from the south-east and back to the north-east is curbed by mountain ranges to the south, west and north.

The climate is continental and rather dry with the exception of some spots, like the fertile Ili valley in

Jungaria, which is open only towards the Soviet territory in the west. Artificial irrigation has been practised in the cases of Kiangsi and Jungaria since times immemorial, although pastoral life still dominates the steppes and the mountain ranges of Jungaria.

Although the population of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1980 exceeded the 10 million figure with the ethnic Chinese (Han) comprising the majority, in the period of 1944-49 there were only approximately 3.3 million people inhabiting Eastern Turkestan. No census was conducted in that period, and therefore the figures quoted here are not exact:

<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>In thousands</u>
Uighurs	2,500
Kazakhs	320
Chinese	202
Tungans	93
Mongols	63
Kirgiz	60
Russians	40
Tajiks	20
Uzbeks	15
Manchus	12
Indians	8
Tatars	5
Gipsies	2
Others	3

Among the thirteen nationalities inhabiting eastern Turkestan, the Turke element used to make up 9% of the total. The Uyghars had settled life in the oases and cities, whereas Kazakhs, Mongols and Kirghiz were nomads migrating in steppe and mountains with their livestock. A large number of them have also taken to settled life under the Communist rule. This conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups was divided into two hostile camps on the eve of the uprising.

The Chinese bureaucratic elite in the administration consisted largely of Han Chinese and men from lower Yunnan. Corruption permeated every layer of the military-administrative structure. There even petty Chinese officials were making enormous fortunes through extortion and bribery. Governor Sheng himself accumulated an enormous capital plundered from the victims of his party, and later used this wealth to purchase immunity from prosecution for his crimes by "donating" 50000 ounces of gold to Kuo Min Tung party treasury.⁸ In the economic sphere, all trade fell into the hands of Tientsin men to the detriment of non-Chinese, whereas Shansi men largely controlled transportation.⁹ All the Chinese enjoyed classical "Sanib"* status regardless of their social standing, and whenever a dispute arose

* Master

between the Chinese and the native, the latter was always the
to see.

The uprising was supported by all the non-Chinese
ethnic groups. Among those, the most numerous were the
settled Uighurs and the nomadic Kazakhs, and these people
played the crucial role in the uprising. Kazakhs, as well as
two other nomadic people - Kirghiz and Mongols - were
organized on tribal lines, where the leaders of numerous
tribes and clans commanded the complete allegiance of their
kinmen. When ever corrupt Chinese officials imposed new
levies, tribal elders had to shoulder the burden. Naturally,
they did not hesitate to support the uprising once it
started. The Uighurs had more sophisticated social
organization, but they, too rose up against Chinese oppression
with overwhelming solidarity. Peasants, laborers, artisans
and craftsmen, workers and intellectuals struggled hand
in hand with small shopkeepers, hawkers, brokers and
merchants. Even Uighur gentry comprised of rich land-
owners and horticulturists, big merchants and remnants
of old native nobility - hojas and beks, fully supported
the uprising both politically and financially. The Muslim
clergy played especially important role in arousing
the masses for determined action against the Chinese. 10

Thus the revolution of 1944 in Eastern Turkestan was a unified national liberation movement of all segments of the non-Chinese population against the wanton oppression of Sheng's regime symbolized by the corrupt Chinese officialdom and repressive military establishment.

II. RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN EASTERN TURKESTAN.

Imperial Russia made a thrust towards the south in the latter half of the nineteenth century, conquering Bukhara, Khiva, Fergana and other emirates of Turkestan by 1875. As part of this vigorous expansion, Russian imperialism declared war on Pamir Sultanate and in 1877 occupied the region under the pretext of protecting itself from the bandits and raiding the Chinese, because after the Muslim rebellion in 1863 destroyed once again the Chinese (Manchu) rulers of Eastern Turkestan, the rebels created Pamir Sultanate in the Pamir valley, Tungan Khanate in Urumchi - Tarbagatai regions, and the emirate of Jettishan in Kashgaria with Yalubek the ruler. ¹¹ It was ceded back to China in 1882 after prolonged and painful negotiations culminated in the treaty of St. Petersburg signed in 1881. ¹² Credit for the reconquest of Eastern Turkestan belonged to Hunanese general Tso Tsung tang, who in 1876-78 period staged a horrible blood-

bath throughout the region after getting a loan for this expedition from the British bank in Shanghai, where the Russians supplied grain to feed the Chinese invaders.¹³ The Russians benefited by retaining the western part of Ili valley, and secured the right to conduct duty-free trade throughout Eastern Turkestan. Russian consulates were opened in 1882 in Kuldja, Urumchi, Kashgar, Chugachak and Sharashme, thus strongly enhancing the Russian influence throughout the area, and providing extraterritorial rights to Russian subjects up till the October revolution.¹⁴

The October revolution followed by the Civil war brought an influx of refugees and the "White Russian" troops of general Dudenov, Amursky and others into Eastern Turkestan. The then government found it impossible to resist the sufficient force of not only assisting the Whites, but also preventing a direct invasion of the Red army in pursuit of the Whites. Although Dudenov and Amursky were assassinated by the Soviet agents and Bakiev turned over to the Soviet authorities from Sense to face a firing squad, up till December 1933 there was no direct invasion of the Red army in Eastern Turkestan.¹⁵ The Red troops were busy fighting national resistance movements in Western Turkestan, bringing there the Soviet rule on the tip of their bayonets.*

* So called basmach movement in Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and other areas of Western Turkestan was finally suppressed through ruthless extermination of the native population only in 1933.

After Governor Yang was dismissed in 1923, a Hami revolt in 1931, caused by the oppressive policies of the corrupt administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen forced him to sign a new treaty with the Soviet Government in order to procure arms for his tottering troops. The treaty had a provision for the establishment of eight Soviet trade agencies at Kuldja, Urumchi, Kashgar, Kuchar, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan, as well as providing for the favourable customs tariffs, telegraph and radio communication services with the Soviet Union. This agreement, signed without authorization from Harkin, precipitated Chin's arrest later when he fled to central China in order to escape the Hami insurrection and the mutiny of his own Russian mercenary troops.¹⁶

A coup of Russian mercenary troops in Urumchi on 12 April 1933 installed Sheng Shih tsai, who in December 1933 made an agreement with the Soviet representatives in Urumchi, becoming their effective puppet in return for military support against the Tungan and Uighur rebels of the Hami region in the east and the "Eastern Turkestan Republic" in the south. More than 7000 Soviet troops equipped with tanks, artillery and even airplanes entered the province through Chuguchak and Kuldja in early December 1933, calling themselves "Tarbagataitai", i.e. inhabitants of the Tarbagatai district in the north of Eastern Turkestan.¹⁷ These troops in combination with

Sheng's own forces defeated the rebels and by 1937 Sheng's authority was firmly established throughout the province. From the coup of the 12 April 1933 till 1942 Sheng governed Eastern Turkestan completely ignoring the authority of the central government of China. The police, civil administration and economic management fell under the total control of soviet "advisers", and the Stalinist purges of 1937-38 were as severe as in the Soviet Union itself.¹⁸ During his overall reign Sheng's prisons claimed the lives of more than one hundred thousand victims, the cream of the population.¹⁹ Former "White" Russians, local intelligentsia, the rich and the famous often disappeared overnight into the horrors of Sheng's torture chambers, where they were forced to sign any confessions offered to them. Many of those who survived, re-emerged later in the Soviet Union.²⁰ A garrison of N.K.V.D troops, known as the eighth motorized regiment, was stationed in Hami to seal the province off from metropolis and to keep Sheng under control. But in 1942, when the very existence of the Soviet Union was threatened by the German invasion, Sheng took his chance to break with his soviet "advisers", by responding to rapprochement initiative from Chungking. As termination of its quasi-

colonial control of Eastern Turkestan was imminent, the Soviet government withdrew the eighth regiment from Hami, dismantled and took back an airplane assembly plant in Urumchi, oil refinery equipment from Maizao and all other industrial plants and installations which had been set up there by Soviet technicians.²¹

Sheng's turnabout towards Chungking did not, however, improve the situation in the province. The purges widened in scope and became less selective, affecting not only those suspected of local nationalism, being rich or thought of as being "unreliable", but also anyone connected with the Soviet Union in one way or another. For instance, simple possession of books printed in the U.S.S.R. was sufficient reason to be imprisoned. As a result, the elite of the non-Chinese population was driven into rebellion against the oppression of the Chinese symbolized in the rule of Sheng Tse tsai, and his removal by the Central Chinese government in September 1944 did nothing to reduce this explosive situation.²²

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1943, existing trade relations with the Soviet Union were also severed, creating acute shortages of industrial and consumer goods on the

local markets. These shortages were combined with rampant war-time inflation made worse by the ever increasing burden of taxation imposed on the local population, required to maintain a large number of Chinese troops. This crisis was aggravated by the trading monopolies of "Tu chan gong si", a government owned corporation that controlled foreign trade, and "Ping jia wei yuan hui", a government controlled body that determined prices on the local markets.²³ Immediately upon the publication of a decree of the provincial government on 5 November 1942, "Ping jia wei yuan hui" became a powerful vehicle for the plundering of numerous local non-Chinese small producers, traders, peasants and cattle-breeders by the Chinese merchants and bureaucracy. The proverbial corruption of the Chinese administration intensified, increasing the hatred of the non-Chinese population. The Chinese would take by force whatever was brought to the market and pay the nominal official price in worthless paper currency. Then they would sell the same goods at inflated prices using their immunity from the plunder of "Ping jia wei yuan hui".²⁴

At the same time, overall taxes in Sinkiang province rose to 2419 Sinkiang dollars per capita in 1944 as compared with 317 dollars in 1936.²⁵ A burden made worse by the obligatory repayment in agricultural produce from Ili region to the Soviet Union as earlier "loans" taken

by Sheng, thus creating shortages on the local markets, which until then were abundant in food-stuffs.²⁶ These oppressive economic policies coupled with the naked violation of elementary political rights of the non-Chinese population made the uprising imminent. In addition, ethnic cultural organisations were increasingly pressured to curb their activities, and ever increasing arrests followed by assassinations in gaol under torture of the members of ethnic groups, including the Russians, Tatars, Uzbeks and others stirred up anti-government action among these groups.²⁷ Finally the Kazakh tribes of Altai led by Usman Bator and with the aid of weapons traded to them by the Soviet authorities through Mongolia, rose up in open rebellion against Sheng in June 1943, in response to his endeavour to move them from their tribal lands into semi-deserts of Kashgaria.²⁸ In March 1944 Usman inflicted heavy casualties on Chinese troops sent to pacify him. Sheng's charges that a foreign power was behind the uprising were rejected by TASS and Ulan Bator.

III. THE UPRISING IN ILI REGION.

In August 1944 Fatih Muslimov, a rich Tatar horticulturist who escaped earlier to the Soviet Union to

evade arrest by the Chinese police, returned to Nilki with two horses loaded with fourteen rifles and ammunition. With a small group of rebels, he attacked the police station at Mazar, a village in the vicinity of Nilki county, and captured more arms and ammunition. Within a few weeks, the rebels grew into a sizeable guerilla force which attacked and captured Nilki on the 6th of October 1944. In the battle of Nilki, the rebels encountered their first serious loss: Hamid Muslimov, who had been in charge of all operational planning, was fatally wounded.²⁹ At the same time the worried K.M.T military command, which up to then called the rebels "six bandits", dispatched general Du De fu to organise the encirclement and elimination of the rebel forces.³⁰ By late October 1944, the rebels in Nilki were on the run, fighting pitched battles against the 4th and 382nd regiments of K.M.T army and inflicting heavy casualties on them.³¹

In the meantime, Soviet Vice-Consul Borisov in Kuldja established contact with leaders of twelve clandestine groups plotting to start an uprising in Kuldja itself.³² Among them was Ali Khan Ture, a clergyman with exceptional oratorical skills and organizational ability who later

became the chairman of the Eastern Turkistan Republic. Everything indicated that every segment of the non-Chinese population of Kuldja was ready to rise up against the Chinese government. The Chinese response to this challenge was to increase the number of arrests. Liu Bindi, a Chinese muslim and prominent officer of K.M.T was despatched from Urunchi, the provincial capital, and ordered to pacify the Ili-region.³³ But the revolutionary situation already passed the point of no-return. A combined anti-Chinese uprising of Uighurs, Kazakh, Kirghiz and other ethnic groups exploded throughout the Ili, the Altai and the Tarbagatai regions of Eastern Turkistan.

On the fifth of November 1944 a group of thirty horsemen loaded with arms and ammunition crossed the Chinese border into the hilly countryside near Korgos heading for Kuldja. They had 70 German rifles, 12 sub-machine guns, two light machine guns, two anti-tank rifles, one light mortar, 1600 hand grenades and 20000 rounds of ammunition.³⁴ This was the group of escapees across the border who had undergone intensive military training in the Soviet Union. Group leader Alexandrov had orders from the Soviet military command to join with several underground resistance groups in Kuldja

Azrael Abit

headed by Alihan Tarey and others in order to initiate a general insurrection planned for the seventh of November - the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.³⁵ Soviet Vice-consul Borisov coordinated the uprising between these groups and the partisans in Nilki. The insurrectionists planned to capture the K.M.T army headquarters in Kuldja, the governor's quarters and the regional police headquarters with the jail.

The partisans from Nilki were expected to take over the second jail in Topadon and then assault the K.M.T army headquarters after joining with the Kuldja groups.³⁶ In the early morning hours of the 7th of November a group of 15 partisans from the U.S.S.R went to capture the police headquarters and release a large number of prisoners kept there. However, the plan to launch a sudden attack was aborted because the group came across Liu Bin di* and shot him, but the garrison guarding the police headquarters was alerted, opening heavy fire on the advancing partisans and forcing them to retreat.³⁷

In the meantime, one detachment of Nilki partisans - nearly 2000 men with 400 rifles - headed by Akbar and Gani came to Kuldja on the seventh as planned and took the Topadon jail, releasing a large number of prisoners.³⁸

But three Chinese airplanes from Kuldja airfield opened machine gun fire on the partisans. The partisans, many of whom had never seen planes before, panicked and fled towards the Soviet border. In the meantime, the detachments headed by Fatih Muslimov and Baichurin were holding K.M.T troops on the way to Kuldja, and suffered considerable casualties. At that time nearly 5000 K.M.T soldiers were engaged against the partisans in Nilki, only two battalions of the 382nd regiment and one battalion of the 4th regiment being garrisoned in Kuldja to supplement the Chinese militia units.³⁹ After Akbar's and Gani's detachments fled in panic towards the Soviet border, the insurrectionists in Kuldja were left without sufficient firepower to attack the army headquarters. However, the inhabitants of Kuldja and the surrounding villages answered the call to arms by Alihan Ture, taking to the streets of Kuldja armed with old rifles, guns, pikes and even large knives. This multitude of men in the streets was taken by the Chinese pilots for well-armed Soviet troops.⁴⁰ The Chinese also panicked and retreated to the fortress of Airambak linked to the Kuldja airfield, Lian Shan and the Police headquarters, waiting for military units from Nilki to come to their rescue.

From the beginning of the uprising on the 7 November 1944, the Revolutionary Committee chaired by Alihan Ture assumed its leadership. At the initial stage, all military operations were directed by Alexandrov and others who came from the Soviet Union with him. But the insurrection gained momentum only after the partisan detachments of Fatih Maslimov and Rafic Baichurin arrived in Kuldja on 9 November numbering more than 800 horsemen with 200 rifles, machine guns and other weaponry. The same day Alihan Ture issued orders to seize the K.M.T army headquarters. The capture of the headquarters after heavy fighting on 10 November was the first big victory of the insurgents and it boosted their morale.⁴¹ At this point Akbar's and Gani's detachments returned from Darji and participated in the assault on the police headquarters on 12 November, which was taken without much fighting, as the K.M.T troops had fled to Airambak.

The discovery of more than 200 mutilated bodies in the old wells of the police headquarters intensified the rebels' hatred of the Chinese and their determination to defeat the enemy.⁴² Although K.M.T detachments returned

21.

from Nilki by 12 of November, the Chinese troops in Kuldja had already dug in around the Kuldja airfield, the fortress of Airambek and Lianshan. Despite their numbers, the insurgents lacked arms and ammunition to attack the besieged Chinese. The Chinese also gave up hope after several unsuccessful attacks to defeat the rebels and decided to wait for further reinforcements from Urumchi.

The rebels' military command decided to send a 120-men strong detachment to block the Talki pass and destroy the bridges in order to stop these expected K.M.T reinforcements.⁴³ At the same time it was necessary to defeat the besieged enemy units in Suidun and Kure, so that they could not attack the rebels in Talki from the rear. Most importantly, all the Chinese garrisons in the region were in panic imagining that they were fighting against regular Soviet army units, and despite their vast superiority in arms shut themselves up behind fortress walls passively awaiting the end.⁴⁴ On the 12th of November 1944 the Revolutionary Committee in Kuldja proclaimed the inauguration of the Eastern Turkestan Republic and the formation of an Interim Government.

Alihan Ture became the President of the republic, and Hakimbek Hoja its Vice-President. Abdulrauf Mahdum was elected the State Secretary. Enver Masabay became the Minister of Finance, Habib Yunich was appointed the Minister of Education. Health and Justice portfolios were given to Mukhiddin Hoja and Muhammedjan Mahdum respectively.⁴⁵

The interim government pledged to the people of Eastern Turkestan that it would: struggle for the creation of a free independent republic; develop local industries, agriculture, horticulture; improve health and education; create a national liberation army; nationalize banks, postal and communication services; and guarantee freedom of religion, freedom of speech and other democratic rights.⁴⁶

The leadership of the newly formed republic faced an immediate task of capturing the besieged K.M.T garrisons in Kuldja, Suidun and Kure, as well as establishing control in a number of big villages throughout the region. Several detachments numbering nearly one thousand men were sent to occupy Lotsougu and Chimpanze near the border so that military supply route from the Soviet Union could be opened up.⁴⁷ These two large settlements

were taken without difficulty, as K.M.T garrisons stationed there had fled earlier. Several hundred inhabitants of these two settlements joined military units of the Eastern Turkestan Republic, which by then took control of the Horgos border region. At this stage three hundred heavily armed men under the command of General Polinov crossed the border from the Soviet Union to help defeat the besieged K.M.T troops in Suidun and Kure numbering more than 1200 Chinese soldiers.⁴⁸

After they had bombarded the K.M.T positions using 120 mm mortars and inflicting heavy casualties on the besieged, the city of Suidun was ablaze, forcing the remaining Chinese troops to surrender. The garrison of Kure also surrendered on the 5th of December 1945.⁴⁹ The first Suidun regiment under the command of Colonel Mogutnov was armed with weaponry captured there.

It was at this stage that the K.M.T high command in Urumchi developed a plan to strangle the uprising in Kuldja by sending 7th Division through the mountain passes of Talki, (to the west of Kuldja) Achal, Kogarchin and Kchokapasses. Talki pass was by then firmly blocked by the first

Suidun regiment, and only Achal, Kogarchin and Kokchoka passes represented the most vulnerable spot in the defence lines of the young Eastern Turkestan Republic.⁵⁰

The military command of E.T.R assigned Muslimov with his 800 men to guard Achal, Kokchoka and Kogarchin mountain passes. The units of Gani were sent to Borotala region. Crossing through Shushegur-Aksu mountain pass, they took over Arasan capturing 8 machine guns and 290 rifles, and then besieged 250-men strong K.M.T detachment stationed at Bukambal.⁵¹

On the 12th of January 7000 soldiers of general Shi Pin left Takianze intending to advance on Kuldja through Talki Achal and adjoining Kogarchin and Kokchoka mountain passes. Despite severe cold and deep snow in the mountains, they were dressed in light winter clothes. Lack of knowledge of the climatic conditions and the topography of the mountains was a fatal mistake. Heavy snowfalls and thick mist in the mountains drastically slowed their movements. After drawing the K.M.T troops deep into the mountains, the partisans of Muslimov ambushed them in Gersai gorge, Irek and Chapkanjota.⁵² For five days they fought a numerically superior enemy in deep snow and severe cold. As their ammunition ran out Muslimov

requested urgent help, but the E.T.R. army headquarters had already despatched General Iskhakbek Muninov who had arrived from the Soviet Union with two squadrons of war-hardened Kirghiz snipers to halt the Chinese advance on Kuldja without letting the enemy out of the mountains. Iskhakbek's snipers reinforced the partisan units fighting in Gersai, Chapkanjota and Irek, tipping the balance.⁵³ By 22 January 1945 cold and hungry remnants of general She Ping's division surrendered and only two small groups led by the general himself managed to escape back to Takiantse.⁵⁴

Immediately after the defeat of general Shi Pin's assault on Kuldja, an E.T.R. unit of 300 crack troops with machine guns was sent behind the enemy lines in Talki pass, blocking the only highway that served as their supply route, at Cholader gorges. More than 3000 K.M.T. troops in Talki retreated in panic when no ammunition and food was forthcoming from Tsinho, only to be cut down by the machine gun fire of the E.T.R. forces waiting for them in ambush. None of them returned to Tsinho.

Large number of arms and ammunition, captured in these mountain battles substantially reinforced the E.T.R. army, making it possible to crush the K.M.T. troops besieged

in Kuldja. On the night of 27th January 1945 the E.T.R troops attacked the K.M.T positions after heavy mortar shelling. Intensive battles culminated in the seizure of Lianshan on the 28th of January.⁵⁵ Airambak was taken on the 29th, both sides sustaining heavy losses in heated hand-to-hand combats. The K.M.T units remaining at the airfield fled Kuldja on the 30th of January heading towards Tsinho.⁵⁶ They were ambushed in Chapkanjota mountains by the troops of general Iskhakbek and local partisans. Having realised that they had no chance of escaping, they surrendered. By 31 January 1945, the K.M.T forces were completely defeated throughout Ili region. Five thousand and six hundred K.M.T soldiers were killed in the Ili region alone, excluding those who were killed in the mountain battles and were not counted. Nearly five thousand were captured in Suidun, Kure and Kuldja. The losses of the insurgent forces were nearly as high, but this included civilians tortured and killed by the K.M.T troops in Nilki and Kuldja on the eve of the uprising, and the victims of the typhus epidemic in Kuldja which began in the December-January period.⁵⁷

IV. THE INAUGURATION OF E.T.R ARMY AND THE LIBERATION
OF TARBAGATAI AND ALTAI REGIONS.

As a result of the total defeat of K.M.T forces in the Ili region the Kuldja rebels became a formidable military force. Partisan units were already fighting the K.M.T forces in the Tarbagatai and Altai regions. On the 3rd of February 1945, the Provisional Government of E.T.R. made a decision to reorganize the rebel forces into a regular army, defining military ranks, introducing badges and decorations. By then, strategic command over military operations was already in the hands of the Soviet military experts who had arrived with general Iskhakbek Muninov in January 1945.⁵⁸ Their headquarters consisted of three sections. The first section code named "Pervii Dom", (First House) housed general ^{Vladimir} Vladimirovich Kozlov who issued all important orders and kept contact with the Soviet Union. The second section, (Vtoroi Dom) housed Soviet Colonels Nazarov, Iskander, (Ivanov), Urazali Daskenov, Iskhak Ibragimov and several others who directed military operations, and the third section (Tretii Dom) housed a large number of lower rank Soviet officers who served as instructors.⁵⁹

The official headquarters of the E.T.R. army with general Polinov as the Commander-In-Chief and Colonel Mazharov as the Chief-of-Staff had by then assumed purely executive functions, merely carrying out orders issued from "Vtoroi Dom", which in turn received directives from "Pervii Dom". A special political adviser from the Soviet Union was assigned to Alinan Ture in the Provisional Government.⁶⁰ On the 8th of April 1945 the National Army of Eastern Turkestan Republic was officially inaugurated. It consisted of Kuldja, Suidun and Kensai infantry regiments, Tekes cavalry regiment and general Iskhakbek's brigade - more than 13000 regular soldiers and officers altogether.⁶¹ Soon after the formation of regular regiments of the E.T.R. army, "Vtoroi Dom" developed a strategic plan for the liberation of the whole territory of Eastern Turkestan. As a first step it was decided to block the two strategically important highways one leading from Urumchi to Ili, and another to Tarbagatai and Altai regions through Shiho. The third cavalry regiment was assigned to take Durbuljin and Chughnuchak before moving into Altai region. General Iskhakbek's brigade reinforced with Suidun and Kuldja infantry regiments was to advance on Takianze and Jinho

before attacking the K.M.T. stronghold of Shiho. Tekes cavalry regiment was assigned to launch an attack in the South after crossing Muzart mountain pass. The fourth regiment was left in Kuldja in reserve.⁶² In May 1945, the E.T.R. forces began the general advance, blocking the highway between Shiho and Durbuljin, and cutting supply lines for K.M.T. troops in Tarbagatai and Altai. Durbuljin and Chuguchak were taken in early June, a large number of Kazakh youths there volunteering into the ranks of the E.T.R. Army and forming one cavalry regiment. This regiment took part in the attack on the strategically important city of Kobuk, which was taken after heavy fighting and substantial casualties on both sides.⁶³

The E.T.R. forces encircled Burchum on 2 September, and bombarded the city with heavy mortars. After a few hours the 700 men-strong K.M.T. garrison surrendered. The regional capital of Altai-Sharasume was taken without fighting on the 5th of September as the 2000 soldiers and officers of its garrison had fled towards the Mongolian border.⁶⁴ Thus the Altai and Tarbagatai regions became part of the E.T.R., considerably increasing its territory and power base.

While E.T.R. units advanced in Altai and Tarbagatai, The Chinese military command in Urumchi amassed more than ten thousand troops along the strategic highway leading to Urumchi, heavily fortifying Takianze, Tsinho and Shino. The Suidan regiment besieged Takianze, but was not able to take it at once, as the K.M.T. troops put up heavy resistance. Only after the regimental commander Mogutnov used trickery to create an illusion that large reinforcements arrived to support the rebels did the K.M.T. troops panic and fled to Tsinho.⁶⁵

After the seizure of Takianze the rebel army detachments moved towards Tsinho, and were met with intensive fire at the Injinho and Bajinho settlements situated on the outskirts of Tsinho. Three Chinese army blockhouses on the main highway there put up stubborn resistance against the advancing E.T.R. troops. Eventually these blockhouses were silenced with hand grenades, after which the E.T.R. troops attacked the Chinese army positions, engaging them in hand-to-hand fights. At this crucial moment one cavalry squadron of K.M.T. Uighur soldiers under the command of Supahun arrived from Maitao, where they had earlier mutinied and decided to join the E.T.R. army. As they wore K.M.T.

army uniforms, they were mistaken for fresh reinforcements. Only when they suddenly attacked did the K.M.T. soldiers realize their mistake. Dumbfounded K.M.T. troops panicked and fled towards Wusu, ^(Shih) leaving behind a large quantity of arms and ammunition. ⁶⁶

Chipeize, situated 60 kilometers to the north of Shiho, was attacked next. One cavalry regiment of the K.M.T. second army was destroyed there. The advance units of the E.T.R. army reached Shiho on the 3rd of September 1945, but heavy engagements broke out only after the 5th of September. As Shiho was heavily fortified, and the K.M.T. second army units there had air support, strong artillery, large number of machine guns and even a few tanks and armoured vehicles, Iskhakjan Ibragimov, the strategic planner of "Vtoroi Dom", decided to call in a few bombers. Six planes were flown into Kuldja airport from the Soviet Union, painted green with the E.T.R. insignia, and then used to bomb Shiho as "captured" planes from the Kuldja airport. ⁶⁷ Amidst fierce fighting for Shiho the E.T.R. forces ran out of ammunition, because the K.M.T. planes had scattered a camel caravan bringing ammunition from Kuldja across the mountains. At this crucial moment, the K.M.T. troops

launched a counter-offensive, attacking the E.T.R. forces who had dug in. When a K.M.T armoured car approached the E.T.R. army positions in front of a column of the Chinese troops, two shots from an anti-tank gun and a rifle hit the armoured car and the officer leading the column. At once the E.T.R. units launched a frontal attack, deploying bayonets and hand grenades, and entered Shiho on the backs of the K.M.T soldiers, taking ammunition from them in the process.⁶⁸ Whether the failure to bring in ammunition earlier was an act of sabotage by the Soviets who by then were becoming uneasy about lightning victories of the E.T.R. army or whether this was the result of criminal negligence on the side of the logistics support section of the army, is unknown, but 872 soldiers of the E.T.R. army died under the walls and blockhouses of Shiho. More than a thousand were wounded, although many of them kept on fighting. As a result of the outstanding bravery of the soldiers of the E.T.R. army, the K.M.T. army lost in Shiho more than one thousand soldiers, and over three thousand prisoners including the commander of the second army corps Ye Chin, 27 artillery pieces, 82 machine guns, 1700 rifles, one tank, one armoured vehicle and a large quantity of ammunition was also captured.⁶⁹

The victory of the E.T.R. army at Shiho created panic in Urumchi itself. Retreating K.M.T. troops burned the bridge over Manas river, hastily trying to create a new defence line there. But the advance units of the E.T.R. army already attacked Hutubi some 60 km behind the city of Manas towards Urumchi. The K.M.T. troops lost the capacity to put up effective resistance against advancing E.T.R. forces. At this crucial stage, when the E.T.R. forces were about to capture the provincial capital, general Chang Chih chung, the commander of K.M.T. forces in Eastern Turkestan, summoned the Soviet consul in Urumchi on the 13th of September to demand that unless a cease-fire was effected immediately China would create an international incident,⁷⁰ less than a month after the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Moscow. Although Eastern Turkestan occupied a trivial position in trilateral negotiations between Russians, Chinese and Americans, article V of the Treaty of 14 August 1945 stipulated that the signatories would "act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party".⁷¹ As Stalin had won substantial gains at Yalta, he did not want to run the risk of incurring confrontation with the United States on

the issue of Eastern Turkestan. Besides, he was already getting suspicious of the E.T.R. leaders' willingness to remain Moscow's puppets once E.T.R. was recognized internationally. In fact, Alihan Turan had already stressed the necessity to liberate the southern regions of Eastern Turkestan in order to establish contacts with the West through India and Pakistan, prompting the Soviets to issue directives through "Yloroi Dom" to halt the successful advance of the E.T.R. army units in the south, and recalling them from Aksu after it had already been taken.⁷²

Two days after this denarcke by General Chang Chih chung, Moscow informed Chung king that the Kuldja rebels requested Moscow to mediate in order to settle their grievances through negotiations with the Central government of China. E.T.R. troops were halted on the Manas river and Kazihan's detachment which had already blocked the highway leading from Manas to Urunchi near Hutubi some 60 kilometers behind the K.M.T. defence lines at Manas was ordered to retreat.⁷³ Thus the Soviets deliberately prevented the E.T.R. army from taking Urunchi. The reasons for this decision can be seen firstly in view of the Sino-Soviet pact of 14 August 1945 giving the Russians Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and enhancing

their influence in Manchuria. Secondly, as the subsequent events have shown, the Soviet leadership had become highly suspicious of the real aims of the E.T.R. leadership and decided not to give the people of Eastern Turkestan a chance to gain even formal independence similar to that attained by the Mongolian People's Republic. Although as a result of the remarkable victories of the E.T.R. army its numbers at the time of armistice on the 17th of September 1945 exceeded 30,000 well-armed soldiers and officers capable of easily defeating the remnants of the K.M.T. army in Eastern Turkestan, this formidable force was not to be deployed.⁷⁴

V. POLITICAL SITUATION AND ETHNIC FRICTIONS IN EASTERN TURKESTAN REPUBLIC.

The conglomeration of ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of E.T.R. was not as unified as the record of the struggle against the K.M.T. troops suggests. It was the common hatred of the oppressors that served as a rallying point. Deep beneath this facade of unity there were boiling dissensions and even open conflicts. Alihan Turan - the quasi president of the E.T.R. and "marshal" of its armed forces, exerted enormous influence

on the people at the initial stage of the revolution. A Muslim scholar, his deep learning and oratorical skills served extremely well in arousing the masses and inspiring them to sacrifice even their lives if need be in order to gain emancipation from evil. His knowledge of Arabic enabled him to communicate in their language with the spiritual leaders of Tungans*, winning the entire ethnic group on the side of the revolution - an important achievement as Tungans have always been formidable warriors. He succeeded in getting the Sibo (Manchu) soldiers - the traditional supporters of the Chinese administration - to support the revolution. But he was an Uzbek himself - that is an emigre and a member of a small minority ethnic group like the Tatars and Russians. Besides, he had no knowledge of elementary military matters, and his title as a marshal of the E.T.R. armed forces was purely fictitious; the Soviets possessed a stranglehold^k over the actual army command. Alihan Turan's self-styled government was permeated with nepotism and even corruption of a truly oriental style.⁷⁵ All important appointments were made not on personal merit, but according to ability to please Alihan Turan's Soviet advisers. Thus, in the first government of the E.T.R., the post of a vice-president of the republic was

* Tungans - Chinese Muslims.

given to Hakimbek Hoja - a revered descendant of old Uighur nobility, whom the Soviet advisers chose to appease the sentiments of the Uighur population, but an old and humble man. The State secretary - Abdulrauf Mahmud, was a son of a clergyman who gained favour of the Soviet consulate by his faithful service. The Minister of Finance - Eaver Musabay, the Minister of health - Muhiddin Hoja, and the Minister of Justice - Muhammedjan Mahmud were all mediocrities useful only as spear carriers for their chief. Although the Minister of Education Habib Yinich was a highly cultured and competent man, he died soon after his appointment, and his successor Saifuddin Azizi, the son of a wealthy landowner, was not much different from the others except for his Soviet training.⁷⁶

No wonder that in these circumstances the army high command, the police administration and the mass media gradually fell into the hands of the Soviet "advisers" and their proteges. Ten years of genocide under Saeng took the lives of too many able men who might have otherwise contributed their talents to the struggle for freedom and independence. Besides, many other capable men^{were} fighting in the ranks of the E.T.R. army firmly believing that this was the only way to get rid of foreign oppression. Nevertheless, the period when Alihan Ture was the president of E.T.R. was characterized by remarkable political tolerance and freedom for all regardless of their ethnic background, religion or political creed.⁷⁷

As the immediate danger of a Chinese punitive action subsided, internal conflicts within the conglomeration of ethnic groups that constituted the populace of the E.T.R. started to brew up. Although Uighurs constituted the majority of the population of Eastern Turkestan Republic, most of the important posts in the army, civil administration and industry were filled by Russians, Tatars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and other ethnic minority groups; a fact which often caused friction between them and the Uighur majority.⁷⁸ As the revolution brought about a complete renewal of the military, political, judicial, administrative, economic and industrial hierarchies, various ethnic groups struggled to fill the vacuum. However, the real power rested with the Soviet consulate in Kuldja and the three Soviet "Houses", and not with the government of Alihan Ture. It was the Soviets that made all key appointments, demanded regular reports from all the members of Alihan Ture's government, and manipulated them at will.⁷⁹

VI. ARMISTICE AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT.

On the orders from the Soviet high command all hostilities ceased on 17 September 1945.⁸⁰ A delegation of three representatives of the E.T.R. - Akhmatjan Kasimi, Rahimjan Sabirhaji and Abulhair Ture was sent to negotiate with K.M.T. representatives in Urunchi.⁸¹ Of these three, only Ahmetjan Kasimi possessed the ability and competence to conduct negotiations. But he too was bound to follow the guidelines of the "Soviet" mediators. The negotiations dragged on until 2 January 1946, when an eleven-point agreement was signed by the representatives of both sides. But the agreement was ratified by Chug king only in June 1946, and came into force on the 15th of that month.⁸² The agreement provided for the formation of coalition government comprised of twenty five members. Fifteen of them were to be elected by the population of Eastern Tarkestan, and ten nominated by the Central Government of China.⁸³ The Uighur language was to become the second official language alongside with the Chinese. Similarly, the key positions of the Chairman of the Provincial Government, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Finance and the Second Deputy Chairman were to be filled by the K.M.T. representatives.⁸⁴ The E.T.R. delegates had to be content with the role of a second fiddle. They were given the posts of the First Deputy Chairman, the Deputy Minister

of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Health and the Deputy Minister of Education.⁸⁵

The E.T.R. army was to retain control over the territory of three rebel regions as a "peace preservation corps", but to be reduced to six regiments. The K.M.T. side demanded that these six regiments should be placed under the command of K.M.T. army headquarters in Urumchi, and that the Chinese troops should be stationed on the Soviet border within the territory of the three regions. The E.T.R. delegates strongly opposed these demands, which were eventually side-stepped by the Soviet "mediators" with vague and dubious statements, only to cause later a lot of resentment on both sides.⁸⁶

But most important of all, the E.T.R. representatives were induced by the joint Soviet-Chinese pressure to drop the name of "Eastern Turkestan Republic", thus giving up the last hope to gain international recognition as an independent republic. From then on the name "Eastern Turkestan Republic" was substituted by merely "Eastern Turkestan" although the green star-and-crescent flag, currency, army insignia and the celebration of 12 November* as a state holiday were retained in contravention of the "eleven-point agreement" till the occupation by the Chinese Communist forces in December 1949.⁸⁷ Until then, the Chinese had virtually no influence whatsoever on the E.T.R. controlled territory.⁸⁸ On the other hand, the agreement guaranteed

*The anniversary of the take-over of the Police headquarters in Kuldja.

free democratic elections for the local government bodies, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, free trade and property ownership irrespective of the ethnic background. Immediately after the agreement was ratified, the government of E.T.R. released the K.M.T. prisoners of war, numbering more than 7000 soldiers and officers, including several generals and colonels. The Chinese side had no prisoners of war, as it was customary for them to torture to death any wounded or captured soldier of the E.T.R. army.⁸⁹ In return the Chinese released from their jails some two hundred surviving political prisoners who had been subjected to torture and great deprivation.⁹⁰

Shortly before the ratification of the "Eleven-point agreement" by Chung King on 7 July 1945 Alihan Ture disappeared from his residence in Kuldja.⁹¹ His family saw him being dragged into an army jeep by four armed men, and he has not been heard of since. Alihan Ture's disappearance was assumed to be the result of his outspoken criticism of the members of his administration who flocked to the Soviet consulate in Kuldja to obtain Soviet passports when Soviet citizenship was offered to them as a test of loyalty in 1946, and his continued unwillingness to adhere to the guidelines of his Soviet "advisers".⁹²

After Alihan Ter's disappearance Alimtar Kasim assumed the leadership of E.T.R., and the Deputy Chairmanship on the coalition government in Urumchi. General Iskhakbek became commander-in-chief of the E.T.R. army replacing general Polinov, who was recalled to the Soviet Union, after the eleven-point agreement was signed on 2 January 1946. Soviet military personnel were also recalled together with Soviet weaponry, leaving no trace of the once substantial Soviet military presence on territory of the E.T.R.⁹³

When an American correspondent was invited to visit the region in 1946, she later reported that there was "no evidence" to support Chinese accusations that the E.T.R. forces were armed with "modern Russian equipment".⁹⁴ In fact, the E.T.R. army at that stage was fully equipped with the arms captured from the Chinese.

Even before the ink was dry on the "Eleven-point agreement", both sides showed that they were not going to adhere to it. The E.T.R. continued its existence as a separate entity. Although its army was reduced to twelve thousand soldiers as stipulated in the agreement, this was done out of economic necessity rather than because of a desire to adhere to the agreement. The area liberated from the Chinese continued to use their own currency, maintained a separate army, civil administration and transport systems

in contravention to the agreement, at the same time boosting trade with mainland China through Urumchi. The K.M.T. too violated the agreement on one of the key points. Instead of withdrawing the remnants of K.M.T. army in Eastern Turkestan, they steadily increased the numbers of K.M.T. troops, bringing them to one hundred thousand by 1943.⁹⁵ These troops, were predominantly equipped with American arms and well-trained but they proved useless to K.M.T., since they ^{could} not be deployed against Communists in the civil war on mainland China. Neither side adhered to the condition stipulating the disbanding of secret police forces and, indeed, strengthened them further. At the same time, the Chinese army and secret police terrorized the population of Kashgaria during the elections, blackmailing or even in some cases assassinating undesirable candidates for the local government bodies. The Chinese military even boasted that they could destroy Eastern Turkestan with the American atom bomb.⁹⁶

By February 1947 both sides were flexing their muscles again. A Soviet consulate-sponsored mass demonstration took place in Urumchi on 22 February. The predominantly Uighur demonstrators protested against the violation of the eleven-point agreement by the Chinese side, and demanded more executive power for non-Chinese groups. Responding to these demonstrations, the commander of the Chinese forces in the province, General Sung Si Lian organized counter-

demonstrations on the twenty fourth. The next day an incident known as the "events of 25 February" occurred, when a large number of the Chinese took to the streets of Urumchi. Having gathered in front of the building of the Provincial government, they began to shout: "Let us take revenge for the blood of the Chinese killed in the Ili region!" Then the demonstrators stormed the building, killing the guard and the chauffeur of the second deputy chairman of the provincial government.⁹¹ At this stage Akhmetjan Kasimi demanded that unless the eleven-point agreement was followed to the letter, the representatives of the three regions would leave the coalition government. The situation in Urumchi became very tense. Telephone communications between E.T.R. delegates in Urumchi and the E.T.R. military command at Manas were cut off. Only after the E.T.R. troops at Manas were put on full alert did the Chinese in Urumchi back down.⁹³

In April 1947 General Chang Chi chung went on an inspection tour of the territory of the E.T.R., and shortly after his return in May he sent a lengthy message to Akhmetjan Kasimi, reiterating that intentional disruption of the peace in the province was being caused by a small minority of ambitious political adventurers. In his letter General Chang Chi chung stated that the Chinese people wanted peaceful economic development and did not wish any political

strife or disputes. His implicit accusations were directed against both the Soviets and the C.C. Clique* of the K.M.T., holding them responsible for the disturbances that had taken place earlier in Urumchi.⁹⁹ Soon after the publication of this memorandum General Chang Chi Chung relinquished his post as the Chairman of the Provincial Government in favour of Dr. Masud Sabiri.¹⁰⁰ The appointment of Turkish-educated Masud Sabiri, whom the Soviets considered to be an American protégé, caused very strong opposition from the Soviet quarters. As a result of their intensive lobbying, the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing Sabiri's appointment. A steady stream of accusations and demands for his dismissal was maintained until finally in July 1947 the E.T.R. faction withdrew from the assembly in adherence to the Soviet orders. The Soviets feared that the success of the coalition government will decrease their influence in Eastern Turkestan and strengthen Uighur nationalists whom the K.M.T. was forced to bring into power in a last bid to retain political and military control over the area.¹⁰¹ The majority of the provincial assembly, including delegates from Aksu, Turfan, Khotan, Karashar and Kashgar thus left for Kuldja in July and August 1947.¹⁰²

* C.C. Clique— an extreme right faction of K.M.T., was named so after brothers Chen Kuofu and Chen Linfu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang Kai-shek and confidential secretaries to the Generallissimo who were instrumental in his original rise to power.

The Soviets reacted so strongly because Sabiri was a major spokesman for Uighur nationalism. He put forward a political program demanding full autonomy for Eastern Turkestan while remaining within the jurisdiction of China. His ideas found popular response not only with the Uighur leaders from Kashgaria, but even within the leadership of the E.T.R. camp, where he had a number of relatives and friends.¹⁰³ As the Soviets had always suffered from a paranoic fear of "Panislamism" and "Panturkism" in Eastern Turkestan, they acted as if Sabiri's appointment as Chairman of the Provincial Government was the main obstacle to the full implementation of the "Eleven-point agreement".¹⁰⁴

A steady stream of accusations and personal innuendos against Sabiri was maintained even after the withdrawal of the E.T.R. group from the coalition government. The Soviets maintained that Sabiri turned his house in the Abadbag district of Urumchi into a "nest of American espionage in Sinkiang".¹⁰⁵ Undoubtedly, knowing the extent of American backing for the tottering K.M.T. regime, Sabiri tried to establish friendly relationship with the newly arrived U.S. Consulate in Urumchi. But there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate any of the Soviet accusations against him, although the newspapers "Yurt" and "Yalkin" published in Urumchi in that period under the editorship of Kurban Kodai, strongly propagated the

ideals of Uighur nationalism and Islam, denouncing at the same time clandestine Soviet activities in Eastern Turkestan. 106

After the withdrawal of the Kuldja group from the coalition government, Akhmetjan Kasimov and General Chang Chi chang exchanged letters on ~~the~~^{the} political situation in Eastern Turkestan. Urging moderation and restraint in dealing with controversial political issues, General Chang wrote in September 1947: "If you have no intention against peace you will return to Urumchi and reopen negotiations with the government". Akhmetjan's reply, sent in November, denied that secession from China was intended, and repeated the demand that Masud Sabiri be removed from his post. 107

The July 1947 split was the culmination of a chain of events that increased bitterness and protests on both sides. A government delegate* was murdered in the E.T.R. controlled territory at Emin, near Chuguchak, in November 1946. 108 Political riots in Urumchi in February 1947 and in Turfan, Toksun and Sanshan in July 1947 claimed several lives. Both the Soviets and the C.C. Clique of K.M.T. were responsible for these disturbances. During this period the C.C. Clique was attempting to build up its membership among non-Chinese nationalities using graft and blackmail. 109 At the same time it used intimidation tactics to rig the elections to the Provincial assembly in seven K.M.T. controlled regions of Eastern Turkestan. The withdrawal of the E.T.R. delegates

* Sent by the coalition government in Urumchi.

and their supporters from the Provincial assembly was initiated by the Soviets in response to the Chinese move to offset increasing Soviet influence by elevating Uighur and Kazakh nationalists into positions of power in the coalition government of the province.¹¹⁰ Turkic nationalism propagated by Mehmet Emin Bugra, Kurban Kodai, Aisabek, Masud Sabiri, Chingizkhan and others found widespread response among the people of Eastern Turkestan. They believed that common religion and linguistic kinship were the unifying bond for Uighurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and other Turkic people constituting ninety percent of the population of Eastern Turkestan.¹¹¹ As the "Eleven-point agreement" provided for the freedom of press, their ideas were disseminated through newspapers "Sinkiang Gazeti", "Erkin", "Yulki", "Yurt" and a monthly magazine "Altai". In addition, Kurban Kodai and Chingizkhan formed in 1948 "The Society for the Defence of Islam" which aimed at the creation of an independent Muslim state in Eastern Turkestan.¹¹² To counter this organization Akhmetjan Kasim in August 1948 inaugurated "The Association for the Defence of Peace and Democracy in Sinkiang". The association was designed to become a mass political party, incorporating the following objectives in its program:

To guarantee the freedom of speech, free press, the right to form political organisations and the right to practice religion. To guarantee equal rights and promotional opportunities in government administration for all nationalities inhabiting Eastern Turkestan. To enhance the principle of electing competent candidates to serve in

executive positions in government administration. To guarantee for all nationalities the printing of newspapers, magazines, textbooks and other literature in their native tongue. To increase the number of schools and technical colleges. To establish courts of law using the native tongues of the people of Eastern Turkestan, and to guarantee equality of rights to all women. To increase the number of hospitals and trained medical personnel and to establish free health care. To guarantee equal rights for all nationalities in land ownership, farming, animal husbandry and to guarantee the ownership of the means of production and any other private property ownership.¹¹³

The program emphasized the necessity of instituting free elections and popular decision-making. The organization published "Ittipak" and "Alga" magazines in Kuldja, "Halikchilik" newspaper in Chuguchak and "Togra yol" in Sharasun.¹¹⁴ The leaders of the Kuldja uprising had the objective of full independence, which was made clear by their proclamation of the "Eastern Turkestan Republic", making 12 November, the day when the regional police headquarters in Kuldja were captured, a national holiday, and by boasting a green star-and-crescent national flag. After the signing of the Urumchi agreement to form a coalition government in June 1946, the word "Republic" was omitted from official statements. For instance, Ahmetjan stated in February 1947:

The problem today is to confirm national unity and to put into effect a democratic policy. We do not put the question of the rule of one nation or group of nations over another nation or group of nations. Therefore the national self-government which we desire is supreme authority in our Province under an executive power which is to be effected not only by the Uighurs or those of Turkic race, but also by the unification of all the peoples in our Province and the implementation of a democratic policy.¹¹⁵

The Uighur nationalists in Urumchi, headed by Dr. Sabiri considered that nine tenths of the population of Eastern Turkestan belonged to the Turkic nation, and therefore the terms like "Uighur" and "Kazakh" should be abandoned. They believed that the uniform language, common territory, common religion and common race of the Turkic peoples of Eastern Turkestan should constitute the basis for a self-ruling entity within the Republic of China.

Basically, the political objectives of the leadership of the E.T.R. and the Uighur nationalists in Urumchi differed very little on the question of achieving independence, or at least full autonomy, from the Chinese. They differed only on the question of how to gain this independence or full autonomy. The E.T.R. leadership relied on Soviet backing, while the Urumchi group wanted to gain full autonomy through dialogue with the Chinese. As the subsequent events were to show, both these groups were gravely mistaken in relying on the goodwill of the Soviets and the Chinese, since these two imperialist powers wanted only to manipulate them as puppets in the "big game" of international power politics.¹¹⁶

The final split of the coalition government on the 26 August 1947 engineered mainly by the Soviets, was to create further divisions within the E.T.R.. Osman Bator, the leader of Kazakh tribesmen of Altai, who had fought the Chinese since 1943, and who became the governor of the Altai region after it had been liberated, retained his allegiance to the Provincial Government of Masud Sabiri.¹¹⁷ Osman's move not only caused the so-called Peitashan affair, but was also followed by almost three years of small-scale fratricidal clashes between the E.T.R. army units in Altai and Osman's tribesmen.¹¹⁸ Only after regular Soviet troops were deployed against Osman, was he defeated, being eventually hunted down and executed in 1950 as a "bandit" by the Chinese communists.¹¹⁹

As the year 1949 approached, the Communist victory on mainland China was becoming imminent. This new factor caused the Soviets to reassess their policies in Eastern Turkestan. The E.T.R. leadership was forced to re-evaluate its stance when confronted with these new circumstances. Ahmetjan Kasimi, the Chairman of the E.T.R. government in Kuldja, made the following statement, admitting "mistakes of the past":

When our national liberation struggle began.., there were made many mistakes on the question of nationalities. When our people took arms and started to struggle, it mixed up the Chinese people with a small group of corrupt K.M.T. officials, marauding soldiers and policemen. It was

convinced that all the Chinese are its enemies. As a result, we have beaten up and expelled with the same stick both our (Chinese) enemies and friends, while defending our worst K.M.T. enemies because they were of the same nationality as us... This was absolutely mistaken, a wrong policy.¹²⁰

Ahmetjan further stated that as a result of this erroneous policy, class enemies*, saboteurs and grafters penetrated the leadership of the E.T.R., obstructing the class struggle and putting forward slogans for an "Independent Eastern Turkestan". This political somersault, undoubtedly performed at the instigation of the Soviets, revealed that days of the E.T.R. were to be short-lived. This meant that the idea of an "Eastern Turkestan Republic" no longer served the Soviet interests in the area.

On 10 January 1949 the K.M.T. dismissed Masud Sabiri from his post as chairman of the Provincial Government of Sinkiang, and replaced him by Burhan Shahidi, who was more acceptable for the Soviets.¹²¹ Subsequently, the Communist victories on the mainland forced the disintegrating K.M.T. regime to seek refuge on the island of Formosa. It was at this stage that the Uighur nationalists in Urumchi appealed to the K.M.T. to grant full independence for Eastern Turkestan and to transfer half of the military equipment possessed by the 100,000 strong nationalist Chinese army in Eastern Turkestan to the natives. If the arms were provided, the

* Meaning upper classes of the native population.

Uighur nationalists wanted to prevent the entry of Communist Chinese troops into Eastern Turkestan. However, Chiang Kai shek ordered his troops in Eastern Turkestan to retreat, disregarding the impossibility of such a move, and obviously preferring a Communist Chinese take-over to the creation of an independent Eastern Turkestan. As a result 100,000 strong K.M.T. army in Sinkiang which had been fully equipped with modern American arms, peacefully surrendered to the advance units of the "Peoples Liberation Army" in October 1949, after the Provincial Government of Burhan had proclaimed allegiance to the Communist regime of mainland China.¹²² Meanwhile, the leadership of the E.T.R. was requested to attend the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and to negotiate the terms of autonomy for the Eastern Turkestan Republic. They decided to seek either independence similar to that of the Mongolian People's Republic, or to become an autonomous state similar to the Middle Asian Republics of the Soviet Union.¹²³ They based this decision on the following declaration made at the First All-China Congress of Soviets in 1930:

In such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kweichow, in which a majority of the population belongs to another, non-Chinese nationality, the toiling masses of these nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic.¹²⁴

On 26 August 1949 a delegation of the E.T.R. headed by Ahmetjan Kasimi left from Kuldja airport. A Soviet plane was to take them to Peking over Soviet territory, as the Chinese Civil war was still raging on the mainland. For several months nothing was heard of them. Then suddenly news came that the plane that was taking them to Peking crashed on 27 August 1949 in the mountains near Lake Baikal in Siberia. Seven badly burnt bodies allegedly belonging to the members of the delegation were brought back only after eight months. Strangely, the bodies started to decompose only after they were brought to Kuldja from the Soviet Union and put on display for the people.¹²⁵ Soon after the news of the alleged crash, a new delegation of five headed by Saifuddin Azizi left for Peking. The Soviet-educated Saifuddin was obviously determined to survive at all cost, so his delegation kept silent throughout the proceedings of the Congress, and after having agreed to all Chinese terms demanding total abandonment of the demands for independence or autonomy from China, safely returned to Sinkiang. It was then announced to the population that the three regions had been joined to China again. The Eastern Turkestan Republic ceased to exist in December 1949.

VII. CONCLUSION:

During the four years of the existence of the Eastern Turkestan Republic, the Soviet Union stepped up the exploitation of mineral resources, and produce from its territory. Wolfram, high grade uranium ore from Borotala mines, gold and beryl from Altai, supplemented horticultural and agricultural products "exported" to the Soviet Union in repayment of the military aid against the Chinese obtained between November 1944 and September 1945. Four thousand tons of wool, three million sheep and one hundred thousand tons of cereals were sent to the Soviet Union in the period of 1945-49 from the E.T.R.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, the economy of the E.T.R. remained in a very healthy state because high levels of production were maintained, the government had restricted spending, and kept taxes low which encouraged the increase of free trade and production output. Because of these reasons, the currency of the E.T.R. remained more stable than the currency in K.M.T. controlled regions although all gold from the E.T.R. banks was also taken to the Soviet Union.¹²⁷ However, the mineral resources and produce from the territory of the E.T.R. was only a trifle compared to the enormous potential of mainland China, which the Soviets hoped to exploit in the same manner after the Communist victory there. On the other hand, the Soviet backed secession of Eastern Turkestan from China would not only undermine good relations

that existed then between the Communist regimes in Moscow and Peking, but could also back-fire at the Soviet Union, because the nationalist aspirations of the Turkic peoples of Eastern Turkestan were equally shared by their kinsmen in Western Turkestan.* The Soviets were also more than suspicious of the loyalty of the leadership of the E.T.R.. These were the apparent considerations behind the Soviet betrayal of the independence movement in Eastern Turkestan.

Soon after the arrival of the "Peoples Liberation Army" in Eastern Turkestan a selective extermination campaign against the Uighur and Kazakh nationalists and the former officers of the E.T.R. army was initiated jointly by the Chinese and the Soviets. Dr. Masud Sabiri was "accidentally" drowned in a cess-pool.¹²⁸ Kurban Kodai, Chingizkhan and a number of others were arrested and executed on 25 January 1952.¹²⁹ Thirteen officers of the first regiment of the E.T.R. army stationed in Shiho were executed on 4 April 1950. Colonel of the E.T.R. army Abdugafur Sabiri, Major Rahmanov and a number of others were executed in April 1951.¹³⁰

The E.T.R. army, renamed "The Fifth Corps" by the Chinese was disbanded. While executions were carried out according to the lists that had been prepared by the Soviet

* Middle Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

secret services in Eastern Turkestan, the Chinese took all the officers of the E.T.R. army into "re-education courses". In Aksu and Urumchi regions alone 3245 "counter-revolutionaries" were victimized within a few months in 1951. Thus the Chinese were taking revenge on the native population of Eastern Turkestan for the humiliating defeats of the 1944 uprising.¹³¹

Sweeping purges, which exterminated many native leaders, including those who led the 1944 uprising in Ili, Altai and Tarbagatai, continued until 1953.¹³² Only after most of the founders of the Eastern Turkestan Republic had been eliminated did the Chinese eventually restore a purely formal semblance of autonomy by creating "Ili Kazakh Autonomous District" on 24 November 1954, and inaugurating the "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region" a year later.¹³³

In studying the history of Eastern Turkestan one is struck by continuous setbacks inflicted on the aspirations of the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic peoples to gain their independence and freedom.¹³⁴ Despite their heroic struggles to achieve this goal, the peoples of Eastern Turkestan were time and again subdued by the Chinese and the Russians, who sometimes clashed for the control over the territory, but more often colluded to subdue the natives.¹³⁵ In the 1944-49 period in Eastern Turkestan, as in Eastern Europe,

the Soviets pursued twin objectives of security and expansion. When Soviet influence in the region was eliminated by the successful political encroachment of Chungking in 1943, the Soviets utilized the legitimate grievances of the native population to sponsor an uprising in order to restore the Soviet influence in the area. On the other hand, the Soviets were from the beginning weary of the rise of an independent Turkic state bordering the Soviet republics of Western Turkestan to demand a greater degree of self-government from their Russian rulers. It was not yet ten years since the last pockets of resistance to the Soviet occupation were eliminated by the Red Army there. 136

Stalin

Obviously ~~the Soviet leadership~~ firmly imprinted in their ^{his} collective memory the words of a Chinese official who requested Soviet arms and troops in order to crush the "Eastern Turkestan Republic" of Hoja Niaz in 1933: "...A Moslem state in Sinkiang would force the Soviet Union to station troops from Turkey to Novosibirsk. In addition, you would lose Sinkiang's resources and markets." 137

These were the obvious considerations behind the notorious "airplane crash" that was staged to liquidate the leadership of the E.T.R. and to betray once again the anti-Chinese national liberation struggle of the peoples of Eastern Turkestan in 1949. 138

The Chinese policy in Eastern Turkestan consisted of a skillful diplomacy designed to prevent the Russian encroachment combined with ruthless extermination of the natives, whom they considered to be only chuan tou.* Naturally, the proud and able people inhabiting the territory responded to this policy with frequent revolts.¹³⁹ Although as a result the Chinese often suffered military defeats, they succeeded in turning them into diplomatic victories by the skillful application of the Chinese maxim: Yi ye chi ye*. In this sense the Communist victory on mainland China did not alter basic historical traits of the Chinese policy towards the people of Eastern Turkestan. A military defeat of the K.M.T. in Eastern Turkestan in the period 1944-49 was turned into a remarkable diplomatic victory by the Chinese Communists, who not only regained the lost Chinese hold on the territory, but also eventually succeeded in eliminating Soviet influences completely.¹⁴⁰ American support for the tottering K.M.T. regime decreased the chances of the peoples of Eastern Turkestan to regain their freedom and independence from the Chinese.¹⁴¹ Although the United States was not involved directly in the military conflict in Eastern Turkestan, it displayed complete lack of understanding of the political situation in the region, and ignored the aspirations of the peoples of Eastern

* Chuan tou- "Turbaned head". A derogatory term used by the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan to depict the natives. Equivalent to "nigger".

*"Get a savage to eat savage". A classic maxim of the Chinese applied to neighbouring peoples, i.e setting them up against one another.

Turkestan.¹⁴² Its diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union played a considerable role in halting the rebels' advance on Urumchi in September 1945, thus depriving the E.T.R. leaders of a chance to seek international recognition by establishing contacts with the U.S consulate in Urumchi.¹⁴³ The ruthless and inhumane nature of Chinese policies in Eastern Turkestan was the main factor that triggered the unified revolt of all the ethnic groups inhabiting the area. Overwhelming support of all classes of the non-Chinese population for the uprising was indicative firstly, of the accumulated hatred towards the corrupt Chinese administration during ten years of Sheng's rule, and secondly of the complete absence of the element of class struggle.¹⁴⁴

The rebels resorted to Soviet military aid only because there was no other alternative, and this factor had a perilous effect not only on the basic aims of the revolution, but on its leadership as well. Although thousands of the best sons of Eastern Turkestan sacrificed their lives to gain freedom for their land and its people, their heroic struggle gave the Eastern Turkestan Republic only four years of prosperous

economic development. Nevertheless, these rebels will always be remembered with pride and affection by the peoples of that unfortunate land.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Ili, Altai and Tarbagatai regions in the north of Eastern Turkestan (see attached map).
2. A mass exodus of the native population from the Ili, Altai and Tarbagatai regions to the Soviet Union in the period of 1958-63 because of the maltreatment by the Chinese was one of the contributing factors in the Sino-Soviet split.
3. The Soviet military aid to the anti-Chinese uprising in Eastern Turkestan in 1944 remains a taboo topic in the Soviet publications.
4. P.J. Fesenko. Strani Vostoka. V. 2 Sintsian p. 327.
5. Source: A map printed in the U.S.S.R. According to the Chinese Sources 1828,418 square kilometers. Strani Vostoka V. 2. p.330- 1,426,000 square kilometers.
6. See attached map.
7. Strani Vostoka. V. 2. p.333. Also Owen Lattimore p.p. 103-105.
8. O. Lattimore. Pivot of Asia. Page 92.
9. Communicated by A.
10. Ibid. Verified with several other informants.
11. P.I. Fesenko. P.327.
12. I.C.Y. Hsu. The Ili Crisis.
13. O. Lattimore. Pivot of Asia. P.p. 269-272.
14. I.C.Y. Hsu. The Ili Crisis.
15. Lars-Eric Nyman. P.p 38-41.
16. Communicated by J. Common knowledge among emigres in Sinkiang.
17. Lars-Eric Nyman. P. 79.
18. Communicated by B.
19. Communicated by C. Although the Soviet Cheka directed the purges, they were executed by the Chinese administration of Sheng Tse tsai.
20. See "An Appeal From the People of Eastern Turkestan". "Radio Tashkent" in one of its broadcasts in 1963 put the figure at 123,000, blaming the Chinese administration of Sheng. The Soviet figures can be considered most reliable, as they were the ones to conduct the purges.
21. A number of them, including general Polinov, Ahmetjan Kasimi and others, were "educated" in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Sheng's police. Communicated by A. and verified with several others.
22. Communicated by E. See also O. Lattimore. P.p 69-81.
23. Communicated by T.
24. Yakovlev. Natsionalno-Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie v Sintsiane p.p 158 ff.2.
25. Communicated by B.
26. A. Yakovlev. P. 159.
27. Communicated by G.

28. A.S. Whiting. Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? P. 102.
29. Communicated by B.
30. Communicated by R.
31. Z. Taipov. V Borbe Za Svobodu. P. 49.
32. Communicated by a leader of one of those groups. (R).
33. Communicated by S.
34. Communicated by A.
35. Ibid.
36. Z. Taipov. P.p 49-50.
37. Ibid. P.p 51.
38. Communicated by A.
39. Z. Taipov. P. 49.
40. A. Whiting. P.p. 104-105.
41. Communicated by R.
42. Communicated by H. Verified with several other eyewitnesses.
43. Communicated by D.
44. Communicated by A.
45. A. Karahoca. Dogu Turkistan. P. 21
46. Z. Taipov. P. 67.
47. Communicated by D.
48. Communicated by B.
49. Communicated by A.
50. Z. Taipov. P. 77.
51. Ibid. P. 87.
52. Communicated by T.
53. Communicated by B.
54. Z. Taipov. P. 92.
55. Ibid. P. 95.
56. Ibid. P. 96.
57. Communicated by A.
58. Communicated by B.
59. Communicated by A and F.
60. Ibid.
61. Z. Taipov. P. 97.
62. Ibid. P. 99.
63. Communicated by participant D.
64. Z. Taipov p. 100.
65. Communicated by V.
66. Communicated by A.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Z. Taipov. P.103.
70. A. Whiting. P.106.
71. Ibid. P.109.
72. Communicated by I.
73. Z. Taipov. P. 105.
74. T. R. Rahimov. P.6.
75. Communicated by A.
76. Ibid.
77. Common consensus of all informants.
78. Communicated by C.

79. Common consensus of all informants.
80. T. Rahimov. P.10
81. Communicated by B.
82. T. Rahimov. Page 10.
83. Ten of them were to belong to Han (Chinese) race.
84. General Chang Chi chung, Telaldin Wang, Mehmet Emin Bugra, Sai Zung Shen, Tanimhan and Burhan respectively.
85. Ahmetjan Kasimi, Rahimjan Sabiri, Delilhan and Seifuddin respectively.
86. Communicated by A. The K.M.T. side maintained pressure later demanding that the E.T.R. army should be subordinated to the Central command in Urumchi.
87. According to the agreement, the Provisional Government of the E.T.R. in Kuldja was officially disbanded. Unofficially Ahmethan Kasimi became the leader after the Soviet agents kidnapped Alihan Ture.
88. The E.T.R. army remained in battle readiness on the demarcation line at Manas. When General Chang Chi chung visited Kuldja in May 1947, he and his retinue wore iron helmets as if at the front.
89. Several wounded rebels were skinned alive, cut and burnt with hot oil in the first days of the war. The Capture by the Chinese meant then certain death. Communicated by all the participants.
90. Z. Taipov. P. 107.
91. Alihan Ture was kidnapped by the Soviet agents and taken to the Soviet Union in May 1946. Was alive there in 1958.
92. Communicated by his former private secretary (R).
93. Communicated by D. and several others.
94. Communicated by T. in whose house this correspondent lived for a while.
95. O. Lattimore. P.99.
96. Communicated by A.
97. Z. Taipov. P.109.
98. Ibid. P.111.
99. O. Lattimore.P.93.
100. Ibid. P.96.
101. A. Yakovlev.P.170.
102. O. Lattimore.P.97.
103. For instance, Rahimjan Sabiri, or Sabirhojaev- one of the three delegates of the E.T.R. to the peace talks in Urumchi, was his nephew. His other nephew, Abdugafur Sabirhojaev, was a colonel in the E.T.R. army.
104. Orchestrated campaign against Dr. Masud Sabiri was initiated and directed from the Soviet consulates in Eastern Turkestan.
105. A Yakovlev. P. 174.
106. Ibid. P.177ff.
107. O. Lattimore. P.99.
108. Ibid. P.93.
109. Ibid. P.92.
110. However the native nationalists were given only titular power. The real power rested with the Chinese military.
111. A. Yakovlev. P.177.
112. Ibid. P.178.

113. Z. Taipov. P.112.
114. Ibid. P.115.
115. O. Lattimore. P.117, quoted from Sinkiang Gazeti, 19 Feb. 1947.
116. Most of the native leaders perished during the purges of 1950-53 in Sinkiang. Few escaped abroad through Pakistan.
117. Communicated by A.
118. Communicated by D.
119. Communicated by U.
120. A. Yakovlev. P.186, quoted from A. Kasimi Selected Works P.263.
121. O. Lattimore. P.101.
122. An Appeal. P4. Also A. Whiting p.118.
123. T. Rahimov p.14.
124. O. Lattimore p.115.
125. Only the body of Abdukerim Abbasov was positively identified. Ahmetjan Kasimi and several others were detained in Peking. Ahmetjan died in a secret prison in Peking in 1962. (Communicated by a highly placed Chinese Source). Soviet consul Borisov who was with them in the same plane, was later stationed in Harbin.
126. Communicated by A.
127. Communicated by C.
128. His assassination was staged shortly after the Communist take-over.
129. A. Yakovlev. P.177ff.
130. Ibid. P.175.
131. Ibid. P.130ff. After the Communist take-over, General Tao Si Ya, the Commander of the K.M.T. troops in Sinkiang retained his position as the Commander of the eighth division, presumably for his role in the peaceful surrender.
132. So called "anti-three" and "anti-five" campaigns, during which mass executions of the "class enemies", "Pan-Turkists" and "Pan-Islamists" have taken place.
133. A common knowledge in Sinkiang.
134. See "An Appeal..."
135. In 1871, 1933 and 1944 the Russians helped the Chinese to regain their control over the territory.
136. So called "Basmachi" movement against the Soviets continued till 1933.
137. A. Whiting. P.135.
138. There was no airplane crash. A. Abbasov was killed in the Soviet Union before his body was sent back. Ahmetjan and several others were detained in Peking.
139. See "An Appeal..."
140. The Soviet consulates were expelled in 1962.

141. On the role of the U.S. government in helping the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan see A. Whiting p.p 106-111.
142. The U.S. policy in China in that period blindly backed the K.M.T. regime.
143. The U.S consulate was established in Urumchi in 1943 at the request of the Chinese.
144. A Yakovlev. P.180.

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12. O.E. Clubb China and Russia. 1971
13. M.Rossabi China and Inner Asia. 1975.
14. M.R.Norins Gateway to Asia . 1944.
- 15 M.Beloff The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia. 1947 v.2.
16. Oral interviews with twenty two participants in the events described in this work.

Abdulrauf Mahdum. The State Secretary in the Provisional Government of the E.T.R.

Achal. A mountain pass half way between Kuldja and Tsinho.

Airambak. A district of Kuldja.

Aisabek. One of the Uighur nationalist leaders. Also known as Isa Yusuf Alpteki.

Akbar. A Kazakh partisan leader killed in November 1944.

Akhmatjan Kasimi. The leader of the E.T.R. after Alihan Ture's kidnapping. Secretly imprisoned by the Chinese in August 1949. Killed in prison in Peking in 1962.

Aksu. A city in Kashgaria.

Alexandrov. The rebel commander at the initial stage of the Kuldja uprising in 1944.

"Alga". "Forward"- A newspaper.

Ali Khan Ture. The president of the Provisional Government of the E.T.R. until 1946. Was kidnapped and taken to the Soviet Union in 1946.

Altai. One of the three rebel regions.

Annenkov. "White" general in Sinkiang. Assassinated by the bolsheviks.

Arasan. A locality in Borotala region in Eastern Turkestan.

Bakich. "White" Russian General deported from Gansu to Russia and executed by the bolsheviks.

bek. A native title.

Bukambal. Winter quarters in Borotala.

Bukhara. A khanate in Western Turkestan conquered by Russia in 1860s.

Burchum. A city in Altai.

Burhan. A chameleon politician of Sinkiang. Played prominent role in surrendering Eastern Turkestan to the Chinese Communists.

Borisov. Soviet Vice-Consul in Kuldja in 1944. Departed with the E.T.R. delegation on 26 August 1949 and pronounced dead.

Borotala. A region in Tarbagatai.

Chang Chih chung. A K.M.T. general and chief negotiator at the peace talks in Urumchi in 1945.

Chapkanjota. A mountain overlooking Kuldja some 50 k. to the north.

C.C. Clique. An extreme rightist faction of the K.M.T.

Chingizkhan. An Uighur nationalist leader assassinated in 1952.

Chipeize. A village near Shiho.

ChinShu-jen. The governor of Sinkiang before Sheng.

Cholader gorges. Half way between Talki and Takianze.

Chuguchak. Capital city of the Tarbagatai Region.

Chungking. The Capital of China after the Sino-Japanese war.

Du De fu. General of the K.M.T. army.

Durbuljin. City in Tarbagatai.

Dutov. "White" general assassinated by the Soviets.

Emin. City in Tarbagatai.

Enver. Musabay. The Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government of the E.T.R.

Erkin. Newspaper "Freedom".

E.T.R. Eastern Turkestan Republic.

Fatih Muslimov. A partisan leader who played prominent role in the uprising of 1944.

Gani. A partisan leader.

Habib Yunich. The Minister of Education in the Provisional Government of the E.T.R.

Hakimbek Hoja. The Vice-President of the E.T.R. till 1946.

Halikchilik. "Popularity"- newspaper.

Hami. A city in the East of Eastern Turkestan.

Hamid Muslimov. A military leader, killed at the initial stage of the uprising in Nilki.

Hoja. A title used by the native upper classes .

Horgos. A border town on the Soviet border located 100 km from Kuldja.

Hutubi. A town some 60 km from Urumchi.

Ili. Also Kuldja- a regional capital

Injinho. A locality near Tsinho or Jinho.

Irek. A mountain gorge 40 km from Kuldja.

Iskhakbek Muninov. A military commander.

Iskhakjan Ibragimov. A Soviet Military Expert in the rank of a colonel.

Ittipak. A newspaper, "Union".

Jeti-shaar. "Seven cities" of Kashgaria.

Kazihan. An officer of the E.T.R. army.

Khotan. A city in the south of Kashgaria.

Kirgiz. A Turkic nationality.

K.M.T. Kuo Ming Tang- The Chinese Nationalist party.

Kogarchin. A mountain pass between Kuldja and Takiantse.

Kokchoka. A mountain pass adjacent to Kogarchin.

Kurban Kodai. An Uighur nationalist leader. Executed in 1952 by the Chinese.

Kure. A military fortress near Suidun.

Lian Shan. A district of Kuldja.

Liu Bin di. Chief of Police in Kuldja prior to the uprising. Killed on 7 Nov. 1944.

Lotsongu. A village near Suidun.

Maitau. An oil producing city near Shiho.

Manchus. An ethnic group from Manchuria.

Masud Sabiri. (DR.) Turkish educated leader of the Uighur nationalists. Killed in 1950 in Urumchi by the Soviets.

Mozharov. Colonel of the E.T.R. army headquarters.

Mehmet Emin Bugra. An Uighur intellectual and a nationalist leader.

Mogutnov. Colonel-Commander of the 1st Suidun Regiment.

Muhummdjan Mahmud. The Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government of the E.T.R.

Muhiddin Hoja. The Minister of Health.

Muzzart. A mountain pass from Ili to Kashgaria in the Tian Shan mountains.

Nankin. The Capital of China before the Sino-Japanese war.

Nilki. A small town in the Ili region.

N.K.V.D. troops. The Soviet troops subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Osman Bator. A Kazakh nationalist leader executed in 1950 by the Chinese.

Polinov. General. Commander-in-Chief of the E.T.R. Army before Iskhakbek.

Sharasume. The Capital city of the Altai region.

Sheng Shih tsai. The Governor of Sinkiang in 1933-43 period.

Shi Pin. A general of the K.M.T. army in Sinkiang.

Shushegur. A mountain pass parallel to Talki.

Suidun. A city 28 miles from Kuldja.

Sung Si lian. A K.M.T. General.

Takianze. A township to Borotala.

Taranchi. Uighur.

Tarbagatai. A region to the north of Ili.

TASS. The Soviet newsagency.

Tekes. A locality in the south of Kuldja.

Togra Yol. The Right Pass - A newspaper.

Topadon. A locality in Kuldja.

Tsinho. See Jinho.

Tso Tsung lang. A Hunanese general who headed a punitive expedition in Eastern Turkestan in 1876.

Tungans. Chinese Muslims.

Ulan Bator. The Capital of Mongolia.

Western Turkestan. Soviet Republics of Middle Asia.

Wusu. See Shiho.

Yakub Bek. An Uighur leader who created the state of Jetishaar in 1862-65. Poisoned in 1878.

Yang Tseng hsin. Governor of Sinkiang between 1911-28.

Yarkand. A city in the south of Sinkiang.