

Hoover Institution Studies: 7

Territorial Claims in the

Sino-Soviet Conflict

Documents & Analysis

Dennis J. Doolin

*The Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution, and Peace
Stanford University, 1965*

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, founded at Stanford University in 1919 by Herbert Hoover, is a center for advanced study and research on public and international affairs in the twentieth century. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hoover Institution.

© 1965 by the Board of Trustees of
the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-19766

Second Printing, 1973

Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

In spite of the growing evidence of a falling out between the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union which has been accumulating over the past several years, it was not until early 1964 that either side openly brought out one of the key issues in the rift—China's demand for the restitution by the Soviet Union of almost 600,000 square miles of land, "grabbed" by Imperial Russia at a time when China was unable to oppose this.

The issue itself had been clear enough for decades. When the Chinese Communists "liberated" mainland China in 1949, they acquired the title to claims and grievances dating back to the middle years of the Ch'ing Dynasty. At the end of the eighteenth century, an expanding Russia began a gradual process of encroachment on the vast territories of Siberia which culminated in the establishment of Vladivostok as a Pacific port. At least a portion of the territory acquired by Russia in this period of expansion belonged—for longer or shorter periods—to the Chinese Empire and was ceded to Russia in the "unequal" treaties of the nineteenth century. As China emerges from the lethargy of past centuries, its claims for the restitution of these areas are backed by its growing power.

In Chinese eyes, Russian encroachment on Chinese territorial sovereignty continued long after the period of "imperialist expansion" on the part of other European states had come to a close. The most notable example was the detachment of Outer Mongolia from Chinese control and its establishment as a "People's Republic" in 1924. Also serving as a constant irritant was a long succession of border "incidents" in Chinese Turkestan, particularly in the Ili area. Under both the Czars and the Commissars, the Russians have been poor neighbors at best. The catalog of complaints has grown tediously long.

The Communist victory in China and its entry into the world Communist system brought a temporary halt to the public expression of

disagreements on territorial questions. But even in this new relationship, the Chinese provided evidence that territorial matters had not been forgotten by publishing occasional maps showing disputed areas as belonging historically to China. Such gambits elicited no response from the Soviets during the era of outwardly tranquil relations, although they did not pass without notice in Russia or elsewhere.

In spite of such evidence of subsurface dissension and the occasional reports of actual clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on the northwestern borders of Turkestan, the Communist Party leaders, both Chinese and Russian, maintained a dignified silence. In the summer of 1964, however, the pressures became too great to prevent this issue from being included in the polemics within the Communist world.

Mr. Doolin's brief sketch of the background and recent course of events which have a bearing on this significant aspect of Sino-Russian relations is accompanied by the texts of many of the key documents involved, including ex-Premier Khrushchev's policy statement on colonialism of December 12, 1962. Other pre-1964 materials provide clues to the attitudes and convictions underlying the open break on the territorial issue which did not come until July 1964.

This study does not attempt to interpret the territorial issue as a factor in the Sino-Soviet split, although it has undoubtedly played a key part. Both the seriousness of the rift and the importance of the dispute over Russian territorial acquisitions are questions which will require a longer historical perspective to decide. The essential purpose here is to provide an objective presentation of the basic facts in the case, supported by careful translations of official statements, press releases, and monitored broadcasts from Russian, Chinese, and Japanese sources. Much of this material has failed to attract the attention it deserves, and some is appearing here for the first time in English. The original documents form part of the collections at the Hoover Institution and are available for inspection by any interested student.

WITOLD S. SWORAKOWSKI
Assistant Director,
Hoover Institution

February 10, 1965

CONTENTS

Foreword	5
Introduction	13
Documents	
1 Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet	27
2 The CPUSA Reproaches the CCP	28
3 The CCP's Reply to the CPUSA	29
4 Subversion in Sinkiang	31
5 Soviet Countercharges	32
6 Khrushchev on Peaceful Settlement	33
7 Chou En-lai to Edgar Snow	36
8 Border Talks Reported	37
9 The CCP to the CPSU	37
10 A Soviet Charge of Border Violations	38
11 A Soviet Jurist's Comments	39
12 The Subversion in Sinkiang	40
13 <i>Pravda</i> on the Situation in Hong Kong	41
14 Mao to Japanese Socialist Delegation	42
15 Japanese Comment on Mao Statement	44
16 An Interview with Chou En-lai	45
17 Adzhubei on the Dispute	46
18 <i>Izvestia</i> on European Frontiers	46
19 <i>Pravda</i> on Mao's Statement of July 10	47
20 Radio Moscow to Germany	57
21 Another Soviet Comment on Mao Interview	57
22 Radio Moscow to Italy	59

23	Mongolian Reaction to Mao Interview	61
24	More Subversion in Sinkiang	65
25	Radio Moscow to Yugoslavia	66
26	Khrushchev to a Japanese Delegation	68
27	Soviet Proposal to the UN	72
28	Radio Moscow to England	74
29	Strong Words from Sinkiang	75
30	Canadian CP on Mao's Ambitions	76