

## Turkestan as the Problem-Country of the Soviet Union

Turkestan (Soviet Socialist Republics: Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) which is about a fifth of the whole of the Soviet Union is a real problem for the Soviet leaders in Moscow and is at the same time the starting point for the whole of her politics in the Orient. This country has remained a problem for the Soviet leaders in Moscow because the family traditions and the cultural spiritual way of thinking of former times have effected the way the native people think. The Islam and the fact that Turkestan is surrounded and has contact with other Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East are the main problems that Soviet Russian leaders must deal with regularly. Also the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops in the year 1979 has caused mistrust among the population in Turkestan with regard to Moscow's politics.

### The Present Structure of the Population of Turkestan

From the result of the census taken in 1979 it was clear that in that year 40,167,390 persons lived in Turkestan. This is more than 15% of the whole of the population of the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> This means that the inhabitants of Turkestan have increased by 7,367,948 persons<sup>2</sup> within 10 years (1970-1979). In 1979 there were 26,409,931 Turkestanis (Uzbeks — 1,997,971; Kirghiz — 1,829,564; Kara-Kalpaks — 297,788; Uighurs — 210,512; other groups — 51,694). The Tatars (1,154,203), Azerbaijanis (156,772) and Daghestanis (11,555) also the Beludjis (18,584) etc., can be classed as Turkestanis, because they have historical and present day cultural and ethnical connections with them. They feel that they have ties to the

population of Turkestan. The basic population of Turkestan (Turkestanis) has increased in the last 20 years (1959-1979) by 13,405,869 persons.<sup>3</sup> By the census in 1979 it was discovered that 785,617 Turkestanis do not live in Turkestan but are scattered about in other regions of the Soviet Union and have no possibility to take part in their own cultural life (language, customs, religion and no school in their mother tongue).

The Russians are the second largest population-group in Turkestan and feel superior to them. In the year 1979 9,312,825 Russians lived here (in the Soviet Republic Kazakhstan alone it was 5,991,205 persons). Although they do not make up more than 20,1% of the whole of the population of Turkestan they are the main stay of Soviet power (leading officials of the state-administration, of C.P. administration, the Army and economic life). They mostly live in the towns of Turkestan and carry out Moscow's politics from there. Their numbers increased within 10 years (1970-1979) by 804,340 persons, a situation which was mainly due to the resettlement policy of the Soviet Russian leaders.

In Turkestan in 1979, 1,185,791 Ukrainians, 1,040,117 Germans, 181,491 Byelorussians, 205,810 Koreans and 1,705,665 representatives of other groups of people (Georgians, Armenians, Latvians, Estonians etc.) had to live as displaced persons. These non-Russian groups are more under the influence of Russians because they have no possibility to keep up their own culture, and because of this, although they perhaps do not want to, or are looking for privileges (language, customs, education, leading positions) they work in the Russian culture. The Soviet leaders have changed Turkestan

into a country experimenting with the assimilation of uprooted people. We can see this by the influence that the Russian language had on two groups of people (Germans and Ukrainians) in Kazakhstan. Of the 900,207 Germans living here in 1979, 318,039 said that Russian was their mother-language. Of the 897,964 Ukrainians 526,424 said that Russian was their main language.<sup>4</sup> The Russification on the non-Turkestanis and the non-Russian people of Turkestan will, of course, make the process of Russification on the people of Turkestan easier. The Turkestanis and the other non-Russian groups have not made any progress with regard to getting closer or understanding each other better culturally. So for example, in the year 1979 only 422 Germans and 95 Ukrainians considered that the Kazakh-language was a native language.

Whereas the number of Russians and deported people increased by the resettlement policy (the opening up of new regions and industrial workers) Turkestan's basic population increased because of a natural increase in birth rate. The love of children and the close connection to Islam played a special role. For example in 1979 in Turkestan there were 1,760,000 families (of which 852,000 were in Uzbekistan) with 7 persons or more.<sup>5</sup> In 1970 there were about 645,000 indigenous families of 10 or more persons in Uzbekistan.<sup>6</sup> Such a characteristic increase had not been taken into account by the central planning of the government and didn't fit into the Soviet concept. The increase of the indigenous inhabitants can easily hamper the influence of the Russian people on the Turkestanis and can force the Soviet Russian authorities to reorganize the economic planning. According to Soviet officials, for example Sharaf Rashidow, the population of Uzbekistan could increase to 22 million people until 1990.<sup>7</sup> According to the latest views of Soviet demography experts, the population of Uzbekistan could reach 25 million

in the year 2000.<sup>8</sup> Most Turkestanis live in villages. The people in the country, even within the territories of their own Soviet Republic, do not have any desire to move into towns. The people from the country in Turkestan are a bulwark, so to say, against the steady intensive intrusion of the communist ideology and Russian influence, and furthermore, they are the ones to treasure the national customs and traditions. The Soviet Russian government, however, wants to reduce this quality of Turkestan. The statement of account presented by Brezhnev at the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1981) plainly showed that Moscow is in the process of changing the demographic structure of Turkestan under the pretext of mobilising the workforce of Turkestan (i.e. Central Asia) in Siberia and the Far East. Brezhnev states that there appears to be a lack of work force in Siberia and the Far East. The Soviet government intends to solve the problem according to Brezhnev as follows: "...in Central Asia and in various regions of the Caucasus, especially in the rural areas, there is an abundant work force. That means, that the population of these regions has to be mobilized for the new territories of the country (the Soviet Union) in particular for the development of these areas. Undoubtedly, the new means of production which are necessary for the economy have to be developed, and measures have to be taken on a big scale for the education and training of skilled workers from the "basic nation" (tub millatdan), mainly from the youths of the villages".<sup>9</sup> This aim in fact means that many Turkestanis will have to leave their country because of the wish and regulations of the Soviet Russian government and the Communist Party headquarters. This, again, means that the Turkestanis will be uprooted and taken away from their national cultural environment. Being far away, in a strange environment and under Russian

influence they will gradually lose their national identity. On the other hand, the Russians will advance into Turkestan and accelerate the total colonisation. It is indeed possible, that the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan, N. Khudayberdiyew, was unaware of the intention of the Polit-Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to transfer the rural population to Siberia. Before Brezhnev, he had announced at the XXVI Congress of the CP of Uzbekistan that the population of Uzbekistan will reach 22-23 million around 1990. Measures should be taken to integrate this coming production force, in order to increase the economic potential in Kara-Kalpak ASSR and other areas.<sup>10</sup> The Communist Party, then, announced a tragic economic aim for Turkestan with the above mentioned statement. At the moment it is impossible to judge whether the republic's bosses who are closely connected to the Soviet communist doctrine are going to take part in the realisation of this plan, whether they will give their consent, or whether they will try to prevent this target followed by Moscow. From this plan to mobilise the work force from the basic part of the population of Turkestan and the Caucasia in order to develop Siberia, the Far East and the North of the Soviet Union, one can see that the increase of the Turkestani population does not lie in the interest of the leadership. With these measures the Soviet government tries to fight the claim of the Turkestanis concerning their homeland.

### **Situation of the Communist Party**

The communist leadership aims at increasing the number of members. At the beginning of 1977 there were 1,566,524 communists in Turkestan, 761,103 were Turkestanis.<sup>11</sup> Consequently the Communist Party of the Soviet Union consisted of 4,90% Turkestanis in the year 1977.

At the end of 1980 the so-called five Communist Parties of Turkestan consisted

of 1,628,456 members and candidates who were mentioned in the party congress of the five Soviet Republics.<sup>12</sup> In the statement of accounts of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties in Turkestan the composition of the national members of the Communist Party has not been defined. At a rough guess one can say that more than half of these are Russians, not Turkestani communists, because the Russians have the absolute majority in the party, for example in Kazakhstan. In terms of figures the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is particularly predominant. At the end of 1980 there were 729,498 communists.

The leadership of the Soviet Union does not only have the right to control the five offices of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Turkestan and also the right to conduct its course, but also to direct instructions to the district offices. Because of that, the lowest level of the party leadership is under direct control of three party offices (Moscow, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Republics and the Area Committee of the Communist Party).

The Communist Party Congress of January/February 1981 of Turkestan voted for the new leading officials of the Communist Party with hardly any alterations in the various Soviet Republics. Altogether 73 Bureau-members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the five Soviet Republics were elected. Of those 27 are Party-secretaries. 27 non-Turkestanis are members of the Bureaus. The first secretary is a Turkestani and the second secretaries are Russians, so no change here. The second secretaries mentioned are coordinating the work of the party and therefore they have an overall picture of the complete party activity. The commander of the Turkestani military area, General I. P. Maksimow, became a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and the

commander of the central Asian military area, General D. T. Yazow, member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Regarding the membership of the Bureau the presidents of the Committee for the state security service (KGB) of the different Soviet Republics are of course not missing. Up to now it has been most mysterious why the bosses of the secret service always seem to get the regular job as Bureau-members. One also does not have to forget, that, in order to understand the Communist Party leadership, the leaders of the party organizing affairs are Russian and that the leaders of the propaganda and agitation departments are Turkestanis. For the first time in the history of the Communist Party in Turkestan a department for information and relations with foreign countries has been organized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The Turkestani, Mr. H. Rahimow, has been appointed for this department. A number of important positions, especially the departments for agriculture and irrigation, have been taken over by Russian communists, for example, T. G. Sinen (dpt. of agriculture) and W. I. Suskin (dpt. of irrigation). There are no indications, why these, for this region, vital sectors, have not been given to indigenous communists?

### Soviet Russian Economic Policy

Turkestan remained *the* raw material producer of the Soviet Union. The main stress lies on the production of raw materials for industry. The extraction of raw materials was intensified. The actual industry in Turkestan though, remained on the level of a preparing branch and status of the end manufacturing industry of the Soviet Union. The extraction of mineral resources was intensified. At the same time the transport of industrial raw materials like coal, gas, crude oil, iron ore, cotton and the like in other regions of the Soviet

Union has been increased. As one can see from the proclamation of the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the latest economic target was that Turkestan was, for the government of the Soviet Union, an alternative which offered enough possibilities for the development and improvement of the economic situation of the Soviet Union.

Apart from the industrial raw materials, the Soviet agrarian politics play a major role. Grain in the north and cotton in the south are central items of agrarian politics. The Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan produced 27,5 million tons of grain in 1980 alone.<sup>13</sup> This region counts, at the moment, as the third grain region of the Soviet Union. In the year 1983, 29 million tons of grain were produced.<sup>14</sup> The demand for cotton has found no end so far. Moscow has requested all cotton producing regions to increase the production with all their means. 9,9 million tons of cotton were produced in 1980 and of that, Azerbaijan produced 883,000 tons and Turkestan 9,017,000 tons.<sup>15</sup> In 1983 the Soviet Union produced 9,2 million tons of cotton altogether.<sup>16</sup> The Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan still remains the base of cotton production for the whole of the Soviet Union. 6,237,000 tons were produced here in 1980, at a rough scale, and this is commonly called "white gold".<sup>17</sup> The Soviet Union aims for a production of 9,2-9 million tons of cotton between 1981 and 1986. Cotton politics created a new modern form of slavery. Despite mechanisation in the cotton industry the people themselves remained the suffering factor in the insatiable appetite of cotton production of Moscovite politics because the Turkestanis (men, women, teenagers and even old people) have to work 18 hours a day, from dawn to dusk. Irrigation plays a major role in Soviet agrarian politics in order to increase the production of wool and other agricultural products. 7,2 million hectares of land were artificially irrigated in Turke-

stan in the year 1979 (3,148 million in Uzbekistan; 924,000 hectares in Kirghizia; 1,7 million in Kazakhstan; 846,000 hectares in Turkmenistan and 582,000 hectares in Tadzhikistan).

In the year 1983 the total irrigation area was around 8,6 million hectares.<sup>18</sup> It goes without saying that agriculture in these areas largely depends on artificial irrigation. Land development and enlargement of farming areas automatically mean a bigger demand for water, i.e. irrigation. The two rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya have mainly contributed to artificial irrigation. This, however, resulted in a decrease of water influx into the Aral Sea. Consequently, this lake is in the process of drying up. For years now, Soviet irrigation specialists have been trying to find solutions to this problem.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, no measures have been taken to stop the drying out of the Aral Sea which lies in the centre of Turkestan. Within the last 15 years the water level has gone down by nearly twenty feet.<sup>20</sup> During the year 1960, the Aral Sea received around 56 km<sup>2</sup> of water. In 1966 it was only 36 km<sup>2</sup> and in 1978 only 8-10 km<sup>2</sup> were left. Round about 12,000 km<sup>2</sup> of the Aral Sea have dried up by now.<sup>21</sup> Two party officials, Kunayew and Rashidov brought the subject up at the XXV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The resolution had also stated that part of the water of the northern rivers and those of Siberia should be diverted to "Central Asia, Kazakhstan and to the oases of the Wolga River". As a result the "Soyuzwodproject" (Water project of the Union), an organisation of the Ministry for irrigation and water economy of the USSR, including 66 project organisations and institutions, had worked out a project to divert part of the Siberian water to Turkestan. In the year 1978 a conference of the Union had been organised in Tashkent to discuss the question of diverting Siberian water to Turkestan. All participants agreed that these

measures were of vital economic and social importance. Although this problem was presented at the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the above mentioned official, up to this very day, no opportunity has been taken to actually start with the construction work. One of the most important projects was the "Turgay-Variante", which should have been the beginning of the diversion of Siberian water to Turkestan. This project had been approved of by all project organisations and had been classified as being a realistic measure. According to this variant, part of the River Ob is being diverted into the River Irtysh. At this point the actual canal starts where the River Wargay meets the River Irtysh, near the town of Tobol, and eventually the water reaches the Turgay Depression between the rivers Irtysh and Sir Darya. At first the Tengis Reservoir is to be filled up, then the canal is being prolonged from south to west and near the town of Djusali it is to be connected to the River Sir Darya. The project of this canal will be 2,500 km long, roughly 12 m. deep and 120-170 m. wide. In some areas there will be locks which will enable the users to pump the water up to a height of 100 m.<sup>22</sup> The intention is to pump 25 km<sup>3</sup> of water to Turkestan through this canal. The cost of the canal project lies around 22 milliard rubles. After completion it is estimated that the canal will bring a profit of about 4,5 milliard rubles per year and should be completed between 1995 and 2005.<sup>23</sup>

According to the calculations of the irrigation specialists, there will be 25 million hectares of irrigable land in Turkestan alone (excluding Kazakhstan).<sup>24</sup> As far as calculations go there will be 3 million hectares of land to be opened up especially for cotton farming in the Amu Darya area.<sup>25</sup> The water diverted from Siberia should enable the people to develop this agricultural potential. Although, according to specialists of the irrigation field, for

example, K. Lapkin, E. Rahimow and E. L. Zolotorow, the diversion of the water from Siberia cannot stop the drying up of the Aral Sea. Most probably the sea will dry up completely because the water is in reality projected to irrigate the farmland.<sup>26</sup> As a matter of fact, the project of the diversion of the Siberian water does not take the water needed to supply the Aral Sea into consideration.

Water and irrigation specialists believe that water reserves of the River Sir Darya will be exhausted in 1990. Nevertheless the Soviet Russians want to proceed with the project regardless of the fate of the Aral Sea and its climatic conditions, only to utilize the southern regions of the Aral Sea.

The Soviet Russian government wants to utilize the southern Aral Sea area and build 14 Sovkhozses for rice, 11 for cattle rearing, 16 for lucerne and vegetable farming and 2 for horticulture. In order to realise this project 400 million rubles are needed. The cost is amortizable within 6 to 7 years.<sup>27</sup> If, at the end of the day, the Soviet Russian government will realise this vast project, then this will have an intensive colonisation effect, triggered off by the Russians and especially by some European ethnic groups in the Aral Sea area. Soviet economic politics in Turkestan have been of a somewhat exploiting nature, as has been proved. There is no use struggling just to maintain a minimum survival status, even if the communist doctrine preaches a "new building up phase of an economic base for communism?" It is a fact and no exaggeration that the people in Turkestan have to pay, for instance in the Fergana area, the equivalent of 7 U.S. dollars for 1 kg of mutton, 2 dollars for 1 kg of grapes, 2,5 dollars for 1 kg of apples and 8-9 dollars for a chicken.<sup>28</sup> People have to wait in queues here for ages, just in order to get the most necessary items for daily life or to wait for a luxury item they have yearned for, for a long time even if it is on the black market. This, in

fact, is everyday life. The grain producing kolkhozniks in the Soviet Union received 2,13 rubles per hour, but the cotton producing kolkhozniks only got 0,29 rubles per hour and the ones in Uzbekistan only got 0,26 rubles per hour.<sup>29</sup> It is also a fact, most extraordinary though, that the so-called working productivity earns considerably less in the agricultural field than in the industrial area. The kolkhoz members in Uzbekistan earned 24,7 rubles per month less in 1982 than the sovkhos members. The kolkhozniks earn 47,8 rubles less than the industrial workers.<sup>30</sup> The actual sense of this discrepancy should be obvious to anybody. If the industrial and agricultural products of this country do not primarily supply the inhabitants, one can easily figure out that the system is of a colonial nature.

### **Ideological Activities as a Means to Secure Existence of Soviet Regime**

The communist leadership regards its ideological activity as part of its general policy in order to secure the regime. Education of the people within "the spirit of communism" plays a major role in Turkestan, because the intention of the Soviet leadership is to activate the people in continuous measures, to mobilise them to political and economic participation. These ideological activities are intended to make the people believe in the politics of the Soviet Union and in that way, that they feel absolutely dependent on the people who run the state, on the communist leadership and the regime of the Russians. The ideological activity has the additional task to suppress and fight ideas which are contrary to the ideas and politics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Russian regime has also learned that communism has no chance without continuous propaganda and this is true especially in the Turkestan region. According to the words of the first secretary of the communist party of Uzbekistan, Rashidow (who died on 31. 10. 83) the "power of the communist belief consists

of the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism".

Many well organised propaganda specialists from Russia are to be found in Turkestan. Apart from the usual means of spreading their ideology (radio, television, journals, newspapers, posters, films, literature and so on) these propaganda specialists work amongst the people as so-called "mediators for the ideas of the Communist Party to the work force". There are 270,000 propaganda specialists in Uzbekistan and 6,500 lecturers of the Communist Party Committees.<sup>31</sup> There are around 234,000 agitators and about 102,000 informants in Kazakhstan.<sup>32</sup> In Turkmenistan there were more than 16,300 teachers as agitators, apart from their teaching; more than 3,300 as political informers and 2,300 as propaganda specialists.<sup>33</sup> In Kirghizia there are about 27,000 propaganda specialists.<sup>34</sup> This "Army of Propagandists" work according to their orders as a "brain-washing machine" within the population. It is obligatory for the population to listen to the lectures of the propaganda specialists, after working hours, according to the demand of the Soviet authorities (Party organisations, Soviet executive committees, Young-Communist-Organisations, collective farm committees and trade unions).

The sectors for ideological activities are extensive. One of the tasks is to fight against the national traditions of Turkestan, if they are not in keeping with the communist way of thinking. According to the 1st secretary of the C.P. of Kirghizia, Usubaliyew, special steps were taken to get rid of the remainder of those dangerous traditional customs, especially religious.<sup>35</sup>

The Communists are trying intensively to get rid of the influence of the "bourgeois ideology". In recent times the scientific and journalistic treatment of the Soviet Russian Turkestan-politics in the West and the infiltration of western critical thoughts about Turkestan has made Soviet ideologists panic. Up till now the Communists have tried to show that all foreign thoughts insomuch as they are against Moscow's

Turkestan-politics, are simply a "falsification of the history of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan, and of the Leninist nationality policy". The Communists defend themselves up to the present day by their numerous publications, and reports on the radio in the Soviet Union and also abroad against the "bourgeois, imperialist, anti-Soviet, nationalist reactionary and hostile ideological diversions", especially concerning Turkestan. It is a task of the future for the West to do research work on Soviet ideas about "Falsification".

However, it appears to be necessary to remind everybody that in the seventies of the 20th century an "All-Union-Council for the problems of foreign ideological tendencies" has been formed by the Academy of Science of the USSR. Afterwards the "scientific council for problems of foreign ideological tendencies" was formed by the Academy of the Soviet Republics in Turkestan. These so-called "Scientific Councils" have the task to register all forms of ideologies from abroad, including Anti-Communist-Movements and the different opinions about the "Soviet Central Asian and Kazakhstan regions". Additionally, they have the task to defend themselves and to produce various materials for the authorities concerned with ideology for the "revealing of bourgeois falsifications of the history of Turkestan". On April 26th 1972 the first conference of this "council" took place in Ashkhabad where the speakers tried to refute all opinions foreign countries have about Turkestan.<sup>36</sup> On December 21st 1978 another conference took place in Ashkhabad, the topic was "some questions concerning the present ideological fight" (*Nekotorye woprosy sowremennoy ideologitscheskoy bor'by*). The object was to criticise, again, the questions of the so-called bourgeois falsification of the Leninist nationalities politics of the communist party. The participants tried to interpret the Soviet Russian policy in Turkestan, subject to their own view. The result was

that the Soviet Union did not even want to hear about the foreign ideas about russification, the fate of the national culture and the colonisation of Turkestan. It was demanded to keep on fighting the "bourgeois falsifiers of the history of Central Asia".<sup>37</sup>

On December 27th 1979 the Academy of Science of Uzbekistan and the Ministry for High Schools and the Special Middle Schools of Uzbekistan in Tashkent organised a conference with the topic: "Questions of immediate interest concerning the ideological fight at the present stage and the task of the Science of Society in Uzbekistan". 13 lectures were held which have already been published in Russian.<sup>38</sup> From these publications one can see that the Soviet Russians wanted to justify all their statements and actions concerning their interventions in Turkestan, without regarding facts which had been criticised by western authors. "The problem of falsification of socialist realities in Central Asia and Kazakhstan" was expressly mentioned at the Communist Party Congress in Turkestan — January/February 1981 and suitable resolutions have been put forward. The Soviet Russians regarded the handling of the Turkestan problem by foreign countries, as enemy propaganda. The secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, Gapurow, said amongst other things, in his statement of accounts, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan had declared measures against enemy propaganda, in order to uncover these enemy actions. This was in January 1979. In the resolution of the congress it was mentioned that "our ideological enemies have to be actively uncovered".<sup>39</sup> During one item of the resolution of the XV Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, it was mentioned: "The fight against the bourgeois and maoistic ideology must be enforced".<sup>40</sup> Rashidow said in his statement of accounts at the XX Congress of the Communist

Party of Uzbekistan amongst other things: "It is necessary to uncover the lies and defamations of the bourgeois falsifiers, and to convey the truth about the Soviet Russian way of life to the people of this earth".<sup>41</sup> The Congress resolution of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan demanded: "All political ideological workers of the Communist Party have to fight a decisive battle, against the imperialist and ideological diversions and against the anti-soviet-chiki".<sup>42</sup> The Soviet Russians have the intention to fight on against the so-called "falsifiers". This one can see from the resolution of the meeting of party activists of Uzbekistan (all party and government officials as well as all university teachers took part) on March 11th 1981: "The work to uncover all bourgeois falsifications has to be increased, with all means of propaganda and agitation".<sup>43</sup>

In the year 1983, this demand reached its climax after February 16th/17th 1983 when the "scientific" conference in Tashkent had taken place. The conference was about "*The fraternal solidarity of the peoples of the USSR in the period of developed Socialism*". There was a work section; "the development of national relations and the present ideological fight" where 12 lectures were held concerning the "falsification of the Soviet Nationality-Politics, Islam-Politics in general, and of Turkestan particularly".<sup>44</sup> The main stress of the Soviet activities does not only lie in the fight against the ideology from abroad, but also the fight against nationalism in Turkestan. It is no secret to anybody, not even to the Soviet Russians, that there is a great national movement in Turkestan. The main aim of the national movement in Turkestan, is at present, the fight for the existence of the people as such, the resistance against russification and the conveyance of pre-tsarist and pre-Soviet national intellectual culture to the young generation, preservation of national customs and religious beliefs as well as intensifying tradi-



tional family life. The Soviets regard this as a "national separation" or as "limited".

Concerning this it said in the resolution of the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan: "We must criticise any national limitation."<sup>15</sup> By the way, according to the Soviets "nationalism is the weapon of ideological diversion of the western powers."<sup>16</sup>

(to be continued)

<sup>1</sup> *Naselenie SSSR* (Population of USSR), Moscow 1980, pp. 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> See: *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenia 1970 goda. Natsionalny sostav naselenia SSSR* (Results of the overall Union census of the year 1970. National distribution of the people of USSR, Moscow 1973, pp. 202-210, 223-31, 284-89, 295-98, 306-310.

<sup>3</sup> For more see: "Westnik Statistiki", Journal, Moscow 1980, No. 9-10.

<sup>4</sup> "Westnik Statistiki", 1980, No. 9, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> "Westnik Statistiki", 1980, No. 2, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> "Woprosy Ekonomiki", Journal, Moscow 1978, No. 8, p. 39.

<sup>7</sup> "Sowet Ozbekistany", Newspaper, Tashkent 4/2/1981, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Turkmenistan Ilimler Akademiyesining Habarlari. Jemigiyetchilik Ilmlerining seriyesi*, Journal, Ashkhabad 1984, No. 2, p. 91. Concerning the problem of the demographic development of Turkestan see also: Baymirza Hayit, *Some thoughts on the problem of Turkestan*, Cologne 1983, pp. 9-19; W. I. Kozlow, *Natsionalnosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskiy obzor* (Nationalities of USSR. Ethnodemographical survey), Moscow 1982, 303 pp.

<sup>9</sup> "Sowet Ozbekistany", 24/2/1981, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", Journal, Tashkent 1981, No. 2, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> "Osteuropa", Journal, Aachen, 1979, No. 9, p. 715-6.

<sup>12</sup> "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda", Newspaper, Alma-Ata 4/2/1981; "Turkmenskaya Iskra", Newspaper, Ashkhabad 17/1/1981; "Sowet Ozbekistan" 4/2/1981; "Sowetskaya Kirgiziya" 23/1/1981 (Newspaper, Frunze); "Kommunist Tadzhikistana", Newspaper, Dushanbe, 26. 1. 1981.

<sup>13</sup> "Kazak Edebiyati", Newspaper, Alma-Ata, 6/2/1981.

<sup>14</sup> "Kazakhstan Kommunisti", Journal, Alma-Ata 1984, No. 4, p. 40.

<sup>15</sup> "Khlopkowodstwo", Journal, Moscow 1981, No. 1, p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> "Sowet Ozbekistany", 29/1/1981, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1981, No. 2, p. 21.

<sup>18</sup> "Khlopkowodstwo", 1984, No. 4, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> For more see: Baymirza Hayit, *Die Wirtschaftsprobleme Turkestans* (The Economic problems of Turkestan), Ankara 1968, pp. 109-110.

<sup>20</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1979, No. 2, p. 16.

<sup>21</sup> "Ozbekistanda ijtmali fanlar", Journal, Tashkent 1978, No. 10, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1979, No. 2, p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> "Ozbekistan adabiyati va san'ati", Newspaper, Tashkent, 1/4/1983. See also: Philip P. Micklin, *Soviet Water Diversion Plans for Kazakhstan and Central Asia*, in "Central Asian Survey", Oxford, 1983, No. 4, pp. 9-43.

<sup>24</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1979, No. 2, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> "Khlopkowodstwo" 1981, No. 3, p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> "Ozbekistanda ijtmali fanlar", 1981, No. 1, p. 63.

<sup>27</sup> "Ozbekistanda ijtmali fanlar", 1981, No. 2, p. 64.

<sup>28</sup> "Die Welt", Newspaper, Bonn, 2. 12. 1980, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> "Khlopkowodstwo", 1981, No. 3, p. 15.

<sup>30</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1984, No. 6, p. 45.

<sup>31</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1981, No. 2, pp. 38-39.

<sup>32</sup> "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda", 5/2/1981.

<sup>33</sup> "Turkmenistan Kommunisti", Journal, Ashkhabad, 1980, No. 11, p. 82.

<sup>34</sup> "Sowetskaya Kirgiziya", 21/1/1981, p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> "Sowetskaya Kirgiziya", 21/1/1981, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> "Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoy SSR. Seriya obshchestvennykh Nauk", Journal, Ashkhabad, 1972, No. 3, pp. 94-95.

<sup>37</sup> For more about this conference see: *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Turkestanskoy SSR. Seriya obshchestvennykh Nauk*, 1979, No. 2, pp. 93-94.

<sup>38</sup> "Ozbekistanda ijtmali fanlar", 1980, No. 3, pp. 9-92.

<sup>39</sup> "Turkmenskaya Iskra", 30/1/1981, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda", 8/2/1982, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> "Ozbekistan Kommunisti", 1981, No. 2, p. 43.

<sup>42</sup> "Kommunist Tadzhikistana", 30/1/1981, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> "Ozbekistan Madaniyati", Newspaper, Tashkent, 13/3/1981, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> See also: "Sowet Ozbekistany", 17/2/1983, p. 1-3; 18/2/1983, p. 1-2.

<sup>45</sup> "Turkmenskaya Iskra", 30/1/1981, p. 2.

<sup>46</sup> See: O. Redzhepowa, *Nationalism-orudie-ideologicheskikh diwersii* (Nationalism as an ideological diversion), in "Turkmenskaya Iskra", 27/1/1981, p. 2.