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Uighur Literature: The Antecedents

Dr. Eden Naby
HARVARD University

With the administrative division of the population of Central Asia into ethnic groupings during the early twentieth century, much energy was devoted to the development of separate cultures for the major ethnic groups living in the area. Although most of the groups fall within the Turkic language family, smaller groups such as Iranians and Mongols faced similar problems. The problem in creating antecedents for newly separated cultures stemmed from the common underpinnings of local culture which were strongly influenced by religion. For the Turkic and Iranian peoples of the area, the religious influence on culture was Islamic and therefore tied closely to general Middle Eastern culture. Additionally, educated persons of sedentary Turkic culture were steeped in Persian literature. Thus sedentary Turkic cultures, from those of the Azerbaijanis to the Uzbeks to the Uighurs faced a twofold problem: to extract Turkic culture from Iranian cultures. Added to these formidable problems arose a third: how to deal with the antecedents to contemporary culture. In this paper, I would like to examine the case of the Uighurs in China who, having passed through several cultural phases, have established the structure for the development of a modern literature and have now begun the task of gathering together the antecedents to that literature.

Establishing the Uighur Literary Antecedents

Uighurs are the major eastern extension of the Turkic speaking people and form the major Turkic population of China. To the roughly seven million living in China, may be added another

220,000 scattered in and around Alma Ata, Frunze and Tashkent who have settled in the Soviet Union as refugees from China. Asia recognized nationality of certain political significance in the Sino-Soviet border dispute, Soviet Uighurs enjoy some opportunity for cultural autonomy. Their importance to this study lies in the insights that comparing Soviet Uighur treatment of the cultural heritage with that of the Uighurs in China provide.

In examining Uighur literary heritage studies, I have relied on two works of recent publication without, in this study, attempting to trace the historical development of the heritage issue during the entire Communist period since 1949 or drawing comparisons with the period of the 1930s. The dearth of available Uighur publications from the 1930s and the intervening political dislocations caused by secessionist movements and the imposition of Communist Chinese rule in East Turkestan make the contemporary period the only a time of relative calm, in recent history, that allows the opportunity for Uighurs to produce cultural materials.

Naby: condensed version of London paper

The first Uighur work here examined is the compilation *QADIMI UIGHUR YAZMA YADGARLARIQLARDIN TALLANMA* (A Collection of Ancient Uighur Written Remains) published in Urumchi in 1984¹. The work is compiled by three Uighurs trained in Beijing (Abiduqayum Khoja, Tur-sun Ayup and Israpil Yusup) and appears in a large printing of 12,400 copies. Included in the 417 pages are descriptions and translations beginning with the Orkhon inscriptions down through Manichaean, Buddhist and Nestorian religious writings as well as

discussions of the origins of the Oguz Nama, especially the 13th century Turpan manuscript of which the only known copy in the Uighur script is at the Bibliatheque Nationale.

The orientation of the compilers is historically linguistic. They are competent in analysis of the pre-Islamic Uighur alphabet, (based on Aramaic through a Sogdian intermediary) that was in use for eastern Turkic from the 9th through the 17th century². Other than a few photo reproductions of inscriptions and scrolls, no original facsimiles the original materials into the contemporary Uighur alphabet. In providing line by line translations of samples of various written remains, the editors apparently have in mind the literate Uighur lay person who, prior to this work, had no single available source of information about the Uighur cultural heritage in his own language. To interest their audience in the transcriptions, the editors have painstakingly worked out an extensive (48 page) glossary of terms. Interestingly, other than facsimiles or originals of the ancient works, the editors relied only on Chinese authors writing on these subjects. None of the expensive Western analysis on this subject was apparently available, possibly for linguistic reasons.

The second Uighur anthology aims at introducing the past literary heritage to contemporary Uighurs. **UIGHUR KLASIK ADABIYATIDIN NAMUNALAR** (Specimens from Classical Uighur Literature) was published in Urumchi in 1981. It is among the first publications to appear during the politically relaxed period in recent Chinese history. Its influence may be measured in part by the large first issue (25,000) and by the fact that it can be seen even in village homes³. The compilers of the work, Tiypjan Aliyop and Rahmitulla Jari, provide a ten page introduction (penned by Jari), brief introductions to seventeen authors or works, and samples of the writing that are accompanied by translation into the contemporary literary vernacular. All of the writing, whether from the widely known 11th century **DIVAN-E LUGHAT-E TURK** or lyrical verse from the 19th century poet Tajalli, appear in the officially sanctioned modified Arabic alphabet of today.

The **UIGHUR KLASSIK..** differs from the **QADIMI UIGHUR..** in that it includes works that have been a part of the living tradition of Uighurs. These works are all from the Islamic period. Unlike the Orkhon inscriptions or Buddhist cave scrolls, the literate and even many among the non-literate are familiar with the forms and the Naby: condensed version of London paper content of the writing. Contemporary writers often write in the same arudh (prosody)

and the images and metaphors of the Islamic past form the main base of present culture. From their reference in the introduction to the harmful influence of the "Gang of Four"⁴, the editors apparently wish to restore to legitimacy not only pride in Uighur culture but also individual writers who criticized the Chinese conquest of Central Asia. Inclusion of Mulla Bilal (1823-1899) and in particular mention of his work **KITAB-E GHAZAT DAR MULK-E CHIN** (The Book of Rebellion in China), based partially on his own experiences as participant in the 1867 rebellion against the Chinese, marks the legitimization of this author for Uighurs in China⁵. The mention of his book on the 1867 rebellion (associated with the short-lived independent state led by Yu'qub Beg (d. 1876)) has opened the way for the future publication of this book in China, access to which had long been available in the West since it was published by N.N. Pantusov⁶.

In non-western cultures, literary histories and anthologies are a hallmark of national consciousness, if not in the sense of political consciousness, then certainly as indicators of cultural separateness (and equality or superiority). Given the unimportance of nationalism among politically uninvolved people in traditional Muslim culture, the scramble to establish national cultural turf may be taken as both an indication of the cultural significance of the administrative division of Central Asian people and a reaction against the chauvinism of the politically empowered majority. Put simply, Uighurs, Tajiks and Uzbeks have needed to justify their cultural autonomy and the value of the continuation of their language and literary traditions by pointing to a rich past. For this reason alone, the anthologies have circulated widely. As in the case of the better known Tajik anthologies, such as that of Sadridin Aini⁷, the Uighur anthologies, particularly the one on the Islamic period, set the parameters for what legitimately can be included in Uighur literary culture. Classroom texts and literary analysis together with the whole range of cultural activities that arise from a literary base such as drama, opera, ballet, historical novels, anniversary celebrations, the naming of buildings, streets, institutions and so forth stems from establishing a cultural heritage. For examples of how entire cultural structures can be built on an established literary base, we need only look at Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and to some extent also Iran and Pakistan. That Afganistan had not been able to draw together an agreed upon cultural heritage made up of the combined cultures of the major traditions of the area. Persian, Pushtu as well as Turkic, probably hindered national con-

sciousness as much as any other social and political factor⁸.

The Periodization of Literature

Naby: condensed version of London paper

The editors of the anthologies here examined, together with most literary historians, organize content chronologically. Periodization of literature, however, means taking one step beyond simple chronology to separate literary production into sections that relate to political and social history. Moreover, in such works milestones in literary history do not simply receive more space and praise, but are accompanied by discussions of the reasons and circumstances under which certain milestones were produced and their effects.

Although periodization originally developed under Hegelian and especially Marxist ideas for historical development, the acceptance of the significance of major shifts in societal paradigms has come into general practice. Broadly speaking, the high literature of the Muslim people has been periodized traditionally into pre-Islamic, Islamic and now also modern or contemporary, meaning secular literature. The rationale for this pattern of periodization lies in the fact that the spread of Islam brought with it two elements basic to subsequent literary output: Arabic prosody ('arudh) and the Arabic alphabet. Modified though both elements were in the Iranian and Turkic linguistic context, nonetheless, they formed the basis of high literature for the millenium following the spread of Islam. Reluctant to accept religion as the basis for periodization, Soviet-oriented scholars of Central Asian literature have either retained simple chronology or they have introduced periodization, that are clearly artificial. These include "old Uzbek" for Chagatay, and the "Uighur-Karluq", and "old Uighur" (as opposed to ancient Uighur, a widely accepted term for the pre-Islamic language) for the language (and dialects) locally known simply as "Turki" on the east and west sides of the Tien Shan throughout the Islamic period. Indeed the use of the term Uighur for the current language of the sedentary Turkic population of East Turkestan is a direct creation of Russian scholars and administrators in Tashkent in 1921 when other ethnolinguistic designations were being made⁹.

Unlike other Central Asian anthologies, which, much like the "tadhkira"s of traditional Muslim society include all worthy contemporary writers, the editors of UIGHUR KLASSIK... anthology pick and choose from the pre-20th century works even among the wide range of authors from which they could draw. Very useful is the biographical account provided for each author. The Uighur an-

thology treats seventeen topics, sixteen of them authors and one, the OGHUZ NAMA, an anonymous work. The following is a list of the writers that are included, their dates and the town or region with which they are associated:

name date place

1. Mahmud al-Kashgari (11th c.) Kashgar
2. Yusup Khas Hajip (11th c.)
3. Ahmad (ibn Mahmud) (12th-13th)
- Yugnaki (4. the Oghuz namah)
5. Ata'i (15th c.) Herat or Balkh
6. Sakkaki (14th/15th c.)
7. Lutpi* (15th c.) Maveralnahr
8. Ali Shir Nawa'i* (1441-1501) Herat
9. Mohammad Amin Khirgati (1634-1724)
10. Zalili (17th-18th c.) southern Xinjiang
11. Nowbati (18th c.) Khotan
12. Abid ur Rahman Nizari (1770-1840) Kashqar
13. Qalandar (19th c.) Khotan
14. Gumnam (19th c.) Kashqar
15. Amir Hussein Suburi (18th-19th c.) Kashqar
16. Mulla Bilal (1823-1899) Khulja
17. Tajalli (1850-1930) Qaghlig

* indicated to be bilingual in "Uighur" (not Uzbek or Turki) and Persian.

All of the writers up to and including Ali Shir Nawa'i appear in sedentary Central Asian anthologies as part of the literary heritage: that is Uzbeks, Afghans, and Tajiks as well as Uighurs lay claim to this great poet and statesman whose father was an Uighur. After Nawa'i, a breaking away of the joint tradition into two parts may be observed. The notable exception to this pattern emerges in the claimed antecedents to SOVIET Uighur literature, where, in apparent deference to the sensibilities of the powerful Uzbeks, Nawa'i is deleted from the Uighur heritage¹⁰.

The editors of the Uighur anthology do not attempt to explain or take note of any sharing of any of this past with the Uzbeks, culturally the most closely related Turkic community to the Uighurs. They also appear oblivious to the fact that, with the exception of the first two writers, al-Kashgari and Hajip, the others up to Ali Shir Nawa'i appear to have made their home in areas other than East Turkestan. Nor do Uzbek accounts of the claimed heritage care to attempt explanations of such facts that might entangle them in questions of the common heritage of the two major sedentary Turkic people. That Nawa'i, clearly the star of Uzbek and Uighur anthologies, lived in present-day Afghanistan appears to be no obstacle to his dominant position in both Uighur and Uzbek literary histories. In fact, he is claimed as be-

ing within the heritage of even the Afghans and the Tajiks despite the fact that his best poetry was written in "Turki" and his lesser poetry in Persian (under the pen-name of Fani)¹¹.

Why does Nawa'i mark such a dramatic turning point in the perception of the development of four major Central Asian literary cultures? Some of the explanation is certainly historical. After Nawa'i, the coming of the Uzbeks to Transoxiana (16th century) marks a break in much of the unity of the area, both cultural and political. The competing Timurids are swept away and replaced by an essentially tribal and partly nomadic, but mainly up-Persianized ruling clique. Moreover, because of the cleavage with Safavid Iran over the issue of Shi'ism, the cultural unity of the area also became upset. Although bilingualism in Persian and Turki continued among urban dwellers, the deciding political role of the Uzbeks plus the diminished cultural role of Iran reduces the role of Persian in Central Asia.

Part of the answer to the pivotal role of the poet certainly lies in his own achievements. The conviction of his contemporaries and followers as well as popular perception held that Nawa'i elevated Turki into a literary language. He made composing in Turki respectable. Thus Turki could aspire to compete with Persian in the area of high literature. Coupled with the emerging political dominance of the Uzbeks and their eventual sedentarization, the high literary niche created for Turki by Nawa'i accounts for what appears to be the beginning of the separation between Persian and Turki culture.

Whatever the answer to questions about the change after the 15th century, it is clear that from the period following the age of Nawa'i the three sedentary cultures of Central Asia follow different paths. Tajik literature relies more heavily upon exchange with the Moghul Persian culture of India, Uzbek literature, after a lapse of some decades, reemerges as a religiously pre-occupied literature appears to lapse into its own reverie, drawing on its own regional resources. After the forceable relocation of many Uighurs from the south to the Khulja area by the Chinese in the 18th century, a new Uighur culture emerges from this nomad-dominated area as well, as represented by Mullah Bilal.

The last entry in the Uighur anthology, that of Tajalli, marks the beginning of another drastic change. For with Tajalli we see the commencement of the introduction of technology even into East Turkestan and the effect of this on culture. Tajalli benefited from three "modernizing" factors: he was able to attend modern schools in India, he benefited from increased travel opportunities, possibly by

train, and he even was able to see his works printed, albeit on lithograph presses, in the Kashgar of the turn of the century¹². These increased opportunities resulted in bringing out some of those attributes of the writers of Central Asia of the time of Nawa'i and before: Tajalli wrote poetry in four languages (Uighur, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani), he was read in west Turkestan as well as East Turkestan, and he was a scientist. His works were published in Tahshkent where they appeared under the penname "Ayar"¹³. He died in 1930, the year in which major political and cultural changes began in his homeland.

Naby: condensed version of London paper

For the editors of the Uighur anthology, the classical period has three turning points: the commencement of Islamic Uighur literature with the *DIVAN-E LUGHAT-E TURK*, the widespread use of Arabic prosody models for the local language, a trend that culminates with Nawa'i, and the turning toward international literary models, especially through the adoption of the prose genre after the 1930s. While it is clear from the catalogue of Uighur manuscripts published in 1957¹³ in China that the sixteen poets included in this anthology do not represent the entire spectrum of classical Uighur literary accomplishment, nonetheless, the editors have offered a glimpse into the little known history of their own literary heritage. In its own modest way, the anthology of classical Uighur culture while at the same time drawing attention to those parts of the culture that are held in common with the other major Turkic culture of the area.

The editors and compilers of these two Uighur anthologies share a concern that the ordinary Uighur not lose his awareness of his past, and pride in that past. They appear to recognize that without a past the future could be lost, particularly when faced with powerful and important civilizations of long heritage. Thus Uighur scholars living in their homeland appear to be devoting themselves to two major tasks: the study of the past and the popularization of that past among their co-ethnics.

FOOTNOTES - NABY

1. This and other publications in Uighur were collected by the writer in Urumchi and Kashgar during a visit in 1985 under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

2. The last known printing done in the old Uighur alphabet was in 1687 and was found among the Sarigh Uighurs of Kansu province. The content was Buddhist. Other texts also date from the Ming period (1368-1644). During the 14 to 15th centuries, other examples also appear throughout sedentary

Turkic areas, probably in the aftermath of Timur's order to go back to the old script. See J. Kalproth, *ABHANDLUNG UND SCHRIFT DER UIGUREN* (Paris, 1820). I am grateful to Kahar Barat (Harvard University) for these details.

3. Personal observation during August 1985 in Uighur villages in East Turkestan.

4. Tiypjan Aliyop and Rahmitullah Jari, *UIGHUR KLASIK ADABIYATIDIN NAMUNALAR* (Urumchi, 1981), p. 1.

5. op. cit., p. 576

6. *VOINA MUSUL'MAN PROTIV KITAITSEV*, 2VOLS. (Kazan, 1880-81). Another local history of 19th c. Muslim wars against the Ch'ing, Mulla Musa Sairami's *TRIKH-I AMNIYYA* is not mentioned in this anthology but he also been published. See Kim Hodong, *THE MUSLIUM REBELLION AND THE KASHGAR EMIRATE IN CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA, 1864-1877* (PhD Thesis, Harvard Universt, 1986) p. xiii.

7. Sadriddin Aini, *NAMUHA-I ADABIYAT-I TAJIK* (3 vols.) (Mascow, 1926). p. 96.

8. The attempt to elevate Rushtu in prestige in opposition to Persian led to forgery of masuscripts that would serve in place of a literary heritage to vie with persian. The best known case is that of Abdul Hai Habibi's production of *PATA KHAZANA* published in Kabul as a literary anthology of the oldest Pushtu poetry some dating to the 12th century.

9. M. R. Ruziev, *VOZROZHDENNYI*

UIGURSKII NAROD (The Rebirth of the Uighur People) (Alma Ata, 1982 (second edition)) Janos Eckman discusses the various designations of pre-mmodern eastern Turkic literary languages in *CHAGATAY MANUAL* (Bloomington, 1966) p. 1-13. Ruziev deals with Uighur literary language but follows the Soviet model in using the term "Uighur" for the Islamic period as well as the pre-Islamic. Allworth (1964) discusses the issue of language designation on page 83, ft. 3.


10. Ruziev does not include Nawa'i and neithr do the articles on Uighur literature in the *BOLSHAIA SOVIETSKAIA ENTSIKLOPEDIA*. In the latter Rabghuzi is included for the 15th century from whence the jump to Khirqati in the 17th century.

11. For limited discussion of Nawa'i within the Afghan cotext, see Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet Afghan Relations", *ASIAN SURVEY* March, 1980. p.

12. Aliyop and Jari, p. 613

13. Yusuf Beg Mukhlisov, ed. *UIGUR KLASSIK EDIBIYATI QOL YAZMILIRI KATALOGI* (Catalogue of manuscripts of Uighur classical literature) mentioned, but not seen by Kim, p. 287. According to Kim, Mukhlisov includes historians in the catalogue. These do not appear in the anthology at hand with the exception of Mulla Bilal who versified parts of his history.

* This is a condensed version of a paper read at the conference, *Central Asia: Tradition and Change* (London, SOAS, April 9, 1987)



THE ROLS OF THE HUI MUSLIMS (TUNGANS) IN REPUBLICAN SINKIANG

*Dr. Andrew D.W. Forbes
University Of Aberdeen*

During the Republican Preiod (1911 - 1949) China's westernmost province of Sinkiang literally "New Frontier". romanisad in Pinyin as "Xinjiang" remained essentially a Chinese Colony in the heart of Central Asia, inhabited by heterogenous Muslim peoples (Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar and Hui) together with smaller, but still significant numbers of non-Muslim peoples (Mongol, Sibo, Solon, Manchu, Russian). Taken together, as recently as the late Republican period, these various "minority" groups compised an estimated 95 % of the total population of Sinkiang, whilst Han Chinese (including politica) exiles and their descendants, poor peasant settlers and administrative officials) made up the remaining 5 %. Thus, according to a survey made by the Siakiang Provincial Police in 1940-41 (and considered by Owen Lattimore to represent "the best available" figures for the late Republican preiod), provincial population estimates by linguistic group were as follows: (1)

Muslim	Non-Muslim
1. Uighur 2941000	8. Mongol 6300
2. Kazakh 319000	9. Sibo
3. Kirghiz 65000	10. Solon 2490
4. Talik 9000	11. Manchu 670
5. Uzbek 8000	12. Russian 13000
6. Tatar 5000	
7. Hui 92000	13. Han 202000

Whilst two of the smaller non-Muslim groups (the Mongols and the Russians) were of economic and social significance in the political fabric of Republican Sinkiang. It is clear that the combined Muslim population - comprising seven "nationalities" and numbering a estimated 3,439,000 (ca. 92 %) of the total population of 3,730,00 - was of overwhelming importance. It is this section of the Sinkiang population which forms the subject of the present paper, and more particularly the question of unity and diversity within the Muslim population with particular reference to the role and position of group 7 in the above table - the Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims, known to their Turkic co-religionists in Sinkiang as Tungani, whence the English term "Tungan", loosely applied to the Hui Mus-

lims of Sinkiang, as distinct from the Hui elsewhere in China.(2)

Within Sinkiang - as, indeed, within the remainder of China - the role and position of the Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims has received relatively little examination, as a result of which various generalisations have come to be accepted and applied, with little variation, to China as a whole. Thus, the writings of earlier Christian missionary researchers such as Broomhall (3) tend to stress the inherent contradictions between Han and Hui, an emphasis continued in the work of the most prolific of contemporary "Sino-Islamicists", Raphael Israeli, who writes persuasively and at length of the "incompatibility of Islam and the Chinese system." (4) Yet it is also apparent that the Hui Muslim population, which may today (1987) number many as 10,000,000 scattered throughout China from Yunnan in the south-west to Heilungkiang in the north-east, and from Sinkiang (East Turkistan) in the north-west to Hainan Island in the south-east, may be as diverse in aspects of its cultural and political heritage as the vast tracts of territory which it spans. Thus, what appears quite "incompatible" in Peking, may very well prove relatively compatible in Kashgar as will be argued in the present paper.

Similar reservations should, perhaps, be applied to more restricted "area studies" of Sinkiang. Thus, although no specific treatise on "Islam in Sinkiang" has yet been written, serious studies of Republican Sinkiang (most notably those of Lattimore, Nyman and Whiting), whilst concentrating primarily to the internal and regional Islamic politics of the province. Taken collectively, these passing references to Islam in Sinkiang (and especially to intra-Muslim relations within the province) tend, perhaps inevitably, to rest on stereotype rather than coherent analysis. Thus Lattimore, a writer of "progressive" sentiment, emphasises the linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity of the Muslim population of Sinkiang, stressing particularly sedentary-nomadic dysfunctions (as exemplified by Uighurs and Kazakhs) as a justification for his dismissive condemnation of "Pan-Turkic nationalism": (5) it need hardly be noted that some Turkic nationalist studies of Republican Sinkiang adopt precisely the opposite standpoint. "papering over" ethnic and cultural disparities which do exist. Whilst emphasising the

Turanian cultural identity of the region. 6 The present writer has argued elsewhere that such analyses are misleading, and that a better understanding of the Islamic politics of Republican Sinkiang may be attained by a study of regional, rather than ethnic, distinctiveness. (7)

Similarly, although Whitin recognises that within Sinkiang the Tungans "seldom enjoyed the full confidence" of their Turkic (and Tajik) fellow-Muslims, and that very often "racial animosities took precedence over religious identification", (8) the role of the Tungans as active supporters of the Chinese policy in Sinkiang has scarcely been elaborated, whilst the unifying force of shared Islamic belief has generally been over-stated and is frequently misunderstood.

Whilst the substance of the present paper is concerned with the role of the Tungans in Republican Sinkiang - between the overthrow of the Ch'ing Empire in 1911 and the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 - it may first be useful very briefly to indicate the position of the Tungans in Sinkiang during the latter half of the nineteenth century, during the great North-Western Muslim Rebellion (1862-78), and during the declining years of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Following the usual pattern for Hui Muslim settlement in North - West China and Yunnan, the Hui of Sinkiang have for many years been linked with the caravan trade and its associated professions (as inn-keepers, halal-butchers, etc.) and with the military calling so despised by the Han in traditional Chinese society, but which has almost come to exemplify the Hui in their role as frontiersmen. Indeed, whilst the Hui are unquestionably Muslim, proud of their position as part of the international Muslim Community (umma) and ways conscious of their spiritual links with the Hijaz, it must not be forgotten that they are also Chinese-speaking, proud of their position as Chinese Muslims, and always conscious of their cultural links with Chinese civilisation. As such, they may act as agents of Sinicisation as well as agents of Islamicisation - and, indeed, this has long been the case within the predominantly Turkic-speaking province of Sinkiang (Eastern Turkistan).

In terms of Sinkiang politics, this dual loyalty (to Islam and, at least when settled beyond the confines of exclusively Han civilisation, to China) has meant that Turkic-speaking Muslim and Chinese-speaking Muslim have rarely shared political aspirations or cultural objectives. Indeed, within Sinkiang, hostility between Turk and Tungan has generally (though not always) outweighed the shared spiritual convictions implied by common membership of the Umma. To put it simply, whilst both Tungan and Turk as Sunni Hanafi Muslims, may pray side-by-side in the same mosque, the predominant Uighur population of Sinkiang (and, to a lesser extent, the Kazah, Kirghiz and other Turkic-speaking groups) have long aspired to autonomy or independence from China, if possible under

their own Turkic-Muslim administration. (9) The Tungan Hui population, by contrast, does not share this perception at all. But - whilst aspiring in spiritual terms to freedom of religious practice - would much prefer to live under a non-Muslim Chinese-speaking Han administration than under a Turkic-speaking Muslim administration.

During Ch'ing times, the diverse political aspirations, of Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslim were best exemplified, in times of peace, by the role of the Hui as military garrison troops, loyal to the Manchu administration. This division was still further apparent in times of war - most particularly during the great North-Western Muslim Rebellion (1862-1878), when Turk and Tungan, having simultaneously but separately thrown off the Ch'ing yoke, not merely failed to cooperate against the advancing armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang, but even engaged in a series of debilitating internecine conflicts until the reassertion of Ch'ing power. (10)

It is noteworthy, too, that the victorious Tso, having crushed the secessionist regime of his main Turkic opponent, Yakub Beg, (11) and having driven his main Hui opponent, Pai Yen-hu, across the frontier to Russian Central Asia, (12) dealt separately with his vanquished Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking opponents. Thus, Turkic-speaking Muslim rebels originating from Sinkiang were treated as subject people who had misguidedly rebelled against Ch'ing authority, who might now - if they lived peacefully in future - might be forgiven; Chinese-speaking Muslim rebels were regarded as traitors to the Chinese polity, however, and as such generally given short shrift.

Yet despite this distinction - and perhaps even because of it - within two decades of Tso's reconquest of the North - West Hui Muslim troops were once again acting as the standard-bearers of Han Chinese authority in Sinkiang. The reason for this was, simply, that not all Hui had been "traitors" to the Ch'ing; indeed, the history of the Hui Muslim rebellions in Kansu, Shensi and Yunnan clearly indicates the presence of serious fissures within Hui society, which the Ch'ing were swift to amplify and to exploit. Thus, whilst the rebel Hui were seen as odious traitors to the Chinese polity who therefore merited extermination, those Hui who cooperated with or assisted the Ch'ing were seen as "good" or "loyal" Hui, properly conscious of their honoured position within the Chinese polity. Indeed, it is even possible that these "good" Hui were seen as paragons of loyalty to China, for despite their outlandish and bizarre religion, which put them on the fringes of Chinese society, they had remained true. Finally, they were excellent soldiers, who generally mistrusted and looked down upon their Turkic-speaking co-religionists. What better material could there be for garrisoning the remote Inner Asian frontiers of China a posting generally so abhorred by the Han?

During Republican times a similar pattern was to

emerge. Thus Yang Tseng-hsin, the first Republican Governor of Sinkiang, rose to a position of authority under the late Ch'ing on the strength of his ability to "manage" the Hui Muslim population of Kansu and Ningsia. Subsequently, in 1908, he was transferred to Sinkiang where he built up a personal power base which rested on his Hui garrison troops, who were the best in the province. In 1911, assisted by these troops, he assumed power in Sinkiang; for the next seventeen years he was to wield absolute authority over China's largest province, rallying heavily for the greater part of this time on his efficient Hui soldiery in the maintenance of Han power over an overwhelmingly Turkic-speaking population. Nor was the role of Yang's Hui supporters limited to the military field - in 1915 Ma Fu-hsing, a Hui Muslim from Yang Tseng-hsin's native Yunnan, was appointed T'ü-t'ai of Kashgar, the second most powerful post in the province. Fu-hsing - who proved to be a man of singular venality and incompetence - ruled over the Uighur heartland of southern Sinkiang until his dismissal and execution by Yang in 1924, and it is noteworthy that his replacement, Ma Shao-wu, who continued the administration of the south until Sheng Shih-ts'ai's seizure of power in 1934, was also a Hui Muslim of Yunnan.

Throughout Yang Tseng-hsin's long period of administration, (13) therefore, his power was sustained by Hui Muslim military troops and Hui Muslim administrators - the first of whom, in Kashgar, was a sadistic incompetent, whilst the second, although a man of honesty and distinction, was characterised by an unswerving loyalty to Nanking. These facts were not lost upon the Turkic-speaking Muslims of southern and western Sinkiang who, as in Ch'ing times, continued to regard the Hui as colonial garrison troops of the Han Chinese, and not at all as Muslim brothers. Only in the Kumul region of Sinkiang's "fars east" did a different perception hold true, and this was because the Uighurs of Kumul Oasis had effectively come to terms with their de facto position within the Chinese polity, and as such rejected the secessionist aspirations of the Kashgarlik and Khotanlik brethren. (14)

Passing over the relatively brief "interregnum" of Chin Shu-jen - who assumed power in Sinkiang between 1928 and 1933, and whose tenure of office was undoubtedly shortened by the simultaneous alienation of both his Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslim subjects (15) we come to the period of Hui or Tungan invasions led by the young Kansu Hui warlord, Ma Chung-ying. It is in these invasions that we find, perhaps, our clearest indication of the traditional relationship between Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslims within Sinkiang. Thus, although Ma Chung-ying ostensibly commenced his invasion of Sinkiang "in the name of Muslim brotherhood" to help the Muslims of Kumul, (16) it is in fact clear that Is-

lam played little or no part in his thinking. Rather, Ma was acting as a typical Chinese warlord who happened to be Muslim. Accordingly, his troops supported KMT 36th Division insignia, and whilst he strongly denounced his arch-rival Sheng Shih-ts'ai for attempting to betray Sinkiang to the Soviet Union, he had no time for the Muslim secessionist camps in Kashgar and Khotan, and paid them scant attention. Only subsequently, when his forces retreated into southern Sinkiang in the face of the Soviet attack of 1934, did Ma turn his attention to the secessionist "Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan", and then his policy was decisively to crush it, driving the Turkic-Muslim administration out of Kashgar and restoring Ma Shao-wu China's representative in the far west. The Komin-tang flag was raised in Kashgar, protestations of loyalty to the Chinese Republic were telegraphed to Nanking, Turkic secessionists were hunted down, executed and - to the horror of the Kashgarlik Uighurs - Sun Yat-sen's portrait was raised in the 'Id-Gah Mosque'. In short, Chung-ying made it quite clear that his first loyalty (beyond loyalty to himself and, perhaps, the "Wu Ma" warlord clique) was to China, and that he regarded the Soviet Union and the Turkic secessionists almost equally as his enemies. Of "Muslim brotherhood" little or nothing was said.

This pattern was also continued between 1934 and 1937, when - in defiance of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and his Soviet sponsors - a separate Hui fief was set up in the Khotan region. It has been argued by Nyman and Aubin - students of Chinese Islam whose conclusions are generally most reliable - that this Hui fief of "Tunganistan" was sustained by a "spirit of militant Islam": yet such was manifestly not the case. Rather as I have argued elsewhere, (17) "Tunganistan" represented a typical petty Chinese Warlord regime transferred from Kansu to China's far west, where Hui Muslim troops (sporting KMT flags and insignia, and employing Chinese as the language of administration) served the Chinese polity (and themselves) as colonial rulers over Turkic-speaking Muslim subjects.

Yet, given the traditional relationship between Turkic-speaking and Chinese-speaking Muslim in Sinkiang, the attitude of Ma Chung-ying and the policies of the rulers of "Tunganistan" can have come as no surprise to the Turkic-speaking peoples of Sinkiang. Had not Sabit Damullah, Prime Minister of the secessionist "Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan", denounced the Hui in the same way, and at the same time, as the Hans in his "Independence address":

The Tungsans are no less our enemy than the Han Chinese... Neither the Hui Chinese nor the Tungsans have any legitimate claim to Eastern Turkestan. We, the People of Eastern Turkestan, no longer need foreigners to be our masters. (18)