

THE POLICY OF THE MANCHU
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE MOSLEM REBELLION IN
SHENSI, KANSU AND SINKIANG
FROM 1862 TO 1878

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THE POLICY OF THE MANCHU GOVERNMENT IN
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE MOSLEM REBELLION
IN SHENSI, KANSU AND SINKIANG FROM
1862 TO 1878

by

Wen-djang Chu

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

1955

Approved by *Henry D. Smith*
Department *Far Eastern Institute*
Date *August 10th 1955*

The Chinese characters in this thesis are very faint and difficult to make out in the original copy received. We have done the best we can with this type of material.

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suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in Shensi, Kansu, and Sinkiang from 1862 to 1878.
submitted by

..... Chu Wen-djang in partial fulfillment of
the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy
and recommend its acceptance. In support of this recommendation we present the
following joint statement of evaluation to be filed with the thesis.

Mr. Chu's thesis is a study of the policy formulating process at the Central Government of Imperial China with respect to one of the most wide spread and most dangerous rebellions that the Chinese Court had to face during the 19th century. As a result of this study, it becomes evident that, this policy immediately broke down in the face of a major crisis. Actually the policy, not only with respect to the campaign of suppression but also with regard to the entire Moslem problem in China's northwest, was formulated by the field commanders. It was only when Tso Tsung-T'ang was put in charge of the campaign that a sound line of approach emerged concerning the conduct of the campaign as well as the question of rehabilitation. It so happens that Tso was one of the strongest leaders of regional interests in late Imperial China and that his political conceptions differed vastly from those which the Court originally held. Incidental to the survey of China's policy towards Moslems, the Moslem Rebellion as such is surveyed on the basis of a broad coverage of documentary and secondary sources, which has never been done before. The sources as such have been used with great skill and balance. Opinions and conceptions of later historians, both Chinese and Western, have been submitted to stringent criticism. The thesis thus represents a major contribution to our knowledge of the history of late Imperial China. The undersigned are happy to recommend its acceptance.

THESIS READING COMMITTEE:

Samuel Michael
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In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Washington I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by my major professor or, in his absence, by the Director of Libraries. It is understood that any copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

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PREFACE

The theme of this dissertation is the domestic policy of the Manchu government in the suppression of the Moslem rebellion in Shensi, Kansu, and Sinkiang from 1862 to 1878. The writer refers to the military development and other facts only when they are helpful to understand the policy of the Manchu government. He does not intend to touch upon the diplomatic field nor to elaborate upon the story from the Moslem angle.

The main sources of materials are the documents compiled by the Manchu government in P'ing-ting Shen-Kan Hui-fei fang-lüeh (平定陝甘新疆回匪方略), supplemented by Ta-ch'ing Shih-lu (大清實錄) as well as the numerous collections of the works of the leading participants of the day, such as Tso Tsung-t'ang (左宗棠), Yang Yüeh-pin (楊岳斌), Liu Yung (劉蓉), Liu Chin-t'ang (劉錦棠), Yüan Pao-heng (袁保恆), Li Hung-chang (李鴻章), Tseng Kuo-fan (曾國藩), Tseng Chi-tse (曾紀澤) and others. Local gazettes are frequently consulted to clarify particular facts relating to the particular locality. Accounts preserved by the contemporary people are heavily depended upon to check on the official documents for errors and deliberate whitewashes. Secondary works and semi-official reports are usually used to provide the general background.

Since most of the westerners did not have much

opportunity to participate or even to observe the making of the government policy of the period, there are very few materials in western languages which can help to build up the main part of this dissertation. There are, nevertheless, always some significant exceptions, such as the papers of Sir Robert Hart of the Chinese Customs House on the question of raising foreign loans. Several western secondary works such as Marshall Broomhall's Islam in China, and Captain W. L. Bales' Tso Tsungt'ang incidentally touch upon the Manchu government policy, but they are far too brief and often incorrect, though sometimes useful. The western sources are especially enlightening on problems about the Moslem religion and people. They are also helpful in clarifying the international background.

It is hard work to plow into the virgin soil of those hundreds of chüan (卷) of bone dry documents without the help of any index. Yet it is a great thrill to be able to present a systematic study of the confusing policy of the Manchu government in the suppression of the Moslem rebellion in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang from 1862-1878.

Wen-djang Chu

Seattle
August, 1955

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